chapter v singapore s security and the extra-...
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CHAPTER V
SINGAPORE 1 S SECURITY AND THE EXTRA-REGIONAL POWERS: INTERESTS AND RESPONSES
CHAPTER V
SINGAPORE 1 S SECURITY AHD THE EXTRAREGIONAL POWERS: INTERESTS AND RESPONSES
Following the British decision of withdrawal in 1967
' and keeping in view its hightened security concerns, the
form of linkages that Singapore should have with the external
powers acquired utmost policy significance. To get the
maximum advantages in terms of security with the least cost
was a challenging diplomatic exercise. The possibility for
gaining such an advantage was how to manipulate itself into
the sphere of interest of a great power. This could be done
by demonstrating that a hostile superpower could gain a
Btrategic preponderence if given access to the area.
Singapore's immediate concern was the pattern of inter-
action of the big powers in Southeast Asia. Although these
powers had maintained dialogue among themselves, from the
point of view of Singapore leaders, fhis sort of detente had
not led to any meaningful reduction in international power
1 politics. In Southeast Asia the influence of the big powers
had continued to be felt. China was likely to re-assert its
influence over this region (which ~t had been doing centuries
before southeast Asia came under the impact of Western colonalisr
1The Nation, (Singapore), 5 September 1972,, p.4.
217
Its support to the various communist movements had alceady
been a source of concern to the national governments in the
region. The U.S.S.R. was also keen to move into Southeast
Asia partly to counter-balance the influence of China and also
to have access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans for its fast
growing naval strength. Japan, another major power, had looked
upon the region not only as a source of valuable raw materials
as well as markets for its products but also as an important
waterway through which most of its oil supplies from West Asia
had to pass.
Wi·th the depart·1re of European colonialism the United
States was the only major power in Southeast Asia. Apart from
their military involvement in Indochina, the Americans also had
substantial milltar.y bases in 'rhail~;d l.iY~ the Philippines, the
two countries in the region whj_ch had joined the u.s.-sponsored
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). To Singapore,
the presence of the United States was of utmost importance
for the overall stability of the region. 2 The Americans,
according to Singapore leaders had endeavoured to thwart the
expansion of communists' influence and encroachment in the
region. In a speech given at the Asian Business Briefing
organised by the Financ:~<?-~_!_i_rne_~ (London) in Bangkok on 28 June,
1976, foJJ.~r Hinister s. R.ajaratnam observed:
2see Chan Heng chee & Obaid ul Haq, ed., ]."'he Prophetic and the Political: Selected spPeches & writings of S.Rajaratnam; (Singapore, New York, 1987), pp.291-93.
218
Given the present uncertainty of the Americans about their role in South and Southeast Asia, they might readily agree to a somewhat more etherial presence in Southeast Asia. As it is they have withdrawn from Vietnam. There is at best only a symbolic presence in Thailand. There are rumours about cutting down en commitments in Korea and Taiwan. After their experience in Vietnam and the readiness with which Asians take up anti-American causes, one can understand if Americans have developed an aversion for Asia and things Asian. 'J'he current strategic thinking in the United States appears to be of an island defense system with mainland Asia excluded and only with Japan at the periphery. Let me be quite frank about this. Should we in Southeast Asia willingly or unwillingly encourage this trend in the United States then what we would in fact achieve is not a region free of great power domination but an area exposed to the tnfl uence of one great power - the Soviet Union.,.,.
In so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is no doubt about the role she intends to play in the region. Her policy in regard to South east Asia is activist, consistent, and credible ••••
And as far as Si.ngapore is concerned, we will continue to maintain gooq relations with the Soviet Union but at the same time resist, on our own, or through the collective strength that ASEAN provides, any Soviet influence or pressure which we believe would be detrimental to our national interests or to our non-communist way of life.(3)
The leaders in Singapore seemed to entertain two possible
fears. First, any sudden decision by the US government to with-
draw from the region could lead to a scramble for influence
by the world's major powers not interested in regional stability.
This might lead to ihstability in the region. Quite possibly,
it implied that China would not object to continued American
3rbid, pp.293-94.
-
219
influence mainly because premature withdrawal by the United
States would tantamount to inviting the Soviet Union to
exert its influence in the region. In view of the existing
power balance and the territorial and the ideological conflictf
with the U.s.s.R., the Chinese would rather tolerate American
than soviet presence. The second reason could be attri-
buted to the Singapore leaders' belief that the Southeast
Asian states were currently undergoing a cri-tical stage of
economic and political development. The resolve on the part
of the ruling elites to build up non-communist political systen
could be seriously shakened, if America chose to opt out of the
region. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stressed this point in a
speech at a banquet in honour of the American Vice-President in
April 1970. He observed:
What Southeast Asia needs is a climate of confidence, continuing security and stability in which constructive endeavour can become rewarding. It also need to have the spirit of success. This spirit can be gener(ited as enthusiasm spreads when their own efforts brings growth and progress. Time-tabling and fixing dates will negate both the climate of confide:nce and the spirit of success ••• A4) ·
It was because of this time-gaining perception that the
Singapore leaders did not show much optimism over the US-Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam agreement on Ending the War and
Restoring Peace in January 1973. In Singapore's view the agree
ment did not guarantee peace in the region since the basic
sources of conflict had not ceased to exist.
4Asia Pacific Rscords, vol.l, No.1, April 1970, p.17.
It is with this perception in mind that: the extra
regional power's interests and stakes in the geo-politically
significant and economically viable Singapore should be studied
as it figures into their foreign policy calculations. In this
regard, an analysis of the policies of China, Japan, the Soviet
Union and Australia, their ability to influence Singapore's
foreign policy and its concern for security and the Singapore
government's responses towards the same would be in order here.
As regards the US policies for the
separate chapter is devoted to the
Singapore and the Peoples' Republic of China
purpose of convience a
5 same.
Singapore's attitude towards China's approach tO\-lards
the region during 1970s could be better explained and understood
in the context of the latter's interests in Southeast Asia, its
state of relations with the ASEAN states and its rivalry with
the Great Powers.
Lying on its southern periphery, historically Southeast
Asia had been of interest to China. In recent years it happened
to be a region in which its rivals had attempted to exert and
expand their influence at it~ expense·. As such, it had always
feared that one or more of them, acting on its own or in
"colusion" with each other, may encourage Southeast Asian states
to adopt anti-Chinese policies or setup organizations
5see Chapter VI.
2ll
aimed against China itself. As a result, of its objectives in
the region had been to convince the Southeast Asian countries
not to align themselves with its rivals. The other had been
to seek minimization of the activities and influPnce of its
opponent.~ while expanding its mm. 'rhe regional states ;·Jhich
refus~d to adopt a nonaligned approach in their foreign policies
and, on the contrary, were more favourably disposed to its
rivals than to itself were considered unsympathetic to Chinese
6 interests.
China's initial reaction to ASEAN were influenced by its
belief that the five founder members v.;ere not only inimical to
its interests but were receptive to attempts by its major rivals ·
the US in particular - to contain the expansion of its influence.
The state of relations between the ASEN~ countries on the one
hand and China, the US and the U.s.s.R. on the other appeared
to indicate that the former were favourably disposed towards
L'"hina • s rivals.
