China Aff(s)

Soft-Left

Plan – Just Arms Control TreatyPlan: The United States Federal Government should ratify the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects [after negotiations with the People’s Republic of China].

Plan – Short + BroadPlan: The United States Federal Government should establish a national space policy which substantially increases space transparency and confidence-building measures and arms control of space weapons with the People’s Republic of China.

Plan – Long + SpecificPlan: The United States Federal Government should lift bans on space cooperation with the People’s Republic of China and increase cooperation by:

Establishing space transparency and confidence-building measures constituted of enhanced space situational awareness capabilities and data exchange, information exchange for space activities, advanced notification for space policies and;

Ratifying a space arms control agreement based on the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.

Plan – Long + BroadPlan: The United States federal government should lift bans on space cooperation and substantially increase its diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China over outer space transparency and confidence-building measures constituted of information exchange for space activities, advanced notification for space policies, and enhanced space situational awareness capabilities and data exchange.

InherencyUS-China Space Race is happening now – China is motivated by the Trump Admin’s hardline posturing and the Wolf Amendment Davenport 7/26/19 (Christian Davenport covers the defense and space industries for The Washington Posts’ Financial desk. He joined The Post in 2000 and has had an array of assignments, including covering the DC-area sniper shootings, the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Fort Hood shootings, and the burial problems at Arlington National Cemetery. He received his B.A. from Colby College in American Studies. And won the Peabody Award in 2010. “Another front in the tensions between the U.S. and China: Space” 7/26/2019 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/26/another-front-tensions-between-us-china-space/?

utm_term=.4474dc34392f_) // tanz

The United States has noticed China’s ambitions, which have touched off a debate over how to respond and what China’s intentions really are at a time when space is seen as a critical warfighting domain. The Trump administration and hawkish conservatives have cast the competition as a power struggle with enormous consequences — the moon as the cosmic equivalent of the South China Sea, where China has expanded a military presence that is of concern to the Pentagon. Earlier this year, the White House announced NASA would dramatically speed up its own mission to return to the moon, initially planned for 2028, but now, at the direction of Vice President Pence, moved up to 2024. “Make no mistake about it: We’re in a space race today, just as we were in the 1960s, and the stakes are even higher,” he said in a speech in March calling for the shortened timeline. China’s landing on the far side of the moon “revealed their ambition to seize the lunar strategic high ground and become the world’s preeminent spacefaring nation,” he said. U.S. officials fear the Chinese advance in space. “Looking at Chinese behavior in other shared domains — the South China Sea, cyberspace — they’ve given us pause for concern,” Scott Pace, the executive secretary of the National Space Council, said in an interview. “And so looking out in space, it’s hard to imagine that they will behave any better than they’d behaved in other areas where they felt that their national interests are at stake.” Newt Gingrich, the former House speaker who proposed a moon base during his presidential bid in 2012, said China is “going to rapidly become the only country that can compete with us for the moon and Mars.” “They want to prove they are our technological superior,” he said. If China can get “to the south pole before we do, there’s a very real possibility we will find it impossible to operate there.” China has demonstrated growing military capabilities in space. In 2007, it took out a dead weather satellite with a missile, putting the United States and others on notice that the national security satellites they have in orbit — used for missile defense, precision-guided munitions and spying — were vulnerable. “China views space as the soft underbelly of the U.S. military,” said Todd Harrison, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But he and others think it is wrong to assume China’s activities in space put it and the United States in a warlike race for a single goal. Rather, some analysts said, the countries are engaged in a long-term power competition for national pride and technological development. China’s rover is a “science experiment,” said Bleddyn Bowen, a professor of international relations who focuses on space at the University of Leicester. “It’s not a Dr. Evil laser.” The notion that the United States has to stake its claim in space or else “we’re going to lose to China” is “absurd,” said Brian Weeden, the director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation, a think tank that focuses on space. He added that some are “trying to prop up the China threat as rationale for their own policy goals.” Instead of competing in space, many think the United States should partner with China

on civil space exploration and science missions, as it does with Russia, another potential adversary. That was made more difficult in 2011, with the passage of a provision written by former U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) that requires NASA to get congressional approval before partnering with China, as well as having the FBI certify that the cooperation would not jeopardize national security. Wolf’s intent was to keep China from stealing secrets and technology, but it hasn’t slowed China’s progress, officials said. “Our policy of excluding China from human spaceflight and exploration missions to the moon and beyond has not slowed its rise as a space power,” Harrison said during a hearing earlier this year of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. “Worse, it may create an incentive for China to build an alternative coalition for space exploration that could undermine our traditional leadership role in this arena.”

Advantage – Space WeaponizationOfficial US space posture is based in Sinophobic suspicions—rendezvous and proximity operations are seen as a cover for ASAT testing, destroying any support for Chinese space security proposals Weeden and Xiao He 16. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the long-term sustainable use of outer space. Xiao, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of International Strategy, U.S. Diplomacy and Politics @ Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of World Economic and Politics. “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” US-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The National Bureau of Asian Research, Report #57, April 2016 http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)//CB

*we don’t endorse ableist language. edited.

RPO=rendezvous and proximity operations

U.S. perceptions of China’s development of space capabilities can best be described as wary . The United States understands the need to develop such capabilities to support national security and defense, but is concerned that some Chinese space capabilities appear to be offensive in nature and aimed at undermining U.S. space power, particularly in light of a new Chinese doctrinal focus on “active defense.” 32 The recent major realignment of China’s military forces and command structure is seen *viewed by some in the U nited States as reinforcing the perception that China is preparing to fight a war in space . At the same time, there seems to be little appreciation that many of the Chinese doctrinal positions are exactly the same as what the U.S. military has proposed in decades past or is considering again now. In the civil space sector, the United States is less concerned with China’s achievements in human spaceflight and exploration, but is beginning to be troubled about China’s use of those achievements for soft power.¶ As part of this wariness, the U nited S tates has voiced strong objections to China’s major proposal on space security , the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).33 The objections are partly due to a disagreement over the salience of the issue. For the United States and a number of its allies, the most pressing issues are assured access to space and protecting existing space capabilities from threats (intentional and unintentional).34 But the United States also sees the PPWT as fundamentally flawed because it is not verifiable and would only apply to weapons “placed in orbit.” Under that definition, the treaty would ban potential U.S. space-based missile defenses or orbital counter-space systems but not the ground- or air-based ASAT capabilities that China is developing.35¶ Some U.S. observers are also suspicious of recent Chinese co-orbital rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO ) as being tests of potential co-orbital ASAT capabilities . In 2010 a Chinese satellite (SJ-12) conducted a series of maneuvers to rendezvous with another Chinese satellite (SJ-06F) in low earth orbit and likely bumped into it.36 A similar scenario (without the bumping) occurred again in 2013.37 These activities are very similar in nature to the U nited S tates’ recent demonstrations of its own RPO technology , such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Experimental Satellite System–11 (XSS-11) and NASA’s Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) satellite.38 However, there is still strong suspicion in the U.S. national security community that the Chinese RPO activities are proof that the PPWT is no more than a political ploy, or at the very least part of a hedging strategy that signals China may not be as interested in peace in space as it professes publicly.¶ However, this skepticism does not mean that the United States sees China as an outright enemy. While Washington is concerned

about China’s rise, it also encourages Beijing to become a partner for greater international security.39 Defense planners in the United States see the world entering into a much more complex and uncertain era, and the overall strategy is one of hedging against the most dangerous threats. The stated goal of the increased U.S. emphasis on protection and preparedness for warfighting is to deter attacks and prevent conflict in space. In that sense, the U.S. military sees itself as taking steps to mitigate a threat from China. Whether that strategy will be counterproductive and will actually end up increasing the risk of conflict remains to be seen.¶ In a similar fashion, the United States is wary, and even borderline distrustful, of commercial and civil cooperation with China in space. The two biggest concerns are technology theft via espionage and the significant role the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays in all aspects of Chinese space activities. There is also a debate in the United States over whether space cooperation should be used as an incentive to encourage China to change its behavior or as a reward for actual change, particularly on human rights and religious freedom. The latter sentiment was behind the passage of the Wolf Amendment as part of the FY12 NASA appropriations bill, which prohibited NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy from spending any money on bilateral space activities with China without explicit congressional approval.40 The Wolf Amendment continues to hinder any significant efforts at bilateral civil space cooperation between the United States and China .

US containment policy drives Chinese militarization and the security dilemma – increasing conflict Lister 11 (Charles, visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, “US Missile Defense and Space Security: Security Dilemma for China?”, E-International Relations, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/03/18/american-missile-defence-and-space-security-a-security-dilemma-for-china/, AG)

The United States (U.S.) has been a global superpower for decades and will surely remain so for some time to come. Nevertheless, as is natural in an international system composed of many competing states, one’s place on the power ladder is constantly being challenged. Just as the Soviet Union confronted American primacy during the Cold War, a rising China is expected to do so in the future. Well aware of this threat to its dominance, the U.S. is keen to empower its Asian allies and maintain a status quo in terms of Beijing’s power position. Ever since the Soviet

Union’s demise, the U.S. has employed military and security strategies to consolidate its own power and contain that of others. Two critical and indeed linked strategies for this have been Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Space Security. While the U.S. maintains that these

strategies are inherently defensive and pose no offensive threat, rival states like China, remain unconvinced and see their own growing influence threatened by a U.S. policy of “containment ” (mieguo dui hua e-zhi zhanlue).[2] For many international security analysts, this situation reveals a central problem of international relations – ‘the security dilemma.’ Put simply, the security dilemma emphasizes “two inescapable predicaments of international politics” – the seeming inability to confidently determine the motives or intentions of others, and the “inherent ambiguity of weapons.”[3] When these two quandaries are combined , states often feel no option but to act self-defensively – an act that normally escalates the situation, even if original intention was benign . In line with this logic, it can be claimed that U.S. statements on space security and deployments of BMD systems have sufficiently threatened China as to cause it to act in an escalatory manner . This paper will therefore analyze whether one can claim that U.S. activities in BMD and space security have indeed initiated a security dilemma for China, and if so, what has been the nature of its response. This paper will focus preeminently on analyzing what the author has deemed to be China’s four principle issue areas affected by U.S. BMD and space security policy – (I) the Chinese nuclear deterrent, (II) Taiwanese ‘reunification’, (III) a growing U.S. Asian security alliance network, and (IV) space security and arms control. This will be followed by an analysis of Chinese reactions, which should help indicate whether China can be said to have reacted in an escalatory manner, and whether therefore, a Sino-U.S. security dilemma can legitimately be claimed to have arisen. U.S. BMD policy only became a Chinese concern in the late 1990s when the Missile Defense Act (1995) was passed by the then Clinton administration. This Act set in motion moves toward deploying multiple shorter-range theatre missile defense (TMD) systems to protect foreign assets as well as a “multiple site” national missile defense (NMD) system[4] to protect the U.S. from long-range ballistic missile threats. This introduced the Asia-Pacific region to U.S. BMD, and China duly perceived the plans as a potential threat to their ‘minimal’ nuclear deterrent[5] and a destabilizing influence on their ‘international strategic security environment’ (guoji zhanlue anquan huanjing).[6] The succeeding Bush administration broadened existing U.S. BMD plans by unilaterally withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and funding the development of a ‘layered’ NMD system utilizing land, sea, air and space-based assets[7] and a network of TMD systems deployed on allied, including Asian, territories.[8] Furthermore, the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy demanded a consolidation of U.S. space dominance and the ability to “deny … adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”[9] To China, it seemed clear that although the Soviet Union was obsolete, U.S. foreign security policy was still heavily governed by Cold War-era mindsets. Despite the ever-expanding influences of globalization and economic interdependence, the U.S., from a Chinese perspective, was still threatened by a rising China and sought to overwhelm Chinese

military power projection capacity, to strategically ‘contain’ China (meiguo dui hua e-zhi zhanlue)[10] by upgrading the U.S. regional security alliance network, and to secure long-term “absolute security”[11] by securing what Huang Zhicheng has termed “a strategic external border in space.”[12] Although the current Obama government has taken a less ‘imperialist’ (diguo waijiao)[13] stance on BMD – by limiting the system to what already exists and only expanding shorter-range TMD systems abroad – China is perhaps increasingly concerned, especially at a regional level, as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Australia all have, or will soon join an extensive U.S. TMD network in the Asian-Pacific region. Effect on Chinese Nuclear Deterrence As long as [China’s] nuclear retaliatory capability is credible, China possesses a wider range of military options against both Taiwan and the U.S. than it might otherwise consider if the U.S. can trump Beijing’s nuclear response RADM Michael McDevitt[14] For China, nuclear weapons are a key instrument for acquiring and maintaining the international stature it deserves.[15] Concurrently though, China conforms to a ‘no first-use’ policy and a doctrine of what might be called ‘minimum ambiguous deterrence,’ where nuclear weapons are solely retaliatory instruments [16]and therefore only a minimal arsenal is required. Consequently, the actual size of China’s nuclear force is never officially announced, which establishes a “retaliatory capability [that] is psychological rather than real”[17] – a tactic notably espoused by Sun Tzu.[18] Because of its small size, the deployment of BMD in Asia, especially TMD systems in Taiwan and Japan, severely weakens the Chinese nuclear deterrent and its leverage over key regional disputes. In many respects, the disadvantage this produces for Chinese power projection means that for the first time since the 1960s, China is potentially vulnerable to U.S. ‘nuclear blackmail’ and regional rivals can defend their interests more confidently relative to China’s expectations. Furthermore, it is likely that the proliferation of BMD systems to U.S. strategic Asian allies has initiated yet more individual security dilemmas in the region and could instigate a cascade effect of arms buildups. China regards its regional environment with a rather Waltzian perspective in that it desires an advantageous balance of power that produces regional stability under Chinese terms. As Keohane would emphasize, this ‘hegemonic stability’ provides China with an environment in which it can grow, expand influence and gain future leverage. Any U.S. BMD system in Asia comprehensively transforms this status quo and lends all advantage to the U.S. Despite American claims that BMD systems in and beyond Asia are not a threat to China, Beijing “cannot base its security on assurances only”[19] and instead regards the deployments as part of an integrated attempt to “softly contain”[20] and ‘strategically encircle’[21]China. Nevertheless, “deterrence is not a static concept” and “‘minimal’ is a relative term.”[22] Having begun over three decades ago, Chinese military modernization has accelerated remarkably since 2000, and qualitative improvements in the scope, mobility and penetration capacity of China’s nuclear force could re-establish a strong and viable deterrent. In fact, as will be explained later, this is increasingly the case today under the new Chinese notion of ‘informationalized warfare’ (xinxihua tiaojianxia).[23] Effect on ‘The Taiwan Problem’ If Japan and the United States extend the missile defense system to cover Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China will oppose such a move very strongly Gen. Qinsheng Zhang[24] Taiwan is a major foreign policy issue for China and has been largely since 1949 when the People’s Republic was established. Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy foresees that eventually, Taiwan will ‘reunify’ with the mainland – until that time, Beijing considers it a ‘renegade province’ illegitimately seeking independence (taidu).[25] Officially, Beijing has a policy that accepts the necessary use of ‘non-peaceful means’ in the event of a Taiwanese push for independence. U.S. support for Taiwan has been clear ever since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the subsequent 1954 Mutual Security Pact that placed “China’s Taiwan ‘province’ under U.S. protection.”[26] Crucially regarding the focus of this paper is the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act that committed the U.S. to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character”[27] in order to prevent Chinese coercive (re)unification. In January 2010, President Obama announced the approval of an arms deal with Taiwan worth $6.7 billion that crucially included one-hundred and fourteen Patriot-3 anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs),[28] the purpose of which is clearly to deter the one thousand four-hundred Chinese offensive missiles and rockets currently deployed across the Strait.[29] For China, this considerably undermines hopes for eventual reunification and serves only to bolster Taiwanese self-confidence and give the U.S. more freedom of action in any conflict over Taiwan. For Rex Li, the U.S. sale of TMD systems to Taipei is part of a wider U.S. policy of “using Taiwan to constrain China” (yitai zhihua) [30] and undermines previous U.S. assurances of ‘strategic ambiguity’ over the Taiwan issue. For others, such a sale is “tantamount to a military alliance”[31] directed against China, and, because the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) arguably represents the most notable ‘nationalist’ or realist voice within China, will serve only to encourage escalatory moves such as incentivizing increased missile deployments opposite Taiwan – thus exemplifying a security dilemma. Further to this, China has serious concerns regarding the stability of various outlying provinces, like Tibet or Xinjiang, where secessionist, anti-government movements could be bolstered by an increasingly confident Taiwanese independence movement backed by U.S. weapons and support. Even though one-hundred and fourteen Patriot-3 missiles cannot defend Taiwan from a full-scale Chinese missile strike, sophisticated BMD technology in the hands of Taipei symbolizes a highly significant shift in the power balance. China has, as the result of one U.S. action, lost a crucial measure of strategic leverage over American regional power and will presumably have to respond counteractively. A growing U.S. Asian Security Alliance Network Extending missile defense protection to … allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and India, has the potential to stress existing security dilemmas within the Asia-Pacific region IISS Strategic Comments[32] For China, the U.S. is continuing to develop a ‘security community’ throughout Asia that resembles more Machiavellian characteristics than anything ever espoused by Kant. From a Chinese perspective, it symbolizes a “coalition of the willing”[33] to gently constrain China through a subtle policy of “containment plus engagement”[34] with the eventual aim of ‘Westernizing’ or ‘splitting’ China.[35] The linchpin to this multilateral security alliance is the supply of land-based (Patriot-3) and sea-based (Aegis vessels with Standard Missile-3 ABMs) BMD systems that can potentially be integrated into a complete region-wide system. Thus far, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Australia all utilize some or both of these systems while India has developed its own indigenous BMD capability. Given China’s perception that regional stability and economic engagement are key to continued growth and development, Chinese officials are increasingly concerned by these developments. Not only do they further antagonize already existing regional security dilemmas,[36] but they indicate a widespread anxiety over a ‘rising China’ – something that Beijing has been extraordinarily keen not to cause. Alliances, which China is uniquely hesitant to develop, are seemingly arising all around it as neighboring states ‘hedge their bets’ as to whether a future China will be a status quo or revisionist power. A crucial aspect of this regional power shifting is the ‘containment plus engagement’ observation. Interestingly, all the states mentioned above are actually expanding their interactions with China. Japan’s new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has introduced a more Asia-centric foreign policy that aims primarily to make relations with the U.S. less dependent (by withdrawing all forces from Afghanistan) and more domestically transparent,[37] and to expand relations and heal ‘old wounds’ (by planning a state visit to Nanjing[38]) with China. In South Korea, President Lee Myung-bak is noted for his close relations with the U.S. but is simultaneously seeking a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China[39] and relying on Beijing to contain the North through their leadership of the Six-Party Talks. In Taiwan, President Ma Ying-jeou stands by his ‘Three No Policy’ (no reunification, independence or war with China) but has probably brought about the greatest improvement in Sino-Taiwanese relations for decades.[40] This trend is similar for other states, like Australia, Singapore, India and Indonesia, who, though they have less direct antagonism with China, still view it as a potential great hegemonic power. Given the Japanese imperialist history in China and events like the ‘Rape of Nanjing,’ Chinese concerns over Japan are highly emotive. Wang Chiming expects the development of a US-Japanese “special relationship”[41] and for Japan to gradually dissolve its pacifist constitutional constraints and eventually remilitarize to counter China and protect Taiwan.[42] In essence, individual Asian state policies relating to the U.S. symbolize a mass ‘hedging of bets’ against China’s rising power and influence. This visible strategic siding with the U.S. can only lead to increased Chinese suspicion of wider U.S. policy for the Asia-Pacific region. Whether China can continue to rely on economic cooperation and interdependence to prevent regional tensions is still to be seen. Effect on Space Security & Arms Control Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime … if there is a space superpower, its not going to be

alone and China is not going to be the only one Sr. Col. Yao Yunzhu, PLA[43] China has long been an opponent of weaponizing outer space and is a leading member of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) initiative. Conversely, the U.S. has staunchly refused to discuss a PAROS-like treaty under the existing terms laid out by China and Russia. Crucially for this paper, space weaponization and BMD are inherently connected in that ballistic missiles travel through space and defending against them requires some extent of space assets. Furthermore, control of space would necessarily result in a comprehensive ‘layered’ BMD system with global scope [44] – something that China is

adamantly trying to prevent. This explains why Chinese analysts like Feng Shaolei reacted to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001 by claiming it proved a “U.S. pursuit [for] international primacy in a world of uncertainty.”[45] Space is the last domain free of total human control and any state that acted preemptively to establish absolute space control would undoubtedly acquire bona fide global hegemony. Unfortunately for the arms control establishment, the Outer Space Treaty does not prevent the deployment of orbital ‘defensive’ weapons. In many respects, the ABM Treaty was the last barrier to weaponizing space – now that it has ceased to exist, U.S. BMD development represents a destabilizing power shift that does threaten to initiate a great power arms race in space. Before 2000, there was a widely held Chinese perception that the U.S. was constructing a post-Cold War arms control environment that suited its own interests[46] – the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty proved this to China and encouraged a Waltian ‘balance of threat’ outlook on international relations.

