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China’s changing regional policies in Asia: A
comparative analysis
Fujian Li
BA Shandong University 2007
MSc University of Birmingham 2008
This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of The University of Western Australia
School of Social Sciences
Discipline of Political Science and International Relations
2013
i
Abstract
The conduct and content of China’s foreign policy has undergone a remarkable
transformation over the last few decades. From being a relatively isolated and marginal
player in international affairs only a few decades ago, China is once again a great power,
especially in Asia where it has historically been the dominant force. One of the key
challenges this transformation in China’s international standing presents, however, is the
way it manages its relations with its regional relations, many of which have been
difficult and, at times, even dangerous. Although there is now growing interest in
China’s international role, surprisingly little research has been conducted on its
pivotally important regional relations in a comparative perspective.
This dissertation addresses this lacuna by analysing the evolution of China’s regional
foreign policies in Asia from 1991 to 2011. The emphasis in the dissertation is on
policies rather than policy because there are subtle but important differences in the
content and conduct of regional policy in different regions and across different issue
areas. Indeed, policy in some regions, I argue, is distinctively shaped by a contingent,
historically-specific array of factors that produce significant variations in policy goals
and outcomes. I develop this hypothesis through a detailed analysis of the conduct and
content of China’s policies in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia and the Asia-
Pacific.
To explain these differences in policy outcomes, I employ an increasingly influential
approach to international relations theory known as ‘analytical eclecticism’. This
methodology, which draws on insights from the main theoretical paradigms to develop a
more complete picture of international behaviour, is especially appropriate in China’s
case where a complex array of factors are at work in shaping Chinese foreign policy.
Crucially, however—and the reason analytical eclecticism is especially useful and
illuminating—these factors have different weights and degrees of influence in different
regions.
Simply put, the argument of this dissertation is that China's increasingly sophisticated
regional policies are driven by multiple factors. While there may be some common
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themes in the pursuit of China's ‘national interest’ and the articulation of its ‘grand
strategy’, such ambitions and goals are articulated and realized in different ways in the
various sub-regions of Asia. Thus, China’s policy priorities are different in subtle but
important ways. The principal contribution of this dissertation helps us to understand
how and why.
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Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. i
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... v
List of Figures ................................................................................................................ vii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................. vii
Glossary ........................................................................................................................ viii
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework and Research Methods ................................. 8
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 8
1.2 Theories of Regions ............................................................................................ 9
1.3 Analytical Eclecticism...................................................................................... 26
1.4 The Comparative Case Study Method ........................................................... 35
1.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 39
Chapter Two: Foreign Policy Ideas and Practice ....................................................... 41
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 41
2.2 The Making of China's Foreign Policy .......................................................... 42
2.3 China's Role in the World: A Historical Overview ....................................... 50
2.4 China's Role in Asia: Some Historical Turning Points ................................. 61
2.5 Chinese Ideas about Asian Regionalism and Regional Cooperation: A
Historical Review ................................................................................................... 71
2.6 The Sino-US Relationship: Past and Present ................................................ 80
2.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 88
Chapter Three: China in Southeast Asia .................................................................... 90
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 90
3.2 The First Period: From 1991 to 1997 ............................................................. 92
3.3 The Second Period: From 1998 to 2008 ....................................................... 105
3.4 The Third Period: From 2009 to the Present .............................................. 117
3.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 125
Chapter Four: China in Northeast Asia ................................................................... 127
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 127
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4.2 China’s Northeast Asian Strategy ................................................................ 130
4.3 The Thinking behind Six-Party Talks ......................................................... 151
4.4 Trilateral Cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea ............. 160
4.5 The Tumen River Development.................................................................... 167
4.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 171
Chapter Five: China in Central Asia ........................................................................ 174
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 174
5.2 China’s National Interests in Central Asia .................................................. 176
5.3 The SCO .......................................................................................................... 191
5.4 Beyond National Interests ............................................................................. 211
5.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 215
Chapter Six: East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: China’s Policies toward APEC, ARF,
APT and EAS .............................................................................................................. 218
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 218
6.2 China’s Policy toward the APEC ................................................................. 220
6.3 China’s Policy toward the ARF .................................................................... 231
6.4 China’s Policy toward the APT .................................................................... 242
6.5 China’s Policy toward the EAS .................................................................... 252
6.6 Conclusion: Does China Have a Strategy toward East Asia or Asia-Pacific
Regionalism? ........................................................................................................ 260
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 265
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 274
v
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Mark Beeson. There is an
old Chinese saying, “shitu ru fuzi”, which literally means a teacher and his student is
like a father and his son. Indeed, Mark plays a father role in my academic world. Even
when I was in the darkest time in my research journey, he has never given up on me and
always been there to encourage me to look forward and carry on. What I learnt from
him is not simply how to conduct serious research, but more importantly, he taught me
how to think critically and independently. He is also a model for me by showing how an
intellectual should care about others and the world. All these virtues, I believe, will
benefit my whole life.
I am also grateful to Associate Professor Jie Chen for his invaluable advice and help in
introducing me to the Chinese academics. Even just a quick chat with him in the
corridor could give me much inspiration. As the only staff member originally from
China, we have a lot of common interests, particularly those concerning the future of
the Chinese nation.
I am lucky to have spent my PhD years in this great department. We are not big in size,
but the solidarity and warm atmosphere compensate for it. It is a family for me. All the
professors are respectable. Linley is most helpful with her patience and motherly caring.
I will remember forever the beautiful time I shared with my fellow PhD colleagues –
especially Kelly, Will, Wahyu, Shaomin, and Mary Lynn. I am sure my PhD journey
would be less fulfilling without their friendship. Special thanks to Kelly, Will and
Shaomin for their help with the editing of this thesis.
Thanks also go to this great university. UWA is a place full of dreams and wisdom. I
believe it has already become a home in my heart. Whenever I go, I will take that
confidence and responsibility that this prestigious university with a glorious history has
given me. The friendship with the Chinese student community in this university is my
great treasure. We laugh and cry, suffer and enjoy together. Whatever happens to me, I
know they are behind me and always prepared to support me. What binds us is not only
that we speak the same mother language or share the same cultural background but
common values and identity. No matter how long you have been overseas, all of us
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deeply love the place where we come from, and the people living there. We are proud of
being Chinese.
Finally, needless to say, the thesis is dedicated to my parents. Without their support, this
PhD is impossible. Their support is not just financial, but more importantly, they
understand the broader purpose of my studies. They know their son has a dream that
one day everyone in China would be treated fairly and justly. It is what they taught me,
to treat everyone nicely and equally. As every parent in the world, they do everything
for their son. I cannot bear to imagine how they tackle with those lonely Spring
Festivals when every other family’s children can go home except their son still abroad
seeking his dream. Thank you, mum and dad.
vii
List of Figures
Figure 4-1 Cross-Strait Trade Relations……………………………………………………………134
Figure 4-2 Degree of Dependence in Cross-Strait Trade Relations…………………. …………….135
Figure 5-1 China’s Petroleum Consumption from 1980 to 2009…………………………………..185
Figure 5-2 China’s Oil Production and Consumption, 1990-2013…………………………………186
Figure 5-3 China’s Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2011……………………………………………187
List of Tables
Table 4-1 Trade Relations between China, Japan and South Korea………………………………..163
viii
Glossary
ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus
AFC Asian Financial Crisis
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT ASEAN Plus Three
ARATF Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAFTA China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
CBM Confidence-Building Measures
CICIR China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation
CPC Communist Party of China
CSCAP Council of Security Cooperation for the Asia Pacific
CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation
DDP Democratic Progressive Party
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EAEC East Asia Economic Caucus
EAS East Asia Summit
EASG East Asian Study Group
EAVG East Asian Vision Group
EC European Community
ECFA Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
EHP Early Harvest Programme
EU European Union
EVSL Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation
FTA Free Trade Area
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFC Global Financial Crisis
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
IT Informational Technology
KMT Kuomintang
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAT Network of East Asian Think-Tanks
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
PAFTAD Pacific Trade and Development Conference
PBEC Pacific Basin Economic Council
PD Preventive Diplomacy
PECC Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PMC ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Politburo Standing Committee
RMB Renminbi
ix
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SEF Strait Exchange Foundation
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TPP Trans Pacific Partnership
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNRCA United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
US United States of America
WTO World Trade Organisation
1
Introduction
The “rise of China” has been one of the most important developments in the
international system over the last fifty years. Both the speed and scale of its rise have
outweighed those of other world powers throughout human history. Although for much
of China’s two thousand years of history since it was unified under the Qin Dynasty it
has been the world’s most powerful and developed nation, strictly speaking, ancient
China was only a regional power and had limited contact with the other parts of the
world. However, technological developments and the outward expansion of the
European powers have meant that since the mid-19th century China has had a much
greater interaction with “the West”, albeit one that would ultimately end in humiliation
and failure for the Chinese. Following two World Wars and the changed distribution of
global power that this brought about, however, China began its re-emergence as a major
power. Although it was apparent that China played an important role in the Cold War
strategic triangle between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, it was not until
the economic reform and opening policy in the later 1970s that China began to realise
its potential. With the end of the Cold War and the bi-polar system, China has rapidly
become a pivotal player in the global capitalist economy.
The statistics about China’s rise are increasingly well known, but merit repeating at the
outset as they form the backdrop for the discussion that follows. China’s gross domestic
product (GDP) has experienced an average 10% growth for more than thirty years. It
has recently become the second largest economy in the world after the US. During the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), when the US and Europe were facing decline, only
China was still providing momentum for growth. China holds the world’s largest
foreign currency reserves and is the US’s largest creditor. In terms of military spending,
according to Chinese government’s official data, China’s defence budget has reached
106.4 billion US dollars in 2012, up about 11.2% from 2011, which is 5.3 times of that
2
in 2002 and 15.4 times of that in 1992.1 China’s military spending is now the second
largest in the world after the US.2 All the above data provide a powerful reminder of just
how important China has become.
The “sudden” rise of China has, therefore, been a major shock for many in the West, and
this is increasingly reflected in a range of opinion and theory that seeks to make sense
of China’s re-emergence as a major player on the world stage. Few people now doubt
that China is rising and has the potential to become a leading nation,3 but not everyone
is convinced by the thesis of the “peaceful” rise of China either. To be sure, “China
Threat Theory” is not a new invention and has echoes of the Yellow Peril phobia of the
nineteenth century, but many new theories are employed to suggest that China’s rise is
potentially alarming. For example, with his offensive realism, John Mearsheimer
famously argues that the confrontation between China, a challenger to the status quo,
and the US, makes conflict almost inevitable.4
Similarly, Aaron Friedberg uses
neoclassical realism to suggest that an authoritarian China will not be compatible with
the democratic West.5 In contrast, liberals are not so pessimistic. Baogang Guo and
Chung-Chian Teng argue that China and the rest of the world have become so
interdependent that the cost of conflict is too high to contemplate. Consequently, peace
can be preserved.6 Indeed, it is possible to find examples of just about every conceivable
1 "China's Defense Budget." GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget-table.htm.
2 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmaments
and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 187.
3 Chang is an exception who has unsuccessfully predicted China’s collapse for more than 10 years.
Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York and Toronto: Random House, 2001);
Gordon G. Chang, "The Coming Collapse of China: 2012 Edition," Foreign Policy, 29 December, 2011,
accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/29/the_coming_collapse_of_china_2012_edition.
4 John Mearsheimer, "Why China's Rise Will Not Be Peaceful?," (2004),
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf.
5 Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
6 Baogang Guo and Chung-Chian Teng, eds., China's Quiet Rise: Peace through Integration (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books, 2011).
3
theoretical perspective imaginable as scholars from a range of disciplines and countries
struggle to make sense of what China’s rise may mean. Many of these perspectives will
be considered and even utilised in what follows as I, too, try to make sense of the rise of
China, although my focus is rather narrower than many of those I consider.
In this thesis, I focus on China’s relations with its various regions, a policy arena that is
becoming increasingly important to China. Although China has never been a global
power in modern terms, it has been a major regional influence, if not leader, for
thousands of years. Many Chinese think that it is their right to regain a leadership
position in the region, particularly in East Asia, which has long been associated with the
spread of Confucian society. However, this goal will not be easily realised. The broadly
conceived region of which China is a part includes some of the most complex and tough
foreign policy problems with which China’s policymakers have to grapple, such as the
possible unification between China and Taiwan, the historical and territorial disputes
between China and Japan, the South China Sea drama between China and Southeast
Asian countries, the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear crisis, terrorism in Central Asia, and the
border disputes between China and India. If China cannot manage this imposing list of
problems, the notion of a peaceful rise is merely rhetoric. The successful management
of China’s regional relations is vital if China is to become a global power, not least
because the conduct of regional relations can be a useful testing ground for China’s
leadership skills. Regional relations allow Chinese officials to accumulate experience
and learn how to play a more prominent role in the world.
The importance of the region for China is self-evident. There is consequently a growing
literature on China’s regional polices, much of which I review in Chapter 1. However, at
the outset it is important to emphasise two puzzles that emerge from a review of the
development of China’s regional policies. The first puzzle is related to change. Since the
end of the Cold War, China’s regional policies have experienced great changes,
especially as China has become a more active partner in regional initiatives than it was
4
in the 1990s. However, since 2010, it seems that China’s regional policies have become
more assertive and less cooperative, which begs the question of what has driven such
changes. The second puzzle is related to China’s different policies towards different
issue areas and geographical regions. For example, even if we agree that China’s
policies towards East Asia have generally become more hawkish, why has its policy
towards Central Asia remained virtually the same as the pre-2010 era? As we shall see,
it makes more sense to talk about policies rather than policy to describe China’s
diplomacy. The two puzzles are, in fact, deeply interconnected and involve trying to
identify the forces that drive China’s regional policies. The thesis will be developed
around this central question.
The argument and contribution
The thesis argues that China’s regional policies are driven by multiple factors. Though
China’s overall foreign strategy may be the same—that is, pursuing China’s “national
interests” —the way such interests are defined and the weighting that is attached to
various goals can differ across regions and issue areas. It is why China’s regional
policies have important variations and priorities at times, rather than being a single
consistent and coherent policy. The factors driving such differences, I shall suggest, may
be historical or contemporary; shaped by interests or institutions; and material or
ideational. China’s regional policies are the outcome of a complex, changing
combination of internal and external forces. As Deng Xiaoping urged, we should “shishi
qiushi” [seek truth from facts] and “juti wenti juti fenxi” [make a concrete analysis of
each specific question]. This is why the thesis considers China’s regional policies in
discrete geographical areas, which have distinctive contingent concerns that influence
policy priorities.
The principal theoretical innovation of the thesis is to reject the constraints of the
single-factor paradigm when considering regional policy. Instead, the theoretical
5
approach described as “analytical eclecticism” will be employed, which advocates using
a combination of different theoretical tools to analyse the different factors influencing
China’s regional policies. In terms of research design, the thesis will undertake a
comparative case study of the conduct and content of China’s regional policies in
Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific to explain how and
why different factors influence China’s regional policies. Another contribution of the
thesis is to provide Chinese perspectives on this topic, partly because much of this
literature is unknown outside China, but primarily because it gives us an important
insight to the thinking of the Chinese policymakers, academics and commentators who
are shaping policy in China. In addition to drawing on the growing Chinese literature,
material and insights gained from more than fifty interviews with Chinese think tank
researchers, university scholars and government officials will also be presented to
support my argument.
Thesis Structure
There are six substantive chapters in the thesis.
Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical framework and research methods employed in the
thesis. This chapter firstly explains the core concepts discussed in the thesis, particularly
the definition and characteristics of regionalism. Through a literature review, the chapter
shows the limitations of mono-causal mainstream theories in explaining China’s policy
towards its regions. Instead, analytical eclecticism is used as the theoretical framework
of the thesis. The chapter elaborates the approach of analytical eclecticism and its
advantages in this research. The chapter also introduces the comparative case study
methodology.
Chapter 2 provides a general introduction to the overall foreign policy of China, which
includes China’s foreign policy making mechanisms, the evolution of China’s
6
perception of its role in the world, the intellectual history of Chinese ideas about Asian
regionalism and regional cooperation, and an introduction to Sino-US relations. This
discussion provides some of the essential empirical detail for the exploration of regional
policy that follows. The changes in China’s regional policy must be set in the broader
narrative of China’s rise. After all, the region, however it is defined, is only a part of the
international context in which China acts.
Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. The chapter is
organised chronologically and reviews the past twenty years from 1991 to 2011. Three
milestones are highlighted, namely the end of the Cold War, the Asian Financial Crisis
(AFC) and the GFC. Three stages in China’s foreign policy transformation are identified.
The first stage was a period of learning and passive participation from 1991 to the AFC.
The second stage was a period of active participation and policy promotion from the
AFC to GFC. The third stage has been a period of strategic uncertainty from the GFC
until now. The chapter provides an explanation for these changes.
Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between China and Northeast Asia. Because the
development of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia has not been as extensive as
Southeast Asia, bilateral relations are still pivotal. Consequently, the chapter will first
review several pairs of bilateral relations, namely the Sino-Taiwanese relationship, the
Sino-Japanese relationship and the relationship between China and the two Koreas. In
the latter half of the chapter, the Six-Party Talks, the trilateral cooperation among China,
Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the Tumen River Development will be examined
to illustrate and explain China’s policies towards multilateral security mechanisms,
economic and functional cooperation and sub-regional cooperation.
Chapter 5 discusses the relationship between China and Central Asia. The discussion
revolves around the different “national interests” China wants to pursue in Central Asia.
Compared with Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, the power structure in Central Asia
7
is relatively simple. China’s initiatives consequently have more chance of being
implemented. The chapter examines the efficacy of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) in facilitating the realisation of China’s interests in the region.
Finally, as the only regional institution led by China, the chapter will discuss how China
uses the SCO as a major test ground for its new ideas and even the promotion of new
norms in world politics.
Chapter 6 discusses China’s regional policy in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. The
discussion is centred on the four major regional institutions, in which China participates,
namely the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS). For each
organisation, process tracing will be used to uncover China’s motives in joining these
institutions and the changes of its policy practice that have ensued. The comparison of
China’s participation in the four institutions helps us to understand why Chinese
policymakers have sometimes had different policies towards different issue areas in
different geographical regions.
The conclusion summarises the contents of the chapters above and reiterates the main
argument and highlights the contribution of the thesis. The chapter will also try to say
something about China’s future regional policies and the possible implications this may
have for the relationship between China and the wider world.
8
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework and Research Methods
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical framework and research methods
employed in this thesis. Further, as this research concerns China’s regional foreign
policies in Asia, we need to establish initially the exact meaning of “regionalism”.
Therefore, the first part of the chapter will review some of the most important theories
of regionalism. Definitions of “region”, “regionalism” and “regionalisation” will be
given and the theoretical and practical significance of regionalism will be explained.
Although mainstream theories such as neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and
constructivism explain “regional cooperation”, these theories become problematic when
we try to apply them to China. None of the theories can provide a satisfactory
explanation for why China’s policy varies so much in response to different issue areas
and subregions. To solve this problem, I adopt an increasingly influential approach
known as “analytical eclecticism”, which will be introduced and outlined in the second
part of the chapter the applicability of the approach in the case of China will also be
justified. Indeed, as we shall see, analytical eclecticism has been adopted by scholars in
China and similar ideas can be found in Chinese academic research.
I adopt an analytically eclectic framework because I argue that China’s foreign policy is
affected by multiple factors that can only be explained and grasped by adopting this sort
of multidimensional approach. This research will try to identify those different factors
and develop an explanation of the different goals and outcomes that distinguish Chinese
foreign policy in different regions.
In the final part of this chapter, I outline the research methods adopted in this project.
The research is primarily comparative and qualitative and uses various case studies to
9
highlight differences in China’s foreign policy goals. Although the case study method is
widely used in international relations (IR) research, there are both advantages and
disadvantages to this approach that will be addressed later in this chapter. This project
explores China’s participation in three distinct subregions and the Asia-Pacific to
highlight the contingent nature of the foreign policymaking process. A comparison of
the similarities and differences in China’s foreign policy towards different subregions
and issue areas casts a revealing light on the nature of China’s overall regional policies
and the different priorities they encompass. Each case study will include a historical
review of the relationship between China and that region, official statements on the
policy towards that region and an explication of China’s foreign policy thinking and
behaviour about the cooperative mechanisms or institutions in that region. The chapter’s
conclusion highlights the main points and the overall approach that will be adopted
throughout the thesis.