When ASEAN was formed in 1967, four of its founder members-
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia- had neither
recognized nor had diplomatic relations with China. Only one,
Indonesia, had formal ties which were suspended following the
1965 coup in Jakarta. In contrast, all the five countries had
diplomatic relations with the u.s., then considered by China to
6Khaw Guat Hoon, "Recent Developments in Chlna-ASEAN Relations", Southeast Asian Affairs, 1979, p.61.
222
be its major adversary. Not only this, two of them- the
Philippines and Thailand- had not only bilateral security
arrangements with Washington but had also been members of
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which was
undeniably an US-sponsored organization aimed at containing
the expansion of Chinese communism in Southeast Asia. While
the other three ASEAN countries - Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore - had no security arrangements with the u.s. nor had
·thHy joined SEATO. They were, nevertheless, known to have pro-
u.s. orientation and were sympathetic to the American goal of
containing China.
Given the perception of these countries as hostile to
its interests and sympathetic to the anti-Chinese and anti-
communist objectives of the u.s., Beijing looked upon the
Association as pro-American and anti-Chinese. It considered
ASEAN to be a "military alliance directed specially against
C:.."hina" brought into existence by the "reactionary cliques" in
7 these five countries at the "behest" of the u.s.
Along with its criticism of ASEAN being a "tool of u.s.
imperialism", China also alleged that it was an instrument of
Soviet "Social imperialism". The Chinese leaders thought that
the Americans and the soviets were . 8
common goal of containing China.
in "Collusion" in aff_M&r/Ly
Although,,Beijing
7Peking Review, 18 August 1967, p.40.
8 Khaw Guat Hoon, n.6, p.62.
their
at that
223
time directed its barage of criticism on u.s., it also tended
to look upon the Soviet: Union as a threat to its interests and
was growing suspicious of Soviet moves in the region. It
perceived any improvement in ASEAN- Soviet relations as an
indication of "collusion" against itself and of ASEAN's anti-
Chinese sentiments.
Singapore and Chinaz Diplomatic Considerations
The political image projected by China and its geo-
graphical proximity made it a central reference point in
Singapore's foreign policy and security considerations. The
question of diplomatic relations with China was quite complex.
The Singapore leaders considered the Chinese behaviour in the
region as detrimental to their national interest because of
certain reasons. First, the Chinese had been consistently
supporting the communist led liberation movements of Southeast
9 Asia by giving moral and also material support to them. It
was these forces which had launched insurgency movements against
the established governments of most of the Southeast Asian
states. Although as a result of growing normalization in Sino-
u.s. relations in 1971-72, China had reduced its highly provo-
cative attitude towards these states, it had not softened it
10 altogether.
9see Dick Wilson, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia (New York, London, 1976), p.117.
10Ibid, p.118. ~--
224
Secondly, China had been giving asylum to the leaders
of various communist parties of Southeast Asia. The first
vice-chairman of the Communist Party of Burma, U Ba Thein T±n,
and the leading central committee member of the Communist Party
of Indonesia, Jusuf Adjitorop, were among the two outstanding
exiles resident in China. The latter was the leader of what
had remained of the pro-Chinese group within the comnunist Party
of Indonesia. Besides, A senior leader of the Communist Party
of Malaya had on occasion made an appearance in Beijing. 11
The third irritating factor was no less importan·t.
The position of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had been
difficult and controversial all along. In the years immediately
following the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Prime Hinister (.'0({.1'\{h..i<A
Chou-en-Lai had encouraged the Chinese in Southeast Asian,.to
become citizens of the states in which they reside. 12 The ouch
Nationality Treaty, which China had concluded with Indonesia in
1958 was an example of this changed chinese position (in the frame
work of which the local Chinese in Indonesia were given the
option to decide between Indonesian or Chinese citizenship, v•ith
the Chinese government accepting the responsib1.li ty ;for re
patriation of those who chose Chinese citizenship. 13
11stratts Time-s(Kuala Lumpur), 10 September 1967, p.13.
12Beijing Review(Beijing), 7 June 1965, p.lO.
13Ibid.
225
A deviation from this new policy approach came when
China had been going through 'cultural revolution'. The
Chinese government changed its position encouraging the over
seas Chinese to rebel against the host governments and incul
cate Maoist revolutionary ethos. It was flagrant intervention
of this kind during the period of the cultural revolution,
particularly in Burma, a country (which had been quite friendly.
to China earlier) that dismayed ahd alarmed the Southeast Asian
governments.
Though in a formal diplomatic sense, Singapore did not
maintain any diplomatic relations with Beijing, it did not lose
sight of the fact that many of its citizens identified themselves
with Mao and his thoughts as well as the PRC. An unknown number
of Singaporean Chinese were both culturally and ideologically
prone to the Chauvinistic appeals from the PRC. Also many of
them had family relations in China. The SingRpore government
believed that it must be cautious in making any decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China. In this connection it must' first consider the effects
of Chinese Chauvinism. Secondly, it could not ignore a widely
held opinion among the Singaporeans that any rapproachment with
Beijing would help the communist opposition in the country. A
shift in the already tenuous balance between the right and the
left in Chinese community would impose significant stratns on
the nation-building process in Singapore. Moreover, recognition
of the Peoples• Republic, the establishment of embassy and the
~sultant influx of diplomats and employees of the New China
226
News Agency would also alarm Singapore's neighbours and
friends especially Malaysia and Indonesia.14
In the 1960s nelther China nor Singapore felt that
their security would be enhanced by extending diplomatic
recognition to or establishing relation with each other. 15
However, keeping in view the traumatic changes in the
regional and global setting, there was a growing conviction
in both the countries that a normalization in their relations
would be in their national interests. Both sides had their
own reason for wanting such an improvement.
China had become increasingly concerned with the Soviet
Union's activities in Asia and less perturbed with those of the
u.s., especially as it interpreted American disengagement from
Vietnam and the Nixon Doctrine (which called for a lesser Americ
military role) as an indication of waning u.s. power in the
region. China did not want to see the u.s.S.Ro emerging as the
major power in the wake of the perceptible decline
in the American influence. This was all the more so since the
u.s. had begun to indicate a willingness to improve its
relations with Beijing. 16
14see Pang Cheng Lian, "Why Singapore needs to move cautiously in its relations with China", New Nation(Singapore), 9 March 1972, p.6.
15straits Times(Singapore), 13 July 1965, p.3.
16Khaw Guat Hoon, n.6, p.63.
227
China viewed the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnew's proposal
for an Asian collective security system, first announced about
three months after the Sino-S-JViet armed clashes across the
Ussuri River in March 1969, as not only an attempt to encircle
China but as evidence of Soviet desire to replace the u.s. as
the major power in Asia. 17 Faced with this growing Soviet
concern, China paid more and more attention to improve its
relations with Southeast Asian countries.
At this juncture, Singapore on its part was also re-
evaluating its policy towards Beijing in the wake of certain
international developments which had an effect on its own
security and the political stability of the region. These
developments were.Britain's desire to withdraw East of Suez
and abrogate the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement, the announce
ment of the Nixon Doctrine and President Nixon's move t~ improve
relations with China and the us decision to disengage from
Vietnam. All these developments induced Singapore to shoulder
a greater responsibility for its own security and survival.
