CHAR,LES STEPHEN BYRUM University of Tennessee

P H I L O S O P H Y AS PLAY

Following closely upon the work of Johan Huizinga's Homo Ludens, this discussion will seek to deal with what Huizinga calls the "play element" in culture. More specifically, there will be an attempt to understand the re- lationship between play and philosophy ; Huizinga initiates such an attempt himself. However, while Huizinga's work in this particular area is funda- mental, it may also have its inadequacies. Hopefully, these inadequacies can be examined by carefully making a distinction between philosophy as a "play with ideas," and philosophy as a "play of ideas." On the former level, statements about a so-called "play element" in culture might be very helpful in the type of extrinsic, cultural explication which Huizinga initiates ; on the latter, more intrinsic, level, to speak of play only as an "element" in culture may be ontologically inadequate. The discussion will thus attempt to move beyond the work of Huizinga and qualify it in terms ot: the work on play by Martin Heidegger, and more especially by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Again, the essential distinction to be drawn will be that which is found between "play with ideas" and "play of ideas."

Huizinga may best be understood as a cultural exegete whose most basic presupposition is that culture as a whole should be viewed as sub specie ludi. He means by this that play is a primordial activity, that it precedes that which is usually termed "cultural," and is identified with man and ratio- nality ; animals did not have to wait for man to teach them to play. He also means that there is a primordial quality of play, the fun of play, which can- not be fully analyzed or explained in terms of its extrinsic manifestations (such as : play serving to vent unused energies, provide relaxation, train for work, or as a form of wish-fulfilling fantasy), or reduced to any other mental categories. Fun, which is the intrinsic correlate and manifestation ("quality," "essence") of play, functions somewhat as a Moorean "ultimate simple." Play is "an absolutely primary category of life, ''z a "totality ''~ or gestalt event, which is mind, but which extends beyond the self-conscious rationality identified with human beings.

At this point it should be carefully noted that the translated subtitle of Huizinga's Homo Ludens, "a study of the play element in culture," may be

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a misnomer, or that the problem in the translation of the subtitle may at least suggest that Huizinga was aware of play as more than merely an ele- ment in culture ; in a sense, such an assessment would be in contradiction to the "culture sub specie ludi" idea. He recalls 3 a lecture entitled "The Play Element of Culture" which he was encouraged on numerous occasions to change to "in Culture." He would not make this "correction" protesting that "it was not my object to define the place of play among alle the other manifestations of culture, but to ascertain how far culture itself bears the character of play. ''4 In a statement which will have significance for the discussion below, he further said : "For many years the conviction has grown upon me that civilization arises in and as play. ''~

At this point, it may be seen that Huizinga is extremely close to Heidegger and Gadamer. However, instead of dealing more with the implications of his ideas about civilization arising in and as play, he moves in an extrinsic direction away from this statement to an historical exegesis of the play "ele- ment" as it manifests itself in culture. He says : "Consequently, play is to be understood.., as a cultural phenomenon.. . It is to be approached historic- ally... TM He then proceeds to show how some of the most fundamental, archetypal activities of culture, such as myth, ritual, language~ philosophy, poetry, and law, can be characterized in terms of play. Had he followed his original conviction, he might have said: "Consequently, culture is to be understood as a play phenomenon : it is to be approached ontologically." If this had been the manner of his expression, his work would have more precisely served as a precursor to that of Heidegger and Gadamer. However, while the importance of the work is not to be diminished, it does follow a decidedly historical predisposition, and, while it may be pursued in the spirit of the "play element of culture," the more extrinsic terminology, "in culture," seems more appropriate, especially in comparison to the work of Heidegger and Gadamer which will be seen.

Attention can now be given to the section of Homo Ludens entitled "Play Forms in Philosophy" which can serve as a general example of Huizinga's historical exegesis of the play element. The discussion can also come to describe more specifically what is meant by speaking of philosophy as a "play with ideas."

