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Papuan political imaginings of the 1960s: internationalconflict and local nationalisms

by

Richard Chauvel

Paper presented at the Seminar on the Act of Free Choice.

Held in The Hague 15 November 2005 on the occasion of the book launch of P.J.

Drooglever,Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoeas van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea

en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht(An Act of Free Choice. The Papuans

of western New Guinea and the limitations of the right of self determination),

edited by P.J. Drooglever. Institute of Netherlands History (The Hague 2008)

Dit Artikel is verschenen in TijdING, een breed samengesteld online tijdschrift over de Nederlandse geschiedenis.

TijdINGbevat artikelen over historiografie, methodiek en allerlei themas uit de Nederlandse geschiedenis. Veelal

gaat het om voordrachten die bij een bepaalde gelegenheid zijn gehouden (nu in geschreven vorm gepubliceerd) en

artikelen die elders al eens zijn verschenen. Maar ook bevat TijdINGbijdragen die voor de eerste maal worden

gepubliceerd. Meestal zullen de artikelen in meer of mindere mate verband houden met een of meer van deuitgaven of projecten van het instituut of met het werk van het instituut in het algemeen.

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39

Papuan political imaginings o the 1960s:

international confict and local nationalisms1

Richard Chauvel

The paper examines the ideas o the uture - Papuan political aspirations- that developed among the Papuan elite in the late 1950s and 1960s, par-ticularly in the last two years o the Indonesia - Netherlands dispute. Itemphasises the context o the dispute, but ocuses on the Papuan actors

in it. The paper does not contend that Papuans infuenced the directionor outcome o the dispute, on the contrary, rather that the dispute shapedthe development o the elite and its political aspirations. The rst part othe paper examines the emergence o a Dutch-educated Papuan elite aterthe Pacic War. Dutch policies sought to cultivate an elite that identiedwith Papua as part o Melanesia rather than with Indonesia. The paperargues that this elite were the rst Papuans, in that they expanded theiridentities rom the regional and tribal to the pan-Papuan. Education poli-cies and structures acilitated the development o a pan-Papuan identity.Another actor infuencing an emerging Papuan identity was the very

structure o the colonial administration. Netherlands New Guinea hada dual system o colonialism, as much Indonesian as it was Dutch. Therst Papuans orged their identity and their political attitudes in reeren-ce to and, sometimes, in opposition to the Indonesians, who held manyo the middle and lower positions within the administration, educationsystem and the missions. The Indonesian role in the colonial administra-tion o Netherlands New Guinea strengthened Indonesian nationalistsconviction that the territory was part o Indonesia. This paper argues thatthe Indonesian role in this dual colonial system tended to have the op-posite eect on Papuans.

The second part o the paper argues that Papuans developed their po-litical ideas in the context o and in response to the dispute betweenIndonesia and the Netherlands. The young and small elite were con-ronted by choices - integration with Indonesia, the Melanesian Unionidea or independence as a separate state. The nationalist impulse, asthis was expressed in the Maniest Politik o October 1961, representeda Papuan attempt to determine their own uture, rather than have theDutch, Indonesians and Americans do it or them. That small, young andpolitically inexperienced elite ailed to exert any infuence on the out-come o the dispute, but it had created a conviction that Papuans had aright to determine their own uture. O all the stakeholders in the NewYork Agreement, it was only the Papuans in the years ater 1962, whoclung to the belie that the provisions or an Act o Free Choice wereanything but a g lea. The paper concludes by arguing that the early1960s was a ormative period in the construction o Papuan nationalismand has become the centre-piece o Papuan nationalist historiography.

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40 Papuan political imaginings o the s

The Papuan Elite

The mission and Dutch educated elite emerged as a new social group inPapuan society during the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch duringthe Revolution and the subsequent confict between Indonesia and TheNetherlands. Papua was not one o the centres o the Indonesian nationa-list movement, except as a place o exile or revolutionaries. Neverthelesshal a century o missionary education had produced a small group opeople aware o the great changes taking place elsewhere in the Nether-lands empire. A 1949 government report identied an educated group osome 1700 Papuans in the territory - village schoolmasters, governmentocials, para-medics, agricultural ocials, police and tradesmen - mosto whom have had some secondary education.2 In the view o the rst

post-war Dutch Resident o New Guinea, J.P.K. van Eechoud: The intel-lectuals consist o a very small number o teachers, ocials o the lowestrank and nurses. New Guinea cannot achieve any autonomy or manygenerations.3 He considered that there were hundreds o Papuans readyor training as teachers and ocials. This task o training a Papuan eliteshould be a major objective o Netherlands policy and or this purposeVan Eechoud established special schools or police and ocials. He alsoestablished a Papuan para-military orce, the Papoea Bataljon. Pupilswere deliberately drawn rom various regions in Papua so as to broadenlocal identies into a Papuan one.

Van Eechouds students understood the essentially political purpose ohis policies. In October 1961, eleven years ater van Eechoud ceased to

be Resident, during the New Guinea Council debates about the recog-nition o the Bintang Kejora as the national fag, one o the Papuan mem-

bers proposed that, i the Bintang Kejora was raised, a fower be placed onvan Eechouds grave as he was the one who had planned all that we arenow about to achieve.4 About the same time Markus Kaisiepo recalled ameeting with Father van Eechoud in 1945 at the school van Eechoudestablished to train Papuans as ocials. Van Eechoud told the studentsthat they had to study diligently because they were the new Papuans or

a new New Guinea. This is what I have been trying to do ever since. Notonly me; all o us.5

When, in 1960, The Netherlands sought to accelerate the pace o politicaladvancement the urther development o an elite was a critical part o thepolicy. Th. H. Bot, the State Secretary or New Guinea, established a po-licy ramework or elite development which was much broader, more sy-stematic in its application and more clearly directed towards the politicalobjectives o sel-government and sel-determination o the Papuans thanthat envisaged by van Eechoud.6Residents and Controleurs throughout theterritory were instructed to register prominent Papuans in the areas otheir administration with the objective o identiying those who could beinvolved in the Governments plans. Specically, those who would besuitable or political education, potential candidates and government no-minees or representative councils, government advisors as well as thosewho could be sent on trips to Holland and elsewhere. The administration

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had a well-established intelligence apparatus to keep pro-Indonesian po-litical activists under surveillance. The register o prominent Papuans

was a means o identiying the Papuan political resources to be mobilisedand cultivated in the administrations development strategies.7

The lists o prominent Papuans included all the well-known politicalgures, such as Nicholaas Jouwe, Markus Kaisiepo, A. Indey, Wettebossy,H. Womsiwor and E.J. Bonay. However, the net went much urther toencompass teachers, missionaries, government clerks, village heads, nur-ses and policemen, skilled and semi-skilled urban wage-earners, many owhom had little or no prior political experience. The lists provide an in-sight into the processes o post-war social change in Papua. For example,they included people who had served in van Eechouds Papua Battalion

and worked in the oil industry in Sorong.8 By July 1961 some 395 promi-nent Papuans had been identied rom ve residencies in Papua.9

