china myanmar relations

8/12/2019 China Myanmar Relations

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The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations:Strategic and Economic Dimensions

P oon K im S H E E

Abstract

The main th esis of this paper is to ar gue tha t Myan mar is nei ther a s tra tegicpawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short and immediate term. Since1 98 8, S i n o-M y a n m a r e n t e n t e i s u n e v en , a s y m m e t r i ca l , b u t n e v er t h e le s sreciprocal a nd mutua lly beneficial. The st ra tegic ent ente a nd economic relat ionsare a marr iage of convenience . However, Myanmar s s t ra tegic loca t ion on at r i j unc t ion be tween Sou th As ia , Sou theas t As i a and Ch ina i s neve r the l e s seconomically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is importantfo r Ch ina a s a t r ad ing ou t l e t t o t he Ind ian Ocean fo r i t s l and locked in l andp r ov i n ce s o f Yu n n a n a n d S i ch u a n . S t r a t e g i ca l l y, M y a n m a r i s p ot e n t i a l l yimportant for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and itsl o n g - t e r m t w o - o c e a n o b j e c t i v e . F u r t h e r m o r e , a C h i n a - M y a n m a r n e x u s i ss t ra tegica l ly usefu l for China to conta in Indias inf luence in Southeas t Asia .Finally, Myanma r is part an d parcel of Chinas grand stra tegic design t o achieveits goal of becoming a great power in th e 21 st centur y. Despite th e more extensiveg rowing Ch inese i n f luence ove r Myanmar, i t i s un l ike ly t ha t Rangoon wi l lb e c o m e a s t r a t e g i c s a t e l l i t e b a s e f o r C h i n a . M y a n m a r s s t r o n g s e n s e o fnationalism, its past ability to successfully deal with foreign powers to preservei t s independence and cul tura l ident i ty, wi l l l ike ly make Myanmar wi ths tandmost odds.

Is Myanmar a Strategic Pawn of China?

T h e a r g u m e n t t h a t M y a n m a r i s a s t r a t e g i c p a w n o r a n e c o n o m i c p i v o t i spredicated on Myanmars geo-strategic position, since it shares common bordersw ith its t w o gia nt n eighbours, China a nd In dia. The logic of th is reasoning is tha t

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Visting Professor a t College of Internat iona l Relat ions, Ritsumeikan Un iversity, J apa n.

The Int erna tional St udies Associat ion of Ritsumeika n U niversity:

Ritsu meika n Annua l Review of In tern a tiona l St udies, 2002. IS SN 1347-8214. Vol.1, pp. 33-53


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responses to Ch inas Mya nma r policies, and th en India s a nd ASE ANs responsesto the chal lenges from a r is ing Chinas inroads and inf luences over Myanmar

since t he 1990s.

Chinas Myanmar Policies: Objectives

China s objectives in Mya nma r ca n be succinctly summa rized a s follow s:First, since 1979, Chinas Myanmar policy has been in line with its general

policy of ensuring a sta ble externa l environment w ith t he neighbouring st a tes sot h a t B e iji n g c a n c on t i n u e t o i m pl em e n t i t s d o m es t i c m od e r n i z a t i on a n d

development policy.S e c on d , C h i n a s M y a n m a r p o l i cy c a n b e s ee n i n t h e co n t e x t o f t h econtinuation of maintaining the spirit of Bandungs policy of peaceful coexistencew ith its n eighbours since 1955.

Third, in the geo-economic dimension, Myanmar is important for China inthe context of being a landridge 2 for C hina to revive its sout hw est silk road fromYunnan province to Mya nma r a nd w estw ar d to Ba ngladesh, India a nd the West .The l ink up with Myanmar could help to develop the poor economies in thes ou t h w e s t er n p a r t of i n l a n d C h i n a t o t r a d e w i t h t h e g r o w i n g e co n om i e s of

Southeast Asia an d India. 3 Furthermore, with the realization of the ASEAN FreeTrade Area (AFTA) with a population of 500 million, China could promote tradesouth w a rd using Myan ma r a s a la ndridge, linking China s inland provinces withth e rest of Southea st Asia .

Fourth, with Myanma r, La os an d Tha ila nd, China can form a sub-regiona lgrouping for economic coopera t ion . Thus China can expor t an abundance ofcheaper goods to these countries. Myanmar is important to China to implementi t s w e s t e r n d e ve lop m e n t s t r a t e g y. 4 K u n m i n g , i n p a r t i cu l a r , w i ll b e n ef i teconomically by linking up with Myanmar for trade and investments. Togetherwi th t he fo rma t ion o f a sub - r eg iona l g roup ing inc lud ing the f i ve ma in l and

Southeast Asian economies (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar),which have a potential market of 200 million people, they can be the goods andproducts out lets for Kunming and other southwestern provinces. The l ink up

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The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions

2 . For a s tudy on the s t ra teg ic l andr idge see , Yuan-Li Wu, T h e S t r a t e gi c L a n d r i d g e ,(California: Stanford University Press, 1975).

3. J . Moha n Ma lik, Mya nma r s Role in Regional Security: Pa wn or Pivot? op. ci t ., p.57.4. Tian Xiaowen, Chinas Drive to Develop Its Western Region (I): Why Turn To This Region

Now? EAI Background Brief No.71, (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of

Singapore), 28 September 2000.


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be tween Ch ina s sou thwes t e rn p rov inces and the ma in l and Sou theas t As i ans ta tes can mi t iga te the gap of economic d ispar i t ies be tween Chinas a ff luent

coa sta l a nd its povert y st ricken south w estern inlan d provinces.

Myanmar in Chinas Strategic Thinking

Does China ha ve long-term gra nd stra tegic designs on Myanma r a nd th e IndianOcean?

M y a n m a r i s g e og r a p h ica l ly l oca t e d a t t h e s ou t h w e st of C h i n a a n d i ss trategical ly important as a landridge for the Peoples Liberat ion Army Navy

(PLAN) in the long term to reach the Indian Ocean via the Myanmar-controlledCoco Is lands, which are about 30 km north of the Indian-control led AndamanIslands. By the year 2050, China is expected to achieve world-class blue waternavy s t a tu s . 5 Myanmar would be s t ra teg ica l ly impor tan t for China to achievedirect access to the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The PLAN would be able toshorten the distance by 3000km reducing the voyage by five to six days by notpas s ing th rough the S t r a i t o f Ma lacca t o r each the Bay o f Benga l . I n 1994 ,J a panese sources reported t ha t China ha d completed construct ion of ra dar a ndelectronic survei l lance faci l i t ies on the Coco Is lands, which were on lease to

Ch ina . 6 There was a l so a repor t tha t China and Myanmar were in te res ted injoint development of a deep-water port at Kyaukpyu on Ramree Islands in theBay of Bengal .7 Furthermore, the al leged mil i tary instal lat ion at the ZadetkyiIs land on Myanmar s southern t ip of i ts terr i tory close to Indonesias SabangIsland, (off northern Aceh in Sumatra) raised suspicions about Chinas futurema ri t ime ambit ions in t he Indian Ocean. 8 Thus Chinas strategic alignment witha nd inroa ds int o Myan ma r could ha ve long-term serious security implica tions notonly for Indonesia, Thailand and ASEAN as a whole, but also for the long-termstra tegic interests of India , J a pan a nd the US.

