K ashm ir Acord

CHAPTER X

Kashmir Accord 1975

The Kashmir Accord of 1975 was the culm ination of the process of

reconciliation between Shaikh M ohammad Abdullah and the Governm ent of

India which begins around 1968 after the form er's last release from the

prison. This Accord marks an end of two decade long political battle of

Shaikh A bdullah to achieve the right of self determ ination for his people and

the right of perm anent autonomous status for Jam m u and Kashmir state to

m aintain its separate personality. The period also witnessed an

unprecedented political mobilization in the state, and silent majority getting

politicized.

The process of reconciliation between New Delhi and Shaikh

Abdullah had begin, as we have seen in the previous chapter, after the

latter's release in 1968, bu t it was only after the Bangladesh W ar of 1971 that

the process was converted into a serious dialogue for a perm anent

settlement. As early as 1972, Abdullah and his deputy and the Plebiscite

Front chief Mirza Afzal Beg, through their press statem ents and private

discourse started showing signs of flexibility in their stand and the

willingness to reach to an understanding w ith central authorities, since they

were enough conscious to realize that after 1971 crisis their bargaining

capacity was at its low. Meanwhile after its defeat, Pakistan had come to a

peace agreem ent w ith India. In the post-war Simla Treaty (1972), a

demoralized, dismembered Pakistan had finally conceded that Kashmir was

a 'Bilateral' (as opposed to an 'international') dispute.1 It was in this

1 On 2 July 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indra Gandhi agreed that "in Jammu & Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 Decem ber 1971 shall be respected by both sides w ithout prejudice to the recognized position o f either side (em phasis

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backdrop that an aged and weary Shaikh A bdullah finally renounced the

self-determination platform and in an interview w ith London Times on March

8,1972, he pleaded for a solution of the problem w ithin the framework of the

constitution of India.

The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reciprocated w hen she told

parliam ent on 24 M arch that she "welcomed the change in the thinking of

the plebiscite leaders because they have expressed their willingness to accept

the finality of the Kashmir accession".2This w as followed by meeting of

Shaikh A bdullah w ith Indira Gandhi in New Delhi in June 1972, and another

w ith Swaran Singh, Union Defense Minister.3

After his return to the state, Shaikh declared on 23 June, 1972, at

Hazratbal, that he had given Mirza Afzal Beg "Full authority to discuss with

any representative of Mrs. Gandhi a greater autonom y form ula for state".

He told his followers "not to look tow ards Pakistan or any other power" to

help them in "their struggle to attain a respectable place in the w orld".4 On

25 June, there were anti-Shaikh dem onstrations in Pakistan-occupied

Kashmir condem ning his 'surrender' to India. The person Mrs. Gandhi

chose as her negotiator was the clean, soft spoken m an of few words, G.

Parthasarathi.5

Thus, a formal protracted dialogue betw een the two representatives

began to jointly explore the areas "w ith all sincerity for reestablishm ent of

relations [between center and lexical interpretations of Article 370 and its

mine)." Bhutto used the language of this accord after 1975 to revive Pakistani claim over Kashmir w hich left m ost of the observers to conclude that w hat Indra Gandhi had w on on the battle ground w as lost on the negotiation table.

2 Ajit Bhattacharjea, K ashm ir: The W ounded Valley, N ew Delhi, 1994, p p .234-235.3 Patriot, 29 June, 1972; H industan Times, 25 June, 1972.4 Sheikh Abdullah's speech on 23 June, 1972, cited in M.J. Akbar, India: The Siege W ithin,

N ew Delhi, 2003, p.270.5 Ibid., p .271.