The British decisions were of direct relevance to
Singapore. Singapore realised that it had to be self-reliant
in external defense. That is why it showed its uneasiness over
the new power configuration emerging in the aftermath of the
British withdrawal and u.s. disengagement. At the same time it
1crBeijing Review(Beijing), 10 July 1969, p.l.
229
it was still confronted with the Chinese inspired and supported "ft.. Y<.at" 1
f communist subversion. It thought that a friendlier pollcy
towards Beijing ~ight make it less inclined to render suppprt
to communist insurgencies in the area. 17
Thus, in the early 1970s, Singapore began to make efforts
to improve relations with China. This led to exchange of trade
and sports delegations and building of co;1tacts, both at the
official and nonofficial levels. 18
Singapore's relations with China had improved consider-
ably by the mid-1970s. Beijing no longer viewed ASEAN as an
anti-Chinese association opposed to its interests. At the same-
time, because China no longer viewed the u.s. as its major rival,
it stopped criticising Singapore's relations-with Washington.
By 1975, Beijing was expressing its support for ASEAN and praising
its aims and achievements. 19
On 10 May 1976, Lee Kuan Yew 'paid a visit to China.
Although there were no diplomatic relations between the two
countries, the Chinese gave the Singaporean Prime Minister a
warm welcome. Premier Hua-Kuo-Feng indeed noted that Singapore
leader's visit would "certainly help enhance the mutual under-
20 standing and friendly relations" between the two countries.
17straits Times(Singapore), 5 January 1969, p.4.
18~bid, 10 February 1970, p.5.
19rbid, 3 October 1975, p.17.
20Beijing ReviE:!W, 13 May 1976, p.1.
229
On 11 May, nua Kuo Feng gave China's strongest endorse-
ment of the political and economic objectives of the ASEAN
describing as "posi.tive" its proposal for the establishment of 21
a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia.
Ass~~/ng the Singaporean guest Prime Minister, he observed:
"China is a developing socialist country belonging to the Third
World. No country has a right to carry out aggression subver~
sion, control, interference, or bullying against other countries. 22
China will never be a super-power now or in the near future".
yew Responding to Hua Kuo Feng's views, Lee Kuan commented
" on China's position vis-a-vis the region, especially towards
the ASEAN and said:
China has expressed her support for ASEAN. I hop(El, others inside and outside the region, will also understand the objectives of ASEAN and support •••• That of the big countries, China is the one nearest to Southeast Asia. Indeed, she is .a part of Asia, and her p)licies will be a major factor in the evolving situation in Southeast Asia. I hope, after this visit, our relations will grow and broaden. On many international issues at the United Nations, we have found ourselves in agreement with you. However, it is to be expected that there will be difference of views in some areas because of different national interests or ideology. These need not prevent us from improving our aultural, trade and other relations.(23)
At the Fifth National Peoples' Congress held in 1978,
Hua Kuo Feng expressed his Government's wish to establish diplo
matic relations with all countries, particularly with Singapore
and Indonesia. 24
21see Asian Recorder, 15-21 July 1976, p.13257. Beijing ~eview(Beiji~g), 13 May 1976, p.l.
22 Ibid.
23. Ibh( _
230
As regards diplomatic relations, Singapore leaders had
stated on many occasions that their country would be the last
among the ASEAN group to do so. Their argument was that normal-
ization of diplomatic relations with China could take place
only after Indonesia had acted first. 25 This showed how
important Indonesia figured in their foreign policy calculations.
Later, during Teng Hsiao Peng's visit to Singapore in
November 1978, Lee Kuan Yew told the Chinese leader that
Singaporean Chinese were carving out a future for themselves
in the region and that they realized that their fate depended
"directly on Singapore's future in Southeast Asia and not on
26 China's future among the front ranks of industrial nations".
Singaporeans have come to realize that just as they canot afford to sacrifice their national interests for China, so they cannot expect China to sacrifice her national interests for Singapore. (27)
Singapore and China: Economic Interaction
Since its'independence and particularly after the British
decision of withdrawal, Singapore had been pressing forward with
the strategy of economic development focused on industrialization
and the import of technology for the development of oil, electroni
24Beijing Review(Beijing), 15 February 1978, p.11.
25straits Times(Singapore), 9 June 1978, p.4.
26 Asia Week, 24 November 1978, p.13.
231
and shipping industries. In the pursuance of its industrial!-
zation policy, it favoured free trade in order to encourage
exports. China had a huge population, large ma~ket and subs-
tantial natural resources while, on the contrary, Singapore
lacked natural resources and had a limited market. It had to
rely on the resources of other countries and international
market for its economic survival. For this reason despite its
political differences Singapore attached much importance to
increase cooperation with Chinese, in the fields of economy,
trade and technology. Singapore sought to achieve this objective
through realistic attitude of its leaders towards China and
through the long-term efforts made by the commercial, industrial,
and financial circles of these two couocries. China's adoption
of the policy of opening up to the outside world in 1979 had
resulted in a major break~hrough in Singapore-China economic
relations, with the scope for co-operation extending from trade
to other fields, to the mutual advantage of both the countries.
The analysis of the trade statistics given in the table '
(Table 1 shows that although the grade between Singapore and s
China grew in volume fromr$ 593.25 million in 1969 toS$ 906.2
million in 1978, its percentage in the Singapore's total external
trade gradually declined from 5.4 percent in 1969 to 1.7 percent
in 1978. The total import from China grew from US $ 113.4 million
in 1968 to us $ 420.91 million in 1980. Similarly export from
Singapore grew from US $ 46.80 million in 1968 to US $ 189.85
million in 1980.
Table 1
Singapore's Trade With China, 1968-1980 ( S $ million)
232
~-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.- -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-Year Imports Exports Total Trade %age Singapore's
$ $ $ total trade ----1968 113.40 46.80 160.20(US $m) o:';
(US $m) (US $m)
1969 418.49 174.76 593.25 5.40
1970 385.5 69.4 454.9 3.70
1971 406.7 46.6 453.3 3.2
1972 399.1 57.4 456.3 2.9
1973 573.2 128.4 701.6 3.3
1974 443.9 125.8 769.7 2.2
1975 682.0 98.5 780.5 2.4
1976 659.0 95.4 755.4 1.9
1977 670.4 144.7 815.1 1.8
1978 775.5 130.7 906.2 1.7
1919 296.45 104.70 401.15 (US $m) (US $m) (US $m)
1980 420.91 189.85 610.76 (IDS $m) (US Sm) (US $m)
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.
Source: Singapore Facts and Pictures, 1969-1978. (Singapore, A Ministry of Culture Publication) and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Yearbook 1981; Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, China, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade.
233
The Singapore-China trade rose considerably since the
two countries had signed a trade agreement in December 1979.