Since the 1988 pos t -mi l i ta ry coup per iod , Rangoon has cemented c loser

military cooperation with China. In l989, the first military delegation arrived inB eijing to negotiat e the purcha se of arms from China . A deal wa s struck w orth

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5. Shee Poon Kim, The South China Sea in Chinas Strategic Thinking , Contempora ry South east Asi a , Vol. 19, No. 4, Ma rch 1998, S inga pore, p.369-387.

6. Asia Y ear book 1994, p.98-100; P eter W. Rodma n, Ch ina Woos B urm a , In ternat i onal H eral d Tribun e, 30 Ma y 1997.

7. In ternat i onal Herald Tr ibune , 7 Apri l 1995.8. Dona ld M. Seekins, B urma -China Relat ions: Pla ying with Fire, Asian Sur vey , Vol. 37, No.

6, J une 1997, p.535.


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about US$ l .4 bi l l ion. 9 Besides the supply of a rms , ( je t f igh ters , t anks , nava lships, e tc . ) China also agreed to t rain Myanmar s air force, mil i tary and army

personnel. 10 The motivation for these arms purchases was to upgrade Myanmar sm i l it a r y c a p a b i li t y a n d t o u se t h e m t o s u p pr e s s t h e m i n or i t y s e p a r a t i s tinsurgencies. In 1994, Myanm a r bought a bout U S$400 million w orth of a rms. 11 I fsuch a rms purcha ses continue, Myan ma r ma y emerge a s the only ga rr ison sta tein Southeast Asia. In October l996, Army Chief, General Maung Ayes visit toB eijing resulted in furt her milita ry a nd int elligence coopera tion between t he tw ocountries. China again agreed to train 300 Myanmar air force and naval officersand to provide additional places for them in Chinese Staff colleges. 12 China a l so

offered favourable terms for Myanmar s arms purchases offering free loans andgrant ing c red i t to the jun ta , as wel l as economic a id and inves tments for theconstr uction of Mya nma r s basic infra structur e, such a s da ms, bridges, roa ds a ndports as well as for industrial projects. Of particular strategic significance is thecons t ruc t ion of s t ra teg ic roads a long the I r rawaddy River t rade route l ink ingYunna n province to the B a y of B engal.

Ch ina s intent ion t o seek closer st ra tegic alignm ent a nd economic coopera tionw ith Mya nma r could be seen from the visit t o Ran goon of a high-pow er delega tion(a bout 100 members) led by Li P eng from 26 to 28 December 1994. B oth L i P eng

a n d h i s c ou n t e r p a r t , G e n er a l Th a n S h w e a g r e ed t o r e a f f i r m a n d f u r t h e rstrengthen the closer relationship between the two countries. The communiquissued at the end of the visit stated the two leaders noted with appreciation theall round strengthening of relations between the two countries in recent years,and reaff i rmed their desire to further promote co-operat ion in the economic,agricultural, environmental, cultural, tourism, forestry, education and scientificfields, and in combating ill icit drugs. 13 I t is doubtful Myanmar can contr ibutesignifica nt ly to th e creat ion of a new Ea st Asian politica l a nd economic order. B utthe price Myanmar wil l have to pay for deviat ing from i ts s t rategic neutral i ty

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9. ht t p://w w w .cn n. com/AIANOW/a sia w eek/99/0528/na t 4ht ml ; In t ernat i onal Herald Tr ibune , 3J une 1997; Asia 1996 Year book , p.97; D.M. Seekins, B urma -China Relations: Pla ying w ith Fire,op. ci t., p.534. See also Denny Roy, Chi nas Foreign Relat ions , (Lanha m, Maryland: Rowma n &Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1998), p.174.

10. The arms purchases include among others, helicopters, attack aircrafts, trucks, artillery,anti-ship cruise missiles, petrol boats, tanks, rockets, mortars, assault rifles, etc. D.M. Seekins,B urma -China Relations: P laying wit h Fire, ib id . , p.534.

11. Mary P . Ca lla ha n, New Dra gon or St ill Dra gging? Asian Su rvey , Vol. 35, No. 2, February1995, p.206.

12. P eter W. Rodma n, China Woos B urma , In ternat ional H erald Tr ibune , 30 May 1997, op. ci t .

13. South Ch in a M orn in g Post , 30 December l994.


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principle might be to potent ial ly become a useful pawn for Chinas long-termst ra teg ic in te res t s . Of course , L i Peng re fu ted as sheer fabr ica t ion wes tern

intelligence reports of the insta llat ion of a sophistica ted ra da r fa cility in t he CocoIsland. 14 Li P eng also made i t unequivoca l ly clear t ha t China ha s no intent ion t oseek a sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. Rangoons authorities endorsedLis comments . 15

Al though Myanmar and Ch ina have c lo se r mi l i t a ry t i e s , Ch ina has a l soencouraged Rangoon to have military links with other countries, such as having,for example, defence supply relations with Pakistan. 16 China claims tha t most ofthe a rms sold to Mya nma r w ere for defensive purposes.

China is a posi t ive rat her tha n negat ive factor in ensuring to ma intain s t ableS ino -Myanmar r e l a t i ons . Though Ch ina r ema ins a s t aunch a l l y s ince 1988 ,Beij ing is concerned about Myanmar s long-term poli t ical and social s tabi l i tybecause of Rangoons fai l ing economy and lack of pol i t ical legi t imacy. Chinasupports th e idea of U N mediat ion t o bring a bout political dia logues betw een t heruling military junta and the National League for Democracys Secretary-GeneralAung Sa n Suu Kyi.

Ch ina a l so endor sed the ASEAN idea o f cons t ruc t ive i n t e rven t ion o rco m pr e h en s i v e e n g a g e m e n t w i t h M y a n m a r , i n p a r t i cu l a r D r. M a h a t h i r s

initiat ive to persuade Ra ngoon t o underta ke politica l reforms.