These political developments need to be placed in a somewhat broadercontext o socio-economic change. In the early 1960s only about 40,000Papuans out o a total population o around 700,000 lived in the smallurban centres dotted around the coastal areas and o-shore islands. Se-condary education had been developed only on a very small scale. WhenPaul van der Veur was planning a survey o secondary school students in1962 he ound it was not necessary to sample the population. He could

have surveyed the entire population o secondary school students. Vander Veurs survey ound that the students were prominently the rst ge-neration o their amilies with a western education. The athers o abouttwo-thirds o the pupils worked in the subsistence sector o the economy.While athers o nearly 16% occupied the teaching, bureaucratic and poli-tical positions to which the students themselves aspired.10

Becoming Papuan

Bot, like van Eechoud beore him, recognised that the topography and

ethnic diversity meant that there was little sense o national awarenessamong Papuans. One o the Governments objectives was to stimulatesuch awareness. The central education institutions made an importantcontribution, as would the Papoea vrijwilligers korps (PVK-Papuan Volun-teers Corps) and the New Guinea Council. Bot also sought to encouragean awareness among the elite that they belonged to the same people as thePapuans o the Australian-administered territories. The objective must bethat Papua, located on the periphery o Asia, shall in the uture constitutepart o a greater Melanesian entity, ultimately independent, yet assuminga place in the world linked spiritually and economically with the West.11

The Dutch and mission education system were key institutions in expan-ding the horizons rom the tribal and the local to the Papuan. The Papuangraduates o van Eechouds schools were in some senses the rst Papu-ans as well as the rst generation o Papuan nationalists in that they werethe ones that began to think o themselves as being members o a broader

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pan-Papuan society, not merely a member o a particular ethno-linguisticgroup.

In the case o the Netherlands Indies / Indonesia, Benedict Anderson hasidentied the critical infuence o the institutions o colonial education,particularly or the rst generation o students, in promoting colonialnationalisms. The colonial education system was highly centralized,with common textbooks and standardized programs. These institutionsprovided students with a common experience a territorially specicimagined reality which was everyday conrmed by the accents and phy-siognomies o their classmates.12 Although the scale was much smallerand the level o education not at tertiary level, the expansion o schoolsand training institutions ater the Pacic war in Papua, also promoted

the development o a pan-Papuan identity among the rst generation ostudents. Indeed, this was the specic objective o Dutch policy.

In his ocial study o the emerging political elite o the early 1960s, G.W. Grootenhuis observed that the more progressive and better-educatedmembers o the elite that he ound among the leaders o PARNA (Na-tional Party) were moving out the milieu o their own ethno-linguisticgroup. They had much greater contact with Papuans rom other regionsand with non-Papuans. Through their education and occupation theyhad moved rom one region o Papua to another. Many o the PARNA

leaders were rom Serui and had moved to Hollandia (Jayapura) wherethey tended to live in Hamadi among Papuans o diverse backgrounds,rather than members o their own group. They played an active part incommunity organizations such as trade unions, youth and sports groups,where they came into regular contact with Dutch residents o Hollandia.They read the local newspapers and listened to the Dutch governmentas well as Indonesian radio broadcasts. Grootenhuis argued that thePARNA members had made but the rst step out o their local milieu.They were usually the rst members o their amily to enjoy an educationhigher than village primary school. They lived among people o diverse

backgrounds in Hollandia, but their spouses were mostly rom their own

group.13 PARNA was part o the fowering o political activity that ol-lowed the announcement o The Netherlands ten-year plan or the de-colonisation o Netherlands New Guinea. As its name suggests, PARNApurported to be neither anti-Indonesia nor anti-Dutch, but pro-Papuan.PARNA sought to unite all Papuans and create a national identity.14

The objective o Dutch policies may have been to promote a sense o pan-Papuan identity. The regional and tribal composition o the Papuan eliterefected the impact o much longer term infuences o the colonial systemthan the policies o van Eechoud and Bot. Paul van der Veurs survey ostudents in 1962 ound that students rom the regions o Papua with thelongest contact with the colonial administration and missionaries were

best represented in the secondary school population. Students rom Biak-Numur islands made up nearly 25% o the total student body, while stu-dents rom other long-contact regions like the island o Japen (Serui) andthe region around the capital Hollandia added another 20%. However,

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emphasising the role o education as a vehicle o social change there werealso some students rom some regions only recently brought under Dutch

administration.15

The prominence in the elite o people rom Biak and Serui gave politicaldevelopments in the post-war period a particular regional dimension.The identication o political leaders rom particular regions and ethnicgroups with pro-Indonesian or pro-Dutch orientations was a eature o1960s generation o Papuan nationalists. In 1960 the Catholic weekly Tiapublished an article entitled Nationaal Partai, in which it noted that allthe PARNA leaders were rom Serui and that Biak had no representatives.Tia observed that the struggle between Biak and Serui was the oldestin Papuan politics. Ater the war Markus Kaisiepo, rom Biak, was the

leading pro-Dutch politician and Silas Papare, rom Serui, led the pro-Indonesia orces.16

Not becoming Indonesian

Van Eechoud and Bots promotion o a Papuan identity was not the onlyactor responsible or the emergence o a growing political awarenessamong educated Papuans. Another stimulus came rom the very struc-ture o colonial rule in the territory. The structure o the Netherlands

administration provided the particular context or Papuan Indonesianrelations. Netherlands New Guinea had a system o dual colonialismin which a handul o Dutch ocials held the most senior positions inthe administration and missionary organizations, while many o the mid-dle and low ranking ocials, policemen, teachers and missionaries wereIndonesians, many rom Maluku, as Papua was administered as part oresidencies and governments based in Maluku until the Pacic War. Thedual colonial structure o Netherlands New Guinea was quite distinctrom the orms o indirect rule ound elsewhere in the Netherlands In-dies, where members o local elites were co-opted into the colonial ad-ministration and local administrative structures subsumed within the

colonial government. In Papuan eyes, the colonial ocials were nearlyall oreigners a ew Dutch and many Indonesians. Particularly beorethe war Papuans came into contact with the more numerous Indonesianswith much greater requency than with Dutch ocials and missionaries.The Indonesians were at the interace o colonial rule. The inevitable re-sentments were directed against the Indonesians rather than the Dutch.The presence in Papua o so many Indonesian servants o the Dutch statecontributed to the Indonesian nationalist sense that Papua was part oIndonesia, but it did not necessarily contribute to the Papuan sense o

being part o Indonesia.