1.2 Theories of Regions
Regions, regionalism and regionalisation
Regions, regionalism and regionalisation have assumed a much more prominent place
in world politics—but what do these words actually mean? Why have they become
increasingly important and a focus of policy attention? The first part of this chapter
provides some clarification of the key terms that will be used throughout this
dissertation.
To understand regionalism and regionalisation, we first need to understand the
underlying concept of the region itself. A “region” could be a geographical reality, such
as a continent. It could also be a group of countries that undertake common economic or
political projects and share some common identities. According to Nye, regions consist
10
of countries that are linked by geographic relations and mutual interdependence.7
However, regions cannot be seen simply as the aggregations of states; regions may
include sub-state actors, supra-state actors and trans-state actors as well. For example,
different parts of China may be said to belong to different geographical subregions of
Asia. Further, economic regions may not always be delimited by political or cultural
boundaries.8 In short, there is no “natural” region. As Hurrell famously argues, “all
regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested”.9
The possible
significance of this observation will become clearer in the case studies, which
demonstrate that some regions remain primarily geographical entities, while some have
increasingly important political identities.
Much of the early interest in regions emerged because of the European experience. As a
result, initial attention was given to regional cooperation and regional integration.
“Regional integration” referred to the “processes by which states go beyond the removal
of obstacles to interaction between their countries and create a regional space subject to
some distinct common rules”.10
Importantly, regional integration was not seen as only
market integration. It could also include other processes such as social integration and
political integration.11
Being a less complex process, “regional cooperation” “normally
refers to joint efforts by states to solve specific problems”.12
Such cooperation could be
“functional”, and based on economic, political or security policy cooperation. However,
7 Joseph S. Nye, International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), vii.
8 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Theorizing the Rise of Regioness," in New Regionalism in the
Global Political Economy, ed. Shaun Breslin, et al. (London: Routledge, 2002). 38.
9 Andrew Hurrell, "Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective," in Regionalism in World Politics: Regional
Organization and International Order, ed. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford University Press,
1995). 38–39.
10 Edward Best and Thomas Christiansen, "Regionalism in International Affairs," in The Globalization of
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, ed. John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia
Owens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 434-449
11 Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (New York: Little,
Brown, 1971), 26–27.
12 Björn Hettne, “Beyond the “new” regionalism”, New Political Economy, no. 4 (2005): 543–571.
11
these different forms of cooperation need not necessarily be densely interconnected.13
Further, regional cooperation and regional integration are not mutually exclusive and
can coexist in a region simultaneously.14
“Regionalism” and “regionalisation” are two more recent terms used by researchers to
describe regional processes and they reflect both the growing sophistication of
scholarship in the area and attempts to explain growing regional developments outside
Europe. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, scholars have different definitions for these two
important terms. Hettne defines “regionalism” as “a tendency and a political
commitment to organise the world in terms of regions”, which can be seen as a regional
project.15
Similarly, Beeson understands regionalism as an intentional process led by
“states and other actors engaged in an essentially political process of collaboration”.16
Hettne and Soderbaum believe that regionalism is related to a programme or strategy
that will lead to the development of a formal regional institution.17
In comparison,
according to Hettne, regionalisation is a more complex process of forming regions with
multiple actors.18
There is an emerging consensus that “regionalism” refers to a
primarily state-led, formal political process, whereas “regionalisation” refers to “a less
self-conscious and coherent process, which is primarily driven by the private sector”.19
In this thesis, most attention will be paid to the formal political processes and foreign
relations associated with regionalism, although attention will also be paid to
regionalisation, especially when it affects political outcomes.
13 Best and Christiansen, “Regionalism in international affairs”, 434-449
14 Ibid.
15 Hettne, “Beyond the “new” regionalism”, 545.
16 Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic
Development (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.
17 Hettne and Soderbaum, “Theorizing the rise of regionness”, 34.
18 Hettne, “Beyond the ‘new’ regionalism”, 545.
19 Beeson, “Regionalism and Globalization”, 5.
12
Regionalism in context
“Regionalism” may be a fashionable term, but the underlying idea is not particularly
new. Since the end of World War II, there have been at least two waves of the
regionalism phenomenon and a rapidly expanding body of scholarship as a consequence.
The “old” wave of regionalism began at the end of World War II and lasted until the
1970s. The second wave began around the end of the Cold War and continues presently.
After World War II, the newly founded United Nations approved the legitimacy of
regional organisations in its charter20
and this became the legal basis for the
development of regionalism. During the Cold War, the growing European Community
(EC) became the principal model of regionalism for other parts of the world, despite the
unique circumstances in which the EC developed and the particular historical traditions
that facilitated cooperation.21
Nevertheless, regional organisations in different issue
areas and geographical areas developed quite rapidly. In Africa, the Organisation of
African Unity was founded in 1963 and this was followed by the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.22
Regionalism became a widespread
political reality across much of the world and research about it developed
simultaneously.
As noted, studies of “old regionalism” concentrated on the European experience, 23
thus,
the number of comparative studies of other regions was limited. Economic issues and
interstate cooperation were the principal focus of this early research and domestic
20 See an online version of the Chater, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
21 Peter M. R. Stirk, A History of European Integration since 1914 (London: Pinter, 1996).
22 Louise Fawcett, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism," International
Affairs 80, no. 3 (2004). 429–446.
23 Theories generated from the European experience and developed for guiding further integration are
influencial for not only the relevance with the European practice but also shaping people’s thinking on
regional projects in other parts of the world. Two major forces, namely (neo-)functionalism and
federalism which compose the foundations of the European regional development are particularlly
important. Thanks to Dr. Gordon Cheung for this point.
13
politics was comparatively neglected.24
In contrast, the regionalism that has developed
since the end of the Cold War is described as the “new” regionalism and is
distinguished by a broader focus that includes non-state actors. Much of this new
attention to broader economic and social forces flowed from the end of the Cold War
and the integration of global markets. The ideological lines that divided states
disappeared. Neoliberal economic policies were, and continue to be, widely adopted in
the post-Cold War world. Thus, unlike regionalism in 1950s and 1960s, the new wave
of regionalism is “open”.
“Open regionalism” refers to the idea that regional cooperation should encourage
further economic integration and minimise the impact of national borders and controls.
The European Union (EU) was something of an exception in this regard, as its openness
was primarily confined within the boundaries of the EU. Nevertheless, the very
existence of the EU provided an important impetus for further regional cooperation
among other countries concerned about the possible development of an exclusive
economic bloc in Europe.25
The net consequence of such processes is that most states
are now willing to open their economies to the outside world—with China being the
most important example of this.
What is especially significant, as far as this thesis is concerned, is that regionalism has
been used to serve different goals and has become a part of the national development
strategies of countries.26
New regional projects have emerged, such as the foundation of
the APEC forum in 1989, which are specifically intended to further national goals—in
24 Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, “Studying regions: Learning from the old, constructing the new”,
New Political Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 333–352.
25 Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, “The new wave of regionalism”, International
Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 589–627.
26 Paul Bowles, “Regionalism and development after(?) the global financial crises”, New Political
Economy 5, no. 3 (2000): 433–455.
14
this case, the desire of Australian and Japanese policy-makers to promote trade
integration and a non-exclusionary regional grouping.27
Once established, regional groupings can be enlarged and, recent problems
notwithstanding, this has been an important part of the European project. Not only did
European enlargement serve the obvious goals of expanding the internal market, but it
also provided a mechanism to expand Western European influence into formerly
communist Europe.28
ASEAN has also undergone a similar, albeit less successful and
ambitious, process of enlargement. The point to emphasise is that regional integration
has the potential—in favourable circumstances, at least—to develop an expansionary
momentum and a mechanism for the diffusion of new norms and practices.29
Even when
such initiatives are incompletely realised, they may be appealing to policy-makers who
see them as a way of promoting particular goals or who fear being excluded from
potentially important regionally based groupings.30
Regionalism and globalisation
It is also useful at the outset to clarify the relationship between regional and global
processes, as the latter has tended to receive far more attention. In reality, it is more
accurate to think of globalisation and regionalism as two sides of the same coin. On the
one hand, regionalism can provide a degree of protection for states from processes and
pressures associated with globalisation. “Globalisation” can most usefully be thought of
as shorthand for a variety of economic and political processes that transcend national
borders and that can place—often unwelcome—pressure on policymakers to comply
27 Mark Beeson, Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (Abingdon and New York:
Routledge, 2009).
28 Thomas Diez, “Constructing the self and changing others: Reconsidering ‘normative power Europe’”,
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2005): 613–636.
29 Charles Oman, Globalisation and Regionalisation: The Challenge for Developing Countries (Paris:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1994).
30 Injoo Sohn, “Asian financial cooperation: The problem of legitimacy in global financial governance”,
Global Governance 11, no. 4 (Oct-Dec 2005): 487-504.
15
with international regulatory standards and open up to external economic forces.31
Individual governments may use regional agreements and cooperation to develop
strategies to counter some of the challenges presented by globalisation. For smaller
economies in particular, regionally based cooperation may offer a way of countering or
influencing the behaviour of footloose multinational capital or meditating the power of
large flows of mobile capital.32
ASEAN’s attempt to position itself as a regionally
integrated production hub and thus attract foreign investment capital is a good example
of this. Likewise, as will be discussed further, the larger East Asian region’s efforts to
develop monetary cooperation are indicative of the growth and potential attraction of
regionally based schemes.
Many developing countries see regionalism as a way of decreasing their dependence on
Western countries and trying to combat some of the potentially negative effects of the
highly influential free-trade agenda. However, in reality, the international trading
system is often anything but free, as the continuing protectionist policies of the EU
attest. It is also clear that China has benefited enormously from its incorporation into the
global trading system and that it is no longer constrained by some of the problems that
confront smaller developing economies. Nevertheless, some scholars in China think
regionalism can be used to meditate the impact of external forces and mediate global
forces to “China’s advantage”.33
Pang takes this argument even further by saying that
31 The literature on globalisation is extensive, see Philip G. Cerny, “Globalization and the changing logic
of collective action”, International Organization 49, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 595–625; Frank Dobbin, Beth
Simmons and Geoffrey Garrett, “The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, coercion,
competition, or learning?”, Annual Review of Sociology 33, (2007): 449–472; Beth A. Simmons and
Zachary Elkins, “The globalization of liberalization: Policy diffusion in the international political
economy”, American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004): 171–189.
32 Oman, “Globalisation and regionalisation”.
33 Honghua Men, “Guojia Zhuyi, diqu Zhuyi yu quanqiu zhuyi – jianlun zhongguo da zhanlue de
mouhua [Nationalism, regionalism and globalism, and China’s mega strategy]”, Kaifang Daokan [China
Opening Herald], no. 3 (2005): 23–30; Xueyu Wang, “Xin diqu zhuyi – zai guojia yu quanqiuhua zhijian
jiaqi qiaoliang [The new regionalism: bridging the gap between Nation-state and globalisation]”, Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 1 (2004): 36–40; Feng Zhu, “Guanyu quyu zhuyi
16
regionalism is a modern form of nationalism that aims at the increase of relative power,
relative gains and national security of nation states—a development and extension of
nationalism in a regional framework.34
I shall explore the merits of such arguments in
more detail in subsequent chapters. However, the point to make at the outset is that
regionalism is increasingly seen by Chinese policy-makers and commentators as a way
of responding to global challenges and promoting national interests, even when the
status of the latter seems to be undermined by the former.35
In actuality, if globalisation is the inevitable end point of larger processes (which is
widely accepted by Chinese intellectual and policy elites), it may be more useful to
think of regionalism as a halfway house on the path to globalisation.36
Regional
cooperation can be thought of as a response to globalisation that is intended to promote
development. For instance, regionally based trade relations can play a bridging role
between domestic economies and the global trade system. As Zhu rightly argues,
effective regional agreements could play such a role in three ways. First, regionalism
can provide stability and peace in a region and create a better environment for economic
development—the preconditions for global integration. Secondly, countries can learn to
cooperate and trust neighbours through regional projects. Regional cooperation and
regional integration may provide a valuable learning experience for wider multilateral
practices on a global scale. Indeed, as we shall see, this is precisely the role that many
commentators and policy-makers think regional agreements can play for China as it
assumes responsibilities that are more global. Thirdly, some Chinese scholars believe
yu quanqiuhua [On regionalism and globalisation]”, Dangdai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International
Relations], no. 9 (1997): 41–46.
34 Zhongying Pang, “Diqu zhuyi yu minzu zhiyi [Regionalism and nationalism]”, Ouzhou [Europe], no.
2 (1999): 40–46.
35 Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, “The imagined economy: Mapping transformations in the
contemporary state”, Millennium Journal of International Studies 28, no. 2 (1999): 267–288.
36 Men, “Guojia Zhuyi”, 23-30; however, the expression of ‘halfway house’does not refer to an accurate
position in the ‘process’ of globalization. Chinese scholars understand that both regionalisation and
globalisation are processes rather than status. ‘Halfway house’ refers to a dynamic transition.
17
that regional projects can promote the multi-polarisation and democratisation of
international relation.37
The general point to make at this stage is that regional processes are an increasingly
important part of, and response to, globalisation, and this is likely to remain an
underlying trend in contemporary world politics. While policy-makers everywhere may
remain preoccupied with the pursuit of “national interest”, it is apparent that
regionalism may offer an important way of realising national goals in an increasingly
integrated international system. Regional processes offer the chance to offset or channel
global influences in way that may actually advantage individual states and even
preserve rather than undermine national autonomy.38
Before considering how this might
work in practice, it is useful to consider briefly how regional processes are
conceptualised in mainstream IR.
Mainstream international relations theories and regionalism
The mainstream theories of International Relations have been employed to shed light
upon the nature of regionalism from different perspectives. The assumption here is that
regionalism, as a special feature of world politics, should be consistent with the
fundamental logics of international relations. However, as in every topic of IR, different
theoretical lens often provide diverse, and sometimes contradictory explanations.
According to neorealists, both political regionalism and economic regionalism are
responses to the external challenges faced by states. In this context, European
integration needs to be understood as emerging from a broad geopolitical framework
that was shaped by US hegemony in the Cold War era.39
The bipolar structure of the
Cold War era and the confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union was a crucial
37 Zhu, “Guanyu quyu zhuyi”, 41-46.
38 Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Regionalising the state: Political topography of regulatory regionalism”,
Contemporary Politics 14, no. 1 (2008): 21–35.
39 Hurrell, “Regionalism in theoretical perspective”, 37-73.
18
part of the evolution of regionalism in Western Europe, even if its ultimate end was far
from clear at the outset. Likewise, in East Asia, Japan was able to practise a form of
neo-mercantilism because the US was intent on making Japan a successful capitalist
bulwark against communist expansion and was not overly concerned about how this
was achieved.40
Although realists and liberals have different understandings of the nature of
hegemony,41
Hurrell believes that hegemony can encourage the development of
regionalism in four ways. First, within geographic regions, a process of regionalism
may be initiated by the existence of a “regional hegemon”: other less powerful states
may attempt to balance the emergence of a powerful neighbour through formal alliances
or political cooperation. For example, ASEAN was founded and has been strengthened
in part, at least, because of the perceived threats from Vietnam before the Cold War and
from China more recently, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Secondly, regional
institutions can be used to constrain the power of the regional hegemon. For example,
one of the key drivers of the initial formation of the EU was a desire to constrain the
potential power of Germany, which was effectively constrained within European
regional institutions. Thirdly, small states may choose to engage in regional processes
as a way of “bandwagoning” with the local hegemon. The option is especially attractive
when the power differential is vast and small states may use this strategy in an effort to
gain material benefits. Finally, a declining hegemon may attempt to use regional
projects to actively share burdens with other countries and achieve its goals.42
In sum, while there are some well-known shortcomings of the neorealist approach,
especially its neglect of the kinds of domestic influences that will be analysed elsewhere
40 Michael Schaller, “Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the origins of containment in
Southeast Asia”, Journal of American History 69, no. 2 (1982): 392–414.
41 See Mark Beeson, “American ascendancy: Conceptualising contemporary hegemony”, in Bush and
Asia: America’s Evolving Relations with East Asia, ed. Mark Beeson (Abingdon and New York:
Routledge, 2006), 3–23.
42 Hurrell, “Regionalism in theoretical perspective”, 37-73.
19
in this thesis, neorealism usefully highlights the role of the external international
structure and the possible role of regional and global hegemons in shaping regions.
However, neorealism is less useful when considering how regional institutions operate
after they have been established or the difference between regionalism and traditional
ideas of alliance making.43
In contrast, neoliberal institutionalism is a more useful theory with which to explain the
practice of international cooperation and collaboration. The theory is based on three
core arguments, summarised as follows. First, interdependence among states will
increase the demand for cooperation because common problems need to be solved and
common interests can be realised through the establishment of cooperative institutions.
Secondly, the theory is state-centred, suggesting that cooperation can still happen when
states pursue their own interests. Finally, institutions are important because information
can be exchanged easily through them and the development of effective institutions can
reduce cheating. When transaction costs are reduced, cooperation in certain areas of IR
becomes possible. According to neoliberal institutionalists, the rationale for regionalism
in this context emerges because economic interdependence necessitates the
development of regional regimes to manage the cooperation. Even in the case of
security cooperation, neoliberal institutionalists do not believe that the foundation of
regional security institutions arises simply because of the balance of power. In fact,
regional institutions can encourage information exchange and increase the transparency
with which interstate relations are conducted, potentially reducing the “security
dilemma”.44
While both the realist and liberal schools look at regionalism from essentially
materialist perspectives, constructivists emphasise the importance of identity and the
social construction of reality in the construction of regional relations and institutions.
43 Ibid.
44 Shiping Tang, “The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis”, Security Studies 18, no. 3 (2009): 587–
623.
20
According to constructivists, national interests and identities are actively created and
shaped by the interaction among states.45
Equally importantly, the histories and cultures
of specific states and regions have the potential to influence the way IR are conducted
and the sorts of intuitions that may emerge as a consequence.46
National interests and
identity may change over time through interaction and negotiation; even the very
definition of “national interest” could be changed to reflect a larger collective identity as
states are socialised into different patterns of behaviour.47
This is clearly the hope and/or
expectation held by many observers about China’s behaviour due to its integration into
regional and global regimes. Although constructivism is criticised for failing to take
material forces sufficiently seriously and not explaining how and why particular ideas
and norms matter, 48
East Asia generally and China in particular have been powerfully
shaped by longstanding culturally inspired historical development and interaction.49
One of the goals of this thesis is to explain how some of these material and ideational
forces interact in the construction of China’s regional policies. The next section offers
an initial examination of China’s regional policy through the three theoretical lenses
discussed.
45 Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
46 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International institutions and socialization in Europe: Introduction and
framework”, International Organization 59, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 801–826; John Gerard Ruggie, “What
makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge”, International
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 855–885.
47 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Relations, 1980–2000 (Princeton:
University Press, 2008).
48 David Martin Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “Constructing communities: the curious case of East
Asian regionalism”, Review of International Studies 33, (2007): 165–186.
49 David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York and
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2010); Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and
Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
21
Mainstream theories and China’s participation in regional cooperation in Asia
If we analyse China’s behaviour through the lens of offensive neorealism,50
we can
easily conclude that China’s main goal for participating in regional cooperation would
be to gain regional hegemony, as Mearsheimer has famously argued.51
China’s
strengthening of its military forces, economic leverage and enthusiastic promotion of its
traditional culture and language are strategies used by Chinese policy-makers to expand
its “hard” and “soft” power in Asia,52
as we shall see in more detail in subsequent
chapters. Realist scholars see China’s support of initiatives such as the APT mechanism
as a way of allowing the country to play a leading role in and effectively exclude the US
from key regional institutions.53
For observers such as De Santis, China is intent on
seizing the US’s regional leadership role. This was especially true when the US was
preoccupied with Iraq and the War on Terror at the beginning of the new century. He
warns the US government that China’s promotion of the regional economic integration
could give China more economic leverage to realise its material interests.54
Even from
the perspective of defensive realism,55
it is thought that China wants to use regional
cooperation mechanisms to maximise its security. As we shall see in Chapter 5, such
arguments seem plausible when we consider that China is actively involved in
developing cooperation with Central Asian countries through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, which was founded primarily to assure the security of China’s western
regions.
50 Offensive realism is a branch of structural realism which emphasizes on power-maximization of states,
see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
2001).
51 Mearsheimer, "Why China's Rise Will Not Be Peaceful?".
52 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and limits of Chinese ‘soft power’”, Survival 48, no. 2
(2006): 17–36.
53 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise”, Current History, April (2006): 160-62.
54 Hugh De Santis, “The dragon and the tigers: China and Asian regionalism”, World Policy Journal 22,
no. 2 (Summer 2005): 23–36.