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implications",6 which lasted for a period of about three years and finally

came to the conclusion w ith the signing of an agreem ent on 13 November,

1974 w hich became famous as Kashmir Accord.7

It appears that Shaikh Abdullah was willing to resum e office and stop

pressing for plebiscite if the pre 1953 constitutional position of his state was

restored.8 And the Article 370 of Indian Constitution m ade perm anent as a

guarantee to protect the internal autonom y of the state, from any future

erosion.9

He further dem anded that since the extension of Union laws to

Jamm u and Kashmir during the last 19 years had been m ade through

unrepresentative channels in violation of the sprit of Article 370 of the

constitution,"10 these enactments should be declared void. O ther dem ands

which Shaikh Abdullah and his representative Afzal Beg pushed for

acceptance as appears from the correspondence between the concerning

parties and the statem ent made by Indira Gandhi in the Parliam ent on 24

February 1975 includes:-

i) Transfer of provisions relating to fundam ental rights to the State

Constitution;

ii) Removal of the supervision and control of Election Commission of

India over election to the State Legislature;

iii) Modification of article 356, to require State G overnm ent's

concurrence before imposing President's rule in the state;

6 Statem ent of Mirza Afzal Beg in ‘Khutba-i-Sadarat Barai-Salana Ijlas,' Jammu and Kashmir Mahazi Raishumari.

7 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir; A Disputed Legacy, Karachi; 1993, p .306.8 ibid.9 Sunaulla Butt, Kashmir in Flames, Srinagar, 1981, p .172. A statem ent w hich appears in

Times of India and other dailies on 10 December, 1972 quotes A bdullah saying that a settlem ent should be m ade where in the "defense, foreign affairs and com m unications w ou ld remain w ith the centre and the state w ould be g iven freedom to shape it's ow n house in accordance w ith its ow n desires."

10 Patriot, 29 June 1972.

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iv) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in relation to the state should

be curtailed.

v) The State Governor and the Chief Minister be designated as pre-1964

nom enclatures of Sadr-i-R iyasat and W azir-i-Azam , respectively, to

uphold the residuary sovereignty of the state.11

Shaikh Abdullah also explored the scheme w hich he had already

advanced in 1970 for w hat am ounted to a kind of federal structure for the

state of Jamm u and Kashmir.12 Further he stated that, "A new and truly

representative Assembly to be brought into being in the state after

dissolving the existing one that body alone should decide which of laws

m ade applicable to the state after 1953 should be retained".13

Shaikh Abdullah was conscious of his w eak position at the

negotiation table w ith the centre; hence, he did not found himself in a

position to press the above mentioned dem ands as a pre-condition to many

settlements. And w hen Indira Gandhi m ade it clear that the clock could not

be turned back-her favorite phrase- Abdullah was too w eak to resist it.14

11 Correspondence betw een Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi and betw een Mirza Afzal Beg and G. Parthasarathi concerning the Kashmir Accord, v id e Sunaulla Butt, op.cit; pp. 198-206; and speech of Indira Gandhi in Lok Sabha on 24 February 1975 as cited in, Statesman, 25 February, 1975.

12 The Sheikh convened a convention of representatives of Jammu and Ladakh in 1974 to seek their cooperation on the basis of five-tire internal constitutional set-up evolved by J&K state people's convention in 1970 w hich envisaged regional autonom y and further devolution of political pow er to low er levels. Balraj Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalism, N ew Delhi, 1981, p .183, and Lamb, op. cit;

13 Hindustan Times, 14 September, 1974. It is im portant to m ention that in the State A ssem bly elections of 1972, Plebiscite Front intended to contest, but w as declared unlaw ful by the governm ent and its leaders w ere arrested under Preventive Detention Act. Later Mir Qasim, w hose Congress party 'won' a decisive majority revealed in his autobiography that the Plebiscite Front had "reduced the [official] National Conferenceto ...... a non-entity in Kashmir's politics." "If the elections w ere free and fair," headded, "the victory of the Front was a forgone conclusion,." Mir Qasim, My Life and Tim es, N ew Delhi, 1992, p p .106 and 132.

