china in the scs territorial dispute

7/31/2019 China in the SCS Territorial Dispute

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South China Sea Territorial Dispute 1

China: The South China Sea Territorial Dispute

Anavie R. Alegre

University of the Philippines-Visayas

Political Science 177

Prof. Barbie Badarios-Jover, Phd

October 14, 2012


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Introduction

The South China Sea is a marginal sea separated from the Pacific Ocean by four

major island groups. The biggest being the Spratly islands, followed by the Macclesfield, the

Paracel and the Pratas. It houses a number of reefs and islandssome of which are partially

submerge which makes them dangers to shipping. The South China Sea extends from the

eastern end of the Singapore Strait to the Taiwan Strait, bordered by the China, Malaysia,

Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.

The territorial dispute in South China Sea is one of the conflict flashpoints in

Asia. Confidence building measures instigated by ASEAN member states with China is one

of the mechanisms of conflict resolution in the region. China plays a vital role in the region.

The ASEAN is trying to engage with China to be able to avoid confrontation with the

Chinese over the territories. Scholars, account that because of the fact that China is both an

economic and military giant, the ASEAN uses confidence building measures to countervail

China. Engagement with China is important in the stability of the region.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chinas policy on the South China Sea and its

implications. In this paper, I discuss Chinese claims, the internal turmoil in China as well as

the diplomatic pressures from other neighboring statesmost especially the members of the

ASEAN.

Significance of the South China Sea

The South China Sea is important in two respects: Economic and Strategic. The

South China Sea is economically important because over half of the worlds shipping tonnage

sail through the sea each year. It encompasses critical routes connecting Northeast Asia and

the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Middle East (Snyder, Glosserman, & Cossa


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2001)which is vital for the oil imports of countries like Japan and South Korea. Its

strategic importance is characterized mainly by sea routes for maritime shipping and naval

mobility that is important in the maritime security of country. Ships that pass along the steel

corridor between Malacca and Singapore Strait and Northeast Asia pass through the

territorial sea.

Some of the earning of the countries surrounding the sea came from the resources that

are present in the Sea. Claimant states of the Spratly islands like Vietnam and the Philippines

vie for sovereignty over the islands because of the oil reserves in the spratlys. The sea is rich

in Oil and natural gas reserves. Estimates of these oil resources range from 105 billion to 213

billion barrels while estimates for total gas reserves are 266 trillion cubic feet (Snyder,

Glosserman, and Cossa 2001). However, these estimates are only mere assumptions. Oil

reserves are proven to be 7 million barrels. These oil reserves will be used to pursue

economic development of the claimant states. Usage of oil in Asia is said to increasing in the

following years.

The South China Sea also provides protein to sources for the human population.

Vietnams GDP relies on the fish stocks taken from the sea each year. However, the decline

in these fish stocks, results to conflicts with trespassing Chinese territorial borders.

Fishermen from the surrounding countries fish beyond their borders just to get a catch, and

this problem of decreasing fish stocks makes it likely for a confrontation to occur with other

claimant states patrolling their territories in the South China Sea.


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The South China Sea Game

History of the Dispute

It was believed that howling demons inhabited the South China Sea. It was frequently

mentioned in Chinese written records to be a source of danger. However, the sea ultimately

served as a means of communication at that time. Merchants from many countries trade in the

South China Sea by acquiring tax from ships that pass by the sea. When European colonial

powers came to Asia they introduced the concept of and sovereignty. The first ones to legally

claim the spratly islands are the British, followed by the French in the fear of the Japanese.

The PRCs sign of public claim can be dated back to the 1950s in response to the President

Quirinos statement that occupation of foreign powers in the Spratlys could damage the

countrys security (Amer, 2002). The official position of the Chinese government was

formally stated in the San Francisco Peace Conference and the US-British Draft Treaty with

Japan. According to Amer, China has been particular about the dispute in the territory even in

times of trangquility.

Conflict Flashpoints

The South China Sea is one of the flashpoints of conflict in Asia. Conflict between

the claimant states is because of three major reasons. First is the hydrocarbon reserve present

in the disputed area. Second is the declining fish stock and the military modernization of

claimant states in response with Chinese military modernization. The hydrocarbon reserve is

being contested because these hydrocarbons are essential or economic development. The

usage of this hydrocarbons to pursue economic development in the claimant states are said to

rise in the upcoming years. The declining fish stock in the South China Sea is also one of the

flashpoints for conflict. In the case of Vietnam, fish products are the main component of their

GDP; the declining fish stocks in the sea makes them cross over their territorial sea and cross


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over the PRC. Because of the probability of conflict escalating into a major confrontation

between the claimant states, states modernize their military in order to bridge the gap

between these countries and China (Amer, 2002). China is a threat in the perspectives of the

other claimant states, because of the fact that China is an economic as well as a military

powerhouse.

