china disadvantage - msdi 2013

Missouri State Debate Institute 2013 Starter Pack#debatelikeabear Rumbaugh/China DA

MSDI China DA

MSDI CHINA DA 1

1NC SHELL CHINA DA 2

****Uniqueness/ Link****GENERAL UQ 5A2: TPP 6VENEZUELA UQ/ LINKS 7VENEZUELA UQ/ LINKS 8VENEZUELA UQ/ LINKS 9CUBA UQ/ LINKS 10MEXICO UQ/ LINKS 11MEXICO UQ/ LINKS 12LINK MAGNIFIER

****INTERNAL LINK/ IMPACT**** 13INFLUENCE= ZERO SUM 14INFLUENCE= ZERO SUM 152NC IMPACT CALC 16PROXY CONFLICTS ESCALATE 17CHINA CONFLICT INTERNAL LINK

18****AFF ANSWERS**** 19NON UQ- US INFLUENCE HIGH NOW 20NON UQ- TPP 21NOT ZERO SUM 22A2: CHINA PARANOID 23CHINA WAR IMPACT D 24A2: NATIONALISM CAUSES CONFLICT 25MEXICO LINK ANSWER 26IMPACT TURN LATIN AMERICAN STABILITY 27IMPACT TURN HEGEMONY 28

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1NC Shell China DA

Massive Chinese economic engagement in Latin America nowArchibold 2012 [Randal C. Archibold April 7, 2012 New York Times “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/americas/us-alert-as-chinas-cash-buys-inroads-in-caribbean.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]China’s economic might has rolled up to America’s doorstep in the Caribbean, with a flurry of loans from state banks, investments by companies and outright gifts from the government in

the form of new stadiums, roads, official buildings, ports and resorts in a region where the United States has long been a prime benefactor.¶ The Chinese have flexed their economic prowess in nearly every corner of the world. But planting a flag so close to the United States has generated intense vetting — and some raised eyebrows — among diplomats, economists and investors.¶ “When you’ve got a new player in the hemisphere all of a sudden, it’s obviously something talked about at the highest level of governments,” said Kevin P. Gallagher, a Boston University professor who is an author of a recent report on Chinese financing, “The New Banks in Town.”¶ Most analysts do not see a security threat, noting that the Chinese are not building bases or forging any military ties that could invoke fears of another Cuban missile crisis. But they do see an emerging superpower securing economic inroads and political support from a bloc of developing countries with anemic budgets that once counted almost exclusively on the United States, Canada and Europe.¶ China announced late last year that it would lend $6.3 billion to Caribbean governments, adding considerably to the hundreds of millions

of dollars in loans, grants and other forms of economic assistance it has already channeled there in the past decade.¶ Unlike in Africa, South America and other parts of the world where China’s forays are largely driven by a search for commodities, its presence in the Caribbean derives mainly from long-term economic ventures, like tourism and loans, and potential new allies that are inexpensive to win over, analysts say.¶

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1NC Shell China DA

China perceives economic engagement as a means of preventing their rise- they will read the plan in the most pessimist way possibleNathan and Scobell 2012 [Andrew J. Nathan Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Andrew Scobell Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation Foreign Affairs Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5 “How China Sees America” EBSCO]Beijing views this seemingly contradictory set of American actions through three reinforcing perspectives. First, Chinese analysts see their country as heir to an agrarian, eastern strategic tradition that is pacifistic, defense-minded, nonexpansionist, and ethical. In contrast, they see Western strategic culture -- especially that of the United States -- as militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish.¶ Second, although China has embraced state capitalism with vigor, the Chinese view of the United States is still informed by Marxist political thought, which posits that capitalist powers seek to exploit the rest of the world. China expects Western powers to resist Chinese competition for resources and higher-value-added markets. And although China runs trade surpluses with the United States and holds a large amount of U.S. debt, China's leading political analysts believe the Americans get the better end of the deal by using cheap Chinese labor and credit to live beyond their means.¶ Third, American theories of international relations have become popular

among younger Chinese policy analysts, many of whom have earned advanced degrees in the United States. The most influential body of international relations theory in China is so-called offensive realism, which

holds that a country will try to control its security environment to the full extent that its capabilities permit. According to this theory, the United States cannot be satisfied with the existence of a powerful China and therefore seeks to make the ruling regime there weaker and more pro-American. Chinese analysts see evidence of this intent in Washington's calls for democracy and its support for what China sees as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.¶ Whether they see the United States primarily through a

culturalist, Marxist, or realist lens, most Chinese strategists assume that a country as powerful as the United States will use its power to preserve and enhance its privileges and will treat efforts by other countries to protect their interests as threats to its own security. This assumption leads to a pessimistic conclusion: as China rises, the United States will resist. The United States uses soothing words; casts its actions as a search for peace, human rights, and a level playing field; and sometimes offers China

genuine assistance. But the United States is two-faced. It intends to remain the global hegemon and prevent China from growing strong enough to challenge it. In a 2011 interview with Liaowang, a state-run Chinese newsmagazine, Ni Feng, the deputy director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute of American Studies, summed up this view. "On the one hand, the United States realizes that it needs China's help on many regional and global issues," he

said. "On the other hand, the United States is worried about a more powerful China and uses multiple means to delay its development and to remake China with U.S. values."

