china and myanmar strategic interests, strategies and the road ahead

8/8/2019 China and Myanmar Strategic Interests, Strategies and the Road Ahead

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Copyright 2010, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

(IPCS)The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies is notresponsible for the facts, views or opinion expressedby the author.

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS),established in August 1996, is an independent thinktank devoted to research on peace and security from aSouth Asian perspective.Its aim is to develop a comprehensive andalternative framework for peace and security in theregion catering to the changing demands ofnational, regional and global security.

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Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557,4165 2558, 4165 2559

Fax: (91-11) 4165 2560Email: [email protected]

Web: www.ipcs.org


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China and Myanmar

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.02

II.WHAT DOES CHINA WANT FROM MYANMAR..04

III.WHAT DOES MYANMAR WANT FROM CHINA ..15

IV.CONCLUSIONS.21

V. BIBLIOGRAPHY..22


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IPCS Research Paper 26, September 2010

2

I. Introduction

China is renowned for its extraordinary

economic growth in the last 30 years. As of2010, it is the third-largest economy in theworld, behind the European Union and theUnited States, and also the worlds largestexporter.1 Although China has become a keyplayer in the international economy, in thepolitical arena, it has kept a low profileexcept on issues that would negativelyinfluence its development and sovereignpower.

On the other hand, Myanmar has

experienced the longest civil war in theworld, for over half a century, with 70,000out of 3,00,000 children having becomechild soldiers,2 and 30 to 50 per cent of thepopulation living below poverty line.3

China and Myanmar share a commonhistory and have strong economic ties.China is currently the largest investor andtrading partner of Myanmar, while Myanmarforms only a small portion of Chinas totaleconomic input. In the past, Chinas

ambition for fast economic growth hadtaken precedence over all other issues, butin recent years it also started to pay attentionto its international reputation as wasdemonstrated during the last OlympicGames. Given Myanmars unenviable recordof human rights, what will be the future of

1Michael Pettis. 2010. China Is Misread by Bulls

and Bears Alike. The Financial Times. 25

February.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40260 Accessed on 30 April

2010.2 Human Rights Watch. 2002. Burma: Worlds

Highest Number of Child Soldiers. 16 October.

http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/10/15/burma-

worlds-highest-number-child-soldiers Accessed on

30 April 2010.3

Australian Government. 2010. Burma. AusAID.

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?Co

untryId=8493641 Accessed on 30 April 2010.

Sino-Myanmar relations in the next five to

ten years?

The answer lies in Chinas strategic prioritiesand its wish for economic growth andinternational reputation. An understandingof the past and present of Chinas andMyanmars actions will enable a moreconcise view of their strategic relations. Thefuture of Sino-Myanmar relations dependson the balance that China will establishbetween its economic development andinternational reputation on one hand, and

on the other, the strengthening of thelegitimacy of Myanmars Junta.

This research paper is divided into two partsto provide a more complete view of howboth countries think in term of theirambitions and the methods they deemimportant to achieve them. This paperargues that firstly, China will seek toincrease its influence in the region for theexploitation of Myanmars natural resources.

To achieve its goal, it will outbid all other

players by paying a higher price for thesegoods, engage in the construction ofnecessary infrastructure at its own cost,provide financial support to uphold the

Junta as also a political umbrella in theinternational community. The possibleobstacles to Chinas ambitions includeborder instability, growing resentmentagainst the local Chinese population inMyanmar, a weak Myanmarese government,and stronger international pressure thatcould tarnish Chinas reputation andconsequently, affect its economic trade. Thispaper will demonstrate that Chinas strategicgoal is to become a superpower in the 21 stcentury, but that it will have to face severalobstacles to reach this goal.

Myanmars Junta wants to gain legitimacyand be recognized as the officialgovernment of the country. During the time


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China and Myanmar

3

of the writing of this essay, the Junta hadannounced the election for the leadership ofthe country, but had not fixed any date.Reports now suggest that the election maybe held on 10 October 2010. It is believedthat General Than Shwe is awaiting the

approval of his astrologer for the electiondate to improve the Junta's chances for

victory.4

To gain political legitimacy, it uses thecountrys natural resources to bargain withother countries in exchange for economicgain, which will then translate into politicalsupport for the regime. In addition,Myanmar does not want foreigninvolvement in its sovereign territory andconsequently, will keep a low profile in the

international arena. The obstacle toMyanmars ambition would be an awakeningof ethnic groups and stronger internationalsanctions that would pressure China tobalance its economic development andpolitical ambition.

From Myanmars perspective, the future ofSino-Myanmar relations will becharacterized by a strengthening of the

Juntas regional and international legitimacy.

4 Wai Moe. 2010. "Election To Be Held in

October?" The Irrawaddy. 8 January.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=1754

8#comment. Accessed on 20 July 2010.


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II. What does China want from Myanmar?Understanding Beijings Objectives, Obstacles and

Strategies

To provide an accurate strategic foresight,an understanding of the past and presentideologies that influence the Chinesegovernments policies at the national,regional, and international levels is vital.

Just like any other country, China wants toencourage its growth and development.However, it does not see itself as any othercountry; it considers itself unique. China has

a long and rich history; a history of greatphilosophers who have changed the way the

world thinks, great leaders who influencedthe academic and political sphere, and acultural heritage that has travelled to everycorner of the globe. Prior to theintervention of foreign powers in itsterritory, China was self-centered and self-dependent. While China did not needothers, others needed China. During itscolonial period, China felt ashamed5 of itsinability to defend itself against foreign

powers. This experience has deeplyinfluenced the politics of its governmentand its relations with other powers. Post-

World War II and the Cold War, Chinadistanced itself from the Soviet Unionscommunist system and started its own styleof semi-communism or socialism withChinese characteristic. China takes pride in

what it has accomplished in a few decades; itis looking for long-term and gradual growthto reach its ultimate goal of becoming asuperpower.

Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was initiated at the first session of theNational Committee of the ChinesePeoples Political Consultative Conference

5 Richard, Hines. 1999. Ching China: The Opium

Wars. Washington State University. 14 July.

http://wsu.edu/~dee/CHING/OPIUM.HTM

Accessed on 12 August 2010

on 29 September 1949 and put into practiceduring the China-India dispute over the

Tibet region in 1953. These principlesinclude: mutual respect for each other'sterritorial integrity and sovereignty(changed to mutual respect for each other'ssovereignty and territorial integrity at the

Asian-African Conference in April 1955),mutual non-aggression, non-interference ineach other's internal affairs, equality and

mutual benefit (changed to equality andmutual benefit in the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese Joint Statements in June 1954,6and peaceful co-existence.7

Since 1996, China has strongly advocated aNew Security Concept (NSC) to deal withregional and international issues throughdialogue and cooperation. It also condemnsstrong resolutions against countries, andprefers instead a softer approach ofpeaceful negotiation. As the Chinese

government presents it, it is a conceptestablished on the basis of commoninterests and is conducive to socialprogress.8 It focuses on ideas of mutualtrust, mutual benefit, equality, andcoordination. The NSC aims tosurmount differences, to increase mutualtrust through dialogue, to resolve disputes

6Lixin Geng. 2006. Sino-Myanmar Relations:

Analysis and Prospects. The Culture Mandala.

