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China, Japan, and the East China SeaLike 37 people like this. Be the f irst of your friends.

During 2012 global security concerns were centered on developments in North Africa and the Middle East as the situation in these regions

Recently, however, the peace and security environment in East Asia has also become increasingly unstable and is causing growing concer

United States strategic rebalance toward the region. In East Asia, the two main actors are China and Japan. As for the former, it is already

territorial disputes with many neighbors: India (over the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as part of Tibet), Japan, the Philip

it), and Vietnam. The potential geopolitical turmoil in East Asia lies squarely on the outcomes of these tense disputes.

Sigfrido Burgos Cceres works at the University of South Alabama and is the auth or ofThe Hungry Dragon : How Chinas Resource Ques

For 2013, the biggest threat to East Asian comity and stability are the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands where China and Japan are at odds. Little mo

shark-infested waters, Japan won the islands in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Much later, the United States took over administration of th

World War II. China expected that Japanafter the 1952 San Francisco Treatywould have to give up the islands, and that they would be

islands were not returned. In 1972, the United States returned the disputed islands to Japan, which has administered them since. When Chi

diplomatic relations in the 1970s, the leaders of the two countries decided to shelve the question of sovereignty of the islands until a future date. i

The Chinese government considers the 1952 San Francisco treaty illegal and void. Additionally, China enacted a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1992 that treats the Diaoyu/Sen

to China, thus trying to unilaterally change the statu s of the islands as defined by the San Francisco Treaty.ii Japan has accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as compulso

undertaking various campaigns to promote their assertions in international forums, it seems to make sense for China to seek a solution based on international law. One only has to wonder: Why does C

the ICJ for resolution?

In late 2012 the Japanese government announced it was purchasing several of the islands from a family that has owned them for some years. China denounced the purchase as nationalization of the is

were transferred from one Japanese ent ity to another, Japans government as certains that the status quo has not changed, and that there is no need to open negotiations with China over the issue.government of Japan was simply a transfer of title under Japanese domestic law and merely states that the ownership of the islands was returned from a private citizen to the government. The obje

adverse impact on the China-Japan relationship. In other words, purchasing the islands was considered the best option available to the government of Japan to protect bilateral relations. Strangely e

Sino-Japanese relations were stable, a joint communiqu between China and Japan issued when Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Japan stated that The Chinese side expressed its positive evalua

pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan s contribution to the peace and s tability of the world through p eaceful means over more than 60 years since World War II.iii

Issues and Options

In many quarters there is a strengthening notion that China is now seriously contesting the Japanese ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands because of its newfound economic and military might,

to burn diplomatic bridges to make its point that maritime and territorial claims are to be considered thoroughly. A footnote to that notion is that China is testing the reactions of the West to a varie

skirmishes, and that it is also calibrating countermeasures and how much diplomatic amplitude it receives in the international stage. As expected by senior Chinese officials, Washington has cri

decision to set up municipalities and military garrisons on remote islands in the East and South China Seas to more aggressively secure its territorial claims. Moreover, American intervention in territ

China Seawhere China has been at odds with another American ally, the Philippineshas been interpreted in some Chinese quarters as a way for the United States to expand its clout and restra

However, Chinese leaders insist in interviews and press releases that China opposes aggrandizement and power politics in all their forms, and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.

To be sure, the United States is not a claimant to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands or the resources in the East and South China Sea, but for decades has had a strategic national interest in the maintenance

the pursuance of prosperity and wellbeing. In fact, since early 2009, the Obama administration has heightened its focus on Asia. Specifically, more attention has been given to East and Sout

economically vibrant areas that have sought deeper ties with the United Statesmainly in reaction to Chinas rising powers and North Koreas increasing belligerence. Some argue that, as part of re

the United States is using Japan as a strategic tool in its effort to mount a comeback in Asia, a policy that is said to be heightening tensions between China and Japan. This narrative is not without

Asia, Japan has been contributing to peace and p rosperity of the entire world, and it has counted on its alliance with the United States to do so. On the ot her hand, Japan continues to reiterate that Chstable development is an opportunity for the global community, including Japan and abutting economies.

