chapter nine
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Chapter Nine. The Political Economy of Trade Policy and Borders. Introduction The Political Economy of National Trade Policy A Brief History of International Trade Policy Economic Integration and Regional Trading Interregional Trade. Chapter Nine Outline. Introduction. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Chapter Nine
The Political Economy of Trade Policy and Borders
© 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning
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Chapter Nine Outline
1. Introduction
2. The Political Economy of National Trade Policy
3. A Brief History of International Trade Policy
4. Economic Integration and Regional Trading
5. Interregional Trade
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Introduction
• Within each country, processes interact to determine that country’s stance on international trade.– This has advantages and disadvantages:
• Pro example: U.S. constitutional prohibition against tariffs among states undoubtedly contributed to the country’s remarkable growth and stability over last 200 years.
• Con example: National character of trade policy tends to perpetuate the mercantilist view of trade as zero-sum game – one country’s gains must come at its trading partner’s expense rather than from improved efficiency.
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Introduction
• Trade policy occurs at levels other than a national one:– Regional trade blocs: EU and NAFTA– Within different regions of countries: the north
and south of U.S. or Italy (interregional trade).
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The Political Economy of National Trade Policy
• The costs of international trade tend to be concentrated on a relatively small number of individuals.– Benefits, however, come primarily in the form of
lower prices and are spread over a large group, with each individual capturing only a small portion.
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The Political Economy of National Trade Policy
• For producers of good X, the question of tariffs is likely to decide which candidate gets their vote.– For consumers of good X, the small effect the tariff
would have on each individual makes the tariff a lower priority issue.
• As a result, a vote-maximizing candidate will more likely follow the wishes of X producers and support the tariff.
– Implies that pro-protectionist supporters will be more successful in organizing an effective lobbying force than will supporters of unrestricted trade.
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The Political Economy of National Trade Policy
• This systematic pro-protection bias in the policy-making process carries over to laws that govern global trade policy.– Example: Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act
• “Escape clause” that allows the U.S. to abandon its tariff-reduction obligations under WTO whenever imports cause serious injury or a threat to a domestic industry.
– International Trade Commission in Washington can recommend relief to the president in the form of a tariff, quota, or Trade Adjustment Assistance eligibility for the industry.
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The Political Economy of National Trade Policy
• Given the pro-protection bias in the policy-making process, how does trade liberalization ever get accomplished?1. Informing voters of the often-hidden costs of
protection.
2. Reciprocity involved in international negotiations creates another pro-liberalization constituency: export industries.• A country lowers its trade barriers in exchange for
trading partners lowering theirs.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Mercantilism was the first dominant theory of international trade.– Critical weaknesses:
• Not all countries could conduct successful mercantilist policies at the same time.
• Even when one country succeeded with mercantilist policies, that success could not continue in the long run.
– Mercantilist success caused imports to rise and exports to fall.
• Accumulated specie (money) was useful only if you could purchase goods with it.
– If you import nothing, you drastically decrease your choices of goods to buy.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Britain and the rise of the United States– At the close of the 18th century, world events plus
effects of Classical economists’ (Smith, Ricardo, Hume) work moved trade policy toward liberalization.
• Industrial Revolution created many new products for export.
– Britain adopted policies of unrestricted trade.
• American colonies used tariffs to generate revenues before American revolution.
– Post-revolution U.S. was protectionist – protected infant manufacturing industries and retained tariffs.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
– Second half of the 18th century: • Germany and France provided stiff competition for
Britain.– Britain and U.S. used tariff protection through World War I.
– U.S. economy enjoyed phenomenal growth relative to rest of world.
• U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariff bill of 1930– Raised tariffs an average of 53%.
• Other economies retaliated – world trade plummeted.– Great Depression.
SeeFigure
9.1
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Figure 9.1: What Happened to World Trade, 1929-1933 ($Millions)
1932
1931
1930
1929
1933
1,2062,7391,839 9922,998
April
May
June
July
August
SeptemberOctober
November
December
January
March
February
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (RTAA)– U.S. recognized the need for trade liberalization as
a way to emerge from Great Depression.– Reduced Smoot-Hawley-level tariffs.– Also changed institutional arrangements for
making U.S. trade policy:• Tariff authority switched from Congress to executive
branch.• Authorized trade negotiations with other countries.