Vol.7(2), December: 2-4.7

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PeoplesRepublic of China. 2000. Chinas Initiation of the

Five Principles of the Peaceful Co-Existence. 17

November.

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18

053.htm Accessed on 30 April 2010.8 Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in

Australia. 2003. China Offers New Security

Concept at ASEAN Meetings. 24 November.

http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/jmhz/t46228.htm

Accessed on 30 April 2010.


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China and Myanmar

5

through negotiations, and to promotecooperation through security.9

In December 2000, the Beibu BayDemarcation Agreement signed with

Vietnam, demonstrated the effectiveness of

Chinese foreign policy. According toChinas Foreign Ministry spokeswoman,Zhang Qiyue, [it] shows that the twocountries proceed from a strategic heightfor promoting the good-neighborliness andall-round cooperation between them.10

Bu Chu Tou and Tao Guang YangHui

Literally, this means dont get your headout and hide brightness, nourishobscurity. Although there is an academic

debate about the application of this belief toChinas external relations, this is a long-termstrategy that took root under DengXiaopings opening up policy in the 1990s.It is usually taken to mean that China needsto devote its energies to developingeconomically and should not seek to play aleadership role abroad.11

Such a belief can be seen to operate inChina's behavior at the international level,especially in the case of the United Nations

(UN). Since 1976, China has only used its veto power six times, in comparison to itscounterparts France (18), Britain (32), theUS (82), and Russia (124).12 China has been

9 Xia Liping. 2004. The New Security Concept in

Chinas New Thinking of International Strategy.

International Review . Spring, Vol.34: 22-5410 Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Beidu Bay

Demarcation Hailed. Peoples Daily. 26

December 2000.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200012/2

6/eng20001226_58871.html Accessed on 30 April

2010.11Joseph Khan. 2006. China, Shy Giant, Shows

Signs of the Shredding Its False Modesty. The

New York Times. 9 December.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/09/world/asia/09

china.html?_r=4&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print

Accessed on 30 April 2010.12 Global Policy. Changing Patterns in the Use of

the Veto in the Security Council.

http://globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Z/Tables_and_

Charts/useofveto.pdf. Accessed on 30 April 2010.

keeping a low profile in the internationalarena. Nonetheless, on matters of nationalsecurity and economic development, China

will act as a realpolitik actor.

I

CHINAS OBJECTIVES:MEET THE PRESENT & PREPARE

FOR FUTURE NEEDS

Chinas growing population and economicboom can be sustained only if it has accessto natural resources. The importance ofsecuring these is a priority in its externalrelations, which has led it to supportgovernments with dubious track records.Chinas population is estimated to touch 1.3billion and industrial growth,, 11 per cent,

by 2010.

By May 2009, China had consumed 33.35million metric tons of crude oil, which wasan increase of 2.6 per cent over 2008.13 Also,it is estimated that by 2025 China willimport three quarters of its oilrequirement.14 With the population andindustry growing steadily, China has tosecure its natural resources and change itscurrent dependence on fossil fuels. In thenear future, China will work to secure its

energy resources to continue to promoteeconomic growth, internal prosperity, andconsolidate its international reputation asthe key player of tomorrows world.

Chinas Motivations to Trade withMyanmar

Chinas relations with Myanmar are part ofits Go West campaign since 2000. It aimsto eliminate poverty and bridge theeconomic gap between Chinas coastal and

13 China Oil Consumption Growth Raises

Stimulus Hope. 2009. Commodity. 23 July.

http://www.commodityonline.com/news/China-oil-

consumption-growth-raises-stimulus-hope-19850-

3-1.html. Accessed on 30 April 2010.14 Tonnesson, S and A Kolas. 2006. Energy

Security in Asia: China, India, Oil and Peace.

International Peace Research Institute. PRIO

Report, April. pp.8-25.


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western provinces within the next 50 years.15Between 1996 and 2005, the Myanmar-

Yunnan border trade accounted for about55 per cent of Myanmar's total trade value;over 80 per cent of its exports to China andabout 40 per cent of Myanmars imports go

through the border trade. Myanmar is thelargest trading partner of Yunnan.16

Since 1995, the one-stop-service wasinitiated and proved to be essential forMyanmar and its neighbouring localeconomies. It has since been expanded overMyanmars border due to Westernsanctions. In 2000, the policy changed,allowing the use of both Myanmars Kyatand the Chinese Yuan as trading currencies.

The China- Myanmar border trade has

flourished in recent years. Chinas exportsincreased 3.1 times, from US$261.2 millionin 2001 to US$800.4 million in 2007, whileChinas imports increased 2.5 times, fromUS$93.7 million in 2001 to US$231.6million in 2007.17 Chinas Go Outstrategy, which encourages energycompanies to secure equity investmentabroad, is essential for the countryseconomic and political development.

The Malacca dilemma, refers to Chinas

excessive reliance on the strait with 60-70per cent of its oil shipment going through. Two threats emerge from this: first, piracyand maritime terrorism; second, influence ordominance of other powers over the strait.China has increased its presence in theregion by developing special diplomatic andstrategic relations.18

15Chinas Myanmar Dilemma. International

Crisis Group (ICG).Asia Report No.177. 14

September 2009.16

Maung Aung Myoe. 2007. Sino-MyanmarEconomic Relations Since 1988. No.86. Asia

Research Institute, National University of

Singapore. April..17 Toshihiro Kudo. 2008. Myanmars Economic

Relations with China: Who Benefits and Who

Pays? In Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson

(eds.)Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in

Myanmar. Canberra: Australian National

University. pp.87-101.18ICG, n.14.

IIGAINING ACCESS TO MYANMARS

RESOURCES:CHINESE STRATEGIES

Chinas involvement in Myanmar ranges

from mining, oil, and gas to hydropower. Tosecure these resources, China will outbid allother players, build necessary infrastructureat low cost, provide low-interest or no-interest loans, arms sales and technicalassistance, provide a political umbrella forthe Junta in the international community,and maintain good bilateral relations withethnic groups and the Junta.