A goo d example of geostrateg ic diplomacy by the U.S. government occurred in early September 2012, when former U.S. Secretary of Stat e Hillary Rodham Clinton flew to Beijing to ask officials of the

to aim for a peaceful resolution of the disputes with Southeast Asian neighbors over claims (maritime and territorial) in the South China Sea. Mrs. Clinton, as a preemptive measure, also asked a

countries to present a strong, cohesive front in dealing with Beijing, and to work towards a steady dissipation of the increasing tensions in the South China Sea. Washington has been urging Beijing a

embrace a non-coercive dispute resolution mechanism and abidance to a fair code of conduct.iv In more pluralistic forums, attendees of meetings at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs have

officials that ongoing discussions between China and Japan sho uld start on ways to reduce the risk of clashes between Chinese and Japanese patrol vessels that have gotten perilously close off the i

those attending these meetings was Indonesia. Indonesia, while not a claimant itself, has been spearheading efforts in Southeast Asia to design and establish, along with China and Japan, a code of c

and disputes. Indeed, many countries in the region realize that a stable Sino-Japanese relationship grants geopolitical certainty.

Strength through Force

In the international arena, the rise of China as a major player in foreign affairs is likely to emerge as a sa lient featu re of the geopolitical lands cape of the early 21st century. As China moves steadily int

start to assume an increasing number of roles and responsibilities. One of these responsibilities is the reinforcement of international codes, norms, rules, and standards that enhance peace and securit

the world. The international community welcomes a prosperous, robust, strong, and vibrant China, but China has argued that to fulfill its roles and responsibilities it needs to undertake a comp

modernization of its military forces. Indeed, since 2004 the Peoples Liberation Army has been mandated by its leadership in Beijing to carry out miss ions beyond the mainlands immediate territorial in

propelled the count rys military to engage in s urveillance, counter-piracy, disas ter relief, humanitarian ass istance, and international peacekeeping operations .v However, some regional actors ha

Beijings accelerated military expansion.vi They argue that a modern military could increase Chinas ability to gain diplomatic leverage or favorable dispute resolutions.

The deta ils speak for themselves: Chinas total military spending for 2010 was more than $160 billion (for comparison, the Pentagon spen ds more than $500 billion a year, although the nu mber is closer

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are included). China is developing its own aircraft carriers, and is already in sea trials with a refitted Soviet-era carrier from Ukraine. It is also developing anti-ship ba

capable of attacking American aircraft carriers. Finally, China is working on a new-generation stealth jet fighter, which it boldly tested in Beijing in January 2012 during a visit by former U.S. Defens

Chinas Peoples Liberation Armywith some 1.25 million ground troops, the largest in the worldis on track to achieve its goal of building a modern, regionally focused force by 2020. The Penta

U.S. Congress titled Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011 revealed that the speed and breadth of Chinas military expansion and modernizatio

destabilization in East Asia and the Pacific. The report provides details on Chinas latest acquisitions, such as aerial and combat vehicles, fast-attack submarines, ballistic missiles, jet aircrafts, milit

weaponry.vii

In addition to hardware, numerous intrusions into computer sy stems around the world in 2010 appeared to have originated in China. The development of capab ilities for cyber-warfare is in line with aut

doctrines: that information warfare is integral to achieving information superiority and an effective means for countering a stronger foe. Most importantly, as a source of economic prosperity and n

increasingly looking to the maritime domain. Chinese Communist Party officials emphasize the growing relevance o f maritime po wer to the co untrys s trategic interes ts. In 2010, Chinas State Oceanic

report titled China Oceans Development, which stated that the historic task for China in the 21st century is building its maritime power and that the historic stage for realizing this task is fro

buildups, h owever, are highly scrutinized. Pentagon officials have no ted that they are concerned abou t Chinas military intentions in the Pacific. In Europe, very real questions have been raised gi

trajectory in the s cope and the scale of Chinas military modernization efforts.

Despite criticism and s crutiny, senior Chinese government officials con tinued to pus h for a more muscu lar China in regional and internat ional affairs. Former President Hu Jintao, in a report to the 18th

Communist Party, explicitly outlined his countrys policy to resolutely safeguard Chinas maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power. These pronouncements have attractedJapan. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe asserted in early 2013 that Chinese power is increasingly transfiguring the South China Sea into Lake Beijing. Japan frets that China will

that it cannot be trusted to us e its nas cent military power responsibly.ix

The overarching rationale against power buildup is that Chinas drive towards military aggrandizement will push other countries towards anti-China coalitions that reduce rather than enhance Chin

becaus e China can effectively deter d irect military actions in the region, nations seeking to counteract its rise will be bound to choos e a cocktail of containment, deterrence, and preemption s trate

speedup, the economic growth China needs so desperately to maintain internal stability and political legitimacy. For many observers, what is really worrying about the anger-laden actions witnesse

they are rooted in nationalism encouraged by the government, radicals, and provocateurs. Clearly, erratic economic growth in 2013 is poised to weaken the governments legitimacy, and the Chinese

may become increasingly dependent on nationalism and patriotism to entrench an intrinsic validity with its citizenry. But not everyone in Beijing is bent on belligerence and truculence. Key actors o

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attempt to cool off pugnacious impulses.