The ormer Governor o Netherlands New Guinea, Jan van Baal, ob-served that the educated Javanese, Makassarese or Ambonese, deployedas ocials throughout the Indies, were impressed by the sheer size othe colonial state and elt that they belonged to it. Their national awa-reness as Indonesians developed rom this experience. The Indonesians,

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particularly Moluccans, who participated in the development o Papua,thought o Papua as part o their country. However, there were virtually

no Papuans who participated in the development o Indonesia, outsidePapua. Papuans thought o the Indonesians in Papua not as compatriots,

but as oreigners, who were colonizing them and their land and most oall occupied the positions Papuans wanted. Van Baal commented that noone oresaw the tragic consequences or the Papua Indonesia confictthis would have.17

When Papuans themselves became colonial ocials ater the Pacic war,Papua was more distinctly set apart than beore rom the unit o the Ne-therlands Indies / Indonesia. The Resident o New Guinea still was res-ponsible to the Lt. Governor General in Batavia (Jakarta), but the admini-

stration was now more separate rom that o the neighboring islands oMaluku. The training o Papuan ocials was undertaken in Papua andupon graduation they were appointed to positions in Papua. Hollandia(Jayapura) was the center o their bureaucratic pilgrimage their Rome not Jakarta or Ambon. Just as happened in the Netherlands Indies, thedeployment o Papuan colonial ocials to positions throughout the terri-tory, irrespective o their ethno linguistic background, contributed greatlyto their becoming the rst Papuans.

E.J. Bonay, one o the leaders o PARNA and under the Indonesian admi-

nistration the rst governor o West Irian, states that the terms Papuaand Amberi were the ones used by Papuans during the Dutch periodto describe, respectively the indigenous peoples o the territory and theIndonesians, rom elsewhere, who had become the ocials, police andmilitary ocials o the colonial government. The amberi were the ac-complices and stooges o the colonial government, whose treatment oPapuans was inhuman and who thought Papuans were stupid, dirty andcurly haired. Bonay argued that Papuans took their revenge against theamberi during the Koreri movement, 1938-1943. He asserts that theamberi sense o superiority evident in the Dutch period has got worsesince the amberi became Indonesians and the new colonizers in Papua.

Bonay contends that it is not surprising that the confict and antagonismbetween Papuans and amberi was a continuity rom the past.18

The antagonism that Bonay observed and experienced between Papu-ans and amberi as a unction o the dual colonialism o the governmentstructure was one o the central themes in an ocial Dutch study o theemerging Papuan political elite in the early 1960s. The study argued thatPapuan elite attitudes towards the Netherlands Indonesia dispute wereinfuenced by personal experience. The studys author, G.W. Grooten-huis, argued that key to personal experience was the notion o progress(vooruitgang). Grootenhuis Papuan inormants made the distinction bet-ween the pre-war period when Papuans were treated as animals (bina-tang) by Indonesian ocials and ater the war, when there was increasinginteraction with the much greater number o Dutch ocials, and Papuanswere treated as humans (manusia). The change corresponded with animprovement o material welare, but Grootenhuis argues it was the tre-

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atment that Papuans experienced at the hands o Indonesian and Dutchocials that was the critical actor. Papuans resented the discrimination

they had suered at the hands o Indonesian ocials. Many elt they hadbeen treated as being dumb and not able to speak good Malay (Indonesi-an) by their Indonesian teachers. Those Papuans who had obtained posi-tions in the administration elt that they were kept in the lower positions

by Indonesian ocials, who regarded them as incapable o being any-thing else. The ocial Dutch were regarded as bearers o development- o education, Christianity and material progress. The Indonesians werenot only the source o discrimination and prejudice, but were suspectedas working against the progress oered by the Dutch. I Indonesia wassuccessul in its struggle to gain control o Papua, Grootenhuis inor-mants eared that this would mean a return to the binatang period and

Papua would be cut o rom the source o progress (kemajuan). As youngeducated Papuans contemplated independence in the early 1960s, theywere uncertain about the uture role, i any, o the Indonesian ocials,teachers and missionaries. Some thought that they should be permitted toremain, but not without conditions.19 Echoing Grootenhuis use o manu-sia and binatang, Van der Veur, in his survey o Papuan students in 1962,ound that students showed a strong desire to be modern, to be manusiaand not binatang. The students aspired to hold the modern political andadministrative positions. Among the reasons cited by the students or theopposition to Papua becoming part o Indonesia was that they did not

want to become slaves.20

It would be misleading to assume that all relations between Indonesiansand Papuans were as antagonistic as Grootenhuis report suggests. Du-ring Indonesias struggle or independence against the Dutch there wereIndonesian politicians who were able to mobilize Papuan support or in-dependence, with Papua as part o an independent Indonesia. SoegoroAtmosprasodjo was a ormer internee in Boven Digul.21 He had workedor the Dutch during the war in Australia and was appointed as head o atraining school or Papuans in 1945. Dr. Sam Ratulangi was the Republi-can Governor o Sulawesi, sent into exile in Serui in 1946 with his closest

assistants and their amilies. Soegoros activities in Hollandia and Ratu-langis in Serui suggest that Indonesian nationalists were able to disse-minate their ideas among Papuans, both the small group o graduates othe missionary schools and van Eechouds training schools and amongstless sophisticated villagers. Soegoro did have the capacity to speak to Pa-puans in terms o their own interests and how these could be advancedwithin an independent Indonesia. The ormer detainee rom Boven Diguland the Ratulangi group were experienced and skilul politicians, whosought to mobilize Papuan support or the Republican support. They in-teracted with Papuans in a very dierent manner to the east Indonesianocials, teachers and missionaries.22

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Born in confict: Papuan responses to the Dutch Indonesiaconfict

The last months o 1961 and the rst o 1962 were the climax o a 12yearlong dispute that went to the brink o open military confict. The USsponsored negotiations that led to the New York Agreement o August1962 took place under the threat that Indonesia would move rom armedinltrations to a large-scale military attack. It was this environment thatstimulated and shaped a critical period o Papuan nationalism. Papuannationalist political activity itsel was a actor in the escalation o the con-fict. President Sukarno recognized that a rival Papuan national claim toPapua was a much greater threat to Indonesias own claim than conti-nued Dutch rule.23

The political developments in Papua were responses to the escalatinginternational confict. The Papuan leaders reactions were by no meansuniorm. For Papuan leaders, both pro-Indonesia and nationalists, thisperiod was a political roller coaster. They were alternatively encouragedand demoralized by the international developments. As the tension esca-lated, the ocus o the dispute or Papuans shited rom the rival claims tosovereignty over the territory to the issue o sel-determination and theprospect o an independent state o West Papua. The shit was a catalystto an emerging sense o Papuan nationalism. Among the Papuan politi-

cal elite there was an awareness that their homelands ate was at stake.These international developments and the Papuan responses revealed thedivisions in the elite and more broadly in Papuan society. Papuan leadersound it dicult to position themselves in the confict.