Total trade turnover reached US $ 0.401 billion in that year,
and US $ 0•610 billion in 198o. 29
Singapore and Japan
It would be useful tm approach Singapore's ties with
Japan in the overall Japanese ASEAN/regional perspective. After
its military retreat from southeast Asia at the end of the
Second World War, Japan had managed to return to the region
and reasserted its influence in a ver',' different way. It was
first through reparation arrangements, and later through trade
and aid with individual Southeast Asian countries. With the
United States as its ally and with guaranteetfsecurity provided
to it under the US-Japan Mutual Security Pact, Japan was able to
focus its attention and marshal its resources for the resurgence
of economic power, while leaving all foreign policy initiatives
in the region to the Americans. Interestingly, by the nineteen
seventies, Japan had already overtaken the United States in its
trade with Southeast Asia. As economic ties between Japan and
Southeast Asia grew and as Japan's own global ec~nomy expanded,
the region of Southeast Asia in general and the five ASEAN
countries in particular had become increasingly important to
Japan because of many reasons. First, the region was one of the
major supplier of raw materials for Japan's grO\ving industries.
Secondly, the region was a substantial market for Japanese exports,
Thirdly, ASEAN was an important area for Japan's overseas investmen
28 See Table 1.
In addition, the geographical location of the area also
provided vital link between Japan and the countries in Europe,
West Asia, Africa, and South-Western Asia. It was estimated
that approximately 40 percent of Japan's world imports and 78
percent of its vital crude oil supplies passed through the
Straits of Malacca. Goods from Australia and New Zealand also
had to pass through Makassar Straits.
Poli t.ically, the ASEAN count:r:-ies 1.vere important to Japan
mainly in the context of the Asia-Pacific region and its global
strategy. With their basically anti-communist governments and
with economies integrated with the non-communist nations, five
ASEAN countries were seen by the Japanese as allies of their
country in the regional balance of power. The Japanese support
and cooperation to them would definitely enhance Japan's position
in the international community while their political stability
and friendly disposition would guarantee Japan the accessibility
to its most vital life-line, the straits of Malacca. Strategi
cally it was the main watersway for the Japanese fleet to reach
the Indian Ocean.
Japanese Prime Minister, Fukuda for the first time (year
not available) in Japan's post-war diplomatic history, putforth
publicly Jap-=m 1 s policy towards Southeast Asia. The main points
of the Fukuda Doctrine were that Japan will (i) not become a
military power; (2) pursue "heart to heart" understanding with
the ASEAN countries not only in politics and economies but also
social and cultural spheres; (3) cooperate with ASEAN as an
235
"equal partner" in its effort to consolidate its members and
to strengthen their resilience while, at the sametime, try
29 to establish relations with the Indochinese states.
Singapore's Response
Keeping the above perspective in mind the Singapore
leaders thought that the active cooperation with Japan, a
strongest non-military, non-communist economic power in the
region, would enhance economic progress and ensure political
survival of the Republic. This was all the more assuring for
them to note that Japan had become the most likely friend and
supporter of the ASEAN. Although prior to 1966 Singaporeans we.
critical of both individual Japanese and Japan as a whole.
Memories of Japanese atrocities committed by them during the
30 war and the brutalities perpetrated by them during the occu-
pation period (1942-45) lingered in the minds of ·the
Singaporean people· in general and those ·in authority in
particular. Relations between Japanese business~n and their
counterparts in Singapore were strained because the Japanese,
on occasion, had shown themselves to be arrogant, clanish, and
disinterested in anything 'other than observing their own customs
and making the best possible business dea1. 31
29Lai Fung-wai, Frances, Wibhout A Vision: Japan's Relations with ASEAN, Occasional Papers, No.1Q(Singapore: Nation University of Singapore), 1981, p.S.
30 Straits Times(Singapore), 5 July 1966, p.2.
31see Kenneth Young, Southeast Asian Attitude and Expectations concernin;J Japan(New York, 1970), pp.23-4.
236
Initially, the delicate question of reparations to
Southeast Asian countries under its occupation had checked the
establishment of normal relations until 1956. 32 Continuing
negotiations regarding the quantum and quality of the repara
tions enabled Japan to enter into Southeast Asia - in the mid-
nineteen fifties. In most cases Japan offered credits which were
tied to the purchase of capital goods manufactured in Japan
along with dmvestment participation and exchange of products.
The Japanese continued to place heavy reliance on Southeast
Asia for its natural resources.
The relationship between Singapore and Japan since 1965
had been one of inter-dependence and respect for. each other's
capabilities. Keeping in view its own development priorities,
Singapore welcomed increased Japanese investments and a higher
proportion of exports to Japan. On 25 September 1967, during
Primier Sato visit to Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
in his welcome speech, told his Japanese counterpart:
That Chapter (of Japanese occupation) is closed although not forgotten •••• Twentyfive years ago it would have been impossible to imagine the circumstances which have enabled my colleagues and me to welcome you to Singapore today.
How it happened is the history of the last twentyfive years. Perhaps everyone has grown a little wiser in the meanwhile.(33)
32see Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan, "Some countries have misgivings about Japan", reprinted in AsiaPacific Record Basic Documents and vital speeches, vol.l, no.S, August 1970_ pp.12-16.
33cited in Straits Times, 25 September 1967, p.1.
237
As regards Japanese businessmen, diplomats and tourists,
there was considerably less anti-Japanese sentiment in Singapore
than in other Southeast Asian countries under Japanese occupation.
In course of time there had grown a degree of commonality of
interest, especially in the Singaporean and Japanese business
relationships because Singapore had a stable political climate,
a labour movement usually under control, and a government
34 oriented towards economic development.
Economic Cooperation
Japan entered into agreement in 1967, 1970, 1972 and
1973. In the field of economic interaction, Singapore and
Japan had under these agreements made a commitment to Singapore
of¥ 12,740 million (roughl~S$ 106.2 million) in loans and I
provided¥ 2,,40 million (roughly S $ 24.5 million) in grants. 35
The economic assistance extended by Japan was used for constru-
cting a shipyard, a satallite earth station, a thermal power
plant etc.
In May 1977, the Japanese government decided to support
a petro-chemical complex project in Singapore_ the total cost
of which was estimated to be¥ 180 billion. 36 It was expected
to contribute to the growth of Singapore's economy and as a
consequence, greatly enhahce the existing frrendly relations
between the two countries.
34 Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.68, No.13, !,1arch 26, 1970, p.6s.
35outline of Japan's Basic Policies And Japan-Singapore Relations(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1977), p.12.
36Ibid. -
238
As regards government-sponsored technical cooperation,
Japan had accepted 1,455 trainees from Singapore and dispatched
593 experts during 1966-1976, and material and equipment worth
V 37 million by March 1977. In 1970-71 the Japanese provided
assistance to the tune of ¥ 51 million under technical coopera-
tion in the construction of a Japanese garden in Jurong. Anothei
project carried out under Japan's technical cooperation scheme
was the Prototype Production and Training Centre to which Japan
supplled personnel as well as ¥ 195 million worth of equipment
between 1966 and 1972.
Investment from Japan
Japanese investment in Singapore also showed a rapid
rise. 37 According to an estimate, from an investment equi.valent
to S $ 27 million in 1965, it had risen to S $ 61 million by
1970, thus showing more than a double increase. 38 As of the end
of March 1977, the balance of Japanese investments in Singapore
stoodi•.et: US $ 278 million, an increase of us $ 52 million since
March 1976. 39 Japanese investments occupied 1' percent of the
total amount of foreign investments in Singapore, which ranked
Japan as Singapore's third largest invester country after ·the
United States and the United Kingdom. 40
37 See Pang Cheng Lian, "Long-term welcome", Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.25, No.lO, 4 March 1972, p.65.
38Ibid.