Be the Best: Outbid All Other PlayersChinas political history and the fact that the

so-called democratic countries that aresitting on natural resources are already beingexploited by established multinationalcompanies, explain why China is involved

with many governments with dubiousrecords, including Myanmar.

To guarantee its access to natural resources,China is not afraid of paying a high price forthese resources. There are limited resourcesand China believes that the price of theseresources can only increase; therefore, it is

preparing itself for the bad days. SaysChristopher H. Stephens, a senior partner atCoudert Brothers, "The Chinese take a long-term perspective to secure strategicresources rather than a short-terminvestment perspective."19

In 2003, China lost an oil agreement withKazahkstan to western companies alreadyexploring the field.20 Two years later, China

was again involved in oil in the same region,but this time it learned from its past mistake,

and rather than buying the rights to explorethe field, it proposed to buy a company and

19 K Bradsher and J Mouawad. 2005. China Oil

giants Crave Respectability and Power.New York

Times. 9 July.

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/09/business/worl

dbusiness/09cnooc.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3

Accessed on 2 May 2010.20 Ibid.


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China and Myanmar

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that too at a higher price.21 As of 2009,China owned 67 per cent stake in theKazakh-based PetroKazakhstan Inc. whichproduced 10 million tons of crude oil in2007, equivalent to around 200,000 barrels aday.22 It is believed that China paid $4.18

billion for the company, when India bidUS$3.9 billion, demonstrating Chinas willto acquire the resources.23

In 2005-2006, China demonstrated itsdiplomatic and business skills after it signeda gas agreement with Myanmars Ministry ofEnergy to sell 6.25 trillion cubic feet from

A-1 to A-3 block (Rakhine Coastline)reserves through a pipeline that wouldconnect Kunming in Chinas Yunnanprovince and Myanmarese port of Kyauk

Phyu in the western state of Rakhine for thenext 30 years.24 This agreement came as ashock to Indian authorities who had spentseveral years negotiating with Myanmar fora Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline.25

Investment and Economic AssistanceChinas investment and economic assistancein Myanmar is part of its Go Out strategy.In practice, China has provided generousgovernment support and preferential loans.For the last decade, Myanmar has received

economic assistance in the form of grants,interest-free loans, concessional loans ordebt reliefs.

According to the Asia Research Institute,the China-Myanmar bilateral trade in 2005

21Ibid.

22 China, Kazakstan Sign Loan-for-Oil Deal.

2009. The Wall Street Journal. 18 April.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123996097676128

865.html Accessed on 2 May 2010.23 Anand Kumar. 2006. Myanmar-PetroChina

Agreement: A Setback to Indias Quest for EnergySecurity. South Asia Analysis Group Paper No

1681. 19 January.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers17/paper16

81.html. Accessed on 2 May 2010.24 Ben Blanchard. 2010. Factbox: Pipeline From

Myanmar to China to Carry Oil.Reuters. 3

February.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6120MQ2

0100203. Accessed on 2 May 2010.25 Anand Kumar, n.23.

was US$1209.25 million.26 Between 1989and 2005, Myanmars export increased by2.2 times while its imports from Chinaincreased nearly 5 times. Also, Chinasforeign direct investment was onlyUS$194.221 million in 26 sectors in

Myanmar.27

China provides economic assistance toprotect its own investment in the countryand influence the Junta and ethnic groupson their sides to pursue economic trade withMyanmar.

Development AssistanceDuring 19662005, Myanmar received loansequivalent to US$138.7 million from Chinafor various infrastructure projects, including

building bridges such as the Yangon- Thanlyin Rail-cum-Road Bridge (built withthe assistance of the Yuan 169 million loanfrom China) to the installation of theSatellite Communication Earth and Satellite

TV Ground Stations.28

In December 1989, Myanmar and Chinasigned an economic and technicalcooperation agreement. In 1991, Chinacommitted a grant of Yuan 50 million.

Again in 1993, Myanmar received an

interest-free loan of Yuan 50 million fromChina.29

More recently, in 2003, during the visit ofSenior General Than Shwe in China, theChinese government provided a grant of

Yuan 50 million and a loan of US$200million as preferential buyers credit. Thegrant was to be utilized for building acombine harvester plant in Ingone and threesmall-scale hydroelectric plants.30

Under the partial debt relief, China provideda grant of Yuan 5 million for the supply ofculture, educational and sporting goods.

Also, that same year, China agreed to loan

26 Maung Aung Myoe, n.1527 Ibid.28

ICG, n.1429

Maung Aung Myoe, n.1530 Ibid.


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US$200 million for the construction of theYeywa hydropower plant.31

Due to the secrecy in China and Myanmar,unreliable data and the fact that there is nodistinction between Chinas state-owned

enterprises and state-commercialinvestment, it is difficult to providenumerical evidence of Chinas investmentand economic support.

Infrastructure BuildingDue to the lack of investment by Myanmarsgovernment, Chinese infrastructuredevelopment is another important aspect ofeconomic assistance. Chinese companies arebuilding roads, dams, and ports, using low-interest loans and export credit. For

example, China is building the Tasang Damon the Salween River, which will beintegrated into the Greater Mekong sub-region power grid.32

Since 1988, China has helped the Myanmargovernment build 8/9 sugar mills [US$ 158million], 20 hydroelectric plants [US$ 269million], 13/45 new factories for theMinistry of industry-1 [US$ 198 million],and 12/21 new plans for the Ministry ofIndustry-2 [US$ 137 million]. Also, China

upgraded 6 factories for the Ministry-2 [US$346 million], provided 6 ocean-going vessels, and built a dry dockyard [US$25million]. In 2006, Chinese firms built 7/11new hydro-electric plants [US$ 350-400million]33

In sum, foreign investment andtechnological transfers from China toMyanmar aim to increase the value ofexports. Chinas development assistance isclosely linked to Chinese business interests

in Myanmar. Commercial loans wereprovided to guarantee Chinese firms couldalso benefit from Chinas developmentprogramme. Also, it helps China to securethe supply of semi-finished materials for itsgrowing economy. In addition, it secures

31Ibid.

32Ibid.

33 Ibid.

Chinas geopolitical interests in the IndianOcean.34

Arms and Technical AssistanceSince 1988, it is believed that through barterdeals and interest-free loans, China has

supplied Myanmars army with militaryequipment including tanks, armoredpersonnel carriers, military aircraft andartillery pieces such as howitzers, anti-tankguns and anti-aircraft guns.35 Also, in 1998,the UN reported that China deliveredUS$5.9 million worth of military equipmentto Myanmar under a trade category entitledtanks and other armored fighting vehicles,and US$3.4 million of military weapons.36In addition, the PLA provides training in thetechnical use of weapons and weapons

system.