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1NC Shell China DA

That causes military buildups and nationalismGlaser 2012 [Bonnie S. Glaser senior fellow with the ¶ Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, where ¶ she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and ¶ security policy. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as ¶ a consultant for various U.S. government offices, ¶ including the Departments of Defense and State. ¶ Ms. Glaser has written extensively on Chinese threat ¶ perceptions and views of the strategic environment ¶ and on China’s foreign policy 2012 “Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequence” Center for Strategic and International Studies http://csis.org/files/publication/120405_GF_Final_web-sm.pdf]The Obama administration’s initial policy in ¶ 2009 raised fears in many Asian capitals of a ¶ G2 condominium that would make decisions ¶ over the heads of others. Those concerns were ¶ unwarranted and short lived. Beijing interpreted ¶ the U.S. approach as weakness, which, along ¶ with China’s economic success and America’s ¶ struggles, led to a year of Chinese hubris that ¶ manifested itself in a series of intimidating ¶ actions in China’s neighborhood. Subsequent ¶ entreaties by regional states to counterbalance ¶

China increased U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific ¶ region. Now, the U.S. Asia “pivot” has prompted ¶ Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and ¶ heightened regional worries about intensified ¶ U.S.- China strategic competition.¶ In the run-up to the leadership transition that will ¶ take place at China’s 18th Party

Congress this fall, ¶ Beijing is inwardly focused and unlikely to act on ¶ its fears. However, 2013 could see a shift in Chinese ¶ foreign policy based on the new leadership’s ¶ judgment that it must respond to a U.S. strategy ¶ that seeks to prevent China’s reemergence as a ¶ great power. ¶ Signs of a potential

harsh reaction are already ¶ detectable. The U.S. Asia pivot has triggered ¶ an outpouring of anti-American sentiment in ¶ China that will increase pressure on China’s ¶ incoming leadership to stand up to the United ¶ States. Nationalistic voices are calling for military ¶ countermeasures to the bolstering of America’s ¶ military posture in the region and the new ¶ U.S. defense strategic guidelines. For example, ¶ an article published in China’s Global Times, a ¶ jingoistic newspaper owned by the Communist ¶ Party mouthpiece People’s Daily, called for China ¶ to strengthen its long-range strike capabilities.

Causes war and escalationLieven 2012 (Anatol Lieven, Professor in the War Studies Department at King’s College and Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, June 12, 2012, “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html)With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914.¶ In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the U nited S tates were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. ¶ But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China.¶ Neither the U nited S tates nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

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General UQ

China is crowding the US out of Latin America nowArchibold 2012 [Randal C. Archibold April 7, 2012 New York Times “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/americas/us-alert-as-chinas-cash-buys-inroads-in-caribbean.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0]Several analysts in the Caribbean say they believe that China eventually will emerge as a political force in the region, with so many countries indebted to it, at a time when the United States is perceived as preoccupied with the Middle East and paying little attention to the region.¶ “They are buying loyalty and taking up the vacuum left by the United States, Canada and other countries,

particularly in infrastructure improvements,” said Sir Ronald Sanders, a former diplomat from Antigua and Barbuda.¶ “If China continues to invest the way it is doing in the Caribbean, the U.S. is almost making itself irrelevant to the region,” he added. “You don’t leave your flank exposed.”

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A2: TPP

TPP is not china econ containmentSolís 2013 [Mireya Solís is the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies and senior fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and associate professor at American University May 24, 2013 “The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP” Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis]In recent commentary for the Financial Times, David Pilling argues that the central objective of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations is the exclusion of China. In his view, the desire to build an “anyone but China” club is due both to the perception that China got an easy pass when it joined the WTO and has continued to flaunt international trade and investment rules; and to the articulation of a larger political strategy to marginalize this emerging superpower. Pilling goes on to predict that the TPP will fail to deliver major liberalization as the traditional pattern of shielding sensitive sectors will emerge, and admonishes that only a much diluted trade agreement faces a realistic chance of ratification given the fractured consensus on the new proposed rules. In this

rendition, the TPP appears politically myopic and economically irrelevant.¶ The argument that the TPP is a club that bars Chinese entry is inaccurate and unhelpful. China, like any other APEC economy, has the right to request entry into the TPP. Whether the Chinese leadership will judge TPP membership to be in their country’s national interest and whether TPP members can be persuaded that China

is prepared to abide by the negotiated disciplines is a separate matter. But it is important to dispel the notion that the TPP precludes Chinese entry. In fact, this trade agreement scores better than most in incorporating an accession mechanism that has already delivered membership expansion from four to twelve members –now comprising 40% of world GDP. More fundamentally, it is hard to understand why TPP countries would pursue the counter-productive and unfeasible goal of marginalizing China. China sits at the apex of the world economy as it ranks number two in share of world GDP and is at the center of global supply chains. A trade agreement that by fiat sought to

defy these fundamental economic realities would be foolhardy indeed. Hence the TPP concept is expansive: it aims to eventually develop an Asia-Pacific wide platform of economic integration, not to draw lines encircling China.

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Venezuela UQ/ Links

China influence in Venezuela is strong- even after the death of ChavezNg 2013 [Teddy Ng in Beijing March 7, 2013 South China Morning Post “Chinese support for Chavez tempered by caution” http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1183783/chinese-support-venezuelas-hugo-chavez-tempered-caution]Sino-Venezuelan ties would remain stable under acting president Nicolas Maduro, who is likely to continue Chavez's China-friendly policies, the commentary said. Even if Henrique Capriles, an opposition politician, became Venezuelan president, the country would not make significant changes to bilateral ties, Xinhua said.¶ Chavez visited China six times. Under his presidency, Venezuela signed co-operation

agreements with China that covered energy, agriculture, infrastructure, trade, finance and aviation.¶ The strong bilateral ties between the two nations were highlighted when president-in-waiting Xi Jinping visited Venezuela as vice-president in 2009. He and Chavez signed agreements allowing for preliminary steps towards drilling projects and multiple refineries on Chinese soil.¶ "We know that Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world," Chavez said when receiving Xi.¶ "All the oil that China needs for its development in the next 200 years is here in Venezuela."¶ All the oil that China needs for its development in the next 200 years is here in Venezuela¶ In addition to the energy deals, China also granted a

US$4 billion loan to Venezuela, which will be used to boost development projects such as railways. China has become Venezuela's biggest foreign lender in recent years.¶