39outline of Japna's Basic Policies and Japan Singapore Relations, no.~6, p.12.
40Ibid.
239
By June 1977, the number of Japan-Singapore joint
ventures in Singapore had grown to be about 250 (projected
enterprises). About 180 of these were in the manufacturing
field. Joint ventures between the two countries covered a
wide variety of industries, such as shipbuilding, industrial
machinery, precision machinery, chemical production, foodstuff
production, construction, insurance, transportation and so on.
Trade
In the field of trade the balance of trade between
Singapore and Japan had, since 1963, been heavily weighted in
Japan's favour. The ratio of trade deficit remained low until
1969 when imports from Japan took a quantum jump and it conti
nued through 1970s. Officials in Singapore had been concerned
at this severe imbalance in bilateral trade. Although they
demonstrated their ability to cover this continuing balance
of trade deficit with invisible income (i.e. tourist spending
in Singapore, etc.) over a long period, the problem was c~ng
great difficulties. There was a continuing demand in Singapore
for Japanese finished products (e.g. motor cycles, television
sets, etc). On their part, the manufacturers in Singapore were
finding it nearly impossible to sett their finished good in
the Japanese market, thus causing imbalance in trade. This
could be seen from the data given. ;., ~ \table 2 •
Table 2
Singapore's Trade with Japan, 1968-1980 (S $ million)
240
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.- .. Year Imports Exports Total Trade %Singapore's
$ $ $ total trade
1968 971.7 10.8
1969 1018.89 336.31 1355.20 12.34
1970 1458.0 /65'· 8 832.0 14.1
1971 1699.6 379.8 2 079.4 14.8
1972 1874.5 392.4 2266.9 14.5
1973 2295.5 713.3 3008.8 14.1
1974 36 53.9 1610.5 5264.4 15.2
1975 3254.3 1112.9 4367.2 13.6
1976 3590.8 1668.8 5259.6 13.6
1977 4474.0 1918.1 6392.1 14.0
1978 5668.2 22 26. 0 7894.2 15.0
1979 3025.3 1189.2 4214.5
1980 Jan/ 4166.8 1797 5964.3 June
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. Sourcez Singapore, Singapore Facts and Pictures,
A Ministry of Culture Publication,and Department of Statistics, Singapore.
241
An analysis of the above data shows that despite this
imbalance in trade, year after year Singapore's trade with
Japan had been growing steadily. After West Malaysia Japan
became the second largest trade partner which maintained a
trade amo~nting toS$ 971.7 million or 10.8 percent of Singcpore•s
total trade in 1968. This represented an increased ofS$ 267.5
million over that of 1967. Total trade increased from S $ 971.7
million in 1968 to S $ 1,355.2 million in 1969. Japan had taken
over from West Malaysia as Singapore's leading t~ade partner
since 1970. Singapore's total trade with Japan rose to 2079.4
• million in 1971. This accounted for 14.8 percent of the Republics
total trade. In 1974 Japan which accounted for 15.2 percent of
Singapore's total trade, became the Republic's leading trade
partner. Japan had been among the Singapore's three leading
partners in 1977 accounting for 14 percent of total trade and
retained its leading position in 1978 contributing 15 percent
to Singapore's total ~rade.
By commodity, products of the heavy and chemical industries
accounted for 82 percent of Japan's exports to Singapore. Main
items included machinery, ships, iron and steel. As for Japan's
imports from Singapore, pE:!troleum products occupied an over-
whelmingly large share of 71 percent in 1976. The increase in
Japan's imports from Singapore in 1976, particularly petroleum
products (56 percent i.ncrease over the previous year), palm oil
45 percent, textile yarn and threa~ 129 percent, and crude
rubber 35 percent, contributed substantially towards the
realization of balanced trade relations, which were still in
42 Japan's favour.
- ..,..,.
242
Singapore and Soviet Union
Singapore leaders had observed that the threat to the
security of the Republic came not only from the internal
communist subversion or China, but also from direct Soviet
involvement in the region. Soviet Union's condemnation of
ASEAN (since its incept1.on in 1967), its role in the
~Karrtpll.clllean- problem·, it~ security 't;:reaty· with-
Socialist Republic . of Vietnam in November 1978, and i·ts
general anti-U.s. policy both at the regional and the global
level, had made Singapore leaders aware of the fact that Soviet
Union had become power to be reckon with in the region. Thus
the Soviet aims in Southeast Asia and the challenge thei.r actions
posed to the interest of the ASEAN countries, as ,,.,ell_ as China
and United States provided the main refet'ence for Singa;,Jore 's
threat perceptions. It Honld therefore be important to have a
clear view of the Soviet objectives and ambitions in the reglon
and the Singapore's responses toward the same.
The Soviet Union had for long, important, if not vital,
interests in South East Asia. These flowed from several consi-
derations. The first related to the free use of the seas for . 43
navigation by Soviet naval and merchant vessels. The second
43George K. Osborn III, Balance of Power in Southeast Asia, Occasional Paper No.S3, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies(Singapore), 1978, p.1S.
243
represented an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to kpu.bL~~
prevent the peoples 'JI China·. ·and U.s. influence from growing
in the region, the third emanated from the Soviet Union's
desire to expand its political and economic influence where
feasible. The last related to its inclination to provide an
alternative source for communist ideological inspiration in
a region where many communist parties looked to it for such
44 ideological guidance.
The Soviet Union's strategic interest in the freedom of
navi,Jation through Southeast Aslan Waters was natural. Despite
improvements in land transport between Europe and the Soviet
Far East and increased use of Arctic shipping over the past
several years, sea lanes passing through Southeast Asitin
region remained an important link between the eastern and western
extremities of the u.s.s.R. In a narrow military sense, the
maintenance of balanced fleet deployments on a worldwide scale
enhanced Soviet interest in the regional straits and the South
China sea. The continuous Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean could play a role in the Southeast Asian strategic balance.
Maintenance of such a presence by deployments through the South
China Sea also provided visible evidence of Soviet interest.
The acquisition of Soviet base facilities in Danang and Cam
Ranh Bay bases in the SRV caused both regional and extra-
reg onal states to reevaluate their relations with the Soviet
Union.
244
There could be little doubt that for several years the
U.s.s.R. had embarked on a policy of containing China. The
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's call for an ASian collPctive
security arrangement was primarily directed against China, only
secondarily at the u.s •• In this context the Soviet support to
Vietnam and Laos are two instanceso The Soviets had made
available large-scale assistance to the S.R.V. and then there
was large scale infusion of Soviet advisors in Laos. These
clearly showed the concrete efforts on their p~1rt to check the
expansion of Peoples' Republic of China's influence in Southeast
Asia. Soviet support to the SRV in the latter's hostilities
with Kampurchaa rather reinforced the PRC's apprehensions. It
seemed unlikely that the U.s.s.R. would abandon its efforts to
limit the PRC's influence. 45 Conversely, one could argue that
it was the Chinese pol~cies that were pushing the SRV towards
a closer ambraces with the Soviet Union. It was in this context
that the ASEAN's particularly Indonesia's and Malaysia's concern
that emanated from the growing rivalry between China and the
Soviet Union in the region, should be appraised.