14 Ajit Bhattacharjea, op. cit., 235.

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If Abdullah believed that abandoning plebiscite w ould mean gaining

w hat he w anted in terms of autonomy, he was soon disillusioned. His

dem ands were unacceptable to the centre for a variety of reasons; most of

these were justified to protect the national interests than any submission to

the reality. Thus, conceding these dem ands w ould m ean a tacit admission

that the adm inistration of the State since 1953 was not legal, and that the

elections held in the state were not fair, and the Assembly therefore, was not

the true representative body of the people. Consequently, every action of

the assembly after 1953, including the ratification of the Accession in 1956,

was invalid .15

Another apprehension was that "To concede that all the post-1953

developm ents in Kashmir were w ithout the sanction of the people of

Kashmir and that all the elections in the state since then were rigged would

be a splendid vindification of Pakistan's stand in the U.N position over

Kashmir.111 Thus it will weaken India's international position. Further, at the

national level, it was simply not possible to allow the Assembly to sit in

judgm ent over all the laws enacted since 1953, for such a proposition would

have set a bad precedence which m ight be exploited in future by extremist

elements, for instance, in Tamil N adu or N agaland".17

While on the one hand Shaikh Abdullah w as disappointed by center's

inability to concede his dem and of guaranteed internal autonom y for J&K

State, on the other hand he came under severe criticism in the state for

drifting away from his stand of self-determination through plebiscite.

Throughout the period w hen talks were on w ith New Delhi, there were

13 G.R Najar, Kashmir Accord 1975: A Political Analysis, Srinagar, 1988, p. 35.16 Tribune, Chandigarh, 21 September, 1974.17 A m rit B azaar Patrika, Calcutta, 28 September 1974.

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those in the state who were not at all happy about w hat seemed to be in

prospect.18

M irwaiz M uham m ad Farooq was particularly distressed by w hat

seemed to be an im pending settlement of the future of the state of Jammu &

Kashmir by his rival Shaikh Abdullah such as to preclude forever the

prospect of anything like a free plebiscite.19 He ridiculed Shaikh for

changing his stand and for declaring Kashm ir's accession w ith India as

final.20 He considered that Shaikh Abdullah had sold out to India in general

and Indira Gandhi in particular. 21

A bdullah 's followers, on their part too, last no time in declaring

Mirwaiz as a 'Pakistan agent'. This was followed by clashes betw een the

followers of the Plebiscite Front and the Awam i Action Committee on 13

July, 1974, the day w hen the 1931 m artyrs were com m em orated 22

The Shaikh Abdullah sensing the m ood of the people in the state,

visited different areas from time to time and through a series of speeches

tried to neutralize the influence of those who were not happy w ith his policy

of rapprochem ent w ith New Delhi. In an emotional speech in March 1947,

at Hazratbal on a Friday congregation he said: "D uring last two and a half

m onths various rum ors and stories against me are being circulated here, but

people should not believe these stories. I assure you, here at this holy place

that I have never bargained your interests and not left you and I shall remain

firm on my determ ination in future too. I shall stand by the promise; I have

given to you, till I am alive. My 42 year's political life is before you. In

18 Alastair Lamb, op. cit; pp. 306-307.w Ibid.20 In his in terview w ith Motherland, M oulvi Farooq said: "H ow can he [Abdullah] change

his opinion and declare that the state's accession to India is final? The plebiscite Front, the party w hich the Sheikh leads, had been raising the voice for plebiscite during all these years and n ow they have announced their final verdict on the accession as if they are de-fact and de-jure leaders of the state." M otherland, N ew D elhi, 28 Decem ber 1974.

21 A lester Lamb. Op. cit;22 Ibid.

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norm alizing the relations between India and Pakistan and in some

settlem ent lies our interest. New Delhi had suggested me to change the

name of the Plebiscite Front but I m ade it clear to them that it was not

possible to change the name because plebiscite was its aim ". 23

Similarly, while addressing Front workers at M ujahid Manzil, on

April 4, 1974, he rem inded that, the "Restoration of 1953 could be the basis

for talks betw een me and New Delhi. I have repeatedly assured you that

w hatever results come out of these talks it will be placed before you. You

will be com petent to take a decision on the results of the talks w hether to

accept it or to reject it".24 To be fair this was never done w hen the Accord

was concluded.