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Venezuela UQ/ Links

Chavez death doesn’t change Sino-Venezuelan relationsParker 2013 [James Parker has lived in Beijing for eight years and has worked at both foreign and domestic financial institutions. He is also engaged in consulting in the areas of international economics and international political risk, and teaches post-graduate finance courses for various UK Universities March 7, 2013 The Diplomat “China’s Hugo Chavez Blues” http://thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2013/03/07/chinas-hugo-chavez-blues/]The death of Venezuela’s charismatic and controversial President Hugo Chavez has seemingly surprised many,

despite a long and well documented struggle with his illness. Chavez’s international politicking was the main reason for much of the global attention on him, and his forging of relationships with countries hostile or

troublesome to the United States has been a recurring theme throughout his tenure. Yet it is perhaps the relationship between China and Venezuela, which has blossomed during Chavez’s extended term as President, which is now of most interest.¶ For all his anti-U.S. rhetoric, the United States was still the largest single importer of Venezuelan crude oil even if the trend in recent years (in part thanks to the remarkable U.S. energy revolution) was

decidedly downwards.¶ Both as part of his anti-U.S. Strategy and for domestic economic reasons, Chavez increasingly found a willing partner in China. China’s demand for oil has been growing in line with its economy, and indeed it is now the largest importer of oil in the world. Venezuela became a natural target for China’s sometimes confusing policy of engagement and support as applied to many poorer but rich-in-resources economies. ¶ Indeed, many aspects of China’s relationship with Venezuela can be seen within Beijing’s relationships with a whole host of other nations, many in Africa and the Indian Ocean. These include soft-seeming loans with fewer human rights, governance or transparency “strings” attached, but with apparent requirements that much of the funding be used to contract Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) to build infrastructure such as railways and roads along with other large construction projects including power stations.¶ The SOEs invariably import Chinese workers (China “exporting unemployment”) which can cause tension in poor countries with high unemployment rates. Meanwhile, the credit is extended by Chinese policy banks (such as China Development Bank or the Export-Import Bank of China) sometimes in conglomerates with other state owned banks all benefiting from their “subsidized” cost of capital – alongside the state owned construction firms. Future supplies of raw materials (such as oil, timber or minerals) are contracted to repay the debts, and extraction is normally facilitated by some of the infrastructure created.¶ Often these deals have been partly enabled by China being able to fill “gaps” left by firms from other countries. “Western” firms are often reluctant to invest in such places due to such concerns as corruption, the negative PR generated from doing business where human or political rights are a serious issue, and often a lack of trust due to recent memories of nationalizations – Venezuela arguably exhibiting all three. ¶ The fascinating book China’s Superbank delves into the workings of the massive China Development Bank (CDB) and dedicates a whole chapter to that institution’s exposure and dealings with Venezuela. Indeed, China’s exposure to Venezuela may now top USD $50billion, according to Michael Forsythe and Henry Sanderson, authors of China’s Superbank.¶ Although Venezuela is almost certainly safe for China’s investment still (absent a shock result in the mandatory election or other political instability), many will remember the scenes of China trying to evacuate tens of thousands of workers from Libya while worrying over the security of its investments in the country as Gaddafi fell.¶ Although the gaps left by western firms may be a competition-free, natural place for Chinese investment, there are often risks of being caught on the wrong side of any successor regime should instability become serious. By way of comparison, Iran was a very comfortable place for American and British firms before the Shah was overthrown. ¶ Whilst Chavez’s death and legacy will remain a hotly debated topic, his passing reminds us of the dangers of building close ties with a centralized regime based so

closely on a single personality. China’s appetite for raw materials, particularly energy, looks set to continue growing, and Beijing is therefore likely to continue investing in energy-rich countries. The associated political risks, China hopes, will remain mostly distant and manageable.

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Venezuela UQ/ Links

China engagement of Venezuela is highBremmer 2013 [Ian Bremmer president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, and author of ‘Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World’ March 6 2013 Financial Times “Chávez death exposes flaws in China’s foreign policy” http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/03/06/chavez-death-exposes-flaws-in-chinas-foreign-policy/#axzz2WsfpPnHi] “[Hugo] Chávez was an outstanding leader of Venezuela, and a good friend of the Chinese people,” noted China’s foreign ministry on Wednesday. Whatever personal sorrow might be felt in Beijing this

week, China’s regret at the strongman’s passing is founded largely on worries over the future of economic relations with his government.¶ Those relations have grown considerably in recent years. According to Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, the China Development Bank has cut loans-for-oil deals in Venezuela over the past five years that account for some 60 per cent of all China’s exposure in Latin America. In 2012, Venezuela made payments on the $42bn loan by sending China an average of about 300,000 barrels of crude oil a day.¶ There is a broader concern. Chávez’s death caught no one by surprise; it has been expected for many months. But the news from Caracas reminds Chinese officials that their government continues to depend on commercial relations with relatively unpredictable countries that they don’t understand as well as they should.¶ During a visit to Beijing this week, state officials have told me that they fear the demise of Chávez means the end of his movement — and that the opposition leader Henrique Capriles, once elected president, will undermine China’s considerable interests in the country. Mr Capriles has fed this worry by publicly questioning the legality of the loans-for-oil deal and by arguing that Venezuela should repay the loans in cash rather than oil.¶ In reality,

Chinese concerns about Mr Capriles should remind us how poorly Beijing understands Venezuela. The opposition is unlikely to defeat vice-president Nicolas Maduro, Chávez’s handpicked successor, in the upcoming election and even if Mr Capriles wins, he is highly unlikely to violate the terms of a pre-existing contract. Venezuela’s dire economic circumstances will make it hard for any new president to antagonise deep-pocketed potential friends.¶

China has huge engagement in VenezuelaArsenault 2013 [Chris Arsenault March 12 2013 Al Jazeera “Venezuela looks to China for economic boost” http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html]As China’s economic and political footprint grows across Latin America and Africa, worrying some and

enriching others, Alvaro Ruiz Sanchez has his eyes on the prize.¶ President of OrOctrading, a consulting firm, Sanchez - sporting thick cufflinks with the red Chinese flag and a dark blazer - has been teaching Venezuelan companies about doing

business with the world’s second-largest economy.¶ “Usually, manufactured goods from China are coming into Latin America and raw materials are going out,” Sanchez told Al Jazeera. “Venezuela has posted a positive trade

balance with China, because of oil exports, but without those we would have a major deficit.”¶ Trade between Venezuela,

holder of the world’s largest oil reserves, and China grew to $18bn in 2011, a 24-fold increase from 2003, reported China Daily, a government-backed newspaper.¶ Venezuela exports more than 500,000 barrels of oil to the Asian giant daily, according to government figures, and plans to increase that to one million by 2015. The two countries had signed 300 bilateral

agreements, including 80 major projects, according to a University of Miami study in 2010.¶ As relations between Venezuela and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away from its traditional trading partner towards the east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuela’s largest trading partner.¶ Venezuela's interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of President Hugo