55 In different from the offensive realism, defensive realism emphasises on the balance of power rather
than maximising it. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1979).
22
While it is clear that the broadly realist approach identifies some important issues and
developments, it has some limitations. For example, if China really wants to exclude the
influence of the US, why has it persisted in developing the six-party talks and inviting
the US and North Korea together in an effort to peacefully resolve the nuclear crisis on
the Korean peninsula? Similarly, why does China still actively participate in the APEC
forum in which the US and other Western countries play important leading roles? This
question is especially pertinent with reference to the early 1990s. The existence of
APEC and other regional groupings highlights that cooperation between China and its
Southeast Asian neighbours in particular is not limited to security issues alone, as will
be considered in Chapter 3. Thus, achieving security maximisation is a
multidimensional process and not something that can be achieved through China-
ASEAN cooperation in a single area or with a single mechanism. On the contrary, one
of the reasons that Chinese policy-makers have been somewhat nervous about
multilateral mechanisms is that they may actually constrain China’s freedom of action
and options, as will be illustrated by examination of the South China Sea problem. The
potential limitations of neorealism in explaining such complex, multi-level relationships
are quite apparent.
However, if we try to explain China’s behaviour through the lens of neoliberal
institutionalism, China’s cooperation with Southeast Asia becomes more understandable.
According to neoliberal institutionalists, economic interdependence and the desire to
reduce transaction costs increases the demand for institutionalised cooperation between
states.56
For example, the regionalisation process in East Asia had already been
underway for quite a long time before governments attempted to promote closer
cooperation. The business network among Chinese business people in Southeast Asia,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China has formed an informal part of regional
56 Robert O. Keohane, “The demand for international regimes”, International Organization 36, no. 2
(Spring 1982): 325–355.
23
economic integration.57
China needs Southeast Asia because it is a major source of raw
materials and markets; Southeast Asian countries need China for its huge market size
and strong economic growth. The sort of economic interdependence that is such a
prominent part of liberal theorising58
is clearly evident in China’s relations with the
region.
Somewhat paradoxically, the AFC of 1997 and 1998 actually had the effect of
encouraging the countries of East Asia to increase cooperation and the development of
formal institutions, especially in the area of monetary cooperation.59
These processes
are explored in greater detail later, but the general point to make at this stage is that the
development of processes such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the China-
ASEAN free-trade area had the potential to provide both China and its neighbours with
substantial economic benefits, while simultaneously reinforcing China’s political role
and standing.
However, while neoliberal institutionalism can help us to understand why some forms
of functional cooperation have flourished, it is less successful at explaining why
institutional cooperation in Northeast Asia is so comparatively underdeveloped.60
If
economic interdependence really does lead to an increased demand for regional
institutionalisation, why are regional mechanisms in Northeast Asia still relatively
underdeveloped? As we shall see, there have been very limited attempts to
institutionalise cooperation among South Korea, Japan and China thus far. This is a
surprise, given that South Korea and Japan are both major investors in China and China
57 Solvay Gerke and Thomas Menkhoff, eds, Chinese Entrepreneurship and Asian Business Networks
(Oxford: Routledge, 2004).
58 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
59 William W. Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial
Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
60 Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of
Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
24
is the most important trading partner for its two Northeast Asian neighbours.61
Even
though Japan’s low interest loan to China in the early period of China’s economic
reform was extremely important for China’s economic rejuvenation, regional integration
at the political and institutional levels still seems distant. Neoliberal institutionalism
does not provide a satisfying or complete answer.
Thus, to answer this question we need to look to constructivism. According to
constructivists, identity and interests are constructed and can change.62
East Asia’s
troubled history and the deeply entrenched animosities this has generated mean that
ideational factors have become major obstacles to cooperation in Northeast Asia.63
The
principal problem is the relationship between China and Japan. Chinese scholars
describe this bilateral relationship as “cold politically while warm economically”.64
The
reality in Northeast Asia does not fit with the economic interdependence theory. Despite
the fact that the economic structures of China and Japan have been tightly bound
together and Japan needs China’s cheap labour and market while China needs Japan’s
technology, capital and market, political cooperation is difficult. For example, in 2004
and 2005, Chinese nationalist sentiment threatened to become unmanageable and sour
61 For South Korea’s and Japan’s export, import and trade, see: “South Korea export, import and trade”,
Economy Watch, 11 April 2010, accessed 15 June 2012,
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/south-korea/export-import.html;
“Japan export, import and trade”, Economy Watch, 15 March 2010, accessed 15 June 2012,
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/japan/export-import.html.
62 Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics”, European Journal of
International Relations 3 no. 3 (1997): 319–363.
63 Jennifer Lind, “Perils of apology: What Japan shouldn’t learn from Germany”, Foreign Affairs 88, no.
3 (2009): 132–146.
64 Xide Jin, “Zhong ri “zhengleng jingre” xianxiang tanxi [An analysis of the phenomenon of “cold
politically while warm economically” in Sino-Japanese relations]”, Riben Xuekan [Japanese Studies], no.
5 (2004): 8-23.; Jifeng Zhang, “Zhong ri zhijian “zhengleng jingre” de changtaihua jiqi duice [The
normalisation of “cold politically while warm economically” Sino-Japanese relations and the
counterplan]”, Guoji Maoyi [International Trade], no. 6 (2005): 19-22.
25
the relationship further.65
Consequently, mistrust between the two countries remains a
major obstacle to their further cooperation.
Constructivism not only has the potential to explain why cooperation in Northeast Asia
cannot happen but also why interest among Chinese policy-makers about cooperation
with Southeast Asia can fluctuate, for example, from no interest pre-1990s to the current
support. Sohn argues that China’s changing behaviour is due to the “collective learning”
of Chinese foreign policy-makers through feedback effects, persuasion and other
processes. Consequently, ideas about regional cooperation have changed. As a result,
China’s support of regional cooperation may become more consistent over time.66
Through learning, many Chinese policy-makers and commentators have accepted
regionalism as a beneficial method to promote its national interests.
The potential importance of constructivist insights can be seen in South Asia, where the
historical record suggests traditional Realpolitik might prevail. In reality, China wants to
become more active in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Another
good example of the way in which China has changed its ideas is the signing of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.67
Although the document
is not a legally binding, China’s participation suggests that it would like to solve the
problem peacefully and accepts that a multilateral mechanism could play some role in
the issue. However, China’s recent, more assertive, maritime policy in this area also
implies that there may be limits to the impact of norms and ideas associated with
cooperation. At the very least, it provides an important test of the efficacy and limits of
the constructivist model.
65 Che-po Chan and Brian Bridges, “China, Japan, and the clash of nationalisms”, Asian Perspective 30,
no. 1 (2006): 127-56.
66 Injoo Sohn, “Learning to co-operate: China’s multilateral approach to Asian financial co-operation”,
China Quarterly 194, (2008): 309–326.
67 See an online version of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm
26
Constructivism can provide an insight into China’s changing behaviour, but it remains
to be determined how much change has occurred within the foreign policy-making
establishment, how deeply new ideas may have penetrated and how large a role it may
play in explaining changes in policy direction or variations in policy across issue areas
or regions. This thesis will try to shed light on how much the fundamental ideas
underpinning China’s foreign policy may have changed. A key question to be explored
is whether, if Chinese policy elites have accepted the growing importance of
regionalism, why does China’s foreign policy vary so much in different subregions?
Likewise, why has China become more assertive towards its neighbours over the
Diaoyu, or Senkaku, Islands and South China Sea disputes? Has China changed
overnight from a responsible regional stakeholder to an aggressive power? To answer
these questions, a combination of constructivist insights and more traditional answers
provided by realism and liberalism is required. In short, if we want to develop a
persuasive account of the complex, multidimensional and varied approach taken by
China towards its various regional partners, an analytically eclectic approach must be
adopted.
1.3 Analytical Eclecticism
What is analytical eclecticism?
Each of the three mainstream theories has strengths and weaknesses, and each leaves
some residual problems. To develop an understanding of the complex forces that shape
policy in different issue areas and geographical regions, we need to adopt an analytical
approach that can capture the multiple influences that determine regional policy. Such
an approach—analytical eclecticism—has been developed by Katzenstein and
27
colleagues. This section draws on the work of Sil and Katzenstein in particular to
explain the potential advantages of this approach.68
Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism are the dominant theoretical
tools employed to analyse contemporary international relations, especially in the US.
Each paradigm has a set of core assumptions. Further, the questions asked and the
methods used to answer them have become standard features of each paradigm. The
principal advantage of working within one paradigm is that a research project may have
greater internal coherence when it is congruent with the rules and key beliefs accepted
by researchers in a particular research tradition. Such consistency and agreement among
like-minded scholars about the most appropriate way to conduct research and about the
kinds of core beliefs that shape research agendas can lead to an accumulation of
knowledge within an individual research tradition. At times, it can also lead to research
findings and claims that seem at odds with reality. Some of the more parsimonious
claims made by neorealists about the nature and importance of the international system
are illustrative of such potential problems.69
Certainly, there is something to be said in
favour of simplifying and eliminating redundant variables if this yields illuminating
claims about behaviour, but this is often at the cost of ignoring nuance and inconvenient
differences in outcomes. It is precisely this type of fine-grained difference this thesis
seeks to uncover.
Any theory relies on generalisations and cannot address all the factors that may
determine particular outcomes. One of the common criticisms of IR theory in general is
that it is often needlessly obscure, not reflective of (or even always interested in) real
world events and not relevant to policy debates. Liberals such as Nye make this sort of
68 Rudra Sil and Peter J. Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in World Politics (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
69 Richard K. Ashley, “The poverty of neorealism”, International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984):
225–286.
28
point, such as when he bemoans the lack of relevance in much IR theory.70
One of the
major claims made by advocates of analytical eclecticism is that it has the potential to
overcome such problems by offering policy relevance and an ability to provide more
persuasive explanations of real world policy issues.
Sil and Katzenstein argue that the potential contradictions between theory and reality
could and should be solved. Analytical eclecticism is not a new paradigm or theory to
replace the existing paradigms; rather, it is an approach that attempts to resolve real
puzzles and problems using existing paradigms in a synthetic way. The core idea is to
employ multi-factor analysis. Sil and Katzenstein’s key argument is that the research
focus of traditional paradigms is overly restrictive and limited to a few core factors. For
example, the overwhelming importance of power in traditional realism may usefully
illuminate some patterns of behaviour, but often at the cost of neglecting other
important variables. To realist IR theorists, power plays a similar role to money in some
branches of economics, providing the foundational concept for a series of major claims
about systematised behaviour.
In contrast, from the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, a key idea is “efficiency”.
The central claim here is that when cooperation is institutionalised, transaction costs
will be reduced. Transparency, openness and the free flow of information are also
thought capable of reducing security dilemmas. Thus, international organisations may
provide key benefits for individual states, leading to the sorts of absolute gains liberals
take to be a key feature of the attractiveness of international regimes.71
Conversely,
constructivists emphasise the role of identity when attempting to explain the behaviour
of states and their willingness or otherwise to cooperate. The main point made by
constructivists is that the international system is essentially a socially constructed entity,
the operation of which depends on inter-subjectivity and shared understandings about
70 Joseph S. Nye Jr, “Scholars on the sidelines”, Washington Post, 13 April 2009.
71 Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of international regimes”, International
Organization 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 491–517.
29
appropriate behaviour.72
Identity and even interests are redefined and constructed as a
consequence of the interaction among states. Constructivists pay particular attention to
the way the beliefs and identities associated with various states and actors may change
over time, as this has the potential to influence behaviour.
An especially significant feature of Sil and Katzenstein’s approach is their argument
that the three key factors associated with the various paradigms—namely, power,
efficiency and identity—could all exert an influence at the same time. Consequently, it
is misleading, even unrealistic to imagine that any single factor is dominant or that there
is only one way of understanding world politics. Analytical eclecticism analyses issues
by self-consciously drawing on different theoretical perspectives to make a judgement
about which factor should be viewed as primary in a particular case. This can
effectively avoid the bias of paradigms. Thus, this approach seeks to complement and
combine the insights of extant paradigms to develop a more complete and persuasive
explanation of behaviour.73
Analytical eclecticism with Chinese characteristics
Does analytical eclecticism provide a useful framework with which to understand
China’s foreign affairs? Katzenstein, an expert on Asian affairs, believes that analytical
eclecticism is especially useful for the study of international politics in Asia. As Kang
has argued, current mainstream theories are based on Western experiences74
and this
raises questions about their applicability to Asian case studies. It is not unreasonable to
assume that the different historical contexts from which ideas about the nature and
content of foreign policy-making emerge will influence state behaviour and conceptions
72 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional
Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
73 Sil and Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms.
74 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks”, International
Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57–85.
30
of national interests.75
The fundamental question for scholars of East Asian politics and
history is deciding just how much weight to attribute to such background considerations.
One of the objectives in the case study chapters that follow is to analyse and assess the
impact of different factors in shaping the different policy outcomes that distinguish
different regions in China’s foreign policy.
Katzenstein and Okawara’s analysis of Japan’s security policy utilises the eclectic
approach and this provides an important illustration of the approach’s utility.76
They
point out that no single theory can explain the complexity of Japanese security policy,
demonstrating there are both realist and liberal elements in Japan’s China policy. In
contrast, the combination of realism and constructivism helps explain the quite different
policy adopted by Japan towards Taiwan.77
In general, it is possible to argue that
realism and constructivism can provide a persuasive explanation of the traditional order
of IR in East Asia, with China as the central state. The tributary system was not only
based on power and geographic location but also consolidated by collective norms and
identity.78
. Likewise, liberalism and constructivism can explain the growth of the Asian-
Pacific security institutions in which distinctive ASEAN norms have combined with a
more general process of institution building.79
Indeed, the development of regional
institutions is a complex process that involves considerations about efficiency, the
possible development of common identity and the very redefinition of the interests of
states. Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism could all offer insights
75 Jutta Weldes, “Constructing national interests”, European Journal of International Relations 2, no. 3
(1996): 275–318.
76 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical
Eclecticism ". International Security 26, no. 3 (2001-2002): 153-85.
77 Japan’s Taiwan policy is realist in nature, as the security of Taiwan is linked with the security of Japan
with China as a common threat. However, Japanese policy makers intentionally keep ambiguous on
Japan’s possible respond to a major conflict between China and Taiwan for its interests. Katzenstein and
Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific security”, 153–185.
78 Ibid.
79 Jurgen Haacke, “ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment”, International
Relations of the Asia Pacific 3, no. 1 (2003): 57–87.
31
into such processes; a combination of all three might provide an even more compelling
and persuasive explanation.80
Such a claim is potentially important given that Chinese scholars have expressed
dissatisfaction with the so-called Western theories for some time. Many Chinese
scholars feel that the current mainstream theories cannot successfully explain China’s
behaviour or interpret its foreign policy strategy, as will be seen in this thesis through
the review of indigenous scholarship in this area. Indeed, some Chinese scholars feel
that neorealism and neoliberalism represent something of a barrier set by Westerners
which could constrain China’s rise.81
For example, the prominent realist scholar
Mearshemier famously argues that because every state is seeking power maximisation, a
rising power will inevitably challenge the status of the current hegemon.82
Thus,
conflict between China and the US is unavoidable. China is not only presented as a
threat to the status quo and a potential aggressor, but such an interpretation also
encourages the US to respond in a similar fashion—all of which casts Chinese policy in
an unfavourable light and increases the risk of conflict.
Despite the relatively underdeveloped nature of IR theory in China thus far, there have
been systematic attempts to gauge the utility of various Western theoretical approaches
by Chinese scholars. Interestingly, some of these studies have been broadly sympathetic
to the eclectic approach, suggesting its basic insights and methodology transcend
80 Katzenstein and Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific security”, 153–185.
81 For example, see Bin Yu, "9/11 Yu Xifang Guoji Guanxi Lilun - Jianlun Zhongguo Guoji Guanxi
Lilun De Fazhan Yu Chuangxin [9/11 and Western International Relations - on the Development and
Innovation of China's International Relatios Theory]," aisixiang.com, 27 September, 2012,
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/27851.html?page=1; Chunsi Wu, "Quanli Zhuanyi Lilun Xin Sikao [a
New Thinking on the Power Transition Theory]," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 11 February 2010.
82 Mearsheimer, “Why China’s Rise”.
32
borders.83
For example, Li’s discussion of what he calls the “Synthetic Explanation
Model” is very much in accord with Sil and Katzenstein’s analytical eclecticism.
Li, from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, is China’s leading IR theorist and his
overall orientation is very like Katzenstein’s. Li also believes that theories should be
viewed as a potential toolkit and combined to provide plausible policy-relevant analyses
of international affairs. Li discusses the role of theories in explaining international
systems. Although he acknowledges that the three mainstream theories have different
understandings of the international systems, he argues that their core assumptions can
be generalised as “power politics”, “institutional cooperation” and “ideational
interaction”. Each of the theories provides an explanation of international systems. Like
Katzenstein, Li argues that the complexity of the international system and the multiple
factors that shape policy outcomes mean that no theory can provide a full explanation of
IR practice.84
Li contends there are potentially two ways to overcome the problem of overemphasis
that causes the main theories to neglect important variables. The first is a kind of
comprehensive theory—namely, putting together the core assumptions of different
theories to explain the different attributes of the international system—and, secondly,
using different theories at the same time to solve a real problem in finding a synthetic
explanation model. Li believes that the first way, the synthesis of the core assumptions
of different theories, is not feasible and not necessary. Because each theory is based on
a specific set of assumptions, the problem of incommensurability may exist. However,
the second approach of using different theories to develop a synthetic explanation model
is possible and broadly in sympathy with Katzenstein’s approach. The goal of this kind
83 For example, Yiping Chen, “Quanli, jizhi yu rentong: dui meiguo dongmeng diqu luntan zhengce
yanbian de fenxi [Power, institution and identity: An analysis of US policy towards the ARF]”, Shijie
Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 1 (2006): 29–35.
84 Shaojun Li, “Guoji guanxi da lilun yu zonghe jieshi moshi [Grand theories of international relations
and the synthetic explanation model]”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 2
(2005): 22–29.
33
of synthesis is not to build a new theory but to develop more accurate explanations of
social reality by applying multiple insights. For Li and Katzenstein, the central insight
and claim is that it is not only possible to combine analytical perspectives, but it is
actually necessary if we are to develop explanations of the multiple influences on
international behaviour that are more accurate.85
The application of analytical eclecticism in this research
In this research, analytical eclecticism will be applied to analyse China’s regional policy.
The key question this research aims to answer is what are the driving forces behind
China’s policy towards regionalism in Asia? If we try to analyse this issue by taking an
overly narrow view, we are unlikely to develop a plausible explanation. Single-factor
analysis of the sort that predominates in mainstream theories cannot explain why
China’s policy towards various regions is different, even where broadly similar
“structural” conditions exit. Power, efficiency and identity drive China’s foreign policy
in different ways and with different consequences. By adopting a problem-focused
research orientation (namely focusing on specific phenomenon of international affairs
rather than the theory building), it will be possible to identify the factor or combination
of forces that play(s) the most important role in a particular issue area.
For example, neorealism clearly has some capacity to explain China’s strategic policies
and security issues. Given China’s troubled recent history and its painful incorporation
into the international system, it is hardly surprising that many of its recent strategic
initiatives accord with the expectations of neorealist scholars, as we shall see. Even if
not all of the claims neorealists make about the inevitable drivers and development of
the international system are accepted, some of their assumptions do provide an insight
into the thinking of some strategic planners in China, where realist ideas have long
85 Ibid.
34
exercised a powerful influence on military strategy.86
The integrity of territory and
national sovereignty remain central concerns for the Chinese policymaking elites, as
they do for many of China’s neighbours.87
A possible intensification of competition
over finite energy supplies also poses enormous challenges for the region generally and
for China in particular, a country with a very high dependency on external energy
sources and a political system that is legitimated largely by continuing growth.88
These
issues will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters, but the general point is
clear: the types of issues that realist and neorealist scholars give most attention to
remain important—especially in geographical areas where the struggle for control over,
or access to, scarce resources remains intense or where strategic issues remain contested
and unresolved.
However, China’s foreign policy behaviour is not defined solely by competition;
cooperation occurs in many areas between China and its Asian neighbours. Even among
the states that have territory disputes, such as China and Japan or between China and its
Southeast Asian neighbours, cooperative behaviour continues and neoliberal
institutionalism can help us to understand why. As will be seen, China’s interaction with
the global economy has not only been central to its remarkable economic rise but has
also exerted a powerful influence over the way economic relations are conceived and
managed in the process. Even in the increasingly fraught area of security, where realists
might be expected to have greater insight, there is growing cooperation around non-
traditional security issues that have become increasingly institutionalised. There is some
recognition, at least, that the nature of some problems, such as the environment, means
86 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
87 Amitav Acharya, “The strong in the world of the weak: Southeast Asia in Asia’s regional architecture”,
in Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community, ed. Michael J.
