CHAPTER -IV

MATERIALISM AND THF: CONCF:PT OF PF:RSON

In this clwptt:r I would discuss difkrenl views of" lht: concept of pt:rson. It may

be helpful lo discuss I he views of' J{cnt' I ksc:1rlt'S. 1\nll.':lronp. nnd PF Strmv~:on i11

order to explicate tlJe COIH.:epts of person. ·1 have discussed in the previous chapters

Dualism. behaviourism and itkntily tht:ory. The problems or mind ami its relationship

with the body have been carefully considered.

All these theories of mind are in a way theories of person whose mind and

body theorists are talking about but in different ways. Physical events and" mental

events occurred, and we may call these events 'experiences' for short. And truly we

have consciousness of these' experiences. Thus, the questions arise as to what is the

owner of these experience? What is conscious when such experiences occur? When

'there is some event, there is something that is conscious of these happenings. So what

sorts of things have consciousness, What is _t_~~-subject or consciousness? One pretty

indisputable case is that of persons or human beings. But what is a person?

215

'lh.:re me various themiL'S concerning the llll'lltalevcnts (consciousness) which

fi.lll into tlm.:e basic categories. There is the view that suth events happen to purely

IJOilllJalerial things. Propom:nls or such a vk~v liSt!aUy mlmil the existence or purely

material things; hence they arc called dualists secondly, there is the view that they

happen to purely material things: we may call this m<Jicrialism. And thirdly, there is

the view that they happen to things which arc neither purely material nor purely non­

material, we shall call this the theory of person. Apart from t!wse, there is also a view

that persons arc both mind and body, and we may call this common sense belief.

This chapter can be divided into the following ways:

I. The view that persons me hoth lllind and hody, (conJIIJOII ~;ense hclief).

2. The view that Persons arc mind (Dualist's view of' person).

3. The view that persons arc body (Physicalism).

4. The view that persons are the subjects to which both mental attributes and physical

attributes can equally be ascribcd.(Strawsonian concept of person)

Let me start with the common sense belief that persons are both mind and

body. When a layman thinks about 'what a person he is', he might not think of

anything else but his body and mind and thereby concludes that 'he is both a body and

a mind'. Ordinarily, our every day language includes the talk of someone as, for

example, bodily strong built but without much thought; sometimes as slender but very

216

cunning. And we also sometimes talk ot' a bald headed man to he a wise man. so on

and so f(xth. When we make a propositional statement, the subject is predicated in

mental or physical lt:nns. and smnl'!i1nes in hoth tcm1s. Whe11 we talk ahoul a

'person', we ordinarily talk about his mind or his body or both. We hardly make such

u sharp contradistinction bctwccn thc pcrson on th<..: on<..: hand. and his mind and his

body on the other hand. It seems to he that this is done only in the field of' philosophy.

And common pcopk might nev~.:r thought that their 'persons' to be something

different from their minds or bodies. And sometimes when we ask them "who they

are", they might not have anything to say more than their minds and bodies. In this

way, it seems, therefore, that the common sense helicl's hold person to he both mimi

and body.,

The comnwn sense beliefs or the concept or person an; not presented in a form

of philosophical argument, but in the way layman would ordinarily thinks about

himself and others, and it seems this is enough for the common sense view on the

concept of person. In short, a person is both a thinking thing and an extended thing.

But this sort of view is seriously in contradiction with the dunlist's position.

I would disc:.:uss Descartes's position 011 the:.: C:.:OII<..:<.:pt of' pc:.:rson and other like

minded philosophers that 'Persons and minds'. I kscarlcs holds that the subject of'

consciousness is the 111i1H.I ami that th<..: 111i11d is a thi11g or e11tity separate and distin<..:t

from the body. In seems to be:.: that l(lr Descartes the notion ftf person means the same

217

us the subject of consciousness. The body is a thing or entity whose essence is

occupying space, that is, having shape. size. and location in ·space. and it is in no sense

conscious. The mind, on the other hands, is compktcly dif'lcrcnt in its natun:. It is

utterly non-spatial, having neither shape. size, nor location. Its essence is simply

consciousness, that is thought, feelings, memories, perceptions, desires, emotions etc.

For Descartes, it is the mind itself which is conscious or the mental event. It follows

that the person may continue to exist even arter his 'body perishes in death.

According to Descartes, person is a mind. The essence of person consists

wholly in his being a thinking thing, that is. mimi. hut not a body. For him, it seems as

though the essence of body is wholly excluded from the essence of person because he

is a thinking thing. Let us sec what he said in hi~; n1editation II. "But what, then Hill I'!

A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that

doubts, understands {conceives), uflirms, denies wills, rcl'uscs, that imagines also, and

perceives".' Again, he also said, "Thinking is another allrihutc of the soul (mind); and

here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I

am - I exist: this is certain as often as I think ... if I should wholly cease to think, that

i should at the same time altogether cease to be. 2 Regarding his body, he said, "I

thought that 1 possl!ss a countcnanct:, hands, arms and all the fabric of members that

1 Descartes, Ml'tlitatin11 II, p.l2 2 Ibid, p. 32.

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upp~ars in th~ cmpsc, and \\hich I call hy the name of body", and "Now it is plain that

I am not the assemblage of 'members called the human body.3

Descartes holds that since the mind and the body me separate entities, each can

exist without the otlu.:r. lie 111aint;1ins ;1 1cnl distinction hctw~.:en 111i11d and hody. Lvcn

though he knows that he possesses ;1 hody, his hody is not im:lud~.:d among the

essential properties of his fJC'rsoll-hood (thinl.;ing thing). Fwn if some parts of his body

are taken away, he is not deprived of" anything. lie taller said in his sixth meditation,

"It is certain that I (that is. my mind, by "vhich I am what I am) is entirely and truly

distinct from my body, and may exist without it. 4 It is obvious and undeniable that

Descartes is at least correct in holding that some material objects do indeed exist

without minds. Ikscartes hil!lsdf" hclieves that anin1als (otl.lcr than nwn) were also

examples of hmlies without mind. Some pcoplc might not agree with him there, ami

there would he even 11101e disagree111e11t with his thesis that n1inds could exist without

bodies. lkscartes bdieved that minds were iniiiHlrlal, that they continue to exist as

disembodied minds even alter the body has jlerishe<.! jn death.

There seems to be an important gap in Descartes' account, a gap which can be

noted in the summary given. From the fact that the essence of the mind is one thing,

having consciousness, and the essence of the body is anotl_1:_r, occupying space, it docs

J /hid. p. 31. 4 /hid, p. 56.

219

not however, follow that the mind and the body are two separate entities in the real

world as stone and water. The distinction between mind and body seems to be perhaps

only rational, but not actual. What is to rule out the possihility that one and the same

thing can have both Illest: propt:rlies, he both a thinking thing and at tht: same time an

extended 'thing? The essence or being a husband is heing a married 111an ami the

essence of being a parent is having oiT springs, but <.)ne and the same person can be

h<)th a husband iliHI a parL'Ill (and, ohvioll.•dy, c:111 hl' Olll' witho111 hci11g llll' oilier). lhi~;

gap in Descartes' reasoning was lirst pointed out by Spinoza, who had been a follower

of Descartes. Spinoza realised that "although two attributes may he com.:dved as r~..:ally

distinct'', and here he has in mind thinking and extension, "we cannot nevertheless

thence conclude that they constitute two beings or two different substances.5 Then

breaking decisively with Descartes, Spinoza went on to maintain that in the case or

human beings (and, as a matter of fact, for Spinoza, in everything as well), both

thinking and space occupancy were characteristics or one and the same thing.

Uoing back to I kscartes, thcrt: is a question as to how tht: mani lcstations of

consciousness arc related to the pl1ysical attributes which also belong to persons.

' According to A.J. Ayer, the answer that would still be most acceptable to common

sense, at least when it is made to consider the question in these terms is that the

relation is contingent, not logical, but only factual. In philosophy this view is mainly

associated with Descartes, if he did not originate it, he put it forward in the clearest

5 Spinoza, Ethics, part I, prop x, note (Philosophic Classics). p. 113.

220

und wH:umpt·omisitlg way. lh~ vkw is that a person is a combination ol' two separate

et1tities, a body and a n1ind or soul.< lnly the tllind is co11s~ious, till.! physical properties

which a pt:rson h:~:> ;11e properliv:; ol l1i·; body. I he two L'lltities ;n·c sep;11;1te i11 thL·

scnsl..! tha't th~rc is no logical collllL'l'liult hl'IWL'ell then I. i\ccurding to I kscarlL's's

VIL'W, it is concl'iV;Ihk th:1t citlwr siJ,11dd l":ht withnill tilL· other; th:~t is tiiL~re IS 11i1

lhnn anybody at aiL ami equally till eontradil·tion in supposing llwta pcrsotl's body is

animated hy SlllllL' other mind, til' tlol hy :llty tllit1d :tl :ill. This does llol. however,

L'Xt:ltttk !Ill' possibility or tiJLTL' !Jritlg L':tlls:d l'Oillli . .'L'tion hl'l\\'L'l'll tiJctll: So tltat L'\'ell ir

they are separable in prineipll', there m:1v sJ.ill he groumls" l'or holding that they :trc

inscparabk in 1;1el.h

Descartes lli1nsclr prejudged this question hyde lining the mind as a suhst:n1ce,

which implied, in his usage, that its existence was causally as well as logieally

intl!..!pendent or the existencc or the hotly. nut this view that the mind is a suhstanee is

not entailed by the view that mind and body are logically distinct. Now it would he

CO!llpatibk With this sort or duaJislll to rL·jecl the llolioll or llll'lll;tl SllbSI:IIIl'l' ;tltogetlll'r

and cotH.:civc ol' the mind in difll:rcnt ways, hut not as a suhstancc.

Whatever may be the attraction~: or this dualistic view for common sense, the

tendency of some philosophers has been to try to replace it by some form or monism.

1' 1\..1. Ayer, 71w Concl'fJI o{a l'a.wm and Other L1·.1a_rs. pp. 82-83.

221

For example, Berkeley, who hold that physical objects wen: collections of sensible

qualities which were dependent I(H· their ex istencc upon hL;ing pnreiwd (to he is to he

perceived), anu lllune who saw no grounds ror holding that anything cxistcd hul

sensory, impressions and the idea which copied them, may both he regarded, in their

different ways, as having tried to cffecl the reduction of body to mind. 7 Now if the

mind is regarded as a substance, the question arises how such a substance could ever

be identified. If it is regarded as a collection of sensory impressiori.s or experiences,

there is the problem, to which llumc himself confessed that he could sec no answer, of

showing how the collection is united. What is it that makes a given experience a

member of one such collection rather than another? With any view of this type, there

is also problem of itkntifying tlw experiences themselves. According to J\..1. J\yl!r. In

the ordinary way, we idcJJiily e.xpL·rienn·:; in ln111~; of' IIIL' pcrson~; who~;c L'Xpericncc

they arc; but clearly this will lead to a vicious cin.:k if' persons themselves arc to h<:

analysed in terms of their experiences. X

Even John Locke holds that person is a mind. llcrc we must understand by the

term 'person' is meant something incorporeal, not physical. lie defined the term

'person' as "a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and rcllcctiun, ami can

consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places, which it

docs only by that consciousness which is inseparahk from thinking and essential to

------- ... ·-----··-·-·

7 !IJid., p. 83. K Ibid., p. 84.

222

it". Further. "as htr as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action

or thought, so h1r reaches the identity of person".9

llc also writes that. ''I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same

person and the same JlHIIl stand fi11· one and the same thing". Yet he believes that these

two expressions stand for quill' distinct itkas. "Person" having to do with a rational

self and "Man" having to do sintply wit It a L:ertain sort of living organisn1. i\ rational

parrot. he argued, would not he calk:d a man, nor would a non-rational human he

called anything but a man. The fonm:r. hdw"Z:iler. mjght be a person, while the latter,

failing in rationality, might not he. ;\ person. then. is not a rational man. since "man"

has rl'll.·rl'lll"l' to coqH,n·;tl fillltt, illtd tlti·; i~; not ;1~; Itt' .'iit\V il. pml of'lhc lltl'allillg ol'

"Person" at all. But he then inferred that "l'uson" tllllSI dcnolt.: soJIIcthing im:orporcal

and indeed invisible. This deviates from common usage to the extent that accon.ling to

one entry in a standard dictionary "person" means "the bodily form of a human

being". We speak of someone as being "comely of person" and of physical assaults as

"crimes against the person", but neither usage is conveyed in Locke's explication. For

him, identity of person was simply identity of consciousness, so that I remain the same

person if I am conscious of being f>O, even though my body should change drastically

and be diminished through age, disease, or amputation. 10 Thus, according to Locke, it

is logically possible ror SOillCIIIll: to rcllt:till the s:lltll' IWrson l'Vl'll in tlw discnJhodicd

9 John Locke, Essays Conc.:erninR lfuman UnderstandinR. Cambell Fraser (ed.), Oxford, 1894, 1.3ook 2. 10 Paul Edwards, The Enc:vclopaedia ofPhilosophr. Vol. 5-6. pp. I Il-l 12.