The discussion of phi losophy begins by calling ~ttention to t h e early Greek sophist, whose craft is something between an art ( z[Zv~7v :za2atdv - Pro,tagoras 7) and a game (xcetTwov- Gorgias 8) ; at its inception it would

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be proper to speak of both an aesthetic and an athletic dimension. The philosopher's role is seen as a specialization of the role of the ancient seer, prophet, medicine-man, or rates. Huizinga stresses the way in which the Sophists engaged in verbal contests, jousting with words, riddles, and ideas in the same manner that the athlete would in the Olympian arena. Philos- ophy was a performance, an exhibition, in which the audiences laughed and applauded with each assault and retort. A lengthy "volley" between masters filled the audience with delight and excitement, and brought fame, honor, and acclaim to the victorious philosopher.

Philosophy is also seen to be born in an almost recreational environ- ment. Such activities were associated with leisure (oXo2~) time, and Huizinga e tymologically demonstrates that even the word school origi- nally meant "leisure." The, association with play is unmistakable :

Theaetetus in the Sophist has to admit to the Stranger from Elea that the sophist belongs to the sort of people "who give themselves up to play" (zgor ~r aat> lxeze~6vTcov). Parmenides, pressed to pronounce upon the problem of existence, calls this task "playing a difficult game" (Jroay/xamd~& t aal6gav ~ag~etv).9 Philosophy is further associated with youth; an activity identified with youthful distractions and pleasant pastime.

That which begins with the Sophists is indicative of the further history of philosophy. The dialogues of Socrates and Plato, and even the refutation of the Sophists by Aristotle, take a similar form. During the Middle Ages, such philosophical rivalry was readily apparent. One quickly thinks of the scholastic disputation, the debates of men such as Erasmus and Luther, and other intellectual rivalries which often gained widespread public attention. It is not likely in the entire history of philosophy that a more perfect example of the type of figure that Huizinga is describing could be found than Gior- dano Bruno whose mean&rings through Western Europe and Great Britain were both famous and infamous. An ideal environment for Huizinga's phi- losophical playfulness was the court of Elizabeth I of England, significantly called by Spenser "The Fairie Queen," where a man such as Bruno obtained the highest honors, and where even the Queen learned Latin and Greek so that the scholarly conversation could be carried on in the erudite languages of the ancients. It is quite ironic that the Age of Reason was the age of wigs, linen and cambric collars, and sable furs. Huizinga concludes that the learned discussions of the modern philosophical periodicals, and haughty

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atmosphere of the convening of scholarly societies is not far removed from the playful, though polemical, air of the Middle Ages.

At this point, one can come to talk about "playing with ideas." Almost like the ball in a tennis match, the ideas of the ancients (which had at- tained an almost sacred status) and those introduced by the new discoveries of science were being bantered about. Almost like a derby, the philosophers "rode" their ideas, using all of their semantical and rhetorical skill, jockeying for position before their excited audiences. The philosophers were the players, and the ideas their playthings.

One should not think at this point that the "play" of these philosophers was not serious. To juxtapose necessarily playfulness and seriousness is fundamentally fallacious. They were involved in the activity which fulfilled their unique individuality more than any other, and while it was often pursued in agonistic earnest, it was also their play giving them their fun and its correlate, freedom. It is only in an age influenced by the inhibitions of Puritanical piety and such perversions of thinking as the so-called "Protes- tant Work Ethic" that rigid distinctions are made between that which invol- ves play and that which should be taken seriously ; it is only in the perverse solemnity of the modern age that it becomes adversely pathological to see "Life" as a game.

The thoughts on "playing with ideas" can be qualified to a certain extent by saying that there are degrees of this "playing with." This means that there are variations in the way that man sees himself as transcending the ideas. During the period from the Sophists until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which is the advent of the modern age for Huizinga, there seems to be a fairly balanced status between ideas and thinkers. In fact, throughout much of this period, as was mentioned above, the ideas of the ancients were held in particular awe. At this point, or in what one might call the pre-modem age, the understandings of ~'play witk ideas" and "play of ideas" are very close. This can be noticed now and will be explained below.