Myanmars Perception and Responses

Why w a s stra tegic entente betw een Mya nma r a nd China possible in 1989? Themain reason was the Wests diplomatic isolation of Myanmar. The military coupand the killings of the students in 1988 in Rangoon, as well as the killings ofCh inese s tudent s during t he Tia na nmen cris is in J une 1989, received str ongcri t ic ism and tr iggered off western economic sanct ions. Bei j ing saw a goldenopportunity to fil l the strategic vacuum in Myanmar and decided to make some

i n r o a d s i n t o R a n g o o n . T h e e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s b y t h e We s t h a d a d d e d t oMyanmars economic difficulties. Due to isolation and necessity, Rangoon decidedto move closer to China so as to seek both military and economic assistance from

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14. China N ews , 20 April 1995.15. Renmi n r i bao , 28 December 1994; Ta Kun g Bao , 6 Ma y 1998.16. S.D. Muni, China s St ra tegic Enga gement w ith th e New ASE AN, An E xploratory S tudy of

Chinas Pos t -Cold War Po l i t i ca l , S t ra teg ic and Economic Re la t ions wi th Myanmar, Laos ,

Ca mbodia a nd Vietnam, op. ci t., p.80.


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B eijing. I t is in this context tha t one can a rgue tha t Mya nma r wa s not a player inthe strategic game vis--vis China. Myanmar s military never completely trusted

a ny externa l ma jor power, including China , i ts northern gia nt n eighbour, beca uset h e M y a n m e s e l e a d e r s h a v e d e e p s e a t e d f e e l i n g s o f s i n o p h o b i a a s w e l l a sxenophobia. The Myanmese pol i t ic ians were social ized in an environment ofpolitical culture of distrust. 17

Myanma r ha s no intent ion, nor is wil l ing to be a s t r a tegic paw n of China. Infact, Mya nma r s milita ry leaders a re aw a re of the potent ial da ngers to be too closeto China to feel comfortable. By the late 1990s, Myanmar decided to adopt acounter hedging strategy by diversifying its diplomacy welcoming India 18 a nd

conso lida t ing it s t i e s w i th ASEAN a s we l l a s encoura g ing J a pan a nd oth e rindustria lized sta tes like Singa pore and t he EU to invest in Ra ngoon.To minimize Myanm a r s milita ry dependency on C hina , Ra ngoon, in August

2001 decided to purcha se 12 MIG -29 fight ers from Russia a t a ba rga in price ofb e t w e e n U S $ 130 m t o U S $15 0m f o r t h e e n t i r e b a t c h . M y a n m a r h a s a l s odispatched 300 milita ry personnel to Moscow for tr a ining to fly the MIG s a nd toacquire rocket technology. 19 The strategic s ignif icance of this purchase is thatRuss ia offe rs another poten t ia l a l te rna t ive to Rangoon to ba lance China andIndia .

The closer s t rategic and economic t ies between Myanmar and China havepresented a dilemma for Rangoon. How can it keep its independence, strategicn e ut r a l it y a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e m a i n t a i n a g ood r e la t i on s h ip w i t h i t sneighbouring st a tes, especially C hina ?

In order to minimize Myanmar s economic dependence on China, Rangoonneeds t o d ive r s i fy i t s economic con tac t s w i th t he i ndus t r i a l i zed coun t r i e s ,especial ly the US , the EU, J apa n, the ASE AN sta tes and India so as to at t ra ctmore foreign direct investments (FDI) and acquire new technology and skills forits labour force to overcome the structural weaknesses and backwardness of itseconomy. To achieve greater efficiency of its economy, the military regime has no

choice but to undertake political reform and accept democracy. Political reformscan s t rengthen i t s f ree marke t economy. Improvements of human r ights a renecessary, a s they a re tied to aid a nd investm ent. So fa r, evidence ha s show n tha t

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17. See Lucian Pye, Poli t ics, Personal ity an d N ation-Bui ld in g: Bur mas Search for I denti ty ,(New H a ven, Yale Un iversity P ress, 1962).

1 8. F o r t h e c on c e pt o f C o u n t e r -H e d g i n g S t r a t e g y , s e e C h u n g C h i e n -p e n g , C h i n a sEngagement wi th Southeas t As ia Af te r the Leadersh ip Trans i t ion , A Counte r-HedgingSt ra tegy?, E AI Working P a per No. 87, (Singa pore: EAI, NU S), 9 Ma y 2002.

19. S tr a tford G loba l I nt elligence U pda te, 22 August, 2001, see w ww .burma project.org/082201.


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the current military junta is reluctant to transfer its political power to civilianru le . But in the long run , shar ing pol i t ica l power wi th c iv i l ian pol i t ic ians i s

inevitable.

Indias Strategic Perspective

Myanmar and India share a border of about 1331km (827 miles). Furthermore,Mya nma r h a s a long coa stline of 2276km (1414 miles) th a t sha res cert a in par ts ofthe Bay of Bengal , in part icular the surrounding areas of the Coco Is lands andthe Anda ma n Sea , which is very importa nt in I ndias stra tegic considerat ions.

In Indias strategic thinking, Myanmar s location is central to strengtheningNew Delhis geopolitical position in Southeast Asia. Myanmar is a key steppingst one in In dia s new look Ea st policy w hich seeks t o develop an d expand political,economic an d securit y ties w ith ASE AN.

Indias growing interest in Myanmar could be seen from the shift of its low-key policy in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, which emphasized humanrights and democracy to one of emphasis on a s t rategic real is t pol icy towardsR a n g o o n . T h e m a i n r e a s o n f o r I n d i a s s h i f t w a s t h e g r o w i n g c o n c e r n a n duneas iness of Myanmar s abandonment of i t s t rad i t iona l s t ra teg ic neut ra l i ty

policy a nd st ra tegica l t i l t t owa rds C hina . Since the beginning of the 1990s, Indiahas been extremely sensitive to the growing influence and presence of China inthe Bay of Bengal , par t icu lar ly so when China he lped to upgrade Myanmar sr ada r f ac i l i t i e s i n t he Cocos I s l ands and the cons t ruc t ion o f a nava l base i nSi t twe .

With t he expansion of India s IT industry (in par ticula r in t he softw a re a reas)and knowledge economy, 20 India is interested to bui ld a Trans-Asian Highwayfrom P a tna to Kalemyo in Mya nma r, a northern town bordering India, as well asga s pipelines from Ca lcutt a t o Mya nma r.