Chavez on March 5, held talks with Chinese officials over the weekend.¶ "The best tribute that we could give to our comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China," said Maduro, who once served as Venezuela’s foreign minister.¶ In a televised meeting with Maduro, Zhang Ping, chairman of China’s

National Development and Reform Commission, said “deepening relations between China and Venezuela” are “the only way to comfort the soul of President Hugo Chavez”.

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Cuba UQ/ Links

Deepening economic ties now between China and CubaAl Jazeera 2012 [Al Jazeera July 7, 2012 “Cuba seeks strong trade ties with China” http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/2012775380851346.html]Cuba has signed a series of economic agreements with China coinciding with a visit to Beijing by leader Raul Castro.¶ The four-day visit , which began on Thursday, has offered Castro a first-hand look at Chinese economic reforms.¶ The pacts inked on Thursday include a grant and interest-free loan to the Cuban government for economic and technological co-operation.¶ They also inculde

a credit line to support Cuban health care and other public services, but further details were not given.¶ The signings followed talks in which Castro told Hu Jintao, China's president, that relations between the two nations were deepening and broadening.

Cuba wants to model China’s economic developmentAl Jazeera 2012 [Al Jazeera July 7, 2012 “Cuba seeks strong trade ties with China” http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/07/2012775380851346.html]The trip is Castro's first to China since taking over from his brother in 2008. Cuba watchers have speculated he would study China's mix of socialism and market liberalisation of which he spoke approvingly during a 1997 visit.¶ Asked what Cuba could learn, Liu Weimin, the foreign ministry spokesman, said China was eager to share its experiences.¶ "We consider that mutual communications benefit helping countries adopt a suitable model for

economic and social development depending on concrete local conditions," Liu told reporters at a briefing.¶ Cuba is China's biggest commercial partner in the Caribbean. Beijing helped prop up the Cuban economy after the withdrawal of Russian aid in the 1990s.

Cuba is within China’s economic sphere of influenceChina Daily 2012 [China Daily “Cuba, China to strengthen economic, trade ties” 2012-09-27 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2012-09/27/content_15787011.htm]HAVANA- Top officials from Cuba and China reaffirmed here Wednesday their commitment to strengthening bilateral economic and trade ties.¶ At the 25th Session of the China-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission, Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming stressed the importance of developing and improving bilateral cooperation and promoting business ties between the two sides as some European countries are struggling with their debt crises.¶

Chen said that during the meeting co-chaired by him and Ricardo Cabrisas, vice president of Cuba's Council of Ministers, the two sides "discussed and reached broad consensus on issues of mutual concern".¶ He believed the meeting "will perfect bilateral cooperation of mutual benefit and deepen our economic and trade relations".¶ Chen added that the Sino-Cuban ties and friendship are at their best time in history.¶ For his part, Cabrisas said the year 2012 has seen significant advances in bilateral ties especially in the field of economy and trade. Cuban leader Raul Castro visited China in July, during which the two countries signed several important agreements on health care, computer technology, banking, agriculture and trade tariffs.

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Mexico UQ/ Links

Chinese engagement in Mexico now- attempt to respond to the PivotEconomist 2013 [The Economist Jun 6th 2013 “Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?” http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3]However, as our story on Mr Xi’s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America’s backyard. China’s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American

Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to

Mexico as it imports.¶ But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

Huge trade deals with Mexico and China- turning the cornerDe Cordoba and Guthrie 2013 [Jose De Cordoba and Amy Guthrie June 4 2013 “Mexico, China Seek to Jump-Start Trade” Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323469804578525523377882046.html]Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a series of accords with Mexico on a trip here Tuesday, as he aims to jump-start an often tense relationship between the two rival exporting powerhouses.¶ The deals cover areas including food, energy, mining, infrastructure and education. The two also agreed to resolve recent differences over textiles and to allow Mexico to sell pork and more types of tequila to

China.¶ Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto said the agreements mark "a new phase" in the relationship between the two countries and said he agreed to visit China in 2014.

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Mexico UQ/ Links

Converging interests between leadership signals increased economic relations between China and MexicoDe Cordoba and Guthrie 2013 [Jose De Cordoba and Amy Guthrie June 4 2013 “Mexico, China Seek to Jump-Start Trade” Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323469804578525523377882046.html]Both Messrs. Xi and Peña Nieto are trying to make their mark as reformers. In a recent speech, Mr. Xi said China could stay "dynamic" only by keeping up with the times.¶ Since assuming power in December, Mr. Peña Nieto has pushed through a number of long-stalled reforms. At the top of his agenda: opening up Mexico's

energy sector to private investment, which would spur an investment boom and an increase in economic growth.¶ "Mexico and China are two countries ascending in a new international order," said Mr. Peña Nieto as he welcomed Mr.

Xi. The Chinese leader said both countries were ancient civilizations and share a similar history of struggle for independence which had created between the two peoples a natural affinity which make them "good friends and great partners."

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Link Magnifier

Chinese who see the US as benign are overwhelmedNathan and Scobell 2012 [Andrew J. Nathan Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Andrew Scobell Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation Foreign Affairs Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5 “How China Sees America” EBSCO]A small group of mostly younger Chinese analysts who have closely studied the United States argues that Chinese and American interests are not totally at odds. In their view, the two countries are sufficiently remote from each other that their core security interests need not clash. They can gain mutual benefit from trade and

other common interests.¶ But those holding such views are outnumbered by strategists on the other side of the spectrum, mostly personnel from the military and security agencies, who take a dim view of U.S. policy and have more confrontational ideas about how China should respond to it. They believe that China must stand up to the United States militarily and that it can win a conflict, should one occur, by outpacing U.S. military technology and taking advantage of what they believe to be superior morale within China's armed forces. Their views are usually kept out of sight to avoid frightening both China's rivals and its friends.