Foreshadowing a theme among the reormasi era nationalists, Papuanleaders in 1961 resented the act that there was an international struggletaking place, beyond their control, but about their uture. At a meetingin August 1961 Herman Wayoi, the chairman o PARNA, protested thatPapua was not a commodity: This land is o and or the Papuans.24 Itwas with this sense o resentment and in a rapidly changing international

environment that led to the fag raising on 1 December 1961. On 19 Octo-ber a group o some 72 people (all but one Papuans), representing mostregions o the territory, both Christians and Moslems gathered in Hollan-dia. Four o Papuas leading politicians and members o the New GuineaCouncil Nicholaas Jouwe, E.J. Bonay, Nicholaas Tanggahma and F. To-rey, took the initiative or the meeting. 25 The meeting elected 17 people toorm a Komite Nasional Papua. The Komite Nasional issued aManiest Politikthat, inter alia, stated:

On the basis o desire o our people or independence, we urgethrough the mediation o the Komite Nasional and our popularrepresentative body, the New Guinea Council, the Governmentso Netherlands New Guinea and The Netherlands so that as o1 November26:

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our fag be fown beside the Netherlands fag;our national anthem,Hai Tanahku Papua,be sung along with the

Wilhelmus;the name o our land become West Papua;the name o our people become Papuan.

On this basis we the Papuan people demand to obtain our ownplace like other ree peoples and amongst nations we the Papuanpeople wish to contribute to the maintenance o the reedom othe world.27

TheManiest Politik was ormulated a couple o weeks ater the Nether-lands Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, presented his plan to internationa-

lize the dispute to the UN General Assembly. Torey, who was one o theounders o the Komite Nasional and a member o the New Guinea Coun-cil, explained theManiest Politik in the context o Luns proposal. He saidthat Luns proposal had created much misunderstanding in Papua. Somemembers o the New Guinea Council considered that i all they did waspassively listen to the claims o the Indonesian and Netherlands Govern-ments, they would eventually be orced to support one o the adversariesand their own voice would not be heard at the UN or in the internationalcommunity. Torey argued that the objective o theManiest Politik was toestablish Papuas right with the raising o the fag to demonstrate to the

international community that Papuans desired to stand on their own eetand later establish their own nation. That was Papuas right. Torey relatedthat this was why Komite Nasional proposed to the Government that on 1November that the Papuan fag would be fown beside the Netherlandsfag, the anthem be sung and our land and people be known as Papua.

TheManiest Politik was the rst assertion o the Papuan demand to jointhe other ree peoples o the world and establish their own nation state.Following Kelly and Kaplan, Papuans wanted to become part o the sy-stem o nation states developed ater the Second World War. It was sig-nicant that the Papuan demand was expressed at a moment when the

processes o decolonization were being played out in the orum o theUN. Kelly and Kaplan are correct in asserting that decolonization was animposition o a new political order rom top down.28 Papuans understoodthat the process was largely out o their control, but at this brie momentthey attempted to use the international system and its central institution the UN as well as its language and principles to assert their demandto become a member o the club.

Despite the act that not all the leaders who gathered on 19 October sup-ported theManiest Politik, it was decided to press on because shortly theUN would decide the ate o Papua and its people. The Komite Nasionalwanted to make sure Papuas voice be heard and that the world under-stood that Papuans had their rights and Papuans knew what they wanted.Torey acknowledged that it was unusual to raise a national fag besidethat o the colonial power. It was not Komite Nasionals intention that theraising o the fag meant the transer o sovereignty. In Toreys opinion,

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a proclamation would pose a dilemma. Independence would mean thedeparture o the Dutch, Indonesia would invade and Papuans would not

have the resources to deend themselves.29

As Torey acknowledged there were some members o the Komite Nasionaland the Council, who had concerns about the fag. Achmad argued thatthe fag should only be raised ater there was an inormation campaignabout the fag and when sovereignty was transerred to Papua.30 Burwosthought that many people would not understand the distinction the KomiteNasional leaders were making between the fag raising and independence.Many o the people he represented in Manokwari thought that the fagraising would mean that independence had been granted.31 Outside theCouncil there were others who shared this view. PARNA initially argued

that independence could be achieved within the ramework o the LunsPlan. In November PARNA insisted that a transer o sovereignty shouldtake place at the same time as raising the fag.32 Despite these reservationsthe Council members supported the Komite Nasionals petition.

Despite the misgivings the Luns proposal had created in Papua, whenthe New Guinea Council came to debate the proposal there was strongsupport rom Papuan members because o the centrality o Papuas righto sel-determination in the Luns Plan. Torey argued that the Luns Planrepresented the one chance to resolve the problem o West Papua. Howe-

ver, he wondered what would happen i the Luns Plan was not accepted.It was certain that Indonesias demands would grow. He eared that theDutch would withdraw. He asked himsel what steps would need to betaken by the Netherlands Government to guarantee Papuans right o sel-determination.33

Two days prior to the fag raising, none o the resolutions supporting theLuns Plan or the internationalization o Papua gained the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.34 The reaction o the most seniorPapuan politicians was not quite what the Netherlands authorities in TheHague had expected. Kaisiepo, or example, told a Dutch journalist alt-

hough he had accepted the wisdom o the Dutch attempt to obtain aninternational guarantee or Papuas right o sel-determination, Papuanshad never sought internationalization, rather they wanted the continua-tion o the Netherlands administration until sel-determination. Jouwecontended that the result oered little hope or Indonesias case as anabsolute majority o UN members had supported Papuas right o sel-determination.35

The rst raising o the fag took place in ront o New Guinea Council

building on 1 December 1961. The Komite Nasional organized the occa-sion. Kaisiepo, the deputy speaker o the New Guinea Council, and W. In-ury, chair o the Komite Nasional, welcomed the Governor, senior ocials,members o the Council and political party leaders. Unavorable weatherhelped keep the ceremony in Hollandia quiet.36 Flag raising ceremoniestook place throughout the territory. Not surprisingly, in areas like Biakthere was strong interest shown, but even where support or Indonesia

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had deep roots, like Serui and Yapen, there was much local interest. Therewere no incidents reported.37

Papuans and the New York Agreement

An examination o Papuan thinking and actions surrounding theManiestPolitik, with its assertion o Papuas right to independence, and the fagraising o 1 December shed light on a critical period in the developmento the nationalist movement. Another aspect o this period relates to thekey issue o sel-determination, the New York Agreement and the imple-mentation o the Act o Free Choice in 1969. Central to Papuan concernswas their own participation, or rather the lack o it, in the determination

o Papuas uture.