It is unfair if we blame people for showing their disapproval to the

dialogue process for they were educated by Shaikh A bdullah and by the

organization to which he was political ideologue-Plebiscite Front-for more

than two decades to fight for the right of self-determination to be exercised

through a free plebiscite. He had raised their expectations to the highest

level by cham pioning their cause w ithout any compromise. And now w hen

due to a sudden turn of events in 1971, Shaikh was m aking a rapprochem ent

and had staled at the very outset that the accession w ith India w as final, this

came as a rude shock to the people who found it difficult to reconcile w ith

the changing circumstances. Thus Shaikh like a political strategist would

adopt a public posture dem anding that governm ent of India should restore

the 1953 position of the state.25

23 Cited in Sannaullah Butt, op. cit; p .180.24 Ibid.25 Arnrit Bazar Partrika, Calcutta, provided a correct analysis about Sheikh Abdullah's

public pronouncem ents on 9th September, 1973: "What the Sheikh says in the public does not reflect his real attitude he has taken at the negotiations [with Delhi], Political com pulsions perhaps leave no better alternative to the Sheikh than the public posture of the kind he has chosen to take. It is w ell know n that the Sheikh's current n egotiations...... have not been favorably v iew ed by the pro-Pakistani elem ents [read

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Since now it was evident to Abdullah and his comrades that any

compromise m ade w ith New Delhi, would not be unopposed in the state,

they quiet unmistakingly, created such slogans through which people could

be prepared to accept the outcome of the negotiations, which Shaikh was

aware, w ould not be according to the promises he had m ade w ith them.

One such slogan w hich was shouted quiet frequently in the public

gatherings arranged by the Plebiscite Front was:

R aj Ktiri Taj K ari Bab Kari Low Low,

A al Knri W angan Kari Bab Kari Low Low.

M eanwhile negotiations continued betw een New Delhi and Shaikh

A bdullah and his friends, absorbing all shocks of criticism and public anger.

At one point w hen Shaikh Abdullah was under severe criticism from

different quarters in the state, and thus dem anded that the constitutional

position of the state as it existed before 1953, be restored, created a deadlock

in the talks.26 It was only due to the efforts of D.P Dhar, Mir Qasim and P.N

Haksar, that Indira Gandhi was persuaded about that, "A bdullah's

acceptance of Kashm ir's accession to India as final should form the basis of a

dialogue w ith him and a way out should be form ed to accommodate his

view point regarding the internal autonom y of the state".27 U nder such

influences, the governm ent of India realized his [Abdullah's] difficulties and

therefore, reciprocated by recognizing the need to accommodate his view

points to the extent that was possible and desirable.28

A w am i Action Com m ittee in Kashmir]. Presum ably the Sheikh's public posture is intended lo neutralize these elements."

26 G. R Najar, op. cit; p .49.27 N ew W ave, N ew Delhi, 24 February 1975, M.J Akbar, op. cit; p .270-271.28 G. R Najar, op.cit; p. 50.

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Thus, after a long period of ups and downs, the negotiations between

Mirza Afzal Beg and G. Parthasarathi concluded on 13 November 1974,29

Its contents were formally accepted by Abdullah on 12 February 1975

30 and were presented before the Indian Parliam ent by Mrs. Indira Gandhi

on 24 February 1975, as the "Kashmir Accord".31

The negotiated terms of the Accord are as under:

i) The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is a constituent unit of the

union of India, shall, in its relations w ith the Union, continue to be

governed by Article 370 of the constitution of India.

ii) The residuary powers of legislation shall rem ain w ith the state;

however, parliam ent will continue to have pow er to make laws

relating to the prevention of activities directed tow ards disclaiming,

questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

India or bringing about secession of a part of the territory of India

from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the

Indian National Anthem and the Constitution.