223

state. It can, then.:ll.m:, be regarded that the idea of a person losing a part of himscl f as

impossible: Persons arc indivisible. the expression 'partlifa person' being "a manifest

absurdity".

Assuming the possibility !hal persons an: 111inds lh~:n.: an.: so1111: prohkn1s ld"l

with us. lt is dualist theory which gives us to the idea of mental suhst;1nce. By

substance it is l1en.:hy understood as tiling, entity, stu IT. clc, which has an independent

existence <lf its own: lh:1t whil·h does nul dqwnd liH· ils t·xist~·nn· 1111 anylhin).'. l'lsl·. II"

that is so, then how can a mind. which is 1111 independent substance, be the subject of'.

and owner of experiences which also illcludcd the physical events? If the person is a

composition or two integral parts - mind ami hody. he must be the subject or both

mental and physical events, slates and processes. By·du;Jiist's definition, however, the

person being a thinking thing (mind) cannot he a material body and. therefore, cannot

also be the subject or owner of the bodily ewnts, processes ami states. It is for this

reason that the dualist account of person as mind cannot he upheld.

Again, another source of discontent with dualism was that it seemed to commit

us to the existence of a very peculiar kind of entity, a something which persists in

time, has states, undergoes changes, and engages in processes, and yet invisible,

intangible, without size or shape or mass. It is a curious something; it docs not seem

intelligible that there should he such a thing. Nothing can be said about it except that it

is a subject of consciousness! And even that docs not make explicitly clear what it is.

224

If-the persons were minds. there are still some diniculties about identification

and individuation. The problems of identilication eom:en1s how we can tell \vhen we

arc in the presence or some other mind 1\ rather than B or even in the presence of any

other mind at all. That is to say. person being a mind. how can we identify Mr. Smith

in the presence of othn pl.'rsons Mr .Iones and Mr. l{oherts? Since, on lhl.' d11alisl

account, another mind is not detectable by any observation we could make, it is

impossible that we should have any reason to think we cnuld ever identify another --- .....

mind as mind 1\ or mind B. There is 110 way or idet1lil"yit1g one person from another

person if they (mind) cannot be dctcckd by any observation. So we could never

justifiably believe we were, for example. talking to someone. "1\ concept or mind

which made it impossible justifiably to apply that concept to any other thing would be

utkrly useless, evc11 if itt1clli!'ihlc". 11 /\11d ll1e S<lllle lu,hl:; l•~r lite co11ccp1 of pnson as

long as person arc thought or as min·.ls.

On the other hand, so n1r as idcntilication is concerned, it does seem to he the

case that we can only tell we arc in the presence or another consciousness and can

only tell whose consciousness it is by observing physical phenomena. We have no

way of getting at the other mind directly. So we must depend upon sense observations

of material bodies, especially human bodies. And that leaves mental things in a weaker

position, at least epistemologically, than material things as l~tr as the concept of person

as mind is com:erncd.

11 Jerome /1.. Shalh:r, '111<' l'hilo.'"l'h1·oj 1\lnlll, 1'1' 38. 5'l

225

Till! probklllS or individuation CliiiCLTn what makl!S two minds distinct

assuming there could be two distinct minds. One answer might be that they have

different mental histories, each having had di ITerent mental l!Venls at certain times.

But it seems perfectly intelligible to suppose that at some time we might have two

distinct minds with exactly the same history of mental events (each rhight have grown

up in exactly the same way). And. if this supposition of two exactly similar minds is

intelligible, lht:n what would make thc111 two distinct minds rather than one and the

same mind'! Prohkms n:lating to this sort of individ11;1tion. the dualist docs not SLTIII

Lo have <Ill answer. lie lllllsl say that they :11e distinct. and yet he cannot say how or in

what respect they dilTer. This docs nul m;II\C any sense too. The same goes for the

concept of person as mind.

Let us consider it another way. So far as individuation is concerned, too,

mental entities seem to have a weaker status than matcri:1l cnlitirs. i\s it docs seem

possible for there to be two uil'l'crent persons who have exactly the same mental

history. exactly the same set of mental states and events throughout their I i fe. The only

thing that could distinguish the two would he the existence of different bodies in

different places. This indicates that mental entities depend in part on material entities

for their individuation. 12

12 /hid., pp. 38-39, 59.

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The com:...:pl or p...:rson as mind CillliHll. th...:rl:l'or...:, hi.! ·lllaintaincd <IS till! true

act:Olllll or pnsoll lor thc rcasOIIS gi VCII ahovc. Now it call he condudcd Oil this part or

of person must indude some rcfcn.:nt:c to material bodies, although it may not be

necessary to idcntil'y tlu: person with the ·\Jii1Ty. lndc~~l. there arc grave dif'liudtics in

attempts to defend such an identification because the concept of person is much more

than the t:om.:cpt ol' lllakriaJ hody. llowcvcr, persons Cllll he idcntificd through

llliltniHI hndil·:; t\ d11ali·;J11 \\hil'l1 ind11th·:; llw ('(lJI\'('pt nl' illl illllllilh·lial :;11hit·1·t ol

consciousness utterly independent ol' matcrial hodks is unable to deal with the

problems of identification ami individuation.

Contrary to the concept of person "s mind just discusscd earlier, tlH:re "re some

philosophers who hold that persons arc nothing hut body. They arc called physicalist

or materialist. 1\nd their doctrine is materialism. According to this doctrim; "physical

matter is the basic reality ami that thoughts and e111otions are si111ply results or it, ami

that religious ami supcmatural h~licls arc hasdcss". 1 1

Materialism as such docs not totally reject the internal states or the mental

concepts of our everyday language. To rid mental concepts of our language is just to

impoverish human language. What the doctrine rejects however is the Cartesian notion

of mental substance, a substance that has an independent existence of its own. It was

13 Reader's Digest Reverse Dictionm:l'. p. 375.

227

held by Thomas llohhes, in opposition to Descartes, that there was no need to

postulate thc cxistcncc or mimi in additio11 to hodi~:s: conscious stalcs and a~livitks

could he attri hulcd to the body i tsc I r. !\ nd modcrn phi losophcrs, I i kc Ryle and Camap,

have argued that it is a lllistake to think or conscious states <llld processes as ghostly

inhabitants ora p~:rson's priva\1: mental stage. stalt:nlclll about people's mental Iii\: ;1rc

reducible to statements about their physical institution, or their actual and potential

behaviour. 14 Proponents of the materialist theory of mind would say that the mental

states, processes and events arc nothing <.ij1a~t from-lhe state of the central nervous

system or the brain states. 1\nd functionalist account of mind would say that they arc

the functions of the brain. For them. persons Hre nothing morc than matcrial hodics.

J\11 arg11n1enl ill t:lVOlll or tJ1c pJ1y~;ic:11d type oflliiiiiiSIIl is tlJ<ll IIIIlS( of tilL'

difficulties faced by non-makrialists arc avoitkd. 1\t least there 1s then no spcci;ll

problem of personal identity. The criteria ftlr the identity of persons will be the same

as those that determine the identity of their bodies: and these will conform to the

general conditions which govern the identity of all physical object of a solid

macroscopic kind. It is primarily a matter of spatio-tcmporal continuity. Moreover, if

persons can be C<.]Uatcd with their bodies. there will no longer be any need to specify

how minds and bodies arc correlated. Once it is shown how states of consciousness

can be ascribed to bodies, this problem will have hcen solved. But whether this can he

shown is itself very much an open question. It is obvious that any view of this type

14 A.J. Aycr. The Concept o/a l'a.1·on ll/1(1 Other t~·ssavs. p. 84.

228

faces very serious diniculties: and it is not at all so clear that they can be satisfactorily

met.

I would discuss now in detail the hypothL\-;is on the concept of a person

proposed by D.M. !\rmstrong1whosc view is hascd o11 scientific ground.

Matcri~alist Approach to the Concept of Per·son

The materialistic theory of' person is, best represented hy I>. M. !\ rmst rong in

his book A Materialist Jhewy of Mind and in his article The Nature ol Afind. I w,nlid

try to work out the lllatcrialistic l'OIICcpt or person along with thl'ir theory or llliiHI. It is

important to present hrielly the m;1krialist's \'icw on thL· comTpl of mind. and

subsequently the conccplol' person.

According to this theory. the mental stales arc identified with purely physical

states of the central nervous system which is perhaps, what Descartes called, a pineal

gland. It is important to take note of the theory that the central state theory does not

deny the existence of inner mental states. On the contrary, it asserts their existence:

they are physical states of brain. 15 The concept of mind. according to him, is primarily

the com.:cpt ol' a stale ol' the person apt l(ll· bringing about a certain sort ul' hehaviour. 11'

"D.M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory ofMind, p. 75. 16 Ibid., p. 83.

229

lf the mind is thought of as that which has mental states, then we can say that, on this

theory, or less accurately hut more epigrammatically, the mind is simply the brain.

Now 1 shall atll:mpt ll l "nrk nut till' matnia list account o I' mind or 111L'ntal

processes within thl' l'r:~nH·wnrk nltlw plty·:icn dt~'lttic:tl ell tlw 111:th'1 i:tli::l vinv of

man.

One of the account of lliCiltal protcsscs that is ol' once attractive to any

philosopher sympathetic to a matcrialist view or man ts 'Behaviourism'. Traditional

philosophy had tended to think or the mind as a rather mysterious illll'lll'd (//'£'//(/ that

lay behind, and is responsible l'or, the outward or physical behaviour of our bodies.

Dcscart~:s thought or this innl'r arcn:1 as a :;pirit11:~l s11hst:111LT, and it is this conception

of the mind as spiritual substance that lkhaviourist, like Gilbert Ryle, strongly attack

as a "dogma ur the ghost in the Machinc". h>r him, thc mind is not somdhing bchind

the behaviour or the body, it is simply that part ol' behaviour. As rur example, my

anger with you is nut some modification or a spiritual substance which somehow

brings about aggressive behaviour, rather it is the aggressive behaviour itself'. My

addressing strong words to you, striking you, tuming my hack on you, and so otl.

Thought is not an inner process that lies behind, and brings about, the words I speak

and write. It is my speaking and writing. So the mind is not an inner arena, it is

outward act. 17

17 Gilbert Rylc, 7'h1! ConCI!JII ofi\1iJl(/, p.

230

i\nnslroll):', is titus ultlte view tlt<tl "II is clear llt;ll such a v1ew ollllall lils in

very wdl with a completely lllatcrialist or physicalist view of man. If there is no need

to draw a distinction between mental processes and-their cxpn;ssions in physical

behaviour, but i r i nstcad the mental processes arc idenl i lied with thci r so-cal led

'expressions' then the cxistcm.:e of mind stands in no conflict with the view that Man

. I. h I . I . I I . IIIX IS 11011111g II{{/ fJ I)'SICO-C IC/11/C£1 1/I('C W/1/Sitl.

Since behaviourism is one version of materialism. I shall lake it into account

also in the course of discussing tnakrialisnl. One of th~..: weak point of behaviourism,

that I have just outlined is that our common experiences tell us that there can be

mental processes going on although there is no behaviour occurring that could

possibly he lteated as expre~;~;ioll ol ti1L·~;c ptmT:;:;c:;. l·m L·x;11npk, a tlt<lll 111ay he ""I'.IY

but gives no bodily sign, he may think hut say or do nothing at all. This is quite

enough to prove that 111ind is nul the S<lllle as behaviour, hut rather which stands

behind ami brings about our co1nplcx behaviour. In short, the mimi is the spring of

action or behaviour.