With th e development of the AFTA in J a nua ry 2002 w ith a populat ion of 500

million, Southeast Asia is therefore an important region for Indias look Eastpolicy. In 1994, as part of its look East policy, and growing concern over Chinasstrategic presence, India seems to have moved away from support ing the pro-democracy movements to endorsing t he milita ry lea dership.

India stepped up high-powered visits to Rangoon aimed primarily to moveMyanmar away from forging close ties with China. Besides playing on security

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20. J ohn Wong & Wong Chee Kong, China s Softw a re In dust ry (II): The Ra ce w ith I ndia , EAI

B a ckground B rief No. 118, (Singa pore: EAI, NU S), 26 Mar ch 2002.


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ASEANs Responses

Chinas growing influence over Myanmar has resulted in anxiety for the ASEANsta tes. The wa riness over Chinas inroads into Mya nma r ha s resulted - w ith thesupport of other ASEAN members - in Thailands initiative to lobby for Myanmarto become a full-fledged member of ASEAN, which then finally led to acceptingMyanmar as a member of ASEAN in l997. To counter Chinas strategic inroadsinto Southeast Asia was one of the important considerations to accept Myanmarand Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. Thus ASEAN, especial ly Thai landchanged its non-interference attitude to a pro-active constructive engagement

strategy to construct ive intervention pol icies towards Myanmar. ASEAN wasworried and saw the danger of Myanmar s slow strategic, military and economictilt t owa rds China . Thus there a ppea red to be a need to a dopt a common str a tegyto deal w ith a resurgent C hina . From Mya nma r s perspective, joining ASE AN, theB a n g l a d e s h , I n d i a , M y a n m a r , S r i L a n k a , Th a i la n d E con o m ic C oop er a t i on(B I M S TE C ), i s a b r i d g e n e t w o r k s t r a t e g y t o p r om o t e r e g i on a l c oo pe r a t i onbetween South Asia , Southeas t As ia and China and counterba lance i t s over-relia nce on China .

Is Myanmar an Economic Pivot of China?

Myanma r ha s long his torica l t ra de links with China dat ing as far ba ck as t he 11 t h

century during the Pagan dynasty. Contemporary Myanmar-China t rade at thepeople- to-people leve l main ly concent ra tes a t the upper Myanmar Shan andKachin states and the border of Yunnan province. 26 Although official trade wasb a n n e d b y N e Wi n f r o m 1 9 6 2 - l 9 8 8 , t h e b a n d i d n o t p r e v e n t C h i n e s e a n dM y a n m e s e t r a d e r s f r om c on d u ct i n g t r a d e a t t h e b o r d er a r e a s o f Wa n t i n i nYunna n province and K yukok a n outpost on the Mya nma r side.

The yea r 1988 marked a s ign i f i can t change in Myanmar s t r ade po l i cy

towa rds C hina . The first sign of Ra ngoons interest in promoting great er economicties could be seen from th e St a te La w a nd Order C ouncils {(SLORC ), changed t oS t a t e D e v e l o p m e n t a n d P e a c e C o u n c i l ( S D P C ) i n 1 9 9 7 } a n n o u n c e m e n t o fl e g a l i z i n g b o r d e r t r a d e o n 5 A u g u s t l 9 8 8 . T h i s m a r k e d a n e w c h a p t e r i nMya nma r s open tr a de policy w hich resulted not only in opening up border tra debut even more importa ntly, i l legal tr a de and dr ug tra fficking.

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2 6. M y a M a u n g , Th e Bu rm a Road to Cap i t a l i sm, Economi c Growth ver sus Democr acy ,

(Connecticut: P ra eger P ublishers, 1998), p.183.


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Chinas Yunnan province which has a populat ion of about 43 mil l ion, washistorica l ly a southw est Si lk Roa d tr ade route, linking Mya nma r w ith S outhw est

Asia . I t has now emerged as a poten t ia l t a rge t of Chinas long- te rm s t ra teg ica mbition, tr a nsforming t he w hole region as pa rt of a golden Qua dra ngle regiona ltrade zone involving Yunnan, Myanmar, Thai land and Laos. 27 This zone couldbecome Chinas landridge to the Indian Ocean for its maritime trade. Yunnan, inpar t icu lar, could emerge as an in tegra ted par t o f the symbiot ic re la t ionshipes t ab l i shed by the SLORC to s eek economic and mi l i t a ry a id f rom i t s g i an tneighbour . 28 The growing importance of Yunnan in China-Myanmar economicties could be seen in November 1989, a year after the military coup, when the

S L O R C s i g n e d a m u l t i p l e t r a d e a n d e c o n o m i c a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e Yu n n a nauthori t ies , including geological surveys, coal and t in mining and a televisionstat ion. 29 A month later, in December 1989, the two countries signed an economica nd technica l coopera tion agreement in which China a greed to offer a n interestfree loan of Rmb 50 million (US$15million) for the Rangoon-Thanhyin rail androad bridge construction project. 30 According t o a Ta iwa nese source, from l961 tol994, Beijing has given a total of Rmb 500 million in aid to Rangoon and Chinahad comple ted 18 out of 20 pro jec ts for Myanmar. 31 The increasingly closereconomic ties betw een the t w o countr ies could be seen from the sha rp jump in the

tr a de volume betw een t hem. In 1988, for exam ple, the t ota l tra de betw een C hinaand Myanmar reached US$9.51 million. In 1989, it jumped to US$76.03 million,w hich w a s eight t imes th a t of the previous year . 32 In 1995, the t ota l value of tr a deg r e w t o U S $ 76 7. 4 0 m i l l i on . 33 I n 1 9 9 8 , C h i n a - M y a n m a r t r a d e d e c l i n e d t oU$576.49 million, 34 but in t he year 2000, the tota l tr a de increased t o US $621.26million. 35

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27. Mya Ma ung, Th e Bu rm a Road to Capi tal ism, Economi c Growth ver sus Democr acy, op. cit . , p.186.28. Mya Ma ung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth ver sus Democr acy, ibid ., p.190.29. Liang Chi-shad,Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of China: From Delicate

Friendship to Genuine Co-operation, in Peter Carey, ed., Bur ma, T he Challenge of Chan ge in a Di vid ed Society , (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), p.81.

30. Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of China: From DelicateFriendsh ip to Gen uine Co-opera tion, i b id ., p.81.

31. Qiao Yiming, China and Burma: Pol i t ical and Economic Relat ions , M a i n l a n d C h i n a Studies , Ta ipei Vol. 39, No. 1, J a nu a ry 1996, p.87.