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Influence= Zero Sum

U.S. and Chinese influence are zero-sum.Joshua Kurlantzick, 2007, Visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World. p. 208-209, Google Books

But China’s growing soft power will threaten the U nited S tates as well: the emergence of

China’s soft power is already having a strategic impact on US foreign policy. China could wield its influence in a growing clash over resources. Like China, the United States needs continued access to oil and gas, since estimates suggest that America could be importing nearly 70 per-cent of its oil in two decades, up from just over 50 percent today. Oil and gas do not trade on a completely free market, tend to be controlled by state-linked companies—and may be running out. Stores of easily accessible petroleum, liket he fields in Saudi Arabia, could be dwindling. Colin Campbell, the former chief geologist for Amoco, argues that 2006 may have been the peak production year for oil, after which re-serves and production will hit a long downward slope. 19 With oil becoming scarcer, Latin American and West African and Asia oil remain among the

cheapest for the United States, and the easiest for American companies to refine and use. The U nited S tates cannot afford

to lose access to these re-serves to any potential competitor . As we saw in Chapter 7, China has enjoyed success in winning access to oil and gas, and Beijing views energy as a zero-sum game.

U.S. diplomatic inaction has allowed China’s rise in terms of promoting their soft power.Shaun Breslin, July 2009, is Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom, International Affairs, Vol. 85 Issue 4, “Understanding China's regional rise: interpretations, identities and implications,” Ebsco Host

Crucially for Gill, US foreign policy since 9/11 ‘has opened new opportunities for China’s emerging security diplomacy to succeed’.44 Add to this an inward turn in economic affairs,45 and US action and inaction have created a space—not just in East Asia—that Chinese diplomacy has attempted to occupy . This diplomatic space is predicated to a substantial degree on the declining moral authority and attraction of existing powers. As an Australian official interviewed by Lampton put it, it is ‘negative soft power’—at times, not being the US is enough to improve China’s international image.46 For Kang, this is particularly important in East Asia because it reinforces ideas about Asia as ‘different’. One element of the predominant cultural predisposition in the region is a liking for, perhaps even aspiration to, hierarchy. Asians are there-fore on the whole comfortable with the idea of a return to a hierarchical

Sinocen-tric regional order. If this is true, then the reaction in Asian states to the rise of China is based on some form of soft power; but the roots of this power lie not so much in the contemporary Chinese state as in the creation

of a historical ‘Confu-cian’ world order and a structure of international relations that percolates through into contemporary society.

14


Influence= Zero Sum

U.S. soft power is zero-sum with China’s – even if publicly declared to be cooperative.Gideon Rachman, January/February 2011, is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times and author of Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety, Foreign Policy, “Think Again: American Decline,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline?page=0,4

But whatever they say in formal speeches, America's leaders are clearly beginning to have their doubts, and rightly so. It is a central tenet of modern economics that trade is mutually beneficial for both partners, a win-win rather than a zero-sum. But that implies the rules of the game aren't rigged. Speaking before the 2010 World Economic Forum, Larry Summers, then Obama's chief economic advisor, remarked pointedly that the normal rules about the mutual benefits of trade do not necessarily apply when one trading partner is practicing mercantilist or protectionist policies. The U.S. government clearly thinks that China's undervaluation of its currency is a form of protectionism that has led to global economic imbalances and job losses in the United States. Leading economists, such as New York Times columnist Paul Krugman and the Peterson Institute's C.

Fred Bergsten, have taken a similar line, arguing that tariffs or other retaliatory measures would be a legitimate response. So much for the win-win world. And when it comes to the broader geopolitical picture, the world of the future looks even more like a zero-sum game , despite the gauzy rhetoric of globalization that

comforted the last generation of American politicians. For the U nited S tates has been acting as if the mutual

interests created by globalization have repealed one of the oldest laws of international politics: the notion that rising players eventually clash with established powers. In fact, rivalry between a rising China and a weakened America is now apparent across a whole range of issues , from territorial disputes in Asia to human rights. It is mercifully unlikely that the United States and China would ever actually go to war, but that is because both sides have nuclear weapons, not because globalization has magically dissolved their differences. At the G-20 summit in November, the U.S. drive to deal with "global economic imbalances" was essentially thwarted by China's obdurate refusal to change its currency policy. The 2009 climate-change talks in Copenhagen ended in disarray after another U.S.-China standoff. Growing Chinese economic and military clout clearly poses a long-term threat to American hegemony in the Pacific. The Chinese reluctantly agreed to a new package of U.N. sanctions on Iran, but the cost of securing Chinese agreement was a weak deal that is unlikely to derail the Iranian nuclear program. Both sides have taken part in the talks with North Korea, but a barely submerged rivalry prevents truly effective Sino-American cooperation. China does not like Kim Jong Il's regime, but it is also very wary of a reunified Korea on its borders, particularly if the new Korea still played host to U.S. troops. China is also competing fiercely for access to resources, in

particular oil, which is driving up global prices. American leaders are right to reject zero-sum logic in public. To do anything else would needlessly antagonize the Chinese. But that shouldn't obscure this unavoidable fact: As economic and political power moves from West to East, new international rivalries are inevitably emerging.