Green and Bates Gill (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2009), 172–189.
88 According to recent data, China’s dependence on imported oil has been raised to 55.2%. See William
Pentland, “China’s energy insecurity worsens”, Forbes, 15 August 2011, accessed 17 August 2011,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/08/15/chinas-energy-insecurity-worsens/ .
35
that no individual state can address the problem alone. In some issue areas, the pursuit
of absolute rather than relative gains may be a prerequisite of effective action.
This is not to suggest that China’s foreign policy behaviour is dictated solely by
material conditions or the transnational nature of particular problems. On the contrary,
relations with Japan, especially concerning the notorious question of interpreting
bilateral and regional history, serves as a powerful reminder that there are other forces
at work in shaping some aspects of China’s foreign policy. The importance of questions
of identity, history and discourse are important variables in explaining the particular
trajectory of relations with Japan in particular, as we shall see. Due to the importance of
ideational, even ideological, factors, the constructivist approach provides a potentially
important way of understanding the socially constructed basis of foreign relations (as
well as the domestic forces that encourage them at times).
1.4 The Comparative Case Study Method
Advantages and disadvantages of the case study method
The final part of this chapter outlines the principal research methodology to be
employed throughout the thesis. The case study method is used widely and successfully
in researching IR. According to Li, the case study method allows a researcher to select a
single event, a few events or a particular aspect of an event and conduct an in-depth
analysis of a specific issue. In this way, a more comprehensive explanation can be
developed that attempts to delineate the relationship between the contingent
environment and specific outcomes.89
As George and Bennett point out in their
89 Shaojun Li, “Lun guoji guanxi zhong de anli yanjiufa [On the method of case study in international
relations]”, Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 3 (2008): 111–123.
36
exhaustive delineation of the case study methodology,90
this approach allows
researchers to carry out “contextualised comparisons” that allow the identification of
key variables across “analytically equivalent phenomena”. In other words, by
comparing broadly similar phenomena in different contexts, it should be possible to
isolate some of the more important factors that account for different outcomes. Potential
causal mechanisms can be examined in detail in different circumstances, allowing
inferences about their possible relative significance to be made.
Of course, there is the possible issue of selection bias when selecting case studies;
however, in this research, the selection process was dictated by the nature of the
research question. Given the interest of the thesis in China’s foreign policy, its evolution
and possible differentiation, the decision to look at China’s regional policies was
compelling. However, it is also possible that China’s current policy settings are not
representative of its historical position, which is why I pay particular attention to the
historical context within which each case study is embedded.
The use of case study method in this research
In this research, I will utilise the case study method. The aim of this research is to find
out the rationale and driving forces behind China’s foreign policy towards different
regions. One of the most striking aspects of China’s regional policies is that they are not
uniform. On the contrary, there are significant and revealing differences in the various
subregions that constitute China’s immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, in this thesis,
separate analysis is undertaken of China’s principal Asian neighbours and they are
divided into subregions—namely, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. . I
shall also analyse the way these sub-regional relationships fit into the wider “East Asian”
and “Asia-Pacific” regions. Given that China’s participation in South Asian cooperation
is limited, however, I will not discuss South Asia in this thesis.
90 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 21–24.
37
The best way to understand and account for China’s policy in each of the subregions is
to observe policy outcomes in the various regions closely and to use process tracing to
map the development of specific policies over time.91
This involves a careful analysis
and identification of possible causal mechanisms and their potential influence on the
dependent variable, in this case China’s distinctive regional policies. In each of the
subregions, a specific institutional development will constitute the primary focus of
attention. By carefully mapping its origins, evolution and the involvement and attitudes
of Chinese policy-makers, we can begin to account for the difference in policy
outcomes and goals that have distinguished each area.
In Northeast Asia, the focus will be on the mechanism that was established to solve the
North Korean nuclear crisis—namely, the six-party talks. Recently, a new cooperative
mechanism between China, Japan and South Korea has been built to strengthen the
cooperation in the region. However, the bilateral relations, such as the Sino-Taiwanese
relationship and the Sino-Japanese relationship will compose the foundation of
discussion. In Southeast Asia, the China-ASEAN cooperation mechanism will be
explored, as this has been a particular focus of interest for Chinese policy-makers and
highlights the tensions between its economic and strategic agendas; specifically, the
China-ASEAN free-trade area will be discussed. In Central Asia, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation will be the focus of analysis, as this also illustrates two
potentially competing agendas: namely, anti-terrorism cooperation and energy
cooperation.
Each of the three case study chapters on Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central
Asia is preceded by an overview of that particular subregion’s place in China’s policy
practice and thinking. Historical context is crucial in understanding the specific
trajectories of regional relations and they exhibit a degree of “path dependence”, which
91 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
38
helps to explain their specific dynamics.92
Importantly, history does not only determine
the distribution of material power and resources but also the way development and
historical relations have been understood. Indeed, specific historical circumstances are
so consequential that I shall argue that in each case study it is possible to identify some
historical turning point or critical juncture that has significant continuing implications
for contemporary regional relations.
Besides reviewing the specific history of the various regions, attention is allocated to
the official statements of the Chinese government regarding policy. The official
statements include Chinese leaders” speeches, governments” reports to national
congress, party congress reports and other relevant government documents. These
statements provide the official account of China’s policy and the rationales for
subregional differences. However, since Chinese governmental statements are usually
very ambiguous and generalised, this material needs to be critically interrogated and
compared with information gained from an observation of the actual outcomes of
China’s policy. Much of this qualitative analysis is reinforced with interviews with
intellectuals and policy elites who are based in Chinese think tanks and universities.
These interviews provide a valuable insight into the evolving policy debates within
China and the increasingly influential public intellectuals who are seeking to interpret
and influence China’s policy.
In each case study, the origin and the development of the regional institutions observed
and the attitude and behaviour of China will be carefully examined to test whether the
country’s identified national interests have been served in the regional institutions. In
this way, we will be able to uncover the driving forces behind China’s participation in
the regional institutions.
92 Paul Pierson, “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics”, American Political
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 251–267.
39
The comparison of the three subregions will progress through all the three case studies.
Following an analysis of the three subregions, an analysis of China’s participation in the
four larger region-wide institutions—APEC, ARF, EAS and APT—will be made, with
the intention of assessing what implications the development of China’s subregional
policies may have for the greater East Asian region. In other words, can China’s policy-
makers align their subregional policies and goals with China’s participation in a broader
conception of the region?
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the theoretical framework and research methods of the
thesis. Some of the more important theories of regionalism and regionalisation have
been discussed, as these will inform parts of the subsequent analysis. The chapter has
analysed the potential value of mainstream theories of IR—neorealism, neoliberal
institutionalism and constructivism—and suggested that there is potentially much to be
learned from each of them when attempting to explain something as complex as China’s
regional policies. However, the key claim made is that none of these theories in
isolation can provide a satisfactory explanation of China’s proactive attitude towards the
Asian region generally, or towards the crucial subregions focused on in this thesis.
Consequently, this research adopts a theoretically eclectic approach to analysis. The
main justification for adopting this approach is that China’s foreign policy is affected by
a number of different factors; single-factor analysis based on one of the mainstream
theories cannot provide a complete explanation. Power, efficiency and identity play
different roles in policy formulation in different subregions and issue areas. As a result,
a variable complex of factors shapes China’s foreign policy behaviour across
geographic and issue areas. Through detailed empirical observation and process tracing,
it is possible to construct a detailed account of the forces that shape different policy
outcomes and priorities.
40
Before we look at China’s policy in the region, we need to say something about Chinese
foreign strategy, how Chinese policy is devised and implemented, and what factors we
should consider when analysing Chinese foreign policy. The next chapter begins this
process by providing an overview of China’s overall foreign strategy and the Chinese
foreign policy-making establishment.
41
Chapter Two: Foreign Policy Ideas and Practice
2.1 Introduction
To understand the rationale behind China's regional policy, its overall foreign policy
goals must be identified and placed in context. What factors (ideas or institutions) affect
China's behaviour when it seeks to achieve these goals, especially in the Asian context?
This chapter attempts to answer these questions and give the reader a general picture of
China's policy-making mechanisms.
China's foreign policy cannot be understood without considering the historical
background from which it has emerged, because many issues in today's foreign relations
are profoundly influenced by historical legacies. Perceptions of historical issues also
shape Chinese policy-makers' thinking and the way they see China’s place in the
international system.93
In this chapter, I will review the development of China's
historical world view and China's foreign relations history in Asia in particular. Section
2.2 discusses China's foreign policy-making mechanism and introduces the different
actors in the foreign policy-making process. Section 2.3 provides an introduction to
China's traditional world order and the current thinking of some of China’s policy-
makers and intellectuals about how the world should be organised. Section 2.4 explains
the historical background of China's role in Asia, to provide insight into China’s foreign
policy for this region. It will become clear that historical legacies continue to affect
China’s relationships in Asia. In Section 2.5, a review of Chinese ideas towards Asian
regionalism and regional cooperation is provided, which reveals the importance
attached to the evolution of the Asian region over time. Section 2.6 is an introduction to
Sino-US relations. Even though this dissertation is principally concerned with policy in
China's immediate neighbourhood, its policy towards the US must also be considered,
93 William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
42
given that the US is a key player and has major interests in the region. Finally, a
conclusion will be provided.
2.2 The Making of China's Foreign Policy
China, like all nation states, has a specific set of foreign policy goals. But, as
Christopher Hill has argued, foreign policy-making is more complex than having a
single goal.94
As in any country, there are different interest groups within the Chinese
government and these are increasingly important factors in determining overall policy,
especially as these interests are often in competition.95
Indeed, for all the clichés that are
often used about “China Inc” and the monolithic state, the reality is increasingly at odds
with the stereotype. Having said that, unpacking the “black box” of foreign policy-
making in China is especially difficult. The system remains frustratingly and
deliberately opaque. Nevertheless, in this section, I shall outline some of the key
influences on, and components of, the foreign policy-making process in China. Two
questions will inform the discussion: who makes China’s regional policies and how do
they make them?
Thirty years ago, the above questions were much easier to answer because when Mao
Zedong ruled China, particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), he was
responsible for making all major foreign policy decisions. He was assisted by Premier
Zhou Enlai, who was responsible for turning the overall strategic direction into specific
plans, and then overseeing their implementation. Only the Central government had the
right to deal with foreign affairs during this period. Within the government agencies,
two departments had primary responsibility for foreign policy. One was the Ministry of
94 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave, 2003).
95 Victor C. Shih, Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008); David Shambaugh, “Coping with a conflicted China”, The Washington Quarterly
34, no 1 (2011): 7–27.
43
Foreign Affairs, the other one was the Department of International Liaison of the
Communist Party of China (CPC). However, in today's China, foreign policy-making is
much more complex. It is true that China is still centrally controlled, but because
China's interaction with the outside world is more frequent and multidimensional, there
are more stakeholders in foreign affairs. Now, not only do different departments within
the government have potentially differing opinions, but provincial governments may
also have their own agendas, especially on regional issues. Indeed, as the recent report
by the International Crisis Group has demonstrated the multiple influences on the
policy-making process accounts for the abrupt shifts in policy direction in the pivotally
important, strategically volatile South China Sea.96
In Beijing, there are three levels of foreign policy-making.97
The highest level, namely
the decision-making level, rests with the Politburo. As the Party wields the highest
decision-making authority in China, the major foreign policy issues are decided within
the Politburo. As the Politburo has 25 members elected by the 18th CPC Central
Committee, and some Politburo members are provincial leaders who are not residents in
Beijing, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), which is composed by only seven
people, is de facto the highest decision-making body. The current PSC includes the
Chinese President, the Premier, the Chairman of the National People's Congress , the
Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the President of
the Party School of the Central Committee of CPC, the Secretary of the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC , and the Executive Vice Premier. It is
still not clear how specific decisions are made in the Politburo and the PSC, but
96 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea”, 23 April, 2012, accessed 20 September,
2012. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-
sea-i.aspx
97 Ning Lu, “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and
Party Departments,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-
2000, ed. D. M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 39-60.
44
consensus-building is thought to be one of the most important features.98
The second level of China's foreign policy-making mechanism is the consultative
level.99
The principal mechanism here is the Central Foreign Affairs Small Leading
Group, with President Hu Jintao as the head and Vice President Xi Jinping as the deputy
head currently. In the small leading group, heads of major bureaucracies are included;
for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the
Department of International Liaison of the CPC, the Office of Taiwan Affairs, the Office
of Overseas Chinese, the Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, the Deputy General
staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and so forth. This small leading group
discusses many specific issues in relation to foreign affairs. It also has responsibility for
coordinating the views of different agencies and departments. On many specific issues,
the suggestions and drafts produced in this meeting are passed by the PSC straightway.
The everyday operations of this small leading group are run by the Office of Foreign
Affairs of the Central committee of the CPC, with Dai Bingguo as the Secretary General.
Dai is also a state councillor in the government, which makes the incumbent the highest
foreign affairs official in the Chinese government.
The implementation of foreign policy is conducted by different bureaucracies,
according to different issue areas. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the most important
for implementing policies made by the PSC, although its influence on the overall
direction of foreign policy is surprisingly limited when compared to some of its foreign
counterparts.100
The Party rely less on Ministry of Foreign Affairs nowadays and the
98 H. Lyman Miller, “Hu Jintao and the Party Politburo,” China Leadership Monitor (9), 30 January 2004.
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm9_lm.pdf; However, the number of PSC
members has decreased from nine in the 17th
CPC Central Committee to seven in the 18th
CPC Central
Committee. The decline of the number may promote the efficiency of the decision making given that
consensus is easier to be formed.
99 Ning Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
100 David M. Lampton, “China's foreign and national security policy-making process: Is it changing, and
45
ministry is only one of the stakeholders who deal with foreign affairs. It is worth
noticing that in the current Politburo, there is no representative of professional
diplomats. Unlike the fourteenth and fifteenth Politburo when Jiang Zemin was the
Secretary-General from 1992 to 2002, Qian Qichen, the Vice Premier who was in
charge of foreign affairs and Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau affairs was an insider.
Qian was a professional diplomat who acted as the foreign minister from 1988 to 1998.
However, after that, the highest level professional diplomats, such as Tang Jiaxuan and
Dai Bingguo, were both not in the politburo, and they were/are only state councillor
rather than vice premier.
The foreign ministry manages Chinese overseas missions. Likewise, intelligence and
analysis from embassies all over the world is funnelled through this ministry. In the
ministry, there are departments devoted to regional affairs and functional affairs. In
regards to East Asia, the Department of Asian Affairs is the most important. On Central
Asia affairs, the Department of European-Central Asian Affairs holds the place of
central importance. However, given the importance of the US in the region, the
Department of American and Oceania Affairs is also important and influential on Asian
affairs. On maritime issues, such as that of the South China Sea, the newly founded
Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs plays a major role, although it is still
something of a work-in-progress.101
As China's economy has become more integrated into the global economy, the Ministry
of Commerce has grown in importance102
, especially when dealing with China’s foreign
economic relationships. This ministry sends representatives all over the world, to look
after China's business interests. Within the ministry, departments are divided according
to the different regions and issue areas.
does it matter?” in David M. Lampton The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of
Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 1-36.
101 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea”.
102 Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking.
46
The Department of International Liaison is often viewed as the biggest loser in the post-
Cold War era. This department is a Party organ controlled by the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party. The department mainly deals with Party diplomacy, with
the Communist parties in foreign countries. However, despite the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the demise of Communist parties across much of the world, the department
still plays an important role in diplomatic relations with North Korea, Vietnam, Laos
and some other countries. Indeed, the Department remains one of the most reliable
channels for communication with North Korean leaders. This role is likely to continue,
given that the current ambassador to North Korea is the former deputy director of the
department.103
The Office of Taiwan Affairs, the Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, and the
Office of Overseas Chinese are particularly specialised departments. In their own
domains, they are highly influential. An interesting phenomenon is that senior
bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are appointed as the heads of these
offices. For example, the former Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi and
Wang Guangya, have been appointed as the directors of the Office of Taiwan Affairs
and Office of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, respectively. He Yafei, another former
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs has become the Deputy Director of the Office of
Overseas Chinese. All of them have a very long experience as senior diplomats, which
no doubt strengthens the understanding of international issues in these departments.
The PLA has also become more and more influential in foreign affairs. In China, the
Party also controls the army. Although the governmental structure contains a Ministry of
Defence, the operations of the Ministry of Defence are conducted by the Central
Military Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. At present, however, the
103 "Liu Hongcai Dashi Jianli [the Curriculum Vitae of Ambassador Liu Hongcai]." Embassy of People's
Republic of China in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, accessed 22 August, 2012,
http://kp.china-embassy.org/chn/dshd/dsjl/.
47
relationship between the Party and the army is undergoing significant change. In Mao
Zedong’s and Deng Xiaoping's era, there were personal ties between Communist Party
leaders and military leaders. Leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping had
themselves been military leaders during the civil war. However, since Jiang Zemin's and
Hu Jintao's generations, civilian leaders have had no significant ties with the military.
Two ways to ensure that the military remains under the control of the Party are: for the
Communist Party leaders to appoint senior generals and military officers directly, and
also, to invest in the modernisation of China's military force and improve the living
standards of officers and soldiers.104
However, with the professionalization of the
military force, the PLA has begun to express its own interests and agenda.105
Although
there is no sign at this moment to show that the Party and the military have serious
divisions, the military can influence the decision-making process and apply pressure to
the Party. One example of this can be seen in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The
military is believed to have put pressure on Jiang, encouraging him to take a hard
line.106
On many other foreign policy issues as well, such as the South China Sea issue,
the military has its own policy preferences, and they are usually more aggressive than
those of the civilian government.107
Further complicating Chinese foreign policy-making is that with the opening of China,
Chinese local governments are now in closer contact with the outside world. This is
especially pronounced in the coastal or border provinces. China’s sheer size and
geography means that different parts of China belong to different sub-regions of Asia.
104 Tai Ming Cheung, “The Influence of the Gun: China's Central Military Commission and Its
Relationship with the Military, Party, and State Decision-Making Systems,” in The Making of Chinese
Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2001), 61-90.
105 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China”, in SIPRI Policy Paper
(Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010).
106 Cheung, “The Influence of the Gun: China's Central Military Commission,” 61-90.
107 Michael Auslin, “Is the PLA a Paper Dragon?” Wall Street Journal, 2 July 2012.
48
For example, in the relationship with Southeast Asia, China's coastal provinces have
specific interests. The provinces of Guangdong and Fujian attract a lot of investment
from the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, as I will elaborate in Chapter 3. The three
provinces in Northeast China have their own local concerns in the Northeast region of
Asia, as we will see in Chapter 4. Similarly, in the Northwest of China, Xinjiang
province's interests are tightly connected with the Central Asian region, which will be
examined in Chapter 5. Thus, although China's foreign policy decisions continue to be
made by the Central government, the influence of local governments and their foreign
policy initiatives play a growing role in shaping policy in particular areas and contexts.
Importantly, the differences between departmental interests can sometimes lead to
conflicting policy outcomes. In the case of the South China Sea, the Bureau of Fisheries
Administration, the China Marine Surveillance agency, the PLA Navy, the China Coast
Guard under the Ministry of Public Security, the China Customs Anti-Smuggling
Bureau under the General Administration of Customs, and the Maritime Safety
Administration affiliated with the Ministry of Transport, all have different interests and
responsibilities. The activities of these agencies are not necessarily coordinated with
those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this can lead to misunderstanding and
tension, and heighten the potential for conflict.108
In today's China, as international affairs grow in complexity, specialists’ points of view
take on increased importance. Through formal or informal channels, the advice of
experts such as former diplomats, scholars in universities and researchers in strategic
think tanks, reach policy-makers.109
One example of a formal channel is the Foreign
Policy Advisory Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which includes 22 former
108 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea”.
109 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” in SIPRI Policy Paper,
(Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2010); James G. McGann, "Chinese Think
Tanks, Policy Advice and Global Governance," in RCCPB Working Paper (Research Center for Chinese
Politics & Business, 2012).