– RTAA remained in force until the 1962 Trade Expansion Act.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Post-Second World War Trade Policy– The United States pushed hard for global postwar
trade liberalization.• U.S. had great industrial strength…export opportunities
could be exploited only in a relatively open environment.
• Strong international economic ties lessened risk of war.
• Desire to rebuild Europe and limit spread of Soviet influence.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
– U.S. also instrumental in establishment of multilateral financial institutions:
• International Monetary Fund (IMF)• World Bank• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
– Predecessor to WTO
• Congress attempted to reclaim trade authority it previously ceded to president.– 1947: insisted that Escape Clause be included in all
tariff reductions.• Escape clause permitted cancellation of tariff reductions
shown to cause injury to domestic industries.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Escape clause, if carried to logical extreme, would eliminate trade – trade always injures some industry while helping others.
– Escape clause is an example of Safeguards imposed in an effort to avoid adjustment costs involved in trade’s reallocation of resources.
– Main U.S. Trade Acts since 1950:• Trade Expansion Act of 1962• Trade Act of 1974• Trade Agreements Act of 1979• Trade and Tariff Act of 1984• Omnibus and Competitiveness Act of 1988• Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Trade policy in the 1960s and 1970s– Trade Expansion Act of 1962 replaced the RTAA.
• Kennedy sought to regain momentum in trade liberalization.– Granted president authority to negotiate 50% reductions in
tariffs.
• Contained 3 items important to world trade:1. Multifiber Agreement (MFA): president agreed to impose
quotas on cotton textile imports and to partially exempt textiles from tariff reductions.
2. Negotiations shifted from product-by-product to across-the-board format.
3. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) added to U.S. safeguard provisions.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Trade Adjustment Assistance– Instead of levying tariffs against imports that
resulted in injury to a specific industry, the TAA was an alternate way to deal with the injury:
• Directly compensate injured firms and workers for their losses.
– Extended unemployment benefits
– Retraining
– Relocation assistance
– Low-interest loans
– Even restitution to whole communities harmed by an industry’s decline.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
– Trade Act of 1974• Granted president 60% tariff-reduction authority.• Extended existing set of import quotas from cotton
textiles to cover wool and synthetics.• Strengthened role of International Trade Commission.• Loosened eligibility requirements for compensation
under TAA:– Injury to domestic industry no longer had to be linked directly
to government policy, but only to increased imports.– Competition from imports now only had to constitute an
“important” cause of the injury.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
– Trade Act of 1974 also laid the groundwork for the Tokyo Round of GATT talks (1974 – 1979).
• Resulted in 30% reduction in tariffs of major industrialized economies.
• New policy: U.S. (and others) could reach agreements (called Codes) accepted by only a subset of GATT countries.
• Tokyo Round left several unresolved issues:– Developed-country barriers against developing-country
exports.
– Mutually acceptable interpretations of safeguard provisions.
– Conflict resolution mechanisms.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
• Trade Policy in 1980s and 1990s– Trade and Tariff Act of 1984
• Gave the president authority to negotiate bilateral trade treaties.
– Uruguay Round Agreements Act (GATT talks)• Began 1986…approved 1994
• Major results:– Agricultural: reduced export subsidies; required tariffication
of existing nontariff barriers; reduced existing tariffs an average of 36%; provided for minimum access for new entrants into previously-closed foreign markets.
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Brief History of International Trade Policy
– More results of GATT:• Textiles: bilateral quotas of MFA must be removed at
end of 10 years; quotas probably will be replaced by high tariffs.
• Complete elimination of tariffs in several important sectors by industrial countries.
• Clarified distinction between acceptable and unacceptable subsidies.
• Strengthened enforcement of intellectual property rights.
• Established WTO– Member countries must now subscribe to all rules and
responsibilities.
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See Figures9.2 and 9.3
Economic Integration
• Formation of countries into groups (EU, NAFTA)
1. Preferential trading arrangement (PTA)– Member countries agree to erect lower barriers to
trade within the group than to trade with nonmember countries (Figure 9.3).
2. Free trade area– Involves eliminating barriers to intra-group trade
while allowing each country to maintain its own nationally determined barriers to trade with nonmembers.