15


2NC Impact Calc

DA is more probable- increases in engagement mean more chances for miscalculationBremmer 2013 [Ian Bremmer president of Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, and author of ‘Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World’ March 6 2013 Financial Times “Chávez death exposes flaws in China’s foreign policy” http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/03/06/chavez-death-exposes-flaws-in-chinas-foreign-policy/#axzz2WsfpPnHi]In fact, the single clearest message I have received in Beijing is that while China would always prefer to make deals with predictable

partners in predictable countries, China’s leaders know that even after years of efforts to improve political risk assessment, they still must develop a deeper and more refined understanding of all the markets in which China now has commercial interests. That means that this traditionally insular, risk-averse government will become more active on the international stage — not to play a more ambitious global leadership role, but simply to better understand other countries, their political

systems and political cultures.¶ It also means that to protect their own interests, China’s leaders are now more likely to intervene in the political lives of others — and the debate is on in Beijing as to what form “intervention” might take in each case.¶ In the process of becoming more deeply involved in the politics of foreign countries, they are likely to discover that they have traded one form of risk and uncertainty for another.

16


Proxy Conflicts Escalate

Economic proxy conflicts escalateYeisley 2011 (Mark O. Yeisley, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Winter 2011, “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/winter/yeisley.pdf)The United States currently enjoys a unique position as the sole global superpower, yet it is unlikely this unipolar moment will endure much longer. China is uniquely positioned to translate rapidly expanding economic might into sufficient military resources to achieve regional hegemony . ¶ To meet the needs of its growing population and burgeoning economy, China must focus on obtaining strategic resources abroad, and herein lies the challenge for US foreign policy makers. In a future bipolar system where a nuclear-equipped China and U nited S tates both require non renewable strategic resources, competition for such resources will be a vital strategic interest for each side. ¶ Scholars debate whether such strategic interests will necessitate conflict between the United States and China in the future, yet preparations for such conflict now dominate US defense policy. The alternative, strategi cally justified future is one of proxy wars with China for continued access to strategic resources, particularly in African states. While the United States should not reduce current preparations for conventional war-fighting domi nance, prudence dictates that it also prepares for future proxy conflict management in Africa. ¶ The ongoing financial crisis will undoubtedly force reductions in future defense spending if the United States is to reduce its national debt load. This will necessitate further strategic, military, and interagency doctrinal and training realignments if it is to be successful in meeting the chal lenges of future foreign internal defense operations in Africa and else where. Preparations must begin soon if the U nited S tates is to overcome the looming challenge of strategic resource competition with China. A failure to plan for this proxy competition may well make a future war with China inevitable .

17


China Conflict Internal Link

China perceives the plan as United States aggression and revisionismNathan and Scobell 2012 [Andrew J. Nathan Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Andrew Scobell Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation Foreign Affairs Sep/Oct 2012, Vol. 91, Issue 5 “How China Sees America” EBSCO]In the eyes of many Chinese analysts, since the end of the Cold War the United States has revealed itself to be a revisionist power that tries to reshape the global environment even further in its favor. They see evidence of this reality everywhere: in the expansion of NATO; the U.S. interventions in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo; the Gulf War; the war in Afghanistan; and the invasion of Iraq. In the economic realm, the United States has tried to enhance its advantages by pushing for free trade, running down the value of the dollar while forcing other countries to use it as a reserve currency, and trying to make developing countries bear an unfair share of the cost of mitigating global climate change. And perhaps most disturbing to the Chinese, the United States has shown its aggressive designs by promoting so-called color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. As Liu Jianfei, director of the foreign affairs division of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, wrote in 2005, "The U.S. has always opposed communist 'red revolutions' and hates the 'green revolutions' in Iran and other Islamic states. What it cares about is not 'revolution' but 'color.' It supported the 'rose,' 'orange', and 'tulip' revolutions because they served its democracy promotion strategy." As Liu and other top Chinese analysts see it, the United States hopes "to spread democracy further and turn the whole globe 'blue.'"

18


Aff Answers

19


Non UQ- US Influence High Now

US influence in Latin America is unrivaledDavydenko 2012 [Andrey Davydenko, International Affairs 16-05-2012 “J.F.Bertonha: US Hegemony Waning in South America?” http://en.interaffairs.ru/experts/281-jfbertonha-us-hegemony-waning-in-south-america.html]The US dominance in Latin America was hardly ever called into question throughout the XX century. In fact, the situation largely remains the same at present, adds Bertonha.¶ The Central American

and Caribbean economies are integrated with the US economy to the point of being inseparable from it. The US has unrestricted access to the natural resources on which the countries of South America sit, and in 2007 the volume of the continent's trade with the US exceeded the transactions between the region and China roughly by a factor of five. Moreover, it is fair to say that China and the US are not on the same plane in terms of the investments in South America.¶ The US faces virtually no rivalry from other external influencers in South America, where the lion's share of the decision-making is known to require stamps of approval from the US Department of State. In the military-strategic aspect, the US as the country maintaining military presence in a number of Central American countries also meets with no competition. Columbia hosts several US military bases and serves as a de facto US foothold on the continent, while the US Fourth Navy treats the

adjacent marine expanses as the US backyard. Even though the Latin American countries comprising the populist camp have the task of parring the US military threat written into their military doctrines, they obviously pose no challenge to their perceived adversary. Given the above, US defense studies mention South America almost exclusively in the context of fighting drug trafficking and illegal migration.

20


Non UQ- TPP

TPP non uniques the DA- we are already economically containing ChinaPilling 2013 [David Pilling Financial Times May 22, 2013 “It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but China’ club” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/08cf74f6-c216-11e2-8992-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Wscx4HLi]The two are very much linked. No one will say it out loud, but the unstated aim of the TPP is to create a “high level” trade agreement that excludes the world’s second-biggest economy. The 12 countries now hoping to join – which also include Canada, Mexico, Chile, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Australia – make up 40 per cent of global output and about a third of world trade. That’s a big club to be barred to Chinese entry.¶ There are two motives at work. The first is to wind back time to before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Many politicians, trade unions and businesses now rue the day that China was let in. China got a huge lift from gaining access to global markets. But, the argument goes, it paid only a small price for admission. Joining the WTO did not stop China from “manipulating” its currency, from rigging its tender procedures, from funnelling cheap finance to its state-owned behemoths, or from systematically flouting intellectual property rules.