On 16 February 1962, ater Sukarnos Trikora speech calling or the libe-ration o West Irian, the New Guinea Council held a debate on the righto sel-determination. Tanggahma and Bonays contributions refectedtwo broad approaches. One rejected Indonesia; the other argued that asolution could only be ound with Indonesia. Tanggahma discussed ourpossible scenarios: Integration with Indonesia was undesirable. An as-sociation with Australian New Guinea could only be contemplated when

both halves o the island were independent. A long-term association with

The Netherlands was not possible because the world considered it colo-nialism. The only option was continued Dutch administration leading tosel-determination. Bonay argued that it was only possible to resolve theconfict i Indonesia and The Netherlands cooperated. As long as therewas a dispute, Papua would never be able to exercise its right o sel-de-termination. Bonay wanted a tripartite conerence, where Papua wouldseek recognition or its right.38

These diplomatic developments surrounding the climax and eventual re-solution o the West New Guinea dispute took place at the highest levelso the United States, Indonesian and Netherlands Governments. Papuan

leaders, pro-Indonesia or nationalists, took no part. They could only ob-serve rom a distance and send protest telegrams, petitions and resolu-tions to those in Washington, Jakarta and The Hague determining theirate. These means o representation were much used as the tensions grewand negotiations continued. The Papuan responses were in keeping withthe pattern o political developments ater 1960. Members o the NewGuinea Council and those involved in the political parties established inthe atmosphere o rapid political advancement were critical o the Ame-rican intervention, which they considered partisan. Robert Kennedy inparticular attracted their ire. Political leaders also sought to remind theNetherlands Government o its commitment to sel-determination andconsultation.39 PARNA took a somewhat dierent line. While maintai-ning its established policy o Papuan representation in any negotiations,it addressed issues raised in the Bunker Plan. It proposed a two-year jointadministration o Indonesia, The Netherlands and West Papua responsi-

ble to the United Nations. At the end o the two years there would be aUnited Nations-supervised election.40

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The crucial aspect o the Bunker Plan or Papuans was when, how andunder whose administration they would exercise their sel-determina-

tion. In June, Jouwe, who was a member o the Council delegation to TheHague and who had then attended the 4th Committee meeting in NewYork, made it clear to Ambassador Bunker that the guarantee or sel-determination had to be watertight. Jouwe insisted that Papuans shouldexercise their sel-determination under the supervision o the United Na-tions and beore the administration was transerred to Indonesia.41 Giventhat Indonesia had not accepted the right o sel-determination or any oits regions and had consistently rejected it in the specic case o Papuaor the duration o the dispute, any Indonesian commitment to sel-de-termination under the Bunker Plan was treated with some scepticism byPapuan leaders.42 The demand or the plebiscite to be held during the

period o United Nations administration was a consistent and enduringtheme o debates in the New Guinea Council and the subject o manymotions while the negotiations were in progress and ater the New Yorkagreement was announced.

Bonay, one o the PARNA leaders, was the only member o the Councilwho accepted the Bunker Plan as it oered a prospect o a peaceul reso-lution. Tanggahma was another Council member who sought somethingo a rapprochement with Indonesia. He tried, unsuccessully, to persuadethe Council to send a delegation to Indonesia.43

Student opinion

The activities o the Komite Nasional, the ormulation o theManiest Politikand the debates in the New Guinea Council provide some insights intohow the senior leaders in the Papuan elite were responding to the escala-ting confict. It is dicult to assess to what extent the views expressed bymembers o the New Guinea Council and parties like PARNA refected

broader sections o Papuan society. Paul van der Veurs survey o 927students attending post elementary schools a potential elite group

give us a glimpse into the thinking o another section o the emergingelite. The survey was conducted between April and June 1962, thus aterSukarnos Trikora speech, during the Bunker negotiations and the Indone-sian military inltrations.44 Van der Veur asked the students their viewsabout Papuas uture political status. He posed the students a number opossibilities: continuation o Dutch rule; transer o Papua to Indonesianauthority; ederation with the Australian-ruled eastern hal o the islandand independence in the not too distant uture. Van der Veur argues thatthe results indicated that the program o ...rapid decolonisation hadcaught the imagination o a large segment o the youth....45 Specically,the results indicated that a large majority (77.4%) o the students avou-red the continuation o Dutch rule, a very small number (0.9%) preerredIndonesian rule, a substantial minority (34.5%) avoured independenceand a substantial majority supported some orm o union with the easternhal o the island. The support or continued Dutch rule was qualied bystatements (300 out o 598 respondents) to the eect o until we are ready

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or independence. Similarly, the support or independence was qualiedwith comments such as not too soon and by 1970, the date oreshado-

wed by the Dutch or independence. The students responses indicatingstrong opposition to the transer o Papua to Indonesian rule were some-times associated with comments refecting anti-Indonesian stereotypes.46Van der Veur considered that the students were relatively well inormedabout the political developments. In retrospect, the students condence,in April-June 1962, that continued Dutch tutelage to sel-government andindependence was a possibility seems optimistic. The students may have

been expressing, unconsciously, their own vested interest in the confict.They were among the beneciaries o Dutch policies. They, like the mem-

bers o the New Guinea Council, were the potential elite o an indepen-dent Papua. This said, the students strong opposition to the solution then

being negotiated by the Dutch and Indonesians seems clear enough.

The New York Agreement

In August, as the Bunker negotiations reached their nal stage, both theIndonesian and the Dutch governments appointed Papuans to their res-pective delegations. Silas Papare, Fritz Kirihio and Dimara joined theIndonesian delegation, while Council members Jouwe, Womiswor andTanggahma were appointed as advisers to the Netherlands delegation.

Governor Platteel was especially keen that Papuans be seen as partici-pants in the negotiations. Since beore the negotiations commenced, theNew Guinea Council and the major political parties had demanded par-ticipation and consultation. He wanted to avoid any suggestion that theDutch had excluded Papuans rom the decision-making.47 As it turnedout, the Papuan advisers arrived ater the negotiations had been nali-zed.

The Bunker negotiations culminated in the New York Agreement, underwhich Netherlands New Guinea would become the Indonesian provinceo West Irian. The administration would be transerred through the medi-

ation o a United Nations transition administration rom 1 October 1962to 1 May 1963. Ater six years o Indonesian administration, the inhabi-tants o West Papua would have the opportunity to exercise their sel-de-termination through an Act o Free Choice.

Papuan reactions to the agreement were mixed. There was rejection, ee-lings o betrayal, resignation and accommodation to an Indonesian utureas well as some discussion o possible proclamations o independence.The Governors good intentions did little to appease Papuan eelings thatorces beyond their control had determined their ate, despite their repre-sentations. The political organizations and activity as well as the Papuannationalist sentiments and national symbols that had emerged in the pre-vious couple o years counted or little in the last analysis.