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Economic Integration
3. Customs union– Intra-group trade faces no barriers and members
maintain a common external tariff (CET) on trade with nonmembers.
4. Common market– Extends free trade among members to factors of
production (labor migration and capital flows), as well as to goods and services.
5. Economic union– Most extensive form of economic integration.
– Means common, group-determined economic policies, as well as a common currency.
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Figure 9.2: Levels of Economic Integration
Common market
Preferential tradingarrangement
Free-trade area
Customs union
Economic union
Red
uctio
n of
in
tra-
grou
p ta
riffs
Rem
oval
of
intr
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Figure 9.3a: Tariffs Under Different Stages of Integration
t = 10%
t = 5%BA C
t = 20%
(a) Preferential Trade Arrangement
t = 10%
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Figure 9.3b: Tariffs Under Different Stages of Integration
t = 0%
t = 0% BA C
t = 20%
(b) Free-trade Area
t = 10%
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Figure 9.3c: Tariffs Under Different Stages of Integration
t = 0%
t = 0%BA C
CET = 15%
(c) Customs Union
CET = 15%
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Economic Integration
• Protectionist element of integration is called Trade Diversion.– Diversion of trade from nonmembers to members
caused by discrimination inherent in integration.
• Trade-liberalization element of integration is called Trade Creation.– Integration eliminates protection among member
countries and allows them to specialize and trade according to comparative advantage and to exploit potential economies of scale.
• If trade diversion dominates trade creation, welfare falls.
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Economic Integration
• Figure 9.4 illustrates integration’s trade-creating and trade-diverting effects.– SM denotes supply of good X by member countries.
• SNM is the supply by nonmember countries.
– Formation of a free-trade area causes a move from C to H.• Trade increases as imports rise from X0-X1 to X2-X3.
• Trade also is diverted from nonmember countries toward member countries, causing an efficiency loss represented by area of triangle e.
See Figure 9.4
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Figure 9.4: Welfare Effects on a Free-Trade Area in Good X
PX
E
PX0
PX1
F
0 X3 X0 X2X1
SNM
SM
SNM+ t
SM+ t
D
S
G
a b c d
e
RT
J
X
C
H
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Economic Integration
• Additional considerations– Integration may have dynamic effects – i.e., may
cause member economies to evolve differently over time.
• Integration increases size of “domestic” market.– May allow firms to achieve economies necessary to become
competitive in export markets.
• May allow group of countries to exercise some monopoly power in world markets.
• May cause increased competitive pressures on industries within integrated group.
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Economic Integration
• Two waves of economic integration:– 1960s
• Most were modeled after European Community.– Attempts among developing countries met only with partial
success.
• Some African and Latin American plans failed.
– Mid-1980s• European Union (EU)
• North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
• Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
• Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
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Economic Integration
• Figure 9.5 indicates that among the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR, the EU has the highest share of intra-group trade.
• The European Union– 1957: Treaty of Rome created European
Commission.• Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Germany,
and Italy.
– 1971: agreed to 10-year plan to achieve full economic union. See Figure 9.5
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Figure 9.5: Intra-Group Trade as Percent of Total Merchandise Trade, 2000
0EU NAFTA
20
40
50
60
70Percent
30
10
ASEAN MERCOSUR
Intra-Group Exports as Percent of Total ExportsIntra-Group Imports as Percent of Total Imports
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Economic Integration
– 1986: added Spain and Portugal.– 1987: passed Single Europe Act
• Expanded policy making to include areas of environment, monetary policy, health and safety, and foreign policy.
– 1991: changed name to European Union.• Outlined plan to move to common currency (the euro)
and central bank.
• Figure 9.6 shows the current 15 EU members.
See Figure 9.6
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Figure 9.6: European Union Members and Applicants, 2001
Sweden Finland
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Czech Rep.Slovakia
Romania
Bulgaria
TurkeyGreece
Italy
Austria
Germany
France
SpainPortugal
Luxembourg
Belgium
Netherlands
Denmark
UnitedKingdom
Ireland
Hungary
Slovenia
Members
Applicants
Malta
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Economic Integration
• NAFTA– U.S., Canada and Mexico– Several unique characteristics:
• Mexico asked to join U.S. in free trade area – Canada later asked to join them – took effect 1994.