49
ambassadors and 13 leading foreign affairs related experts. This committee meets
regularly to discuss the current international situation and to make suggestions to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.110
The Ministry of Commerce also has its own advisory
committee, which includes 22 leading scholars, and which make suggestions about
China's trade relations.111
There are a few regionalism-related think tanks playing
important roles in China’s regional policy making. Notably, the National Institute of
International Strategy (formerly the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences) is very active in promoting China’s participation in the East Asian
regional projects. Its former director Zhang Yunling was a member of the East Asia
Vision Group.112
The media and the public can also influence China's foreign policy-making to some
extent. Although traditional media is controlled by the Party, new media (for example,
social media) is harder to control. Sometimes, the government has to consider the
nationalist attitude of the netizens. With the collapse of the Communist ideology in the
reform era, nationalism has become one important source for the legitimacy of the
Communist Party's rule in China, along with economic development.113
The emphasis
on patriotic education in Chinese schools and universities since the early 1990s is an
example of such a practice. However, as Susan Shirk argues, nationalism is a double
110 “Jianjie” [Introduction], Waijiao Zhengce Zixun Weiyuanhui [Foreign Policy Advisory Group],
accessed 27 July, 2012, http://fpag.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zwhjj/ .
111 “Shangwu Bu Juxing Jingmao Zhengce Zixun Weiyuanhui Chengli Dahui Ji Shangwu Fazhan ‘Shi Er
Wu’ Guihua Zixun Lunzhenghui” [The Ministry of Commerce held the Inaugural Meeting of the
Economic and Trade Policy Advisory Committee and the Consultation Meeting of the 12th Five-Year
Plan of Business Development], Comprehensive Department, Ministry of Commerce of the People's
Republic of China, accessed 27 July, 2012,
http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xxfb/201107/20110707666539.html.
112 Other think tanks such as the East Asia Studies Center of the China Foreign Affairs University and
the APEC Study Center at Nankai University are also imporant in the regionalism-related track two
diplomacy.
113 Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism.
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
50
edged sword.114
It can help the rule of the Party but can also threaten it. The government
can sometimes use it as leverage with foreign countries, but the nationalist movement
can also lead to violence and social instability. For example, students under the rule of
Kuomintang (KMT), in 1935 initiated an anti-Japanese movement, which finally
developed to the confrontation between students and the government. This remains a
difficult issue, because even now the Chinese government cannot afford to be seen as
not supporting China’s national interests. The potential for public opinion to influence
foreign policy was clear in the relationship with Japan in 2004 and 2005, when
nationalist sentiment led to the Chinese government taking a hard-line stance.115
Thus, China's foreign policy-making is becoming ever more complex. Local
governments and different departments in the Central government and even individuals
have various interests. They will try to influence the decisions of the Central
government, or modify policy during the implementation process. Understanding this is
important for our analysis of China's regional policy, as the complex nature of China's
foreign policy-making has led to variations in China's regional policy towards different
sub-regions of Asia.
2.3 China's Role in the World: A Historical Overview
China's traditional world order
The interpretation of history is not straightforward. The past affects us today, because it
can shape our beliefs about the present. This is especially true in the Chinese case
because perceptions of the Chinese traditional world order continue to influence modern
Chinese foreign policy practice. In this section, I will mainly talk about the tributary
114 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
115Erik Beukel, "Popular Nationalism in China and the Sino-Japanese Relationship," (Copenhagen:
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2011).
51
system, which is widely regarded as the most important model of East Asian order in
the pre-modern era. However, we also need to recognise that our understanding of that
world order is filtered through contemporary reality and ideas and does not represent a
set of unambiguous “facts”. As Zhang has pointed out, typical understandings of the
tributary system over-simplify the Chinese traditional world order and are too
idealistic.116
During the weakening of the Song Dynasty (960-1279), for example, China
paid tribute rather than receiving it. However, in terms of the influence of the accuracy
of modern understandings of the Chinese traditional tributary system on today's foreign
policy thinking, what is important is that people believe that such a system represented
China and East Asia's past. Regardless of the reality of past events, contemporary
historical perspectives affect the views of today's policy-makers in China and its
neighbouring countries.
The primary features of the tributary system were inequality and the paying of tribute.
This is in contrast to the Westphalian system, which formally features the equal status of
nation states, even if the reality is actually very different.117
The tributary system was
based on Sino-centrism, which is the idea that China is the centre of the world. This idea
stems from the early maturation of the Chinese civilisation and the long-lasting absence
of any civilisation to challenge China’s dominance in the region.118
Thus, China is
called Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom), the Chinese nation is Hua (Chinese) and the
peoples living in the lands surrounding Zhongguo are Yi (barbarians). However, it is
worth mentioning here that the division between Hua and Yi is not only based on race or
geography. Hua and Yi are also cultural terms. That is, if “barbarians” practice Chinese
116 Feng Zhang, “Jiegou chaogong tixi [Deconstruct the tribute system],” Guoji Zhengzhi Kexue
[Quarterly Journal of International Politics] 22 (2010): 33–62.
117 David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010).
118 Benjamin I. Schwartz, 1968. “The Chinese perception of world order, past and present”, in The
Chinese world order: traditional China's foreign relations, ed. John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1968).
52
culture, they become Chinese. For example, in the Yuan and Qing dynasties, when the
Mongols and Manchu became the rulers of the Chinese land, respectively, they came to
accept the Chinese world order and are thus regarded as Chinese dynasties.119
Taking a Sino-centric view, the world can be imagined as a series of concentric circles,
with Chinese culture spreading from the central circle (China) to the outside circles, but
with diminishing strength, and thus ending in the uncivilised world.120
However,
according to the Confucian classics, which have informed the dominant political
ideology (Confucianism) since the Han Dynasty, this kind of hierarchy and superiority
should not lead to expansion, because expansion can only bring hegemony (Badao) at
its best result. Rather, the ideal status is kingly way (Wangdao), which cannot be
achieved by military conquest, but only by the attractiveness of an enlightened
civilisation.121
This is reflected in the quotation, “yuanren bufu, zexiu wende yi laizhi”,
which translates as “if the people far away do not accept China's authority, China should
improve its own civilisation and moral standard to attract those people”122
Confucianism also holds that there is no need for China to promote its civilisation
abroad with coercion. Rather, China should build a successful model, which other
peoples can come to learn.
119 Michael H. Hunt, “Chinese foreign relations in historical perspective,” in China's foreign relations in
the 1980s, ed. Harry Harding (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984).
120 “The so called five-zone (fuwu) theory”, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 1: The Ch'in and
Han Empires, 221 B.C. - A. D. 22, ed. Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 379–381.
121 Wolfgang Ommerborn, “Mencius' Theory of Renzheng (Humane Politics) and Its Reception in the
Song Dynasty: The Arguments of Yu Yunwen in His Zun Meng bian,” in The Book of Mencius and its
Reception in China and beyond, ed. Chun-Chieh Huang, Gregor Paul and Heiner Roetz (Wiesbaden:
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2008), 21-36.
122 "Jishi Pian," in Lunyu [Analects of Confucuis].
See http://www.confucius2000.com/confucius/lunyu.htm
53
However, the argument that China only follows Confucian teachings is a myth.123
China's foreign policy history is much more complex than Wangdao. The Tang Dynasty,
for which expansion with force was a central theme during its strongest period,
exemplifies this point. However, it is also true that the tributary system has had
constraints on China's own behaviour and that China pursued a relatively peaceful
policy even when the capability existed to invade other countries. In that sense, the
traditional tributary system contributed to the stability of China’s world, permitting the
development of a Pax Sinica world order.124
Of course, that is not to say that the tributary system was only an idealistic project. On
the contrary, it served many real interests of both China and its tributary countries. For
the Chinese emperor, the tributary system proved his legitimacy as the ruler of China, as
the tributary system was regarded as an extension of the Chinese domestic political
system.125
As the Son of Heaven (tianzi), the emperor expected to enjoy the tribute of all
peoples under heaven (tianxia)126
. In the early Ming period, for example, emperors of
the new dynasty desperately wanted to tributary relations with the surrounding nations,
123 Feng Zhang, "Zhongguo liwailun" zouyi [On Chinese Exceptionalism]. Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi
[World Economics and Politics], no. 3 (2012): 82–104.
124 Chih-Lien Huang, Tianchao Lizhi Tixi Yanjiu (Zhongjuan): Dongya de Liyi Shijie - Zhongguo
Fengjian Wangchao yu Chaoxian Bandao Guanxi Xingtai Lun [“ 'Pax Sinica' Studies in the System of the
Heavenly Court's Rule by Propriety,” Vol. 2: The East Asian Ceremonial World - On the Form of
Relations between the Chinese Feudal Monarchy and the Korean Peninsula] (Beijing: China Renmin
University Press, 1994).
125 John K. Fairbank, “Tributary trade and China's relations with the West,” Far Eastern Quarterly 1, no.
2 (1942):129–149.
126 Tianxia (all under heaven) is an interesting concept which has been recycled by Chinese scholars
recently to decribe an alternative to the current world order. They believe that Tianxia is superior to the
Westphalian nation states system. With more and more common problems faced by human beings, a view
that the world is composed by individual units cannot provide collective solutions. Tianxia sees the world
as an organism. Problems in the other part of the world are consequently China’s own problems as well.
Therefore, in a world of Tianxia, real global governance is thought to be acheivable. For discussion on
this concept, Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang’s work is most seminal. See Zhao Tingyang, Tianxia
Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun [The System of All-under-heaven: An Introdution to the Philosophy of
World Institutions] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005).
54
to legitimise their rule in China. For tributary countries particularly, the system was a
form of trade;127
tributary missions typically received more gifts from the Chinese
emperors than they tributed. Further, for both China and the tributary states, sharing a
stable and secure border was important. China had the obligation to protect the security
of its tributary states, although the role was admittedly limited and varied across the
different dynasties.128
The collapse of China's world order and the transformation to a “new” China
However, in the nineteenth century, the arrival of the European powers in East Asia
seriously challenged the established system of foreign relations in China. When the
Westerners forced China to open-up after the First and the Second Opium Wars (1839–
1842, 1856–1860), the Chinese traditional view of international relations was seriously
disrupted.129
Further, following these conflicts, the introduction of the Westphalian
system of notionally sovereign states in East Asia began to erode the Chinese world
order. The East Asian tribute system finally collapsed at the end of the nineteenth
century, with Korea and Vietnam being colonised by the imperialist powers. In Chinese
official history, the year 1839 was the beginning of the so-called “one hundred years of
humiliation”.130
From 1839 onwards, internal turmoil and external invasion caused great suffering and
instability. From the official historical view of the People's Republic of China (PRC),
127 John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng, “On the Ch'ing tributary system,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies 6, no. 2 (1941): 135–246.
128 Fangyin Zhou, “Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System,” Chinese Journal of International
Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 147–178.
129 Xiaomin Zhang and Chunfeng Xu, “The late Qing dynasty diplomatic transformation: analysis from
an ideational perspective,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, no. 3 (2007):405–445.
130 Alison Adcock Kaufman, “The ‘Century of Humiliation,’ then and now: Chinese perceptions of the
international order”, Pacific Focus 25, no. 1 (2010):1-33.
55
China became a semi-colonial country. Sovereignty and territory were frequently
abused by Western powers. A crisis point was reached with the Japanese invasion from
1931 to 1945. Nearly half of China's territory was taken by the Japanese. These abiding
memories of invasion and colonialism make China acutely sensitive about issues of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, sentiments that an increasingly vocal public
reinforce.131
Unsurprisingly, given this turbulent history, the official Chinese view is that internal
stability is the key to protecting sovereignty and territory. The Qing dynasty's fall and
the humiliation of China was the culmination of a series of internal crises, such as the
Taiping Rebellion. During the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s, the
nationalist government leader, Chiang Kai-shek, believed that in order to resist external
forces, the internal situation must first be secured, namely, “rangwai bixian annei”.132
Chiang insisted that only if the Communist Party and warlords were expelled, would
China be ready to fight a war with Japan. Internal stability was thus seen as the key for
the nation's renewal. It is worth mentioning here that this idea is also stressed by the
Communist leaders in the modern era; stability is viewed as the first priority. The
official view is that instability opens the possibility of external intervention, whereas a
strong government protects sovereignty and territory and allows for economic
development and modernisation.133
Modernisation has long been viewed as a major goal of China's restoration process. In
the late Qing dynasty, among the Chinese elites, it was determined that China's failure
131 Guo Yu, "Dynamics of Popular Nationalism in China's Japan Policy in Post-Cold War Era" (PhD
diss., University of Birmingham, 2012.)
132 Huailu Li, “‘Rangwai bixian annei’ zhengce bianxi,” [On the policy of 'stabilizing domestic situation
before resisting foreign aggression'], Gui Hai Luncong [Gui Hai Tribune] 23, no, 5 (2007): 24–27.
133 Deng Xiaoping famously argued that 'wending yadao yiqie' (stability is the first priority). See
“ Zhonggong dangshi shang de 80 ju kouhao (72): "wending yadao yiqie" [No. 72 of the 80 slogans in the
history of the Chinese Communist Party: 'stability is the first priority'], People.com, accessed 24 July,
2012, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5303/5304/20010626/497648.html.
56
in the Opium War was owing to their inferior weaponry. The level of industrialisation
and GDP per capita in China was very low.134
A belated “self-strengthening” movement
was started in an effort to catch up with Western superiority in technology and weaponry.
However, the 1894–1895 war between China and Japan marked the failure of the self-
strengthening movement. All these failures led to the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in
the 1911 revolution.135
However, revolution does not automatically bring economic and
social development. On the contrary, China was still weak and people's lives remained
hard after the 1911 revolution. After many years of war against Japan and the
Communist Party, the national economy of China was almost bankrupt. The inflation
rate was spiralling out of control in the last days of the Nationalist Party’s (KMT's) rule
in China, which accelerated the collapse of that government.136
Ideas and concepts about world order in the PRC
Predictably enough, after the foundation of the PRC, economic development was a
major task for the Communist Party. However, the Cold War environment and the
limited impact of Mao’s policies, to say nothing of the disastrous impact of the “Great
Leap Forward”, meant that policymaking occurred in an economically and politically
fraught environment.
In the Mao era, the possibility of world revolution dominated China's foreign policy-
making, particularly during the years of the Cultural Revolution. China’s elites thought
that major international conflict and world revolution were possible and that China had
134 Lizhou Sun, “Wanqing zhongguo gdp shijie diyi zhaoyang aida” [China was defeated even though it
had the biggest GDP in the world in the late Qing], Youth.cn, accessed July 24, 2012,
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/9574281.html.
135 Samuel C. Chu, “The Sino-Japanese War of 1894: a preliminary assessment from U.S.A.,” Jindaishi
Yanjiusuo Jikan [Collected Papers of the Institute of Modern History], no. 14 (1985–1986): 349–370.
136 Shun-hsin Chou, The Chinese Inflation, 1937–1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
57
a responsibility to help exploited people elsewhere to seek independence.137
As a result,
China's foreign policy was highly ideological in tenor and objectives. Pursuing China’s
own “national interest” became more difficult in this period, not least because China
suddenly found that it faced rivalry from both the Soviet Union and the US. The border
conflict between China and the Soviet Union, in the late 1960s, provided an alarming
reminder of the precarious nature of its security situation. Against this backdrop, Mao
decided to engage with the US. The adjustment of foreign policy in the early 1970s laid
down the foundation for China’s subsequent “opening”.138
The de facto alliance
between China and the US made it more natural for policy to turn toward the Western
world order. However, this fundamental redirection only came to realisation after Mao's
death and the end of the Cultural Revolution. Only after a domestic political
transformation did leftist foreign policy go into decline.
In this new situation, Chinese leaders made a different set of strategic judgements about
the world situation. Chinese leaders gradually developed the view that a world war
could be avoided and world revolution should not be regarded as the main theme of
world politics. Instead, peace and development became the dominant ideas. In this new
situation, China abolished the strategy of allying with US and developed a more
balanced foreign policy in the first half of 1980s, i.e. China tried to improve the
relationship with the Soviet Union and maintained an independent role in global
affairs.139
The end of the Cold War brought significant structural change to global politics.
Chinese elites generally believe that the world is moving toward a multi-polar era,
137 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National
Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
138 Baijia Zhang, "Gaibian Ziji Yingxiang Shijie - 20 Shiji Zhongguo Waijiao Jiben Xiansuo Zouyi [an
Outline of Chinese Diplomacy During the 20th Century]," Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences in
China], no. 1 (2002): 4–19.
139 Ibid, 4-19.
58
characterised by the simultaneous emergence of more non-traditional security threats
worldwide.140
The usefulness of formal alliances and the sort of arms race that
characterised the Cold War era were seen as increasingly ineffectual.141
Chinese officials
therefore began to develop new security concepts with mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality and coordination as the core concepts.142
Chinese diplomats first tried this
concept at the first ARF in July 1994 and further implemented it in the development of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the new century, which I will discuss in more
detail in Chapter 5.
In the new century, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao headed the
development of a new foreign policy strategy to suit China's increasing power, and its
rising influence over the East Asia region. This new thinking was in direct response to
the fact that China's neighbours and other great powers began to worry about the
implications of China's rise. To address these concerns, Chinese official scholar Zheng
Bijian developed the idea of a “peaceful rise” theory (which was changed to “peaceful
development” in 2004, to minimise the implied threat, as “rise” is a word which arouses
anxiousness from other countries more easily).143
This theory emphasises that China
140 As early as the 14th Party's Congress of the CPC in 1992, Jiang Zemin stated, in his report, that the
world was moving towards multi-polarisation. After that, multi-polarisation became the official view on
trends in world order. Scholarly discussion on multi-polarisation could be traced back even before the end
of the Cold War. Chinese strategists such as Wan Guang and Du Xiaoqiang had noticed the possible
collapse of the bipolar system. See Guang Wan, "Shijie Duojihua De Fazhan Qushi [the Developmental
Trend of the World Multi-Polarisation]," Liaowang Zhoukan [Outlook], no. 11 (1987): 31–33; Xiaoqiang
Du, "Guoji Zhanlue Geju Duojihua Xintan [a New Investigation on the Multi-Polarisation of the
International Strategic Structure]," Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics], no. 5
(1987): 1–7, 63.
141 Changhe Su, "Anquanguan De Yanbian [the Evolution of the New Security Concept]," Shijie Zhishi
[World Affairs], no. 20 (1996): 6; Yiping Zhang, "Lengzhan Hou Shijie De Xin Anquanguan [the New
Security Concept of the Post-Cold War World]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International
Relations], 2 (1997): 38–40, 22.
142 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Position Paper on the New
Security Concept," (2002). See http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15319.htm.
143 Elizabeth Economy, "The End of the 'Peaceful Rise'?" Foreign Policy, December, 2010, accessed 1
59
will not follow the historical examples of Germany or Japan, both of which challenged
the status quo as part of their rise. Accordingly, this model suggests China is willing to
develop peacefully and actively join in multilateral mechanisms.144
In 2005, Chinese leaders announced their “Harmonious World” concept, which is
grounded in a comprehensive view of world order. In April 2005, President Hu Jintao
advocated the promotion of peaceful co-existence, equal dialogue, prosperousness and
development, to construct a harmonious world, during the Asia-Africa Summit. In July
the same year, President Hu visited Russia. The Harmonious World concept became the
consensus between the two countries and was written into a subsequent joint statement.
In September 2005, President Hu delivered a speech in the United Nations to promote
the idea.145
The idea is supposed to be based on Chinese traditional culture and
highlights the importance of harmonious co-existence; it has a central notion, “he er bu
tong” (harmonious but different). This idea includes the following points: 1. Peaceful,
fair, effective and democratic multilateralism; 2. an open, fair, non-discriminatory
multilateral trade promotion system; 3. the mutual respect, inclusivity and
understanding of civilisations, cultures and institutions; 4. the strengthening of the role
of the United Nations.146
The above ideas seem ambiguous and generalised, and are rather different from the sort
of “grand strategy” we are familiar with in the West. However, strategic ambiguity is an
important feature of China's foreign strategy in the post-Cold War era, due to the quick
change of the international situation and China's own power. Uncertainty is the major
October, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_end_of_the_peaceful_rise.
144 Bijian Zheng, “Zhongguo Heping Jueqi de Xin Daolu [The New Way of China's Peaceful Rise],”
Wenhui Bao, March 21, 2004.
145 “Hexie Shijie” [Harmonious World], Xinhuanet, accessed July 24, 2012
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-08/24/content_5000866.htm.
146 Hu Jintao, “Hu Jintao: nuli jianshe chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie (quanwen)” [Hu
Jintao: strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity], Xinhuanet, accessed
July 24, 2012, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/news/971778.htm.
60
challenge which encounters the international community in the context of China's rise.