China claims all of the four island groups in the South China Sea, the Paracel,

Spratlys Islands, Pratas and Macclesfield bank. Taiwan and Chinas claims are the same.

However, the dispute with Taiwan in the Pratas and Mcclesfield bank is not as controversial

and relatively important compared to the dispute in the Paracel and Spratlys. The Spratly

conflict on the other hand, is more complex than the conflict over the Paracel. Paracel and

Spratly Island claims dates back to the 1970s. Furthermore, according to Fravel China not

only wants to acquire the rich natural resources, namely, fisheries, oil and natural gas in the

sea but also eyes control of a part of the Sea Lines of Communication. This could be

detrimental to other states especially the US and Japan. The navigation in the South China

Sea is important because of its strategic location. If the Chinese could control these sea lines,

it would be difficult for other states to navigate impeding world trade since almost have of

world trade shipping and goods pass through the sea. The PRC claims Maritime Space in the

South China Sea one of the ways in which it can expand its naval capability.

Almost all of the claimant states in the South China Sea claim an exclusive economic

zone of 200 nautical miles and the natural prolongation of its continental shelf. China and

Taiwan claims major parts of the sea areas as part of the countrys historical waters, claiming

an EEZ of 200 nautical miles and natural prolongation in the Gulf of Tonkin. According to

Amer, it can be postulated that Taiwan and China are both pursuing a Chinese claim.

Currently, China controls the whole of the Paracel archipelago and 10 islands Cays and reefs

in the Spratlys. China asserts its claims using the UNCLOS and history as their bases.


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Chinese Strategy in the Territorial Dispute

China seeks to consolidate its claims, strengthen its naval capability, enhance and

expand its physical presence. China also wants to attract western oil companies to explore

the disputed areas and conduct bilateral diplomacy with other claimants to be able to assert

their claims over the islands. In the case of western oil companies, if they negotiate with

China and end up having a consensussince we know for a fact that China is also an

important market to these oil companiesthen it would be easier for China to gain

sovereignty over the disputed areas. Furthermore, this is also to enhance the efficiency of oil

companies in China that currently has a limited role in the dispute. China is very firm in their

interest in the disputed areas. They seek to deter other states by dealing with them bilaterally.

China prefers bilateral engagement to avoid interventions of other countries such as the US.

In the Chinese perspective, intervention of these other countries threatens Chinas claim over

the islands. China is very sensitive when it comes to interventions from other states, and that

the involvement of Japan may destabilize the region and that the intervention of the US might

result to Chinese use of force. To manage the China threat, the rapid institutionalization of

the ASEAN and the engagement between the two is very crucial. Furthermore, one thing that

is notable in how China deals with the territorial disputes is delaying and deferring a final

settlement so that it can assert its claims and deter the other states claims. Because of the

importance of China consolidating its claims it is essential for them to engage with other

claimant states bilateral. Thus, explaining the importance of bilateral interaction in the South

China Sea. Chinas goal of improving its naval capabilities is to protect their national interest

(Asia Report).

China has a record of compromising in the majority of its land boundary that it shares

with Vietnam and India. However, China has been unwilling to compromise over the


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sovereignty over the contested islands as well as the scope of their maritime rights. However,

even though China is very assertive of its claim in the South China Sea, the existence of the

same interest in the territorial dispute leads China to engagement with other states bilaterally

and multilaterally. China recognizes the importance of an economic relationship with the

ASEAN and cooperates with the organization because of two reasons. First, the country aims

for economic build up. Second is that economic cooperation with the ASEAN takes

precedence over the use of force, most especially when it comes to the exploitation of

resources (Amer and Kivimki, 2002). The PRC follows Deng Xiaopings rationale of

economic interdependence in the joint exploration of the economic resources in the disputed

areas (Amer and Kivimki, 2002). Since the confrontations among the claimant states affect

the natural resources in the area, a joint cooperation in the exploitation of these natural

resources is very important. However, we try to explain this cooperative behavior by looking

at the Chinas domestic mechanism in handling the issue. I determine here three indices to

explain their assertiveness on the issue as well as their engagement and cooperation with the

ASEAN and other non-member countries:

(1) Sovereign interestexplaining the reason China is very assertive in its

claim.