However, with the coming of the modern age this closeness is shattered. No longer is there a balanced reciprocity between idea and thinker, but increasingly man sees himself in the position of transcending the ideas and manipulating them; playing with ideas becomes self-conscious, calculated, and even belligerent. There is a great gulf which separates the fanciful colloquy of the court of Elizabeth I and, for example, the propagandized manipulation of the media in the 1968 and 1972 United States presidential

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campaigns. For Huizinga, there has been a fatal shift from playfulness to over-seriousness. "The old play-factor has undergone almost complete atrophy... The virtue [an old idea] has gone out of the game. ''1~

Huizinga notices that at the same time that the play element begins to wane other play-related activities begin to show significant changes. Athle- tics in general began to become more specialized and professionalized ; until mid-1800, cricket players could still be photographed playing in top hats. He might also have noticed that what had begun calmly enough in the Enlightenment was at this same time becoming reason running rampant in the beginnings of the industrial revolution which would quickly attain the excesses of the technological society. It will be recalled that Huizinga saw play as mind, but as going beyond what was merely rational ; now, man was proclaiming that reason incarnated as science could solve any problem. It is of utmost significance that one see the correlation between professionalized athletics which Huizinga prophetically described as "sports sui generis," the technological society, and the unvirtous status of contemporary politics; these elements become bound together in what economist John Kenneth Galbraith calls the "technostructure" where the euphemistic "name of the game," or to follow Huizinga, the essential element or quality, is not play or fun, but money and material resource. The technostructure can appro- priately be described as a culture in which the only play is "false play, ' 'n and a culture in which the greatest failings can be traced to man's taking himself too seriously. Finally, one cannot help but note in passing that it is in this same period of change that Huizinga is describing that the United States began successfully to establish its "manifest destiny."

Huizinga would have welcomed the disclaimers of the technological so- ciety, the so-called "counter-culture." Here is a movement which can best be understood as a reaction against the over-seriousness of the technostructure. It is youth oriented (Huizinga had found Callicles very early seeing the importance of this aspect), 12 and places significance on the aesthetic as it moves beyond the purely rational to the emotional which encompasses more adequately what Huizinga called the "totality" of man ; its members are fundamentally players. The technostructure is old and established, and from its close-minded bastions of extrinsic power come such pronouncements as "youth no longer see the value of work," or "young people aren't serious- minded enough anymore - - they're just fool-lug around." Significantly, professional football in the United States has become primarily an "over-30"

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affair. 13 Of further ironic significance one can recall that it was Richard Nixon, who was brought to power by the manipulative forces of the techno- structure ("Their Finest - - sic or sick - - Hour"), who was also self-esteemed as the nation's "Number One Football Fan," and who celebrated one of his most ignoble moments sitting before a television set watching a football game while the counter-culture marched in protest against the greatest travesty of the technological society, the war in Southeast Asia.

Huizinga would further have welcomed and could have profited greatly from a fuller awareness of the thought of Nietzsche, whose work is some- times seen as "philosophy gone over the brink," but who recreated the play-element in philosophy and paved the way for Heidegger's "death of metaphysics" which sounded the death knell on rationality running rampant. For Nietzsche, philosophy's Cartesian-inspired over-seriousness is mediated ; philosophy becomes a gay science or joyful wisdom. Once again it becomes possible to speak about "playing with ideas" without being pejorative. Hui- zinga evidently knew little about Nietzsche, but in his one mention of him in Homo Ludens 14 he takes a position against Nietzsche's more rationalistic critics and sees the possibility of his thought leading philosophy back to its antique origins.

However, it remains for Heidegger, and more especially for Gadamer in the particular area of play, to move beyond Nietzsche. Not only will it be- come possible through their work to offer positive statements about "play- ing with ideas," but also to offer the more significant understanding of the "playing of ideas." The "play of ideas" will then be described in such a way that it will not only be shown to be more fundamental than "playing with ideas," but also be shown to hold inherent correctives to those excesses already demonstrated as potentially within the range of "playing with ideas." Again, the primary work in this area is that of Gadamer, but his work is precluded by that of Heidegger ; therefore, the discussion will give at least limited attention to Heidegger and then move to a consideration of the ideas on play found in Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method).

For Heidegger, the "death of metaphysics" has occurred because of the "forgetfulness" of Being. This "forgetfulness" amounts to a misplaced concentration of thought in regard to the "Grund-frage" (ground question) of metaphysics, why are there essents (beings) rather than nothing ? Human rationality, which is epitomized for Heidegger by Descartes and modern science, has erred in seeking the answer from individual beings, and not

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Being itself.