32. Table 1, p.19; see also Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic ofChina: From Delicate Friendship to Genuine Co-operation, ib id . , p.83.

33. Ta ble 1, p .19.34. Ta ble 1, p.19.; see a lso Chi na Stat ist ical Year Book 2000, (Beijing: Ch ina St at istics P ress,

2000), p .593.

35. Ta ble 1, p.19; see a lso h tt p:w w w .china .org.cn/english /2001/December 23577.ht m


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Border and Illegal Trade

The volume of border t rade between both countr ies increased and in l988, i trea ched Rmb 789.52 million a nd th en jumped t o Rmb 965 million in l989, a 26%increase over l988. In l990, the total border t rade went up to Rmb 1006.978million a nother increase of 11%over l989. 36 If one t a kes into considerat ion illegalcontraband, such as opium, heroin and the jade trade along the border, then thetotal amount of trade would be much larger and its implications for Myanmar smilitary regimes survival, economic and security interests far more importantthan it appears. Myanmar is the world largest opium producer. In 1995 alone, i t

produced a bout 2340 tons of w hich 98%w ere for export .37

What are the implications of this il legal trade? Mya Maung mentioned thatsome of the t op milita ry junta w ere involved in t he illega l drug t ra de. 38 P ar t of theea rn ings f rom th i s i l l ega l t r ade wen t t o s e rv i ce t he pu rchase o f a rms f romChina . 39 The profits ma ke it possible for the milita ry t o expand it s forces. Becaus eof the huge amount of money involved, the region of the Golden Triangle hasbecome an area of pol i t ics of drugs and pol i t ical intr igues as well as powers t ruggle among the Myanmar mi l i ta ry e l i te , e thnic Chinese ex-war lords , l ikeKhun Sa , i . e . Chang Chi fu , e tc . , e thnic separa t i s t insurgencies , and the loca l

authorities of China and Thailand in a complicated chain of partnerships. 40 Thissymbiot ic partnership enabled the Rangoon mil i tary authori t ies to uproot theethnic minority insur gents control of their r espective na tu ra l resources and bordertra de with a number of bila tera l cea se-fire a greements st ruck betw een t he ethnicrebels a nd t he S LORC beginning in 1993. 41 Fina lly, th e symbiotic cooperat ion forthe drug tr a de among the releva nt a uthorities wa s one of the ma in reasons for th esuccess of the SLORC in averting international economic sanctions by the West. 42

Hence, the SLORC , wit h th e help of its par tn ers, ha s been pa rt of th e problem notth e solution of th e underground lucra tive drug tra fficking in Myanm a r. 43

44 44

P oon Kim S H E E

36. Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of China: From DelicateFriendsh ip to Gen uine Co-opera tion, op. ci t., p.83.

37. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma Road to Capi tal ism, Economi c Growth versus Democr acy, op. cit ., p.196.38. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth versus Democr acy, ibid .,

pp.201-204.39. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth ver sus Democr acy, ibi d., p.205.40. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth ver sus Democr acy, ibi d., p.194.41. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth versus Democr acy, ibid .,

pp.192-193.42. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capital ism, Economi c Gr owth versus Democr acy, ibid ., p.192.

43. Mya Maung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth ver sus Democr acy, ibi d., p.197.


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Is the Trade Deficit Undermining Sino-Myanmar Entente?

One of the features of Myanmar-China t rade is that Rangoon had consis tent lysuffered from trade deficits vis--vis China in the l990s. From l990 to l995, Myanmarincurred a tr a de deficit from a bout U S$105 million in l990 to more t ha n U S$468.30million in 1995. 44 In 2001, the trade deficit amounted to US$363.16 million. 45

Though Myanmar consistently suffers trade deficits with China, i t will notlead t o tra de dependence on C hina , beca use it only const itut es a bout 10.5%(1999-2000) of total external t rade. Myanmar s largest t rading partner is ASEAN. I ta mount s to 44%of its t ota l tra de volume (1999-2000). Singa pore, wit h a sha re of

24.3%, i s t h e la rges t i nd iv idua l t r a d ing pa r tn e r, whe rea s Tha i l and s t r a dea moun t s t o 10.5%. 46 The above dat a suggest th at there is no danger tha t C hina isoverwhelmingly dominating Myanmar s trade.

While the West continues to criticize Myanmar s human rights records, i td o e s n o t p r e v e n t t h e M u l t i N a t i o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n s ( M N C s ) f r o m p l e d g i n ginves tments for Rangoon. In the year 2000, the FDI f low in to Myanmar wasU S $203million , w it h S in ga pore (28%), U K (24%), U S A (18%), Fr a nce (10%),J a pa n (8%), (In dones ia (4%), H ong Kong (2%), M a la ys ia (2%), ot her s (4%). 47 Mosto f t h e F D I w a s c h a n n e l l e d i n t o t h e a r e a s o f o i l a n d g a s e x p l o i t a t i o n ,

manufac tur ing and tour i sm re la ted indus t r ies (hote l s , e tc ) . China i s no t theleading foreign investor in Myanmar, although for the first ten months in 2001,Ch inese compan ies signed 87 dea ls for projects tot a lling U S$186m. 48

Theoretically, with a G NP per ca pita of about U S$200. - in 1999, Myanmar isone of the poorest states in Southeast Asia. 49 Since China is relatively better offtha n Mya nma r, i t should purcha se more from the lat ter ra ther tha n enjoy a t ra desurplus with Rangoon. How does one explain this trade deficit with China? First,i t ha s t o do wi th t he s t ruc tu re s o f t he economy o f bo th s t a t e s . Myanmar i sbasically an agrarian economy whose exports to China are mainly confined to afew primary commodities, such as teak and rice. In l986 to l987, teak exports

constit uted a bout 45%w hereas rice amounted to a bout 27%of its t otal export s. 50

45 45


44. Ta ble 1, p .19.45. ww w.mya nma rpi.com 2 J an ua ry 2002.46. ASEAN I nvestm ent Repor t 2001 Foreign Di r ect I nvestm ent and Regional I n tegr a t i on ,

(J a ka rt a : ASE AN Secreta ria t, 2001), p.52.47. ASEA N In vestm ent Report 2001, For eign Di rect I nvestm ent and Regional I ntegr ati on, ibid., p.53.48. w w w .a tim es.com/Ch ina /CL 15Adol.hm l.49. Asiaweek , 18 February 2000.50. Mya Ta n a nd J oseph L.H. Tan ed., M yanmar Di l emm as and Opt ions , (Singapore: ISEAS,

1990), p .170.