In order to meet this objection. Ryle has made an attempt by introducing the

notion of a disposition to behave, which playsa particularly important role in his

account of the mind. Now it can be said of a disposition to behave in a certain way

under certain circumstances. According to Ryle, 'to say that a person knows

18 D.M. Armstrong, op.cil., p. J;t(,_

231

something, or aspin:s to b~ something. is not to say that h~ is at a particular mom~nt in

process of doing or und~rgoing anything. hut that h~ is able to do c~rtain things, wh~n

the n~cd aris~s. or that ~~~ is pron~ to do allll k~l certain things in situation or Cl:rtain

sorts. 19

How did Rylc use 'the notion of a disposition to behave' to meet the obvious

objection to behaviourism that then: ca11 he mental processes going 011 though th~

subject is engaged in no relevant 11L:haviour'! Ryle's stra!Lgy is to argue that in cas~

when th~ suhj~d is not h~havi11g in <Ill)' ll"kV:IIlt way. he or she is dispos~d (liable) to

behave in som~ rcl~vanl way. /\s th~ glass docs not shatter hut it ;s still brittle. so do~s

not the man behave but he docs have a disposition to behave. llerc is an important

point to take not~ of: th~ hrilllencss or glass is a disposition that the glass rd:tins

throughout its history, but clearly there could also be dispositions that come and go.

The dispositions to behave that arc of special interest to bchaviourist arc, for the most

part, of this temporary character.

To explain th~ breaking or a lightly struck glass on a particular occasion by

saying it is brittle is, on this view of dispositions, simply to say that the glass breaks

because it is the sort of thing that ~asily breaks wh~n lightly struck. The breaking is

the normal behaviour, or not the ahnorn1;1i behaviour of such a thing. Th~ hrilllcn~ss is

not to be conceived of as a cause li.>r th~ hrcakag~. or ~v~n. more vagu~ly, a l~tctor in

19 Gilbert Ryle, op. cit., p. 122.

232

bringing about the breaking. Brittleness is just the fact that things of that sort breaks

easily.

By argumg this way, the objection that mental processes may he gomg on

\\ithout t1tttw:11d t'Xflll'';:;i,•tl 1:111 lw 11wt It ·.,Till:; clt-:11 tl1;1l t11 :;utlll' l'.\ktlt tlw

behaviourists is alright, hut still they did not do enough especially when the first

person m:count is conccmcd. When I think, hut nty thought do not ttccessarily issue in

any action, it s~o.·ems as ohvious :ts :ntythint• .. is ohvinus that tht:rc is something m:tually

going on in me which constitutes my thought. It is not simply that I would speak or act

if some conditions that arc unl'ullillcd arc to he l'uflillcd. Something is curn:ntly going

on, in the strongest sense and most literal sense of "going on". and this something is

my thought. It has been pointed out th:tt Rylcatt behaviourism denies this 'inner goings

on', and so it is not satisfactory as a theory of mind, and a theory of person as well.

Yet there is not hJunJ any other version of" behaviourism that is more satisl~tctory. So,

the moral for those who will take a purely physic:tlistic view of man is that they tnust

look for some other account or the nature ol' mind and or IIICiltaf processes.

It can be seen that behaviourism is a profoundly unnatural account of mental

processes. If somebody speaks and acts in certain way it is natural to speak of these

speech at~d ac.tion as the expression of his thought, but not natural to speak of them as

identical with his thought. It is very natural to think of the thought ~s someth~ng quite

distinct from the speech and action which, under suitable circumstances, hritigs the

speech and action ahuul. That 1s to say. thoughts arc not tu he identilied \\ith

behaviour, we thi11k. they lie hchi11d behaviour. In r0~dity. a nwn's hchaviour

constitutes the rc:tsu11 we have !"or :tttril•utinv L"l'tt:till IIIL"Ilt:d processes to hi111. hut the

behaviour itscllcallltul he idctlli;icd \\itlt tile lltcntal pwccsscs.

Now it seems sollll'\\"hat ck:tr tlt:tl lK·rhaps the hchaviuurists ~Ire \\TOll!_.'- in

idcntif'ying the mind and mental uccunL·nccs with hchaviour. hut pcrhaps they an.:

right in thinking th:tt our notiu11 ul" :1 111itHI :11HI ul" itHlividual llll'llt:d st:tiL's is lo)-'ie:dly

tied to behaviour. The reason is that perhaps what we mean by a mental stale is some

state of the person which. under suitable circumstances. brings about a certain range or

behaviour.

Now Ictus sec what the materialist has said on the concept or tnind. Annstrong

says:

"'J'he concept ofu 111ental slate is tJrinwrily the conceJJI ofu stale l~jthe /)('!"son

apt fiJr hringing ahout a certain runge of helwviour .... A/Jiwugh llli}](/ is not

hchaviour, if is the cause c~f helwl'iour " .. 'o So. according to this ddinition. perhaps

mind can be iJentilied not as hchavio11r. but rather as the inner cause or cert<tin

behaviour. Thought is not speech under suitable circumstances, rather it is something

within the person which. in suitable circumstances brings about speech. And. in l;u:t.

211 I>.M. Armstrong, A 1\lutaia/ist 'J"heol~l' of llf111d, p. X2.

234

Armstrong is of the opinion that this is the true account. or at any rate a first true

account, of what Wl! ml!ant by a mental state. 71

lt is an important question to ask, 'ho\\ docs this line or thou[!,ht linked up with

a purdy physicalist view of man?' The position sccms to he this th:1t while it docs not

make such a physicalist view inevitable but it does make it possible. It docs not entail.

but it is compatible with, a purely physicalist view of man. For if our notion of the

mind and mental slates is nothing hut that or a cause within the pcrson or certain

rangcs of bl!haviour, thcll it beCOllleS a scientific l\lll!Slioll, and llOl a question or

logical an;llysis, what in I~Icl the intrinsic nature or that cause is. There have hcen . .

dilkrcnt argunu:nts on thc nature or this cause. The cause 1night hc, as De-scartes

thought it is, a spiritu:d ~;uh~;taJJce, Wllii<iiiJ' tllllllll'h till· l'inl'lll .':!lint! lo (liiHI!Jce the

complex bodily behaviour of which men arc capable. It might bc breath, or spccially

smooth and mobile atoms dispcnsed throughout the body, it might bc many othcr

things. But in fact, as At·mstrong argues, the verdict of modern science seems to be

that the sole cause of mind - betokening behaviour in man a·nd the higher animals is

the physicochemical workings of the certain nervous system. So by assuming our

concept of a mental state have been correctly characterised as nothing but the cause of

certain sorts of behaviour, then thcsc mcntal statcs can bc idcntilicd with purdy

physical states ofthc ccntral ncrvous systcm.22

21 D.M. Armstrong. 1'l1c Naturc o(Mind, p. Jt17. 12 /hid, p. Jtl7.

235

Armstrong bused his argument on s~:icnce. !lis theoretical set up is in fact very

scientific. He puts the authority of science as to the nature of man above other

disciplines. According to him, if we consider the search fcJr truth, in all its fields, we

find that it is only science that man who have authority in their subject can, after

investigation that is more or less prolonged, and which may in some cases extend

beyond a single human life time, reach substantial agreement about what is the case.

"It is only a ll'~;nll ul :;cil'lllilit· ill\'t".liJ•.:IIit~ll 111:11 \Vl' t'Vl'l :;n·n1 In 1e;1ch ;111 inll'lkt·ln;d

consensus about controvcrsialmatlcrs". 21

This is of the utmost importance. hll· in philosophy, in religion, in such

disciplines as literary criticism, in moral question in so far as they are thought to be

matters of truth and falsity, there has been a notable f~1ilurc to achieve an intellectual

consensus about the disputed questions among the learned, so there is a good reason to .

attach a peculiar authority to the discipline that can achieve a consensus. And if that

discipline that can achieve a consensus, and if that disci pi inc presents us with a certain

vision of the nature of man, then this should be a powerful reason for accepting that

VICW.

Armstrong is or the view that it is the Illl:thmls of' science by which we can

achieve an intellectual consensus about so many controversial matters. And as a result

of scientific investigation, such a consensus has been achieved. It is the scientific view

23 /hid, p. 345.

236

or man, and not the philosophical or n:li)lious or artistic or mor:tl vision ol' man, th:tt is

the best due we have to the ll<tlttlc ol 111<111. /\1HI it is ralional to argue lr<llll lhe best

evidence we have .2·1

There is a dirtl:rence between hehaviourist and materialist with regard to the

notion of disposition. Whereas the behaviourist holds that the brittleness of glass is not

a state of the glass hut is simply the l~tctthat things of that sort behave in the way they

do, materialist hold that it is the state or the glass that gives rise to these manil'cstation

in suitable circu1nstam:es. 7' The disposilion itsdr is distinct lro111 its tllalliksl:tlioll.

The scientists may like to argue that it h:ts been discoven..:d that the hrittklll'SS or glass

is in fact a certain sort or pallcrn in the molecules or the glass. Similarly, a matcrialist

would clai111 that llll'llt:d state~; :Ill' i11 lat·t idt·11tic:d with tlw tTIItr:d nt·rvoll~; ~;y::tt'lll ol'

the brain stale. 1he bruin and its partner, the SJJiral cord, to}!.ether jiJrm the central

control c~lthe body, and this is known as t/1(' "tentralll(~rvous .\ystem (( 'N,\'). ;>r,

Now it can he seen that this way or looking at disposition as a slate which h:1s a

causal power is very dii"!Crent from that of the bchaviourists and Rylc. No need to

mention much about it. the materialists, we can say, are committed to the view that

they are actual states of the object that has the disposition. And Armstrong believes

24 /hid, p. 345. 25 /hid, p. 348. 26 Renshaw Elspath, }'our Amazing /Jud\' p. '1X.

237

that the view of dispositions as st~1tes. which is the view that is natural to science. is

the correct nnc. 27

Thus. I have considered \\\0 Sl'par:lll' but interlocking lines or thought that

push Armstrong in the same Jirel'lion. The first line or thought is that it goes

profoundly against the grain to think of the mind as behaviour. The mind is rather, that

which stands behind and brings about our behaviour. The second line of thought is that

the behaviourist's concert or disposition. prorcrly conceived. arc ready states that

underlie behaviour, ami, under suitable circumstances. bring about behaviour. So hy

putting these two together. II'C' reach the <'llll«'i'fltioll o(lt 111<'1/tu/stutc· us o state· o(tlll'

fil.!l".\'011, llfil for f11'11tlllciiJ.I!, Ct'J ltJ/11 ruJI,I!,t'\ uJ /l('litll'ltJIIr. llw; lolllllda is a very

illuminating way or looking at th<: COIICCpt of' a n1c11\aJ stall: ill a conl<:111por:1ry World

of materialistic philosophy.

By using the Hegelian terms, the Classical Theory of mind saw the mind as an

inner arena, this is the thesis. In reaction. 'bcflaviourts_m saw the mind as nothing else

but outward act, this is the anti-thesis. But Armstrong's Central State Theory saw the

mind as an inner arena identified by ils causal rela!ion lo ou/ward acl, this is the

synthesis. 211 This shows that luunan tholl{'.hl of'tc11 lltov~:s i11 a dialcdi~:al w:1y, f'm111

thesis to anti-thesis and then to the synthesis. From the C'I:Jssic;d Theory and

21 D.M. Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, p. 347. 28 Ibid., p. 348.

238

Behaviourism. Armstrong rorged his proposed synthesis · that the mind is propL:rly

conceived us an inner principle. but a principle that is identified in terms or the

outward behaviour, it is :~pi l(,r hrin)'ill!' ahout.

This way or looking at the mimi and mental staks. however, docs not entail

much a materialist or physical \'iew or 11W11, ror nothing is said in this analysis about

the intrinsic nature or these mental staks. But if we have gcncral scientific grounds for

thinking that man is nothing but a physical mechanism. we can go on to argue that the

mental stales arc in fact nothing hut a physical s\ah:s of the central nervous system.