Being is the inner power of the being by which it is. Being is the perduring power which remains whatever fluctuations may occur within beings. Being is the emergent power, stepping forth into the light of itself. Being as ground therefore is physis : the emergent-enduring-power. ~ Heidegger's attitude toward Dasein shifts away from authentic beings being their own "there," to the experiential, disclosed (aletheia) "there" of Being's being. There is thus an experience of Being rather than a logical, rationalistic conceptualization. Admittedly, because there is a transcending of the rationa- listic, this may be difficult to "understand"; thus, the "abyssal" character of the question of Being. Being itself, in its self-disclosure, "is the final explanation, the final "because." Being as "because" (Well) is all we know on Heidegger's earth but precisely what we need to know. ''1~ Goethe suc- cinctly provides the summary remark : "How ? When ? Why ? The gods are silent ! Hold yourself in because and do not ask why ?,,iv

Before moving directly to what Heidegger has to say specifically about play, an important similarity between Heidegger and Huizinga can be noted. Huizinga has said that there is a primordial quality or essence to play which defies the same kind of logical, rational conceptualization that Heidegger mentioned in regard to Being ; for Huizinga, this is the fun of playing. He then says that no other language has an exact equivalent to the English word fun, but that the closest may be the Dutch aardigheid, le which is derived from aard, and means the same as the German Art and Wesen. Heidegger uses the same words to describe the essence of Being's disclosure- happening (the idea of "happening," truth as aletheia negating any con- ceptions of a static, substantive essence). In an etymological consideration similar to that of Huizinga, Heidegger notes that in the German language "essence" is translated Wesen and reflects the Indo-Germanic root, ~as, which carries the verbal force of "coming to reside, arriving, taking place." There is thus the movement from the earlier Heidegger's use of the word Sein to the use of the word Anwesen, and the old "being of beings" be- comes the "arriving of that which arrives" (das Anwesen des Anwesenden). There may exist, therefore, a direct relation between the "fun" of play, and the disclosure-happening, aletheia-event of Being. As a concluding aside, one might also ask if there is any etymological relationship between the Indo-Germanic vas, and Huizinga's rates.

Heidegger then comes to describe very specifically the disclosure-happen-

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ing of Being in terms of play. It becomes appropriate to speak of play as the mode of Being ! And, it follows from this assertion, that as human beings (and perhaps this can be extended to beings in general) are playful, having fun, that they are not only participating in, but occasions of, the Dasein of Being.

The historical movement of Being is a play. Its missionary sendings and withdrawals are a toying of Being with man... The process of Being in which it revealed itself to the Presocratics, but afterwards appeared under the guise of idea, substance, objectivity, will-to-power, and technology, can neither be deciphered nor governed by man. Rather, Being "toys with" man. The role of man is to "play along with" (mitspielen) the play. The idea of freedom [authentic existence] is transformed from the power to take over the direction of one's being to the willingness to "work with" and "play with" Being... Being plays "because it plays," and man is caught up in that play. 19 One can thus speak of play, not simply as an "element" of culture or as being "in" culture, but as the mode of Being for which culture is sub specie. Heidegger is thus able to follow the intrinsic implications of Hui- zinga's first statements, and for Heidegger the totality of the world, that which is, plays; within this context one can properly speak of "culture sob specie ludi."

Heidegger also describes the role of man in such a culture, and one can see both the ideal sense of "playing with ideas" and at least begin to catch a glimpse of the more essential reality of the "play of ideas." "The play of Being is not one-sided... Being needs man's attentive co-operation, although it retains the upper hand. T M Being and man are involved in an inter-play ; Gadamer will speak of a "conversation" with Being, and Buber's "dialogue" (Zwiesprache) of the Ich-Du relationship is also instructive. In this dialogue with Being (Heidegger sees man and Being as existing in a "duet"), 21 man achieves his human being, is the place where Being plays itself, and man has fun. Philosophically, the dialogue is characterized by a creative openness to the "new-not-yet" which continually arrives in perpetual novelty. More important than discursive, ontic answers to questions is the non-absolutized questioning process itself : "anything like a final explanation is simply in- appropriate. ''2~