The New Guinea Council building became a ocus or well-organized andwell-supported demonstrations against the agreement. At the rst such

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demonstration Markus Kaisiepo condemned the agreement: We weretraded as goats by the Americans. He agreed with the PARNA leader,

Bonay, that the time had passed or Papuans to support Dutch policy.Now they must support us.48 Bonay himsel recalled two o the chants atthe demonstration: How many dollars or Papua, Yankee. We Papuanswant reedom, not Soekarno.49 There were some Council members whonoted the dierence between the resolution o the international disputeand the accommodation o Papuan national aspirations. As was the caseduring the negotiations, the critical actor or many Papuan leaders wastiming o sel-determination ater years o Indonesian control. The issueprovoked a clash at the National Congress in September between sup-porters o a plebiscite in 1963 under the United Nations administrationor 1969 under Indonesian control.50 Zacharias Sawor, a Dutch educated

Papuan agricultural ocial, attended the meeting. He recalled that themajority at the Congress wanted the plebiscite to be held while the UN-TEA troops were present so as to insure a proper vote.51

Among some Council members there seemed to be an awareness, thatdespite their protestations and representations, the New York Agreementmeant Papuans had lost this battle. The intent o the National Congress,held in mid September 1962, appeared to be both to reassert the Papuannational ideals and yet reach some accommodation with the Indonesianadministration. The1969 plebiscite was the ocus o symbolic compromise

and the next objective o the national struggle. Tanggahma argued:

We must give Indonesia no chance to destroy our aspirations. Jakarta would get the opportunity i Papuans were disruptive.Thereore I will urge people to maintain law and order. Papuansmust strengthen themselves in order to sustain and preservetheir nationalist sentiments until the plebiscite. To this end Pa-puans must organize themselves in large parties with the sameobjective: independence in 1969.52

During the brie period between the Komite Nasional and itsManiest Po-

litik in October 1961 and the signing o the New York Agreement in Au-gust the ollowing year there was a shit in the Papuan political agendas.The changes refected the roller coaster ride that the Indonesia Nether-lands dispute generated or Papuan leaders. The nationalist demands otheManiest Politik were ormulated at a time o relative optimism. TheKomite Nasional members might have resented the act that the Dutch go-vernment, despite the undertakings to the contrary, had not consultedthe New Guinea Council about the Luns Plan; still, the plan held somepromise that Papuas right o sel-determination would be protected andan Indonesian takeover avoided. When the New York Agreement wassigned there was little discussion about what the fag raising o 1 Decem-

ber meant. The ocus o the debate was on the agreements provisions orsel-determination, particularly when and how these provisions would

be implemented. Papuan leaders were keenly aware in 1962 that imple-mentation under the UN administration would mean something dierentrom implementation ater Indonesia assumed control o the administra-tion.

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Sel-determination

A key ingredient and consistent theme in the development o Papuannationalism rom 1962 to the renaissance ater Soeharto is the interpre-tation o the sel-determination provisions o the New York Agreement.The provisions or sel-determination were the straw o hope to whichPapuans clung. Clemens Runaweri, in his report prepared just beore hisattempt to represent Papua at the UN discussions on the Act o FreeChoice in 1969 wrote:

The main problem o the dispute between the Netherlands andIndonesia was dealing with the political uture o the Papuans.And the presence o the UN Representative in this territory is or

the purpose o protecting the Papuans right o sel-determina-tion. Unortunately this UN man seem not to be a protector butas an advisor with competence and authority. He is actually alooker watching at a game played by the Indonesian Army Gen-erals against the innocent and unweapon Papuans.53

What Clemens Runaweri saw as the crux o the problem, the other inte-rested parties in the confict regarded as something to be shaded by a gleave. The Australian Minister or External Aairs, Sir Gareld Barwickin January 1962 anticipated that successul negotiations would probably

include a ace saving ormula or the protection o Papuan interests. ThePapuans right to choose their own uture would be entirely dependenton Indonesian good aith and that there would be no way o ensuringthat this aspect o the agreement would be carried out.54 Foreign reportingon developments in Papua between the Indonesian assumption o the ad-ministration and the Act o Free Choice was intermittent and patchy.However, one o the consistent themes in the reporting was the hope andtrust Papuans placed on the just implementation o the sel-determinationprovisions o the New York Agreement. It was a hope maintained in theace o overwhelming evidence that Papuans experienced in their dailylives that the Indonesian authorities had a dierent understanding o the

provisions and contrary outcome in mind. For example, Floyd Whitting-ton, the Counsellor o the US Embassy who visited West Irian in August1964, observed that knowledge o the terms o the New York Agreementwas widespread in Papuan society and the prospect o a plebiscite

burns like a talisman o hope or the uture. The most remarkable aspecto this problem was the unanimity with which Papuan leaders o varyingattitudes toward continued union with Indonesia agreed that it was o thegreatest importance that a air plebiscite actually be conducted.55

In retrospect, that hope and trust seems misplaced, nave and ignoranto the international orces that acilitated a resolution o the West NewGuinea dispute in Indonesias avor. Perhaps the contemporary Papuan

belie that a thorough investigation into the New York Agreement and theconduct o the Act o Free Choice will resolve their confict with Indo-nesia refects something o the same view o the world and how interna-tional relations are conducted. Nave the Papuan aith in the sel-determi-

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nation provisions might seem, but it is a key and consistent ingredient inPapuan nationalism.

Correcting the course o Papuan History

In the post Suharto reormasi era revival o Papuan nationalism the historyo the 1960s that o Papuas incorporation into Indonesia has becomethe history to be rectied. Much o Papuan nationalism has becomea debate about history. This paper has argued that Papuan nationalismwas also shaped by history. The nationalists o the 1940s, 1950s and 1960swere educated and developed their political ideas in the context o Indo-nesias struggle or independence and the subsequent dispute between

The Netherlands and Indonesia about who owned the land o Papua.The key ingredient that made Papuan nationalism was the demand in the

Maniest Politik o October 1961 that the Papuan people obtain their ownplace like other ree peoples and nations. This demand was ormulated asa response to Foreign Minister Joseph Luns ill-ated attempt to internati-onalise the dispute with Indonesia. Luns Plan sought to protect Papuaninterests, yet just as much as Sukarnos command a couple o months la-ter to crush the puppet state o Papua, it was a case o others determiningPapuas uture, not Papuans.

To say that much o Papuan nationalism has been a debate about historyis misleading. It has been more o a monologue. The Kongres Papua omid 2000 ormalised in the ollowing resolutions the key assertions o thePapuan rectication.

1. The people o Papua have been sovereign as a nation and a statesince 1 December 1961.

2. The people o Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the 1962New York Agreement on moral and legal grounds as the agreementwas made without any Papuan representation.