That is even true for Chinese policy elites themselves. Chinese state and society are
both undergoing an era of rapid transformation. Simultaneously, China's status in the
global system has also changed enormously, particularly during and after the GFC,
when the relative power of China increased while the US and European Union
weakened, at least economically. China's rise has become a reality and China's strategic
intention increasingly affects global politics, especially since 2010, when China's
international behaviour, particularly with respect to its region, seems to have become
more assertive. As a result, the question of China's grand strategy has begun to attract
more and more attention, in and outside China.
In fact, it can be said that in the reform era, China has not developed a coherent,
premeditated and stable grand strategy, if a grand strategy is a “distinctive combination
of political, economic, military, cultural and ideological means by which a state seeks to
ensure its national interests”.147
Chinese national interests have, in fact, reflected
contingent factors in the reform era.148
During the 1980s and 1990s, economic
development was the first priority. Across the millennium and in the first decade of the
new century, China's conceptions of its national interests have expanded and become
more complex. Although economic development is still the major consideration, issues
such as social development have also begun to be taken into account. And after the GFC,
China's national interests seem to have been redefined again.
Therefore, we can make the following observations which form an important backdrop
to what follows. China has no coherent grand strategy in the reform era. China's strategy
is always adaptive to changes in the new situation as is the nature of evolution. To a
large extent, China's strategy is still reactive. When we analyse China's regional policy,
147 Feng Zhang, "Rethinking China's Grand Strategy: Beijing's Evolving National Interests and Strategic
Ideas in the Reform Era," International Politics 49, no. 3 (2012): 318–45.
148 Ibid.
61
therefore, we need to take a dynamic rather than a static view. Seen in this way, it is not
surprising that China's regional policy has both elements of flexibility as well as a
certain lack of coherency. In fact, that is just the reality which we will explore in the rest
of the thesis. Before I take a closer look at China's regional policies, we need to
understand some historical context which shapes those policies.
2.4 China's Role in Asia: Some Historical Turning Points
Having provided a sketch of China’s overall foreign policy thinking and history, this
section will focus on its Asian dimensions. It will provide a historical review of the
relationship between China and its neighbours in different sub-regions. The purpose is
to show how the region has been affected by China, as well as the manner in which this
has shaped China's foreign policy. The contemporary implications of these historical
factors, on specific regional relationships, will be explored in more detail in subsequent
chapters. The intention here is to account for how the past affects the present that is
evident in some of these relationships.
China and Southeast Asia
The earliest official recorded interaction between China and Southeast Asia began with
the envoy sent by Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (reign: 156 BC to 87 BC). By then,
a trading route had been developed connecting China and India, through Southeast
Asia.149
Following this, China and a number of Southeast Asian countries gradually
formed tributary relationships. For example, in the third century, the official ties
between China and the kingdoms in the Malay Peninsula were already established. In
the Tang Dynasty (618 AD to 907 AD) and Song Dynasty (960 AD to 1279 AD), the
relationship between China and Southeast Asia gained further momentum. Kingdoms in
149 Fangchuan He, "’Huayi zhixu’ lun [On ‘hua-yi order’],” Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui
Kexue Ban) [Journal of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences),], no. 6 (1998): 30–45.
62
the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and Brunei also sent missions to China regularly. It
is worth mentioning here that Vietnam, with whom China is currently having major
problems, gained autonomy from China in the late tenth century and finally became an
independent kingdom and a tributary country to China in 1174 AD.150
The tributary system reached its peak in the Ming (1368 AD to 1644AD) and Qing
Dynasties (1644 AD to 1912 AD). For example, during the period of Emperor Yongle of
the Ming Dynasty (reign: 1402 AD to 1424 AD), the imperial Chinese navigator Zheng
He was sent to visit Southeast Asia, South Asia and Africa. He made seven voyages and
visited more than 30 countries, greatly improving the relationship between China and
the Southeast Asian countries.151
During this period, China's influence in the region
went beyond the ceremonial. In 1409, Zheng He helped the locals of Malacca (the most
important trading centre in Southeast Asia, originally controlled by Thailand) to found
their own nation: the Kingdom of Malacca. Zheng's other activities such as eliminating
pirates, pacifying the internal turmoil of Sumatra and protecting Malacca all showed
that China had played a role as a regional leader during that time.152
However, after the late Ming period, China turned inwards, and almost in the same
period, European countries accelerated their colonisation process in East Asia. Though
the Qing court forbid emigration, large numbers of Chinese labourers and merchants
went to Southeast Asia looking for new opportunities, particularly after the seventeenth
century. The size of this diaspora increased rapidly after the Second Opium War (1856
AD to 1860 AD), when Britain and France forced the Qing government to sign the
unequal treaties, which, among other things, allowed for the free movement of Chinese
150 Ibid.
151 “Admiral Zheng He”, Chinaculture.org, accessed 24 July, 2012,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/zhenhe/131897.htm.
152 Jinming Li, “Zhenghe xia xiyang yu zhongguo dongnanya de youhao jiaowang [Zheng He's
expeditions and the friendly intercourse between China and Southeast Asia],” Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu
[Southeast Asian Affairs], no. 1 (2003): 62–69.
63
labour.153
The large amount of overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia became a
major issue between China and the newly independent Southeast Asian countries in the
post-Second World War era and remains a source of occasional tension to this day
because of the dominant position occupied by “Chinese” capital in the region.154
Throughout the twentieth century, Chinese nationalist and communist revolutions were
interlinked with those of the Southeast Asian countries. For example, the Chinese
Nationalist Revolution in 1911 received tremendous economic support from Southeast
Asian Chinese.155
This revolution also encouraged local independence movements in
Southeast Asia. Dr Sun Yat-sen's works were widely distributed in the region and
influenced the local nationalist revolutionaries. As Indonesian first president Sukarno
said, his theories of nation building, “Pancasila”, were influenced heavily by Sun Yat-
sen's “Three Principles of the People” and he was actually converted to nationalism with
the encouragement of Sun's thoughts.156
However, from the mid-1960s and with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution,
China's foreign policy became increasingly leftist. China began to export revolution to
Southeast Asia.157
For example, China's support for the Communist Party of Burma
further strained the already tense relationship between China and Burma. Thousands of
Zhiqing (Rusticated Youth) from Yunnan went to Burma, to support the Communist
153 Guotu Zhuang, “Lun zhongguoren yimin dongnanya de sici dachao [On the four waves: history of
Chinese migration into Southeast Asia],” Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu [Southeast Asian Affairs], no.1 (2008):
69–81.
154 Wai-Keung Chung and Gary G. Hamilton, “Getting Rich and Staying Connected: the organizational
medium of Chinese capitalists”, Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 58 (2009): 47–67.
155 Jinzhi Lin, “Xinhai geming, nanyang huaqiao yu dongnanya minzu duli yundong [The Revolution of
1911, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the national liberation movements of Southeast Asia],”
Paper read at Jindai Zhongguo (Di Si Ji) [Modern China] 4, (1994): 78-106.
156 Ibid.
157 Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy.
64
revolution there.158
China was also initially against the development of ASEAN, which was founded in
1967, because it was seen as anti-Communist. The relationship with Vietnam also
deteriorated during this period as Vietnam “leaned” towards the Soviet Union after the
split between China and the Soviet Union. After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978,
the bilateral Sino-Vietnamese relationship broke down, triggering the Sino-Vietnamese
War in 1979. The unhappy past between China and many Southeast Asian countries
during the Cold War period become a major source of anxiety for Southeast Asian
countries concerned about the power of China. As we shall see, such concerns remain
alive even now.
China and Northeast Asia
The history of the interaction between China and the Northeast is much longer and more
profound than the relations between China and the other sub-regions of Asia. This
history consequently continues to influence the present regional order even more
powerfully. The interaction among the three major Northeast Asian powers, China,
Korea and Japan, is the core of the foreign policy history of this region. Historically,
China was an important cultural influence on Korea and Japan. Japan sent large
numbers of envoys, students and monks to China in the Tang Dynasty and effectively
brought back Chinese civilisation. Korea adopted Chinese political institutions,
literature and Confucianism, among many other influences from China.159
Compared
with the frequency of wars and conflicts in Europe, the region was relatively peaceful
for a long history.160
158 Nyíri Pál, "Like Tenderloin in a Cow," in The Newsletter (International Institute for Asian Studies,
2012).
159 Gilbert Rozman, The East Asian region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991).
160 Although three major wars between China and Japan occurred in pre-modern times, namely the
65
However, since the late nineteenth century, the region has experienced a series of
traumatic conflicts beginning with Japan’s invasion of Taiwan and Liu Qiu (today's
Okinawa) in 1874. China and Japan also began to compete for control over the Korean
Peninsula. In 1885, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Tientsin, which required both
countries to withdraw their troops from Korea. However, the war between China and
Japan, for dominance over Korea, failed to be prevented by the treaty and occurred
between 1894 and 1895 and China was defeated, which marked the failure of China's
self-strengthening movement in late nineteenth century. As a result, Korea was forced to
terminate the suzerain-vassal relationship with China, and China's traditional world
order finally collapsed.161
After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905, Japan's
authority in Korea was confirmed. In 1910, Japan established a Governor-General in
Korea, making it a colony of Japan.162
As Japan was successful in learning from the West and adopting its technology and
institutions,163
it became a popular place for Chinese to study. Many early
revolutionaries such as Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei, and Communist leaders
Battle of Baekgang between the Tang and Silla alliance, and Baekje and the Japan alliance with the latter
defeated; Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281 with the Yuan China defeated; and Japanese
invasions of Korea from 1592 to 1598 with Japan defeated by the alliance of China and Korea. Both wars
between China and Japan in the Tang period and Ming period were over control of the Korean Peninsula.
In the former case, China and Japan supported two different states on the Peninsular. In the latter case,
China helped Korea to prevent the invasion of Japan. This pattern was repeated in the modern era and
helps to explain the continuing difficulties between these neighbouring states. See Eric Teo Chu Cheow,
"Understanding Sino-Japanese Relations from the Historical Perspectives: Asymmetry and Geo-Politics,"
in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Need for Conflict Prevention and Management, ed. Niklas Swanström
and Ryosei Kokubun (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008).
161 For a detailed research on this history, see S. C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895:
Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
162 “Japan and the West: The Meiji Restoration (1868–1912),” Columbia University, accessed July 25,
2012, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/webcourse/key_points/kp_10.htm#top.
163 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the seventeenth to the
twenty-first century, vol. 24 (London: Routledge, 1996).
66
such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, all spent time in Japan. Dr Sun Yat-sen also gained
support from Japanese, such as Toten Miyazaki, who was a life- long supporter of the
Chinese revolution. However, Japan's ambitious to dominate East Asia never stopped. In
1931, Japan occupied Manchuria, and in 1937, the total war between China and Japan
began. After eight years of brutal war, on 15 August 1945, Japan surrendered and was
de-militarised.164
Crucially, however, the history of this period and the Japanese
invasion continues to affect the psyche of East Asian people and that of many Chinese
in particular. Disputes over the “correct” interpretation of the historical record of the
war still affect today's Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese relations. For many Chinese
and Koreans, the Japanese have not fully atoned for or admitted to their war crimes. The
endless disputes over Japanese history textbooks which minimise the war’s importance
are evidence of this and they are widely criticised in China.165
Likewise, the repeated
visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the notorious Yasukuni Shrine, which contains the
remains of convicted war criminals, are a further irritant to the Chinese and something
that allows Chinese policy-makers to exert political leverage when it suits them to do so.
All this has caused nationalist sentiment to grow in China and South Korea against
Japan in recent years.166
The civil war in China and the victory of the CPC effected a change in Northeast Asian
relations. In 1950, Communist China decided to ally with the Soviet Union. More
immediately, the Korean War broke out and China sent troops to the Korean Peninsula
to support its allies in the North. “Red” China and the US became enemies directly
embroiled in conflict. In this new environment, the US signed the bilateral treaty of San
164 “Japan in China, 1937–1945”, Asia for Educators, Columbia University, accessed July 25, 2012,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_japanchina.htm.
165 Xuanna Li, "Riben Jiaokeshu Shijian Jiqi Zhongguo Minjian Shentao Shenglang [The Japanese
Textbook Incident Evokes Chinese Civic Condemn," Xinhuanet, accessed 1 October,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/06/content_2796200.htm.
166 John Miller, “Japan's Burden of History - Can it Be Lifted?,” (Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, 2002.)
67
Francisco with Japan, effectively re-militarising Japan. The US Seventh fleet was
stationed in the Taiwan Strait at the same time, to deter China. This established the
present state of affairs in Northeast Asia: the “cold” civil war between China and
Taiwan continues, and the division of the Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot and a
permanent obstacle to cooperative relations in Northeast Asia and beyond.167
Nevertheless, some progress has been made.
The normalisation of the relationship between China and Japan only became possible
after the normalisation between China and the US following Nixon's visit in February
1972. In September of the same year, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited
China. In August 1978, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
With China “opening” and reforming its economy from the late 1970s, Japan became
one of the first investors in China, providing many low interest loans to China during
the 1980s, which was important for China's economic construction.168
In the Cold War era China only recognised North Korea as the legitimate regime in the
Korean Peninsula and regarded South Korea as a puppet state of the US. However, this
attitude changed when China began the reform era and decided to initiate economic and
trade cooperation with South Korea. With China's mediation, both North and South
Korea were admitted into the United Nations in 1991. In 1992, China built formal
diplomatic relationship with South Korea. This change also led to an adjustment in the
relationship between China and North Korea. After this period, the bilateral relationship
was considered more in terms of national interests, rather than ideological or historical
friendship as in the previous decades. One direct manifestation of this was that North
167 Zhihua Shen, “Zhongsu tongmeng, chaoxian zhanzheng yu duiri heyue: dongya lengzhan geju
xingcheng de sanbuqu jiqi hudong guanxi [The Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War and the Peace
Settlement with Japan: the three steps in the formation of the Cold War situation in East Asia and their
interaction],” Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences in China], no. 5 (2005): 172–188.
168 Yuan Hong, “Jianguohou zhongri guanxishi fenqi wenti gaishu [A brief discussion on the periods
division issue on the history of Sino-Japanese relations after the foundation of the People's Republic of
China],” Lishi Jiaoxue [History Teaching], no. 11 (1990): 46–48.
68
Korea voted to support Sydney to hold the 2000 Olympic Games rather than Beijing in
1993.169
Overall, it is clear that there is at least some basis for thinking that, even in a
geographical area that many consider politically difficult and strategically fraught, the
logic of economic interdependence has caused China’s policy-makers to recalibrate their
policy settings and foreign relationships. In other words, those scholars who have
emphasised the normative and discursive aspects of foreign relations in the Korean
Peninsula need to be taken seriously.170
China and Central Asia
China is often regarded as an East Asian country today, given its cultural similarities
and connections with Korea, Japan and Vietnam. Although the depth of the interaction
between the Northeast Asian countries is much deeper than between China and the
Central Asian States, the interaction between China and these states has a long history
as well. Since Zhang Qian's mission achieved diplomatic success to ally China with
Central Asian countries to defeat Xiongnu more than 2100 years ago, China formed
close ties with Central Asia, as I explain below. Further, as the historical territorial
threats against China were mainly from the North and West, the relationship between
Central Asia and China is important, and remains relevant when trying to understand
China’s foreign policy towards the region today.
Ancient Central Asia was called the “Western Region” in China. The definition of this
region changed in different historical periods. Thus, the Western Region can refer to
China's Xinjiang province, but also to a larger area, including the present day Central
Asian republics. In the Han and Tang dynasties, China's power expanded to the Central
169 “Zhonghan Jianjiao Jin Zhengri Buman [China and South Korea built diplomatic relationship and
Kim Jong-il was unsatisfied]”, ifeng.com, accessed July 25, 2012,
http://news.ifeng.com/photo/history/200708/0828_1398_204352.shtml.
170 David C. Kang, “International relations theory and the second Korean war”, International Studies
Quarterly 47, (2003): 301–324; Roland Bleiker, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
69
Asian region. The Tang set up the Anxi Protectorate and Beiting Protectorate in today's
Xinjiang province and the Central Asian region, and implemented military rule there.
Chinese troops were stationed as far as in today's Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan.171
However,
China's dominance in Central Asia was challenged by an emerging civilisation, the
Arabian Empire. In 751 AD, in the Battle of Talas, the Tang troops were defeated in
Central Asia by the Arab forces.172
China's control over Central Asia weakened until the
Qing dynasty, which regained the territory in Central Asia, principally in what is now
Xinjiang province. However, the reassertion of Chinese rule was not unchallenged.
In 1864, the Hui minority (Chinese Muslims) revolted in Shanxi province and Gansu
province. The chaos spread to Xinjiang. The Muslims in Xinjiang also rose up. Yaqub
Beg, who came from Central Asia, used this opportunity to conquer the southern part of
Xinjiang and found his own khanate. Although Britain put diplomatic pressure on the
Qing to protect Yaqub Beg, in 1875, the Qing court decided to expel the Yaqub Beg
regime. The regime was defeated by Qing troops three years later.173
This period was
important because it showed how foreign powers such as Britain and Russia competed
for influence in Xinjiang, in the context of their “Great Game” in Central Asia. After the
Yaqub Beg invasion, Beijing also tightened control over Xinjiang making it a province
and using it to consolidate China's north-western border.
In KMT-ruled China, Xinjiang was in fact controlled by local warlords. These warlords
tried to play-off the Soviet Union and the Central government of China against one
171 Changhong Wei and Shouxin Guan, “Xiyu jieshuo shiping [A historical review on the geographical
boundary of the Western Region],” Xinjiang Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Xinjiang
University (Social Science Edition)] 32, no. 1 (2004): 87–90.
172 Fangchuan He," ‘Huayi zhixu’ lun [On ‘hua-yi order’],” Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui
Kexue Ban) [Journal of Peking University, Humanities and Social Sciences] 35, no. 6 (1998): 30–45.
173 Cangjin Shi, “Shahuang eguo yu agubai zhengquan de guanxi: jianxi shae yu yingguo de xiangguan
juezhu he zhengduo [A study on the relationship between Russia and Yakoob regime: and an analysis of
the relative contests between Russia and Britain],” Shixue Jikan [Collected Papers of History Studies], no.
5 (2006): 29–36.
70
another. In 1943, the warlord Sheng Shicai decided to distance himself from the Soviet
Union and leaned on the Nationalist government. In that context, in August 1944, the
“Ili rebellion” began with the support of the Soviet Union. The Republic of East
Turkestan was founded. In early 1945, the troops of the Soviet Union were sent to
Xinjiang to directly join in the rebellion. Only after the Soviet Union and the Nationalist
government signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1945, and China promised
to give up its sovereignty claim over Mongolia and assured the Soviet Union's privilege
in Manchuria, including controlling the Lvshun Port, did the Soviet Union cease its
support of East Turkestan.174
After the Chinese civil war ended and China chose to ally with the Soviet Union in the
1950s, the Soviet Union helped China's reconstruction of Xinjiang. However, with the
deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the 1960s, the situation changed. In the
early 1960s, the Great Leap Forward created large numbers of refugees in Xinjiang. In
1962, about 70,000 Xinjiang people were encouraged by the Soviet Union to flee to
Central Asia. The cross-border nationalities become conductors for nationalism and
instability factors. Since the late 1980s, the instability caused by nationalist movements
in the Soviet republics directly affected Xinjiang, with many Uyghur separatist groups
being based in Central Asia.175
All these historical details merit emphasis, however, because East Turkestan's political
legacy can be seen to this day and cross-national tensions and ambitions remain a
source of tension in Xinjiang. The Chinese government still sees this area as an historic
threat that needs to be managed as part of its overall policy in securing its borders, as
we will see in Chapter 5.
174 Duben Ding, Zhongya Tongshi. Xiandai Juan [The General History of Central Asia. Modern Era],
vol. 4 (Urumchi: Xinjiang People's Publishing House, 2004).
175 Ibid.
71
2.5 Chinese Ideas about Asian Regionalism and Regional Cooperation:
A Historical Review
“Regionalism” may be a new term for Chinese intellectual and political elites, but the
idea of regional cooperation, or even regional integration, is not necessarily new. After
traditional patterns of international relations in East Asia collapsed with the invasion of
Western colonial powers and the decline of Chinese power, the concept of the “region”
became increasingly important to the Chinese. During this process, various versions of
“Asianism” (or Asian regionalism) were developed for different purposes and interests.