Heidegger thus makes the distinction that this discussion has sought be- tween "play of ideas" and "play with ideas," and has envisioned the ideal way in which the philosopher plays ~u~lh ideas. Heidegger's philosopher is

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involved in a never-ending process of inquiry, and the inquiry itself is tantamount to the experience of Being. Heidegger's way is called "ideal" in contrast to the perverted, manipulative "playing with" described in relation to the egotistical excesses of technological rationalism. What now finally remains is for Gadamer to build upon the work of Heidegger, and become even more explicit about the play of ideas. It may also have come time in the discussion to stop using, or at least explicitly qualify, the word idea which has previously acknowledged, substantival overtones, and think more in terms of "play with Being" and "play of Being."

Gadamer's work can be understood as a "hermeneutic of Being." How- ever, it is not a hermeneutics which merely seeks to understand Being, but quite the contrary, it is an attempt to experience Being as understanding, tradition, or thinking. Such a hermeneutic is not a methodology or an attempt to conceive understanding as the result of man's subject/object relationship with his world (as in the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher or Dilthey). It is rather an attempt to see understanding as a process of eventful happenings, which is the way of Being itself, and "the way of being of man himself. ''2a Therefore, for Gadarner, the process (and it must remain process) of under- standing or thinking, the transmission of tradition, is the more specifically explained mode of Being and play : that is, understanding or thinking is the disclosure-happening play of Being. "Understanding is not reconstruction but mediation. T M

Understanding itself is not to be thought of so much as an action of sub- jectivity, but as the entering into an event of transmission in which past and present are continually mediated. This is what must gain validity in herme- neutical theory which is much too dominated by the ideal of procedure, a method. 25

Furthermore, Gadamer (in a way similar to both Heidegger and Huizinga) sees that the mode of understanding is language, and that language thus becomes the most fundamental form of play. Therefore, several items are being conjointly brought together into a synonymous context : Being, play~ understanding, thinking, transmission of traditions, and language. A ra. tionally analytic philosophy might attempt to act divisively with these items ; the type of philosophy which Gadamer calls for would realize more their intrinsic interrelatedness, and in doing so become more immersed in an en- counter (Buber's Begegnung) with aletheia-truth.

Within Being's playfulness, or within understanding, there are two inter-

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related elements; an episodic element which is related to the dimension of "playing with," and a trans-subjective element which is related to the dimension of "playing of." Episodic means that "every particular 'act' of understanding is a moment in the life of tradition itself. ''=6 Therefore, as each thinker plays with an idea, he is a part of the life or truth of that idea, or of Being itself. The thinker or philosopher, with all of the prejudices or worldview which constitute his uniqueness, does not stand subjectively above the tradition, but serves as a conveyor of the tradition from past to present to future ; the tradition only lives, Being only is, the philosopher only authentically exists in this conveyance, which is thus described as a game. The philosopher is in an active reciprocity with understanding, langu- age, Being, which exists as an open questioning which does not seek absolute finality in either understanding's past (for example, a particular text) or in its present (the thinker's present set of prejudices). The tradition, under- standing, Being game lives in its presentation and representations, its being played. In relation to this episodic element, it is justifiable to be involved in a playing with ideas or Being.

Trans-subjective means that "what takes place in understanding is a mediation and transformation of past and present that transcends the know- er's manipulative control. ''m At this point, the game/play imagery becomes of utmost importance for Gadamer, for involvement in true play or a real game brings the realization, not that one is playing, but that one is being played ! Any single individual or single occasion of understanding is a subordinate part of the whole movement of understanding, the entire play of Being. The most essential understanding of man is thus gained, not in seeing him as transcending, manipulating, or autonomous from the whole, but as intrinsically related to the totality of Being as a player who is being played (or Being-played).