The view that China is a freeloader and a cheat rather ignores the fact that today’s advanced economies – including Britain, the US and Japan – all pursued rampantly mercantilist policies during their take-off phases. But there you have it.¶ The second motive for the TPP sounds like the opposite of the first. It is to create a block so powerful and attractive that China will feel obliged to mend its errant ways in order to join. To further that aim, TPP rules will penalise China in some areas. One example is rules of origin. Under the TPP, tariffs on garments produced in, say, Vietnam and shipped to the US would fall to zero. That would be a potentially huge boost to Vietnam’s already sizeable garment industry. Yet to qualify, fabric such as cotton would have to come from a TPP country, most likely the US. At the moment, of course, much of the cotton for Vietnam’s huge garment industry comes from China.¶ So how do you design a club that excludes China but admits the likes of Vietnam? After all, Vietnam is also a command economy with huge state-owned enterprises, opaque regulations and a keen disregard for intellectual property. The TPP is meant to bear down on all those sins. Those close to negotiations in the country say the aim is to push Hanoi to make root-and-branch reform of its state sector. That is wishful thinking at best and disingenuous at worst. When push comes to shove, deciding whether to admit Vietnam – and several other potential TPP members – will be more

about politics than economics.¶ That is because the TPP itself is at least partly a political project. For Japan, the fact that it is an “anyone-but China club” is decisive. Shinzo Abe, the nationalist prime minister, regards membership as a chance to sit at the table with the big boys. When he recently committed Japan to joining, he said the TPP would help Japan’s “security” – hardly part of

its official remit – and spoke of TPP members’ shared “values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law”. That description pointedly excluded China, yet somehow managed to accommodate Vietnam (an authoritarian Communist state) and Brunei (an Islamic Sultanate).

21


Not Zero Sum

There is no such thing as economic containment- the relationship is not zero sumSolís 2013 [Mireya Solís is the Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies and senior fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and associate professor at American University May 24, 2013 “The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP” Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis]If Chinese exclusion were the selling point of the TPP for countries like Japan, then one would be hard pressed to explain why the Japanese government is concurrently negotiating two major trade agreements with China: a trilateral FTA in Northeast Asia and an East Asian trade agreement known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). And the same is true for all other

Asian countries in the TPP who already partake in the ASEAN-China FTA and are participating in the RCEP talks. The “us versus them” dynamic of security alliances is not really applicable to free trade agreements. The noodle bowl that characterizes the maze of FTAs illustrates the fact that in the world of international trade overlapping memberships render moot purely exclusive arrangements.

22


A2: China Paranoid

Realist theories don’t prove China is hostile. Zbigniew Brzezinski, pub. date: February 2005, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Foreign Policy, “Clash of the Titans,” Lexis NexisAs an occasional scholar, I am impressed by the power of theory. But theory—at least in international relations—is essentially

retrospective. When something happens that does not fit the theory, it gets revised. And I suspect that will happen in the U.S.-China relationship. We live in a very different world than the one in which hegemonic powers could go to war without erasing each

other as societies. The nuclear age has altered power politics in a way that was already evident in the U.S.-Soviet competition. The avoidance of direct conflict in that standoff owed much to weaponry that makes the total elimination of societies part of the escalating dynamic of war. It tells you something that the Chinese are not trying to acquire the military capabilities to

take on the United States. How great powers behave is not predetermined. If the Germans and the Japanese had not conducted themselves the way they did, their regimes might not have been destroyed. Germany was not required to adopt the policy it did in 1914 (indeed, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck followed a very different path). The Japanese in 1941 could have directed their expansionism toward Russia rather than Britain and the United

States. For its part, the Chinese leadership appears much more flexible and sophisticated than many previous aspirants to great power status.

Power transition theory is wrong – a rising China won’t cause great power competition or war.Samuel S. Kim, pub. date: 2004, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, The International Relations of Northeast Asia, p. 23-4 There are several problems with most realist visions of post-Cold War Northeast Asian international relations. First, the historically derived correlation between system transition and war causation may no longer apply. There are many differences between ascendant China and the rise of Wilhelmine Germany , and furthermore world history may well be in a different normative (anti-imperial) cycle. 42 Indeed, what distinguishes the post-1945 international system is the extent to which international organizations have become prominent and permanent parts of a complex, increasingly interdependent global system. In the post-Cold War era, thanks to globalization dynamics, the games that nation-states play have lost much of the realist simplicity of the struggle for power and plenty.

Moreover, with the third wave of democratization, "democracies seem able to influence international norms and institutions, thereby affecting the probability that force will be used even by states that are not themselves particularly democratic."" The most significant and troubling geopolitical trend since the end of the Cold War is the predominance of intrastate armed conflict, not traditional interstate war or great power rivalry , and NEA has yet to

experience a single interstate or intrastate war in the post-Cold War era . If anything, the past quarter

century has seen a double failure in prediction. While no pundit or international relations theorist predicted such momentous events as the end of the Cold War, German reunification, or the collapse of the Soviet Union, many predictions on the rise of Soviet primacy in strategic rivalry, the rise of Japan as a superpower, and the hegemonic decline of America have all fallen by the wayside. The lesson is that we should shy away from committing the fallacy of premature extrapolation conflating China's actual power with its

potential power. Overestimations of Chinese power could easily play into the hands of Cold War hard-liners in the U nited S tates, if they have not already done so, lending support to reck less

self-fulfilling prophecies of the inevitable conflict with China. "

23


China War Impact D

No US/China war—It’s in neither country’s best interestAckerman 2011 (Robert Ackerman, May 10, 2011, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,” http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning

America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN

(Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip”

Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own.

Chinese leadership wouldn’t risk warRoss 2009 (Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, September 2009 “Myth The Great Debate” http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/myth-3819)Professor Friedberg's concluding suggestion that China's illiberal political system exacerbates the China threat fails to grasp that

Beijing's authoritarian system is its greatest vulnerability. The

Chinese leadership dares not risk war; it is acutely aware of its vulnerability to the will of its people and the necessity to minimize strategic adventurism

and the risk of military defeat, lest it be the cause of its own demise. A balanced rather than an ideological assessment of the Sino-American dynamic offers the United States the confidence to compete with China and secure U.S. interests, and simultaneously promote U.S.-China cooperation.

