9D Chicago Tribune | Section 1 | Tuesday, May 8, 2012

more than a decade, he said, thecompany worked hard to developmarketable cigarettes that weremore likely to extinguish on theirown.

Philip Morris collaborated withthe marshals on flame retardantfurniture standards in the early1990s, he said, because the com-pany believed those might present“a potentially more effective al-ternative for improved fire safety.”

By 1993, records show, the firemarshals were so vehementlyopposed to fire-safe cigarette testproposals — and so financially andphilosophically connected to thecigarette industry — that a topPhilip Morris lobbyist told theTobacco Institute she feared thatthe marshals had actually becomea liability. Records show she toldcolleagues she thought the Na-tional Association of State FireMarshals was “tainted.”

The lobbyist worried that “therelationship of the industry —especially Philip Morris — to theNational Association of State FireMarshals (NASFM) may even-tually be disclosed publicly.” Shesuggested to the Tobacco Institutethat the fire marshals stop dis-cussing fire-safe cigarettes andfocus solely on furniture flam-mability standards.

But the industry didn’t severties, in part because other ciga-rette executives thought theyneeded the marshals to counterfire-service groups that werepushing for fire-safe cigarettelaws, records show.

A key prong in R.J. Reynolds’1996 strategic plan to fight theselaws was the marshals’ petition tothe Consumer Product SafetyCommission for flame retardantfurniture rules. A handwrittennote on the first page directs anR.J. Reynolds employee to file theplan under “Fire Safe Sparber.”

The plan used italics to ham-mer home the urgency of focusingon the furniture fueling fires, notthe cigarettes sparking them: “In1996, fire officials must keep thepressure on the Commission tofocus on the fuels rather thanignition sources.”

Playing ‘hardball’The fire marshals’ actions

helped Big Tobacco fend off fire-safe requirements for years. Butthe delays couldn’t go on forever.

The Tobacco Institute shutdown in 1999, a requirement of themultibillion-dollar court settle-ment between the industry andstate attorneys general. Not longafter that, states succeeded inpassing rules requiring fire-safecigarettes, so tobacco no longerhad an incentive to promote flameretardant furniture.

But by then Sparber had foundnew clients with problems of theirown: chemical manufacturers.

With each passing year, healthconcerns were growing as themost commonly used types offlame retardants were discoveredin human breast milk and blood.

As Sparber worked to preserveand even expand the market forflame retardants, the fire marshalswere again at his side. So wasDeppa, whom he had hired fromthe Tobacco Institute.

So intertwined were Sparber,the chemical companies and thefire marshals that even Sparbercouldn’t always differentiatewhere the agendas diverged.

For instance, one of Sparber’sclients as a lobbyist was theBromine Science and Environ-mental Forum, an internationaltrade group representing largemanufacturers of flame retar-dants. Sparber revealed to federalregulators in 1999 that althoughthe forum was paying his com-pany’s fees, the chemical group’sgoals for fire prevention were soaligned with those of the firemarshals association that he oftenlobbied for both groups on thesame matters.

Chemtura Corp., AlbemarleCorp. and ICL Industrial Products— the three largest companies thatfund the bromine forum — de-clined to answer questions abouttheir relationships with Sparberor the fire marshals. Chemturaand Albemarle said their flameretardants are safe and effectivelyprotect people and property fromfires.

Brace, the former marshal, con-firmed that his association be-came “heavily involved” with theflame retardant trade group andsupported its agenda. He said heworked with the forum because ofhis desire to save lives, and he wasleery of studies that linked thechemicals to health problems.

The bromine group, Brace said,paid for him to go to Japan, Koreaand Taiwan, where he urgedelectronics manufacturers to addflame retardants to the plasticexteriors of computer monitorsand televisions. The marshalslater pushed for worldwide stand-ards requiring that the plasticcasings of electronics resist a

candle flame and posted Internetvideos comparing name-brandcomputer monitors that went upin flames with those that didn’t.

John Dean, the fire marshals’president from 2006 to 2008, saidthat during his time the marshalswere not being swayed by chemi-cal companies and did not focussolely on flame retardants. “Thefire marshals were concernedabout preventing fires, and wedidn’t really care how they did it,”said Dean, a retired state firemarshal from Maine.

But the marshals did press fornational furniture flammabilityrules that would have increasedthe use of flame retardant foam inthe U.S., even though federalscientists had concluded that thistype of chemically treated foamdidn’t provide any meaningfulprotection in fires.

To sway legislators and oppo-nents, the marshals and Sparbercharacterized couches and easychairs as dangers to society, some-times referring to the foam insidecushions as “solid gasoline.”

While Sparber was a registeredlobbyist for Chemtura and itspredecessor, Great Lakes Chemi-cal Corp., the fire marshals askedfederal regulators to requirewarning labels on furniture madewith non-fire-retardant foam andsought a “hazardous material”designation for this type of foam.

In 2007, Sparber emailed ex-ecutives at Chemtura and Albe-marle about his efforts to getfurniture stores declared “hazard-ous occupancies,” a classificationusually reserved for locations han-dling gasoline and other highlycombustible materials.

Such a designation, Sparberwrote, “threatens to shut downany number of retailers,” limit thenumber of sofas they could storeor force them to install extensivesprinkler systems.

“Literally,” he wrote, “a singlesectional couch might exceed thelimit.”

The goal, Sparber wrote, was tomake furniture manufacturersand retailers fear these “obviouslydraconian consequences” andthereby support strict flammabil-ity standards or face the wrath ofcode enforcement officials.