Man is not defined prior to or independent of the event of Being which thinking essentially serves. Not only is man not primary in his relation to Being : man is at all only insofar as he is addressed by Being and, in his thinking, participates in the event of Being... The basic relation is not man's relation to himself (i.e., his "self-consciousness," his subjectivity), but his relation to and immersion in the event of Being... Thinking is the place where Being clears itself and shines forth. The most accurate character- ization of thinking, therefore, is not as the achievement or work of man, but as the achievement of Being. Thin~ing has an ontological status tran- scending human intentionality and purpose. 28

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Therefore, the philosopher is a participant in the "play of ideas" or more precisely "the play of Being." Being transcends him, and his thinking pro- cess is his being played by Being. In a sense, the philosopher is the servant of Being; to follow Heidegger's terminology, the "missionary" of the "mission" of Being. His effort, or his play, is part of an endless process ;2.~ it has no aim in which it terminates and continually renews itself in repe- tition.

Only when it claims a terminus by absolutizing a single repetition of the whole does it cease to be play, a game, and take itself too seriously in false play.

The most original meaning of play is neither the object nor the subject of play, but the medial meaning, the play as such, i.e., the spontaneous to-and- fro movement accomplished by play... The players are drawn into the play in such a way that they are unburdened, released from the strain of taking the initiative, and "play takes over," as a pure self-display. But even though "the play's the thing," it still needs the players as those to whom it dis- plays itself, who begin by playing only to become played in the process, a~

In conclusion, the primary implication which can be drawn from Gada- mer's statements on "the play of ideas" or "the play of Being" may be that, either for philosophy as a specific sort of discipline or for thinking in general, a full appreciation of the dimension of "play of" or "played by" serves to protect philosophy from becoming too serious, or thinking in general from becoming absolutized or ideological. At the root of such abso- lutized ideology is that which stands diametrically opposed to human being and freedom Der se. When human' being and freedom are emasculated or threatened, such too-serious absolutizing is inevitably the essential villain. The dimension of "playing with" has a definite, pathological potential ; the dimension of "playing of" or "played by" has an inherent iconoclastic element, its desire for, pursuit of, and expectation of "the new."

The greatest threat to philosophy, to thinking in general, and in turn to fun, humanity, freedom, and Being itself, is a narrow-minded, establishment enforced adherence to ideas that have been sanctified as absolutes. Such philosophical narrow-mindedness issues in such excesses as the technostruc- ture or "the forgetfulness of Being." It is no small thing to think of oneself, not as a subjective absolute, but as a part of an on-going process, a totality ; as part of a game in which Being is "there" through one's play, and one's being played. In such a game absolutes become tentative absolutes, and

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principles become operative principles. There is a buoyancy, a carefreeness, a certain tensionless frivolity to understand or be oneself in the context of the ripening' of Being; there is a certain freedom ("you shall know the aletheia-truth, and it shall set you free") in the speculative dialectic of the game, the world-play of Being. Philosophy is thus : a creative open- mindedness ; an endless questioning-answering dialectic with Being; an iconoclastic waiting without idolatrous absolutes; an immersion into be- cause without a final why ; a being played by the play of Being.

NOTES

1 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston : Beacon Press, 1970), p. 3 (hereafter HL). z HL, ibid. 3 I /L, foreword. 4 HL, ibid. 5 IlL, ibid. 6 HL, ibid. 7 I-IL, p. 147. s HL, ibid. 9 HL, p. 149. :to I-IL, pp. 198-199. :tl HL, p. 206. 12 HL, p. 150. 13 1974 Atlanta sports survey. :t4 HL, p. 152. 15 Martin He]degger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, 2. Auflage (Tiibingen: Max Nie- meyer, 1958), pp. 11-13. Quoted in John D. Caputo, "Being, Ground, and Play in Heldegger," Man and World, 3 (1970), 30. 16 Caputo, ibid., p. 31. :t7 Heidegger, Der Satz yore Grund (Pfullingen: Verlag Giinter Neske, 1957), p. 206. Quoted in Caputo, p. 34. 18 HL, p. 3. 19 Caputo, op. cit., p. 34. 20 Ibid., p. 40. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., p. 40. 23 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 163. 24 David Linge, "IntrodueAion to Translation of Gadarner's Essays," p. 6. 25 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tiibingen : J. C. B. Mohn, 1965), pp. 274- 275. Quoted in Linge, p. 7. us Linge, p. 9. 2r Linge, ibid. 2s Ibid., pp. 46-47. 29 Theodore Kisiel, "The Happening of Trad i t ion : The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger," Man and World, 2, 3 (1969), 371. 30 Ibid.

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