In this section, I focus on several important trends in Chinese intellectual history, to
provide a general picture of the evolution of the idea of Asianism. Importantly, this
discussion reveals not only the socially constructed and contingent nature of ideas about
regions, but also indicates the pre-existence of ideas about regional cooperation and
identity that underpin contemporary relations.176
The Period before the PRC
The first version of Asian regionalism or Asianism we need to look at was initiated by
the founder of modern China, Dr Sun Yat-sen.177
However, Sun’s revolution, which
ended the Qing dynasty, was plagued by obstacles and failures. Until the last days of his
life, China remained disunited and burdened by the unfair treaties signed with foreign
powers. Significantly, Sun could not gain support for the independence of China from
Western powers, so he considered cooperation with Japan. Sun hoped that Japan and
176 On the overall background to this debate in the region, see Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of
Regionalism: A Normative Critique”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004), 105-
125.
177 The following discussion mainly focuses on Sun Yat-sen’s idea of pan-regionalism. For his ideas
about the Asian Federation of Nations with the capital city being Guangzhou, please see Baogang He’s
excellent survey. Baogang, He, “Sun Yat-sen’s Idea of Regionalism and His Legacy” In Sun Yat-sen,
Nanyang, and the 1911 revolution, eds Lee Lai To and Lee Hock Guan (Singapore: ISEAS Publication,
2011), 44-60.
72
China could cooperate, based on the similarities of civilisation and race. He also
supported the idea that China should develop a “Munroe Doctrine” in Asia.178
After Sun discovered the expansionary ambitions of Japan, Sun’s thinking began to
focus on the tension between gongli (right, justice) and qiangquan (might, power).179
Sun employed the concept of “Wangdao” to emphasise that Asianism should be based
on justice. “Wangdao” is a way of ruling based on benevolence and right. This contrasts
with “Badao”, which is based on hegemony and might. Sun warned that Japan should
conduct a “Wangdao” culture, rather than a “Badao” culture.180
Ironically, after 1931,
when Japan founded the puppet government of Manchukuo in Northeast China, the
concept of “Wangdao” was used to legitimise it. However, until the end of his life, Sun
continued to promote Pan-Asianism and hoped that Japan could ultimately be persuaded
to cooperate with China. Indeed, when the US passed the discriminatory Immigration
Act of 1924 which incensed the Japanese, Sun seized the opportunity to once more
promote his ideas about Pan-Asianism.181
In contrast to Sun Yat-sen’s consideration of cooperation with Japan, many Chinese
intellectual elites, such as Li Dazhao, believed that forming alliances with other weak
countries was more appropriate. Li Dazhao was one of the founders of the Chinese
Communist Party and thus an influential figure. Li’s “New Asianism” was a response to
Japanese Pan-Asianism, which he considered dangerous. He believed that the First
178 Jiang Sun, “Jindai zhongguo de ‘yazhou zhuyi’ huayu’ [‘Asianism’ discourse in contemporary
China],” Shanghai Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Shanghai Normal
University (Philosophy & Social Sciences)] 33, no. 3 (2004): 47–53.
179 Ibid.
180 Junmin Zhang, “Sun Zhongshan da yazhou zhuyi sixiang zai renshi [A review on Sun Yat-sen's Pan-
Asianism],” Xueshu Yanjiu [Academic Research], no. 10 (2002): 88–92.
181 Bing Sang, Pairi yimin fa'an yu Sun Zhongshan de da yazhou zhuyi yanjiang [The new immigration
law and the Exclusion of Japanese and the lecture on Great Asianism by Sun Yat-sen]. Zhongshan Daxue
Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of Sun Yatsen University (Social Science Edition)] 46, no. 6 (2006):
1–13.
73
World War and the chaos of Chinese domestic politics was essentially a conflict
between Pan…ism (Pan Asianism, Pan Japanism, etc.) and democracy. In January and
December 1919, Li published two articles in Guomin magazine, which criticised
Japanese ideas about Pan-Asianism and presented his own alternatives. Li’s principal
concern was that Japan might use the rhetoric of Pan-Asianism to justify and disguise
its expansionist ambitious. By contrast, Li’s New Asianism was “based on national
liberation...all the Asian peoples which are oppressed should be liberated, realise
national self-determination, form a major alliance among themselves, stand by the
alliance with Europe and America, develop an international federation and improve
human beings’ happiness”.182
Li's thinking was thus a form of anti-imperialism, based
on self-determination and national liberation.
Another influential figure who wanted to form alliances within Asia was Zhang Taiyan.
Zhang was a thinker, historian, Chinese philologist and nationalist revolutionary, who
lived in the late Qing period. Zhang is interesting because his thinking was mainly from
a cultural and religious perspective. He was jailed from 1903 to 1906 for his
revolutionary activities and went to Japan upon his release. In 1907, he and Zhang Ji,
Liu Shipei, Chen Duxiu and other Chinese intellectuals, some Indian intellectuals in
exile, as well as Japanese intellectuals and participants from other Asian countries,
founded the Yazhou Heqin Hui (Asian Amity Association) in Tokyo. Zhang drafted the
constitution for this association, which reflected his ideas about cultural Asianism. The
association welcomed members with different beliefs, including communists,
nationalists and anarchists, but excluded those interested in expansionism. Zhang
stressed the importance of preserving what he described as China’s “national essence”
and the “Asian essence”. Part of this distinctive cultural tradition was derived from
Buddhism, which not only influenced his own thinking but was considered an important
source of indigenous social stability. Zhang was concerned about the aggressive nature
182 Author's translation from citation in Wei Guan, “Lun Li Dazhao de xin yaxiya zhuyi: jiantan Sun
Zhongshan da yazhou zhuyi zhi bianqian [New Asianism of Li Dazhao: considering the vicissitudes of
Sun Zhongshan's Great Asiaism],” Beifang Luncong [The Northern Forum], no. 6 (2003): 51–55.
74
of European culture and its impact on Asia’s own diminishing cultural traditions. One of
his core beliefs was that Asian countries should cooperate in the face of the European
challenge and that Japan should help China and India to preserve their civilisations.
Thus, Zhang was especially disappointed when Japan not only did not help save Asian
culture, but actually tried to destroy it.183
The anti-Japanese movement that developed in China in response to Japanese
expansionism precluded total acceptance of Asianism. One example, is the failure of the
Yazhou Minzu Huiyi (Asian Peoples’ Congress), which was held first in July 1926 (in
Nagasaki, Japan) and then in November 1927 (Shanghai, China). The Asian Peoples’
Congress was initiated by the Yaxiya Minzu Da Tongmeng (Great Alliance of Asian
Nations) of China and the Quan Yaxiya Xiehui (Pan-Asian Association of Japan), for the
purpose of people-to-people diplomacy. The congress faced great opposition from the
Chinese public and intellectuals, who thought that it was only a tool of the Japanese
imperialists designed to cheat the Chinese people.184
These historical events are
important because they show that the idea of Asianism in the early twentieth century,
regardless of whether it was initiated by Japanese or Chinese elites, could not engender
widespread support from the public. Then as now, there are plainly limits to the depth of
any possible regional processes.
Any possibility of greater cooperation was effectively foreclosed, of course, because the
conflict between China and Japan developed into total war (the Second Sino-Japanese
War) in 1937, only ending in 1945. In 1940, a puppet government was founded in
183 Banghe Sheng, “Jindai yilai zhong ri yazhouguan jianlun: ‘yazhou yitihua’ de sixiang zhuisu [A short
introduction on the Asian ideas in modern China and Japan: a historical review on ‘Asian integration’],”
Guoji Guancha [International Review], no. 4 (2005):1-9; Banghe Sheng, “Zhang Taiyan yazhouguan
xushi [A review on Zhang Taiyan's Asian ideas],” sinoth.com, accessed July 25, 2012,
http://culture.sinoth.com/Doc/article/2010/8/15/server/1000064702.htm.
184 Bin Zhou, “Yaxiya minzu huiyi yu zhongguo de fandui yundong [The Pan-Asiatic Conference and
Chinese opposition movement],” Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu [The Journal of Studies on China's Resistance
War Against Japan], no.3 (2006):128–159.
75
Nanjing under the control of Japan, when Wang Jingwei became the head of the state
and the government. Interestingly, to legitimise his regime, Wang and his followers used
and developed Sun Yat-sen’s Pan-Asianism. Wang believed that the nature of the Three
Principles of the People (KMT’s political ideology) was consistent with Pan-Asianism.
From Wang’s perspective, Sun Yat-sen’s plan for liberalising China had two parts:
China’s self-strengthening and cooperation with Japan. Wang thus argued that Japan’s
new order to build a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was in keeping with Sun’s
Pan-Asianism.185
However, the reality proved rather different and arguably set back the prospects for any
meaningful form of regional cooperation for decades.186 Because Japan used ideas
about Pan-Asianism to legitimate its violent occupation of much the region, the idea
became discredited and associated with imperialism. In the Chinese context, Wang, used
the discourse of Pan-Asianism to legitimise his collaboration with the Japanese, making
the very idea of Asian integration even more infamous. This period, and the memories
and perceptions associated with it, still influences public policy and thinking about
regionalism to this day, especially if the proposals are initiated by the Japanese
government. In the contemporary context, a growing band of outspoken Chinese
nationalist netizens are making cooperation difficult. Significantly, however, many of
them draw their inspiration from what they consider to be historical outrages perpetrated
by Japan, such as the Nanjing Massacre in 1937, with 250,000 to 300,000 victims.187
The other major consequence of this period that merits emphasis is that the Japanese
threat caused China and the US to become more closely allied, further undermining
185 Dianxing Zhang, “Lun Wang Jingwei de ‘da yazhou zhuyi’ [On Wang Jingwei's Pan-Asianism],”
Shixue Yuekan [Journal of Historical Science], no. 7 (2008): 131–134.
186 Mark Beeson, “Geopolitics and the making of regions: The fall and rise of East Asia,” Political
Studies 57, (2009): 498–516.
187 "Scarred by History: The Rape of Nanjing," BBC, accessed 1 October, 2012,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/223038.stm.
76
China’s Asian identity. China's war-time leadership considered itself to be “liberal” and
aligned against the fascist countries, rather than part of an Asian bloc fighting against a
Western alliance. Even after the civil war, when the Chinese Communist Party assumed
power, it formed a solid alliance with the Soviet Union, further weakening China's
putative Asian identity.
The PRC Period
As what we have seen in the section above, China’s regional policy experienced
turbulence and disorder under Mao’s rule since the later 1950s, though the five
principles of peaceful co-existence188
and the spirit of “Qiutong Cunyi” (seeking
common ground while reserving differences)189
helped China solve some border
disputes with neighbouring countries during this period and to conclude some
diplomatic relationships. It only went back to normal after Deng’s economic reform
since the late 1970s.
With the pragmatic approach to policy-making inspired by Deng in particular,190
China
188 The five principles were initiated by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in talks with the Indian
representatives visiting China in December 1953. The five principles were written into the Agreement on
Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. Both India and China agreed to use
the five principles to guide diplomacy between the two counties. The five principles included: 1. mutual
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. mutual non-aggression; 3. mutual non-
interference in each other's internal affairs; 4. equality and mutual benefit; and 5. peaceful co-existence.
Chinese leaders actively promoted the five principles in bilateral and multilateral relations and claimed
that a new international political and economic order should be established on that basis. See “Heping
Gongchu Wuxiang Yuanze [The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence],” Xinhuanet, accessed July 5,
2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/09/content_1515866.htm.
189 “Qiutong Cunyi” was initiated by Zhou Enlai in the April 1955 Asian-African Conference in
Bandung, Indonesia, which was attended by 29 third world countries. China's initiative was well received
by conference participants and marked an important moment in the PRC’s efforts to take a leadership role
in the developing world. See “Wanlong Huiyi (Ya Fei Huiyi) [The Bundung Conference (The Asian-
African Conference)],” Xinhuanet, accessed July 26, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-04/11/content_2813794.htm.
190 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press,
77
gradually improved its relationships with neighbouring countries and especially
strengthened economic cooperation. In the broader international context, however,
China's national identity remained as a third world country.191
Even when there was no
explicit or official policy towards regionalism or regional cooperation during the 1980s,
Chinese elites continued to deliberate possible options for future regional cooperation.
One influential figure known to have spent time considering this issue is Huan Xiang, a
leading strategist and major advisor for Deng Xiaoping.192
In 1985, Huan Xiang wrote a paper on the prospects of development of the Asia-Pacific
region. In this paper, he emphasised the importance of the Asia-Pacific region to China
and the need for independent policy on Pacific Rim cooperation. Huan argued that
China must have its own plan, saying that if China did not participate, it would risk
being marginalized. His view was that China should champion the development of
Pacific cooperation, and actively promote the interests of third world countries. Huan
argued that economic cooperation and cultural cooperation should come first, because
political cooperation and military cooperation would be more difficult to achieve. China,
Huan thought, should have the confidence to play an active role in promoting this sort
of Asia-Pacific cooperation.193
The impact of this sort of thinking and internal debate is
striking evidence of the ideational and normative change that has occurred within some
sections of China’s elite policy-makers.
2011).
191 Peter Van Ness, “China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity, in
China's Quest for National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1993).
192 Fang He, XingXiaoqun and Run Qing, “Li Yimang he Huan Xiang jianyan waijiao zhengce
[Suggestions to foreign policy by Li Yimang and Huan Xiang],” Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan [China News
Weekly], no. 283 (2006).
193 Xiang Huan, “Yatai diqu fazhan qianjing yu huan taipingyang hezuo [The future development of the
Asia-Pacific region and the Pan-Pacific cooperation],” Guoji Wenti Ziliao [Materials for International
Studies], no. 4 (1985): 2–9.
78
In 1991, China acceded to the APEC Forum, which marked the beginning of China’s
active participation in the regional organisation. China's changing perception about
regional cooperation could be seen in official documents as well. In 1995, Premier Li
Peng’s “Report on the Work of the Government” mentioned for the first time that China
should promote global and regional economic cooperation. Since this report, Chinese
Premiers emphasise the importance of regional cooperation, in nearly every report on
the work of the State Council. Party congress reports are seen as China's most important
official documents, guiding the development of the nation. At the Fourteenth Congress
of the CPC in 1992, there was no initiative on regional cooperation. In contrast, at the
Fifteenth Congress of the CPC in 1997, Jiang Zeming stressed that China should
actively participate in multilateral diplomatic activity. This was the first time the idea of
multilateral diplomacy was raised in a Party Congress report. At the Sixteenth Congress
of the CPC in 2002, Jiang further argued that China should strengthen regional
cooperation and have influence in regional organisations. At the Seventeenth Congress
of the CPC in 2007, Hu Jintao made China’s attitude even clearer when he argued that
China should promote international and regional security cooperation and actively push
for regional cooperation. This was the first time that the CPC mentioned regional
cooperation in the security sphere.194
In response to the so-called “China threat theory” that China’s rapid economic
development sparked in the new century, China developed the strategy of “yulin
weishan, yilin weiban” (do good to our neighbours, treat our neighbours as partners) for
guiding its relationship with its neighbours. At the APT Summit Meeting in 2003,
Premier Wen Jiabao introduced the regional policy of “mulin, anlin, fulin” (friendly,
peaceful and prosperous neighbours), which explained the strategy of “yulin weishan,
yilin weiban”. “Mulin” refers to political relations, meaning that China wants to
194 Reports to the CPC National Congress (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/21/content_698625.htm; Reports on the work of government
by the State Council (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010),
http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-02/16/content_200719.htm.htm.
79
construct a stable and harmonious relationship with its neighbours. “Anlin” refers to
security relations, reflecting China’s goal of maintaining regional stability and peace.
“Fulin” refers to economic relations, which involves developing sub-regional and
regional cooperation, promoting regional economic integration and seeking the common
development of Asia.195
Such ideas were further developed by Chinese leaders by
applying the concept of a “Harmonious World” to Asia. In 2011, President Hu initiated
the idea of a “Harmonious Asia” at the Boao Asia Forum. He believed that a
Harmonious Asia should: 1. respect the diversity of civilisations and promote a good
neighbourhood; 2. change its developmental model and promote comprehensive
development; 3. share opportunities and overcome challenges together; 4. seek common
ground while reserving their differences and promoting common security; and 5.
promote mutual benefit and regional cooperation.196
Overall, this initiative marked an
important shift in China’s regional policy and a sophisticated response to a rapidly
evolving international context.
However, while these new foreign policy concepts are clearly important indicators of
policy learning and development that lend support to a constructivist interpretation of
China’s foreign policy behaviour, they occurred within a wider geopolitical context that
might be more familiar to realist scholars. Indeed, many observers argue that regional
policy is in fact not prioritised by the Chinese government, but that it remains
preoccupied with the US, its principal great power rival and competitor for regional
influence. Whatever the merits of these views, without an understanding of the Sino-US
relationship, China's regional policy cannot be explained.
195 Kun Zhai, " ‘Mulin, anlin, fulin’ de shidai neihan [The contemporary implication of the friendly,
peaceful and prosperous neighbours],” Ban Yue Tan [China Comment] 21 (2003): 81–83.
196 Shuo Zhang, “Hu Jintao jiu gongjian hexie yazhou ti 5 dian jianyi [Hu Jintao initiated 5 points of
suggestions for constructing a harmonious Asia together],” Chinanews.com, 15 April, 2011, accessed
July 26, 2012, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2011/04-15/2975535.shtml.
80
2.6 The Sino-US Relationship: Past and Present
As explained in Section 2.3, China’s leaders believe that the international system is in a
period of transition, from a world with one superpower to a multi-polar world. As the
current hegemon, many in the US may reject this judgement and strive to maintain
America’s global leadership.197
In recent years, as a consequence of the rise of Chinese
power, questions about the future of the Sino-US relationship, that is, whether China
and the US are on track for an inevitable conflict, or whether China and the US can co-
exist and cooperate, have become increasingly prominent points of debate in academia,
the policy domain and even among the public.198
Whether the US is really in decline
remains to be seen,199
but its power remains immense at this stage and China must
accommodate this reality as part of its “peaceful rise”.
However, the complexity of the Sino-US relations is due not only to the challenges
these countries pose for each other, but also to the fact that the two countries are so
interdependent. The ideas of a “Chinamerica” and “Chimerica” have even been
197 For example, in the new strategic defense guidance, China has been recognised as a major challenger
of US global leadership, see Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, ed.
Department of Defense of the United States of America (2012).
198 The literature in this area is growing rapidly. For illustrative and important samples see Robert J. Art,
“The United States and the rise of China: Implications for the long haul,” Political Science Quarterly 125,
no. 3 (2010): 359–391; Michael Beckley, “China's century? Why America's edge will endure,”
International Security 36, no.3 (2011/12): 41-78; Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United
States, and Global Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Avery Goldstein, “Power
transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of
Strategic Studies 30, no. 4–5 (2007): 639–682; John J. Mearsheimer, “The gathering storm: China's
challenge to US power in Asia', The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–396;
Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu “After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of
U.S. decline,” International Security 36, no.1 (2011): 41–72.
199 Christopher Layne, “This time it's real: The end of unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International
Studies Quarterly 56, no.1 (2012): 203–213.
81
suggested as ways of conceptualising this growing economic integration in particular.200
For China, engaging with a Western world led by the US has been one of the central
themes of Chinese foreign policy. While China values relationships with developing and
neighbouring countries, the relationship with the US, remains paramount and holds the
dominant position in China's foreign policy thinking. This section, therefore, briefly
reviews the history of Sino-US relations and evaluates the present situation. In the
following case study chapters, this section will be built upon to provide a more detailed
analysis of the Sino-US relations in each specific sub-region of Asia.
Compared with China's 4,000-year recorded history, the US is a young country. The
differences in historical experiences have influenced the thinking of policy-makers in
both countries and helped to shape bilateral relations as a result. Chinese historical
memory is punctuated by periods of great strength but also vulnerability, leading many
Chinese to have a cyclical view of history.201
Another legacy of this historical backdrop
and sensibility is the firm expectation that China must rise again after 100 years of
humiliation and regain its past position of prominence and power, namely “zhonghua
minzu de weida fuxing” [the great rejuvenation of Chinese nation]202
. In comparison,
although the US also experienced a civil war, several economic crises and major
international conflicts, over the course of 200 years of history, the US has experienced
no absolute failure or fundamental decline of the sort experienced by China.
Consequently, it has a progressive view of history. By the 1990s, with the end of the
200 Handel Jones, Chinamerica: The Uneasy Partnership That Will Change the World (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2010); Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, '' ‘Chimerica’ and the global asset market
boom,” International Finance 10, no. 3 (2007): 215–239.
201 Wei Liu and Guoli Xu, "Dui Shixue Jiazhiguan Yu Lishi Bentiguan Guanxi De Lishi Kaocha [on the
Relationships between View of Value of History and Ontology of History]," Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan
Yanjiushengyuan Xuebao [Journal of Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] no. 4
(2004).