Added to the importance of the sea-lanes was the trade
the Soviet Union conducted with the Southeast Asian state,
especially in such raw materials as rubber. The expansion of
Soviet political and ec,)nomic influence was directed towards
convincing Southeast Asians that the U.s.s.R. did provide a
model for successful economic development for less developed
countries. 46
45George K. Osborn III,
46_, . ~
n.44, - p.16.
245
Thus, the rationale for the Soviet Union's presence
in the Straits of Malacca area was predicated upon its interests
in keeping the sea-lanes open from the Baltic ports of Western
Russia to the far eastern parts of eastern Russia. From Moscow's
point of view there were two important reasons for the Southeast
Asian sea-lanes :to.- remain open and avai !able for passage. The
first involved the deployment and "free passage of its fleet,
the second involved trade which although slowly growing in
importance, did not matfh t.he significance of the fact of the
47 Soviet naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Singapore shared the ASEAN's concerns about the Soviet
objectives and policy manifestation in the region. The
Soviet Union extensively used the straits of Malacca for its
warships, trawlers, and larger commercial ships. Although
greatly concerned, Singapore permitted the Soviet Union to frJY
use its facilities fueling, minor repair facilities, and as I'
a port of call for its ships. In 1970 approximately 520 Soviet
ships, most of them trawlers and fighters, availed themselves
of Singapore's services. 48 Singapore lay in the middle of the
arc w~ich began in the Baltic sea, extended around the cape of
Good Hope to Singapore, and from Singapore to Vladivostok. The
Soviet Ministry of Sea Transportation viewed Singapore as an
ideal repaj.r and replenishment point and focal point for
operations in Asia. 49
47~bi~ p.59.
48The New Nation, 28 August 1971, p.3.
49see Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew, Revised Edition(Singa
pore, 1971), p.586.
246
In keeping with these long-term and varied interests
in the region, the Soviet Union had been condemning the ASEAN
since its inception in August 1967. In the first few years the
Soviet Union perceived it as a "client of Capitalism". The
Soviet Union also claimed that t.he Pentagon planned to merge
ASEru~ with the Asia-Pacific Council (ASPAC) into one great
military bloc. The central theme of Moscow's condemnation was
the nature of ASEAN's relationship with Washington. The Soviet
Union's viow of ASEAN could be explained in various ways: Firstly,
1'-Ioscow interpreted the formation of ASEAN as a hostile .~hti-
corrununist organization aimed at halting the march of socialism
in the region; seconruy, its hostility could be underst0od in
the context of US 1~ies with the Association. All the five ASEAN
states were generally pro-West and especially pro.US in their
policy orientation. Thirdly, Moscow feared that ASEAN would
become a viable military pact, replacing the ineffective SEATO.
Finally, the Soviet Union's hostility could only have been
heightened by the fact that ASEAN was an area of considerable
importance but one where the Soviet influence was minima1. 50
Singapore's Responses
The international changes that had taken place since the
late 1960s had a tremendous impact on Singapore's policy towards
big power. Its policy towards the Soviet Union during 1970s
was the product of several factors like the latter's role in
the Kampurchean crisis of 1975, its security treaty of 1978 with
Vietnam, its anti-US policy and its critical attitude towards
50Bilveer Singh, ~iet Relations with ASEAN 1967-88 (Singapore, 1989), p.37.
ASEAN countries. Although Soviet Union did not rank as a
country of major importance to Singapore, Singa9ore had been
trying to maintain an equal distance with any of the major
powers, especially to avoid the image of playing a suppo~tive
role for the one that was looking for a foothold in this area.
As early as in 1967 an agreement had been reached between
Singapore and the Soviet Union that 11 ships 11 of the latter could
use the Singapore facilities. At that time there was no mention
of naval vessels, and as a result this question remained a topic
for speculation. 51 In September 1970 while in Europe P:t;j.me
Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated that Singapore would repair any
vessel from any country, provided that the peaceful conditions 5 ~yew
were maintained. 2 In March 1971, Lee,emphasized that the Soviet
naval presence in the I:r..dian and Pacific Oceans and the South
China Sea constituted a needed counter-balance to the presence
of the major powers. 53 Acco~ding to some press reports, a Soviet
technical mission had been in Singapore in February 1971, and
that the party included naval experts who had'been shown around
Sernbawang, the Naval Ship Yard. They were reported to be
interested in bunkering and repair facilities.
In November 1971, the defense arrangements agreed upon
by the Commonwealth Five Power Group went into effect. Australia•
Britain, and New zealand had stationed naval units at Sernbawang,
51New Nation(Singapore), 29 March 1971, p.3.
52Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew, revised edn., p.586.
53straits Times(Singapore), 28 March 1971, p.11.
249
in accordance with the defense agreement. Also, from time to
time ships of the u.s. Seventh Fleet used the facilities there.
The members of the Five-Power Defense Group were known to
have been making representation to Singapore government to
restrict Soviet usage of Singapore's facilities to commercial
shipping. 5 4
It was doubtful U~ether refusal of permission to Soviet
naval shipping to use Singapore's facilities would impair the
relations between Singapore and the Soviet Union. Moscow
had been cautious in its comments regarding Lee Kuan Yew's
stance. It had chosen, however, to speak on this question
in a different way. In December 1971 Moscow attacked the Five-
Power defense arrangements as being directed towards maintaining
the hegemony of Britain and SEATO in Southeast Asia. 55 In
January 1972 Radio Mosco,., asserted that the United States had
penetrated Singapore and that 11 Singapore had long since become
56 a land of promise for u.s. monopolies ...
As a matter of fact, following the British decision to
withdraw from the region, and the US decision t1j> 'll.sianise'
the Vietnam war as well as to lower its posture in the region,
Singapore along with other ASEAN emmbers had begun to look upon
the Soviet Union for future leverage against the incoming Chinese
54The Times(London), 29 March 1971, p.2. Also see editorial in New Nation(Singapore), 10 February 1972, p.8.
55 see Asia Research Bulletin, vo 1.1, No.8, J-anuary 197 2, p. 56 5.
5611 Radio Moscow 11 , reprinted in The Straits Times, 20 January, 1972, p.S.
249
57 influence as the retreated US power. They believed that the
US was an outgoing power and the Soviet Union incoming power, 1,--
and unlike China the Soviet Union had no links with the
domestic communist movements. Furthermore there was no 'overseas
RUssian' problem to complicate domestic politics or cause an
immediate threat. In that sense links with the Soviet Union
had been considered less risky gamble than with the PRc. 58
The developments in Cambodia in early 1970, hov:ever,
added a new dimension to Singapore's attitude towards the Soviet
Union. In March this ye~r Lon Nol overthrew President Sihanouk,
a pro-US military general, to the discomfiture of the Soviet
Union.
Between the late 1971 and April 1975, the Soviet attitude
to ASEAN remained unchanged. It still accused ASE~~ of being
associated with Washington, while at the same time giving half-
hearted praise to any moves that would disadvantage the Western
59 powers.
The events in Indochina since late 1978, had, however,
created a tense situation in Southeast Asia. The growing Soviet
involvement in Indochina, especially in SRV, alarmed Singapore
and other ASEAN countries. The divergence of perceptions
57Bilveer Singh, Soviet Relations with ASEAN 1967-88 (Singapore: National University of Singapore, 1989), p.39.-
58Ibid. 59Ibid.