Political UmbrellaChinas permanent membership in the UNSecurity Council provides political supportto Myanmars Junta regime. In 2007, theUN drafted a resolution that condemnedMyanmars human rights violations, which ifit had not been vetoed by China, wouldhave enabled international humanitarianorganizations to operate without restrictionand begin political dialogue with all stake-

holders.

Although China is flexible when it comesto human rights standards, there is a limit tothis political support, which will bediscussed in the next section.

China sees itself as the future superpowerand to achieve this goal, it needs to increaseits regional and international influence.Myanmar provides the opportunity toensure access to natural resources and to

some extent, improves China's internationalimage as it "mediates" the Myanmar crisis.

China wants to continue to exploreMyanmars natural resources and have good

34 Ibid.35

Andrew Selth. 1995. Asia, the Burmese Army.

Janes Intelligence Review, 1 November: 84-125.36 ICG, n.14


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China and Myanmar

9

relations with the government in power toguarantee border stability and protect itseconomic investment that will result in highreturn only if Myanmar can deliver thesegoods. In addition, the strategic position ofthe country compels China to maintain its

relations with the Junta to be less dependenton the Malacca Strait and secure its accessto the Indian Ocean.

IIIOBSTACLES TO CHINAS QUEST IN

MYANMAR

China wants to develop itself just like anyother country; now that it is an economicpower, it naturally wants to establish itself asa political power. Therefore, in recent years,

there has been a more conscious attempt onits part to balance its economicdevelopment with its internationalreputation. Four factors will prevent Chinafrom realizing its goal: first, an increase inborder instability; second, growingresentment against the Chinese; third, weakMyanmar governance; and fourth, growinginternational pressure on China to be moreinvolved in Myanmar.

Border Instability

Economic growth has a direct relation withinternal stability; China has made it apriority to maintain regional and borderstability to pursue its economicdevelopment. In August 2009, at theChinese-Myanmar border, a Junta militaryoperation against the Kokang MyanmarNational Democratic Alliance Army(MNDAA) led to a massive influx of morethan 50,000 people into Chinese territory.37China responded immediately by providingemergency food, shelter, and medical

attention. In addition, China deployed extratroops and armed policemen at the borderto prevent a possible spill over of the

violence.

37 Larry Jagan. 2009. Border War Rattles China-

Myanmar Ties.Asia Times. 1 September.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KI0

1Ae04.html Accessed on 2 May 2010.

The Kokang are of Chinese ancestry, speakMandarin, and have lived for decades in theNortheast of Myanmar. Just like otherethnic groups, they have their own militiaand have fought against the Myanmar Juntafor decades demanding autonomy. Also, the

Kokang were part of the Burma CommunistParty, but since 1989, had agreed on aceasefire that was upheld until the Juntasattack.38

This military operation led to a diplomaticscuffle between the two countries. China

was deeply upset over the spill overeffects and furious with the Myanmargovernment for not informing it of themilitary operation. Furthermore, Myanmarhad to apologize to Chinese authorities

for the instability caused by its offensive.39

This is a prime example of what Chinawants to avoid. Border stability is key to thepeaceful development of China andtherefore, it is working hard to curb illegalactivities such as narcotics trade,prostitution, HIV/AID, and gambling, toreduce instability along its border. Althoughthere is the political will, corruption at theborder frustrates efforts of the Chineseauthorities to respond effectively against

these forbidden deeds.

Drug and Gambling problems The Golden Triangle, which includesMyanmar, had been the center of opium andheroin trade in the 1980s, and today, 95 percent of heroin in China comes from thisregion. The Chinese authorities believe thatthere is a strong correlation between drugsand crimes, as well as drugs and sex, whichcan lead to the spread of HIV/AIDS.

In addition, since gambling is forbidden inChina, many Chinese nationals have gone tobordering countries to play in casinos. Fromthe Chinese governments perspective,gambling can lead to the kidnapping,torture, and murder of people unable to

38Ibid.

39 Ibid.


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repay their debt. Therefore, China has takenstrong action against these illegal activities.

The problem also arises from the corruptionon either side of the border, and even highofficials in border provinces. Also, manyethnic groups depend on these illicit

activities for revenue, and a strongrelationship between the military Junta andethnic groups was forged to capitalize onthese resources.40

Growing Resentment against ChinaChinas economic investment in Myanmardoes not lead to social development due toChinas lack of trust on Myanmar and thelatters lack of investment within its ownsociety. This has pushed the locals to resentChinese presence.

There is a strong, but unequal economicinvestment between the two nations. Fromthe 1990s to 2006, Myanmars imports fromChina grew much faster than its exports toChina. In 1990, Myanmars exports to China

were US$33 million and in 2006 they hadincreased 6.9 times, reaching US$229.7million. During the same period of time, itsimports were US$137.7 million andincreased 9.6 times to US$1.098 billion.41

Many problems arise from this unequaltrade: firstly, there has been growingdisenchantment with the quality of Chinesegoods; secondly, a feeling of neo-colonialism and alienation; and thirdly, thedestruction of natural resources without anycompensation.

Cheap Chinese Products, but at What Price?Since the 1970s, Chinese consumer goodshave flooded Myanmars market throughillegal trade. Just like the rest of the world,

every household in Myanmar relies onChinese products.42 Similarly, there hasbeen a growing resentment against thequality of these goods. Moreover, oncethese products arrive in the cities inMyanmars interior, they become more

40ICG, n.14.

41Toshihiro Kudo. n.16.

42 Maung Aung Myoe, n.15.

expensive due to the many bribes and feethat are paid along the way.43

A Feeling of Alienation in their Own CountryIn the north, for instance, Myanmaresecitizens feel as if they are being pushed out

of their own land. Mandarin is spoken widely, there is an increase of signstranslated into Chinese, most businesseshave some kind of Chinese investment, andit has been estimated that China owns 60per cent of Myanmars economy in CentralMandalay, which has been unofficiallyrenamed Chinatown.44 As a Burmeseshopkeeper said, after 100 years ofcolonization by the British, we had so manythings left, but after twenty years ofcolonization by China, we have nothing.45

The Destruction of the Environment without anyCompensation

The absence of reliable information on landacquisition, environmental impact anddisplacement by Chinese hydropower,mining, wood trade, oil and gas explorationprojects have raised concerns ofinternational environmental organizationsand locals.46 Chinese construction andinfrastructure development projects do notinvolve the locals due to the lack of

confidence on Myanmars labor force; theChinese instead, bring thousands of laborersalong for their projects in Myanmar.Consequently, there is little economic inputin the local economy. In addition, theseinfrastructure projects have to be protecteddue to instability and necessitate a largelabor force; thereby promoting militarypresence, forced labor, and forcedrelocation.