(2) Management of the South China Sea issue inside China.

(3) Identifying the domestic and international actors that influence Chinas

behavior.

Sovereign interest in the South China Sea is characterized by speculations that arose

that China defined the South China Sea as one of its core interests. If this is the case, then the

prospect of an all out war coming from China is clear because the term is traditionally used

for matters involving national sovereignty. Matters like Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjjiang where

China is willing to compromise with other states and that the state would resort to the use of


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force if necessary (Asian Report). Furthermore, the South China Sea was also regarded as

lost territories of which is to be recovered like other lost territories. According to them, they

are a part of Chinese historical waters.

The Management of the issue on the South China Sea territorial dispute is

characterized by the complexity of the role and the bureaucratic structure behind Chinese

management. These agencies are as follows:

(1) The Bureau of Fisheries Administrationresponsible for one of the China Fisheries

Law Enforcement, one of the two largest law enforcement forces responsible for all

of Chinas claimed maritime territory. It regulates the domestic fishing industry and

prevents foreign vessels from fishing in the claimed regions (Asian Report).

(2) Chinas Marine Surveillanceunder the State Oceanic Administration the other

major maritime law enforcement force with the role of defending Chinese

sovereignty over claimed waters. It has the most power in ocean management and is

a different structure form the government.

(3) Local Governments involved in the dispute because of their pursuance of tourism

in the waters that lead to confrontations with other claimant states.

(4) Peoples Liberation Army Navyis responsible for protecting Chinese maritime

security by patrolling the claimed waters.

(5) Ministry of Foreign Affairsmanagers of tensions. Its role is to negotiate with

neighboring countries over the south china sea dispute. It also provides policy

guidelines and tracks the activities of other agencies to prevent confrontation with

other states. It is theoretically responsible for the formulation of Chinese foreign

policy. However, other players in the game have bypassed it.


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(6) Energy Companiesan important component in the South China Sea discourse. It

pertains to the national oil companies in China that has little or limited role due to

Chinas unclear status and the political sensitivity of the South China Sea issue.

This bureaucratic structure of the government doesnt have coordination with each other

that complicates things for China on the South China Sea issue. The ineffectual coordination

of these structures of the government contributes to Chinas cooperative mechanisms with

other states. Most notably the inefficiency of the Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is

responsible for the Chinas foreign policy. They also are having trouble with role confusion

among these agencies. Agencies which roles are supposed towards domestic policies engage

in foreign policies in order for the individuals in these agencies to be able to rise up to the

political ladder apart from familial ties. The priority of these agencies most especially by the

Local governments is economic development. This in turn results to political instability in

China.

Apart from the incoordination of these agencies of government in China, Fravel, proposes

the concept of regime insecurity to explain Chinese cooperative behavior in the South China

Sea. According to the diversionary theory, States manage their internal insecurity through

engaging in external conflict with other states to undermine the states internal conflict.

However, this theory could also be one of the venues for explaining why states cooperate

with each other. In the case of China, the state engages in the strategies mentioned earlier in

this paper to avoid external support for secessionist groups. China has long land border

encompassing diverse people. The diversity of the people may result to secessions. Chinas

cooperative behavior with other states can be explained by the states fear of external support

for these secessionist groups.

Engaging with China


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Many insecurity in the South China Sea is very important since they is a prospect of

the conflict escalating into war. The concept of managing insecurity is for states to engage in

collective security. This collective security is to countervail an aggressor from disrupting the

peace in the region. The ASEAN is the epitome of collective security in the South China Sea

dispute. It serves as an arbiter in the dispute mitigating various norms and agreements in

order to avoid armed conflict amongst the states. The concept of this collective security is to

countervail the hegemon which this paper identifies as China. According to many scholars,

the instigation of the ASEAN is to countervail Chinese hegemony over the region.

Engagement with China was emphasized in the Bangkok Declarationthe founding

document of the ASEAN as one of the instruments for conflict management in the region.

The ASEAN sees engagement with china as essential because of its growing power and

assertiveness in its claims.

States engage in confidence building measures as a means of communication in the

territorial disputes. The ASEAN is the main institution leading these confidence building

measures. Norms are being set up by the ASEAN for conflict management. These norms are

also known as the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way has two forms of confidence building

mechanisms, formal and informal Confidence building measures (Antony 2005). Formal

Confidence building measures include consultative mechanisms on matters of mutual interest,

bilateral mechanism processes and legal instruments in managing disputes. These

mechanisms are being used as political tools to strengthen regional ties and to maintain a

good and pleasant regional environment (Antony, 2005). It should also be noted that the

ASEAN regional forum is also one of the instruments by which the ASEAN is pursuing its

engagement. The forums role is maintaining regional security it includes convening of

meetings of defense officials, sea-lane cooperation, as well as anti-piracy and disaster reliefs

(Jiang, 2009). Moreover, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) is the treaty that ensures


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peaceful way of conflict resolution between member and non member states of the ASEAN.