Accon.ling to Armstrong. a purc matcrialist allows man nothing but physical,

chemical and biological propcrlil's which. in :dl probability. hL· rq•.anls :1s n·ducihk to

physical properties only. The materialist account or the nature or mind is compatible

with the view that man is nothing hut a physico-chcmical mcchanis1n. !king a

materialist, Armstrong said that man is a material substance who has ccrtain cxtra,

non-material attributcs. 29 And this non-material attribute ts what I have already

pointed out carl icr, the inner pri nci pic which is idcnti lied 111 terms or the out ward

behaviour, it is apt for bringing about. And he goes 011 to arguc that mental statcs arc

in fact nothing but physical states or the ccntralncrvous systcm or simply thc brain.

29 D.M. Armstrong. A Afateriali.11 Theorr of!l!ind. pp. 37-38.

239

Thus we have discussed the materialist concept or lll'rSOil Oil the basis or

Armstrong's argument as the physicaL chemical (and. biological) mechanism or

properties. This extra, non-material property is. acrording to him, the internal slate or

the person apt for the production or behaviour. So what is this internal state of the

person according to materialist? This can best he answered hopefully by considering

the objections against it.

Let us begin with the ohviolls ohjn:tion that m;ty arisc·againsl materialist and

then how materialist would react to this ohjcctiotl.

The view or the ( 'cnlr;d Sl;tll' .llw()ry ()IJ I Ill' llllli()IJ or lllilld IJI;ty lw lh()IIJ'.Itl In

share a certain weakness with hchaviouris1;1. rYiodcrn-philosophcrs arc or the view that

although behaviourism may be a salisf~tctory account or mimi from another person

point of view, but it will not do as a lirst person account. In our encounll:r with other

people, all we observe is their behaviour. their speech and action. In other person case,

behaviourism might seem to do full justice to the h1cts. But in our own case, we seem

to be aware of so much more than mere behaviour.

Even the materialist conception of the mind as an inner principle apt f()r the

production or certain sorts or behaviour again fits the other person cases very well.

Bodily behaviour of a very sophisticatt:d sort is observed, quite di lTcrcnt from the

240

behaviour that ordinary physical objects display. It is logically inferred that this

behaviour ·must spring fl·om a very special sort or inner cause in the object that

exhibits the behuviolll'. This inner caus~: cult be named "the Mind", ami those who take

a physicalist view ol' 111~1n argue that it is sintply the central 11crvous sysll:m ol' lilt:

body observed.

Now let liS compan: this with the case or glass. ( 'ertaill characteristic behaviour

is observed. That is the breaking and slwl'::!:iJ.!g or the matdial when m:tcd upon hy

relatively small f(m:e. !\ special inner sl<ltc' or the glass is postulall:J to explain this

behaviour. Those who t:1kc a pmcly physictli~;t vinv ol" l'.lass then ;ugiiL' th:1l this st:lll:

is a natural state or the glass. It is, pnh:tps. (Ill :IITIInJ'.t'nH·nt or its moll'rllks. <lnd nol,

say, the particularly 1nakvolenl di~;po~;ition of till· dt'IIIOIIS thai dwell in l'.las~;.

But when we turn to our own cast:. the p:>silion may seem less plausible. It is

the fact that we are conscious, we have experience. Now can we say that to be

conscious, to have expcrictH.:cs. is simply for something to go on within us apt for the

production or certain sort or behaviour. Such an account docs not seem to do any

justice to the phenomena. And so it seems that our account or the mi nJ wi II also f~ti I to

do justice to the first person case.

The objection may become ckarer il' we consider the following case in which

one can do something without any awareness or what one was doing. Suppose that you

241

have driven a car for a very long distance without break. And then you may have had

experience of a curious state of automatism, which can occur in these conditions. All

of a sudden chance that one "come to" and realised that one has driven for distance

without being aware of any thing. ( )ne has kept the car on the road, used the brake ami

dutch pcrhap~, yet all without any awareness of what one was doing.

In this case, it is obvious that i11 sollll' se11se lllental processes arc still going on

when one is in such an autPmatic state. The only thing is that one is not aware of his

awareness (apperception) of what one was doing. Unless one's will was operating in

some way, and unless one was still perceiving in some way, the car would not still be

on the road. Now it is claimed that on acc(;u_t~t of mind as an. inner principle apt for the

production of certain sorts of hdwviour leaves out consciousness or experiences, what

is claimed to have been omitted is just whatever is missing in the automatic driving

case (apperception). Now it is atllllitted that an account of n1e11tal processes as states of

the person apt l(ll· the production of certain sorts of behaviour m:1y very possibly he

adequate to deal with such cases as that of automatic driving, it may be adequate to

deal wi1h most of the mental processes of animals, who perhaps spend a good deal of

their lives in this state of automatism as well.

However, such an account of the mental processes, it is contended, cannot deal

with the consciousness that we normally enjoy. As it has been considered earlier, it

will seem obvious to some philosophers that the account of mental states given

242

previously is unsatisi~H.:tory because it leaves out consciousness or experiences. Those

philosophers who argue that the central state theory or mental states as unsatisl~1ctory

might protest that the argument has a quite unsatisl;1ctory other-person char;1c~_cr. It is

as though we took the very complex behaviour of other person. a cause which may be

called a mental stale. and then we proceeded to idetltily these postulated n1ental states

with stntrs or thl' hr:lin. In 0111' ll\\'11 l':ISl', at k:tsl. \\'l' ha\'l' :1 dirt'l'l aw:m.·nt·s~; or \llll'

mental states. We arc conscious. we have experiences. In fact. it w;~s this very l~1cl that

leu to the rejection ot' physicalist progr<llllll1C with respect to the mind sponsored by

behaviourism. So, according to them, cuusciousne$~ is something more than the

occurrence of an inner state apt for the production of certain sort of behaviour.

ArmstronJ• .. in his :11tcmpt to rc;tct to thi~; po:;~;ihly, ;nul it ;1ctu;dly i~:. in1pmt;111t

and powerful objection consciousness is something more tlmt physict~list account of

mental states leaves out. suggested lht~l con\'ciousn<'-"·'· is no /IIlii"<' thon tlll'on'll<'ss

(pcrceJJiiom) l~( inna mental shtles hy the fJI!I'.\'IJ/1 whose states they are. 10

Consciousness or experience, then, is simply awareness of our own mental state of

mind. The technical term for such awareness of our own mental state is introspection

or introspective awareness.

So, according to Armstrong, the notion of consciousness is nothing more than

perception or awareness of the mental state. Perception, in general, can he thought of

J() /hid., p. 95.

243

as an inn~:r stales or events apt f(H· the production of certain sort of behaviour towards

our environment. Thus perception is something that goes on within the person within

his mind- although of course, this mental event is normally caused hy the operation

of the environment upon the organism. 31 It seems a very promising view to take of

perceptions that they arc inner slates defined hy a certain sort of behaviours that they

enable the perceiver to exhibit. i r so impelled, as the situation demands.

How is this discussion or perception related to the que~tion of consciousness or

cxpcriencl.!, the sort ol"thing that the driver who is i11 a state of" autolnatism has not got.

sense of" tht: word, is llotl1i11g hut perception or awareness or the stale or our OWII

kind". 32

In the case or a driver who is in such an automatic slate, he perceives, or is

aware of the road. If he did not, the em would he in a ditch. The only thing is that he is

not however CliiTenlly aware or his :1\\':ll'ellL'SS of the road. Jle perceives the road, hut

he does not perceive his perceiving, or any thing else that is going on in his mind. In

other words, he is not. as we normally an:, conscious or what is going on in his mind.

Jl D.M. Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, p. 350. 32 Ibid., p. 350.

Thus, according to Armstrong, the concept of consciousness, in this sense of

the words, can be thought or as "pen:eption'' or in other w(lrds, 'inner sense'. It is not

for one to directly observe the minds of others. That is to say, one docs not have direct

access to the mental st;llCS or others. hut each or liS has the. power or capacity to

observe directly our 0\\'ll lllillds. <llld 'pnn·iVL·· what is going Oil there. Ill the case or

driver who is in an ali!OIIlatic state. the driver is cllle whose "inner eyes" is shut, one

who is not currently nw:m: or what is ~:•.oil! I'. on in his lllind.

If the account of' perception is along the right line, why should we 11ol give an

ill'l'OIIIItor illlll"l uh:.t'l \'ill IIIII'• till 11111',1 \1111',111";•,) illllllr till' ',i\1111' IIIII', illll'<idy 1!.1\'1'11 ul

perception? Why should we not conceive or it as an itlllcr slate. a state in this case

directed towards our own mental st:1tes'! We cnn say that one who is nwnre, or

conscious of his thoughts or emotion is one who has the capacity to make

discriminations between his different mental states. I lis capacity might he exhibited in

words. For example. he might say that he is in an angry state of mind when and only

when, he is in an angry state. so on and so forth. I lowever, such verbal behaviour

would he the expression of result of the nwarcncss. I Jere, it seems very obvious that

the awareness itself would be an inner state. The sort of inner state that gives the man

a capacity li>r such hchaviouralcxpressio11s. I hnve 111e11tio11cd how /\nnslro11g reacted

to this sort of dirticulty by saying that CO/ISCi0/1.\'/WSS is /10 1110/'C! than UWll/'l'IWSS of'

inner mental slates hy the person whose mental S/(I{C!S they are. If this so. then

consciousness is simply a further mental state. a state directed towards the original

245

mental account or his further nH:n!<ll st;tk along the same lines that we g1vc of the

mental state towards which it is directed.

Armstrong, however, hclicv~:d what Kanl suggested the correct way of'

thinking ·about introspection when he spoke of' our awareness of' our mental states as

tiH: operation of' iJtncr s~:nsc. llc t;tkcs scnse or perception ~IS the n{udcl li>r

introspection. By sense perception we hccotne aware of' current physicallwppenings in

our environment and om hody. By 'inner sense' we hecontc aware of' current

I . . . I 11 1appenmgs m our own lllJIH.

Now if I pcrcetve a physical sil'.'ation. then we have an inner mental stale

'directed' in a certain way towards a c~:rlain physic;tl situation. In the same w;1y, if' I

am aware, not only or the physical situation, hut also of the fact that I am perceiving

(perceiving Jltent;tl stale) then we h<tvc a f'urlh~:r Jltt:nlal slate 'din.:ctcd' in th~: sante

sort or way towards th<: origin;!l lll<:l!lal slates. And it' this t'urlh<:r mental slat<:, which

qua mental state is simply a slate of the person apt f(>r the production of certain

hchaviour, can he contingently identified with a state of the brain, it will he a process

in which one part of the brain scans another part of the brain. Thus, Armstrong argued

that in f}('/'('('fJtion till' hroi11 scans till' l'lll'il'ni/J/11'1/1 /11 tl\l'(/J'c'll<'SS of till' l}('f'('('t'tioll

33 D.M. Armstrong. A Malerialisl 1'l1eory o(,\/i/1(/, p. 95.

another process in the hrain scans that scmming Thus, fitrther awareness "olthat

awan•m•ss would ulso he /111.\Sih/e · u /itrtll<'r SCC/111/illg of the origi11ul i1111cr scllllllillg. H

Now it can he argued wi I h !\rillS( rong' s poi IllS 0 r view I hal COilSCiOIISill'SS or

our own mental state may be assimilated to perception or our own mental states, and

that, like other perceptions, it may then be conceived or as inner slate or event giving a . ..

capacity for selective behaviour towards our own mct~tal state:15 /\II that is considered

is meant to be simply a logical analysis of consciousness, and none of it entails,

although it docs not rule ouL a purely physicalist account or what these inner states

arc. lloWeVCf, if a purely flhysicalisl aCCOUil[ or lll<ln is accepted (O h<.: the (rUe one Oil

the general scic11tilic grou11d. then there scetns to he no h;tr in our identil'yittg these

inner slitlcs with purely physical sl;tles ot' lite cenlral nervotrs .•;ysll'rn. /\s alrr:tdy

pointed out, s consciousness or our nH:ntal state becomes the scanning or one part or

our central nervous system by another. In brief. consciousness is a sci r scanning

mechanism in the central nervous system.

Thus I have discussed the materialist position on the concept of mind within

the framework of the physico-chemical, or the materialist view of man. Having based

the materialist view or man on science, now it is the task or scientist to decide the truth

or falsity of the materialist theory on the issue of the notion of mind. Now it is clear on

1'1 !hid, p. 95.

J~ IJ.M. Armstrong, '/'lie Nature of !1/nlil, p. J.'i I.