iii) W here any provision of the constitution of India had been applied to

the slate of Jamm u and Kashmir w ith adaptations and modifications,

such adaptations and modifications can be altered or replaced by an

order of the President under Article 370, each individual proposed in

this behalf being considered on its merits; bu t provisions of the

constitution of India already applied to the state of Jammu and

Kashmir w ithout adaptation or modification are unalterable.

iv) W ith a view to assuring freedom to the state of Jamm u and Kashmir

to have its ow n legislature on matters like welfare measures, cultural

29 Times o f India, 14 Novem ber, 1974.30 Indian Express, N ew Delhi, 13 February 1975.31 Statesman, N ew Delhi, 25 February 1975.

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matters, social security, personal law, and procedural laws, in a

m anner suited to the special conditions in the state, it is agreed that

the state government can review the laws m ade by Parliament or

extended to the state after 1953 on any m atter relatable to the

Concurrent List and may decide which of them, in its opinion, needs

am endm ent or repeal. Thereafter, appropriate steps may be taken

under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The grant of

President's assent to such legislation w ould be sympathetically

considered. The same approach would be adopted in regard to the

laws to be m ade by Parliament in future under the proviso to clause 2

of that Article; the state government shall be consulted regarding the

application of any such law to the state and the views of the State

G overnm ent shall receive the fullest consideration.

v) As an arrangem ent reciprocal to w hat has been provided under

Article 368, a suitable modification of that Article as applied to the

state should be m ade by Presidential O rder to the effect that no law

m ade by the legislature of the State of Jam m u and Kashmir relating to

any of the under m entioned m atters shall take effect unless the bill,

having been reserved for the consideration of the President, receives

his assent; the matters are;

(a) The appointm ent, powers, functions, duties, privileges and

im m unities of the Government; and

(b) The following matters relating to Elections, namely, the

superintendence, direction and control of elections by the Election

Commission of India, eligibility for inclusion in the electoral rolls

w ithout discrimination, adult suffrage, and composition of the

legislature council, being matters specified in sections 138,139,140 and

50 of the constitution of the state of Jamm u and Kashmir.

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K ashm ir Acord

vi) No agreem ent was possible on the question of nom enclature of the

Governor and Chief Minister and the m atter is therefore remitted to

the Principals.32

On 25 February, 1975, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her statem ent told the

Lok Sabha that during the course of negotiations "M irza Afzal Beg pressed

for the transfer of provisions relating to Fundam ental Rights to the State

Constitution, the removal of the supervision and control of the Election

Commission of India over elections to the state legislature, and the

modification of Article 356 to require the state G overnm ent's concurrence

before im posing Presidents Rule to the state. It was not found possible to

agree to any of these proposals".33 She appreciated Shaikh Abdullah that

despite his strong views on these issues he accepted the agreed conclusions

of the Accord.34

In the Accord, Shaikh Abdullah did not achieve his ambition for a

return to the exact position as it had been prior to his dismissal in A ugust

1953,35 rather it m arked a substantial compromise on the part of Abdullah

36and his ratification to the accession of Jam m u and Kashmir state to India as

final, along w ith m uch else which India had decided for the state since

1953.37 The Accord was as Ajit Bhattacharjea p u t it, "w ordy and full of

assurances, but in effect the clock stated where it w as".38 To Balraj Puri, the

Accord "was not on [Abdullah's] terms bu t on those of Mrs. Gandhi which

his representative Afzal Beg had signed".39

32 G.R. Najar, op. cit; pp.50-53.33 P. N . Bazaz, op. cit; p .245.34 Ibid.35 Alistair Lamb, op. cit; p .307.36 Balraj Puri, op. cit; p .184.37 Alistair Lamb, op. cit.38 Ajit Bhattacharjea, op. cit.39 Balraj Puri, op. cit; p .185.