The twenty-first century has seen the PLA develop a “voluminous literature” [47] on space weapons and conflict, largely in reaction to U.S. progress in BMD technology and its potential space applications. China evidently recognizes the immense utility of space and cannot allow the U.S. to acquire dominance there. Major General Liu Jixian’s view that “whoever controls

the universe controls our world; whoever controls space controls initiative in war”[48] is becoming commonplace in Chinese analysis and is encouraged by events like the annual ‘Schriever’ Space Wargame organized by the U.S. Air Force Space Command. Chinese lawyers, like Li Juqian, have also been producing work on the legality of anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) tests, like the one China conducted in January 2007, and on analyzing the issue of

sovereignty in outer space.[49] This strongly indicates that the PLA is planning in an escalatory manner and contributing towards a Sino-U.S. security dilemma in space. In fact, it is likely that China’s strategic reaction to U.S. moves to acquire preeminent control in space will be a continuation of classical Chinese ‘minimal deterrence’ – where China will manipulate “asymmetric space deterrence”[50] (where China has more targets to aim at in space than the U.S.) along Sun Tzu’s principle of “defeating the superior with the inferior”[51] and in conjunction with the doctrine of ‘informationalized warfare.’[52] As Dai Xu stresses, “leveraging space technology can allow a rising power to close the gap with advanced countries more rapidly than trying to catch up.” [53] The above analysis has made clear that U.S. BMD and space security policy has aroused significant concern in China due to its inherently negative impact on four key issue areas of Chinese foreign and security policy. As explicated in the introductory paragraphs, a security dilemma is deemed to be in existence when: State a’s actions are perceived as aggressive by State b, who subsequently reacts in an escalatory manner, thus initiating a spiral of escalation that often leads to conflict. At the heart of this is the fact that “weapons that states can use for their own self-protection, [can] potentially or actually threaten harm to others”[54] and one can never know the intentions of another – ‘the problem of Other Minds.’[55] Human agency is therefore “the critical variable” that determines whether a security dilemma produces “a mistrustful spiral of deteriorating relations, or a virtuous circle of cooperation.”[56] It is this aspect of human agency – how has China decided to react – that will now be discussed. China’s Reaction: Escalation or Cooperation? Military reaction: There’s no problem for China to increase its arsenal by 100 missiles a year, even with today’s budget restraints. These missiles are cheap to produce Chu Shulong[57] The most striking and certainly escalatory Chinese reaction came on January 11th 2007 when the PLA Air Force conducted an ASAT test that destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite, the Fengyun-1C.[58] Although China began researching ASAT technologies in the mid-1980s,[59] the fact that this was the world’s first ASAT test since 1985,[60] and that its success meant China had surpassed what the Soviet Union ever accomplished,[61] means that it sent a very serious message to the international community. As far as linking it to U.S. BMD and space security policies, Chinese officials have claimed the test was meant to express a ‘matching of U.S. capabilities’ and to fortify the Chinese ‘minimal’ nuclear deterrent.[62] Although a case can, and has been made for its legality under current international law,[63] it unquestionably broke post-Cold War behavioural norms, and

given that the U.S. reciprocated with their own ASAT test in February 2008,[64] it helped consolidate a chronic mistrust between China and the U.S. Another Chinese reaction, also escalatory to the U.S. but in a more subtle manner, is the accelerated modernization and partial expansion of the strategic missile forces – the Second Artillery Corps. Whereas in 2002 the core of the Chinese inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the DongFeng-5A, was immobile and took two-to-four hours to fuel prior to launch,[65] today’s arsenal, based around the DongFeng-31, is road-mobile and can launch immediately on command.[66] Furthermore, these new missiles carry multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs),[67] highly sophisticated satellite-guidance technology[68] and the capacity for deep earth penetration.[69] This qualitative improvement is further compounded by a quantitative increase in scale and also the deployment of nuclear-armed Ju-Lang-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) onboard China’s new nuclear-powered Jin-class submarines.[70] All of this helps to enhance and protect China’s retaliatory nuclear deterrent force and crucially to weaken the influence of U.S. BMD. Specifically regarding Taiwan, China has continued to increase the missile force aimed across the Strait and has reportedly now included Russian S-300PMU-2 satellite guided anti-air systems[71] to deter any future preemptive or retaliatory missile or aircraft strikes, thus establishing near-complete cross-Strait influence. As further proof of a security dilemma, five days after the U.S. announced the sale of TMD systems to Taiwan, China successfully tested for the first time an indigenous BMD system,[72] which will only add to China’s deterrence and power projection capacity. What is perhaps most potentially alarming is the nature of the PLA’s research and development (R&D) initiatives in counterspace technologies. In-depth research and analysis into microsatellite kill vehicles,[73] particle beam and high-powered microwave and laser weapons,[74] as well as space mines and pellet clouds[75] all send a particularly threatening message to the future security of U.S. space assets. This is further exacerbated by reports of the PLA having used experimental lasers to ‘blind’ U.S. satellites.[76] Continued research into “technological hedges”[77] for improving BMD penetration capacity, especially the development of

maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) that could ‘dodge’ US BMD interceptors[78] has raised significant concern in the U.S. as to Chinese future intentions. Militarily therefore , China has definitely acted along what Booth and Wheeler call, in a security dilemma context, the ‘fatalist’ role. China has acted defensively in a way that has escalated tensions and mutual suspicion and lent credence to Hobbes’ vision of an anarchical world dominated by purely self- interested motivation. China has expanded and modernized its nuclear missile forces in order to sustain its “uncertainty principle” of deterrence , has consolidated its regional influence, especially over Taiwan, and has developed asymmetric balancing capacities to deter the U.S. from acquiring global dominance. Political Reaction: Beijing prefers consultations rather than confrontations with the U.S., including on missile defense[79] Within the political sphere, the Chinese reaction to U.S. BMD and space security policy has been, on the whole, remarkably different in that it has emphasized the crucial importance of dialogue and economic engagement. Conscious of history’s rising powers being profoundly threatening and violent, China has been keen to stress its ‘peaceful rise’ as a ‘responsible great power.’ The Chinese notion of the ‘new security concept’ (xin anquan guandian[80]) – where economic engagement and trade relations are deemed more important for national security than competition within conflicting and antagonistic ideological blocs – now largely directs Chinese foreign policy. This points to a wider trend of constructivist influence in Chinese foreign policy. There seems to be a strong belief, reinforced by traditional Confucian teaching, that through effective public diplomacy and soft power, China can attract its regional neighbours towards a Chinese perspective and establish a stable and cooperative peripheral security environment governed by the notions of comprehensive security (zonghe anquan [81]) and harmony. From an external frame of reference, such a policy ironically seems to be a more subtle version of what China has perceived as a U.S. policy of “containment plus engagement!” China’s regional relations wholly represent this diplomatic philosophy. Regarding Taiwan, despite its harsh reaction to U.S. arms sales, China is experiencing an enormous improvement in cross-Strait relations with four rounds of wide-ranging semi-official talks completed and one planned for the near future,[82] and extensive negotiation under way for an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Relations with Japan could perhaps be in the first stages of a “diplomatic revolution” (waijiao geming[83]) where historically-created lingering mistrust is replaced by close economic cooperation. To a certain extent, China is more willing to tolerate Japanese BMD acquisitions as it is accepted that in the long-run, Japanese power will decline relative to that of China,[84] and it is better to ensure that Japan is not provoked into remilitarizing and thus presenting a greater threat than already exists. China is also seeking more productive South Korean relations, especially in economics and trade – this is arguably consolidated by China’s leading role in the Six-Party negotiations. Given China’s need for a stable international environment in which to grow, arms control regimes have often been a core focus of Chinese diplomacy.[85] It is feasible therefore, and has been claimed,[86] that China’s ASAT test in 2007 was a necessarily costly signal calling for a negotiated global ban on ASAT testing. After all, a major historical tool of diplomacy, especially between ‘great’ powers, has been the exploitation of military advances for bargaining leverage.[87] In international relations, a state can react to a perceived provocation or threat primarily through two different channels, the military and politics. The case detailed in this paper emphasizes this very clearly. In perceiving a Chinese “lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs,”[88] and accepting that “Chinese missiles [are] capable of reaching … U.S. and allied military installations,”[89] the U.S. has taken actions and determined specific strategies solely within the military sphere. In response, the Chinese reaction has taken place both within its international diplomacy and its military activities, the former transcending U.S. antagonisms and the latter reciprocating them. This reveals a fascinating aspect of China’s wider policy-making structure. It increasingly seems that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the PLA are operating under the influence of very different philosophies. On the one hand, Hu Jintao’s ‘harmonious world’ and ‘peaceful rise’ policies are inherently intertwined with five-thousand years of Chinese rationalist Confucian thought,[90] and emphasize the primacy of economics and the self-rewarding power of engagement in order to “sustain a peaceful setting for the country’s rise to the ranks of the great powers.”[91] Meanwhile, the PLA seems to represent an increasingly Machiavellian nationalist stance[92] that stresses a realpolitik view of a Hobbesian world of constant threat and competition. The PLA therefore has reacted with a short-term view aimed at defending Chinese interests by directly preventing the U.S. from expanding its influence relative to China, while the CCP’s diplomatic trends point to a more long-term objective of sustaining growth and development by advancing dialogue and engagement in order to inhibit the formation of a grand anti-

China alliance. Therefore, there certainly is a security dilemma in existence – as U.S. BMD and space security policies heralded a potential paradigm shift in the long-term Sino-U.S. power balance – but, in the short- and medium-term, there is simply too much critical economic interdependence between the two states for any extent of conflict to logically arise. Today, rationalism seems to hold the advantage in the wider scope of Chinese foreign policy, something that is perhaps reinforced by the Obama administration’s “phased adaptive approach”[93] to BMD, its pledge to seek an international

ban on space weapons,[94] and its determined and constructive attitude to nonproliferation and arms control. However, in the long-term, once China has consolidated

itself as a truly global superpower, the stabilizing economic interdependence may begin to dissolve and generate revisionist tendencies that precipitate more fatalistic security dilemma repercussions.

High tension makes space arms race inevitable in the status quo – conflict escalates into widespread destructionAxe, 8-10-2015, David Axe is the editor of War Is Boring and a regular contributor to the Daily Beast. He has written for Danger Room, "Wired" and "Popular Science." "When it comes to war in space, U.S. has the edge," Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/09/the-u-s-military-is-preparing-for-the-real-star-wars/

Quietly and without most people noticing, some of the world’s leading space powers — the United States and China— have been deploying new and more sophisticated weaponry in space . Earth’s orbit is looking more and more like the planet’s surface — heavily armed and primed for an inevitable conflict . A growing number of “inspection” satellites lurk in orbit, possibly awaiting commands to sneak up on and disable or destroy other satellites . Down on the surface, more and more warships and ground installations pack powerful rockets that, with accurate guidance, could reach into orbit to destroy enemy spacecraft. A war in orbit could wreck the delicate satellite constellations that the world relies on for navigation, communication, scientific research and military surveillance. Widespread orbital destruction could send humanity through a technological time warp. “You go back to World War Two ,” Air Force General John Hyten, in charge of U.S. Space Command, told 60 Minutes. “You go back to the Industrial Age.” It’s hard to say exactly how many weapons are in orbit. That’s because many spacecraft are “dual use.” They have peaceful functions and potential military applications. With the proverbial flip of a switch, an inspection satellite, ostensibly configured for orbital repair work, could become a robotic assassin capable of taking out other satellites with lasers, explosives or mechanical claws. Until the moment it attacks, however, the assassin spacecraft might appear to be harmless. And its dual use gives its operators political cover. The United States possesses more space weaponry than any other country, yet denies that any of its satellites warrant the term.’

Space weaponization increases probability for conflict – electronic jamming, nuclear control, and ambiguity all make space highly volatileFinch 15 (James P. Finch is the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he previously acted as the Principal Director for Space Policy. He has held space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Headquarters U.S. Air Force, “Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth,” JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015)

**Note – ADIZ = Air Defense Identification Zone

As potentially dangerous as the overlapping ADIZs are, they are far less destabilizing than actions in space could be during a crisis. All contestants in the “great game” unfolding in Asia have fairly similar appreciations of the implications that would follow engaging military or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting their ADIZ. These understandings have been built over 100 years of air travel and were underscored dramatically in the miscalculation associated with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983. Such shared understandings are largely nonexistent in space . Not only do nations have less experience operating in the domain, but the criticality of space systems to broader

operational objectives also may create a tempting target early in a crisis. Combined with the lack of potential human casualties from engagements in space, this lack of common understanding may create a growing risk of miscalculation in a terrestrial political crisis. If not explicitly addressed, this instability in space could even create a chasm that undermines the otherwise well-crafted tenets of strategic or nuclear stability . While much has been written about how nuclear weapons contribute to, or detract from, crisis stability, space, in some ways, is more complex than nuclear stability. First, today a clear taboo exists against the use of nuclear weapons. Crossing that firebreak at any level has immediately recognizable and significant implications. Second, in the context of nuclear weapons, theorists can (at least arguably) discriminate among escalatory motives based on the type of weapon— strategic or tactical—and based on the type of target—counterforce or countervalue targeting. This was most famously sketched out in the form of an escalation ladder in Herman Kahn’s 1965 book, On Escalation. This convenient heuristic method for understanding escalation based on the target and the weapon type is arguably more complex for space. This is a byproduct of the lack of mutual understanding on the implications of the weapon and the value of the target. These factors deserve detailed consideration because they describe the playing field on which a terrestrial crisis could spiral into space conflict. Efforts to manage crises, therefore, must account for these complexities. To begin, there is no taboo against many types of counterspace systems . Starting a framework with weapon type, the threshold for use of temporary and reversible counterspace weapons appears much lower. There are documented instances of electronic jamming happening all over the world today, and the number of actors who aapossess counterspace weapons such as communications jammers is much higher. Given the low cost and relative simplicity of some counterspace weapons, even nonstate actors have found utility in employing them. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted, “ Irregular warfare has come to space .”8 Consequently, this type of weapon—temporary and reversible—may appear at first glance to be less escalatory and less prone to miscalculation than kinetic weapons. At the other end of the weapons spectrum are weapons that have permanent and irreversible effects. The extreme version of such a weapon would be a debris-generating kinetic kill device such as the kind that was tested by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War and by China in 2007. These weapons are particularly insidious because they generate large amounts of debris that indiscriminately threatens satellites and other space systems for decades into the future. One additional dimension to the weapons spectrum that merits consideration in the context of crisis stability relates to the survivability of a weapon. It is commonly accepted that space is an offense-dominant domain , which is to say that holding space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending them. This could lead to first-strike instability by creating pressure for early action at the conventional level here on Earth before counterspace attacks could undermine the capability for power projection. But the offense-dominant nature of the domain has implications for both peaceful satellites as well as space-based weapons. This could also create first-strike instability regarding space-based weapons since the advantage would go to the belligerents who use their space weapon first . In this way, space-based weapons may be uniquely destabilizing in ways that their more survivable, ground-based relatives are not. Adding complexity to Kahn’s heuristic, however, is the situational context surrounding the employment of counterspace systems. In the space context, strategists will have to consider weapon type, the nature of the target, and also the terrestrial context. Today’s electronic jamming has primarily been witnessed in the Middle East, where regimes have sought to deny freedom of information to their populations by jamming commercial communications satellites. The same weapon type—a satellite communications jammer—applied against a satellite carrying strategic nuclear command and control

communications during a crisis could be perceived much differently. In such an instance, decisionmakers might conclude that the other side is attempting to deprive them of nuclear command and control as a prelude to escalation . Similarly, the application of permanent, irreversible force against a commercial or third party satellite would have a much different effect on crisis dynamics than mere jamming. Physically destroying or otherwise rendering inoperable such assets could raise a party’s stake in the conflict, by threatening either its power projection capabilities globally or its assured ability to retaliate against a nuclear strike. Many militaries use commercial assets to communicate with deployed forces, and a “show of force” strike against a commercial satellite could inadvertently engage an adversary’s vital interests. Simply put, the weapon, target, and context all contribute to the perceived intent and effects of a counterspace attack. Unlike in other domains, tremendous ambiguity exists regarding the use of counterspace weapon s. This means that all of these variables would be open to interpretation in crises, and it should be remembered that an inherent characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time is short and the potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic, decisionmakers tend to lean toward worst-case interpretations of an adversary’s actions. This is a clear recipe for inadvertent miscalculation .

Weaponization and ASATS causes nuclear war – flashpoints with China are inevitable – outweighs probability of ground-based conflicts Billings 15 (Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, Citing Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center, and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, The Scientific American, August 10, 2015, “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever)

The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth orbit , where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites for modern warfare , space has become the ultimate high ground , with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could cripple [destroy ] the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure . And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the U nited Nations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both

“developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the South China Sea or Russia’s in Ukraine. China in particular , Clapper said, has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites , referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least 5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy , although with minimal success ; in late July at the U nited Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo , likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly. “The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space,” says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. “But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked.” Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested “space mines,” self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administration’s multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites were—particularly the ones in “geosynchronous” orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth , both superpowers backed down. “Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,” Krepon says. “We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too.” Today, the situation is much more complicated. Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity , filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every

satellite is at risk , in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules—and they don’t have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten. Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a “kinetic” method to destroy an adversary’s satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude. More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests’ only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites.

Space conflict will inadvertently trigger a nuclear war Gopalaswamy 15 (Bharath, director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, managed the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he oversaw developing projects on South Asian security issues, held research appointments with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and with Cornell University's Judith Reppy Institute of Peace and Conflict studies, holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin, previously worked at the Indian Space Research Organization's High Altitude Test Facilities and the EADS Astrium GmbH division in Germany, “Space weapons and the risk of nuclear exchanges”, The Bulletin, http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346, AG)

The Outer Space Treaty keeps weapons of mass destruction out of orbit. That's not the same as prohibiting warfare in space. More than one nation has successfully tested destructive antisatellite weapons in space and many more are presumed to possess antisatellite capabilities. Meanwhile, important strategic capabilities such as early warning, secure communications, intelligence gathering, and command and control increasingly run through space. This raises the troubling possibility that the use of antisatellite weapons amid a crisis between nuclear-armed nations might lead to a nuclear exchange—indeed, US war games have repeatedly demonstrated that antisatellite weapons can cause crises to escalate in unpredictable ways. Below, experts debate this question: To what extent do antisatellite weapons increase the risk of nuclear war—and what can be done to moderate the risk? China’s 2007 antisatellite test sparked considerable debate among policy planners in the United States regarding the potential vulnerability of US space assets. Many scholars and analysts believe that, over the last decade, China has slowly but steadily invested in a wide range of counterspace capabilities

that are in fact capable of posing threats to the United States and its allies. Concern focuses on two issues. First, Chinese counterspace abilities might someday challenge US command of the commons, particularly in the area of space. This is a crucial consideration vis-à-vis Washington's conventional military operations because space assets provide the United States enormous advantages in military surveillance and other areas. Second, certain counterspace capabilities could endanger assets that are critical to Washington's launch-on-warning nuclear posture. An attack on such assets could lead to an inadvertent nuclear war. Relatedly, some worry that Beijing’s investments in counterspace technologies might trigger a regional arms race—in particular, Delhi might invest in such capabilities as well, heightening the risk of an inadvertent nuclear exchange between India and China. Postures and motivations. The US military enjoys significant qualitative advantages over potential rivals because of support provided by space platforms. A vast array of imaging satellites, for example, significantly improves US surveillance capabilities. Global positioning satellites help US forces guide their weapons with unparalleled accuracy. Communication satellites help control flows of information. As a result, US military forces are able to project power in an expeditionary manner. They can operate in distant theaters, employing both doctrines and sophisticated equipment that rely on satellites for advanced surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and timing data. But US space assets also represent potential vulnerabilities—mainly to Chinese counterspace capabilities. Several assessments based on publicly available information suggest that, despite China’s increased investments in counterspace technologies, Washington still enjoys a huge advantage in conventional operations conducted with the support of space assets. Still, China is reluctant to engage fully in the rules-based world order that Washington built after World War II, and this is a key concern to US policy makers. They worry that China might exhibit unpredictable behavior—and indeed, unpredictability was manifested in the antisatellite weapon test that China carried out in 2007, and in its other tests in outer space since then. A second key concern for US policy makers is that counterspace capabilities might inadvertently trigger a nuclear exchange— say, between the United States and China , or between China and India. Several US policy planners worry that China could employ counterspace capabilities to destroy Washington's critical space asset s, such as early warning satellites. In some scenarios, this could lead to incorrect conclusions that China had engaged in a preemptive nuclear strike. Similarly, Chinese or Indian investments in these capabilities might lead to miscalculations in Beijing or Delhi, escalating a conflict into a nuclear exchange. But to understand the probability of such a situation, it is important to understand China and India's motivations for acquiring counterspace capabilities—and also to understand the two countries' nuclear postures.