247

tht: mat~rialisl view that the th~orist do~s not allow forth~ pr~.:scrH.:c of ~onsciousm:ss

which is tlifkn;nt frorn lhL' CL'Iltr:d nervow; systL'IIl. In othL·J' w:1ys. lllerrtal stall's :m: not

capable of independent cxistL·ncc l'nnn thL· hr:rin statL'S. l';1rticul:rr kind ol' rm·nt:d

account may very possibly he adcquall' to deal with lh~ case ol' autornalic driving. It

may also be adequate to deal with the m~ntal processes of most lower animals. But

such account of mind cannot deal with the consciousness that human beings m'rmally

enjoy, hmvevcr, much an attempt has been mad~: by materialist to defend his position.

Um: ol'the rnajor prohlcrns lan·d hy rmtcri;distlh~orists is 011 the idcntilicalion

of consciousness with thL· central nervous systenr. I think this ide11tilic:rtion ol'

consciousness with the hrain (or ( 'NS) i~; very dillicult lo accept li1r the li,!lowirJg

reason. The brain. which is till' plrysiL·;d p;1rl of till' hody. i:; n llrirw lravi111'. :;ll;lpl·, :;i/.l·,

weight and location in space. When we think of the brain. then:I(He .. what col!.le into

our mind is those d i fkrent pro pert ics of l he hra in I ike any other physical object. I ~ul

when we think of 'consciousness' itself, what do come· into our mind? If

consciousness and brain arc identicaL cvc11 though their Gl!H.:cpts and meanings are

difli!rent, why not those physical properties appeared in our mental scenario like a

moving picture on the screen? According to G.E. Moore, The moment we t1y to .fix our

allention upon consciousness and to see what distinN~v it is, it seems to vanish. It

seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the

sensatio11 of' hlue. all we Cllll sec is the hiiH·. tilt' otlwr delllellt is us if it were

248

diaphanous. J(j It can, theref"ore, be argued that consciousness as such cannot perhaps

just be the same as the brain.

Now our position at this stage seems to be this. The materialist theoretical

construction-within which the concept of" mind or internal states and the concept of"

physical states arc discussed. docs not give us much about the clear picture or the

concept of person to whom, hy philosophical assumption, both mind and hody arc

supposed to belong, or to be possessed by this person, except that person is some sort

or unique IJialL:rial object very dillcrent 110111 mdinary object, like slum.~. Wc eannot.

therefore say the Jnatcrialist thcory to hold true lin· thc account ol" the coiJCcpt ol"

p~rsotl.

In our every day lite, we ordinarily talk about mind and body. Sollie lillie we

talk about intelligent people like Plato, and sometime about strong people like

Hercules: When we say that ·Plato was a great philosopher', we arc not referring to his

body but to his mind. And when we say that 'Hercules was a strcing man":· we arc

talking about his body built, but not his mind. This clearly shows that there is some

sort of dualism, but this dualism is not dualism in reality as Descartes proposed, hut in

that "My mind is no/ working". or "A·~)' leg is injurC'd". I krc we can sec that there is a

"thing" which possess hoth ol" thc111 - 1lli11d :1nd hody. In gr;un111ar, the poss~:ssor ol"

36 G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 22.

249

tlwsc mind and body, I have .i ust poi ntcd, is called 'Pronoun' i 11 the posscssi ve case.

There is an occasion in which we also s<ty so1nclhing as the subjective pronoun, for

example, 'I am thinking. calculating <'I c. etc. ". or "/ clo SOII/I! work".

So, what is this subjective pronoun T or possessive pronoun "My"? I have . -. -

considered the view that mental events happens CLi purely immaterial substances

(dualism) and also the view that so-called mental events arc physical events which

happen to purely Material substances (Materialism). These two main views have both

between the conscious, on the OJlC h<tmL 4111d lllallcr 1111 ll'tl.: other h<llld, hut <II the

cxpcnse of introducing th<.: v<.:ry mysterious notion of the pur<.:ly thinking suhstarh.:t:s.

Material ism disp<.:nse with such a not ion, hut at I ht: ex pcnse or ohl i ter:tl i nt•. what we

take to be an ineradicable gulf between the conscious and matter. It is for all these

reasons that there must be a neutral theory in which the subject 'I', or in other word,

'person' finds a place or mention as the owner or mimi and body. I will look at a

recent attempt to lind n compromise between these two theories. We shall call it 'the

person theory'.

I would like to introduce the person theory in brier. According to this theory,

mental events happen neither to purely immaterial substances nor to purely material

substances, but to some thing which is neither purely illllllalcrial nor purdy lll<llcrial;

250

let us call them persons. Mental events happen to persons. and persons arc subject to

both mental and physical happcnings. TilliS. persons arc the subjects or expcricnccs. 17

It is perhaps Spinoza vvho was the historical ancestor of the person theory. I lc

was the I )utch philusophn olllll' :;l'\l'llkt'lllh l'l'lllmy. I k thcrl'ltllt: tksnvl's su111C

little lllt'nlion here hut not in dl'lail lie says "The mind ami the body arc Olll' and th<.:

same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute or thought, now under the

allrihute or extcnsiun. A IIHHk ol t'\ll'llsioll :lltd the itka or th:ll llllltk <Ill' Olll' ollld thL'

same thing. but c.xprt:sscd in two w~1ys. IX line. Spinm.a cntainly st:cms to hold an

identity theory or tht: Mind-Body rt:lations fill· the rt:ason that to lK· Oil!.: and tht: salllt:

thing is, it seems. to bt: numerically idt:ntical.

The person theory can also be said as double-aspect or attributes theory,

although attributes theory of man is the modern version of the double-aspect. The

mental and the physical are both ofthcm simply aspects of something which in itself is

neither purely mental nor purely physical. Thus, a man can equally well lx: considcnxl

as an extcmkd. physical thinv or as a thinkiiiJ'. thilll' .. althotiJ'.h l'ithn ol lhL'Sl'

characterisation only brings out one aspect of the man. There is an analogy of an

undulating line which al a given time may he concave fi·om one angle of view and

convex from the other. The line itself is never completely described by either term.

37 Jerome. Philosophy r~(Mind, pp. 50-51. 38 Michael Della Rocca. Si1ino:a 's ArgumcntfiJJ·/dentill' The(}!y, p. 183.

251

But only by the IISC of both lcllliS. Y cl it is not tiJat tltcrc <trc two tltings, Olll' COIICliVe

and other convex. Then.: is otdy one thitt~·. which is, lmtn one point ol view, conc<tvc,

from another point of view, convex. S<> i~ the case with man. lie is both a thinking

thing and an extended physical thing - not that he is two things hut rather that he is

one thing with two :tspccts.

The view or 111an as given hy Spinll/.a is traditionally known as douhk-aspec!

view. It is like some versions of till· identity theory, hut. al least in Spinoza's case, it

diiTer~ with respect to the COitccptioll or the ll:ittg that has two aspects. Spino/.ll 's view

is that "what h<ts the two aspects is not llltrcly tllatcri;tl nor is it pmely ntental cithn,

hut for the identity theorist what has the two aspects is nwtcrial. 1''

ll must he JH>ted that in a double-aspect theory, there are two issues or crucial

importance- what is the nature of the underlying stuff which has both the aspeds, and

what exactly are "aspects''? As for the nature of the underlying stuff to which both the

mental and physical aspe~.:ts an: allrihull'd, Spin01.a docs no! dearly mention. Frank

Thilly said: "According to Spinoza, there is hut one substance or principle, on which

ull pruccss~:s, both physical and m~nlal tkpeml and rrom which they proceed .... Tht:

mind and the body arc processes or one and the same thing expressed in two diiTcrent

ways.40 Each man, and, in !~let, everything else that exists, is just a particular instance

39 Jerome A.Shaffcr, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 51. 4° Frank Thilly, A 1/istorl' o/Philo.lof>hy, p. 326.

252

' I' I l' . II " I " I I II "( . I" .. N " II Ill' Sjll'l'lllH'II ll \\' 1:11 ''fllllll/;1 1·;1 ~; ::11 1';1:111('1' . :1111 :1 •;o 1':1 •; HI< Ill :1!1111' .

But it is very dirticult to fully understand what this stun· is. And we cannot hope !'or

llllll.:h clarilicatioll :thout thl! IHitiii'C or this lllllkrlying sturr 1'1~1111 Spinot.a's view poi Ill.

The second question. what is an "aspect"? is equally important to answer, since

we do not know what it means to say that the mental and the physical arc "aspects" ol'

the same thing until we know ''lwt an "aspect" is. Fven here also, Spinoz<~'s theory is

not of much help. As ShatTer puts it. in Spinoza's theory. the mental and the physical

or. indeed. how one and the salllL' thin!' could haw surh dif'li.TL'Ilt :tllrihull's.·"'

Again. il' the douhlc-aspcct theory is nc11tral in itsdl' and :1s it h:ts hccn

suggested, the mental events happen neither to purely immaterial substance nor to

purely material substances, but to something which is neither purely immaterial nor

purely material; what dsc \Votdd he the centre or these happenings? In other words,

what is it this unclerlyinK stufT to which we attribute both the mental ami physical

aspects? Borrowing Strawson's word. we can suggest that this underlying stuff or

entity is person.

41 Jerome A. Shaffer, op.cit., p. 51. 42 Ibid., p. 52.

l would like to examme the Strawsonian "t"oncept or person which is also

known as a unitary coJiccpl. 1\ccording lo lli111, !he suhjccl to which we allrihull: the

properties which imply the presence or consciousness is litcr:dly idcJJtical with tlwt to

which we also allrihuk physical properlit·s. i\nd il' we ask what this suhject is, the

only eorrecl answer is just thai it is a pnson. In his huok, lndiJ·iduo/.1, l'v1r. PY.

Stn.twsou attempts to prove that the collccpl ol' a pcrson is a primitive concept, anJ

what he means by this is just that it is not analysable in any or the ways that some

philosophers have tried to Jo so, !'or example, l'er.wn us mind or l'er.wm as hody. In

Strawson's view, it cannot be maintained either that persons are compound; that they

are the product or two separate entities, l)(' sets ol' entities, one the subject or physical

charuclcristh.:s nnd tlw other the subject nl' cnllscitHISill'SS.

The aim or Strawson in his hook lndil'iduuls is "to describe the actual structure

of our thought about the world and to exhibit some gem:ral and structural ft:alures or

the conceptual schemes in terms or which we think about particular things".43 By

'particular things' or 'particulars', Strawson means that the things we talk to each

other about when, for example. we say that 'Thomas the cat is washing his face'.

l'onununicalion is possihk only if' onc person knows what another person is talking

about, i.e., can identify the particular thing in this case Thomas th<.: cal which is lh<.:

subject of the other's remarks. /\lithe things we succeed in talking about can, he says,

be located within a singl<.:, unified, spatio-t<.:mporal system or relations. lJsing that

43 P.F. Starwson, Individuals, pp. 9. 15.

254

systems w~: buill fill· ourselves a unified picture of" the wor!tT i11 which we ourselves

have a place, and in which every ektPellt i~; thou)•.ht ol" directly or indirectly rl·latnl to

every other. By means of identifying rclcrences, we lit other people's reports and

stories, along with our own, into the si nglc story about clllpi rica! n.:al i ty .·''

It is a 1~u;l that sonH.:thing can he idcntilkd directly. il" necessarily ostt.:nsivcly

by pointing to them or touching thclll: Strawson calls. "basic particulars". The basic

particulars arc material bodies and those things that possess material bodies arc called

Person. Material bodies arc 'IInce dimensional objects with some endurance through

time'. It is they. ami only they. which arc therefore able to confer on the spatio-

temporal framework "its own f"und<!JllCIItal cktraclcristics".' 1 ~ W<.: also succeed in

talking about things that arc not basic parlicul:trs. identifying lhl'lll indirn:tly hv means

of' their relation to a Jll<ttni:ll hndy thalc<lll he tdcnlllicd directly. l·or cx<llllpk, we can

talk about what Strawson calls "privalL~ particulars". Such as the pain that. (ill·

example, Caesar felt when stabbed by Brutus because we can identify the pain as that

of Caesar, and Caesar, since he possesses a body. can he directly located within the

spatio-temporal framework.