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The Shaikh did express the view, in his letter to Mrs. Indira Gandhi

on 11 February 1975, that "The constitutional relationship between the

centre and the state should be w hat it was in 1953,"40but only to learn that

"The clock cannot be pu t back and we have to take note of the realities of the

situation".41

The first clause which was the key provision of the Accord confirms

"Jammu and Kashmir a Constituent unit of the Union on India" and

approved that the state "shall continue to be governed under Article 370" of

the Indian Constitution. In reality however, betw een 1954 and the mid

1970's, 28 constitutional orders "Integrating" the State w ith India had been

issued from Delhi, and 262 Union laws had been m ade applicable in the

Jamm u and Kashmir.42 Thus, Article 370 was retained; so were the changes

m ade after 1953, to reduce Kashmir's autonomy.

The second clause confirms residuary pow ers of the state legislature

on the one hand, but on the other hand it was m ade clear that the Parliament

will continue to make laws to prevent activities against the integrity of the

Indian Union, or insult to the National Flag or National Anthem and the

Constitution. In other words any act on the part of the State Legislative

Assembly which could possibly be construed to im ply a progression of the

state tow ards independence, could be over ruled by the Union Parliament, a

qualification which took away a great deal of rem aining strength from

Article 370.43

The third and the fourth clause of the Accord while reaffirmed the

status quo, it however, gave the provincial governm ent the authority to

"review" laws on the concurrent list extended to Jam m u and Kashmir after

40 Statem ent in the Parliament on 24 February 1975, The Kashmir Accord, G overnm ent of India Press, N ew Delhi.

41 Ibid.42 Sumantra Bose, K ashm ir: Roots o f Conflict, Paths to Peace, N ew Delhi, 2003, p .88.43 Alistair Lamb, op. cit.

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1953, and 'decide" which of those m ight 'need am endm ent or repeal'.

"Even this was probably no more than a token gesture",44 because the

prom ised review of Parliam ent's laws or any laws or regulations extended to

the state after 1953 never took place.45 These provisions curtailed the powers

of the State Assembly in specified matters of importance, including elections,

the appointm ent of governors and terms of office and functions were

reduced to legislate on "welfare measures, cultural matters, social security

and persona] law".

Through the fifth clause of the Accord the centre retained the powers

to appoint Governors and take over the governance of the State under

Article 356, w ith drastic consequences a decade later. Even symbolic

political concessions such as changing the title governor to Sadr-i-Riyasat

and Chief Minister to Wazir-i-Azam were not granted since there was no

agreem ent over this issue. Thus, the "quantum of autonom y", about which

m uch publicized negotiations were made, w as reduced for less than w hat

was offered to the State from time to time since 1953 till 1972, w hen formal

talks were initiated. While Shaikh Abdullah considered the Accord, "The

first step tow ards restoration of [the] pre-1953 constitutional position of the

state",46 The Indian Prime Minister opines that "It provided scope for further

application of the Indian Constitution to the State".47

W hal Abdullah then got in return to his acceptance of the status quo

and his confirm ation of the terms of Kashm ir's incorporation into the Indian

Union since 1953, was technically outside the purview of the agreement, but

very m uch part of it. During the talks that led to Accord, the negotiators

m ainly concerned themselves in sorting out the constitutional issues.

44 Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir, op. cit. p. 41.45 A. S Anand, Development of the Constitution of ]ammu and Kashmir, N ew Delhi, 1980, pp.

112-143.46 Statesman, N ew Delhi, 5 March 1975.47 Balraj Puri, op. cit; p.187.

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However, the political issues also figured in these discussions, and the most

im portant political issues discussed and subsequently agreed upon by the

parties were:

a. That the Plebiscite Front will be dissolved; and

b. The Congress party though in a majority in the State Legislature will

surrender pow er in favour of Shaikh Abdullah.48

Accordingly, on 23 February, the day before the Accord's

announcem ent, Syed Mir Qasim resigned as Chief M inister of the State.