Advantage – Space DebrisSpace debris is catastrophic and action is key- impacts become irreversible within this decadeKurt 15 (Joseph, Juris Doctor Candidate, William & Mary School of Law, 2016; B.A. Marquette University, 2000. [“NOTE: TRIUMPH OF THE SPACE COMMONS: ADDRESSING THE IMPENDING SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS WITHOUT AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY” 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 305 Lexis]) NvP

Despite the high costs imposed by the large amounts of space debris already in orbit, this problem might not rise to the level of a crisis were the rate of space debris creation holding steadily. Unfortunately, the amount of space debris orbiting the Earth is increasing at ever-faster rates. 31¶ Two relatively recent events bear the brunt of the blame. 32¶ In 2007, China used an anti-satellite missile to destroy one of its own weather satellites. 33¶ That collision alone added over two thousand bits of trackable debris to Earth's orbit, and tens of thousands of smaller bits of debris. 34¶ Another devastating collision occurred in 2009 when an active, privately owned satellite crossed paths with a defunct Russian satellite. 35¶ These two events alone are responsible for over a third of all debris in Earth's orbit. 36¶ By creating innumerable new pieces of space debris, collisions such as these in turn make further collisions more likely. 37¶ The Kessler Syndrome is the term given to this exponential growth in the amount of space debris that would be the inevitable byproduct of a cascade of ever more frequent collisions of space objects. 38¶ The end result of the Kessler Syndrome is catastrophe: the orbital zones surrounding the Earth would be rendered unusable. 39¶ At some point, a cascade of collisions will gather enough momentum as to make this phenomenon irreversible. 40¶ Scientists cannot know how imminent such a tipping point is, but some believe it could arrive within a decade or so if the problem is not mitigated. 41¶

US-China cooperation is key to effective space debris mitigation measures Pekkanen 15 - Lob and Gertrud Tamaki professor at the Jackson School of International Studies, in the University of Washington Seattle, works on the international relations of Japan and Asia, with a special interest in outer space governance, security, and policy, co-chairs the U.S.-Japan Space Forum (Saadia, “Frenemies In Space; China Needs To Protect Its Assets, Too”, Forbes, August 26, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/saadiampekkanen/2015/08/26/frenemies-in-space-china-needs-to-protect-its-assets-too/#727d36512959//dmeth)

It is common to equate Space Situational Awareness (SSA) only with U.S. national security. One reason for this is the omnipresence of the United States military, which has been central to our way of thinking about the concept in outer space security. In theory, the SSA mechanics are simple: how do you figure out where something is, where it is going, and what it might do to your stuff out there. In practice at this stage, no one does SSA better than the U.S. military , primarily through its Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). The U.S. military is already pretty formidable in terms of its capabilities relative to the rest of the world. Now it is also working on coalitions to make itself even more indispensable to governing SSA realities worldwide. In 2010, the U.S. Air Force Space Command’s long-standing Schriever Wargames validated the importance of an institutional infrastructure to safeguard space capabilities. Among the organizational possibilities were a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), a Combined Joint Task Force-Space (CJTF-Space), and a Space Council. Of these, the idea of CSpOC, conceived as a center to leverage allied space capabilities all the way to the operational level of war, is critical from a global and Asian perspective. The idea of emphasizing, in other words, not just “joint” (as in the U.S. military) but “combined” (as with U.S. allies) has been around for some time. But perhaps

today, there is greater appreciation of the fact that “J does not equal C,” that the U.S. has to partner with allies and other stakeholders , that it cannot fight a war alone. The theme of partnering with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms around the world is evident also in the U.S. government’s 2011 National Security Space Strategy. The theme is turning into a reality, moving at a brisk pace. Although little public information is available on the trajectories of the CSpOC itself, there is a bilateral and multilateral reality going into place that might eventually consolidate and bring it about down the line. USSTRATCOM has moved forward on this front, signing direct agreement after agreement with a band of trusted allies. As of 2015, it already has SSA agreements with eight countries, namely Canada, Germany, the U.K., France, Italy, Israel, Australia, South Korea and Japan. In addition, the U.S. has signed agreements with two international organizations, the European Space Agency and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites. It has also reportedly signed agreements with 49 commercial entities in 18 countries. There is a similar movement toward multilateral arrangements, with the U.S. inking a memorandum of understanding on a Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO, not a center) with Australia, Canada, and the U.K in late 2014. Given the sensitivity about national space assets and data-sharing, as well as the inequality of allied capabilities, however, it is not too difficult to see the U.S. military remaining at the heart of this spreading SSA governance for a long time to come. Even the CSpO Initiative, for example, places JSpOC at the center of a collaborative mechanism between the U.S. and its allies Recommended by Forbes MOST POPULAR Photos: The 10 Best And Worst States To Make A Living In 2016 +175,746 VIEWS Millennials Are Doomed To Face An Existential Crisis That Will Define The Rest... Open TextVoice: Inside The Data-Driven Race For President But several realities should also guide U.S. efforts to shape the emerging SSA governance frameworks . The rise of a whole new generation of stakeholders in the global space game means that the centrality of the U.S. military alone is not something that can be taken for granted. Consider the formal, non-profit Space Data Association (SDA), and especially its Space Data Center that bills itself as the first global operator-led network for providing data to improve SSA and satellite operations. Formed in 2009, its membership is open to all interested players in and out of the U.S. Then there are the prospects of U.S. engagement with Asia , home to two of the world’s most ambitious military space powers, Japan and China. For Japan, as a formal U.S. ally, all this resonates with its own efforts to create a new force that will participate in space surveillance. It also chimes with Japanese efforts to improve national capabilities for space surveillance not just for debris but also “suspicious satellites” that could harm the country’s assets. Japan foresees having its own radars and optical telescopes, as well as integrated dedicated systems for identifying, analyzing, and cataloguing orbits. In line with what Japan has done to date in the interest of its space security, it is difficult to imagine it will give up the opportunity to indigenize SSA capabilities. Much of what the U.S. is doing appears to be directed at the famed China threats in outer space that we hear so much about — the irresponsible debris-creating Chinese behavior, the increasing Chinese counterspace capabilities. There might be limits to straight-line projections. The nondiscriminatory realities of orbital debris may lead China to back away from what are effectively space suicide missions that can devastate all equally. There is also the huge technological uncertainty that comes with militarizing or weaponizing space in the face of an opposed U.S. military, and now a spreading US-centric coalition framework worldwide. Not to be forgotten is the cost of traveling down this road, problematic in light of a downturn in China’s economy and a populace that might be more difficult to placate with technology fireworks alone if negative economic conditions are prolonged. We should remember: China’s space assets are just as

important to Chinese comprehensive security in the long run as to all other ambitious space powers. China wants to protect its space assets as much as the U.S. does its own. Although other motives might be at play, this may be one reason why the Chinese military has already reached out to the U.S. military more formally and directly on SSA issues . It is an opportunity that the U.S. military can help shape in prudent and watchful ways . This would not be naïve, just responsible behavior for the U.S. too.

Space debris causes nuclear miscalculationTyson 7 — Program Officer of the Global Security Institute Rhianna, “Advancing a Cooperative Security Regime in Outer Space”, Global Security Institute, May 2007, http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/05_07_space_brief.pdf

Threats to space assets grow with our ever-increasing uses of outer space. At present, there are over 800 commercially used satellites in orbit.2 Orbital paths are further cluttered by deserted spacecraft,

discarded rocket debris and other “space junk ” shed from hardware. A piece of space debris, with an average impact speed of 36,000 kilometers per hour,3 could destroy a satellite . While a collision of two operating

satellites is predictable (yet nonetheless worrisome), the overcrowding of orbital paths heightens the risk of radio frequency interference, causing harmful disruptions in communication. Beyond the severe economic repercussions resulting from disrupted commercial satellite communications , hostile actions in space can result in grave

security threats, especially in times of war. Militaries rely on satellites for monitoring of and communication with troops on the ground . If a military satellite was deceived , disrupted, denied, degraded or destroyed , commanders lose their communication capabilities , result ing in mounting tensions and an escalation of conflict . A worst-case scenario could involve inadvertent use of nuclear weapons ; without satellite- enabled monitoring capability in a time of tension, or, if early warning systems give a false reading of an attack, governments may resort to using nuclear weapons.

Advantage – Mars ColonizationIncreasing US-Sino space cooperation provides the necessary foundation for stronger overall relations – space is historically a stabilizing element and solves misperceptions Weeden ’15 Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former U.S. Air Force Officer with sixteen years of professional experience in space operations and policy. National Bureau of Asian Research, “An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship”, September 9, 2015, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602

The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a stable foundation for a stronger overall relationship between the two countries. Space was arguably a stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to reduce tensions and an outlet for collaboration. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation, taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding the “Thucydides trap,” where an established power’s fear of a rising power leads to conflict. The Role of Space in the U.S.-China Relationship Space is a critical domain to the security of the United States. Space capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces,

enable the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the foundation of the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the United States’ ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the near future. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space activities. As a result, the most useful and densely populated orbits are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic

congestion and interference. Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASA’s successes in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of China’s new capabilities have created significant

concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimed at countering or threatening the space capabilities of the United States and other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and China’s growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space. There is growing

mistrust between the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use technologies such as rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a

misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities. Recommendations for Managing Tensions and Promoting Positive Engagement Despite these challenges and

concerns, there are concrete steps that the U nited S tates and China can take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward positive engagement . In 2011, President Barack Obama and then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space

and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security. President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the

potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space. Both countries should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis . Second, Presidents Obama and Xi should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on

earth. Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals. Space weather, scientific research, exploration, capacity building for disaster response, and global environmental monitoring are all areas where the United States and China share joint interests and could collaborate with each other and other interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the military realm. In addition, the United States should take steps on its own to stabilize the relationship. First

and foremost, it should get serious about making U.S. space capabilities more resilient. Increasing resilience would support deterrence by decreasing the benefits an adversary might hope to achieve and

also help ensure that critical capabilities can survive should deterrence fail. While resilience has been a talking point for the last few years, the United States has made little progress toward achieving the goal. Radical change is thus needed in how Washington develops and organizes national security space capabilities. Moreover, the United States should embrace commercial services to diversify and augment

governmental capabilities, while encouraging allies to develop their own space capabilities. Second, the United States should continue to bolster the transparency of space activities by increasing the amount of space situational awareness (SSA) data available to satellite operators and the public. Greater transparency reinforces ongoing U.S. and international initiatives to promote responsible behavior in space and also helps mitigate the possibility for accidents or naturally caused events to spark or escalate tensions. Shifting responsibility for space safety to a civil agency that can share and cooperate more easily with the international community and working with the international community to develop more publicly available sources of SSA data outside the U.S. government are two steps that would enhance trust, improve data reliability, and reinforce norms of behavior. The consequences of

not addressing the current strategic instability in space are real. A future conflict in space between the United States and China would

have devastating impacts on everyone who uses and relies on space. Both the United States and China have acknowledged the dangers of outright conflict and have pledged their interest in avoiding such an outcome. Taken together, the initial steps outlined here could help stabilize the U.S.-China strategic relationship in space, mitigate the threat of the worst-case scenario, and work toward a more positive outcome that benefits all.

Better US-China relations offer an opportunity to colonize Mars---Collaboration patches up Nasa’s stunted innovation and budget---the plan is crucialDickerson 15 “Here's why NASA won't work with China to explore space” Kelly Dickerson - science reporter at Tech Insider, covering space and physics. graduated from the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism with an M.A. in science and health reporting. B.S. degree in biology and a B.A. degree in communication from Berry College. previously written for Live Science, Space.com, and Psychology Today, Oct. 19, 2015, http://www.techinsider.io/nasa-china-collaboration-illegal-2015-10

NASA could have much to gain in the future in working with China . China became the third country ever to successfully launch humans into space, behind Russia and the US, and it's made much progress since. Two years ago, CNSA landed a small telescope on the moon, which is still up there taking crystal-clear images of the cosmos (because Earth's dirty atmosphere isn't in the way). The agency also operates its own space lab called Tiangong 1, is testing powerful new rockets, and has ambitious plans to land more probes on the moon and perhaps a colony there one day . If CNSA's progress in space exploration and tech development isn't a compelling enough reason to work with China, then NASA's stunted budget offers another . More international collaboration could only be positive for a space agency that has faced budget cut after budget cut . President John F. Kennedy committed to a moon landing by the end of the 1960s, then Nixon took the helm and slammed on the brakes after a handful of crewed lunar missions. As Logsdon writes in an article for NASA: "Nixon rejected NASA's ambitious post-Apollo plans, which included developing a series of large space stations, continued missions to the moon, and an initial mission to Mars in the 1980s," Logsdon writes. "By the time Nixon left the White House, the NASA budget had fallen from its peak of almost 4% of the total federal budget to less than 1%." Some argue that we would already have sent humans to Mars if NASA had kept its momentum. More collaboration could help get NASA back on track. NASA administrator Charles Bolden event wrote in a recent blog post that he thinks more collaboration will help get us get boots on Mars : A Journey such as this is something that no one person, crew, or Agency can undertake alone . [...] A mission of this magnitude is made stronger with international partnership – the sort of spirit and cooperation that is demonstrated so vividly by the tens of thousands of people across 15 countries who have been involved in the development and operation of the International Space Station. In fact, NASA just announced a partnership with the Israel Space Agency that will allow the two agencies to conduct joint missions and share research facilities. I personally think it would be great to see a similar agreement with China some day soon — especially since the nation announced it's seeking international partners to help build another space station in the 2020s (and the station sounds really cool). But again, current US law forbids NASA from helping out or getting involved at all. Russia will only support the $100 billion space station until 2024, and that's a huge problem because, right now, NASA relies on Russia's rockets to get its astronauts into space. It's unclear what NASA will do once Russia pulls out. Working with China and other nations to build a bigger and better space station would be a great option. Instead of two space stations, we could have one truly international station with the most brilliant scientists

around the world working together. That kind of collaboration would speed up tech development; instead of space stations just copying each other's rockets and space probes, we could start working together to advance tech nology at a much faster pace than we are right now. We'll need a new generation of space tech if we ever hope to get to Mars. It already seems like the two agencies do want to collaborate, since discussion of that possibility has reached the White House several times. US scientists have also openly criticized policy makers in the past for preventing Chinese scientists from attending space conferences. It seems like politics shouldn't get in the way of pure scientific pursuit, but the reality is US lawmakers won't allow collaboration with China because they are worried about national security and protecting state secrets. But who knows, if the two space agencies started working together , it might open up enough lines of communication between the US and China for the two nations to defrost their icy relationship . In the meantime China will continue to expand its space exploration efforts. Unless a big policy shift happens, NASA might have to sit on the sidelines while an incredible new chapter of space exploration begins.

As long as we stay on Earth extinction is inevitable---colonizing Mars is unique and is the only potential solutionGeorge Dvorsky, 8-30-2012, is a Canadian bioethicist, transhumanist, and futurist. He is a contributing editor at io9 and producer of the Sentient Developments blog and podcast. "How Self-Sustaining Space Habitats Could Save Humanity from Extinction," io9, http://io9.gizmodo.com/5939232/how-self-sustaining-space-habitats-could-save-humanity-from-extinction

This planet can't protect us forever . Sooner or later, there'll be a catastrophe that renders this world uninhabitable for humans . And when that day comes, we'll need to know already how to live in space.¶ Yesterday, we explained why we should reboot the Biosphere 2 projects of the 1990s. There are a lot of scientific and technological benefits from learning to create self-sustaining habitats — but the biggest reason is because we need to know how to live in space, before we have no place else to live. ¶ Why we should reboot the Biosphere projects¶ The last Biosphere 2 project ended 18 years ago. Correction: The failed Biosphere 2 project

ended…Read more io9.com¶ There's little question that this is an important area of inquiry. We clearly want to venture out into space, but if we're going to do so, we'll eventually have to lose our dependence on Mother Earth . Colonists won't always be able to rely on a steady stream of

supplies from Earth, which means they're eventually going to have to figure it on their own.¶ Physicist Stephen Hawking suggests that our ongoing efforts to colonize space could ultimately save humanity from extinction . As it stands, Earth is our only biosphere — all our eggs are currently in one basket. If something were to happen to either our planet or our civilization, it would be vital to know that we could sustain a colony somewhere else.¶ And the threats are real . The possibility of an asteroid impact, nuclear war, a nanotechnological disaster, or severe environmental degradation make the need for off-planet habitation extremely urgent. And given our ambitious future prospects, including the potential for ongoing population growth, we may very well have no choice but to leave the cradle.¶

We're obviously not going to get there overnight — but here's how we could do it.¶ Baby steps ¶ As already noted, the first thing we need to do is develop

a fully functional biosphere for long-term human occupation. We still haven't figured out how to do this yet, so it should be at the top of our priority list. We especially need to figure out ways to keep CO2 levels in check, maintain a

steady internal temperature, avoid water acidification, and find a way to keep our sanity in check given the close confines.¶ Once this has been done, we can start to think about going into space. The initial structure or set of building materials could be brought up from Earth (either by rocket or space elevator), or we could make it difficult for the astro-biospherians, by making them pull together all

their materials from local sources such as asteroids (call it the ‘teach a man to fish approach').¶ But life in an orbital biosphere will present unique challenges.

Growingplants in a zero gravity environment is possible, but difficult (they tend to sprout in bizarre orientations). There's also the problem of prolonged exposure to zero gravity on humans, and the long-term effects of solar

radiation.¶ That said, there are potential solutions to these issues. Back in 1974, physicist Gerard O'Neill outlined a freestanding orbital habitat consisting of large cylinders that would

spin along an axis at a rate of one rotation per minute. This would result in a simulation of gravity along its inner surfaces.¶ Initially, these self-sufficient space stations should be kept simple — pilot projects to prove that humans can live off-planet and independent of Earth — an important precedent for any subsequent missions to space, or for colonization efforts to other terrestrial bodies.¶ And indeed, as time passes, these projects will have to assess

the viability of more complex and long-term missions. As Ben Austen has warned, we could run into problems such as inbreeding. His solution, however, is to stock our habitats with DNA to expand upon the existing gene poo l. More radically, colonists could take

advantage of cybernetics, advanced genetic engineering practices, and life extension technologies to overcome these issues as they arise.¶ What's not known, however, is how long a human offshoot could live in Earth's orbit

alone. It's conceivable that a self-sustaining base could function for generations, but that doesn't seem like a reasonable long-term solution for the future of human civilization — particularly if the home planet is inaccessible for whatever

reason.¶ But this is why we should also focus our efforts on building closed-loop systems on the Moon, Mars , and

beyond.¶ Extraterrestrial but planetary biospheres¶ Back in 2000, NASA completed a $200 million study called the "Roadmap to Settlement" in which they described the potential for a moon-based colony in which habitats could be constructed several feet beneath the lunar surface (or covered within an existing crater) to protect colonists from high-energy cosmic radiation. They also outlined the construction of an onsite nuclear power plant, solar panel

arrays, and a number of methods for extracting carbon, silicon, aluminium and other materials from the surface.¶ ¶ More recently, NASA has also confirmed the presence of water ice on the Moon — a critical ingredient for any self-sustaining colony. Most of it resides at the Moon's north pole, but it's a fair amount — about 600 million tons worth.¶ Assuming

that the radiation problem could be addressed, it might also be possible to set up solar-powered farming enclosures . If we could start

farming at the lunar North Pole, experts estimate that a 0.5 hectare space farm could feed upwards of 100 people.¶ At the same time, however, there will be some considerable challenges. The Moon features a long lunar night, which could limit solar power and require a colony to withstand temperature extremes. The Moon is also low in light elements, namely carbon, nitrogen, and hydrogen. Low gravity (at ⅙ of Earth's) could prove to be a long-term problem. The Moon is also completely devoid of an atmosphere, and it has virtually no potential as a future terraforming project. At best, the Moon could serve as a good proof-of-concept station for future projects, or for a short-term stay in the event of a catastrophe on Earth.¶ As NASA's roadmap suggests, a colony on the Moon could help us prepare for a mission to Mars. It would probably be wise to set up, test, and train a self-sustaining colony a little

closer to home before we take that massive leap to Mars.¶ And indeed, Mars holds considerably more potential than the Moon . It features a solar day of 24

hours and 39 minutes, and a surface area 28.4% less than Earth's. The Red Planet also has an axial tilt of 25 degrees (compared to the Earth's 29%) resulting in similar seasonal shifts (though they're twice as long given that Mars's

year is 1.88 Earth years). And most importantly, Mars has an existing atmosphere, significant mineral diversity (such as ore and nickel-iron), and water. Actually, it has a lot of water . Recent analysis shows that Mars could have as much water underground as Earth .