3. The people o Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the results

o Pepera (the Act o Free Choice) because it was conducted undercoercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and immo-ral conduct contravening humanitarian principles. Accordingly, thepeople o Papua demand that the United Nations revoke resolution2504, 19 December (sic) 1969.56

One o the ew Indonesian attempts to respond to and engage with theKongres Papuas interpretation o history was that o ormer oreign mi-nister Dr. Subandrio in his book entitled, appropriating the Papuan slo-gan,Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat (Correcting the History othe Struggle or West Irian). Subandrio can make as good a claim as anyIndonesian, with the exception o Sukarno, or the diplomatic successo 1962, so it is appropriate that he responded to the Kongres Papua andcelebrated his own and Sukarnos achievement. He criticised PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid or giving in to the demands o the Papuan sepa-ratists by changing the name o the territory rom Irian to Papua and or

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55 Papuan political imaginings o the 160s

upprig facially h Kongres Papua. Subari ugh rbu hKongres Papuas argum ha Papua wr ivlv i I-

ia ruggl r ipc, by arig ha hua I-ia rm fghr ha b xil W Iria (Bv Digul), whrhy acculura wih h lcal ihabia. Subari cclu ha:Apparly, h Papua Ppl Cgr i ura h hi-ry ipc i w ai.57 Suil Bambag Yuhy,h Scuriy Miir, ai a h lauch Subari bk ha: Hwrua ar h Iia ppl hav lr am, wh illp gra concern and commitment clariy h ruh a h ac aa fcial guiac h Iia ppl a h iraial cm-muiy, wh hr i a grup ppl ampig cloud, distort andmanipulate the acts o history, craily wih ubjciv cmm a ir-

prai a wih h pliical bjciv paraig rm h rririaluiy Iia.58

Th hiry h la Papua a h Iia a urig h1960 i whr w cig aialim cr ach hr. I a l-r a Duch ri a h im h Lu Pla, Subari wr hai Th Nhrla pri wih h plicy ablih Papua Merdeka,r Iia ha cul ma hig l bu konrontasi.59 Th Nhr-la ci pri, bu may Papua hav a i ha makonrontasi.

endnotes

1 I aii h rrc cii, hi papr raw a umbr h au-

hr arlir publicai, i paricular The Land o Papua and the Indonesian

State: Essays on West Papua, vlum & w (Mah Uivriy, Cr

Suha Aia Sui, Wrkig Papr 120 & 121 (2003));

The Papua Confict: Jakartas Perceptions and Policies (Plicy Sui 5, Ea

W Cr Wahig, March 2004) ;

c-auhr wih Ikrar Nua Bhaki; Constructing Papuan Nationalism: His-

tory, Ethnicity and Adaptation (Plicy Sui 14, Ea W Cr Wahig,2005)

2 Report on Activities, Reactions and Aims o the autochtonic population o Nether-

lands New-Guinea concerning the uture political status o their country in connec-

tion with the Dutch-Indonesian Round-Table-Talks, Hllaia, Spmbr 1949.

3 J.P.K. va Echu, Na Buurbli Niuw Guia, 10-3-47, Nationaal

Archie Den Haag (NA),Archie Minog,Rapportage Indonesi, dossier 779.

4 Handelingen Nieuw Guinea Raad (NGR), Eerste Buitengewone Zitting, 30-10-61, p.

33

5 Vraaggprk m Kaiip a Juw, 13-10-61; NA, Archie Minog,Kabinet

van de Gouverneur van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, dossier 35.

6 Vrlag va Ri va Saacrari va Bila Zak, Mr Th.

H. B aar Nrla Niuw Guia, Auralich Niuw Guia, Aural-

i VS, 9 ja - 24 b 1960, p. 33, NA, Particuliere collectie Th. H. Bot, dossier

no. 44.

7 Mm Ri Crc vmbr 1959 r: rgirai prmia Pa-

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8 Letter Resident Hollandia to the Governor o Netherlands New Guinea 25-4-

60; Letter A. Boendermaker, Directeur van Binnenlandse Zaken, to the Gov-

ernor o Netherlands New Guinea, 9-5-60, NA, Archie Minog,Kabinet van deGouverneur van NNG, dossier 17.

9 The List o Prominent Papuans o July 1961 mentions 151 prominents in

Hollandia, 90 in the Geelvinkbaai, 29 in Fakak, 98 in West New Guinea and

27 in South New Guinea, NA, Archie Minog, Kabinet van de Gouverneur van

NNG, Dossier 17.

10 Paul van der Veur, Questionnaire survey among the potential Papuan elite

in 1962 West New Guinea, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI) ,

(1964) vol 120 no 4, pp. 425, 431-432.

11 Verslag van de Reis van de Staatssecretaris van Binnenlandse Zaken, mr. Th.

H. Bot naar Nederlands Nieuw Guinea, Australische Nieuw Guinea, Austral-

i en de VS, 9 jan - 24 eb 1960, pp. 1-3.

12 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Refections on the Origins and

Spread o Nationalism (London: ed. 1991) pp. 121-122

13 Rapport van de wetenschappelijk ambtenaar G.W. Grootenhuis in NNG, Pa-

poea Elite en Politieke Partijen, (Hollandia 1961) deel I, pp. 26-27, NA, Archie

Minog, Dossierarchie no 11575. This ocial report was written at the height o

the governments promotion o the Papuan elite and as tensions with Indo-

nesia increased. It was sympathetic to the Netherlands Governmentss policy

objectives.

14 Tia, (Hollandia) no. 226, 27-8-60

15 Paul van der Veur, Questionnaire, BKI120:4, pp. 429-43016 Tia (Hollandia), no. 226, 27-8-60

17 Jan van Baal, Ontglipt Verleden ( 2 vols, Franeker 1989) vol. II, pp. 166-7; Dani-

lyn Rutherord, Raiding the Land o the Foreigners: The Limits o the Nation on an

Indonesian Frontier. (Princeton 2003) p. 180.

18 E.J. Bonay, Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasionalisme Papua. (Unpublished manu-

script, Wijhe, The Netherlands, 1984) p. 84.

19 Rapport Grootenhuis, Papoea Elite en Politieke Partijen vol I, pp. 15-17,

106.

20 Paul van der Veur, Questionnaire BKI120: 4, pp. 449, 453-4

21 Boven Digul, north o Merauke in southeast Papua, was established ater the

1926-7 communist uprisings in Java and Sumatra as a place o internment orIndonesian nationalists and communists. Anderson argues that Boven Digul

had a central place in the olklore o the Indonesian nationalist struggle and

was a sacred site in the national imagining. He mistakenly contends that,

apart rom the internees, no Indonesian nationalists saw Papua with their

own eyes until the 1960s. Anderson, op. cit. p. 176

22 Richard Chauvel, The Land o Papua and the Indonesian State, vol. I, pp. 10-13.

23 Sukarno, Tahun Kemenangan, August 17, 1962, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi,

(Panitya Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, Jakarta), vol II, p. 500

24 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden augustus-

september 1961, NA,Archie Minog, Dossierarchie no G 16725.