Two days later the Congress party in the State Legislature, which controlled

it, unanim ously elected Shaikh Abdullah its leader.49 The Shaikh could

hardly have done m ore to identify himself w ith the party against which he

had launched the Tehrik-i-Tarki-Mcnvalat only a decade before. He was

sworn in as Chief Minister on 25 February 1975, returning to the post after

nearly tw enty two years.50

The Accord comes under severe criticism not only w ithin the state but

also at the national and international level. In Pakistan, unsurprisingly, the

Accord was denounced as a "Sell-out". Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had particularly

strong w ords for Shaikh Abdullah. He observed that this m an w ho had set

himself up as the cham pion of democracy was now about to become head of

a governm ent dom inated by a party, Congress, to w hich he did not belong,

in an Assembly of which he was not even a mem ber.51 A t Bhutto's behest

48 G.R. Najar, op. cit; p .5849 Alistair Lamb, op. cit; p.308.50 Ajit Bhattacharjea, op. cit; p .236. According to Syed Mir Qasim Sheikh Abdullah

refused to take office as he w as highly upset w ith a statem ent m ade by Mrs. Indira Gandhi stating that relations between Kashmir and the Indian U nion w ould continue as before, w hich was reported by the All India Radio. H e was livid w ith rage, according to Qasim, "You have m ade a statement as if I have sold out Kashmir for the chair of Chief Minister," he roared. ] pleaded that he should not be influenced by the radio version of the statem ent [by Mrs. GandhiJ" Mir Qasim, op. cit; p .142-143.

51 Alistair Lamb, op. cit.

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Pakistan observed an impressive hartal on 28 February, 1975;52 and overseas

Pakistani and Kashmiris in the United Kingdom and elsewhere held

dem onstrations.53 After sometimes, on 12 March, 1975, China joined in the

chorus of disapproval.54

W ithin the State, the signing of the Accord by the Abdullah created a

backlash of adverse public opinion as ordinary Kashmiri masses felt or were

m ade to feel that Abdullah "had bartered the rights of state people and

surrendered parts of Kashmir autonom y just to obtain crum bs of pow er"55,

an im pression which Shaikh A bdullah failed to remove till the end of his

life. He repeatedly assured the people that he is bound to get the Accord

approved by the state people but, according to Prem N ath Bazaz, "He never

had the coinage to do so".56 The Awam i Action Committee and the

Jammaat-i-Islamia in the valley and the Jan Sangh in Jam m u left no stone

un turned to divert the public disappointm ent in their favour to carve out a

political space in the State.

The Jan Sangh in New Delhi and Jamm u w as vocal in its opposition

to the Accord: it urged that Article 370 of the Indian Constitution be

abrogated and the whole of the State of Jam m u and Kashmir incorporated

into the Indian Union just like any other state.57 The party challenged the

claim of Shaikh A bdullah of being the leader of the people of the state. It

held that Shaikh Abdullah could " ....a t best claim to be the leader of a

Kashmiri population". 58 Though Abdullah assured from time to time that

regional aspirations of the people of Jammu and Ladakh will be taken care

s2 Ibid.53 Ibid.54 Ibid.55 P.N. Bazaz, op. cit; p .68.56 Ibid; p .2557 M.J. Akbar, Kashm ir: Behind the Vale, pp. 187-188.58 M otherland, N ew Delhi, 29 August, 1974.