43 ICG, n.14.44 Ibid.45 Ibid.46 Regional Environmental Forum. 2004.

Advancing World Governance: Perspective From

the Regional Environmental Forum for Mainland

Southeast Asia. REF II, Bangkok, Thailand.


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China and Myanmar

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Weak Governance in Myanmar: AThreat to Chinese InvestmentEfficient economic trade between statesdemands a stable socio-politicalenvironment. Therefore, it is in Chinasinterest for Myanmar to have strong

governance. Confidence in a country tosecure, provide, and achieve economic tradeis based on the political atmosphere. A weakor incapable Myanmarese government willthreaten Chinese investment. Myanmarslack of expertise and knowledge oneconomic planning and policy makesChinas investment insecure.

In 2007, China tried to establish SpecialEconomic Zones (SEZ), just like it haddone on its territory in the early 1990s, but

Myanmars inability to understand the SEZconcept and lack of economic expertiseresulted in its failure to pass a law that

would have helped develop the country.47Myanmars weak governance which isriddled with corruption, weak judicialsystem, and lack of transparency andaccountability has made it difficult to dobusiness in Myanmar. Even Chinesebusinessmen complain of the widespreadcorruption, which is worse than in China.48

Myanmars inability to provide a secureenvironment for trade combined with a lackof professionalism and widespreadcorruption, make it appear that Chinasinvestment stands on precarious ground.China, thus, clearly does not want to see a

weak Myanmar government because itknows that the return on all its investment isbased on the stability of the government.

Therefore, it is in Chinas interest to ensurethe stability of Myanmars socio-politicoenvironment that includes building relations

with ethnic groups and the Junta.

Relations with Ethnic GroupsMuch of the natural resources are located interritories inhabited by ethnic minorities;therefore China maintains strong relations

47ICG, n.14.

48 Ibid.

with these ethnic groups to guarantee accessto the resources. According to theInternational Crisis Group, China wants tomaintain a balance of power between ethnicgroups and the government to ensure themaintenance of the current stability under

which China can exploit the resources of thecountry. Also, China has its fair share ofethnic minorities and knows only too wellthe importance of preventing ethnic groupsfrom gaining full autonomy withoutallowing the situation to escalate. China isafraid that such movements could lead toborder instability since nearly 25 of the 55ethnic minorities live in Yunnan province.49

China helps and supports these minoritiesespecially the Kachin, Wa, and Kokang, by

providing economic assistance, arms, andbasic utilities (electricity, water, andtelecommunication), therefore, securing theborder trade.50 Myanmars government doesnot approve these relations because theyundermine its authority as the government,

which continues to fight these groups.China can use its relations with theminorities as leverage when dealing with theMyanmarese government, which hasreinforced the latters dislike of itsdependence on China. Consequently,

Myanmars government does not trustChina and tries to limit Chinese influence inits internal and external policies.

China has invested and financed manyprojects in Myanmar. It does not expect animmediate return, but believes that in thelong term it will be beneficial for Chinaseconomic development. Therefore, it isessential for China to maintain goodrelations with ethnic groups that live inresource-rich areas and with Myanmars

government to gain official access to theseresources. This two-face policy that China

49 Kezia Dewi. 2009. Yunnan: Home of 25 Ethnic

Minorities in China.Associated Content. 30

March.

http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1593284/

yunnan_home_of_25_ethnic_minorities.html?cat=4

7 Accessed on 2 May 2010.50 ICG, n.14.


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12

is employing is dangerous and unstable, butat the same time, guarantees its access toresources. Just like the British divide andrule policy, China wants to maintain thisrelationship for economic purposes, toprevent internal instability vis--vis its own

ethnic minorities and gain some leverageover Myanmars government for businesstrade.

Chinas Rise to Superpower Status: TheLimits of Human Rights ViolationsChinas unique political system and historymake it more tolerant of human rights

violations, but there is a limit to Chinesesupport for dubious governments. Althoughit is impossible to define such limits, Chinassupport is clearly diminishing given

Myanmars human rights violations. Greaterinternational pressure on China would affectits reputation, which is essential for itsfuture ambitions.

China in the recent years has tried tobalance economic trade interests andinternational image by getting moreinvolved in the international arena duringthe 2007 Saffron Rebellion, 2008 CycloneNargis, and the 2009 extension of Aung SanSuu Kyis house arrest.

Veto Power: China does not like to be put on thespot

After the January 2007 Chinese veto on theUN draft resolution, China called on theMyanmar government to listen to the callof its ownpeople and speed up theprocess of dialogue and reform.51 This veto

was the first non-Taiwan related veto usedby China, and China felt uneasy abouthaving stood up against the West. Asmentioned earlier, Chinas foreign policy is

based on the New Security Concept; it doesnot want to be in that situation again, andconsequently advised the Junta to at leastappear to be cooperating with theinternational community.

51UN Security Council, S/PV.5919, 12 January

2007.

Chinas veto had some positiveconsequences, as the International LaborOrganization (ILO) was expelled out ofcountry, the government accepted a newagreement allowing ILO to stay, and theMyanmar government announced a return

to talks on the constitutional nationalconvention. At the same time, China tried toimprove the Juntas relations with ethnicgroups by influencing leaders of ethnicgroups living in Yunnan province, itadvocated the Junta to hold direct talks with

Aung San Suu Kyi, and China hostedsecret talks between US and Myanmar.52

The 2007 Saffron Revolution: A Pro-active China This time China faced strong internationalpressures to take a stronger stance against

the Junta, which resulted in Chinasupporting the Security Council statementand resolution on violence against peacefulprotestors. China called for democraticprogress and political dialogue with theopposition, and it helped the UN Secretary-General Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambarito access senior generals and Aung San SuuKyi.

It is believed that Chinas influence on thecrisis was deeply affected by its decision to

join the international community against theJunta. China has been criticized by Myanmarfor siding with them.53 Despite Myanmarscondemnation, China is still providingstrong diplomatic support to the UN. Iteven supported the UN Security Councilstatement of 2008 that expresseddisappointment at Myanmars slow progresson the Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy,

which led Myanmar to establish a timelinefor the same.

The Saffron Revolution was an eye-openingexperience for the international community;they saw a pro-active China that had the willto improve the human rights situation inMyanmar. Although China made sure thatthe UN Resolution was softer than the

52ICG, n.14.