• Composition of member countries was very different from most trade blocs.– Very different levels of economic development existed. Most
trade bloc members are fairly similar in economic development.
See Figure 9.7
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Figure 9.7: Where Do They Go? U.S., Canadian, and Mexican Exports, 2000
0%
Sh
are
of
U.S
. ex
po
rts
40%
60%
80%
100%Percent
20%
Non-NAFTAcountriesMexicoCanadaU.S.
Sh
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Can
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xpo
rts
Sh
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of
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exp
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s
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Economic Integration
• NAFTA (continued)– Tariffs on about half of members’ trade were
removed immediately.• Remaining tariffs will be phased out by 2010.
– Rules-of-origin rules dictated that in order to qualify for duty-free treatment, a product must divulge its quantity of North American content (different thresholds for each industry).
• Many Asian firms produce goods in Mexico as a “back door” path to the U.S. market.
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Economic Integration
• NAFTA (continued)– Conflict resolution mechanism:
• North American Trade Commission (3 people) created to hear disputes and levy any penalties.
– Opposition to NAFTA from pro-protection forces:1. Agreement’s environmental impact
2. Effects of differences between labor standards and wages in U.S. and Mexico.
3. Possibility of sudden large import surges from Mexico.
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Economic Integration
• NAFTA (continued)– Since NAFTA began, imports from Mexico have
risen and those from Asia have decreased.– Chile is on the waiting list to join.
• Free Trade Area of the Americas due to be completed no later than 2005.– 34 countries
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Economic Integration
• MERCOSUR– Formed in 1991– Includes Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay.– 1994: became a customs union with average CET
of 14%.– Intra-MERCOSUR trade increased 400% in first 4
years.
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Interregional Trade
• Sometimes interregional trade becomes international trade:– Breakup of Soviet Union.– Reacquisition of Hong Kong by China.– Role of factor mobility
• Labor and capital move more easily within than between countries due to both natural and policy-induced barriers to intercountry mobility.
– Role of economic policy• At times, governments show their ambivalent feelings
toward trade by applying different trade rules in different regions of a country.
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Interregional Trade
• Role of economic policy (cont.)– Most common form of subnational trade policy:
• Special Economic Zones (SEZs)– Allow more generous rules for trade and for inward foreign
direct investment than apply in rest of country.
– Example: China
• Export-Processing Zones– Concentrate on attracting firms that assemble products for
export.
– Example: Mexico’s maquiladora program.
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Notes for Case Two
• Do Political/Economics Boundaries Really Matter?– An economic map of China (Figure 9.8) shows
that costal provinces have higher per capita income levels than interior provinces.
• Beginning in 1978, China opened up special economic zones (SEZs), which were located primarily in costal provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian.
• In 1999 all provinces were allowed to create SEZs.
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Figure 9.8: Chinese Per-Capita by Province, 1999
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Notes for Case Three
• Life before the NAFTA– Figure 9.9 depicts the maquiladora establishments
in Mexico in 1996.• The region along the southern side of the U.S.-Mexican
border is a major center of electronic assembly operations.
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Figure 9.9: Maquiladora Establishments, 1996
Mexico City
Tijuana(Canon, Casio,
Hitachi, Hyundai, Iwai, Matsushita,
Pioneer, Samsung, Sanshi,
Sanyo, Toshiba)
Mexicali (Daewoo, LG Electronics, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Sony, JVC)
San Luis Rio Colorado (Daewoo)
Ciudad Juarez (Canon, Mizumo,TDK, Toshiba, Yozaki, Zenith)
Mexico
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Key Terms in Chapter 9
• Section 201
• Mercantilism
• Smoot-Hawley tariff bill of 1930
• Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)
• International Monetary Fund (IMF)
• World Bank
• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
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Key Terms in Chapter 9
• Escape clause
• Safeguards
• Multifiber Agreement (MFA)
• Trade Adjustment Assistance
• Codes
• Uruguay Round
• Fast Track
• Integration
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Key Terms in Chapter 9
• Preferential trading arrangements (PTA)
• Free-trade area
• Customs union
• Common external tariff (CET)
• Common market
• Economic union
• Trade diversion
• Trade creation
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Key Terms in Chapter 9
• Special economic zone (SEZ)
• Export-processing zone