What is the most relevant in this account is the central place in our conceptual

scheme given to persons. Persons can be idcntilied directly through their bodies and

44 I hid., p. 29. 45 Ibid., p. 39.

255

arl' thl'rl'IIHL' h:1~;ic p:nlicula1~;~ hulll1cy ;nc IIlli idcJJiiliL·d with IIIL'ir bodies. 1!1 his houk

flllfividual.\:, Strawso11 dl'lilll'S t!J~o: COIICL:pt ol' a illTSOII ill IL'I'IllS or lh~o: sort ol' prcdicall:s

it attracts: '/11<' COIIC<'fJI o( fl f}('/'WJ/1 is the CrJIIC<'f'l o( ll 1_1'/W of <'lllily .\'1/ch thttt hotiJ

predicates ascrihing the state of consciou.,·ness a/Ill fJredicates ascrihing corporeal

characteristics, a physical situatioll. etc., ure ClflWIIy OfJ{Jiicah/e to a single individual

c~( tllat single type of <'lllity.'1r, We can. lhncl'orc, :trguc according In Strawson thai

persons arc neither purely complex physico-chemical bodies as Armstrong holds nor

purely collections of mental CVl~nls or experiences as maintained by Hume. In f~tct, it

is only OCCaUSe We have the COIICepl or a person that Wl' C<lll also spl'ak of' a person's

hody and of' a person's mind.

Thus, thl' Strawsonian line of' tiHIIIJ'ht is th:1t the IIIL'Ilt:d and the physicd arc

both of them attributes of JU.!I'.\0/IS, the p~o:rsOil is lhe Ulllk:rlyillg entity which has both

mental and physical attributes. And it can he said that Strawson' s concept of person is

the attributes-theory of person. The person could be said of as that 'he is six feet tall,

weighs one hundred and seventy five pounds. is moving at the rate of three miles an

hour (all physical allrihull's) and tlu: very same person could also be said of as that 'he

is now thinking about a paper he is writing, feels a pang of anxiety about that paper,

and then wishes it were already over and done with (all mental attribute). As

Strawson's concept of person implies. we have here neither attributions to two

different subjects, a mind and a body (dualism), nor attributions to a body

46 /hid., pp. I 01-102. Sec also l'er.1ons. by the salllc author. pp. 94-9'i.

{lllah.:rialism), nor t:vcn attribution t\l a tllind (idcalislll) hut attribution to a pnsutl. Wt:

and physical attributes arc applicahk to hi111.

Strawsutt illlrudun_·s tltL' IL'Itll f'vl prnlic;llc to tckr lu prcdic;tll's ;t~;nihillj'

corporeal charadcristics and P-prcdic<~\1.: In rl'IL·r lo ptnlic<~l\.:s <~scrihin~ sl<~tc·s or

consciousness. I k saYs: .. , IIIIIs! n11tkc o I'Oif.l~il dil'ision. into f\l'O, o( tiH' kinds o(

pn·clicates fll'riJICrll· llf'J'Iied lo inclil·iduuls oj lhis t\j)(' 'l'!lt' first kind o/;JI'ctlicufc

consists of those ll'hich ore ctl.\o tn·otwrlt· llf'l'liecl to lllctfaiul /)(]dies to ll'!lic/1 lt'c'

ll'o11ld not dream of liJ'f'l.l'ing jJI'Cdicutes tiSc'l'ihing stoles of co/1.\ciousnl'ss. I \t·ill cull

thisfirsl kind A/-fJI't'clicutcs ... lite .\C'('(J/1(/ Aind mnsists ufullthe other prc·clicutcs It'<'

lf/'I'~V to Jlersons '/'he.\<' I shu// cctlll'-fJI'cdic·otn ".17

Struwson s;tid that it is iruporlal\1 lo acknowkdg~.: tlw logical priruitivctH .. 'SS or

th~.: concept of a person. The meaning or s<~ying that th~.: concept or person is p~imitiv~.:

is that it is not to be <~nalys~.:d in a c~.:rtain way ur ways, w~.: do not, l(>r I.:X<111lpk, haw to

think or it as a secondary kind of entity in rcl<~tion to two pri.mary kinds, namely, a

particular consciousness and a particular human body. And at the san11.: tim~.:. this

concept has not to h~.: analysed in terms or either mental properties or physical

· 4S pn)pertles.

17 1'.1-'. Stra\v\oll. l'!'r.\uns. p. '>·1. IK /f>id., Jl. 1)).

257

Now, I would considc:- the I(JIIowing two questions with which Strawson

began his discussion: 1'1

(I) Why arc one's state of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? and

(2) Why arc they <1snihcd to thL· H'IY S<lllle thing as cnt;~in corporc;~l ch;lr<lcteristics. a

certain physical situation. de.'!

I krc it was not to IK· supposed th:tt the answers to these questions arc

indcpcnd~.:nl or each othcr. Rather. they h;IVL' the S(lllll~ answer.

These two questions led him to the rejection of 'the Cartesian dualism' and the

'No-ownership theory'. According to Strawson. the facts in question explain why a

subjccl of cxp~.:riencc should pick out one ho<.ly from others, g1v1.: it, perhaps, a11

honoured oame and ascribe to it whatever characteristics it has; but they do not

explain why the experience should he ascrilx:d to any subjecl at ail: and they do not

explain why, if the experiences arc to he ascribed to something, they and the corporeal

characteristics which might be truly ascrilx:d to the l'avourcd body. shoul<.l be ascribed

to th~.: same thing. So the l'acts in qucstio1i d~ not c;qllain the us~.: that w~.: make of' the

word 'l' or in short, they do not explain the concept we have of a person. 50 A possible

reaction, Strawson said, at this point is to say that the concept we have is wrong or

confused, and this reaction can be f(nmd in two very important types of view about

--------------~9 Ibid., p. 86. 50 P.F. Strawson, f'ersons. p. X7.

these matters. One is Cartesian dualisn• and the other IS "No-ownership" or "no

l . I . ,. I ,, .. ~I Sll )JCd l odrtlll' 0 l h.' Sl' .

The argunt~lll lhal Stra\vsu11 is susp~ckd ot" acc~pling dualism, it" any. wuuld

be a mistake !'or the reason uiscusscd in the !'ollowing. lie rc.iects the view that the

subject of states or consciousness is a wholly immaterial, i10n-physical thing, a thing

to which nothing hut stales of consciousness cnn he ascribed. I I:s argument can he put

in the following ways. Suppose SO!llel)ne has the concept or a subject or

consciousness, then Ill' llltl·;l IlL· will in)-' It• ;tllow ll~ttl lhclc could he other suhjccls. than

himsell'. i.e., that he 111ight he only onesl·ll" anlllllg lll;lll)'. lhc possession olth~.: concept

of another subjects of' consciousness makes one able to distinguish oneself li"om the

others, pick out or identify diiTerenl selves (subjects) and so on.~ 2 In possessing a

conceptual scheme in which the concept or a person is itself a basic particular, persons

recognises both themselves and others as persons, and, therefore, as person living in

community of persons. On the contrary. i r one had no ilka how to distinguish on~.:sel f

from another, th~.:n one would not have the concpd or dif"fl:r~.:nt suhj~.:cts. Now, if other

subjects of consciousness wen .. · wholly inllll:ttnial. then there would lw 11o way ot"

distinguishing 0111: suhj~:cl f"ro111 anotliL·r how could w~: possibly t~.:ll how many

subjects were around us right now or which subject was which? 1\.nd il' there was no

way of distinguishing one subject from another, it would not be possible for one to

51 Ibid., PP: 87-88. 52 P.F. Strawson·. Individuals. pp. 99-104.

have the com:epl or otiH:r subjects. So tile ("artesian concept or the subject as wholly

immaterial is without 111eaning and thnelim:. incomp;ttihle with the Strawsonian

concept or person.

The Cartesian dualism which holds that slate or consciousness are ascribable

only to, and thus ow11ed only hy, tninds. whik lmdily charal'leristics have a similar

relation to something different- the body, is incompatible with Strawson's concept of

person and, therefore, rejected by him.

The view that "state of com:ciousness must be ascribed ~o something, and that

something hus physical charm.:ll:ristics also", leads Struwson to the COilCCpt or person

as son1cthin~·. prcs11pposcd hy hoth phv:>il':d or t·orporc:d ~;l:tll'~: :t11d .·:l:tll':: ol"

consciousness. ·1 he concept of" person is thus, according to Strawson, by no means

reducible (O the concept or mental stales 1101" to the COIJCepl of" physical states since it is

presupposed by both.

It is this position that "State of consciousness must be ascribed to the very

same thing as certain corporeal char;\cteristics. etc., which h:ads Strawson to th...:

rejection of the Cartesian dualism.

Again, Strawson rejects the 'No-ownership' theory on the ground that "States

of consciousness do not belong to any thing although they may be casually dependent

260

on th~ body". 5.1 This rcje<..:tion comes after the vi~w that "Slat~ or consciousness must

be ascribed to anything at all". This No-ownership theory rejects the terms of

reference of the question like "Why are one's state oLconsciousness ascribed to

anything at all?" Strawson's conclusion is that stales of consciousness must he

ascribed to something, and that something has physical clwracteristics also. It is this

conclusion that kads him to the concept of' a person as something pn:suppos~d by both

physical or corporeal stat~s and states of consciousn~ss, it is that sense, 'logically

primitive, i.e., the concept or person is not reducible to something mental or to

something physical since it is presupposed hy hoth.

( j len Langli lrtl COilllllCiltS I hat "i r the basic out! i ncs () r Strawson' s account () r

our conceptual scheme arc correct, it li >I lows that we cannot cl i m i nate rclcn;nc~s to

persons from our talk about the world without also elirninating rekrcnccs to state of

consciousness or mcntal events. :; 4 Both mental evcnts that cause a movement of a

human body and the human body that is caused to move are, in Strawsonian sense,

assumed to belong to the same person whose mind and body they are. Both the mental

attributes and physical attributes belong to, or are owned by, the concept 'person'.

That is why, even "No-owncrship theory" is ruled out.

H Ibid., pp. 95-98. 54 Glen Langford, Human Action, p. 66.

261

/\gain, the 'No-owncr~;hip theory' holds I hal the sl<tlc ol' cottsctollsJJcss or

experiences do not belong to anything at ~.n.-allhoug_l~ they may be causally dcpcmknt

on the body. It is for this reason that this 'No-ownership' view rejects the terms of

reference or the lirst question. Strawson. thcrcl'orc. dismisses that view by nrguing thnt

it is incohcrent. 55

David llume SL'L'tns to be the source or this 'No-ownership' view, even though

he might be unaware of this. llis argument is as follows: ''There arc some

philosophers, who imagine we arc cv~.:ry motiH.:nt intimately conscious or what we

call, 'self'; that we feel its existence: and its continuance in existence; and arc certain,

beyond the evidence ol' a dctnonstratiotl, both or its pcrll~ct identity and sitnplicity"."1'

llumc was of thl: opinion that such philosophl:rs in dlt:ct ignore thl: naturl: ol' thl:

CX))l:ril:IICC which they adduce as c:vidence lur thc:ir view or at least they do it their

he can discover no impressions or the self. or indeed anything apart from particular

impressions or perceptions, each of which may exist separately in such a way that they

'have no need of anything to support their existence'. In the same book he says: "I can

never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything

but perception. Then.: are, therefore, nothing but bundles or collections of perceptions

rmd thl' mind is il hind nf tlwatl"l' Wlli'H' 'WVI'rill j)l'l"l't'ptiow; SIIITI'S';iwly lllill•l' tll1•ir

55 llamlyn, Metapl~vsics, p. 193. 5

b David llume, Treatise on /Iuman Nature, p. I (J I.

·.-\'

262

appcaraJice".\ 1 hn· this reason, m:unding to I h1nlt:, nothing which n1nits the

applicati'on or the notions or silnplicily ami idt:lltity, hmwvn lllllch tht: relations that

exist between the perceptions in a hu11dle ··· those ·or constancy, cohercm:e and

causality make us llllaglnl' lh:11 tiH:rl' is such itkntity ;u1d si111plirity. l'nson<~l

identity is thus a kind or lictioll while, because or the imagillations, we have a natural

propensity to ascribe to oursclws. hut to which nothing corresponds in reality, and the

same applies lo simplicity.

. .....