Mars has all necessary components of life---everything is in accessible forms---The plan is the last pushZubrin 11 —Formerly a Staff Engineer at Lockheed Martin Astronautics in Denver, he holds a Masters degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Washington. "Victory From Mars", Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays, 3-7-2011, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=fF8Lql4ZTqYC

Among extraterrestrial bodies in our solar system, Mars is singular in that it possesses all the raw materials required to suppor t not only life , but also a new branch of human civilization . This uniqueness is illustrated most clearly if Mars is contrasted with the Earth's Moon, the most frequently cited alternative location for extraterrestrial human colonization. ¶ Unlike the Moon, Mars is rich in carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen, and oxygen , all in biologically readily accessible forms such as carbon dioxide gas, nitrogen gas, water ice, and permafrost.2 Carbon, nitrogen, and hydrogen are only present on the Moon in parts per million quantities. Oxygen is abundant on the Moon, but only in tightly bound oxides such as silicon dioxide, ferrous oxide, magnesium oxide, and alumina oxide, which require very high-energy processes to reduce.' Current knowledge indicates that if Mars were smooth and all its ice and permafrost melted into liquid water, the entire planet would be covered with an ocean over 200 meters deep.' This scenario contrasts strongly with the Moon, which is so dry that if concrete were found there, lunar colonists would mine it to get the water out. Thus, if plants could be grown in greenhouses on the Moon (an unlikely proposition, as the Moon's 2-week-long dark spell is unsuitable for most plants, and the absence of any atmosphere would make necessary very thick glass for solar flare shielding), most of their biomass material would have to be imported. ¶ The Moon is also deficient in about half the metals of interest to industrial society (copper, for example), as well as many other elements of interest such as sulfur and phosphorus. Mars has every required element in abundance. Moreover, on Mars, as on Earth, hydrologic and volcanic processes have occurred that are likely to have consolidated various elements into local concentrations of high-grade mineral ore. Indeed, the geologic history of Mars has been compared to that of Africa, with very optimistic inferences as to its mineral wealth implied as a corollary.' In contrast, the Moon has almost no history of water or volcanic action, with the result that it is basically composed of trash rocks with little differentiation into ores that

represent useful concentrations of anything interesting. ¶ Power could be generated on either the Moon or Mars with solar panels , and here the advantages of the Moon's clearer skies and closer proximity to the Sun than Mars roughly balance the disadvantage of large energy storage requirements created by the Moon's 28-day light/dark cycle. But if the desire was to manufacture solar panels so as to create a self-expanding power base, Mars holds an enormous advantage, as only Mars possesses the large supplies of carbon and hydrogen needed to produce the pure silicon required for making photovoltaic panels and other electronics. Also, there is no geologically purified source of silicon dioxide, such as sand, on the Moon. In addition, Mars has the potential for wind-generated power, while the Moon clearly does not. But both the Sun and wind offer relatively modest power potential—tens or at most hundreds of kilowatts here or there. To create a vibrant civilization , a richer power base is needed , and Mars has this both in the short and medium term in the form of its geothermal power resources , which offer the potential for large numbers of locally created electricity-generating stations in the 10 megawatt (10,000 kilowatt) class. In the long term, Mars will enjoy a power-rich economy based upon exploitation of its large domestic resources of deuterium fuel for fusion reactors. Deuterium is five times more common on Mars than it is on Earth, and tens of thousands of times more common on Mars than on the Moon.' ¶ But the biggest problem with the Moon, as with all other airless planetary bodies and proposed artificial free-space colonies, is that sunlight is not available in a form useful for growing crops. A single acre of plants on Earth requires 4 megawatts (MW) of sunlight power; a square kilometer needs 1,000 MW. The entire world put together would not produce enough electric power to illuminate the farms of the state of Rhode Island. Growing crops with electrically generated light is economically hopeless. But natural sunlight cannot be used on the Moon or any other airless body in space unless the walls on the greenhouse are thick enough to shield out solar flares, a requirement that enormously increases the expense of creating crop land. Even accomplishing this requirement would do no good on the Moon, because plants will not grow in a light/dark cycle lasting 28 days. ¶ But Mars has an atmosphere thick enough to protect crops grown on the surface from solar flares. Therefore, thin-walled inflatable plastic greenhouses protected by unpressurized ultraviolet- resistant hard-plastic shield domes can be used to rapidly create crop land on the surface. Even without the problems of solar flares and a month-long diurnal cycle, such simple greenhouses would be impractical on the Moon as they would create unbearably high temperatures. On Mars, in contrast, the strong greenhouse effect created by such domes would be precisely what is necessary to produce a temperate climate inside. Such domes up to 50 meters in diameter are light enough to be transported from Earth initially, and they eventually could be manufactured on Mars out of indigenous materials. Because all the resources to make plastics exist on Mars, networks of such 50- to 100-meter domes could be manufactured and deployed rapidly, opening up large areas of the surface to both shirtsleeve human habitation and agriculture. Looking further into the future , it will eventually be possible for humans to thicken Mars' atmosphere substantially by forcing the regolith to outgas its contents through a deliberate program of artificially induced global warming . Once that has been accomplished, the habitation domes could be almost any size, as they would not have to sustain a pressure differential between their interior and exterior. In fact, once that has been done, it will be possible to raise specially bred crops outside the domes. ¶ The point is that unlike colonists on any other known extraterrestrial body, Martian colonists will be able to live on the surface, not in tunnels, and move about freely and grow crops in the light of day. Mars is a place where humans can live and multiply to large numbers, supporting themselves with products of every description made out of

indigenous materials. Mars is thus a place where an actual civilization , not just a mining or scientific outpost, can be developed . And it is this civilization, grown in size and technological potency on a frontier planet with a surface area as large as all the continents of Earth put together, that will both radically tip the balance among those who remain behind on Earth and provide the pioneers with the craft and outlook required to push the human reach much further. ¶ Thus, for our generation and those soon to follow, Mars is the new world. The nation that settles it is one whose culture, values, social forms, and ideas will provide the point of departure for the further development of human civilization as our species expands outward from its planet of origin to the innumerable others awaiting us in the infinite reaches of space.

Advantage – InnovationWhile the Wolf Amendment doesn’t explicitly bar civil cooperation between the US and China, it has a stifling effect that has effectively prohibited cooperation in the status quo.Jeff Foust (staff) 4/8/2019 [“New opportunities emerging for U.S.-China space cooperation” online @ https://spacenews.com/new-opportunities-emerging-for-u-s-china-space-cooperation/, loghry]

Civil space cooperation between NASA and Chinese organizations is sharply restricted by language commonly known as the Wolf Amendment, first placed in an appropriations bill in 2011 by then-U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) Similar language has been included in subsequent appropriations bills, including the fiscal year 2019 appropriations bill enacted in February. The Wolf Amendment, though, doesn’t bar cooperation between the two countries in civil spaceflight. “A lot of people think that the Wolf Amendment is a prohibition on working with the Chinese. It’s not,” said Mike Gold, chairman of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, during a March 29 panel discussion on U.S.-China cooperation by the Secure World Foundation. The provision, he noted, allows for cooperation if there is certification from the FBI that such efforts don’t pose a national security risk and if Congress has been notified of the plan. “To me, those are two commonsense steps,” he said. That has allowed some limited cooperation in areas like science and aeronautics. However, many still see the amendment as a barrier to more significant cooperation. “I absolutely agree that the Wolf Amendment does not prohibit cooperation, but the effect of it has been to prohibit it,” said Brian Weeden, director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation. The restriction, coupled with political rhetoric critical of working with China, has resulted in what he called a “stifling effect” for any plans for enhanced partnerships between the two countries.

No cooperation over space ensures that any attempt for relations will fail – that threatens overall security and Asian stability Hitchens and Chen 8 (Theresa, Center for Defense Information, World Security Institute and David, CENTRA Technology, Inc, “Forging a Sino-US ‘‘grand bargain’’ in space” Space Policy 24 (2008) pg. 128–131, Available Online at Sciencedirect.com, Accessed June 28, 2011, EJONES)

In Washington’s space security community the debate has coalesced around the question of whether the future of Sino-US relations in space should more closely resemble arms control or an arms race—illustrated by the intercepts and destruction of satellites by both nations a year apart. Whatever direction Washington and Beijing take in their nascent military space competition is certain to be followed by other major and emerging space powers. Unfortunately, the existing trend in both nations is for promoting an offensive space strategy aimed primarily at one another. With a new US administration, whichever candidate enters office will face the challenge of finding viable alternatives to the anti-satellite arms race that lies at the end of the present course, an outcome that would be in neither party’s interest. The incoming president might avoid such a security dilemma with China by utilizing the full range of US soft power, backed by realistic hard power consequences. This will require the incoming administration to expand its understanding of what constitutes a space issue, and to develop a deeper knowledge of what motivates China’s leadership. Using both persuasion and dissuasion to craft a kind of ‘‘grand bargain’’ with China regarding space, the next president may be able to steer Sino-US competition toward trade, economics and sport, rather than military

oneupmanship. Accomplishing this would strengthen US national security and international stability in the Pacific region.

Strong relations are key to the overall development of space, scientific advancement, and innovationZhou, Center for Space and applied Sciences, 8 (Yi – Chinese Academy of the Sciences and Professor at George Washington University, Perspectives on Sino-US cooperation in civil space programs, Science Direct, Space Policy 24 (2008) 132-139) AC

On the other hand, some commentators in the USA worry that cooperation with China will somehow compromise US economic and political progress and even US national security [7]. However, there are several potential benefits for the USA which should be given greater consideration: _ Benefits for geopolitical issues and global stability. A country’s strategic interests may provide the primary motivation for engaging partner nations in cooperative space ventures. The International Space Station (ISS) is a good example of this. China and the USA are both important countries and a stable relationship between them is a key factor in global stability. Space could be a focal point for promoting this kind of stability. Several European countries and Russia have undertaken cooperative activities in space with China to satisfy their ARTICLE IN PRESS geopolitical demands and other interests. Chinese participation in US-led space exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good US–China relations [8], which would be good for US international relations and would provide geopolitical benefits. _ The United States will be able to understand more about China’s space development and direction through actual cooperation. At the moment the USA observes China’s space policy and capabilities through statements in China’s white papers. But studying one paper every five years is too limited and does not provide sufficient detail. Some American consulting and research institutions may simply rely on graduate students’ superficial papers to try to gain insight into the direction of China’s space development. These are not full-scale or always entirely accurate, and may sometimes result in misunderstandings. If NASA signed an agreement with CNSA and began joint space projects, they would more easily and directly understand China’s space activities and directions. They may even be able to make some good suggestions for China’s space projects and policies. These win–win suggestions should be readily adopted by China’s policy makers to extend the two countries’ space and national benefits. _ Extending US opportunities for scientific discovery. Scientists in the USA have many interesting ideas and proposals for space science and space exploration, but the US space budget, though huge compared with that of other countries, is still limited. If the USA were to cooperate with China in space science and space exploration, there would be more opportunities for US scientific discovery. For example, in the China–ESA cooperative Double Star Exploration Program, China supplied the launch service and satellite. ESA supplied the back-up scientific instruments of the Cluster mission on the satellites. This helped ESA obtain more scientific data for research through the added payload. Greater research results were achieved. ESA’s instruments were valued at h800 000, which alone certainly cannot support a major new European science mission. _ More choices and back-up for the USA. Space exploration is an inherently risky activity in which the element of risk can be managed and mitigated but never eliminated. It is necessary for any country to spread and manage risk. More back-up means greater safety. International cooperation can be used to duplicate capabilities which ensure that failure in one area is unlikely to jeopardize the entire mission or project. The most obvious example of this point today is the ISS’s reliance on the Space Shuttle and the Soyuz for transporting humans to the station. In the next 20 years the USA and China will be realizing ambitions to fly to the

Moon. By cooperating with China, this additional back-up would lower the risks involved in human spaceflight. For example, if Americans return to the Moon and meet with an accident, the Chinese lunar project or crew could supply assistance as a back-up. Usually, such arrangements are discussed and integrated from the very beginning, in the design phase. Unfortunately that does not seem very likely under current circumstances. _ Savings on the cost of US space projects to free up funds for more missions. Space science and space exploration activities are all extremely expensive, whether human or robotic. It is sometimes a waste of money and resources for different countries to explore the same unknown with the same scientific goals. Humans around the world should definitely share in pursuing these missions. In contrast, duplicated efforts will result in negative byproducts, such as more space debris and an increased perception of a space race. China’s space launch and satellite ability has advanced greatly. Its space budget is also very stable, although total funding is not very high. It is believed that China’s civil space budget will grow continually over the next 15 years. If the USA can supply some instruments to or engage in joint research with China, it will be able to save significantly on mission costs associated with instrument development and launch. The USA would thus have more money for other worthwhile projects which other countries do not have the ability to do at present. This would obviously help the USA maintain its ‘‘space leadership’’. _ Some space research, inherently global in nature, involves targets in geographic locations that are important to US interests. Earth observation research is a good example. China’s Earth observation data and other useful data and research achievements could enrich US research models or pools in the same fields. Scientists from both countries need to integrate data for research and development. Another example is that US scientists may need China’s ground-based magnetic storm data to perfect their space weather prediction model. It will be very helpful to both countries to undertake joint research in these areas. _ Benefits for the US space industry. China is a very big market. China’s GDP increases by over 10% per year [9], which also means very rapid development and lots of business opportunities. The USA’s space industry and its other technology-intensive products are more obviously competitive than China’s. If Congress were to assume a more positive posture, the US space industry would be able to expand into China’s market and reap significant benefits. This would help to reduce the USA’s trade deficit as well. Europe has already entered China’s space market and received economic benefits in space business and other areas.

Space development is key to overall innovationSteven J. Markovich 14, writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, “Space Exploration and U.S. Competitiveness,” 12/5/14, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/space-exploration-and-us-competitiveness

Launching STEM Careers and Innovations The space race of the 1960s and 1970s captured the American public’s imagination unlike any other human endeavor . A 2009 study in the science journal Nature found that the Apollo program had inspired half of scientists surveyed, while almost 90 percent believed that manned space exploration inspired younger generations to study science. Some evidence seems to support this. According to the National Science Foundation, the percentage of bachelor’s-degree graduates in science and engineering fields peaked in the late 1960s , around the time of the moon landing, but has declined slowly since. Space exploration can also foster innovation in ways unlike other human undertakings, pushing the limits of technology and requiring the collaboration of some of the brightest people across multiple disciplines. As Jim Bell, president of the Planetary Society, a nonprofit group dedicated to space exploration advocacy and education, said in a CFR interview:

"When you’re embarking on an enterprise that is the hardest thing to do, it often attracts the best people who are intrigued by very difficult problems and want to have a sense in purpose in applying their knowledge to something big." NASA catalogues some 1,800 spinoffs in which technologies originally developed for space exploration were transferred to the private sector. Some are obvious, such as communications satellites, but other transfers are less well known. Many medical advances derived from space technologies, from refinements in artificial hearts to improved mammograms and laser eye surgery. Space exploration drove the development of new materials and industrial techniques, including thermoelectric coolers for microchips, high temperature lubricants, and a means of mass-producing carbon nanotubes, a material with significant engineering potential. Even household products such as memory-foam mattresses, programmable ovens, vacuums, and ski apparel trace their origins to NASA.

Innovation key to the economyBroughel and Thierer 2019 [James and Adam, Senior Research Fellows at the Mercatus Center of George Mason University, “Technological Innovation and Economic Growth,” Mercatus Center at https://www.mercatus.org/publications/entrepreneurship/technological-innovation-and-economic-growth]

Most economists agree that technological innovation is a key driver of economic growth and human well-being. Negative cultural attitudes about technology and its disruptive effects could threaten reaping these benefits. Policy responses that reflect such attitudes (and discourage innovation) risk triggering economic stagnation, decreased economic dynamism, and lower living standards. James Broughel and Adam Thierer make this case in “Technological Innovation and Economic Growth: A Brief Report on the Evidence.” The Effects of Innovation Technological innovation brings benefits. It increases productivity and brings citizens new and better goods and services that improve their overall standard of living. The benefits of innovation are sometimes slow to materialize. They often fall broadly across the entire population. Those who stand to benefit most—the poor and future generations—have little or no political influence. Innovation causes short-term disruptions. These disruptions may be unsettling, as some old business models fail and some individuals lose their jobs. Incumbent interests may resist change. Those affected are often well-organized and powerful. They may try to derail opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship that could lead to more growth and prosperity over the long haul. Policymakers act within notoriously short time horizons. They are also likely to hear disproportionately from constituencies and interests that are harmed by new technologies. This may lead to (1) resistance to change among policymakers and (2) policy interventions that stifle entrepreneurship and protect incumbents from new competitors. The Need for Sound Public Policy Public policy plays an important role in fostering innovation by establishing the “rules of the game.” These include the rule of law, property rights, patent protections, contracts, free trade policies, freedom to travel, various incentives to invest, and light-touch regulations and regulatory regimes. When it comes to new technologies, the policy default should be permissionless innovation rather than restrictive regulations. Permissionless innovation is the idea that experimentation should generally be permitted by default, even when innovation might lead to some short-term disruption of established business models. In the long run, the perpetual search for new and better ways of doing things drives human learning and, ultimately, prosperity for all.

Economic decline causes a world war – populism and structural factors ensure escalation Sundaram and Popov, 19 (Jomo Kwame Sundaram, former economics professor and United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, Vladimir Popov, Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin, “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War,” Inter Press Service, 2/12/19, http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/, accessed 7/8/19, gdi-sdb)

KUALA LUMPUR and BERLIN, Feb 12 2019 (IPS) - Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened. Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as

‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers.

Solvency – TCBM’sTCBMS can help build a relationship to support China and the US‘s interests in increased bilateral cooperation in space sustainability, science, exploration, and security - info sharing clarifies benign intentions of both parties in space and unseats the culture of secrecy embedded within both national space programsBrian Weeden and Xiao He; July 13, 2016 ((Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). National Bureau of Asian Research; “US-China Relations in Strategic Domains”)//SZ

Transparency and confidence-building mechanisms for managing tensions and crises. The prospects of banning or prohibiting the development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO technologies are slim. RPO technology has many legitimate peaceful uses and potentially significant commercial applications. Both the United States and China are likewise developing their direct ascent kinetic-kill technologies as a result of strong, but different, national interests that are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Moreover, verification challenges associated with the space domain will continue to impede any arms control initiative that is built on bans or limits on deployment of technology or capabilities.¶ A more promising approach is to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures for both direct ascent and RPO. TCBMs are a means by which governments can share information to help create mutual understanding and trust and reduce misperceptions and miscalculations. Although not new, TCBMs represent a shift for the space world, which has long focused its efforts on pushing for legally binding arms control agreements and treaties. The recent report from the UN Group of Governmental Experts, in which the United States and China both participated, highlights several areas for space TCBMs: information exchange on space policies, information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, and contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities.70 Improving information on activities in space likely holds the most promise for mitigating tensions in the U.S.-China relationship in this domain . While determining a satellite’s exact capabilities and function is still difficult, SSA capabilities have developed to the point where it is becoming possible to verify actions and activities in space. The U.S. military already maintains a catalog of more than 22,000 human-generated space objects in earth orbit, much of which is available publicly and also shared with all satellite operators.71 China is currently developing its own SSA capabilities and, presumably, its own catalog of space objects. Russia, several European countries, India, and many other spacefaring nations are also increasing their own SSA capabilities, and most recently actors in the private sector have started to develop such capabilities as well.72 As SSA capabilities continue to improve and proliferate to other countries, it becomes increasingly possible that they may be able to serve as a new type of national technical means to underpin bilateral and multilateral political agreements on responsible and irresponsible behavior in space.73 Such agreements should be aimed at limiting dangerous or provocative actions, such as close approaches of national security satellites;74 signaling restraint for kinetic testing and deployment of new capabilities; and making political pledges to refrain from first use of destructive counter-space weapons.75 A key challenge in developing these agreements will be overcoming cultural and bureaucratic incentives for opacity on both sides. In the United States, the national security community has a deeply rooted culture of secrecy and unilateralism in the space domain that results from policy decisions made during the

Kennedy administration as well as the consideration that space remains the last domain where the United States has a decisive advantage. For China, which sees itself as significantly inferior to the United States, opacity in space activities and programs is seen as one of the few tools to offset overwhelming U.S. capabilities and resources. Both countries also have the usual organizational silos and impediments to sharing information internally that are inherent to all large bureaucracies and undermine bilateral sharing. Enhancing SSA capabilities and increasing transparency on activities in space are in their national interests. While some more exquisite national SSA capabilities should be reserved for security uses, there is a much broader set of basic SSA capabilities that are relatively common among all spacefaring nations and essential to safe space activities, including those of commercial satellite operators. Increased sharing of data from these capabilities and collaboration on enhancing and improving them will result in positive externalities that will benefit all countries. Given that both the United States and China have considerable national security, civil, and commercial interests in space, this domain will have a significant impact on the future of bilateral relations. Although it is tempting to view the U.S.-China relationship in space through a similar lens as the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the differences between the two relationships and their contexts may ultimately matter more than the similarities. The key question is whether space will be a source of tension that creates instability and risk or an area of positive engagement that can strengthen the relationship. Both the United States and China should look at where their interests in space overlap to find potential areas to strengthen their relationship. Both have interests in working with the rest of the international community to strengthen the space governance regime in a manner that enhances the long-term sustainability of space, including by addressing both environmental threats and security challenges. Both countries should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and exploration. Doing so would create an element to their relationship that has a different dynamic from military-to-military interactions. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests in space differ and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions created by the testing and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national SSA capabilities and increasing data sharing with each other.

Current policies regarding China are based on faulty China threat logic - the plan moves away from the harmful policies that are in place right now and fosters cooperation Kluger 15- Jeffrey, senior writer, The Silly Reason the Chinese Aren’t Allowed on the Space Station, (http://time.com/3901419/space-station-no-chinese/) JB

And similar to the nature of those other space agencies too is the professed wish of the Chinese crews to work across national borders. “As an astronaut, I have a strong desire to fly with astronauts from other countries,” said Nie Haisheng, the Shenzhou 10 commander. “I also look forward to going to the International Space Station. Space is a family affair; many countries are developing their space programs and China, as a big country, should make our own contributions in this field.” But that contribution can’t happen aboard the ISS. The 2011 law draws a sort of ex post facto justification from a study that was released in 2012 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,

warning that China’s policymakers “view space power as one aspect of a broad international competition in comprehensive national strength and science and technology .” More darkly, there is the 2015 report prepared by the University of California, San Diego’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ominously titled “China Dream, Space Dream“, which concludes: “China’s efforts to use its space program to transform itself into a military, economic, and technological power may come at the expense of U.S. leadership and has serious implications for U.S. interests.” OK, deep, cleansing breaths please. On the surface, the studies make a kind of nervous, reflexive sense. China is big, China is assertive, China has made clear its intentions to project its military power in ways it never has before—including to the high ground of space. But if that sounds familiar it’s because it’s an echo of the Cold War hysteria that greeted the launch the Soviet Union’s Sputnik. The world’s first satellite, Sputnik was a terrifying, beach ball sized object that orbited the Earth from Oct. 1957 to January 1958, presenting the clear and present danger that at some point it might beep at us as it flew overhead. Every Soviet space feat that followed was one more log on the Cold War fire, one more reason to conclude that we were in a mortal arms and technology race and woe betide us if the guys on the other side got so much as a peek at what we were doing. That argument failed for a lot of reasons. For one thing, the Soviets hardly needed a peek at our tech since they were the ones who were winning. When you’re in first place in your division you don’t to steal ideas from the guys in last. Something similar is true of the Chinese now. After launching their first solo astronaut in 2003, they have followed in rapid succession with two-person and then three-person crews, and have mastered both spacewalking and orbital docking. They have orbited a core module for their own eventual space station, have sent multiple spacecraft to the moon and are planning a Mars rover. They didn’t do all that by filching American tech. The doubters are unappeased, however. Both these reports warn that all of China’s technological know-how, no matter how they acquired it, has multiple uses, and can be put to either good or nefarious ends, a fact that is pretty much true of every, single technological innovation from fire through the Apple Watch. Even if all of the fears were well-founded—even if a Chinese Death Star were under construction at this moment in a mountain lair in Xinjiang—forbidding the kind of international handshaking and cooperating that is made possible by a facility like the ISS is precisely the wrong way to to go about reducing the threat. The joint Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1975 achieved little of technological significance, but it was part of a broader thaw between Moscow and Washington . That mattered, in the same way ping pong diplomacy between the U.S. and China in 1971 was about nothing more than a game—until it was suddenly about much more. Well before the ISS was built and occupied, the shuttle was already flying American crews to Russia’s Mir space station. Russia later became America’s leading partner in operating and building the ISS—a shrewd American move that both offloaded some of the cost of the station and provided work for Russian missile engineers who found themselves idle after the Berlin Wall fell and could easily have sold their services to nuclear nasties like North Korea or Iran. The technology aboard the ISS is not the kind that a Chinese astronaut with ill will would want to or need to steal. And more to the point, if there’s one thing the men and women who fly in space will tell you, it’s that once they get there, terrestrial politics mean nothing at all—the sandbox silliness of politicians who are not relying on the cooperation of a few close crewmates to keep them alive and safe as they race through low Earth orbit. From space, as astronauts like to say, you can’t see borders. It’s a perspective the lawmakers in Washington could use.