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of in any future arrangem ent, "These assurances proved insufficient to ally

the apprehensions of the majority of Jamm u population".59

The most vocal reaction to the Accord and Shaikh A bdullah's new

political discourse, however, came w ithin the Valley and was expressed by

Awam i Action Committee led by M irwaiz Farooq and the Jammaat-i-

Islamia. M irwaiz Farooq who was trying "to carve a political niche for

himself in the valley",60 reiterated his charge that Shaikh Abdullah had

given away his people's right to self- determ ination.61 He was allegedly

backed by some members of the Pradesh Congress members who had an

apprehension that Accord will reduce their political influence in the state.62

Jammaat-i-Islamia also used the opportunity to make the people to believe

that Abdullah was betraying them by m aking an Accord w ith New Delhi.63

The organization particularly criticized the w isdom of Plebiscite Front Chief

for wasting two decades to affirm the reality of Kashm ir's accession w ith

India. It w as claimed that "If Mirza Afzal Beg had openly asserted his view

on accession tw enty five years ago, the people of the state could have been

spared years of privation, bloodshed and continuous restlessness."64

Since Abdullah and his colleagues were left w ith little in the Accord

to convince the people that the deal was in their favour, the criticism drive

launched by these organizations received a big following in the state.

Interestingly, even most of the Plebiscite Front m em bers and carders too

were not satisfied w ith the terms of the Accord. But they swallowed it as a

59 Balraj Puri, op. cit; p .183.60 Indian Express, 2 September, 1974.61 Alistair Lamb, op. cit.62 H industan Times, N ew Delhi, 11 Novem ber, 1974.63 Indian Express, 22 December, 1972.64 Tim es o f India, 5 February, 1973.

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K ashm ir Acord

bitter pill only because Abdullah, the m an w ho struggled throughout to

protect their rights-had accepted the Accord.65

As A bdul Qayyum Zargar, a veteran National Conference member,

who had been Afzal Beg's personal secretary in 1975, narrated later that, "we

were faced w ith a very piquant situation after the 1975 Accord. The people

w anted to go on strike, to protest w hat they saw as an unjust and inequitable

agreement. But we could not let that happen, because the prestige of none

other than Shaikh Abdullah was at stake."66

Shaikh Abdullah who had through out derived his pow er from the

masses, was conscious of the popular mood and hence in order to migrate

the public anger after becoming Chief Minister on 25 February 1975 w ith the

support of the Congress Legislature Party, he refused to merge his own

group-Plebiscite Front- in the congress, in defiance of pressures and

expectations of its State and national leadership. According to Puri, "this act

of assertion of his political w ill....hum ored the regional pride of the people

of Kashmir and compensated, to some extent, the adverse reaction of his

climb dow n in agreeing to the terms of the Accord."67

He also revived the National Conference in October 1975;68 He

dem onstrated his independence by ending the central subsidy on rice even

at the cost of sending up prices and w hen Indira G andhi imposed her

emergency in June 1975, he refused to go along.69

W hen congress w ithdrew its support to Abdullah in the Assembly in

1977, Shaikh Abdullah declared very bitterly: "Since the congress party has

65 Sumantra Bose, op. cit., p. 53.66 Cited in Ibid, foot note, no. 11.67 Balraj Puri, op. cit., p .187.68 R.N. Koul, op. cit., p. 237.69 Ajit Bhattacharya, op. cit., p .237.

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K ashm ir Acord

w ithdraw n its support the Accord that had been concluded between him

and Indira Gandhi should be deemed to have ended."70

Ajit Bhattacharjea criticized Indira Gandhi that instead of supporting

Abdullah, "She was exploiting and dem onstrating A bdullah 's weakness in

order to erode his image in Kashmir, bu t not use the opportunity to revive

secular forces committed to India...."71 O n the other hand M.J. Akbar

blamed local Congress members for m aking A bdullah 's way a difficult

one.72 Q uiet unsurprisingly then A bdullah recalled later in his

autobiography w ith disappointment: "Forgetting my past experience, I

agreed to cooperate w ith Congress, bu t soon had to regret my decision."73

N ot w ith standing, all this political reverses, though less popular then ever,

there was still no rival to A bdullah in the valley, as he dem onstrated in the

elections of 1977.

70 Syed Mir Qasim, D astan-I-H yat, (Urdu), n. d. p. 385.71 Ajit Bhattacharya, op. cit.72 M.J. Akbar, op. cit., p. 189.73 A atish-i-C hinar, op. cit., p.841.

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