Thcrc is a certain oddity in I lurnc's view, which emerges in its very

expression, since he had to use pnson<1l pronouns <~nd the like in order to speak or the

to his somewhat peculiarly unusual conclusions hy the premises of his argunH.:nt in the

Appendix lo the 'Ji"!'uti.H', the two principks tlwl he ltllllltl hi111sell' unahk to nwkc

c:onsisknt: that all our distinct pc1ccptions an: distinct cxistt:nct: and that tht: mimi

never perceives any real connection <~mong distinct existences. Neither of these

principles is obviously true, to say the least, and the former has the paradoxical

consequence, as Hume admits, that a perception can exist by itself apart from any

bundles and therefore unowned by the self. This is just what Strawson rejects.

So if what has been said above on the Humean view is true, then it should be

no surprise that Strawson's claim that tht.: vit:w is incoht:rcnt. Strawson's own

~ 7 1/m/., p. 161.

263

argument is Jin.:cll'd against an interpretation of tilt: 'No-ownt:rsllip' tht:ory which

takes the theorist to hold, as is indeed likely, that the states of eonst:iousness or

experiences which take place arc causally dependent on the state of the body and that

is all there is to the thought that they arc had or owned by anything. It is likely that the

'No-ownership' theorist will hold this way. although it is less than clear th?t Hume

himself did so. The thesis that all that tht:rt: is to the thought of" states of consciousness

being o\\'tll..'d is thL·ir belonging loa hundk of such things.

I lowt:vcr, questions ahoul lhL· idL'Illilicalion of lilt: hundk art: hound lo aris~.:

and it is natural to call upon physical l~tcls to provide that idcntilication. such as its

-dependence on a gi\"Cn body. It is for thts reason. tl1-ose philosophers who wanted to

defend the I htmcan poinl or vil'\V h:I\'L' l'.t"lll'l':tllv \\':lllll'd to S:l\' thai 11'11111 11'1' 1/lt'l//l/ /Jr ' ' '

'/wvin~ stales (~(conscionmes.\' is !hut such s/al<'s helong to a set which is cau.wl/y

dependent on a certain hotly. )X

In the course or discussing the critique of' No-ownership' theory by Strawson,

it is important to mention the distinction he made between the type or possession or

experiences, or the owners or these experiences as implied by the 'No-ownership'

theory. He calls the individual of the first type "11'', and the supposed individual or the

second type "E". This can be explicated in the following ways.

53 Hamlyn, up.cit., p. 195.

264

(i) Type JJ

One's cxperiem:es can be ascribed to some particular individual thing, can he

said to be possessed by, or owned by, or belong to, that til-ing. This idea, although

misleadingly expressed in terms of ownership. would have some validity, would m:tke

some sort of sense, so long as we thought of this imlivitlual thing, the owner of the

experiences, as the body itself.

(ii) Type 1<.:

One's exp<.:ril:1u.:es 111ay h<.: s;tid to h<.:long to, or he poss<.:ss<.:d or owned hy,

some particular thing, to a wholly inadmissible and empty sense or expression, and

this particular thing which is supposed to possess the experiences is not thought of as a

body, but as something else, say ego. 59

So long as it has been thought that a particular slate of conseiousness is

possessed or owned hy, or they me ascrih~..:d to, this body, then it is sonH.:thing a

contingent matter, something that might be, or might have been false. On the other

hand, it might have been a mis-ascription, for the experience in question might be, or

might have been, causally dependent on the state of some other body, or it might have

belonged to some other individual things.60

59 P.F. Strawson, Persons, pp. 88-89. 60 Ibid., pp. 88-89.

265

The diiTen:nce we mentioned or the types or possession is that whereas it is

genuinely a contingent matter that all my experiences are had r by 'l3', it appears as a

necessary truth that all my experiences arc ha<.h by E. But the belief in E and in having

is an illusion. Only those things whose ownership is logically transterahlc can be

owm:d at all. So cxpcricllccs :11c nul mv1wd hy :Jnytlting except in lite dubious sense ol

relationship to a thing, in that they rnight have stood in it to another thing. Since the

whole rundion or 1·: \VaS to OWn cxpcricncl! in a logically non-transferable sense of

'own', and since experiences arc not owned hy anything in this sense, for th<:1-c is no

such sense of 'own', 'E' must be eliminated from the picture altogether. This idea of

'E' only C:tlllC in hec:tiiSL' of:t collhlsiort.1"

What· the 'No-ownership' theorist would like to say is that by 'having

experiences' is meant that such experiences arc uniquely dependent on a certain body

and that this is a contingent matter (for exegetical reasons he speaks of that

dependence in terms or experiences being had by the body, as opposed to the

relationship which might be taken to hold between the experiences and an ego and

which 'No-ownership' theorist rejects, in that case Strawson speaks or the experiences

being had by the cgo). 62 According to ~tra.wson, when the 'No-ownership' theorist

wants to stale the contingentfitcl of' the relationship between experience and the state

61 /hid., p. 89. 62 Hamlyn, op.cit., p. 19).

266

of a certain body he has to say sonH.:thing like this: ";\II my experiences arc had by

(i.e., uniquely dependent on the state of) hody 'B' .113 Any attempt to eliminate the

pronoun 'My' or any other expression \Vith similar force. would yield something that

was not a contingent f~1ct at all. So. in Strawson's word. it is just f<llsc that all

experiences arc causally dependent on a state or a single hody.M On the other hand, to

say that lhe cxpcriL:Jiccs i11 questions iiiL' IIH•sc 111:11 o11c dcpc11dcul 011 body B renders

the claim that those L'XJWI'kllcL'S :ti'L' dqwndL'llt nn hndy B nnalytic and not the

expn:ssions or a contingc11t li1cl at all.

In other words. I he idcnl i fica! ion or c:-: IKTil'llces depends not on 1 heir

dependence on the state or the body, hut rather on the ident{fication <~{their owner;

experiences must be mvned.65 There are two separate points at issue, one about the

idcntiJication or experiences and the other about the nature of experiences. And

Strawson speaks of experiences owing their identity as particulm to their owner. The

crucial point, however. is about the status or experiences - the presupposition or the

'I' which is f'lll.tdamcntal to the notion of' a self. It is or course possihk to identify

experiences in ways other than by reference to their owner, e.g., by reference to some·

particular quality that they have. According to llamlyn, the question at stake is how

can one state the contingent relationship between certain experiences and a certain

63 P.F. Strawson, Individuals. pp. 96-97. M P.F. Strawson, Persom. p. 89. 63 llamlyn, op.dl., p. IIJ:'i.

267

body in a general way without involving the owner of the experiem.:es. In that sense,

S ' . . II I '"' trawson s potnl IS Wt: la <l!ll.

Strawson's :tnswcr to tlwsc two i1nportant qqucslions consists in lhc li1llowing

vtews. The answer to I he fi rsl lJlll!SI ion "why arc Olll'' s stale or consc iousncss ascri hcd

to anything at all?" is, in df"ccl, hcc:nt:;•:.lllt:Y an.: one's. Stale of" consciousness or

~

experiences cannot go unowned, and they <ire not neutral as regards to whose they arc.

In this respect, Strawson 's refutation of the 'No-ownership' thesis seems strong and

same thing as certain corporeal chmactcristics, a physical situation, etc? Ilcrc the

answct· is not sutislitctmily ch:nr that they must be uscrihable, although we do not

mean by that to suggest that it is in any scm:c necessary that they should he ascribed to

different things, as Cartesian implied. The reason that they arc ascribe<.l to the same

thing is because stales of consciousness arc expressed in behaviour for which a body

with corporeal characteristics, etc., is necessary. It might indeed be argued that, that is

the normal case which provides the criteria of intelligibility for speaking of states of

consciousness at all. It docs not, however, imply that it is necessary th<tl <lilY thing

which has stalL'S of" l'llllSCioliSnl'SS IIIIlS! h;l\'l' asnilll'd lo it corporeal chararlcrislics

etc., nny more than the thesis that the critcri:1 for intelligibility of t;tlking of pain lie in

the fnct that pain is naturally and normally expressed in certain forms of behaviours

implies that wherever there is pain there must he such expression.

66 Ibid., p. 196.

268

So Strawso11's :IIIS\\l'l lo till' St'~'""d tpw~;lioll IS lirsl lo iiHJIIirc ils ll'nw; ol'

rell:rence and then to add that in those cases where stales of consciousness are

ascribed to the very same thing as certain C(lrporeal characteristics etc., the thing that

owns the states or consciousness. the sci r or the 'I' in question. may very well he

embodied and normally is so. It is in \..·fk·ct the 'Kantian point' which entails the

rejection of Cartcsianism. Since the 'I' which is involved iii the 'I think' is not to be

itkntilit·d with the mimi or soul. Rather. \\e asnihnl a mimi or soul to something to

the extent that the "I think" applies to it_~,, llowever. what I haw discussed so 1:1r

about Strawson' s concept or person has 11ot yet mad~.: i I ~.:x pi ici I as to "what is rca II y a

person?" except that it is th~.: 'hasic particular' to which belong hoth mind and hotly.

But if we equate th~: Strawsoni:m concept ol' person with th~: self or' 1', thl'll w~: JlliJ•hl

have a bt..:ttcr idea or it. And this begs I(Jr thc identity or person.

/\gain, as I have nH:ntioned earlier. th~: logical pri111itiveness of the concept of

person has to be ackn(lwkdgl·d. No\\' I \\OIIId lih· to l'lahoratc this point in the

following way. By tht..: concept or person is mt..:ant, according to Strawson, the concept

of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of conscious and predicate

ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a

single individual of that type. The claim that. "This concept is primitive" can he put in

the f(JIJowing number or ways. One way is that the answers to the questions already

put lill·wnnl earl in are not to IJL· ~;11ppo~a·d ;1:; ilHkpt'JHil'lll ol eal·h nlhn. 1\111 lhl·y ;m:

67 Ibid., p. :too. ·

conncch.:d ill this Wily: That a 11\.'\.'\.'SSary \.'\lllditioll or slal~s or conscioliSIICSS hdng

ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to the very samr things as certain

corporeal charackristics, a certain physic:d situ;1tion. de. That is to say, states or

consciousness could not he ascribed at aiL unless thL:~~ were ascribed to persons. We

are te111ptcd to thi11k ul a pc1so11 as a su11 ol co111puu11d ol two kinds or suhjcd --a

subject of ex p~.:rktlc~.:s (a pun.: consdouslll:ss, an ego). on the one hand, and a subject

of corporeal attri buies on the other. 6x

i

i

Many questions arise when we think iii this way. Hut, in particular, when WL'

ask ourselves how we have to frame the concept or this compound of two subjects, the

picture is apt to chang~.: ho111 the picture ol two suhjt:ct~; to the picture of' o11e subject

and one non-subject. For it becomes impossible to see how we could come by the idea

of diflcrent, distinguishable. identifiable subjects or experiences dirtcrent

consciousness- if this idea is thought of as logically primitive, as a logical ingredients

in the compound idea of a person. the latter being composed of two subjects. For there

could never be any question of assigning an experience, as such, to any subject other

than oneself; and so never any question of assigning it to oneself either, never any

question or ascrihi11g it to a subject at all. So the concept or the pure individual

consciousness- the pure ego-- is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least, c<~nnot exist

as a primary concept in terms or which the concept of person can be explained or

--------------------68 P.F. Strawson, l'er.\'OI/.1", pp. 92-lJJ.

270

ana\ys~l\. \t \::Ill 011 \y ~_·xi:;l, i( ;11 all, a:; a :;L'UHHLII y, lltill pi i111itiv~ CUIICL'pl. which ilsL·It

' . (,t)

is to he explained, :lll:tlysl'll, in ll.:rlllS ot' the concept ol a person.

It was a kind or entity corresponding to this illusory primary concept of the

pun: ronsriousm·ss. thL· ego suhst:111n·. li1r \\'hirh llttlllL' w:1s seeking with th~.· I'L'Slllting

Jutility when II~: luok~.:d into hit11sdt. allll eomplain~.:d that h~.: could n~.:vcr discover

himsdt' without a pen.:t:plion and t:ould nt:vcr diseowr anything but the perception. lie

could not find the principle of unity between his self and perceptions, nor the principle

of differentiations. It was this entity to which Kant also accorded a purely formal

unity: the unity of the "l thin:.;:· that accompanies all (my) perceptions and therefore

might just as wt:ll accompany none. And finally it is this, perhaps, of which

Wittgenstcin spoke wh~.·n he said ol tilL' subject, tirst. that there is no such thing, ami,

second, that it is not a p;ut ol till' woild. ln1t it:; lintit'''

So, according to Strawson, then the word "I" never refers to this, the pure

subject. But this dues nut mean, as the no-ownership theorist must think and as

Wittgenstein, at least at one period, seemed to think, that "I" in some cases docs not

refer at all. It refers, because I am a person among others. Ami the predicate would

belong properly to the person to which "I" docs rcfcr. 71 Tints, the concept of a person

is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not

--------69 /hid., p. 93. 70 /hid., p. 93. 71 /hid., p. 94.