Broader space cooperation and high-level dialogues resolve the mistrust and miscommunication at the heart of space security dilemmasZhang 11 [Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship” accessed by means of JSTOR]

In the context of the changing strategic landscape between China and the U.S., specific measures could be taken to reduce their mutual concerns. One important measure, often overlooked in the space relationship, is for top civilian leaders to exercise greater oversight over military space programs. Often, statements and actions by the military have driven the fears of the other side. If the U.S. and China intend to build a new partnership in world affairs, civilian leaders must recognize that unscrutinized actions by their own militaries can invite mutual mistrust, which in turn hinders broader political and security cooperation. On the U.S. side, the Obama government needs to take a much closer look at the U.S. Air Force (especially its Space Command) and the Missile Defense Agency. These two institutions periodically try out new space projects that China and Russia perceive as threatening to their national security. For example, in October 2005 the U.S. Air Force conducted a maneuverability experiment with its XSS-11 microsatellite. According to internal Air Force studies, the XSS program was intended as a precursor to an anti-satellite program. Theresa Hitchens, a longtime watcher of the U.S. military space program, suggests that both Congress and the White House should exercise much tighter control over military space programs. She noted during an interview that the U.S. military’s move toward space warfare is a strategic issue with a lot of potential fallout. Thus, the military cannot make that decision on its own. As Hitchens said, “Congress hasn’t asked about this. Congress hasn’t debated this. There hasn’t been a change of White House policy and therefore there has been no public debate. And I think it is a serious mistake. This is something that ought to be debated at the national level with congressional and public input. It’s a bigger deal than just a military decision.”51 China’s civilian leadership must also rein in the military space program. Indeed, after the 2007 ASAT test, some U.S. experts questioned whether the Chinese civilian leadership fully grasped the issue. Just as many U.S. projects have caused concern in China and Russia, the Chinese leadership must recognize that its own military space projects may be worrying U.S. decision makers. Thus, China’s political leadership needs to understand that restraining its military space program will be vital for forging security cooperation with the U.S. As suggested by Bruce Macdonald, one specific measure for the Chinese leadership is to adopt new policy making mechanisms: “President Hu Jintao should establish a senior national security coordinating body, equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council, that he chairs. Such a body would include all interested parties in China’s government to ensure that actions with significant international implications are given the full and careful review they merit.”52 Further, the Chinese political leadership needs to tone down the PLA’s rhetoric on space warfare. The PLA has published countless studies on the role of space war in the future. Although much of the rhetoric has been driven by its fear of U.S. space dominance, discussions on possible countermeasures by China have contributed to the rising mistrust between the two countries. Macdonald argues that “President Hu should address foreign concerns over China’s ASAT test by releasing a more specific statement on the issue and offering to engage in dialogue with the U.S. on mutual space concerns.”53 In this regard, the Chinese leadership has indeed taken bolder measures to limit the political negativities generated by the PLA’s space warfare rhetoric. For example, in November 2009, within days of the Chinese Air Force

commander’s statement on the historical inevitability of space war, Hu Jintao categorically stated that China was firmly against military activities in space and was willing to work with other countries to pursue its peaceful use. In addition, China and the U.S. need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion. According to Joan Johnson-Freese, for China and the U.S. to limit the impact of the space security dilemma, “Better strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself. . . . Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sources.”54 She also points out that the U.S. “must decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space, and do so clearly and consistently. The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemma.”

TCBMs give insight into China’s decision making processes Smith 15 (Marcia, founder and editor of SpacePolicyOnline and former Director of Space Studies Board and of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board at the US National Research Council, Johnson-Freese Why Wolf is Wrong About U.S.-China Space Cooperation, http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/news/johnson-freese-why-wolf-is-wrong-about-us-china-space-cooperation, AG)

Joan Johnson-Freese explained to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission today why former Rep. Frank Wolf was wrong to effectively ban all U.S.-China bilateral space cooperation. Wolf retired at the end of the last Congress, but his successor as chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that funds NASA holds similar views. Johnson-Freese is a professor at the Naval War College and author of "The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze" and "Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to Dominate Space." She was one of the witnesses at today's hearing on China's space and counterspace programs. Wolf included language in several Commerce-Justice-Science (CJS) appropriations bills that prohibits NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from engaging in any bilateral activities with China on civil space cooperation unless specifically authorized by Congress or unless NASA or OSTP certifies to Congress 14 days in advance that the activity would not result in the transfer of any technology, data, or other information with national security or economic implications. His indefatigable opposition to cooperating with China was based largely on its human rights abuses and efforts to obtain U.S. technology. He was one of the strongest, but certainly not only, congressional critic of China, always stressing that he loved the Chinese people, but not the Chinese government. Rep. John Culberson (R-TX) is Wolf's successor as chairman of the CJS subcommittee. In December 2013 when rumors swirled that he would replace Wolf, he was interviewed by a reporter for the Houston Chronicle and when asked whether he agreed with Wolf about China replied: "Yes. We need to keep them out of our space program, and we need to keep NASA out of China. They are not our friends." It remains to be seen whether he will include the same language in this year's CJS bill, but Johnson-Freese spelled out why she thinks it is the wrong approach. She provides a comprehensive rebuttal to Wolf's reasoning, but in

essence her contention is that "the United States must use all tools of national power" to achieve its space-related goals as stated in U.S. National Space Policy, National Security Strategy, and National Security Space Strategy. Wolf's restrictions on space cooperation simply constrain U.S. options , she argues: "Limiting U.S. options has never been in U.S. national interest and isn't on this issue either." She disagrees with Wolf's assumption that the United States has nothing to gain from working with China: "On the contrary,

the United States could learn about how they work -- their decision-making processes, institutional policies and standard operating procedures. This is valuable information in accurately deciphering the intended use of dual-use space technology, long a weakness and so a vulnerability in U.S. analysis . " For

some issues, there really is no choice, she continues. China must be involved in international efforts towards Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs) and space sustainability , especially with regard to space debris, a topic given urgency by China's 2007 antisatellite (ASAT) test that created more than 3,000 pieces of debris in low Earth orbit. She notes that since that test and the resulting international condemnation, "China has done nothing further in space that can be considered irresponsible or outside the norms set the United States." Not that China has refrained from tests related to negating other countries' satellites, however. She and other witnesses detailed China's recent activities in that regard. Kevin Pollpeter of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation joined her at the witness table. They reported on "missile defense tests" in 2010, 2013 and 2014 that are widely considered in the West to be de facto ASAT tests, along with a 2013 "high altitude science mission" and co-orbital satellite tests in 2010 and 2013, as potentially related to ASAT development. These tests were non-destructive, however, and did not generate space debris. Former Sen. Jim Talent (R-Missouri), who co-chaired today's hearing, said that the Commission will publish a report by Pollpeter's institute on China's counterspace activities "in the coming days." The Commission was created by Congress in 2000 and submits an annual report on national security implications of the U.S.-China trade and economic relationship.

Solvency – SSASpace situational awareness solves miscalculationRendleman and Ryals 11 [Col James D., retired USAF, study director for The National Academies study of the US Aerospace Infrastructure and Aerospace Engineering Disciplines, member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics’ Legal Aspects Aero and Astro Technical Committee and International Activities Committee, an elected member of the International Institute of Space Law, and Col Robert E., retired USAF, Professor at the Space Innovation and Development Center’s Advanced Space Operations School, dean of students at the Air Command and Staff College, director of the Commander’s Action Group for US Space Command, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Air Force Space Command and the vice commander of the Space Warfare Center, “The New National Space Policy: More is Needed,” High Frontier, Vol 7, No 2, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-

110224-052.pdf]

A space assurance strategy depends on four mutually supportive elements, or pillars: (1) deterrence and defense; (2) global engagement to include bi-lateral and multilateral TCBMs; (3) situational awareness; and (4) responsive infrastructure. 17 Employing these four pillars should enable US and friendly space-faring nations to continue to perform their missions for the short-term and long-term. The yin and yang of space deterrence and protection will always be an important pillar of space assurance. 18 Global engagement leverages long-standing approaches to secure and protect the space domain through recognized international law, policy, and diplomacy. Situational awareness employs the monitoring of environmental and intelligence factors, and prediction of threats essential to decision making to assure mission success. It enhances global engagement by enhancing transparency. This allows a policy maker or commander to differentiate between purposeful attacks and natural environmental hazards; to anticipate space events and clarify intentions; to reduce the potential for misperception or miscalculation; and to enhance opportunities to avoid disruptive or destructive events. A robust infrastructure enables agile responses to changes in the space environment, to threats, and to assure viability of its systems.

Solvency – Say YesHead of NASA and CNSA call for cooperation on space explorationArthur Dominic Villasanta, 6-27-2016, "Heads of China and US Space Agencies Appeal for Cooperation in Space Exploration," Chinatopix, http://www.chinatopix.com/articles/93677/20160627/heads-china-space-agencies-appeal-cooperation-exploration.htm

Over the past two months, the heads of NASA and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) have jointly and separately called for renewing cooperation in space exploration between the United States and China.¶ The renewed call for cooperation comes amid separate programs by both NASA and CNSA to land humans on Mars by the 2030s. NASA later this year will see the first launch of its Space Launch System (SLS) heavy rocket that will take a multinational team of astronauts to land on Mars by 2035.¶ China plans to land its first robot rover on Mars by 2021 and is currently developing a heavy rocket that can reach the Red Planet. Over the next 15 years, China will develop and launch a heavy lift rocket nearly 10 meters in diameter and with five times the carrying capacity of current rockets for voyages to Mars.¶ Last April, CNSA head Prof. Wu Weiren affirmed China is ready to again work with the U.S. despite the legal ban on cooperation imposed by the U.S. and the perception among influential members of the U.S. Congress that CNSA remains a military-led organization whose priority is to ensure China's military dominance of space beneath the guise of a civilian space program.¶ CNSA is an agency of the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), a pseudo-civilian organization apparently led by military officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).¶ SASTIND and its predecessor have played a key role in developing China's space program since 1956 when China began its ballistic missile program. Today, SASTIND is China's comprehensive administrative office for national defense science; military technology and military industries.¶ "We would like to cooperate with the US, especially for space and moon exploration. We would welcome this very much," said Wu.¶ "We have urged the US many times to get rid of restrictions, so scientists from both countries can work together on future exploration .'"¶ And this May , NASA Administrator Charles Bolden suggested the United States resume cooperation with China in space by having Congress revise U.S. Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 that bans any cooperative effort among the space programs of both the U.S. and China.¶ "We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz. It was because leaders in both nations felt it was time," said Bolden.¶ "That represented a great use of soft power, if you will. Look where we are today. I think we will get there (with China). And I think it is necessary."¶ Bolden suggested initial steps to unfreeze the thaw such as "working on weather satellite data sharing and things like that. Things that will make critics on China on Capitol Hill a little bit more relaxed about the idea of cooperation."¶ The 112th U.S. Congress in November 2011 banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China, a ban enforced under Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539.¶ The probability of the U.S. Congress enacting a new law to overturn Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 is remote considering the animosity between China and the U.S. over the South China Sea and the absence of lawmakers willing to go to bat for China.¶ The right wing Republican Party remains hostile towards China and its members control the committee in the House of Representatives responsible for NASA appropriations. The man who chairs the House of Representatives appropriations subpanel that oversees NASA, John Culberson (R-TX), in 2010 urged President Barack Obama not to allow further contact between NASA and CNSA.¶ "I have grave concerns about the nature and goals of China's space program and strongly oppose any cooperation between NASA and CNSA's

human space flight programs without Congressional authorization," he said in a letter to Obama.¶ Bolden said he doesn't not expect the ban to be lifted during his tenure that ends with that of Obama's.

China wants space cooperation with the US China Daily 16 China Daily 4/25/16 “China Open to Sino-US Space Cooperation” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/25/content_24813817.htm

China is open to space cooperation with all nations including the United States , the heavyweights of China's space program said on Sunday, the anniversary of China's first satellite launch 46 years ago. "China will not rule out cooperating with any country, and that includes the United States," said Yang Liwei, China's first astronaut . Payload has been reserved in the Chinese space station, due to enter service around 2022, for international projects and foreign astronauts, said Yang on the occasion of the first China Space Day, an annual celebration newly designated by the government. Upon request, China will also train astronauts for other countries , and jointly train astronauts with the European space station, Yang said. "The future of space exploration lies in international cooperation. It's true for us, and for the United States too ," according to the senior astronaut. His words were echoed by Zhou Jianping, chief engineer of China's manned space program. Zhou said, "It is well understood that the United States is a global leader in space technology. But China is no less ambitious in contributing to human development." "Cooperation between major space players will be conducive to the development of all mankind," Zhou added . Citing security reasons, the U.S. Congress passed a law in 2011 to prohibit NASA from hosting Chinese visitors at its facilities and working with researchers affiliated to any Chinese government entity or enterprise

China agrees to CBM’s they already have proposed two Glaser in 2014 (Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia; “A STEP FORWARD IN US-CHINA MILITARY TIES: TWO CBM AGREEMENTS” November 11, 2014; http://amti.csis.org/us-china-cbms-stability-maritime-asia/)

In 1998 the United States and China established the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) to avoid accidents when their respective maritime and air forces operate in close proximity. Sixteen years of negotiations yielded little progress, until now. Two agreements on military confidence building measures were inked at the US-China summit in Beijing: notification of major military activities and a code of conduct for safe conduct of naval and air military encounters. Together, they hold out promise that despite persisting mistrust and ongoing preparations to deter and defeat the other side if conflict breaks out, the US and Chinese militaries can work together to reduce misperception, increase predictability, and lower the risk of accident that could result in inadvertent escalation in a crisis. Both initiatives were proposed by President Xi Jinping in June 2013 when he met with President Obama in Sunnylands. The accords are works in progress; the areas agreed to so far are limited , but there are expectations that these will be expanded through ongoing negotiations. In addition, there is an understanding that the agreements are voluntary and are not targeting a “third party.” The notification of respective major military activities will include two elements: defense reports and military exercises. The US will notify China when it issues reports such as the Defense Strategic Guidance, the

Quadrennial Defense Review and the annual DoD report to Congress on military and security developments involving the PRC. China will notify the US when it issues its Defense White Paper and other such reports that it may produce in the future. Mutual notification of major shifts in defense policies will also be included. The two militaries will inform each other when they conduct major exercises in the Asia-Pacific region. The timing of notification of both reports and exercises will be left up to each side to determine, although the hope is that over time both militaries will move toward advance, rather than ex post facto notification. Notification of other major military activities will be discussed and added as annexes. The US hopes to reach agreement in the future on reciprocal notification of ballistic missile launches, including space launches. So far the PLA has been non-committal. China already has an agreement with Russia to notify each other of ballistic missile launches in the direction of each other’s territory that went into effect in December 2012. The maritime code of conduct will include guidelines for ship operators when they sail near each other at sea. These guidelines are based on internationally recognized rules of navigation including the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), and the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). In subsequent negotiations, the two militaries will negotiate procedures for deconflicting operations when aircraft encounter each other and between aircraft and ships. Beijing resisted concluding military CBM agreements with the US for years, even after the 2001 collision between a Chinese fighter jet and a US surveillance plane, primarily because it did not want to appear to give legitimacy to US close-in surveillance operations along China’s coast. Under Xi Jinping, however, China has signaled that it not only wants to avoid accidents, but also wants to establish a more cooperative relationship with the US military as part of an overall “new type of major power relations” that Xi first proposed in early 2012. Xi has apparently instructed the PLA to engage constructively with US military counterparts, including in joint exercises, and to avoid dangerous intercepts that could result in mishaps. Agreement on these basic military CBMs is a good start. As maritime patrols and aerial activities have increased in disputed waters and near contentious territories, so too has the risk of an accident that could spiral out of control. These steps, if implemented and followed by additional measures, can reduce the potential for mishaps between the US and Chinese militaries, as well as provide a template that can be applied to other regional military rivalries, such as China and Japan. Progressing to advance notification of major military activities and expanding the scope of military activities to include ballistic missile and ASAT tests will add more substance. Expanding the maritime code of conduct accord to include aircraft is essential, since air accidents are more likely and more dangerous than naval incidents. As is the case with any agreement, implementation is key, and the provisions in these agreements should be mandatory rather than voluntary when both sides are ready. Periodic meetings to discuss compliance and any violations that occur will also contribute to the shared goals of reducing misunderstanding and building a sustained and substantive bilateral military relationship.

History proves US China space military cooperation is feasible – joint projects, intel sharingMoltz 2011 (James, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Califor, serves as the Associate Chair for Research and Director of the Center on Contemporary Conflict and the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, “China, the United States, and Prospect for Asian Space Cooperation”, Taylor and Francis Online,

http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2011.520847?scroll=top&needAccess=true, AG)

The history of the US–Chinese space relationship has been complicated, involving¶ periods of cooperation and mutual isolation. Given the relative size of the two space¶ programs and their recent demonstrative actions in the area of anti-satellite weaponry¶ (although denied by both sides as intended against the other), it is worth examining¶ this relationship in greater detail. Lack of progress in this important dyad is likely to reinforce the fragmented nature of existing Asian space cooperation and make the¶ establishment of trans-regional activities impossible, with these two emerging space¶ ‘poles’ increasingly pulling countries in one direction or the other.¶ US–Chinese space cooperation began in the late 1970s after the Deng Xiaoping¶ reforms. While possessing a clearly anti-Soviet Union military motivation, early¶ relations between the two space programs resulted in surprisingly fruitful civilian¶ cooperation. Specifically, China agreed to an Understanding on Cooperation in Space¶ Technology with the United States in 1979, leading to the establishment of a joint¶ commission and several working groups.25 As a result of these efforts, two Chinese¶ experiments flew on a US space shuttle mission in January 1992. Military-to-military¶ cooperation established under the Reagan administration—largely for collaborative¶ intelligence-gathering activities against the Soviet Union—helped facilitate space¶ ties by creating a higher-level framework of strategic cooperation. As China¶ developed its commercial Long March rockets, the United States agreed to allow US¶ companies and foreign satellites with US technology (in both cases, with appropriate¶ US export control licensing) to use these low-cost boosters. In 1989, the two sides¶ agreed that up to nine commercial launches could take place over the next five¶ years,26 according to a quota system aimed at protecting higher-priced US launchers.¶ Chinese commercial launches commenced in 1990 and had a series of successes until¶ a number of explosions and other failures in 1992, 1995, and 1996. As a result of two¶ of these failures, the Loral and Hughes corporations, which were also selling¶ satellites to China, provided some limited technical advice to Chinese space officials¶ to work out the problems.