250
represented in it was bound to have still adverse impact on
Soviet Union's relations with individual ASEAN countries.
In view of growing tension between Vietnam and Kampuchea
on the one hand and between Vietnam and the PRC on the other,
simultaneously with the increasing involvement of the Soviet
Union, Singapore and other ASEAN states began a spate of acti-
vities highlighting the tense and uncertain state of affairs
j .. n the region.
The Vietnamese invasion of Kamnurchea and the forcj_ble
ousting of Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge government in Phnom Pen/,
shocked Singapore. Singapore accused the Soviet Union for
creating instability in the region. It also levelled accusations
against the Soviet Union for supporting diplomatically, militarily,
and economically, Hanoi's expansionist shcemes in Southeast
Asia. 6 0
eM-The Vietnam occupation of Kampuchea with ,the political
t and military support of the Soviet Union had clearly placed
Singapore and Moscow on different sides of the fence. Relations
between the two countries had deteriorated sharply. This was
largely the result of ASEAN diplomatic initiative in the inter-
national arena in which the former accused both the SRV and the
60 See s. Rajaratnam's speech at a Mass Rally on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the People's Action Party at the National Theatre(Singapore) on 20 January 1981. See Singapore Government Press Release(Singapore:Ministry of Culture, Information Division, 1981), Ref.No.092/81-0l/20. Also see The Straits Times, 10 January 1981.
2 5'.
USSR of being the main causes of the Kampuchean crisis. 61
A senior minister of state for foreign affairs, s.
Dhanabalan, declared on 20 March 1980 that Singapore would
hot service Soviet naval vessels or military planes. He
declared: 11 A few Soviet naval auxiliary ships carne here for
repairs some time ago.
kind of assistance, not
Certainly we would not consider that
62 now".
He also said that Singapore would not allow the Soviets
to 11 land their planes, refuel or fly over our air space on
flights to Indo-China 11• He further added that while "Singapore
may not be in a position to (materially) sup ·lort the res istence
movement in Indochina, we do not want to make it easy for the
63 Soviets to give support to those they are backing~
While Singapore thought that both the Soviet Union and
China were dangerous, it considered the Soviets, working thr-ough
Vietnam, as the more imminent threat. According to Dhambalan,
11 It is foolish to forget what the long-term interest of comrnunis·t
philosophy is. It just happens that at this juncture, we are
on the same side as China for our own reasons". 64
61straits Times(Singapore), 14 November 1979, p.12.
62see Asian Recorder, April 29 - May 5, 1980, p.15434.
25:1.
Thus the necessity for economic cooperation and
assistance providedby the United States, a form of miljtary
security assured by the Five-Power-Defense Group and Singapore's
relations with ASEAN on the one hand and the role of Soviet
Union during Kampuchean crisis on the other made it difficult
for Singapore leaders to maintain a b~lanced relationship with
the Soviet Union.
~opomic Cooperation
Despite its political differences, however, Singapore
enjoyed an active trade relations with the Soviet Union.· This
could be seen from the table. (table 3). 11hile Singapore • s
small size, precluded it from being a major Soviet area of
ingerest, the analysis of the above data showed that the ·trade
grew from a total turnover of S $ 164.50 million in 1969 to
S $ 262.1 million in 1974. 65 As in the case of Singapore's
trade relations with other countries imports from the Soviet
Union overshadowed exports from Singapore. Import over export
for 1969 decreased from s $ 35.43 million to S $ 25.7 :nlllion
ih 1974. While exports over imports increased from S $ 129.07
million in 1969 to S$ 236.4 million in 1974.
65Figures of trade between Singa:_->ore and Soviet Union were not given after 1974 in any primary source material of Singapore.
Table 3
Singapore's Trade with Soviet Union, 1968-1980 ( S $ million)
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. Year
-1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Imports
35.43
32.4
32.2
24.0
21.6
25.7
Exports
129.07
142.4
115.6
101.5
176.1
236.4
Total Trade
164.50
174.8
147.8
125.5
197.7
262.1
%Singapore's Total Trade
1.5
1.4
1.1
0.8
0.9
0.8
.-.-,-.-~---.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
Source: Singapore, Singapore Facts and Pictures, A Ministry of Culture Publication, & Department of Statistics Singapore.
254
The trade agreernen·t signed by the two countries in April
1966 had obliged the Soviets to purchase Singapore-manufact'Jred
goods to the value of fifty percent of their profit made on
their exports to Singapore. Moscow was also required by
Singapore to keep on fixed deposits in Singapore banks equal to
;fitty to seventyfive percent of these proceeds. 66
Prior to 1970 Singapore was not producing sufficient
varieties of goods to interest the consumer market in the Soviet
Union. The main commodity in Singapore's exports to the Soviet
Union had been rubber. Later Singapore had started selling
clothing and shoes to the Soviet Union. Singapore was working
towards developing a large volume of trade in low cost, high-
skill production in return for food and heavy industrial products~
Although the Soviet Union accounted for a minor share in
67 Singapore's trade, it regarded Singapore as an important
regional commercial centre and held exhibitions of the Soviet
Trade Organization the~e in 1968 and 1971. These exhibitions
were displays of machines tools, cars, tractors, "hidrofoil
dauncher", consumable, clothings, and other evidences of the
Soviet Union's ability to provide competitive products and
manufacturing expertize ·to the Afro-As ian bloc. Singapore's
commercial ties with the Soviet Union were of benefit to other
66with the establishment of the Soviet Trade Commission in 1966, Singapore was able to begin direct trade relations with the Soviet Union. Earlier all of Singapore's sales of rubber were processed through London. Straits Times, 29 July 1966, p.3.
67The Soviet Union's share in Singapore's total trade in 1972 was 0.8 percent only. See the table 3.
ASEAN countries as we=ll. For instance, it generated hope
for the Philippines Chamber of Commerce to use Singapore as a
"clearing house" for Philippines' barter trade with the
68 socialist countries.
On its part, Singapore hoped to expand its trade relations
with the Soviet Union in order to regain losses in entrepot
trade wi·th Indonesia and Malaysia which had resulted from the
efforts of these countries to eliminate the Republic as a
middleman.
Singapore and Australi~
Singapore's strat~egies ·towards l\1Jstr.Jlia Cancl oU1~T
Five Power Defense Arrangement partners - New Zealand, M~laysia
and Britain) '>~~ere, in their own ways, of an enduring and resi-
lient nature. Singapore interacted with these nations in inter-
national organizations and within the commonwealth associa·t.ion.
Moreover, it relied heavily on this group for security, ecJnomic
and political sustenance, and support. Nevertheless, rnut~al
dependence, economic reliance, political support, and other
variables shifted in emphasis and importance according to the
nature of Singapore's national interests.
Singapore's association with Australia was marked not
only by official relations through the Commonwealth but also
by commercial ties. The most visible facet of the connection
67see "Manila bid for Red Trade", Straits Times, 28 August 1970, p.4.
between Singa:lore and Australia prior to 1965 was the
stationing of Australian troops there. This represented
Australia's role in ·the framework of Five Power Defense A1jree-
ment to provide security to Singapore and Malaysia. Sinc8
Singapore's independence in 1965 and the end of Indonesian
C0nfrontation in 1966, Lhe Australian Military presence h:1d
been reduced, at least in number of troops in the garri~on,
but it remained a political question of great importance to
the Singapore government.