25 Monthly Report Australian Liaison Ocer to Netherlands New Guinea

October 1961, National Archives o Australia (NAA), DEA fle 3036/1/1/1, CRS

A1838.

26 The Dutch authorities accepted theManiest Politik, but wanted the rst fag

raising to take place on 1 December rather than 1 November so that it would

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not compromise the Dutch position during the debate about the Luns Plan at

the UN. See Chauvel, The land o the Papua and the Indonesian State vol. 1, p 41.

27 Maniest Politik, Hollandia, 19-10-61, Pengantara: het nieuwsblad voor Neder-lands-Nieuw-Guinea, 21-10-61; Politiek Leven over Oktober 1961, ibidem, Hol-

landia, 28-11-61 in NA, Archie Minog, Dossierarchie no G 16725. The Bintang

Kejora was chosen as the national fag rom three designs. The Hai Tanahku

Papua was composed by the Dutch missionary Kijne in 1925.

28 John Kelly and Martha Kaplan, Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolo-

nization. Chicago: University o Chicago Press, 2001, p. 5

29 NGR 30-10-61, pp 13-18

30 NGR 30-10-61, p. 21.

31 NGR 30-10-61, pp. 40-1

32 Codetelegram Platteel 435 to Bot, 9-11-61, NA, Archie Minog, Codetelegrammen

1945-1963.

33 NGR 31-10-61, pp. 19-20. Nicholaas Jouwe was not present in Hollandia dur-

ing the debate about the Luns proposals. He recalled that he objected to Luns

initiative on the grounds that the New Guinea Council had not been consulted

nor, he thought, had the members o the South Pacic Commission, particu-

larly Australia and New Zealand. Jouwe considered that Papuas uture was

to be secured in association with its neighbours in the Pacic, rather than with

the UN. Interview, Nicholaas Jouwe, The Hague, 5-12-2001.

34 Codetelegram Bot 488 to Platteel, 28-11-61, NA, Archie Minog, Codetelegram-

men 1945-1963. The Brazzaville resolution, which expressed the strongest

recognition or Papuas right o sel-determination as established in the UNCharter, received 53 votes in avour, 41 against and 9 abstentions.

35 Codetelegram Platteel 482 to Bot, 29-11-61, NA, Archie Minog, Codetelegram-

men 1945-1963.

36 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de maanden november

en december 1961, NA, Archie Minog, Dossierarchie G 16725.

37 Maandverslag over de maand December 1961 van de adelingen Geelvink-

baai en Centraal Nieuw-Guinea, NA, Archie Minog, Dossierarchie G 16726;

Codetelegram Platteel 485 to Bot, 2-12-61, NA, Archie Minog, Codetelegrammen

1945-1963.

38 Codetelegram Hollandia 61 to Bot, 16-2-62, NA, Archie Minog, Codetelegram-

men 1945-1963.39 Monthly Reports Australian Liaison Ocer to Netherlands New Guinea

March & April 1962, NAAFile M 341, 5..

40 Bestuursverslag van de Resident van Hollandia over de Maanden Maart en

April 1962, NA, Archie Minog, Dossierarchie G 16725.

41 Interim Report Australian Liaison Ocer to Netherlands New Guinea 19-

6-62, NAA, File M 341, 5. From Jakartas perspective, the Bunker Plan was the

rst o numerous ormulas or a settlement o the dispute in which sel-de-

termination was acceptable. Sel-determination was acceptable precisely be-

cause Papuans would exercise it ater a period o Indonesian administration.

42 Monthly Report Australian Liaison Ocer to Netherlands New Guinea

April 1962, NAA, File M 341, 5.

43 Nieuw Guinea Koerier, 14-7-62. Tanggahmas motion ailed seemingly because

a majority o members considered that a delegation could not go to Indonesia

while Indonesian military activities persisted.

44 Paul van der Veur, Questionnaire, BKI120: 4, p. 424

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45 Ibid, pp. 447-449.

46 Ibid, p. 449

47 Codetelegram, Platteel to Bot, 7-8-62, NA, Archie Minog, Codetelegrammen1945-1963. Platteel was responding to advice rom J.H. van Roijen, the Neth-

erlands Ambassador in Washington and head o the negotiating team. Van

Roijen had advised against the inclusion o any Papuans as they would be

seen as stooges by the Indonesians and others and this would have undesir-

able consequences or the urther conduct o the negotiations. Telegram, Bot

to Platteel, 7-8-62. NA, Archie Minog, Archie kabinet van de Gouverneur van

NNG dossier 12.

48 Nieuw Guinea Koerier, 11-8-62; Interim Report Australian Liaison Ocer to

Netherlands New Guinea 14-8-62, NAA, File M 341, 5.

49 Bonay, op cit, bab 5, p. 1

50 Nieuw Guinea Koerier, 21-9-62.

51 Sawor, Z. Ik bn een Papoea. Een getuigeverslag van de toestanden in Westelijk

Nieuw-Guinea sinds de gezagsoverdracht op 1 oktober 1962 (Groningen 1969), pp.

83-84. When a delegation rom the Congress went to Jakarta, Sawor recorded

Soebandrio as telling them that the Indonesian Government would do its best

to establish security through peaceul and diplomatic means, but i that was

not possible the troops would be sent in. Soebandrio orbade the delegates

to express their views on sel-determination until they had seen the condi-

tions in other parts o the country. It is our principle that Indonesia does not

claim anybody elses territory. Sawor noted that a ew months later Indonesia

launched its conrontation campaign against Malaysia.52 Nieuw Guinea Koerier, 24-8-62.

53 Clemens Runaweri, Political Situation in West Papua between May 1, 1963

and April 11, 1969, and the Act o Free Choice in July August 1969, p. 18

(English original).

54 Submission 10, West New Guinea, Where is the Dispute Heading, G.E. Bar-

wick, 11 January 1962, NAA, Prime Ministers fle C508 pt 2, CRS A4940.

55 Airgram A-207 rom the American Embassy in Jakarta to the Department o

State, Washington, 11 September 1964, West Irian August 1964, Floyd Whit-

tington, p. 9. National Archives Record Administration (NARA)59, Central For-

eign Policy Files, 1964-6, Box 2307, POL 2.

56 Resolusi Kongres Papua, Port Numbay (Jayapura), 4 June 2000. The UN reso-lution was on 19 November 1969.

57 H. Dr. Subandrio,Meluruskan Sejarah Perjuangan Irian Barat, Yayasan Kepada

Bangsaku, Jakarta, 2001) p. 12

58 Ibid, p. 248. Emphasis in the original.

59 Ibid, p. 41.

chauvel

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