53 Ibid.


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China and Myanmar

13

original draft, it was one of the rare timesthat China did not defend its economicrelations as a priority. China has providedand continues to provide diplomatic andlogistical support to the UN. At the sametime, China openly supports Myanmars

roadmap saying that it is much better thannot having a roadmap.54

2008 Cyclone Nargis: Bad TimingJust a few months away from Chinas 2008Olympic Games, the natural disaster putpressure on China due to the internationaloutcry over Myanmar blocking internationalassistance. With a direct appeal fromCondoleezza Rice to pressure the Myanmargovernment, China along with ASEANssupport convinced the Junta to allow

international aid. Unfortunately, right beforethe disaster, China had acknowledged apresidential statement focusing on theconstitutional referendum.55

In November the same year, about 14 pro-democratic activists received 65 years ofprison sentence due to their involvement inthe 2007 Revolution.56 Chinese ForeignMinister, Yang Jiechi, advised Myanmars

Junta to condemn these activists to 3-4 yearsof prison to reduce international attention.

According to a western diplomat, theChinese are actively trying to ensure that theregime does not go too far. China does not

want a US-oriented state on its border, butneither does it want the worlds pariah on itsborder.57

Aung San Suu Kyi and ChinaAfter the decision to extend Aung San SuuKyis prison term by 18 months, a Chineseofficial said that the world should respectthe judicial sovereignty of Myanmar.58

54Ibid.

55 Ibid.56 Ian MacKinnon. 2008. Burma regime Jails Pro-

Democracy Activist for 65 Years. The Guardian.

11 November.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/11/bur

ma-democracy-students Accessed on 2 May 2010.57

ICG, n.14.58

Respect Myanmar Sovereignty, China Says

After Trial.Reuters. 12 August 2009.

Furthermore, China said that it wouldoppose a UN statement against deploringthe verdict; therefore, the UN pressstatement only expressed serious concernregarding the situation.59

At the Ninth Asia-Foreign Ministersmeeting (ASEM), China expressed itsdiscontent and concern about the Aung SanSuu Kyi situation. The ministers agreed tocall for the release of those in detention andthe lifting of restrictions on politicalparties.60 In addition, China joined theGroup of Friends in calling for the releaseof Aung San Suu Kyi and other politicalprisoners.61 There are signs that China

would be willing to participate in someconsortium that would work to bring about

the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and theopposition to talk with the Junta, but Chinais not willing to lead the mediation due to itsstrategic ambitions.

Economic Growth vs Political Ambition There is a clear dilemma between Chinaseconomic growth and its internationalreputation. The timing of these events isimportant; the Olympics were a greatopportunity to project itself as GrandChina, one that has great history, culture,

economy, and is the future world power.Chinas joining the international communityin its stand against Myanmar was not drivenby altruistic motives, but clearly, becauseChina was gaining either through economicgrowth or the amelioration of itsinternational reputation.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57B0O02

0090812. Accessed 2 May 2010.59 United Nations. 2009. UN Security Council

Press Statement on Myanmar. SC 9731. 13August.60 ASEM. 2009. 9th Asia-Foreign Ministers

Meeting Chair Statement. Hanoi, Vietnam, 26

May.61 Ban Briefs Group of Friends on Myanmar on

Lastest Development. UN News Centre. 5 August

2009.

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=3

1693&Cr=myanmar&Cr1= Accessed on 2 May

2010.


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China and Myanmar

15

III. What does Myanmar Want from China?Understanding Burmese Objectives, Obstacles and

Strategies

Myanmar understands that it is strategicallylocated between the two large powers,China and India, both of which have theambition to become superpowers. Inaddition, Myanmars natural wealth andChinas thirst for the same have made theseresources economically valuable, thus,bringing greater income to the military

Junta. In exchange for assuring regional

trade, Myanmar is confident that China willimplicitly support its government, and eventrade, which is important for economic andpolitical sustainability.

IHOW DOES CHINA FIT INTO

MYANMARS OBJECTIVES?

China is the largest investor in Myanmar,but Myanmar is far from being controlledby the dragon. Furthermore, it is China that

is being manipulated by Myanmar. Asdiscussed in the previous section, Chinaprovides a wide range of services fromfinancial support to infrastructure buildingin Myanmar, but Myanmar still has theupper hand in this unequal relationship.

Myanmar uses China for its economicinvestment, political support in theinternational community, and mostimportantly as leverage when negotiating

with other regional or international

companies on resource exploitation.

Myanmars Junta has played upon its keystrategic geographic location and naturalresources with China, India, and ASEANcountries. Myanmars regional neighboursare directly supporting the current Juntaregime and its government understands too

well that the demands of realpolitik are

more powerful than the political beliefs ofstates ultimately it comes down to thesimple question of economic supply anddemand.

Myanmar is surrounded by developingcountries; for countries to develop, theyneed to have access to natural resources.Energy is the foundation of any country to

grow and prosper. Therefore, energyconsumption is directly related todevelopment and internal peace.62 In thiscontext, where Myanmar has the goodsand a long list of countries has thedemand, it uses its strategic leverage togain economic growth to sustain its politicalsystem.

Myanmar uses its close relation with Chinato influence and increase its leverage withother powers such as India and ASEAN to

achieve their goals of economic and politicalsupport for the development of the Junta tolegitimize its hold of power.

Myanmar has been a great manipulator of itsneighboring countries; it has managed tobring the South and Southeast Asian nationsto support its government financially andpolitically.

Myanmar Plays with China and IndiaIt is important to mention that in this paper,

political legitimacyhas been defined in terms ofeconomic trade; when countries agree totrade with a government, whether theyovertly or covertly support the governmentdoes not matter, their business ties

62 Namrate Panwar. 2009. India and China

Competing over Myanmar Energy. University of

Leicester. 14-16 December. pp.1-35 BISA

Conference December 2009


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China and Myanmar

17

in the block including DaewooInternational, MOGE, and Korea Gas Corp.

According to the Reuters, China is buildingtwo pipelines: first one will allow oil fromthe Middle East and Africa to be offloaded

from tankers at a Myanmar port, then pipedinto China. This new route will avoid theMalacca Strait. It will take 12 million metrictons of crude oil a year into China, about 6per cent of China's total imports in 2008-2009; there is no timeline for this project.

The other pipeline will have the capacity tobring 12 billion cubic meters of Myanmargas every year into China, and is expected tostart functioning within the next two years.69

The gas pipeline will alone provide an

income of US$29 billion and at least US$4.5billion in transit fee for Myanmar over 30years.70

Chinas Rise to Superpower StatusChina wants to become a regional andinternational superpower. China has strongeconomic and political relations withMyanmar, although in recent years there hasbeen frustration due to the limits of itsinfluence on the military Junta. The benefitsof Chinas investment will only be visible in

the years to come, therefore it is in Chinasinterest that the government of Myanmarstays stable, hence, to support and guaranteethe strength of the Myanmaresegovernment.