24


A2: Nationalism Causes Conflict

Chinese nationalism will not cause conflictZhao 2006 (Suisheng Zhao, professor and executive director of the Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?" The Washington Quarterly. Winter 2005- 2006. http://www.twq.com/06winter/docs/06winter_zhao.pdf)Anxiety is growing in Asia and the West that a virulent nationalism has emerged out of China’s “century of shame and humiliation,” threatening to make China’s rise less peaceful.4 Yet, Chinese nationalism is a phenomenon much more complex than the expression

of its emotional rhetoric on the streets. Although the Chinese government is hardly above exploiting nationalist sentiment when doing so suits its purposes, Beijing has practiced a pragmatic nationalism tempered by diplomatic prudence. State-led and largely reactive, pragmatic nationalism is not fixed, objectified, and

defined for all time; nor is it driven by any ideology, religious beliefs, or other abstract ideas. Rather, pragmatic nationalism is an instrument that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses to bolster the population’s faith in a troubled political system and to hold the country together during its period of rapid and turbulent transformation into a post-Communist

society. These leaders have set peace and development as China’s primary international goals and have tried to avoid confrontations with the United States and other Western powers that hold the key to China’s modernization. They have made use of nationalism to rally public support, but they realize that, if allowed to persist unrestrained, nationalist sentiments could jeopardize the overarching objectives of political stability and economic modernization on which the CCP’s legitimacy is ultimately based. The question remains, can Beijing keep this nationalism reined in, or will it begin to accelerate out of control?

25


Mexico Link Answer

There are no illusions that Mexico is becoming a Chinese satellite state- historical antagonisms prevent a deep relationshipDe Cordoba and Guthrie 2013 [Jose De Cordoba and Amy Guthrie June 4 2013 “Mexico, China Seek to Jump-Start Trade” Wall Street Journal http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323469804578525523377882046.html]While most of Latin America has benefited from the high prices that Chinese demand has created for commodities, Mexico's case is different. Like China, it exports manufactured goods, mostly to the U.S., and its economy has suffered from China's emergence as the world's factory floor as Mexican-based maquiladoras moved to China, and Mexico's share of U.S. imports fell.¶ But a decade later, the situation has changed. Rising wages in China have led to higher labor costs there, while high oil prices have made transportation more expensive. It is now cheaper to land many products in New York from Mexico than from China, said Jaime Serra Puche, a former Mexican trade minister. The transportation costs from China alone would be equal to a 12% tariff, he said. As a result, Mexico's share of the U.S. import market has risen from 10% to 13% over the past seven years.¶ "Mexico has recovered the ability to compete vis-à-vis China to penetrate the U.S. market," Mr. Serra Puche said.¶ Analysts say it is time for Mexico to take a more aggressive stance with China. "We now need for Mexican products to compete in China," said Luis de la Calle, a consultant and former Mexican trade negotiator. "We should now have an aggressive strategy instead of a defensive strategy with China."¶ In an interview, José Antonio Meade, the Mexican foreign minister, said Mexico was hoping to gain greater access to Chinese markets, especially selling foodstuffs, manufactured goods, minerals and energy.¶ China has a massive trade surplus with Mexico: Last year, it exported $57 billion worth of goods to Mexico, while Mexico only exported $6 billion to China. Mexico's current exports to China "are not representative of our potential if we had proper access to the market, and that will

be part of the dialogue," Mr. Meade said.¶ Mr. Meade emphasized that Mexico's relations with North America continue to be its main foreign-policy focus. Indeed, President Obama recently met with Mr. Peña Nieto during a visit here.

26


Impact Turn Latin American Stability

China influence in Latin America causes instabilityHilton 2013 [Isabel Hilton is a London-based writer and broadcaster. She was ¶ formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and ¶ is editor of www.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English ¶ platform for environmental and climate change news and analysis. ¶ Set up in 2006, chinadialogue promotes just and equitable solutions ¶ to shared problems through high-quality, reliable information. ¶ February 2013 “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf]The United States is Latin America’s traditional hegemonic power, but China’s influence in the ¶ region is large and growing. How far does China’s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a ¶ hegemonic challenge?

China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, ¶ primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. ¶ The impact of China’s activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries ¶ local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese

imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having ¶ an important impact on the region’s infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource ¶ curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful ¶ to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a ¶ benign environment for its economic activities.

Chinese support, however, has been important ¶ for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far ¶ the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. ¶ allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is ¶ becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

Great power warRochlin 1994 (James Francis Rochlin, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University, 1994, “Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America,” pages 130-131)While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more

important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly

inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic

interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere.

Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region . Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war , beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the U nited S tates would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director

of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

27


Impact Turn Hegemony

Rising China presence in Latin America erodes US hegemonyDavydenko 2012 [Andrey Davydenko, International Affairs 16-05-2012 “J.F.Bertonha: US Hegemony Waning in South America?” http://en.interaffairs.ru/experts/281-jfbertonha-us-hegemony-waning-in-south-america.html]Bertonha opines that China presents the US with the biggest problems in South America. Russia's bids in the military sphere may fleetingly cause allergies in Washington but never become critical. Washington easily tolerates the European attempts to cast mostly cultural influences, especially since the US and the EU are strategic allies. In ontrast,

China with its swelling foreign trade has the ability to present the US with serious competition in the future. There is a firm belief in a part of the US establishment and among a faction of the US commentators that for Beijing the widening economic interactions with Latin America are a part of a much more far-reaching plan.

The impact is global nuclear warZalmay Khalilzad (Dep. Secretary of Defense) Spring 1995 The Washington QuarterlyA world in which the U nited S tates exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global

environment would be more open and receptive to American values--democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a

world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear

proliferation, renegade states, and low level conflicts . Finally, US leadership would help preclude the rise of another global rival , enabling the US and the world to avoid another cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange .

28

china disadvantage - msdi 2013

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