Both countries see the potential in cooperation on this matter and have been continuing the discussion in recent years, yet are held back by mutual distrust in other areas of foreign policy.Logan 8 (Jeffrey, specialist in energy policy, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation”, CRS Report for Congress, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs10722/m1/1/high_res_d/RS22777_2008Sep29.pdf)

China and the United States have a limited history of both civilian and military collaboration in space. China has publicly pushed for more dialogue and joint activities. Mistrust of Chinese space intentions grew in the mid-1990s when U.S. companies were accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information to China.12 Since then, cooperation has stagnated, often roiled by larger economic, political, and security frictions in the U.S.-China relationship. In September 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited his Chinese counterpart, Laiyan Sun, in China. He couched the visit as a “get acquainted” opportunity rather than the start of any serious cooperation in order to keep expectations low. No follow-on activities were announced after the trip, although the Chinese issued a fourpoint proposal for ongoing dialogue between the two organizations that stressed annual exchanges and confidence building measures.13 On January 11, 2007, China conducted its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, destroying one of its inactive weather satellites.14 No advance notice of the test

was given, nor has China yet explained convincingly the intentions of the test.15 The international community condemned the test as an irresponsible act because it polluted that orbital slot with thousands of pieces of debris that will threaten the space assets of more than two dozen countries, including China’s, for years. Understanding the nuances of China’s intent in conducting the test is important, but remains open to interpretation. How was the decision made to conduct a test that would contradict Beijing’s publicly-held position on the peaceful use of outer space, and that would almost certainly incur international condemnation? Some speculate that the United States’ unilateral positions encouraged China to conduct the test to demonstrate that it could not be ignored.16 In particular, the U.S. National Space Policy issued in September 2006 declares that the United States would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”17 Given China’s apparent commitment to space, the growing U.S. dependence on space for security and military use, and Chinese concerns over Taiwan, the ASAT test may have been a demonstration of strategic Chinese deterrence.18 Others saw a more nefarious display of China’s space capabilities, and a sign that China has more ambitious objectives in space.19 Still others speculate that the engineers running China’s ASAT program simply wanted to verify the technology that they had spent decades developing and significantly underestimated the international outrage the test provoked.20

NASA looking to cooperate with China on Space projectsLibo Liu, 5-24-2016, "NASA Chief: Congress Should Revise US-China Space Cooperation Law," VOA, http://www.voanews.com/content/nasa-congress-us-china-space-cooperation-law/3344926.htm

NASA says the U.S. can someday cooperate with China as it did with the Soviet Union on the Apollo-Soyuz joint project in 1975.¶ Responding to questions Monday at an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute on Capitol Hill, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden said the U.S. should pursue such a relationship with China in human space exploration.¶ "We were in an incredible Cold War with the Soviets at the time we flew Apollo-Soyuz; it was because leaders in both nations felt it was time," he said. "That represented a great use of soft power, if you will. Loo k where we are today. I think we will get there [with China]. And I think it is necessary."¶ Current law prohibits NASA from engaging with its Chinese counterparts on such projects. But Bolden, who will travel to Beijing later this year, says Congress should consider revising the law. ¶ Peter Huessy, a senior adviser at the Mitchell Institute and prominent defense consultant, tells VOA he is not opposed to a revision of relevant law, but cautions against any premature enthusiasm.¶ "We tend to engage in a lot of wishful thinking when it comes to China," he said. "We should understand China is an explicit adversary and enemy of the United States, according to their own internal documents and strategies and publications."¶ Brendan Curry, vice president of the Space Foundation, tells VOA that small steps can be taken in bilateral relations to calm lawmakers' fears about China's threat to U.S. space assets.¶ The initial steps, he said, would perhaps involve such projects as "working on weather satellite data sharing and things like that — things that will make critics on China on Capitol Hill a little bit more relaxed about the idea of cooperation ."¶ Currently there is no strong voice on the Hill to lift the ban on space cooperation with China, given Beijing's growing military capabilities in space.¶ NASA's Bolden says he does not expect the ban to be lifted during his tenure.

Space Weaponization ExtensionsSpace crises and miscalculation escalate to nuclear war MacDonald 18 (Bruce W. MacDonald is the senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Project with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. He is also an adjunct lecturer in International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. “Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation” https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-

content/uploads/2018/08/SMA-White-Paper_Chinese-Persepectives-on-Space_-Aug-2018.pdf August 2018) // tanz

Understanding space escalation dynamics in the context of crisis stability requires grasping its strategic landscape, including how deterrence functions or fails in a crisis and what factors strengthen or weaken that deterrence. Interdependencies between and among space and other domains are enormously complicated, and their exploration is essential to understanding twentyfirst century strategic crisis dynamics. In the late stages of a crisis that threatens to transition into conflict, adversaries would be likely to engage in limited space and cyber actions designed both to send a signal of intention to escalate if conditions are not met (could be either a real threat or a bluff) and to put themselves in a more advantageous position should major conflict break out. Space asset vulnerabilities provide an adversary with dangerously attractive incentives to escalate and preemptively attack in a crisis (MacDonald, Blair, Cheng, Mueller, & Samson, 2016). In such a scenario, each side would confront the choice of striking first with all its assets in place, knowing that a conflict is beginning; or ceding the initiative, absorbing a first strike, and making a ragged retaliation against an opponent fully expecting such a response. As a crisis progresses and becomes more intense, each side must wrestle with the prospect that the chances for full-scale conflict are increasing. While neither side may wish for a full-scale war, neither side wishes to receive a major first strike. The current fundamental challenge to crisis stability in space—and hence the risk of crisis escalation—is the ease and preferability of launching a disabling first strike against an adversary’s space assets relative to retaliating against those of an aggressor. This is the essence of crisis instability, where pre-emption pays far greater benefits than retaliation (Colby & Gerson, 2013). The weaker or more disadvantaged country in a crisis may find this line of thinking irresistible, or at least preferable to the alternatives. Countries sometimes go to war not because they want to, but because doing so appears less risky than not doing so. Any space power would want to avoid being in an unstable use-or-lose situation. In addition, a major feature of the space and particularly cyber domains is that major attacks can be initiated with little advance warning—and in the case of cyber— with almost no warning. In the space and cyber domains, there is nothing comparable to the stabilizing threat of an assured second-strike capability like that represented in the nuclear domain by sea-based ballistic missiles. For the United States, there are greater risks if conflict escalates into space. Given our greater dependence on space both militarily and economically, the US will want to emphasize deterrence of conflict in space. This can be achieved not just by having space offense, though this would be a necessary component, but also through cross-domain pre-eminence. Conflict is unlikely to be confined to space; cyber and conventional domains will also be involved. Even if the US prevailed in a space-only conflict, the victory would likely be Pyrrhic unless it was overwhelming—China and Russia are unlikely to engage their forces far away from their shores, unlike the US. Thus losing our space capabilities would be more damaging to us than it would be to Russia or China (Morgan, 2010). Until we have a much more survivable and resilient space architecture, we should not want to put our space assets at risk unless absolutely necessary. This 'vulnerability/dependence gap' can be addressed through cross-domain advantages that the US has, particularly in the cyber domain

Another dimension of the problem is the issue of the scale of the attack, both qualitatively and quantitatively. While jamming one or two satellites in isolation appears unlikely to quickly escalate into all-out space war (given the longstanding role of electronic warfare in past conflicts), attacking multiple intelligence-gathering satellites would carry a far higher risk of escalation. Somewhere between these two extremes, however, is an uncertain and unknowable boundary that divides offensive space actions that modestly threaten stability from those that are clearly destabilizing and escalatory. In this unpredictable environment, a country with no desire to spark an all-out space war may still prompt rapid escalation with modest offensive actions that inadvertently cross an unknown threshold. In addition, for technological, commercial, and other reasons the space and cyber domains are evolving far more rapidly than the conventional and nuclear domains, potentially rendering space and cyber strategies ineffective or irrelevant within a few years. In both space and cyberspace, we may learn firsthand how much escalation is too much only after it is too late to stop. Evolving space dynamics could undermine whatever current understanding we may have of crisis and strategic stability in space, and this imperfect grasp of general principles can only add to our uncertainty about the space and cyber offensive capabilities of particular adversaries. Therefore, uncertainty, bluffs, and worst-case thinking are bound to remain prominent forces in the strategic landscape of space. For example, rendezvous and proximity operations on satellites will become more common in the years to come, but they could easily be viewed in a crisis as potentially hostile acts—or in fact be used to commit hostile acts. One bright spot for the United States is its many treaty-committed allies, which would greatly complicate any planning for substantial space offense by China (which has no comparable state partners). Due to the United States’ high level of dependence on non-US commercial space infrastructure, a Chinese attack would necessarily extend to additional countries that may otherwise facilitate a US counterstrike, threatening a much wider conflict than China might want to risk. The essence of the space escalation challenge is the perception of the risk-reward trade-off, the uncertainty of space and cyber action effects, how risk averse or risk tolerant each country would be, and the overall misperception and fog of war issues that are part of any crisis or conflict. Below are outlined phases of escalation that can be identified where space—and cyber—would be involved. Escalation into each higher phase is not a given, but certainly incentives for such escalation will exist. Phase 1: Pre-conflict/signaling Phase 2: Escalated signaling/transition to conflict Phase 3: Conflict, prospect of rapid space/cyber operations; significant conventional operations Phase 4: Major conflict, substantial operations against economic targets Phase 5: Escalation into the nuclear domain Phase 1 Pre-conflict/signaling: In the pre-conflict phase, space and cyber usage will mostly serve a signaling/warning role, whose purpose is to tell the adversary that a transition to actual conflict is not far off, the country is considering escalation, and that the adversary should cease or reverse its provocative behavior. The military or economic impact of these signaling actions at this stage should be minimal. This message would mainly support diplomatic crisis dialogue to reinforce points that country is making in that dialogue. The chief problem is that signaling can easily be misinterpreted even if the signal is executed exactly as planned. There would need to be diplomatic dialogue, both back channel and front channel, to minimize misunderstanding; even then there would be suspicion about possible deception. The problem would be magnified if the operational effects were greater than the signaling country anticipated. An unintended cascading consequence from a modest tactical application would almost certainly be interpreted as an intended consequence by the affected country. Phase 2 Escalated signaling/transition to conflict : If this Phase 1 signaling does not achieve the intended results,

China or the US would likely “up its game” and escalate its space operations activity using space and cyber operations that both send a more serious signal about the imminence of conflict unless the other side backs down, and a desire to get a jump on the more likely conflict to come. This phase of escalation would in essence mark the transition from crisis into conflict. The appeal of space and cyber operations at this stage for leaders is that the effects of the space and cyber operations are unlikely to produce any significant casualties. As long as there is a wish to avoid major conflict if at all possible, these domains are a natural for early engagement. However, the chances for cascading unintended consequences leading to conflict are greater in this phase, making this a riskier phase of a crisis. One major class of unintended consequences would be if a space or cyber operation inadvertently spilled over into the civilian sector and caused economic or humanitarian damage. If perceived as intentional, this could easily result in a horizontal escalation into intentional targeting of economic and other civilian activities. I address the cross linkage with the nuclear mission in Phase 3 below. If these Phase 2 operations do not achieve the desired effects, and the crisis is observed to be transitioning into open conflict, both parties involved in the crisis would be seriously tempted to escalate, and rapidly, with the incentives especially strong in the space domain. The strength of this temptation will depend on perceptions of how successful the escalation will be. Until the US can deploy a significantly more resilient space architecture, which may not occur until the late 2020s at the earliest, the temptation for China would likely be quite strong. Phase 3 Conflict : The next phase of operations would be a full range of military operations involving the conventional, cyber, and space domains—conflict will not be confined to just space and cyberspace. In this Phase 3, escalation in the space and cyber domains would likely be rapid and prolonged, both in support of conventional battlefield operations and more strategic space and cyber targets. An important concern here would be the extent to which strategic nuclear targets would be avoided. This becomes a very important issue where certain systems support both conventional operations and strategic operations, e.g., SBIRS/DSP ballistic missile early warning satellites. On top of all the other risks of the previous phases, the combined risks of greatly expanded multi-domain operations and the possibility of strategic “contamination” sending an unintentional signal of possible nuclear escalation make this a dangerous phase. Both China and the US will have major incentives not to escalate their conflict into the realm of their economies and financial systems, as both nations receive immense benefits from the strength of their economies, and it is possible that diplomacy and negotiations could head off such an escalation. Under specialized circumstances involving, for example, the threatened failure of China’s political system, such escalation could be perceived as preferable. Unintended “contamination” of the economic infrastructure with serious economic consequences from military strikes in Phase 3 could usher in a transition to this Phase 4. Phase 4 Major conflict: This would feature widespread strategic economic attacks, with particular emphasis on space and cyber domains. Phase 5 Escalation into the nuclear domain : Less likely still but an option that cannot be ruled out would be a further escalation into a Phase 5 where nuclear weapons use is at least threatened if the economic and military effects are seen as threatening the existence of the Chinese regime.

Chinese space militarization is driven by the security dilemma caused by the US’s quest for space domination Zhang 11 (Baohui Zhang is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. “The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship: The Prospects for Arms Control” published in Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 1 in March/April 2011.) // tanz

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional advantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing military capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence. In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”10 According to Robert Jervis, “The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state’s security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.” In this context, “Even if they can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can neither neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future nor credibly guarantee that they themselves will remain peaceful.”11 Inevitably, when one state seeks to expand its military capability, others have to take similar measures. DENYING THE U.S. QUEST FOR SPACE DOMINANCE The first factor that caused the security dilemma in the Sino-U.S. military space relationship is the professed American quest for space dominance. This quest is a reflection of the U.S. obsession with primacy that predates the Obama administration. The primacy strategy demands undisputed military dominance in different areas, including space, to ensure the best possible protection of U.S. national security. The U.S. is the only country in the world that has articulated a coherent national strategy for space dominance. As emphasized by Michael W. Wynne, former Air Force secretary, “America’s domination of the space domain provides an unrivaled advantage for our nation and remains critical to creating the strategic and tactical conditions for victory.”12 The U.S. is the leader in the militarization of space. It was the first country that established a dedicated command, the U.S. Space Command, to unify military operations in space. In fact, as its Vision for 2020 proclaims, the Space Command seeks to achieve “full spectrum dominance” in space.13 Furthermore, it envisions permanent dominance in the military dimension of space operations: “Today, the U.S. is the preeminent military space power. Our vision is one of maintaining that preeminence—providing a solid foundation for our national security.”14 General Lance W. Lord, former commander, Air Force Space Command, points out the importance of space dominance: “Space superiority is the future of warfare. We cannot win a war without controlling the high ground, and the high ground is space.”15 In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force released a White Paper called The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, in which General T. Michael Moseley made a similar statement: “No future war will be won without air, space and cyberspace superiority”; thus, “the Air Force must attain cross-domain dominance. Cross-domain dominance is the freedom to attack and the freedom from attack in and through the atmosphere, space and electromagnetic spectrum.”16 This strategy of space dominance, however, generates the classic security dilemma between the U.S. and other countries. Although the U.S. may be motivated by defensive purposes, such as shielding the American population from nuclear weapons and other threats, other countries have to assume the worst in an anarchic world. As observed by Joan Johnson-Freese, “I would argue that the rest of the world accepts U.S. space

supremacy. What the Bush Administration claims is space dominance, and that’s what the rest of the world won’t accept.”17 Chinese strategists certainly perceive the U.S. quest for space dominance as damaging to China’s national security; whoever controls space will have the edge in winning the next war. Indeed, Chinese military and civilian strategists argue that the U.S. search for “absolute security” jeopardizes other countries’ security. It is widely reported in Chinese military literature that the U.S. has already developed and is in fact implementing a master plan for military dominance in space. The challenge for China is to prevent the U.S. from jumping too far ahead. As observed by a major study organized by the General Staff of the PLA, “In recent decades the U.S. has been consistently pursuing dominance in space in order to become its overlord.”18 The study also points out that the U.S. is the first country to develop a full set of doctrines for space militarization and dominance: In April 1998, the U.S. Space Command published its long-term strategic development plan, Vision for 2020, which specifically proposed the concept of space dominance and revealed the goals of allowing the American military to use space weapons to attack the enemy’s land, sea, air, and space targets. World opinion believes this represented the formal debut of U.S. space war theory and indicated an important first step by the U.S. military toward space war.19 Li Daguang, one of the most influential PLA experts on space war, also alleges that the U.S. has initiated “a new space war” to maintain its status as “the overlord of space.” He claims that the ultimate goal of the U.S. space program is to “build a powerful military empire in outer space that attempts to include any space between earth and moon under American jurisdiction.” Under this empire, “without U.S. permission, any country, including even its allies, will not be able to use outer space for military or other purposes.”20 One particular concern for the Chinese military is that the U.S. may no longer be content with merely militarizing space, which involves extensive use of satellites for military operations. Instead, weaponization of space is on the agenda. The PLA now believes that the U.S. is on the verge of important breakthroughs in the development of weapons for space war. As one study claims: “Currently, the U.S. military already possesses or will soon possess ASAT technologies with real combat capabilities, such as aircraft-launched ASAT missiles, land-based laser ASAT weapons, and space-based energy ASAT weapons.”21 Moreover, the PLA suggests that the U.S. is trying to acquire space-based weapons to attack targets on earth: The U.S. military is developing orbital bombers, which fly on low altitude orbits, and when given combat orders, will re-enter the atmosphere and attack ground targets. This kind of weapon has high accuracy and stealth capability, and is able to launch sudden strikes. These capabilities make it impossible for enemies to defend against. Orbital bombers thus can strike at any target anywhere on the planet. It is the major means for the U.S. military to perform global combat in the 21st century.22 This perception of the American lead in space militarization and attempts for its weaponization is a major motive for the Chinese military to develop similar projects and thus avoid U.S. domination in future wars. The PLA believes that control of the commanding heights will decide the outcome of future wars, and China cannot afford to cede that control to the U.S. As a result, space war is a key component of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) new doctrines. In 2006 the PLAAF released a comprehensive study called Military Doctrines for Air Force, which makes the following statement: In future wars, merely possessing air superiority will no longer be sufficient for seizing the initiative of battles. In significant ways, only obtaining space superiority could ensure controlling the initiative of war. The contest in outer space has become the contest for the new commanding heights. Seizing control of space will mean control of the global commanding heights, which will in turn enable dominance in air, land, and sea battles. Thus, it is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space security.23 Another driver of the PLA’s efforts to counter U.S. dominance in space is the time factor.

There is a genuine sense of urgency about controlling the commanding heights in space. The U.S. is seen as already possessing a decisive lead in the race toward space hegemony. As observed by Lieutenant General Ge Dongsheng, vice president of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences: Establishing space capability is not only important but also urgent. This is due to the fact that the U.S. and Russia have already taken the steps and now enjoy a vast lead over us. Even India, Japan, and European countries have ambitious plans to develop their own space capabilities. Under this situation, if we do not hasten implementing our own plan, there will be the possibility of having to face a generational gap in space capabilities.

Isolating China in space – drives China to challenge the US order and increase militarization Daniels 16 (Laura,works at a leading Washington, D.C., specializes in U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, holds a Master of Public Administration in International Security Policy from Columbia University, "Look Up, America: China Is Playing By Its Own Rules in Space", The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/look-america-china-playing-by-its-own-rules-space-15248, AG)

That China is pushing back against the U.S.-led international order is no secret. Beijing is exerting pressure through various avenues: duplicating the architecture of the international order, bolstering its military capacity and challenging access in the global commons. While much attention has been focused on China’s pursuits in the Asia Pacific and within the global economic system, Beijing is also advancing its interests in the stars above. Take for example China’s plans for a manned space station. Due largely to counterproductive U.S. legislation , China has been barred from participating in the International Space Station . Rather than call it quits, Beijing has resolved to make its own station instead . If this sounds familiar, it’s because China has reacted in the same way when denied inclusion as an equal in prominent international institutions on Earth. The textbook example of this is China’s launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) following the U.S. Congress’s refusal to allow Beijing a greater say in the International Monetary Fund, a mainstay of the Western-led international order. Experts believe Chinese motivation for the space station is their unmet desire to be accepted as a major power that sets the rules on the world stag e, which echoes the motivation analysts infer for the AIIB. And as with the AIIB, which attracted fifty-seven founding nations , including close U.S. allies, the Chinese space station is pulling major powers into Beijing’s orbit. The European Space Agency and others have already voiced interest and signed preliminary cooperation agreements. Also significant is China’s buildup of its military capability, a key component of its potential to exert influence over the international order. This has extended into Earth’s orbit, where China has advanced its anti-satellite (ASAT), command and control, and intelligence technology, in line with a military doctrine that underscores the importance of parity in space. This has strong implications for the United States and the international order it undergirds, as U.S. superiority in the “ultimate high ground” of space gives the American military a technological edge that is indispensable on the modern battlefield. With growing military capacity comes the ability to contest freedom of movement in the global commons. In the expansive global commons of outer space, China’s ASAT technology affords it an increasing ability to deny access and disrupt assets

critical to the global economy. While these same developments unfolding in the South and East China Seas are of more immediate concern, free movement of satellites within space is vital, contributing to approximately $1.6 trillion of U.S. commercial revenue.