China wants political stability in the countrybecause of its economic investment. On theother hand, China gains political legitimacyby acting as the mediator between Myanmarand the international community. It is a win-

win situation for Myanmar and China, since

both gain either strategic access and politicalcredibility. As China provides financialsupport to the Junta, it helps to sustain itspower, which consequently allows China tohave some level of preferential treatmentregarding natural resources exploitation. In

69Factbox: Pipelines From Myanmar to China,

n.82.70 Ibid.

addition, when China is seen as supportingand working with the UN on sanctionsagainst the human rights violation orpromoting party talks with Aung San SuuKyi, China is improving its internationalimage and reputation. Hence, the

requirements for a future superpower.

The recent 2007 Monk Strike and the 2008natural disasters, when the Junta did notallow international aid into the country forover three weeks, led to international outcryand condemnation of the Junta, regionallyand internationally.71 In the last few years,the Junta has tried to keep tight control overits national sovereignty. To continue thehold on power, the Junta has kept a lowprofile in the international arena.

Chinas experience with internationalcriticism caused it to advise Myanmar tokeep a low profile. After the Depayin

Massacre in May 2003, the regional andinternational outcry over the Juntas actionspressured the government to improve itshuman rights record. The Junta responded

with the Seven Step Roadmap toDemocracy in August of that year, whichinitially was widely supported by ASEANand China for the future of Myanmar and its

people.72

In sum, China provides advice and acts amediator between Myanmar and theinternational community. Chinas largeeconomy provides the country with politicalleverage and Myanmar uses that facts to itsadvantage especially when it comes to UNsanctions.

71

Worst Asian Cyclone since 1991.Reuters:Alert Net. 28 March 2010.

http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/MM_STO

.htm Accessed on 29 April 2010.

72 Not Only the People of Myanmar but also

ASEAN and the International Community Support

the Seven-Point Roadmap of Myanmar. The New

Light of Myanmar. 21 October 2003.

http://www.myanmar.gov.mm/Article/Article2003/

oct/Oct21a.htm Accessed on 29 April 2010.


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18

IIObstacles to Myanmars Objectives

Myanmars Junta wants to gain the respectof regional and international powers as thelegitimate government of Myanmar. In this

quest, there are two possible events thatcould restrain its ambition: firstly, strongersanctions by the international community,therefore, pressuring China to get involvedand choose between its economicdevelopment and political ambition.Secondly, if pushed too hard by the Junta,there is a possibility that ethnic groups suchas the Wa and the Kachin may unite againsttheir common enemy - the Junta.

Stronger International Pressure on

ChinaA country cannot rise to superpower status without promoting peace and stability.Political reputation is essential for the worldto accept a state as a superpower. Aspreviously stated, China has worked on itsinternational image through Myanmar,especially during the 2007 SaffronRevolution and 2008 Cyclone Nargis. Chinabelieves in peaceful development and itpromotes peace and stability through itsexternal policies of the Five Principles of

Peaceful Co-existence and the New SecurityConcept (NSC), which in turn, have helpedimprove its international image, tarnished inthe past by the infamous TiananmenMassacre.

China is seen to be tolerant to some extentof human rights violations if they areconsidered necessary for the economic andpolitical growth of the country. In the caseof Myanmar, China has recently been morecritical of the Junta, even expressing its

frustration and at times siding with the Westagainst the Junta, but it still takes intoaccount its economic investment in thecountry.

Chinas involvement in helping andsupporting the UN and providinginternational assistance to enter Myanmar inthe aftermath of Cyclone Nargis,

demonstrated the pro-active side of thecountry to the international community. Itseemed that China was promoting peaceand stability for a better world. In addition,China joined the Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) and concurred with the legitimate

concern that ministers had over thehandling of the opposition in Myanmar.

According to a senior European diplomat,Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi didnot openly mention Suu Kyi by name inclosed-door remarks, "but he de-factodid."73 This demonstrates Chinas strongerinfluence and involvement in theinternational community.

Chinas behavior demonstrates ambivalenceand a struggle between its wish for

economic growth and political ambition.Myanmar is only a small economic input forChina, but there is a strategic interest tohave strong relations with this country

which is based on development necessities.Myanmars weak government and inabilityto adopt sound and rational developmentpolicies have frustrated China in recentyears. Although China has been active insupporting the international communityagainst the Junta regime, it has at the sametime, been overtly supportive of the latter.

China is playing both fields because it needsto keep good relations with the Junta forreturns on its economic investment and atthe same time, wants to become a strongerinternational player, which demands a goodinternational reputation and image. If suchinconsiderate actions and policies persist onMyanmars side, Chinas image andreputation will suffer and thus, thwart itsambition to become a superpower.

Ethnic Fault lines

Myanmar has a long history of ethnicconflict since its creation, between theMons, Pyi, Arakanese, and Burman in the900s.

73 ASEM Condemns North Korea and Myanmar.

Dalje. 26 May 2009. http://dalje.com/en-

world/asem-condemns-north-korea-and-

myanmar/260822 Accessed on 30 April 2010.


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China and Myanmar

19

These ethnic groups possess a strong senseof nationalism. For example, the KIO usesKachin language to impart education andpromote culture in its schools, it runscivilian hospitals, and has initiatedinfrastructure projects such as roads and

hydro-electric power.74

These social servicesand the strong sense of nationalism deepentheir non-Myanmar citizenship because theKIO is winning over the hearts and mindsof its people by providing security and socialservices. In the late 1980s, Gen. KhinNyunt arranged to sign a ceasefire treaty

with ethnic groups, especially with thepowerful ones such as the Wa. According tothe Myanmar government, from 1989 to1995, 17 insurgent groups signed ceasefires

with the ruling generals.75 The only groups

that have continued their armed struggleinto the present day and have a significantarmy are the Karen National Union, theKarenni National Progressive Party, and theShan State Army (South).76

In 2004, the then Prime Minister, KhinNyunt was arrested under the charge ofcorruption. He was the creator of the SevenRoad Map toward Democracy and theinitiator of the ceasefires. His arrestconsiderably weakened relations between

ethnic groups and the Junta, and created thepossibility of renewed fighting.77

The 2009 Kokang attack demonstrates the will of the government to take over theseethnic groups and make them part of thegovernment under the system of Border

74International Crisis Group (ICG). 2003.

Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority

Politics.Asia Report No.52, Bangkok/Brussels. 7

May. pp.6-1675Wai Moe. 2009. Wa Army to Celebrate 20

th

Anniversary. The Irrawaddy. 8 April.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=

15456 Accessed on 30 April 2010.76 ICG, n.10477 Myanmar PM Ousted, Under House Arrest.

China Daily. 20 October 2004.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-

10/20/content_383929.htm Accessed on 30 April

2010.