Security ' .. Considerations
Singapore-Australian interaction depended upon hmv
Australia resolved its complex problem o£ \vhether to become an
involved, committed and participating power in the affairs of
Asia, or to retain its present minimal role. Before Vclorld \'-Tar
II economic, security, and political links with Britain •do.re the
bases for much of Australia's foreign policy. The signing of
the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 marked the recognition in Australia
that the United States coulu better guarantee Australian security
than Britain. In the early 1950s Australi~~ interests began to
shift. In 1955, Australia helped establish SEATS and sen·t: units
to serve in the Commonwealth.strategic reserve in Malaya. These
commitments were the result of the decision of Sir Robert Henzier
to pursue a policy of forward defense.69
69A brief analysis of Australia's defense strateg-.r may be found in Joseph F. Flader, Prospects f0r Continuation of_~E~~ lia'~ Forward Defense Strategy(Arlington, Va: Institute for Defence Analysis, October 1969), pp.4-6.
The central theme of this strategy was that the major
threat to Australia emanated from communism and that in ord.er
to guarantee cooperation and support needed to counter i t.r
Australia would have to continue its security relationship
with the United Kingdom and New Zealand in Malaya and support
the defense efforts of its powerful friends in the ANZUS ':':i:·eaty.
The forward defense concept endured throughout the
period of the Emergency (1948-60). It also remained in place
through the period of Indonesian confrontation when Austr<Jlia
deployed combat troops in Malaya and Bronec. The British
decision to withdraw from their defence commitments to 3j_n<;rapo.re
and Malaysia announced in 1967 and the subsequent realization
in Canberra that Australia was expected to take up the Bri ·tish
responsibility in the area forced a sort of rethinking of
Australia's foreign and defense policies vis-a-vis Singaporf::! and
Malaysia.
For the discussion of foreign policy issues, it would be
sufficient to indicate that in February 1969 Prime Minister of
Australia stated that Australian force would be maintained in
Singapore/Malaysia after the British left in 1971, that t:1ere
would be no terminal date in the Australian commitment, and
that Australia would not participate in any formal defence treaty
scheme but would operate within a framework of "general unc'l.er
standing".70
70see Australia, current Notes on International .a.~£airs, Vol.40, No.2, February 1969, pp.42-3.
He also indicated that Australia's defence policy was
in general support of its stated policy in Southeast As1a of
''promoting political stability and economic growth". 71
Singapore's relations with Australia since i'lorlo i;.far II
had been security-oriented and little public criticism of this
policy had occurred until 1967. Since 1967 pressure had been
brought to bear on the Australian government to cut or sig-nifi
cantly reduce its spending in the· entire region of Soutll~~ust ,
Asia. Because of the increasing level of Australian investment
and trade activity in Singapore some form of military presence
had to be maintained in the Straits of Malacca area after 1972.
It was doubtful in any case whether the rejection of a
reduced military presence in Singapore by the Australian govern
ment would drastically alter the non-ifiefence aspects of t.he
relationship which had been developing between the two countries
since 1965. Other aspects of the relationships, especially
rapidly growing trade ties, were slowly reducing the importance
of the defense partnership. Lee Kuan Yew had stated that ho
welcomed the Australian Military contribution to the Five-Power
Defense Group but halll been publicly non-committed on rumours of
Australian decision to de link itself from the defense group.
Personal relations between the leaders of the two ~ove~n-
ments were excellent and Lee Kuan Yew maintained an undi~;t.urbed
position regarding Australian dectsions
defence support to Sj_ngapore/Mal ays ir1.
Singapore and Australia: Economic Cooperation
Trade
Both Singapore and Austr<'3.1 ia had been working tOW<lrd
increased trade activities. Although trade balance had been
heavily in Australia's favour, the volume of annual trade
increased significantly, making Australia one of the mc-Jj or
trading partners of Singapore.
Australia had been a major trading partner of Sing,O:',')Or:e ..
In 1967, the total trade between Singapore and Australia t1..:;.c
been 269.8 S $ million which rose to 1333.3 S $ million
in 1980 (January/June). However, although two-wa.y trade
rose considerably from 3.~2, percent in 1967 to 4.5 percent in
1971, Australia's share of Singapore's global trade deci ined
from 3.4 percent in 1967 to 2.9 percent in 1979.
The i terns of trade between Singapore and Australia '(.Jere
mainly food and petroleum products. Singapore's major imports
from Australia were wheat, meat, fruit, and sugar. On the
other hand Singapore's exports to Australia were primarily p2t-
roleum products and a narrow range of manufacturing goods.,
Investments
Australia was not a major investor in Siggapore. l\.s
at December 1979, Australian investments in Singapore amounted
72 to 1. 7 percent of total foreign investments here. The ma5!1
72see the Speech given by Bernard Chen, Minister o.f: State for Defence on "Economic relations between Singapore and Au.str-a!i<: Speeches(A monthly collection of ministerial speeches, Singapore, 1980), vol.3, No.7, pp.89-92.
Table 4
Singapore's Trade with Australia 1968-1980
S $ l,Hllion)
2()0
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. Year 1m ports
1967 106.8
1968
1969 241.29
1970 340.5
1971 367.7
1972 385.9
1973 442.1
1974 570.0
1975 661.5
1976 578.0
1977 644.6
1978 597.5
1979 843.4
1980 Jan/ 503.4 June
Experts
'73.rJ
123.04
160.1
257.2
294.8
329.2
687.7
637.2
831.2
990.6
928.5
1149.5
829
I'oL'Il l'rade
364.33
500.6
624.9
680.7
771.3
1258.7
1298.7
1409·2
1635.2
1526.0
1992.9
1333.3
%of Sing '[Jo.re 's 'T'ota 1 Tr<'lde
3 r j ;~
4 .-~ 1
4. t)
4.3
3~6
3.6
4.,:1.
3rh
J.6
2 0 9
2 .. ?
.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-~~.-.-.-.
Source: Singapore, ;3ing~ore Facts and Pictures, A Minis·try of Culture Pu.blication andDepartrm:mt of Statistics, Singapore.
areas of investmen~were in the machine tools, automobile
and electric products industries.
Apart from trade and investment, one other aspect in
Singapore's relationship with Australia was technical aid~
Australia had been the donor of technical assistance to
Singapore. Assistance, provided principally under the Colo;nbo
Plan, had been mainly in the form of training awards, expperts
73 and equipment.
Between 1964 and 1980, Singapore received a total of
7 t! 391 undergraduate and 74 postgraduate training awards. The
award~ were mainly in the fields of engineering1. archi tee tu re,
medicine, veterinary science and land surveying, which heJ~€d
build up the core of professjonal manpower in Singapore. In
addition, a total of 538 training attachments were receiw1d.,
Within the same period, 123 Australian experts in Computer.
Science, medicine, engineering and air :'ollution were seni.~ t:o
Singapore to help in ad hoc projects. Aid in terms of equip-
75 ment from Australia amounted to S$ 1.9 million.
Thus the Australian contribution to the growth of ~>inga-
pore's economy was significant.
---------------·--·---
74Ibid.
75Ibid.