“This is hardball of the firstorder,” Sparber wrote.

While these rules weren’tadopted, the intimidating messagehit a nerve with the industriesSparber threatened. Joseph Ger-ard, a retired furniture industrylobbyist, said he recalls Sparbersending him an inches-thick bind-er filled with copies of the sameAssociated Press story clippedfrom newspapers across the coun-try. The story blamed the death ofa South Carolina teenager on sofasthat lacked flame retardants andquoted a fire marshal about theneed for the chemicals.

Gerard said of Sparber: “Hisway of operating was so offensive,it just tore at me.”

To the fire marshals, though,Sparber was a hero. The NationalAssociation of State Fire Marshalsgave him its Hall of Fame award in2008.

Sparber and Deppa declined tocomment for this story.

Jim Narva, the fire marshals’current executive director, saidSparber has not represented thegroup for “a number of years” andthat he took over Sparber’s Wash-ington office in 2008 or 2009.

“It’s history,” Narva said.The marshals’ policy statement

on flame retardants, which hasn’tbeen updated since 2008, saysproducts that exist to fight firesshould not be banned unless thereis “significant evidence” that theycause harm or until other meth-ods of fire protection are found toreplace them.

Narva, who declined to answerdetailed questions, said the firemarshals are not currently in-volved with flame retardant is-sues.

But the marshals’ industry tiesremain strong.

Deppa left Sparber and Associ-ates in 2008 and, according to themarshals’ website, became thegroup’s “liaison to US governmentagencies and their staffs.”

The marshals just last yearhelped defeat a crucial bill inCalifornia that would have re-duced flame retardants in prod-ucts nationwide. The association’spresident at the time wrote a letteropposing the legislation. A lobby-ist for the Citizens for Fire SafetyInstitute, a front group for thelargest makers of flame retardants,read excerpts of the letter at thehearing where the bill was voteddown.

And who remains a financialsponsor of the fire marshals, withits logo on the group’s home page?

Chemtura, one of the world’slargest producers of flame retar-dants.

Tribune reporter Michael Haw-thorne contributed.

pcallahan@tribune.comsroe@tribune.com

PHILIP MORRIS INTERNAL MEMO (1984)

Big Tobacco’s playbookMore than 13 million tobacco industry documents became public after cigarette companies settled lawsuits over the health costs of treating smokers. Hidden among them are records that lay out the industry’s sophisticated campaign to befriend firefighting officials and deflect controversy over cigarette fires. By fending off requirements for “fire-safe” cigarettes and refocusing attention on flammable furni-ture, Big Tobacco helped fuel the widespread use of flame retardants in upholstered couches and chairs.

A Philip Morris researcher traces the earliest calls for fire-safe cigarettes to the 1920s. The company didn’t introduce a self-extinguishing cigarette until 2000.

MEMO FROM BURSON-MARSTELLER TO THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE (1980)

Big Tobacco’s public relations consultant Burson-Marsteller warns in 1980 that “sales could be dramatically affected” if fire-safe cigarette laws pass.

SOURCES: Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, Tribune reporting TRIBUNE

MEMO FROM BURSON-MARSTELLER TO THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE (1980)

Big Tobacco’s public relations consultant Burson-Marsteller warns in 1980 that “sales could be dramatically affected” if fire-safe cigarette laws pass.

TOBACCO INSTITUTE STRATEGY MEMO (1982)

Tobacco executives had a two-pronged defense — insisting they couldn’t make a fire-safe cigarette and shifting the focus to the furniture that burned — but executives voice concern that they were failing to combat “fire scarred victims.”

MEMO FROM CONSULTANT TO TOP TOBACCO ATTORNEY (1982)

The consulting company TriData suggests that establishing a fire safety program would improve tobacco’s image and “provide a strong base from which to present industry views.”

The consulting company TriData suggests that establishing a fire safety program The consulting company TriData suggests that establishing a fire safety program would improve tobacco’s image and “provide a strong base from which to present industry views.”

PHILIP MORRIS EXECUTIVE SPEECH AT WORLD COMPANY CONFERENCE (1984)

Fire-safety groups courted by Big Tobacco became allies in the industry’s fight against laws on fire-safe cigarettes. So successful was the strategy that a Philip Morris executive cites it as an example of how to neutralize enemies.

Fire-safety groups courted by Big Tobacco became allies in the industry’s fight against laws on fire-safe cigarettes. So successful was the strategy that a Philip Morris executive cites it as an example of how to neutralize enemies.

SOURCES: Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, Tribune reporting TRIBUNE

SPARBER MONTHLY BILLING REPORT TO THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE (1992)

Sparber helps the National Association of State Fire Marshals ask the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission for national rules requiring flame-retardant furniture.Sp lpProduct Safety Commission for national rules requiring flame-retardant furniture.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE FIRE MARSHALS LETTERHEAD (1993)

SPARBER MONTHLY BILLING REPORT TO THE TOBACCO INSTITUTE (1992)

Peter Sparber, a former Tobacco Institute executive, helps organize the National Association of State Fire Marshals and bills the Tobacco Institute $200 an hour for what the marshals thought was volunteer work. The marshals shared a Washington office with Sparber and put him on the organization’s letterhead.

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO. STRATEGIC PLAN (1996)

The National Association of State Fire Marshals’ petition to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission for flame-retardant furniture plays a key role in Big Tobacco’s efforts to delay rules requiring fire-safe cigarettes by shifting focus to the furniture fueling fires rather than the cigarettes that were sparking the blazes.

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