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In t he l980s, the ma nufa cturing sector a ccounted for less th a n 5% of th e tota lexport value, consis t ing mainly of l ight indust r ies , such a s text i les , leat her,

cement, animal feed products, etc. 51 These data show that Myanmar s economy isve ry much ag ro -based and unde rdeve loped . Un le s s Rangoon d ive r s i f i e s i t seconomy away from a primari ly agrarian economy to a more sophist icated onewith manufacturing and service sectors, the trade deficit with China is l ikely topersist.

S o f a r , M y a n m a r p r o d u c e s v e r y f e w m a n u f a c t u r i n g i t e m s t h a t c a n b eexport ed to Chin a . The problem of th is prima ry commodity economy is th a t pricesa re subject t o fluctua tion in the interna tional ma rkets a nd can be manipulat ed by

the big buyers. China or oth er buyers from Ra ngoons neighbouring st a tes such asVietnam and Thailand can easily purchase what is produced by Myanmar fromelsewhere. Since China is much more industrialized and has a larger economythan Myanmar, China therefore has many i tems to sel l to Myanmar, especial lyhousehold items, su ch as electr ica l applia nces, cosmetics, textiles, shoes, wa tches,medical products and instruments, etc. 52 Because of the size of Chinas economy,it can produce vast quantities of cheaper goods at very competitive prices. Thusthe Myanmese traders and merchants are going to the outposts of such Chinesetowns as Wantin and Ruili in Yunnan province to buy Chinese goods and then

bring them ba ck to Myan ma r t o sell the items at a higher price.Second, Mya nma r s economy ha s more tha n just st ructura l wea knesses. From

1962 to 1988, under G enera l Ne Wins lea dership, t he B urm ese road to socia lismp r og r a m h i g h l i g h t e d t h e i m p or t a n c e o f e q u i t y a n d i d e ol og y r a t h e r t h a nproduc t iv i t y and e ff i c i ency. 53 The na t iona l i za t i on o f bo th l oca l and fo re ignenter prises a nd t he a doption of a n inw a rd-looking model of economic developmentstra tegy resulted in Myanm a r s equal i ty of poverty. P a rt of the reasons why theeconomy has not been doing well is because the mil i tary has not been able tom o b i l i z e s u f f i c i e n t d o m e s t i c c a p i t a l a n d i n v e s t m e n t s . 54 T h i r d , M y a n m a r seconomic weakness is also due to the administrative measures and bureaucratic

ethos of the military regime. As Mya Maung argued, the trade deficit was due to the ineff ic iency of the Burmese mi l i ta ry command economy and the impor tinelasticity of Burma with respect to Chinese manufactured goods together withthe import e last ici ty of China with respect to Burmese agricul tural and forest

46 46

P oon Kim S H E E

51. Mya Tan an d J oseph L.H. Tan ed., M yanmar Di lemm as and Options, op. cit . , p.169.52. Mya Tan an d J oseph L.H. Tan ed., M yanmar D il emm as and Options, ibi d. , p.208.53. Mya Tan an d J oseph L.H. Tan ed., M yanmar D il emm as and Options, ibi d. , p.9.

54. Mya Tan an d J oseph L.H. Tan ed., M yanmar D il emm as and Opti ons, ibi d. , p.171.


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products. 55 Since Myanmar suffers t rade defici ts vis--vis China, const i tut inga bout one third of its t ota l tr a de deficit , t his new development if unchecked, ca n

lead to eth nic a nd politica l tensions between China a nd Mya nma r.After one decade of closer entente, China has emerged as one of the most

important players in Myanmar s domestic economy and foreign relations. Therea re signs th a t Mya nma r s northeast ma y become a n economic sphere of influenceof China. The development of new roads, rails, bridges and the massive influx ofChinese into Myanmar s northern towns point to s igns that the northeast mayb e c o m e a n e c o n o m i c s p h e r e o f i n f l u e n c e o f C h i n a . S i n c e 1 9 8 8 , C h i n e s eimmigra t ion t o Myanma r, in part icular from Yunna n, ha s been growing ra pidly

ranging from one to two million. About 250,000 to 300,000 Yunnanese Chinesemigrated to Mandalay and half of the population in Lashio is Chinese. 56 There isa tendency toward sinicization of Mandalay not only in the economic but also inth e cultura l a nd social dimensions.

China ha s now replaced Tha iland a s the most import a nt economic part ner ofMyanmar. From l962 to l988 under Ne Wins leadership, Thailand dominated thet r a d e ( b o t h l e g a l a n d i l l e g a l ) w i t h M y a n m a r. I n l 9 9 0 , h o w e v e r, C h i n a w a scatching up and its share of total imports from Rangoon was 15%as compared toTha ilan ds, w hich w a s 16%. In 1991, Ch ina s sha re jumped to 22%of Mya nma rs

to ta l impor ts , a nd Tha i lan ds sha re w ent down to 17%. Fr om 1992 to 1995,Tha ilands and China s sha res decreased from a bout 13% to 10%a nd 18%t o 12%respectively. 57 The decl ine in Myanmar-Thai economic t ies was part ly due toborder conflicts that resulted in the cancelling of a number of logging and fishingconcessions granted to Thai companies at the end of 1993. 58 Chinas inroads intoMya nma r w ere also part ly due to t he success in its economic moderniza tion since1978. By the end of the l990s, the dependency model or patron-client model hadalready taken shape in the economic and mil i tary closer t ies between the twoc ou n t r i e s . Af t e r a d e ca d e o f in t r o d u ci n g a s t r a t e g y o f l i m it e d f r e e m a r k e teconomy, the foundation of Myanmar s economy remains weak and shaky and it

i s un l ike ly tha t Myanmar can ge t ou t f rom i t s c loser economic and mi l i ta ryentene with China.

The pertinent question is whether Myanmar will become an economic and

47 47


55. Mya Ma ung, Th e Bu rm a Road to Capit ali sm, E conomi c Growth ver sus Democr acy, op. cit ., p.212.56. w w w .georget own .edu/sfs/progra m/Asia /bur ma Conf erence.ht m. See a lso Mya Ma un g, On

the Road to Manda lay, a case study of the Sinonization of Upper Burm a, op., cit ., pp.447-459.57. Mya Ma ung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capital ism, Economi c Gr owth versus Democr acy, ibid ., p.216.