According to Mingst, one of the instruments of states to manage their insecurity is Track II

diplomacy in which other states as well as non-state actors can serve as mediators in

conflicting states. In this case, track II diplomacy is part of the CBMs embedded in the

ASEAN way (Jiang 2009, 12). The ASEAN way helps in building security in the region.

Conflict management through the ASEAN range from norm-building, assurance, community-

building, deterrence, non-intervention, isolation, intervention, and internationalization

(Antony 2005, 49). Track II dialogues include the activities of non-state actors active

participation in the policy making process of the ASEAN as well as inputs of non-member

states pertaining to cooperation and security. According to Jiang (2009), Track II dialogue

mechanisms are beneficial in terms of relating information, transparency, and confidence

building It also serves as a venue for non-state actors to actively participate in the policy

making process of the ASEAN (Antony 2005).

Furthermore, these are the bilateral and multilateral engagement in the South China Sea:

Table. 1

Bilateral Mechanism Multilateral Mechanisms

Joint statement on PRC-RP

Consultations on the South China Sea

and on other Areas of Cooperation

PRC-RP Joint Statement on the

Framework of Bilateral Cooperation.

ASEAN-Chinese Joint Cooperation

Committee.

Framework Agreement on Comprehensive

Economic Cooperation

The Philippines and Vietnam signing on

a code of conduct to avoid conflict in

the Spratly.

Joint Oceanographic and Marine

ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct

of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)

The Spratly Islands Development Authority

South China Sea Energy Development


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Scientific Research Expedition

(JOMRSRE)

Organization, SEDO.

Malaysia-PRC Joint Statement on

Framework for Future Bilateral

Cooperation.

The ASEAN + 3a joint cooperation

formulated to enhance cooperation with

China, Japan, and South Korea.

Both the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN + 3 is the expansion of ASEAN-

PRC engagement. The ASEAN + 3 is a joint cooperation formulated to enhance cooperation

with China, Japan, and South Korea with its pursuance of an ASEAN community with

political cooperation as one of its pillars.

Furthermore the following are the bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties

that enhance cooperation in the region.

(1)A joint proposal between Malaysia and Vietnam regarding an area seabed in the

southern South China Sea located seaward of their 200 nautical miles EEZ limits.

(2)A joint statement between the Philippines and PRC in 1995.

(3)Code of Conduct between ASEAN and the Peoples Republic of China in the South

China Sea

(4)ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation

(5)ASEAN-China Summit

(6)2003 Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity

Conclusion

China is very assertive when it comes to its national interest most especially those of

which the state is deems important in their sovereignty. However, whats interesting is that,

even though China is very assertive in its claims, it still displays a cooperative behavior with

respect to its land borders as well as in territorial disputes. The behavior of China in the


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South China Sea is characterized by a delaying strategy and compromise with other states.

This strategy is effective when it comes to Chinas priority of containing its internal conflict.

It is an alternative way other than confrontation with other states. Furthermore, the imbalance

and role confusion of various structures of government in the PRC is one of the factors that

constitute Chinas cooperative behavior with other states. The ineffectual coordination of

Chinese agencies prioritizes economic development than political stability. The Ethnic

Separatist movement in the country leads to regime insecurity. Threat to Chinese regime is a

very crucial matter in China. Its cooperative behavior is mainly because of the states fear of

external support to these separatist groups.

Because of Chinese integration in cooperative regimes in territorial disputes, it could

be established that, this could lead to a peaceful region. Even though the claimant states have

no way of giving up their claims, cooperation in different aspects can be instigated. Claims

are not the main issue in the South China Sea because there are many problems affecting the

four groups of island that should be prioritized. These factors are: economic interdependency,

and the conservation of natural resources. Globalization is predominant; states cannot act on

their own and because of this, it could not be denied that economic integration in the region is

very important to protect domestic goods and to ensure economic development of other

developing states. Climate change is also to be taken consideration; these natural resources

cannot be there forever. If the claimant states engage in war, this will surely affect the

resources in the South China Sea. A full-blown war cannot be beneficial compared to the

benefits of an ASEAN community.


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