ASAT Weapons development is accelerating and leading to competition between China and the US. The continued militarization of space will destabilize international relations, make nuclear war more likely, and lead to terrorist groups getting ahold of ASATs. Kuplic 13 (Georgia B. Kuplic is a practicing Lawyer and received her J.D. from the University of North Carolina School of Law in 2014. “The Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing an Extraterrestrial Arms Race” in the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Relations, Fall 2013.) // tanz

Space systems are important during peacetimes as well as war. During peace, they can be used as a deterrent; during war, space technologies can be used to "enhance combat effectiveness, reduce casualties, and minimize equipment loss."92 Satellites are commonly used for "communications, reconnaissance, early warning of ballistic missile launches, weather data collection, and arms control verification."" However, satellites now also serve an essential role in military operations by providing services such as "secure and high-volume unsecured communications, targeting and navigation services, weather prediction, and battle assessment."94 Although there are currently no known offensive space weapons, technologies that can interfere with, disable, or destroy satellites, although technically "bloodless," could very well be considered weapons or means of warfare.95 Because the U.S. military relies heavily on space systems, disabling a U.S. satellite could cripple military operations during wartime. Additionally, destruction of even a non-military satellite could devastate a society that increasingly relies on satellites for daily functions critical to the civilian and economic well-being, which could in turn trigger a military retaliation. The United States' ever-increasing reliance on space systems means that it has a significant interest in developing a global legal framework for the development, installment, and use of technologies that make those systems vulnerable . 1. Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellites Kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities recently came into the public eye after China successfully tested an ASAT missile by launching it into space to destroy a Chinese weather satellite.97 Kinetic energy weapons have been the most common type of weapon in outer space." The kinetic energy ASAT is designed to destroy hostile satellites through the sheer use of high speeds and kinetic energy on impact.99 2. Co-Orbital ASATs Co-orbital ASAT capabilities use a missile armed with explosives that detonate when in close proximity to a target in order to destroy it.I"o "Space mines," although not yet developed, could use a similar technology to destroy a target either when it comes within range or when a triggering event occurs. o 3. Directed Energy Technologies Directed energy capabilities are non-kinetic, and include technologies such as "dazzlers, lasers, high-powered microwave, and high-powered radio frequency."'0 2 These weapons destroy a target quickly by "shooting" it with energy at or near the speed of light, which is an important capability during time-sensitive situations.' 4. "Soft Kill" Weapons "Soft kill" weapons disable rather than destroy their targets. 10 4 This could involve covering crucial parts of a satellite with paint in order to disable optics or disrupt the power supply, nudging a satellite out of orbit, or electronic jamming to shut down a satellite or disrupt its functioning.' This type of "attack" carries with it the possibility of being covert, as the effects are often similar to routine failures in satellites, and would be difficult to detect.'0o 5. Electromagnetic and Radiation Weapons An electromagnetic weapon-such as a nuclear bomb-could be used in outer space without the same containment problems as would occur on earth since outer space acts as a vacuum. 107 Therefore, the most significant impact of a nuclear blast in outer space, if it were to occur near Earth's atmosphere, would be the electromagnetic pulse.a 8 This electromagnetic

pulse would last for only one millionth of a second but could disable electronics within a several-hundred mile radius of the blast.o' This type of explosion could be used in outer space to cause blackouts across a range of land on Earth, a significant advantage during wartime."o B. Countries in Outer Space As a result of advances in technology and developments in military affairs, many countries are expanding their space capabilities and policies to support military operations, with national security being a key factor driving the use and development of space systems."' The United States currently has the highest number of satellites being used for military purposes at 122,112 and the Department of Defense states that the U.S. National Space Policy "seeks to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by [the use of] outer space.""' Following the United States is Russia with 76 military satellites." 4 The remaining 85 satellites with military capabilities belong to Australia, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom."'5 Although Russia and the United States currently dwarf the rest of the world in military spending in outer space, spending on military space programs is increasing around the world."16 China has been rapidly increasing its status as a space power, and recently joined ranks with the United States and Russia when it successfully docked its manned Shenzhou-9 spacecraft with its orbiting space lab, Tiangong-l." 7 This was part one of the ambitious Chinese space program, which the New York Times reports is "essentially military," stating that "[i]ts every function is designed to carry out a military objective or one that improves the welfare of the state.""' Additionally, on January 11, 2007, China successfully tested an ASAT missile by destroying a Chinese weather satellite orbiting at 500 miles altitude, which is the same altitude at which many U.S. spy satellites orbit." 9 China, however, is not the only country increasing its military actions in outer space. India has also become a growing power in outer space, announcing that it must "optimize space applications for military purposes," pointing out that "[t]he Chinese space program is expanding at an exponentially rapid pace in both offensive and defensive content."l20 India launched its first satellite dedicated solely to military use in August 2013.121 In 2008, Japan authorized military use of space, passing legislation that removed the ban on using Japanese space assets for military purposes.122 Iran launched its first satellite in 2005 with the support of a Russian launcher, and the head of Iran's space program reported that the satellite is capable of spying on Israel.12 3 Possibly in response to Iran, Israel launched a reconnaissance satellite in 2008, which is considered "one of the world's most advanced space reconnaissance systems" and is "reportedly used to spy on Iran." 24 Many European states share capabilities for outer space military support, particularly communications and imagery.' Germany's first military satellite system as well as Italy's radar satellites will likely be integrated with the optical remote

sensing satellites that belong to France, which has the "most advanced and diversified independent military space capabilities." 26 The increased participation in outer space serves to level the playing field and balance Russia's and the United States' longheld domination in the arena as well as increases the number of countries with an interest in and awareness of the need to place guidelines and restrictions on the militarization of outer space.12 7 However, the ability to limit the increasing military expansion into outer space depends not only on intergovernmental cooperation, but also on a shared understanding of the legal framework which governs outer space. The militarization of outer space has the potential to destabilize current relations between states and result in a less safe world. More specifically, the United States has a significant interest in halting the weaponization of outer space as it relies heavily on outer space technology to promote national security.12 8 Satellites that currently serve important peace and wartime functions (including reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, early warning of missile launches, and data collection) 2 9 could be threatened by a proliferation of ASAT weapons in outer space.' 30 Additionally, if countries currently capable of militarizing outer space, such as the United States and Russia, pursue unhindered military operations in outer space, other nations will likely follow, thereby bringing potentially unpredictable-or even dangerous-players into the mix.' Finally, the ease with which ASAT weapons can destroy other more-expensive and technologically advanced space systems means that countries with weapons in outer space may be encouraged to use them in a surprise attack to avoid their destruction by ASAT weapons.132 It also means that relatively unsophisticated non-governmental groups-terrorist groups included-may eventually have ASAT capabilities that could be used to cripple a nation's military operations as well as day-to-day societal functioning. 33

Space war is the most likely theater for nuclear conflict Lamrani 16 [Omar, geopolitical and security analyst for Stratfor, National Interest, “What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War,” May 18, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/what-the-us-military-fears-most-massive-space-war-16248]

The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration. The small satellite revolution promises the speedy replacement of disabled satellites in the event of attack — theoretically securing the U.S. military's use of space constellations in support of operations during a conflict. Small satellites are not a magic bullet, however; key satellite functions will still depend on bulkier and more complex systems, such as the large but critically important nuclear-hardened command-and-control mission satellites. Many of these systems involve hefty antennas and considerable power sources. Given that access to orbit may not be guaranteed during a war in space, the United States has also been exploring alternative ways to perform some of the core functions that satellites now provide. At this stage, high-flying unmanned aerial vehicles with satellite-like payloads offer the most advanced alternative. But considering the vehicles' vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, their lower altitude and endurance relative to orbital satellites, and their limited global reach, this remains a tentative solution at best. Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a contingency is being put in place. In the race between shield and sword, however, there is no guarantee that offensive ASAT capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially denying critical access to space during a catastrophic celestial war. The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover,

future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining. A war in space would disable a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous. In severity, the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the opening salvo in a nuclear attack, driving the threat of a wider conflagration.

FrameworkWe control uniqueness – current academic attempts to engage with public policy only focus on communicating directly to policy makers – the 1ac’s deployment of scenario analysis, in which current world trends are combined in unexpected ways to develop alternative understandings of the future, is key to challenge cognitive biases, groupthink, and dominant social narrativesBarma et al. 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric. Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection,strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas. This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the

technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world. What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes ofcorporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized asfunctional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports

present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future.Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially

implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by whichpolitical science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

“Hard” Left

Possible 1acThe status quo constructs China as perpetually threatening US and global interests; this threatening image of China creates a hegemonic discourse about China which includes the construct of the topic as a symptom of threat construction.Pomeroy 15 (Caleb, “Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & US Security,” June 06, 2015, E-International Relations Students, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-

threat-u-s-security/. // EMS).

Defining a set of U.S. security interests can bias U.S. perception of Chinese activities. Once the U.S. outlines specific security interests, Chinese activities are interpreted and evaluated by the U.S . relative to those outlined interests . A lucid example of this has unfolded over the past decade; the summary of the Congressional Research Service’s 2014 report entitled Threats to U.S. National Security Interests in Space: Orbital Debris

Mitigation and Removal explains that the growing population of space debris “threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial.” The

U.S. criticized the 2007 Chinese ASAT test; National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe states that the “U.S. believes China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both

countries aspire to in the civil space area” (Kaufman & Linzer, 2007, para. 4). With U.S. satellite assets defined as a security interest, it was only natural that many American analysts interpreted this test as a deliberate step made by the Chinese towards a counterspace capability to offset U.S. conventional military superiority as well as an attempt to force the U.S. into space arms treaty negotiations. However, Gregory

Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis (2008) conducted interviews with Chinese officials who were close to the anti-satellite program and

found American commentators tended to place too much importance on the U.S. as a driver in China’s test. This ASAT test, coupled with NASA Administrator Michael Griffin being denied access to the Shenzhou launch facility in

2006, caused the U.S. to sever cooperative ties with the Chinese National Space Agency. Griffin, in turn,

had to resort to claiming the prospect of competition with China to obtain U.S. Congressional support for NASA’s cooperative initiatives (Kulacki and Lewis, 2008). Therefore, the U.S. defining security interests, such as its satellite assets, encourages the U.S.’s interpretation of China’s actions, such as the 2007 ASAT test, as a threat. In this example, the result was a further distancing of Washington from Beijing and a severing of space ties between two of the most space active nations in the world.¶ Defining a set of U.S. security interests can bias the space security conversation towards the U.S.; China’s actions would be interpreted relative to the U.S.’s supposed security

interests, constructing China as the aggressor. For example, with satellite assets outlined as a security interest, the U.S. interprets China’s 2007 ASAT test as threatening to that interest. Yet, space debris in low Earth orbit threatens all nations with orbital satellite assets—not just the U.S. In fact, the 2007 ASAT test caused debris that damaged a Russian satellite six years later (CRS, 2014). Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal (2009) stress the importance of the U.S. working with the international community when approaching Chinese security issues, as opposed to

framing the issue as U.S.-China specific. They suggest the Obama administration “sit down with Japan, the European Union, and other key allies to begin coordinating their policies towards China” to enjoy more policy success, emphasizing that many countries have realized their relationship with Beijing cannot be bilaterally negotiated

(Economy & Segal, 2009, p. 20). An issue like satellite debris cannot be negotiated bilaterally, and the U.S. defining its satellite assets as a security interest can bias the security conversation towards the U.S., making it more likely that China be constructed as an aggressor. If the security conversation is framed as Chinese aggression towards U.S. security interests, the U.S can monopolize an international issue, like satellite debris.

Official US space posture is based in Sinophobic suspicions—rendezvous and proximity operations are seen as a cover for ASAT testing, destroying any support for Chinese space security proposals Weeden and Xiao He 16. (Brian, former U.S. Air Force space and missile operations officer and currently technical adviser for Secure World Foundation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the long-term sustainable use of outer space. Xiao, Assistant Research Fellow, Division of International Strategy, U.S. Diplomacy and Politics @ Chinese Academy of Social Science, Institute of World Economic and Politics. “U.S.-China Strategic Relations in Space,” US-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The National Bureau of Asian Research, Report #57, April 2016 http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016.pdf)//CB

*we don’t endorse ableist language. edited.

U.S. perceptions of China’s development of space capabilities can best be described as wary . The United States understands the need to develop such capabilities to support national security and defense, but is concerned that some Chinese space capabilities appear to be offensive in nature and aimed at undermining U.S. space power, particularly in light of a new Chinese doctrinal focus on “active defense.” 32 The recent major realignment of China’s military forces and command structure is seen *viewed by some in the U nited States as reinforcing the perception that China is preparing to fight a war in space . At the same time, there seems to be little appreciation that many of the Chinese doctrinal positions are exactly the same as what the U.S. military has proposed in decades past or is considering again now. In the civil space sector, the United States is less concerned with China’s achievements in human spaceflight and exploration, but is beginning to be troubled about China’s use of those achievements for soft power.¶ As part of this wariness, the U nited S tates has voiced strong objections to China’s major proposal on space security , the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT).33 The objections are partly due to a disagreement over the salience of the issue. For the United States and a number of its allies, the most pressing issues are assured access to space and protecting existing space capabilities from threats (intentional and unintentional).34 But the United States also sees the PPWT as fundamentally flawed because it is not verifiable and would only apply to weapons “placed in orbit.” Under that definition, the treaty would ban potential U.S. space-based missile defenses or orbital counter-space systems but not the ground- or air-based ASAT capabilities that China is developing.35¶ Some U.S. observers are also suspicious of recent Chinese co-orbital rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO ) as being tests of potential co-orbital ASAT capabilities . In 2010 a Chinese satellite (SJ-12) conducted a series of maneuvers to rendezvous with another Chinese satellite (SJ-06F) in low earth orbit and likely bumped into it.36 A similar scenario (without the bumping) occurred again in 2013.37 These activities are very similar in nature to the U nited S tates’ recent demonstrations of its own RPO technology , such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Experimental Satellite System–11 (XSS-11) and NASA’s Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) satellite.38 However, there is still strong suspicion in the U.S. national security community that the Chinese RPO activities are proof that the PPWT is no more than a political ploy, or at the very least part of a hedging strategy that signals China may not be as interested in peace in space as it professes publicly.¶ However, this skepticism does not mean that the United States sees China as an outright enemy. While Washington is concerned about China’s rise, it also encourages Beijing to become a partner for greater international security.39 Defense planners in the United States see the world entering into a much more complex and uncertain era, and the overall strategy is one of hedging against the most dangerous threats. The stated goal of

the increased U.S. emphasis on protection and preparedness for warfighting is to deter attacks and prevent conflict in space. In that sense, the U.S. military sees itself as taking steps to mitigate a threat from China. Whether that strategy will be counterproductive and will actually end up increasing the risk of conflict remains to be seen.¶ In a similar fashion, the United States is wary, and even borderline distrustful, of commercial and civil cooperation with China in space. The two biggest concerns are technology theft via espionage and the significant role the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays in all aspects of Chinese space activities. There is also a debate in the United States over whether space cooperation should be used as an incentive to encourage China to change its behavior or as a reward for actual change, particularly on human rights and religious freedom. The latter sentiment was behind the passage of the Wolf Amendment as part of the FY12 NASA appropriations bill, which prohibited NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy from spending any money on bilateral space activities with China without explicit congressional approval.40 The Wolf Amendment continues to hinder any significant efforts at bilateral civil space cooperation between the United States and China .

The bifocal lens of China threat and opportunity are false constructions based the West’s epistemological need for certainty and power – the failings of opportunity policies or engagement will converge with the fear incited by the threat constructions making conflict inevitable as politicians push for “hedging strategies” against China. The topic’s move away from deterrence and towards cooperation does not break this deadlock but rather repeats the Western epistemological demand to know with certainty.Pan ’12 - Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University (Chengxin, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, p.148-150)//CT

At the core of the Western self-imagination is the modern knowing subject. Implying the existence of a certain, objectively knowable world 'out there', this self-fashioning affords the West both the confidence and duty to know and lead that world. When certain knowledge about a particular 'object', as in

the case of China, is stubbornly not forthcoming, the self- professed knowing subject then resorts to certain emotional substitutes such as fear and fantasy to make up for the absence of certainty . With fear, one may restore a sense of (negative) certainty about an existential threat 'out there', a threat which seems readily accounted for by the timeless wisdom of realism (and to some extent liberalism). Alternatively,

with the subliminal aid of fantasy, the West can envisage an immensely soothing scenario of opportunity, engagement and convergence that carries with it a teleological predictability about how History begins, evolves, and ends.Thanks to those emotional substitutes, the initial 'inscrutability' of China's Otherness gives way to more comprehensible imageries: it is now either an affront to, or an opportunity for the Western self and its will to truth and power. Either way, it becomes a reassuring object of aversion and attraction that allows for continued Western self-posturing as the modern knowing subject. Indeed, as evidenced in the two dominant sets of China

discourses, the Western self and its Chinese Other are mutually constitutive. More importantly, such mutual constructions are from the outset linked to power and political practice. At one level, they are complicit in the political economies of fear and fantasy 'at home'. At another level, they are constitutive of foreign policy, which in turn helps construct the Other in reality. ¶ Consequently, the China discourses turn out to be an integral and constitutive part of their 'object of study'. For example, as illustrated in Chapters 4-5, America's

'China threat' discourse both contributes to, and is reproduced by, the US partisan politics of fear and military Keynesianism. At the same time, this threat imagery helps sustain a containment policy of sorts. By provoking

similar responses from China, such a policy ends up participating in the creation of the very threat it seeks to contain.

¶ The 'China opportunity' narrative, by contrast, tends to favour a policy of engagement. But as examined in

Chapter 6, this paradigm and its associated engagement strategy are more often than not false promises.

They are false in that their assumption of the West/US and China in terms of a temporal self/Other hierarchy allows their advocates to ignore or at least downplay China's inherent subjectivities and agency in this intersubjective relationship. ¶ To the extent that Sino-Western relations are intersubjective,

socialisation does occur, but it takes place on a mutual basis, rather than as a one-way traffic. In this context, the

promises of the 'China opportunity' become less certain and more problematic. Yet often oblivious to its own false premises, the paradigm instead blames China (and to a lesser extent, Western engagers) for its increasingly apparent 'China fantasy·. What is significant about this 'China opportunity' disillusionment is that it converges with the 'China threat' imagery and together justifies a tougher approach to a country which now not only appears unreceptive to our tutelage but also grows menacingly stronger by the day. ¶ Consequently, for all their apparent differences, the 'threat' and 'opportunity' paradigms are the two sides of the same coin of Western knowledge, desire, and power in

China watching. In essence, both are specific manifestations of a modem quest for certainty in an uncertain world. These seismic twins are not only similar in terms of their discursive functions of constructing self/Other, but they are also joined

together in practice. They make up a powerful bifocal lens for China watching, a lens which can largely account for the emergence and popularity oft he 'hedging' strategy towards China. ¶ At this point, it is worth noting that my

misgivings with these Western representations are not about their bias or factual inaccuracy, nor about their often-critical stances on China. In any case, the alternative is not to idealise China. The preceding chapter has shed light on the volatility and danger of projecting one's hope onto the country, only to be disappointed down the track. In fact, it is no coincidence that some of China's sharpest critics today were once China opportunity enthusiasts. Likewise, Western representations ought not to be condemned for their association with power and political practice per se. The main issue is not about their knowledge/desire/power nexus as

such, which is probably characteristic of all social knowledge. Rather, what is problematic is the particular nature of that nexus and the continued lack of critical self-reflection on the nexus (and its policy consequences) among mainstream IR China watchers. It is in this context that this book has sought to deconstruct a less than healthy field.

The supposed timeliness of the topic is an after-effect of the “China threat paradigm” which encourages constructions of Chinese geopolitics in terms of increasing the circulation of the military-industrial complex and its cultural reproduction.Pan 12, Chengxin Pan is a Senior Lecturer in the International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization at Deakin University (Chengxin Pan, Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics, pg. 105-107)//AM

If changing Chinese public opinion and Beijing’s growing assertiveness in foreign policy are better understood in the context of mutual responsiveness, then threatening as they may appear, they at least

partly reflect the self-fulfilling effect of the China theory as practice. That is, they are to some extent socially constructed by Western representations of the China threat. At this juncture, we may return to the question raised earlier – What’s the cost of having an enemy? The cost, simply put, is that perceiving China as a threat and acting upon that perception help bring that feared China threat closer to reality. Though not an objective description of China, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is no mere fantasy, as it has the constitutive power to make its prediction come true. If this China paradigm ends up bearing some resemblance to Chinese reality, it is because the reality is itself partly constituted by it . With US strategic

planners continuing to operate on the basis of the China threat, this self-fulfilling process has persisted to the basis of the China threat, this self-fulfilling process has persisted to the present day. For example, in July 2010, when China objected to the joint US-South Korean manoeuvres. Meanwhile, a Global Times (a Chinese daily tabloid affiliated with the official People’s Daily) editorial opines that ‘Whatever harm the US military

manoeuvre may have inflicted upon the mind of the Chinese, the United States will have to pay for it, sooner or later’. All such Chinese ‘belligerence’ seems to have provided fresh evidence to the ‘China threat’ paradigm, whose image of China has

now been vindicated. Without acknowledging their own role in the production of the ‘China threat’, ‘China threat’ analysts thus play a key part in a spiral model of tit-for-tat in Sino-US relations. Mindful of this danger, some cool-headed observers have warned that a US attempt to build a missile defence shield could be reciprocated by China deploying more missiles. Even the highly classified US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report Foreign Responses to U.S. National Missile Defense Deployment has hinted at this possibility. In early

2006, Mike Moore, contributing editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, predicted that if the US continues to weaponise space by deploying a comprehensive space-control system, ‘China will surely respond’. And respond it did. In early 2007, it launched a ballistic missile to destroy an inoperational weather satellite in orbit. That test immediately caused a stir in the international press, even though it came after Washington’s repeated refusal to negotiate with China and Russia over their proposed ban on space weapons and the use of force

against satellites. A Financial Times article noted that ‘What is surprising about the Chinese test is that anyone was surprised’. In a similar vein but commenting on the broader pattern of US strategy on China over the years, Lampton notes that ‘Washington cannot simply seek to strength ties with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and central Asian states as an explicit offset to rising Chinese power and then be surprised when Beijing plays the same game’. Nevertheless, such surprise is commonplace in the China watching community, reflecting an intellectual

blindness to the self-fulfilling nature of one of its time-honoured paradigms. This blindness, in turn allows the justification of more containment or hedging. In this way, the ‘China threat’ paradigm is not only self-fulfilling in practice, but also self-productive and self-perpetuating as a powerful mode of representation. One might take comfort in the fact that neither Beijing nor Washington actually wants a direct military confrontation. But that is beside the point, for the lack of aggressive intention alone is no proven safe barrier to war. As in the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the outbreak of war does not necessarily require the intention to go to war. Mutual suspicion, as US President Theodore Roosevelt once observed of the Kaiser and the English, is often all that is needed to set in motion a downward spiral. And thanks to the ‘China threat’ paradigm and its mirror image and practice from China, mutual suspicion and distrust has not been in short supply. A war between

these two great powers is not inevitable or even probably; the door for mutual engagement and cooperation remains wide open. Nevertheless, blind to its own self-fulfilling consequences, the ‘China threat’ paradigm, if left unexamined and unchecked, would make cooperation more difficult and conflict more likely. It is worth adding that my treatment of Chinese nationalism and realpolitik is not to downplay their potentially dangerous consequences, much less to justify them. Quite the contrary, for all the apparent legitimacy of reciprocal counter-violence or counter-hedging, Chinese mimicry is dangerous, as it would feed into his tit-for-tat vicious cycle and play its part in the escalation of a security dilemma between the US and China. Thus, to emphasise Chinese responsiveness is not to deny the Chinese agency or exonerate its responsibility. While the general nature of Chinese foreign policy may be responsive with regard to the US, its ‘contents’ are not simply passive, innocent mimicry of US thinking and behavior, but inevitably come with some ‘Chinese characteristics’. That said, those ‘Chinese characteristics’ notwithstanding, there is no pregiven China threat both unresponsive to and immune from any external stimulus. To argue otherwise is to deny an important dimension of Chinese agency, namely their response-ability

By examining the self-fulfilling tendency to the ‘China threat’ paradigm, we can be better understand that Sino-American relations, like international relations in general, are mutually responsive and constitutive. Thus, both China and the US should be held accountable to the bilateral relationship of their mutual making. To the extent that this ‘China threat’ knowledge often denies such mutuality, and by

extensions, US responsibility in the rise of the China threat, it is all the more imperative to lay bare its intrinsic link with power practice.