Guard Forces.78 According to the 2008Constitution, all armed forces shall beunder the command of the defenseservices.79 The Kokang are the weakestgroup and some have stipulated that it wasjust a way for the Junta to test grounds.

Ethnic groups such as the KIO and theUnited Wa State Army (UWSA) have strongmilitary forces and work as mini-states. They

would rather accept terms of the Panglong Agreement that established a federal statesystem than become part of the Juntasarmed forces.80 Prior to the Juntas attack onthe Kokang last August, the Myanmar Peaceand Democracy Front (MPDF) openlysupported the Kokangs stance to refuse the

Juntas army to enter its territory.81 In

addition, the UWSA supported the Kokangin their fight against the Junta due to aprevious agreement that also included theKokang Army or MNDAA, the Mongla orNationalities Democratic Alliance Army(NDAA) and the Kachin IndependenceOrganisation.82

The potential problem is that sinceindividualism and nationalism are verystrong among these ethnic groups, and sincegroups like the KIO and UWSA possess

strong military power, they could combinetheir forces to fight against the Junta. Anytype of instability prior to the election in2010 would further de-legitimize the Junta

78 EBO. 2009. The Kokang Clashes-What Next?

EBO Analysis Paper 1, September 2009. pp.1-7.79

Wai Moe. 2009. Border Guard Force Plan

Leads to End of Ceasefire.Democracy for Burma.

31 August.

http://democracyforburma.wordpress.com/2009/08/

31/border-guard-force-plan-leads-to-end-of-

ceasefire/Accessed on 30 April 2010.80

Saw Yan Naing. 2009. No Border Guard ForceDeadline for KIO. The Irrawaddy. 30 December.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=1751

2 Accessed on 30 April 2010.81 EBO, n.108.82 M Gyi and Mungpi. 2009. Myanmar: Thousand

flee as Kokang and Government Troops Fight.

Relief Web. 28 August.

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/AD

GO-7VCR28?OpenDocument Accessed on 30

April 2010.


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20

leadership. In addition, the Tatmadow doesnot have the efficient military capability totake on these ethnic groups. Additionally,fighting in mountainous terrain requirestremendous training and experience, whichthey both lack. Nonetheless, the Tatmadaw

has an estimated 492,000 soldiers,83

many ofwhom are conscripted and do not have thepassion to fight for their country. Thestrength of a soldier comes from his heart,from the fact that he is fighting for thehigher good of his nation, which is absent.84

In March 2010, Shan rebels killed 20Myanmar soldiers in an ambush.85 Also, 2000 Karens took refuge in the jungle last

January, to escape a military attack on their villages by the Juntas army.86 Therefore, if

ethnic tensions continue to rise, this,combined with a strong nationalism due tothe election later this year, may lead touniting of the ethnic groups against the

Junta. Consequently, the lack of internallegitimacy in Myanmar would underminethe Juntas ambition to be internationallyaccepted as the countrys rightfulgovernment. In other words, it wouldthreaten Myanmars legitimacy. The mainobstacles on the path of the fulfilment ofMyanmars ambition to prove its legitimacy

as the government of its country thusinclude: firstly, the attempts by China to

83 Amnesty International. 2008. Myanmar:

Ongoing Misuse of Arms Transfer. Blood at the

Crossroads: Making the Case for a Global Arms

Trade Treaty.AI Index ACT: 30/011/2008.

September 2008.84 Clifford McCoy. 2006. Myanmars Losing

Military Strategy.Asia Times . 7 October.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HJ0

7Ae01.html Accessed on 30 April 2010.85 Rebels Kill 20 Myanmar Troops in Shan State

Ambush. The Star. 19 March 2010.http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/3/

19/worldupdates/2010-03-

19T172548Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-

470599-1&sec=Worldupdates Accessed on 30

April 2010.86 Myanmar Army Attacks Force 2,000 Karens to

Flee. The Inquirer. 24 January 2010.

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/vi

ew/20100124-249179/Myanmar-army-attacks-

force-2000-Karens-to-flee Accessed 30 April 2010.

balance its wish for economic developmentand political ambition. Secondly, thepossibility of the uniting of ethnic groups,especially the KIO and the UWSA. If they

were ever to combine their forces, theseethnic minorities would together have the

potential to create more conflict and moreunrest, therefore, further discrediting the

Juntas current fragile situation.

In sum, obstacles to Myanmars ambitionincludes stronger international pressure andfurther alienation of ethnic groups. In bothscenarios, the credibility and legitimacy ofthe ruling Junta would once again put intodoubt.


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Conclusions

Since the end of the bipolar system and therise of globalization, the world has becomeinterconnected and interdependent throughculture, economy, and the polity. In order toprovide an accurate strategic foresight ofSino-Myanmar relations, it is necessary tounderstand the historical and presentcontext, national ambitions, and the currentmeans available to achieve these goals. Atthe same time, to offer a precise forecast,there is a need to hypothesize the possibleobstacles to these ambitions.

The paper concludes that the period of thenext 5-10 years, from a Chinese standpoint,

will be one of balancing between securing itseconomic investment through bilateralrelations between China and ethnic groups,China and the Junta, and its wish forstronger involvement in the political arena.In this quest, China will outbid all otherplayers; provide economic assistance;infrastructure building; and a political

umbrella to the international community.Nonetheless, China will have to face certainobstacles to achieve these goals, mainly thegrowing resentment of local Chinesepresence in Myanmar; border instability;

weak Myanmar governance; and strongerinternational sanctions.

Alternatively, from a Myanmaresestandpoint, due to the Juntas controversialhistory, it wants to prove to the regional andinternational community that it is alegitimate government. Through the SevenStep Roadmap to Democracy and theelection later this year, the Junta wants to

show its credibility as the government ofMyanmar. The Junta has been successful atmaking regional actors compete for itsnatural resources and its strategicimportance works in its favor. When China,India, and ASEAN compete for access toMyanmar, they are supporting the Junta

with financially, which gets translated intopolitical support. Also, the Junta does not

want foreign involvement in its nationalaffairs. Therefore, it purposely keeps a lowprofile in the international arena. The

obstacles to the achievement of Myanmarsgoals would be an increase in internationalcriticism that would pressure China tofurther influence the Junta, and ethnicgroups uniting against the government,

which would weaken furthermore thecredibility of the Junta.

In conclusion, in the near future, Chinaseconomic thirst will be challenged by its

wish to become a regional and internationalsuperpower on the one hand, and on the

other, Myanmars Junta will try to convinceits neighbors and the world that itsgovernment is legitimate.


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About the AuthorBilly Tea was a Research intern at the IPCS in 2010.

china and myanmar strategic interests, strategies and the road ahead

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