271

lu hl' :lll:lly::l'd a:; llt:ll 11 1 :111 :1111111:11i'd hu11\ 111 ul ;llll'lldHHIIl'd :111i111:1. ll11:i i:; IIU[[U :,ily

that th1: t:om:cpt of a pure individu:d 1; •ll~l..'illiiSilt;..'i.'> lliiJ•.ht IIIli h:l\'l' :1 loJ•.iclll~:

s~:comlary ~:xistcncc. it' tlllc thinks. ur linds. it tksirablc. We always speak or a dead

person- a body- and in the secondary way we might at least think or a disembodied

person, retaining the logical bene lit of imlividuality !'rom having been a person.

Before considning some or the criticisms against Strawson's concept of

person, it is important to mention Strawson's view ahoutthe way in which we ascribe

P-Predicate to ourselves and others. lie .say..-: It is o nccc•s.wuy condition o/ one's

ascribing slates of' conscioll.\/less, eXJJerience.\, to one selj, in the way one does, that

one should also ascrihe them (or he fln'l'llr<'d to ltsai/1(' tiiC'nt) to others ll'ho ar<' not

onese/f72 This means. for example, that the ascribing phrases should be used in just

the same sense when the subject is another. as when the subject is olll: s~.:ll. l·or the

common people. the thought. l(>r example. that "in pain" means the same whether one

says "I am in pain" or "lie is in pain". Th~.:rc is no two scts or meaning l(>r every

expression which lkscrihcs a stale of consciousness.

It is crucial in Strawson 's account that P-prcdicatc should be of the same

logical type independently or whether we ascribe them to ourselves or to others, so

that "pain" means the same thing no matter which personal pronoun and which person

or the copulative verb it is preceded hy. ThtiS, a dilfcrcncc in the rcll:rcncc ol' a

72 /hid., p. 9t.

sentem:e us 111g !'-predicate cnt:1ils no dilli.:rcncc 111 the pn.:dicalc itsdl'. N~.:vcrlhclcss

criteria for the applicability of the P-prcdicatc will ordi1iarily vary with diiTcrcncc in

pronominal rclercncc. My criteria li.n sci I' ascription will consist simply in being aware

of the slate I ascribe to mysell'. Hut this cannot he my criterion fi.ll· ascription of the

same P-predicatc to another pcrson, f(>r I (logically) cannot in this sense of"aware'' he

aware of his state. I do not fl:el his anger or his pain. I must accurdiJlgly havc

"logically adequate" criteria. usually cxprcsscd in hchavioural tcrms for ascribing to

another thc same prcdicale I ascribe to mys~lr on thc basis of sheer awareness; and I

do not ascribc thcsc !'-predicates to myself' on the basis of' obscrving my own

behaviour. Strawsun's introduction of' '·((lgically adequall: criteria" is meant to

circumvent the skepticism (that. i r the meaning or an expression is its mode of

verification, "I am in pain'' and "lie is in pain" differ in meaning; and ir we restrict

verification to the having of ccrtain experit..:nce, "lie is in pain" is meaningless if I

cannot experience his pain. Hence, ascriptions of inner states to others arc meaningless

or else neither knowable nor rationally believable). and his insistence that a P­

predicate is univocal even if it has dirti.:J'ing criteria of' applicability is mcanl to

counteraCt verificationism. Indeed. he insists that to know the usc of a P-prcdicalc is to

recognise that it has two sorts of criteria: I cannot asu·ihc F to mysL:Ir unlcss i 11111 ahk

or know how to ascribe it to others. lie says "one can ascribe states of consciousness

to oneself only if one can ascribe lhrm to others, one can ascribe lhemlo others only if

one can iucntify other subjects of' cxpcriences, ami onc cannot idenlif'y othcrs if one

273

Cilll identify thcltl 01 lly as ~;uhjcch of c.xpcncnccs, pos~;cssors of slates of

. ,, 7.' COilSCIOIISIICSS .

I'Jow, I will examine SOilll or the arguments levelled against Strawson's

com:cpl () r pn~;ull.

Even though the person theory seems so promising that it gives us many ideas

about the concept of person. yet it is not of course free from criticism. There arc

dirticultics with the person theory which hcgin to emerge when we probe deeper into

the concept of the person which is i It Vol vcd here.

One of the difficulties is tlwt. as llamlyn argues. in his account of persons

Straw:;oJt doc:; 11111 really p•c~;c·ttl a lltc~;i:; al111111 wl1;t1 we 11tc;1111 hy when we talk ol

people. lie says nothing, l(H· example. ahoul something which 11111sl surely he essential

to the notion or person as we ordinarily employ it - the idea or personal relation. The

dclinilion that "the persons is the underlying entity or stuff which has both mental and

physical altributes" docs not make it clear what a "person" is. 7"1 The dclinition of the

concept of person. as given hy Strawson, docs not help us very much. And the picture

of the person theory docs not come out clearly when we ask how it di rrcrs li·mn the

identity theory.

73 /hid., p. 92. 74 llamlyn, op.cit., p. t<Jl.

274

).'or the jdl'lltily lhemist, thl' llll'lllid iillrihtlll'~; illl' atlrihlllcS ol' hodil'S.

Furthermore, most of them wish to say that in some sctise the mental attributes arc

reducible to physical attributes. ;\1\ the proponents of the identity theory do not,

however. hold to this latter thl'sis. I krhl'rt higl. for l'Xample, holds that where

mentalistic terms are appropriate the basic and underlying reality is mental and

physicalistic terms refer to this mental reality_?'' Thus 1-'cigl seems to admit a dualism

of attributes, mental and physical. Y ct this theory is an identity theory both in the

I

sense tlwt the basic subjects or con~;ciotl';nn•:s are hodies and in the sense that certain

mentalistic and physic;dislic klll\S have <liH: itll<l lh<..· S:tnll.' refCrents (althOU[•.h SOIIIC or

this terms will haw a 111ental rclcrl'nts).

Strawson should not, however, in any way accept the claim that mental

attributes are reducible in any sense to physical attributes. But would he reject the

claim that they arc nttributes of bodies? Docs he wish to say that persons arc bodies of

a certain sort, namely bodies which have mental attributes as well?

I lowever, Strawson holds that persons are things to which bodily attributes arc

ascribed. But this docs not 111<1ke them bodies <~ny more than the fact that something

has red in it make it red. for, unlike ordinary bodies, persons are things which have

mental attributes <ls well. Furthermore, for Strawson, it is not the cnsc that persons arc

things which just happen to have bodily attributes (but might not have them), nor is it

75 Herbert Feigl, The '111e11ta/' and '!'hysical', pp. 474-475

275

the case that they an; things which just happen to have mental attributes (hut might not

have had them). As Strawson's definition of them impiies, it is essential to persons

that they be entities which necessarily have both mental and bodily <-tllributes. Thus,

Strawson's conception of persons makes it clear that they arc things which differ

essentially from bodies which have bodily :1ttrihutcs necessarily. They arc dillercnt

types or sturr or substances or entities. ;\I HI therd(>n:, Str;lwson 's person theory is I i

fundamentally different from materialism of any sort. The theory is dualistic in I

holding that there arc two different type1 of subjects in the natur;d world, physical

I

bodies and persons. Physical bodies have solely the physical dimensions; persons

necessarily have two dimensions. a physical and a mental dimension.

The prohkn1 arises when the question of 'body' comes into the picture. If it is

not possible, on the person theory, to say that a person is a body, perhaps it is possible

to say that a person is, in part, a body in the way that something which has red in it

may be in part reel. But this will not help us very much. for it inevitably raises the

question what the rest of it is. That is, it suggests that a person is some sort of an

amalgam, a compound of a body and something else (perhaps a soul?). such

suggestions, however, arc precisely what the person theory attempts to combat.

If 'person is a body' is on the person theory rejected, then can we even say that

a person has a body? This seems to be what Strawson would want to be able to say so.

What would it mean then? Certainly it means that persons have bodily attributes. Is

276

there anything else that it can mean? Is it to say anythi11g about a relation between a

person and a body'? It seems not on th~: p~:rson th~:or·y. h>r a body, as always

mentioned carl icr, is some\ hi ng which ncccssari l y has solei y hodi l y attri butcs and such

a thing has nothing to do with persons, \:vhich, as we saw, arc things which necessarily

have both bodily and mental attributes.

1t seems that there is a good deal hanging on this question of the relation (on

the pcrson theory) hctwccn pcrsons ;md hodics. For cxnmplc, consider the laws or

nature which hold for bodies, the laws of physics, chemistry, biology. We would

surely want to be able to say that these laws also hold f'or human bodies as well as

other bodies. If it is true in its Newtonian formulation, that "a body continues its state

of rest or steady motion unless ... ", we would want this to hold for persons as well as

for all other hod ies. Yet if we cannot say that a person's "body" is a body in the same

sense that rocks and trees are bodies, then these laws of nature, which apply to bodies,

cannot he applied to the "bodies" of' person. ;\nd that would he so great an

inconvenience, to say nothing of its kind, as to count against the person theory.

To be sure, the terms, "body" is used in many ways besides the Newtonian one

mentioned above, some of which come closer to the person theory. I will consider

only one that comes very close to the Strawsonian conception of a body. According to

Jerome, if someone said "they found a body in the lake today", we would be very

surprised if he meant a rock, or a tree trunk, or an old sunkcn boat, or a fish, although

277

all or these arc, in the Newtonian sense. bodies. llere, "body" means "corpse", i.e., a

dead human being. A corpse or "body" is left when a person dies, although it is not a

part of living person or something which he has while he was alive (he docs have the

right to say what is to be done with it after he dies). This concept of the body becomes

gruesomely explicit when we rel"cr to it <ls "the !Tll1<lins".7r'

It is this com:cption or the body which comes closest to that found in the

person theory. For, in that theory, as we have seen, a hody is not a person, nor is it a

part of a person, nor is it something a person has. At most it is the person in so far as

he is thought of as the subject of bodily attributt.:s. It is then an abstraction, an

intellectual construction, rather than a reality. But it becomes a reality at death. It

materialises into that thing we call a corpse. On the person theory, a human body is

what would be the person's corpse if he died; the only way we can talk about a

person's body is if we consider him as if he were dead. 77

Again, Jerome concluded that it is one of the paradoxical implication of the

person theory that the body which has a person cannot he conceived of as a physical

object subject to the law of nature. In its attempt to establish the unity of the person

(contra dualism) without sacrilicing the thesis that persons arc conscious (contra

76 Jerome A. Shaffer, Philosophy of !lfind p. 56. 17 Ibid., p. 57.

278

materialism), the person's theory seems to end with the absurdity that a person's body

. I . I I . ?x IS not a p 1ys1ca t 1111g.

Moreover, the notion ol'"scll" is not well discussed in the Strawsonian concept

of person. This makes it incomplete. A person can be a person by the capacity of his

"self' perhaps alone and not otherwise. The states and acts of mind, and that of the

hody arc oill' thill)'.: th:tt which h:ts lhl'lll is it \Vottld sn·n1 quite <lllother. Om lll<lin

concern in this chapter is about the nature of' the subject of mental phenomena - the

entity to which we ascribe sensations, perceptions, thoughts, desires (all mental states),

and actions (bodily states). According to Colin McGinn, "The question as to the nature

of the self is best put by asking what am!?"; the self is just what is referred to when

the word 'I" is used". 79 As I have mentioned earlier, this notion "self' or "I" is what

seems to be what Strawson, if not incorrect. called a 'person'. It is this "self' or "I"

which is the essence of person, and it cannot just be left out of the account of person.

78 Ibid., p. 57. 79 Colin McGinn, The Character ofMind, p. 103.