58. Mya Ma ung, Th e Bu r ma R oad to Capital ism, Economi c Gr owth versus Democr acy, ibid ., p.217.


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mil i ta ry co lony of China in the 21s t century? So fa r there i s no ev idence tosuggest tha t C hina ha s the intention of colonia lizing Mya nma r s economy a nd th e

mi l i t a ry. F i r s t , j udg ing f rom pas t examples , due t o l ong - t e rm po l i t i c a l andstrategic considerat ions, t rade defici ts with China and the neighbouring s tatescan be adjusted for long-term strategic and political investments. 59 To offset thetr a de deficit w ith Mya nma r, China can purchase more goods besides giving moreaid and credi ts to Rangoon. In other words, Chinas future economic t ies withMya nma r ca n be a s se ssed f rom C h ina s pe r spect ive i n t h e l a rge r con tex t o fChina s politica l and st ra tegic interest not only towa rds Ra ngoon but a lso towa rdsSouthea st Asia a nd t he Asia-P a cific region in genera l.

Prospects of Myanmar-China Relations

What w i l l be t he fu tu re p rospec t s o f Myanmar-Ch ina r e l a t i ons i n t he 21s tc e n t u r y ? T h e r e a r e t h r e e s c e n a r i o s , t h e a l a r m i s t , t h e p e s s i m i s t i c a n d t h eguardedly optimistic. The alarmists argue that Myanmar is playing with fire bys e e k i n g c l o s e r m i l i t a r y c u m s t r a t e g i c a n d e c o n o m i c t i e s w i t h C h i n a . T h ea l a rmis t s t h ink ing i s ba sed on th ree r ea sons . F i r s t , i t w i l l l e ad to i n t e rna ltensions between Chinese and Myanmese which could possibly result in future

a nt i-Ch inese riots (such a s in Ra ngoon in 1967) due t o growing Ch inese economicd om i n a t i on i n M y a n m a r . S e con d , C h i n a s a r m e d s u pp or t m a y l e a d t omilitarization of the military junta who may be reluctant to contemplate politicalreforms which are necessary for economic development. Third, Chinas inroadsmay lead to conflicts with its neighbours because of Myanmar s abandonment ofits tr a ditiona l policy of neutra lity. 60

The pessimists bel ieve that Myanmar wil l become a colony of China as aresult of growing political influence, economic domination and sinicization ofMyanmar. 61 The gua rded optimists believe tha t C hina w ill be a benign pow er a ndwi l l seek genuine f r iendship and coopera t ion . 62 Regard ing Ch ina s s t r a t eg i c

in ten t ions towards the Indian Ocean , us ing Myanmar as a landr idge for i t sma rit ime am bitions, no conclusive evidence ha s been present ed by th e proponent s

48 48

P oon Kim S H E E

59. Shee Poon Kim, The Politics of Chinas Trade Relations with Thailand, Asian Sur vey,March 1981.

60. D.M. S eekins, B urma -China Relations: Pla ying w ith F ire, op. ci t., p.539.61. Mya Ma ung, Th e Bu r ma Road to Capi tal ism, Economi c Gr owth ver sus Democr acy, op. cit .,

p.277.62. Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the People's Republic of China: From Delicate

Friendsh ip to Gen uine Co-opera tion, op. ci t., pp.71-93.


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of th e ala rmist scenario.Which scenario is likely to evolve depends on the following questions: first,

how long can the military hold on to power? Second, can the military survive inthe 21st century? Third, how does Myanmars membership in ASEAN affect itss tra tegic relat ionship with China? Fourth, w ha t w ill be the a t t i tude of the US , theE U , J a p a n a n d I n d i a t o w a r d s My a n m a r ? F i ft h , h ow f a r w i l l M y a n m a r t i lttowa rds China ? The an swer t o this last q uestion w ill a lso depend on th e extent ofthe success and failure of Myanmars economic development and its free marketpolicy.

Conclusion

The a bove ca se study shows t ha t th e evolution of Mya nma r s C hina policies frompos i t i ve s t r a t eg i c neu t r a l i t y t o s t r a t eg i c i so l a t i on i sm and f ina l ly t empora rystrategic alignment with China was the result of a combination of various factorsr a n g i n g f r om i t s g e os t r a t e g i c p os i t i on a n d i t s p r ox im i t y t o C h i n a , i n t e r n a lpolitica l a nd economic needs, as w ell a s externa l pressures. In short, Mya nma r sChina pol icies s ince 1948 have been a combinat ion of i ts internal needs andresponses t o externa l t h rea t s . Despi te Mya nma r becoming independent s ince

l948, the political system remains problematic and unstable, plagued by ethnicinsurgencies and the difficulty of achieving a viable united Union. Myanmar isa lso fa ced w ith challenges from t he rising politica l a nd economic a spira tions of itspeople. The military junta still has to face the problem of how to find a politicalfra mework w hich can a ccommodat e the a spira tions of the civilian politicians a ndt he people.

From Chinas perspect ive, Chinas Myanmar pol icies have also undergonechanges. During Maos period from l949-l976, combinations of Maoist ideologyand strategic-cum security factors were the main determinants shaping Chinaspolicies. However, since 1978, with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and thereafter, in

th e post-Cold Wa r era , China s policies towa rds Mya nma r w ere mainly motivat edby economic an d long-term st ra tegic-cum securit y considera tions.

From 1962 to l988, China s Mya nma r policy w a s more of a reactionar y st a ndtowards Myanmar s China pol icies , and the changing regional environment inSoutheast Asia. The extent of Chinas friendliness or hostili ty towards Myanmardepended on the extent of Rangoons friendliness or hostili ty. When Myanmaradop ted an an t i -Ch inese po l i cy a s Ne Win d id i n t he 1960s , Ch ina r eac t ed

ha rshly. When Mya nma r a dopted a friendlier policy t owa rds C hina in the 1970s, 49 49



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Beijing reacted favourably and positively. Furthermore, Chinas friendliness orhos t i l i ty towards Myanmar in par t icu lar and o ther Southeas t As ian s ta tes in

gene ra l , depended on Ch ina s f avourab le o r un favourab le pe rcep t ion o f t hestra tegic a nd security situ a tion on t he south ern flank of its border. China r eactedpositively when Myanmar did not join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation(SEATO) and refrained from endorsing the Manila Pact in the 1950s. China wasa lso plea sed wh en Mya nma r did not join th e Soviet camp in t he 1970s. So long a sMyanma r wa s not a paw n of any super power r ivalry aga inst China, B eijing wa scontent to main ta in a cord ia l re la t ionship wi th Myanmar i r respec t ive of theideology of the r espective governm ents .