Thus, we affirm uncertainty about China in the topic.Our affirmative opens up space for deconstructive self-watching which problematizes the supposed givenness of the western subject tasked with “knowing” China.Pan ’12 - Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University (Chengxin, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics, p.151-152)//CT

One message from this study is that it is no longer adequate for us to be merely 'China' specialists who are otherwise blissfully 'ignorant of the world beyond China'. 9 China watching needs autoethnography or ‘self-watching’ toconsciously make itself part of its own object of critical analysis

whereby the necessary but often missing comparative context can help us put China in perspective. All research, to be sure, must already contain some level of reflectivity, be it about methods of inquiry, hypothesis testing, empirical evidence, data collection, or clarity of expression. And the Western representations of China's rise, predicated on some particular ways of Western self-imagination, are necessarily self-reflective in that sense. And yet, such narrow technical reflectivity or narcissistic posturing is not what I mean by 'self-watching'. In fact, the unconscious Western self-imagination as the modern knowing subject (who sets itself apart from the world and refuses to

critically look at itself) is the very antithesis of self-watching. ¶ Self-watching, l suggest, requires at once discarding this positivist self- (un)consciousness and cultivating a critically reflective, philosophizing mind. 'The philosophizing mind', wrote Collingwood, 'never simply thinks about an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks also about its own thought about that object'. This position is similar to that of the ‘ironists’. According to Richard Rorty, ironists are 'never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final

vocabularies, and thus of their selves'. In the concluding chapter of his Scratches on Our Minds, Harold Isaacs seemed to have endorsed such 'ironist' approaches to China studies: 'we have to

examine, each of us, how we register and house our observations, how we come to our judgments, how we enlarge our observations, how we describe them, and what purposes they serve for us'. 12 Back in 1972, John Fairbank

put such reflection in practice by suggesting that America's Cold- War attitude towards China was based less on reason than on fear,

a fear inspired not by China but by America's experience with Nazi and Stalinist totalitarian regimes. These examples clearly show the possibility of reflective

China watching, but alas, as noted from the beginning, such reflectivity is hardly visible in today's 'China's rise' literature . Indeed without trace of a single author, the two dominant China paradigms hinge onto a ubiquitous collective psyche and emotion that is often difficult to see, let alone to criticise from within . Yet it is imperative that such self-criticism should occur , which entails p roblematising China watchers' own thought, vocabularies and taken-for- granted self-identity as disinterested rational observers . It requires us to pause and look into ourselves to examine, for example, why

we constantly fear China, rather than taking that fear as given: 'We are wary of China because we are wary of China'. Self-watching demands an ironist awareness of the contingency, instability, and provinciality of mainstream China knowledge, its intertextual and emotional link to the fears and fantasies in the Western self-imagination, the political economy of its production, and the attendant normative, ethical and practical consequences both for dealing with China and for serving the power and special interests at home. Put it differently, it requires a deconstructive move of intellectual decolonisation of the latent (neo)colonial desire and mindset that, despite the formal end of colonialism decades ago, continues to actively operate in Orientalist knowledge and China watching, facilitated by its various scientific, theoretical, and pedagogical guises . .

Space policy is a unique way to challenge hegemonic discourses which perpetuate war and capitalism. Klinger Julie, ‘19, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, “Environmental Geopolitics and Outer Space”, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1590340, accessed 4/8/19, J.Ward

Using outer space as a source of state or imperial power is nothing new . Elites have used the cosmos as a material and meaningful source of authority for millennia. Emperors and monarchs claimed that “divine mandates” installed them in their thrones (Marshall 2001; Monod 1999; Spence 1988). Religious figures backed these claims to territorial control by anthropomorphizing the evolution of the cosmos to claim privilege vested in them by a “God” or “gods” that “resided” in “the heavens” (Brown 2003; Crone and Hinds 1986; Gordis 2003; McAnany 2001; Stopler 2008). Religious figures aligned with state or imperial power positioned themselves as indispensible to appeasing heavenly powers in exchange for subordination and material wealth transfers from other people. Powerful actors past and present used claims of exclusive access to the ultimate high ground, even if only imagined, to organize regimes of territorial control on Earth, lending classical geopolitics a deep historical resonance with respect to outer space. Whether from a military, royal, or religious standpoint, these classical views define the outer space environment as a source of natural, spiritual, or military threat (Olson 2012; Peoples 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan 2011). The invocation of these threats is politically and economically expedient for mobilizing capital and labor power in the form of tithes, tributes, or defense appropriations. By the same token, such discourses characterize outer space as replete with riches to be enjoyed only by the spiritually worthy (Schwaller 2006; Smart 1968) or capitalized on for strategic advantage by the most technologically advanced (Klinger 2017; Lewis 1996). In the latter case, outer space and its earthly infrastructures can be misconstrued as a “depoliticized environment” (Swyngedouw 2011), shaped by technological development policy instead of politics. This view naturalizes a state-centric realpolitik approach to the cosmos. This view strips the cosmos of any

environmental significance beyond its potential to be instrumentalized to serve national strategic interests, and has been deployed with renewed vigor under the Trump administration in the United States. Critical geopolitics interrogates how hegemonic ideas of state and non-state power are (re)produced through discourses and practice, while antigeopolitics positions politics outside and against state apparatuses (Ó Tuathail 1996). Critical geopolitics deconstructs the taken-for-granted ideas of outer space as organized according to state actors competing for control and hegemony (Dunnett 2016; Sage 2008, 2016). In this respect, Macdonald’s (2007) anti-astropolitik critiques the classical geopolitical strain of thought that recasts outer space as populated with strategically valued “objects for which powerful states may compete” (Dolman 2002, 138). Although the “anti-” approach to geopolitics has been critiqued for reifying the divide between state and society (Sharp 2011), its challenge to the narrow definition of state interests provokes broader imaginings on the diverse possibilities of human engagement with power (Koopman 2011), and with outer space (Parks and Schwoch 2012). These broader imaginings are not visible in classical geopolitical approaches to outer space. By contrast, the lens of critical geopolitics brings the neoliberalization of the state into focus (Dodds, Kuus, and Sharp 2013). Drawing on Foucault, this perspective treats the emergence of private space firms as consistent with neoliberal governance rather than as a break with the “tradition” of national space programs because the state is characterized as one of several assemblages of power that remake global geographies (Rowan 2017). Indeed, the rise of a private space sector must be accompanied “from start to finish” (Foucault 2010, 121) by people determined to facilitate the colonization of public institutions by the private sector, and who are in a position to marshal the power of the state to enforce this process.

Reps come first – institutions are shaped by and based upon discourse – criticism of those reps k2 upset power balancesSpringer 12’- University of Victoria, Department of Geography and History (Simon, “Neoliberalism as discourse: between Foucauldian political economy andMarxian poststructuralism”, 5/12, http://academia.edu/592370/Neoliberalism _as_ discourse_between_Foucauldian_political_economy_and_Marxian_poststructuralism) RR Jr

Nonetheless, the materialist interpretation of history is one key feature of Marxism that many believe cannot be easily reconciled with poststructuralism. Poststructuralism is often said to establish an orientation toward history that denies material historical truth, yet far from being a denial of temporality, it is instead to emphasize the forces that go beyond any telos of history that can be fully known, appreciated, and articulated by human actors (Peters, 2001).So while Foucault, for example, rejects Marxism as a particular theory of the mode of production and as a critique of political economy, he nonetheless forwards a critical view of domination which , like historical materialism, recognizes all social practices as transitory, and all intellectual formations as integral with power and social relations (Poster, 1984). Thus, although often critical of Marx, by Foucault’s (1988a) own admission, his approach also bears striking parallels to Marxism. In Foucault’s rendering, the historical relativity of all systems and structures(society, thought, theory, and concepts) is recognized alongside a materialism of physical necessities (Olssen, 2004). A discursive approach to Foucault thus represents a questioning of the very relation between structure and agency, which evokes a complementary between Marxian and poststructuralist thought. As such, Poster (1984, p. 12) contends that Foucault’s approach understands discourse and practice as a couplet, which enables Foucault ‘to search for the close connection between manifestations of reason and patterns of domination. Foucault can study

the way in which discourse is not innocent, but shaped by practice, without privileging any form of practice such as class struggle. He can also study how discourse in turn shapes practice without privileging any form of discourse’. In this sense, Foucault rejects Marx’s under-standing of historical materialism as a mechanism through which material (non-discursive) practice is separated from discourse and by which the latter is subsequently subordinated to the former (Olssen, 2004). In contrast to Marx, the objective of Foucault’s (1972/2002,p. 180, original emphasis) version of materialism as an Archeology of knowledge is to reveal relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events ,economic practices and processes) [wherein] these rapprochements are not intended to uncover great cultural continuities, nor to isolate mechanisms of causality nor does it seek to rediscover what is expressed in them it tries to determine how the rules of formation that govern it maybe linked to non-discursive systems: it seeks to define specific forms of articulation. For Foucault, unlike Marxian understandings, human destiny is not directed by a single set of factors and instead ‘the forms of articulation and determination may differ in relation to the relative importance of different non-discursive (material) factors in terms of both place and time’.

A2 China Space Race/ThreatFocus on US-security issues causes the very risks it seeks to avoid, specifically in the context of a China space race.Pomeroy 15 (Caleb, “Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & US Security,” June 06, 2015, E-International Relations Students, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-

threat-u-s-security/. // EMS).

In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned of the threat of a possible “space Pearl Harbor,” outlining the U.S. as the most space-dependent country in the world and suggesting that the U.S. Department of Defense establish an “Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence, and Information” (Rumsfeld Commission, 2001, pp. 8, 32-33). In 2003, China launched its first astronaut into orbit and, in 2007, tested an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that destroyed a decommissioned Fengyun-1C weather satellite and caused the most severe orbital debris cloud in space flight history (CRS, 2014). In January of 2014, General William Shelton, commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, explained that while electronic jammers and laser attacks could reduce satellite capabilities, “direct attack weapons, like the Chinese anti-satellite system, can destroy [U.S.] space systems” (“U.S. military satellites,” 2014, para. 5). General Shelton reiterated that mankind has consistently created conflict in every medium at its disposal, from land to sea, undersea to air, and now cyber and outer space.¶ There are few instances in history where an emerging power did not enter conflict with an existing power (Karabell, 2013). As China reemerges as an international power, it is natural to question whether or not the U.S. and China will engage in conflict. However, asking if China’s reemergence is a threat to U.S. security interests may not be the best way to approach this issue. In fact , even defining U.S. security interests could cause an inherent threat to those supposed interests. This essay will argue that defining U.S. security interests can threaten the U.S., and this question’s discursive construction increases the risk of a U.S.-China conflict. A wide range of case studies could be used to illustrate these arguments to approach the question of U.S.-China conflict; this essay will look at the contemporary issue of space security as it is currently receiving historically high levels of attention in Beijing and Washington.¶

A2 US-China War !’sThe attempt to contain China is based on a narcissistic and positivist interpretation which perpetuates the escalation of conflictPan ‘4- Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University (Chengxin, "The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29.3, p.325-326, JSTOR)//SL

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main- stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War

world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hardline stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the

Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93 For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-

defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on

fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides . At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting com- ment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in gen- eral represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemol- ogy, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

A2 China Rising/I-Law DA’sAttempting to shape China’s rise is an Orientalist way of the West exploiting China for economic gain.Ban et al. 13 (Department of Communication, University of Cincinnati, Zhuo, and Sastry, Department of Communication, University of Cincinnati, Shaunak, and Dutta, Department of Communications and New Media, National University of Singapore, Mohan Jyoti, “‘‘Shoppers’ Republic of China’’: Orientalism in Neoliberal U.S. News Discourse,” Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, Vol. 6, No. 4, November 2013, pgs. 290-292)//DD

China has long been seen as a place with lack of respect for international laws and convention; an Orientalist construction that can be traced back to the development of international law (Onuma, 2000). This historically constructed label of ‘‘international truant’’ continues to be employed while describing China today. In our corpus, the ‘‘lack of respect’’ for international convention and law was a significant leitmotif as news articles exhorted it to restrain its deviant nature and ‘‘play

by the rules.’’ News discourse also emphasized that China does not behave in a manner that behooves a major leader in world economics and affairs. Similarly, news articles debated how to get China to ‘‘act responsibly,’’ and the international community’s (and the U.S.) role in ensuring that it behaves responsiblely. Consider this excerpt: At the Group of 20 summit meeting in Seoul, South Korea, last week, President Obama chided China on its currency policy, calling for Beijing

to ‘‘act in a responsible fashion internationally’’ and saying the undervalued renminbi was ‘‘an irritant to a lot of China’s trading partners and those who are competing with China to sell goods

around the world.’’ (Barboza, 2010, p. 1) The undertone here of ‘‘grow up and behave like an adult’’ is not necessarily novel in how the U.S. has historically understood its role in world diplomacy and foreign relations, but it is interesting to juxtapose this statement with China’s economic responsibilities as articulated in an article titled ‘‘Taking on

China’’: [E]merging nations could and should play an important role in helping the world economy as a whole pull out of its slump. But China, the largest of these emerging economies, isn’t allowing this natural process to unfold . Restrictions on foreign investment limit the flow of private funds into China; meanwhile, the Chinese government is keeping the value of its

currency, the renminbi, artificially low by buying huge amounts of foreign currency, in effect subsidizing its exports. And these subsidized exports are hurting employment in the rest of the world. Chinese officials defend this policy with arguments that are both implausible and wildly inconsistent. They deny that they are deliberately manipulating their exchange rate; I guess the

tooth fairy purchased $2.4 trillion in foreign currency and put it on their pillows while they were sleeping (Krugman, 2010, p. 25). Given the moral imperative (‘‘could and should’’) placed on China to ‘‘pull the world out of a slump,’’ their failure to play ball becomes an ‘‘irritant’’ to the interests of the world economy. Nowhere in our corpus do we find articulations that seek to engage and debate with China’s actual foreign-policy intentions. There is apparently no

space for an alternate theorizing of China’s foreign-policy measures as rational (if albeit incongruent with dominant U.S. concerns and interests within the global economic logic). The metaphor of the tooth fairy is particularly

illuminating of how the relationship between the world economy and China is imagined: as that of an exasperated parent trying to discipline a spoilt child. Given China’s potential importance to the world economy and its refusal to act in a manner that is deemed ‘‘internationally responsible,’’ the U.S. continually employs alternative communicative channels: . . . So

somewhat belatedly, President Obama decided he needed what every American president since Nixon had had: A direct back channel of communications to the Chinese leadership, a way to head off trouble or create an opening without going through the formal diplomatic exchanges. ‘‘Think Kissinger, Scowcroft, Brzezinski, Berger,’’ one of Mr. Obama’s senior national security aides said the other day, ticking off the names of national security advisers who cultivated off-line access to the Chinese leadership. (Sanger, 2010, p. 13)

Threat-con Turns DA’sThe creation of the ‘China threat’ through the status quo’s discourse causes the deterioration of US-Sino relations Pan 12, Chengxin Pan is a Senior Lecturer in the International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization at Deakin University (Chengxin Pan, Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics, pg. 85-86)//AM

While the lack of an enemy - real or imagined – appears costly indeed for the discursive identity and institutional ‘survival’ of the military-industrial complex, I contend that having an enemy, even an imagined one, is by no means cost-free. In fact, in the case of China, it could be very costly in that the construction and treatment of China as a threat could result in China becoming one in reality. In other words, the cost lies in the fact

that the ‘China threat’ paradigm could become self-fulfilling in practice. A self-fulfilling prophecy, according to American sociologist Robert Merton,

means that ‘a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true’ .

What is ‘false’ in hindsight or in the eyes of a bystander is frequently defined as real by the actor in question; and ‘if men [people] define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. In international relations, fear, often based on ‘false’ images, can have precisely such self-fulfilling consequences. Thucydides, the author of a realist ‘great text’ History of the Peloponnesian War, noted a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in interstate politics. In his account for the war’s outbreak, Thucydides suggested that ‘What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’. More than two millennia later, another realist scholar-practitioner,

George Kennan ascribed the origin of the Cold War to the paranoid ideology of the Soviet Union. If so, the fear manifested in the ‘China threat’ paradigm could also become confirmed in reality. Two interrelated processes are at play here. First, the ‘China threat’ paradigm, taken as objective truth, would imply the need for containing China in practice. Second,

such practice given the logic of mutual responsiveness, is more likely than not to be mirrored back by China in either symmetric or asymmetric ways. As the latter’s hardline mimicry apparently ‘confirms’ the initial fear of the China threat, what we are witnessing is a classic case of self-fulfilling prophecy.

A2 Ob jectivity/Specificity No objectivity—representations and language mediate experiencePan 12 -- a Senior Lecturer in the International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and a member of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization at Deakin University (Chengxin Pan, Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics, pg. 12-14)//CT

Indeed, it is the ear of the audience, or the intertextual and worldly constraint, to which a China watcher needs to respond or endear oneself, whether consciously or not. To be sure, the intertextual context within which China knowledge is produced is not fixed, nor is it always a ‘Western’ context. Chinese voices, discourses and interpretations can, should, and have often been part of that interpretive process. In China Watcher, Baum tells a revealing story in the 1960s about a peculiar way in which China watchers, with Communist China off limits, often gazed at it from afar by interviewing mainland refugees in Hong Kong. He writes that: Two particularly well-informed illegal aliens from Guangdong [known as Xiao Yang and Lao Yang] became more or less permanent fixtures at the Universities Service Centre in the late ’60s. They were interviewed so frequently and so intensively by center-based scholars that it became a standing joke among us—told only half in jest—that the vast majority of scholarly books, articles, and Ph.D. dissertations written about China during the Cultural Revolution decade, 1966-76, were based on information provided by these two

individuals. My own 1975 book on the Four Cleanups, Prelude to Revolution, is no exception.61 This episode shows that a significant part of Western understanding of Chinese politics and society at that time might have come from two Chinese informants . It is safe to assume that what those informants told their Western interlocutors was not China per se either, but their situated interpretations of China or, more precisely, their interpretations of some specific vignettes of their own localised experience in China. In turn, those interpretations, if not already intentionally or unintentionally prompted or skewed to suit the needs of their Western interviewers, would certainly be subject to re-interpretation by the latter , in line with their worldliness and interpretive conventions . One source of such conventions, as American sociologist Richard

Madsen notes, has been the writings of early Protestant missionaries to China, whose ‘framework of assumptions about how to understand and what to do about China’ in part laid the groundwork for today’s secular China studies.62 Therefore, what can be and has been known about China is always already to some extent shaped by the intertextual situatedness of China watchers (including those who are Chinese). No one visits or studies China ‘as entirely a stranger: we already know or think we know what is to be expected’.63 Veteran American journalist James Mann

pithily described a similar process through which Western media coverage of China operates: The biggest problem is that the media coverage of China tends merely to reinforce whatever is the reigning stereotype or image, or “frame,” of China in any particular decade or era. In the 1950s, the coverage in the United States was of Chinese as disciplined automatons. In the 1980s, it was “China goes capitalist.” In the early 1990s, it was “crackdown in China.” Now, it’s “China rising” (and “China gets rich”). Once an impression gels, then the extended press coverage —by which I mean, TV specials, newsmagazine covers, newspaper features—all either repeat the impression or at least play off it in some way or another. 64 Explaining the

problem, Mann believes that it is mainly those ‘back in the home offices’ such as producers, editors, and the like who help shape the China coverage according to the governing images of the day.65 He probably could

have added Western audience to that mix. Without the audience, or the ear, ‘Rigorous research into specific aspects of contemporary China which does not capitalise on existing presumptions—the usual human rights,

repressive regime, rampant capitalism etc frames—does not get past the niche market of China specialists, if it is published at all’.66 In that case, many authors probably would never bother to begin with. Consequently, certain popular images will persist while alternative views struggle for attention. Some decades ago, the Australian journalist Peter Hastings hoped to write more reports on Asia but his boss, Sir Frank Packer (the father of the late Australian media tycoon Kerry Packer), frowned upon the idea: ‘Nothing in it… Who wants to read about those places?’67 Of course, in reality there was always much in it; it just

happened that nothing there seemed to interest ‘us’. Thus, like Asia, China’s existence as an object of media curiosity or social inquiry from the outset owes a lot to this ‘who’—the consumers in the marketplace of knowledge—and their expectations, presuppositions, foreunderstandings, and established self-imaginations.