Reflections

China and Japan share strategic interests not only in terms of bilateral relations but in a variety of areas. Both have committed to building win-win ties through cooperation and reciprocity. Despi

interests, many months have passed after Chinese con sumers s taged a boycott of Japanese products over the uninhabited islands: sales of Japanese autos in China have yet to recover, Chinese f

South Korean component suppliers, and the U.S. has displaced China as Japans largest export marketthe commercial cost of failing to resolve this dispute keeps rising fast.

Citizens and politicians of both countries could do well in reminding themselves of the tremendous efforts made by former Chinese and Japanese leaders as they devoted themselves to normalizin

decided to establish a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, thereby propelling the bilateral relationship to a higher level. Yet, it is illustrative that immediate

overshadowed by fact that the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands offer the prospect of rich fishing grounds, potential oil reserves, and a strategic military outpost in the sea for both China and Japan. What is n

these spats have changed the landscape of Sino-Japanese relations, especially since territorial and maritime disputes are prone to spirals of escalation and retaliation. If one looks at it with perspecti

that both regional economies will, in the end, lose more than gainJapan can potentially lose a tectonic market for its products, and China will likely not be able to leverage Japans technologi

investments for growth.

In China, there is sincere hope that the new leader of the CCP will bring about the long-delayed economic, political, and social reforms needed to make their country a growth-and-peace-seeking econchanges in Chinese foreign policy are not likely to follow the selection of a new leadership team in Beijing. Sooner or later China will enter a phased progression into an increasingly open situation,

one where people with diverse backgrounds have more inputs. And this evolution could very well include a system based on equality, rule of law, and more accountability. Nowadays, as a political

under penumbra of secrecy. For instance, we have learned that Chinese authorities are sensitive to media coverage of the wealth amassed by some elements at the highest echelons of power. Those s

the increasingly corrupt system of interlocking ties between the Communist Party and state-owned banks, industries, and monopolies. The vast internal assemblage of knots and ties allow top CCP

to become affluent, and even facilitate the rapid shuttling of monies out of China.x

There are encouraging signs that change is near. Within China, not everyone is tight-lipped. A senior editor at the Beijing-based Study Times argued on a controversial web article that the lack of p

cause of public discontent, including stalled economic restructuring, income disparity, and pollution. Also, Chinas lack of transparency and its trends in military prowess have been denounced. Ch

stated that being nationalist in China is politically correct, and the government has long relied on a muscular nationalism to bolster its legitimacy. xi Even staunch allies are progressively looking out

2012 Myanmar played hos t to a visit by U.S. President Barack Obama, which marked a dramatic shift in policy for a strateg ically important neighbor th at had long been cons idered to be aligned reliably

In years to come, the world can only hope that students of international affairs will be expected to learn that China and Japan acted as responsible members of the international community, and that in

to s tabilize relations with each other after a realization of ho w much more was at s take.

iKimie Hara, 50 Years from San F rancisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japans T erritorial Problems,Pacific Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, 2001, 361-382.

iiZhongqi Pan, Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective,Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2007, 71-92.

iiiKoichiro Genba, Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads,New York Times, 20 November 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/opinion/koichiro-genba-japan-china-relations-at-a-crossroads.html?_r=0

iv Clinton seeks Chinese accord on South China S ea, CBS News, 4 September 2012, available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501712_162-57505428/clinton-seeks-chinese-accord-on-south-china-sea/

vAndrew Scobell and Andrew J. Nathan, Chinas Overstretched Military, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2012, 135-148.

viThe Chinese military remains focused on Taiwan, which it claims as part of its sovereign territory, and reports claim that it has deployed as many as 1,200 short-range missiles aimed in its direction.

viiOffice of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the P eoples Republic of China 2011, Annual R eport to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012), 94 pages, available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2

viiiState Oceanic Administration ofthe P eoples Republic ofChina, Institutional Website, http://www.soa.gov.cn/

ixJames R. Holmes, T he South China Sea: Lake Beijing, The Diplomat, 7 January 2013, available at: htt p://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/01/07/the-south-china-sea-lake-beijing/

xThomas L. Friedman, T he Talk of China, The New York Times, 15 September 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/opinion/sunday/friedman-the-talk-of-china.html?src=me&ref=general

xiDidi Kirsten Tatlow, The Meaning of the China-Japan Island Dispute,International Herald Tribune, 19 September 2012.

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