Converse ly, when Myanmar dec ided to rece ive a id f rom the West , Chinareac t ed nega t ive ly. When Myanmar d id no t ac t i ve ly suppor t Ch ina s b l eedVietnam white pol icy in the 1980s, China reacted negat ively. When Ne Winadopted a hard-line policy towards the ethnic Chinese in 1967, China condemnedth e Ne Win government a s fa scist. All these examples serve to prove tha t C hina sMyanmar pol icy was mainly shaped by Rangoons China pol icy. In no way didMaoist ideology and the overseas Chinese factor and nationalism play importantroles in Chinas Myanmar policy throughout the whole period from l949 to 1988.Externa l secur i ty and long- te rm s t ra teg ic cons idera t ions were the over r id ing

factors in Chinas Myanmar s policies. In the post-Cold War era, regional geo-economics cum long-term strategic interests have become the central focus ofChinas Myanmar policy. From the year 2000 onwards, Chinas Myanmar policycan be a ssessed in the cont ext of China s growing int erests in promoting an Ea stAsian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and economic integration with ASEAN withinthe framework of ASE AN P lus China a nd eventual ly ASE AN P lus China , J a pana nd Korea.

In short, although at the moment or in the foreseeable future, Myanmar isnot a stra tegic paw n nor a n economic pivot of China , Mya nma r s stra tegic locat ionon a trijunction between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless

economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is importantfo r Ch ina a s a t r ad ing ou t l e t t o t he Ind i an Ocean fo r i t s l and locked in l andp r o v i n c e s o f Yu n n a n a n d S i c h u a n . S t r a t e g i c a l l y, M y a n m a r i s p o t e n t i a l l yimportant for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and itsl on g -t e r m t w o -o ce a n o bje ct i v e . F u r t h e r m o r e , a C h i n a -M y a n m a r n e x u s i ss t ra teg ica l ly usefu l for China to conta in Indias in f luence in Southeas t As ia .Finally, Myanmar is part and parcel of Chinas grand strategic design to achieve

its goal of becoming a great pow er in the 21st century. D espite grow ing Chinese50 50

P oon Kim S H E E


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in f luence over Myanmar, i t i s un l ike ly tha t Rangoon wi l l become a s t ra teg icsa tellite base for China . Myanm a r s strong sense of nat iona lism, its past a bility to

successfu l ly dea l wi th fore ign powers , and i t s de te rmina t ion to preserve i t sindependence and cul tural ident i ty, wil l l ikely make Myanmar withstand mostodds.

Table 1. Mya nma r s Tra de w ith Ch ina : 1950-2001

(US$million)

Yea r Tot a l Volume E xport s Impor t s B a la nce1950 3.37 1.40 1.97 0.571960 31.50 6.60 24.90 18.301970 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.501980 34.19 4.89 29.30 24.411988 9.51 1.81 7.70 5.891989 76.03 24.60 51.43 26.831990 171.00 33.00 138.00 105.00

1991 411.00 96.00 315.00 219.001992 404.00 119.00 285.00 166.001993 507.00 150.00 357.00 207.001994 536.00 130.00 406.00 276.001995 767.40 149.55 617.85 468.301996 658.63 137.41 521.12 383.711997 643.50 73.41 570.09 496.681998 576.49 62.05 514.44 452.391999 508.21 101.68 406.53 304.852000 621.26 124.82 496.44 371.622001 631.54 134.19 497.35 363.16

Sources:Statistics for 1950-1994, see: Sta ti stics on th e Bu r m ese Economy : The 19 t h and 20 th Centuries,Teruko Sa ito a nd Lee Kin Kiong (Singa pore: Ins tit ute of Southea st Asian S tud ies, 1999), p.188.Statistics for 1995-1999, see: Chi na Sta t is t ica l Year book 2000 , No. 19, Nat ional Bureau ofSt at istics, China Sta tistic P ress, p.593.Statistics for 2000, see: Chi na Stati sti cal Year book 2001 , No.20, National Bureau of Statistics,China St at istics P ress, p.591.S ta t i s t i c s fo r 2001 , see : China-ASEAN , In te rna t iona l Seminar on China-ASEAN Trade ,

Investment Cooperation, Kunming China , J une 6th-7th 2002, p.9.

51 51



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Table 2. Yunn a ns E xt erna l Tra de 1999

(US$10,000)

Count r ies Tot a l Impor t /E xpor t %of t ot a l t ra deMya nma r 29952 18.05H ongKong 29246 17.62J a pa n 13467 8.11U S 12836 7.73Viet na m 7221 4.35

Aust ra lia 6613 3.98Indonesia 6516 3.93G erma ny 6113 3.68I t a ly 5183 3.12S out h Korea 4190 2.52

Source: Yun nan Year book 2000 , Editorial Depart ment, Yunna n Nianjian 2000 of YunnanSource: Yea rbook, p.267.

Table 3. Yunn a ns E xport s (Ten La rgest Tra ding P a rt ners 1999)

(US$10,000)

Count r ies Tot a l E xpor t %of t ot a l t ra deMya nma r 24599 23.78H ongKong 17351 16.77J a pa n 11154 10.78Indonesia 6424 6.21Viet na m 6252 6.04

U S 4858 4.70S out h Korea 3173 3.07Net her la nds 2950 2.85Ta iw a n 2423 2.34S inga pore 2084 2.01


52 52

P oon Kim S H E E


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Table 4. Yunn a ns I mports (Ten La rgest Tra ding P a rt ners 1999)

(US$10,000)

Count r ies Tot a l E xpor t %of t ot a l t ra deH ongKong 11895 19.02U S 7978 12.76Aust ra lia 5365 8.58Mya nma r 5353 8.56G erma ny 4097 6.55

Russia 3138 5.02I t a ly 3114 4.98Ca na da 3002 4.80J a pa n 2313 3.70Chile 2069 3.30


Table 5. China s Foreign Tra de wit h t he ASE AN S ta tes

2000(US$million)

Tot a l E xport s Impor t sS inga pore 10,820.67 5,761.04 5,059.63Ma la ysia 8,044.87 2,564.87 5,480.00Indonesia 7,463.77 3,061.82 4,401.95Tha ila nd 6,624.04 2,243.25 4,380.79P hilippines 3,141.73 1,464.41 1,677.32

Viet na m 2,466.41 1,537.26 929.15Mya nma r 621.26 496.44 124.82C a mbodia 223.55 164.06 59.49B runei 74.37 13.02 61.35La os 40.84 34.42 6.42Tot a l 39,521.51 17,340.59 22,180.92

Source: Chi na Stati sti cal Year book 2001 , No. 20, National B ureau of Sta tistics,Source: China Sta tistics Press, p.591.

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