202 Shengqun Yang, "Deng Xiaoping Yu Zhonghua Minzu De Weida Fuxing [Deng Xiaoping and the
Great Rejuvenation of Chinese Nation]," People's Daily, 28 September, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2004-08/23/content_1861611.htm.
82
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, its global power had reached a peak,203
leading many American commentators to believe that it had a unique opportunity to
impose itself on the international system.204
As a consequence, there is a potential for
conflict because of the surprising similarity both countries share about their historical
sense of mission and exceptionalism205
.
The relationship between China and the US began to become internationally significant
in the late nineteenth century. At this time, the US was a rising power and China was
beginning its decline in the international system. The US was focused primarily on
China’s economic potential, and showed no interest in gaining direct influence over
China in the way of the European powers. Chinese decision-makers in the late Qing
dynasty, such as Li Hongzhang, understood this and tried to use the US to balance the
impact of the European powers. In this context, the US Secretary of State John Hay
initiated the “Open Door” policy which supported Chinese territorial and administrative
integrity and sought to promote equal opportunity for trade and business in China.206
The US was also a model for China in the early days of the Chinese self-strengthening
movement. The Chinese Education Mission (1872–1881) was sent by the Chinese
government to the US, which was a pioneering initiative with profound long-term
consequences. Though most of the students in the mission did not finish their study in
the US, many of them, such as Chinese statesman Tang Shaoyi, and the principal
architect of the Chinese railway system, Jeme Tien Yow, became influential figures in
203 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004).
204 Charles Krauthammer, “The unipolar moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no.1 (1990-1991): 23–33.
205 For a good analysis of the exceptionalism of China, see Feng Zhang, “The rise of Chinese
exceptionalism in international relations,” European Journal of International Relations, accessed 1
October, 2012, http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/10/26/1354066111421038.
206 “Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China,” United States Department of State,
accessed July 26, 2012, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/HayandChina.
83
China’s modernisation process.207
Most notably, Sun Yat-sen's “Sanmin Zhuyi” (Three Principles of the People) was
influenced by the ideas of Abraham Lincoln on “government of the people, by the
people, for the people”. Dr Sun's five Yuan system of government organisation was also
modelled on the division of power in the US, albeit modified with Chinese
characteristics. The US government supported the newly born republic of China and
built a formal diplomatic relationship with the new republic in 1913, becoming one of
the first countries to do so.208
Throughout the nineteenth century, the US was essentially what might be described as a
“regional hegemon”, and its influence was confined to the Western Hemisphere. The
influence of the US in East Asia was limited in the nineteenth century, especially when
compared with other Western powers. However, the two world wars changed this
situation. During both the First and Second World Wars, China and the US became
allies. The US abolished its unequal treaty with China and signed the new equal treaty
in 1943, which led many other Western countries to imitate the action209
. The US also
provided significant resources for resisting the Japanese invasion. Of course, this was
not an entirely altruistic act, as China helped the US constrain 80% of the total Japanese
military force. The end of the Second World War confirmed the dominant role of the US
in the region. Soon after the war, Chinese civil war started between the Communists and
the KMT, with the US first playing a role as a mediator and then turning to support the
207 Origins of the Chinese Educational Mission, Chinese Educational Mission Connections, accessed
July 26, 2012,
http://www.cemconnections.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=99999999&
limit=1&limitstart=0.
208 The Chinese Revolution of 1911. United States Department of State, accessed July 26, 2012,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/ChineseRev.
209 Keli Guo, "Kangri Zhanzheng Yu Feichu Bupingdeng Tiaoyue [the Second Sino-Japanese War and
the Abolishment of the Unequal Treaties]," Studytimes, accessed 1 October, 2012,
http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/919413.htm.
84
KMT. However, many leaders in the US, such as George C. Marshall, were very
disappointed with the corrupt Nationalist government in China and consequently
provided limited help to the KMT in the latter process of the war, which is viewed by
Chiang Kai-shek himself as one of the reasons for the KMT's failure in the end.210
When the Communist Party won the civil war and the People's Republic of China was
founded in 1949, the so-called “loss” of China transformed the geopolitical situation in
the region.211
With the signature of the Sino-Soviet Union friendship alliance and the
involvement of China in the Korean Peninsula in 1950, China and the US were
inexorably drawn into conflict. One of the most important consequences of this period,
which I explore in more detail in subsequent chapters, was the US security guarantee for
the Taiwanese regime. The legacy of this period and the US intervention on behalf of
Taiwan remains a critically important aspect of the bilateral relationship to this day and
one that continues to make the relationship between China and the US very difficult at
times.212
Nevertheless, relations between China and the US improved dramatically following the
break between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. In 1969, the military
confrontation between China and the Soviet Union reached its peak in China's Northeast
region and Xinjiang, and the Soviet Union asserted nuclear deterrence on China.
Chinese leaders realised the serious security environment. At the same time, President
Nixon also hoped to adjust the US Asian policy and engaged with China to contain the
210 In Chiang Kai-shek's diary, Chiang wrote that “the US must regret and Marshall should take full
responsibility” for the Kuomintang's failure, see "Jiang Jieshi Bushi Hen Mao Zedong, Ershi Hen Meiguo
[Chiang Kai-Shek Did Not Hate Mao Zedong But the US]," People.com, accessed 27 July 2012,
http://view.news.qq.com/a/20120708/000012.htm. For more information about Chinese Civil War,
GlobalSecurity.org, 27 July, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/chinese-civil-war.htm.
211 Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1990).
212 For a detailed inside account of some of these problems, see Henry Kissinger, On China (New York:
Penguin, 2011).
85
Soviet Union. After a strategic calculation, Chinese leaders made the decision to make
rapprochement with the US, which led to the “ping pong diplomacy”, Kissinger's secret
visit, and finally, the pivotal and transformative visit of President Nixon to China in
1972. Although China and the US remained notional enemies, when facing the real
common threat from the Soviet Union, the two countries became strategic partners.213
China's relationship with the US improved further with the beginning of economic
reform and following China's war with Vietnam in late 1970s. However, with the
Tiananmen incident in 1989, this period ended with the crushing of the student protests,
which attracted so much negative commentary in the US, and also coincided with the
end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the common threat from the Soviet Union.
The ostensibly closer ties between the US and China were weakened and have arguably
yet to return the heights of the early 1980s. As far as China’s elites were concerned, the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union triggered new challenges,
especially, the growth in American hegemonic power.214
These concerns were
heightened and apparently justified by the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995 and 1996, the
Chinese embassy bombing by the US air force in 1999, and the EP-3 surveillance jet
incident in 2001; all of which increased Chinese mistrust of American intentions.215
However, this had not stopped China from weaving itself into the Western-led world.
Likewise, within the US, there have been different opinions about policy towards China.
213 Rober S. Ross, ed. China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in
the Cold War (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).
214 Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on US global strategy,” Political
Science Quarterly 116, no. 3 (2001), 343–365.
215 “The US and China: An uneasy relationship,” BBC, 27 July, 2012,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/118753.stm; “U.S. and China share long history of distrust,” CNN,
27 July, 2012,
http://articles.cnn.com/1999-05-24/us/9905_24_china.trust_1_sinoamerican-relationship-china-winston-
lord?_s=PM:US;
“56g. Triangular Diplomacy: U.S., USSR, and China,” ushistory.org, 27 July, 2012,
http://www.ushistory.org/us/56g.asp.
86
It should be noted that although the relationship between China and the US has been
unstable since the 1990s, they have not become enemies, but nor are they allies. China's
accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO), despite very demanding entry
conditions, actually worked to China’s long-term benefit, as it facilitated its integration
into the world economy,216
and deepened what has largely been seen as a beneficial
interdependence between China and the US. WTO membership and the undoubted
benefits it has brought, also consolidated the influence of those policy-makers in China
who were supportive of continuing economic liberalisation.217
Equally significantly, after September 11, 2001, China's support of the US on terrorism
related issues gave both countries a common language, as China took advantage of the
growing preoccupation with security issues to address its own strategic concerns, as we
shall see in Chapter 5. However, there are limits to cooperation, and the US and China
have also had disagreements on human rights, arms sales to Taiwan and trade disputes.
In the new century, US policy has consequently become even more complex as it tries to
manage competing economic, strategic and political imperatives. It cannot even be
oversimplified as containment or engagement, but one that seeks to draw China into
becoming a stakeholder in preserving the current world order.218
With the rise of Chinese power, especially after the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009,
the competition between the two countries intensified and frictions have begun to
increase. However, at the same time, their common interests (such as ensuring global
216 Nicholas R.Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy: (Washington: Brookings Institute,
2002).
217 Shaun Breslin, “Globalization, international coalitions, and domestic reform,” Critical Asian Studies
36, no. 4 (2004), 657–675.
218 For a good review on US policy towards China, see David Shambaugh, “A new China requires a new
US strategy,” Current History, (September 2010): 219–226.
87
financial stability) also increased, further deepening their interdependence.219
China’s
export earnings have been invested in American financial markets, especially in US
treasury bonds, and, although this has been described by former US Treasury Secretary,
Lawrence Summers, as the “balance of financial terror”, the prosperity of China and the
US is now mutually interdependent. American strategists even promoted the G2,220
a
special relationship between China and the US (although this idea was quickly rejected
by China’s leaders), to provide some sort of joint leadership on key global issues.
However, many Chinese scholars argue that the G2 initiative was a conscious strategy
or even a trap on the part of the US to let China invest more in US treasury bonds and
bail out the US at a time of crisis.221
Regardless of the real intention behind the US
initiative, one thing is sure: the Sino-US relationship has global influence and is one of
the most important relationships in the world.
With the shift in the balance of power between China and the US, competition and
cooperation between these two countries in Asia has become more apparent. Given that
the US is a global power; its presence in Asia is a reality with which China must
contend. The interaction between China and the US in Asia has therefore become one of
the principal concerns of Asian international politics. After President Obama took office
in 2009, the US began to implement the so-called “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific as
part of its overall strategy. This emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region as a central
strategic concern on the part of the US has heightened competition between China and
219 Rosemary Foot, “China and the United States: Between cold and warm peace,” Survival 51, no. 6
(2009/2010): 123–146.
220 Among many others, C. Fred Bergsten, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Niall Ferguson and Robert Zoellick
were most active in promoting this idea.
221 For example, Yantang Liu, “Lengguan suomei zhong mei ‘G2’ shidai [Calmly observe the era of 'G2'
between China and the US],” Liaowang [Outlook Weekly], 14 March, 2009, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-03/14/content_11009192.htm; Jianfei Liu, "Lixing Yingdui
‘Liangguo Jituan’ Lun [Respond to the G2 Rationally]," Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan [Chinese
Cadres Tribune] 5 (2009): 35–37.
88
the US.222
In the following case study chapters, we will examine the interaction between the US
and China and the impact this relationship has specific regional contexts.. Even at this
stage, however, it is evident that the relationship between China and the US contains
elements of both competition and cooperation. This kind of relationship has been
described as one of “superficial friends” by Tsinghua professor, Yan Xuetong.223
Yan
believes that the relationship does not ensure real cooperation, but that it does maintain
a certain degree of stability in the relationship. I shall explore the validity of this claim
in subsequent chapters. The general point to emphasise at this stage is that the Sino-US
relationship is an important influence on China's regional policies, and it is within this
context that Chinese political elites make their policy.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview on China's foreign policy-making and thinking.
The principal conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that China's regional policy
needs to be considered in a larger context that includes the specific historical context
that continues to influence policy development. China's regional policy also needs to be
connected to China's overall foreign policy (though may not be coherent and undergoing
evolution). Policy thinking on regional affairs has had a long tradition, but in the PRC
era regional policy has only been on its own terms in recent years. Without
understanding China's overall strategy and foreign policy goals, we cannot get a clear
picture of the way regional policy fits into this larger picture. The presence of the US in
222 Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese leadership and elite responses to the US. Pacific pivot,” China
Leadership Monitor 38, (2012).
223 Xuetong Yan and Qi Haixia, “Football game rather than boxing match: China-US intensifying rivalry
does not amount to Cold War],” The Chinese Journal of international Politics 5 (2012): 105–127.
89
Asia has great influence on China's foreign policy and regional diplomacy, and this is
something I shall come back to in subsequent chapters.
Based on the above observations and drawing on State Councillor Dai Bingguo’s view
on China’s core national interests224
, China’s overall foreign policy goals include: the
stability of China’s political institutions; the preservation of China’s sovereignty and
territory integrity; and the social and economic development. The overall foreign policy
goals are prioritized and presented differently in the three sub-regions, which leads to
differences in the policies implemented. In the next three chapters, I will closely
observe China's policy ideas and practice in each of the three sub-regions of Asia.
224 Bingguo Dai, "Zhongguo Guowu Weiyuan Dai Bingguo: Jianchi Zou Heping Fazhan Daolu [Chinese
State Councilor Dai Bingguo: To Upheld the Way of Peaceful Development]." Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-12/06/content_1760381.htm.
90
Chapter Three: China in Southeast Asia
3.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine China’s relations with the region of Southeast Asia. Many
Chinese scholars believe that if China wants to become a global power, the most
important area in which it should play an active role is Southeast Asia.225
Southeast Asia,
as a region, is the first with which China has cooperated and China has concentrated
most of its efforts for regional cooperation on this region since 1990s. China supports
the core role of ASEAN in leading East Asian cooperation, and the relationship between
ASEAN and China is consequently a key test of China’s regional policies. In this
chapter, the development of China’s engagement with Southeast Asia in three different
periods will be examined. The first period encompasses the years immediately
following the Cold War through to the 1997 and 1998 AFC, which was a learning period
for China as far as regional cooperation, was concerned. During this time, China played
a relatively passive role. The second period is from the AFC to the eruption of the GFC.
During this time, China became an enthusiastic supporter of ASEAN-led regional
cooperation. The third period is from 2009 to the present, during which Chinese policy
elites have found it increasingly difficult to cope with changes in the region, including
even China's own rise. As a consequence, regional cooperation in East Asia has lost
momentum.
The key driving force for China’s engagement with ASEAN is China’s desire to build a
peaceful and stable regional environment—the essential condition for its national
225 Pinyuan Zeng, “Zhongguo dongnanya zhanlue lun [On China’s strategy on Southeast Asia]”,
Zhongguo Baodao Zhoukan [China-Week], (2004); Guofang Shen, “Dongnanya de guoji diwei fazhan
qushi ji yu wo guanxi [The developmental trend of the international status of Southeast Asia and the
relationship with China]”, Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], no. 18 (2008): 56–58.
91
development in the opinion of senior policymakers and commentators.226
The country is
also motivated to cooperate in the region to mitigate Southeast Asian countries’
nervousness about its rise. Moreover, China’s policymakers realise that cooperation
with Southeast Asia will determine the outcome of attempts at integration and
cooperation in the whole region. In the long-term, regional cooperation in East Asia can
change the regional order, which is part of China’s larger ambition to reform the current
international system as we saw in Chapter 2.
This chapter will employ the theoretical framework of analytical eclecticism, which will
be used to identify the different factors driving China’s participation in regional
cooperation in different issue areas and contexts. As has been discussed in Chapter 1,
the use of single-factor analysis can lead to oversimplification and the neglect of
potentially important issues. This is especially the case as China’s foreign policy
towards the region has changed over time. As we shall see, the behaviour of China and
some of its Southeast Asian neighbours has been driven by a combination of material
and ideational factors, a possibility that was highlighted in the changing attitudes
towards China after the 2008 and 2009 GFC.
Throughout the following analysis, particular attention will be paid to the impact of
crises as a driver of change, especially in a policy sense. Change is particularly likely at
moments of crises, when different factors undermine the extant order and force
policymakers to adjust to rapidly changing circumstances.227
At such times, previously
established institutions or policy positions may become unsustainable, forcing
policymakers to adjust and explore new options. In the context of regionalism in
226 Most recently, Jinping Xi made such an argument in the 2012 Forum on China-ASEAN Free Trade
Area, when he said that “t[T]he more progress China makes in development and the closer its links with
the region and the world, the important it is for the country to have a stable regional environment and a
peaceful international environment.” See "Chinese Vp's Speech at Ninth China-Asean Business and
Investment Summit and 2012 Forum on China-Asean Free Trade Area ", Xinhuanet,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/21/c_131865567.htm.
227 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The study of critical junctures: Theory, narrative, and
counterfactuals in historical institutionalism”, World Politics 59 (2007): 341-369.
92
Southeast Asia, the end of the Cold War, the AFC and the GFC are three such turning
points.
3.2 The First Period: From 1991 to 1997
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in which ideological
division was no longer such a barrier to cooperation among East Asian countries, with
the Korean Peninsula the only exception. China’s improving relationship with the
ASEAN countries is a good example of this improved atmosphere. It should not be
forgotten that one of the aims of ASEAN was to provide a collective response to the
possible expansion of communism.228
In 1967, foreign ministers from five Southeast
Asian countries signed a declaration announcing the birth of ASEAN, an organisation
seeking military security and political neutrality in the region. These countries were
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand, which were all part of the
broadly capitalist bloc. From the perspective of China’s leftist foreign policymakers
during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, they stood on the wrong side of an
ideological divide that gave ideational depth to an underlying ‘structural’ division.
ASEAN was considered as hostile towards China and not until 1975 did the country
formally accept the organisation’s existence.229
The decline of revolutionary foreign
policy gave Chinese foreign policymakers more freedom to develop better relationships
with Southeast Asian countries, as we saw in Chapter 2.
The improved relationships among the Southeast Asian countries themselves also
resulted from the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the ASEAN and countries
in Indochina were divided: some were loyal allies of the US, such as Thailand and the
228 Yuen Foong, Khong, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex” In Regional Orders:
Building Security in a New World, eds. David A Lake and Patrick M Morgan (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania
State University, 1997), 318-39.
229 “Dongmeng yu zhongguo guanxi dashiji [The chronicle of events on the relationship between
ASEAN and China]”, Xinhuanet, 1999, accessed 4 September 2012,
http://sub.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20091124/newgx4b0be930-2426156.shtml.
93
Philippines; some, such as Vietnam, were seen as proxies of the Soviet Union in the
Southeast; and countries like Laos had close ties with China. The entire region was
fractured. During that time, it was unimaginable that all these countries could eventually
cooperate within one single association as they do today. And yet ASEAN would go on
to play an important role in solving the ‘Cambodian problem’ in the early 1990s, as
well as absorbing new members in the 1980s and 1990s: Brunei joined in 1985,
Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. The political
integration of Southeast Asia or the growth or regionalism provided a more peaceful and
stable regional environment, which was itself an important precondition for the
improvement of the Sino–ASEAN relationship.
As noted in Chapter 2, historically, ASEAN countries had strategic concerns about
China. First, they were afraid that China might threaten the stability of their regimes by
supporting the communist parties in Southeast Asian countries and utilising the overseas
Chinese issue to intervene in their domestic affairs.230
This was especially true in the
years of the Cultural Revolution, when China exported revolution rather than
manufactured goods to its neighbours. Secondly, ASEAN countries were concerned
about the increasing strength of China’s economy and its military forces. Given that the
South China Sea was a potential flashpoint, they were concerned about the possible
implications of China’s military modernisation. Finally, they also feared China’s
potential as a competitor in international trade, as ASEAN countries were in a more-or-
less similar position in the value chain of global production networks.231
These fears
were not unreasonable considering China’s size and potential. But unreasonable or not,
they definitely prevented the two parties moving closer.
After the catastrophic impact of the Cultural Revolution had passed and the leftist
230 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National
Liberation (Berkley: University of California Press, 1970).
231 Guoxing Ji, “Zhongguo yu dongmeng guojia de weilai guanxi ji qi dui meiguo de yingxiang [The
future relationship between China and ASEAN countries and its impacts on the US]”, Dongnanya Yanjiu
[Southeast Asian Studies], no. 4 (1989), 8–14.
94
foreign policy became less influential, (see Chapter 2), Chinese policymakers tried to
repair the country’s relationships with Southeast Asia. Soon after the decision to open
the economy was made, in November 1978, China's new paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping paid visits to three ASEAN countries—Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.
During his visits, he reassured them that the Chinese Government were determined to
strengthen and develop their friendship with ASEAN countries.232
Deng’s declaration
may have been genuine considering that all three countries had a large number of
Chinese in residence that controlled the capital that Deng’s China urgently needed.233
As we will also see in the next chapter on Northeast Asia, the so-called overseas
Chinese played a very important role in China's economic rise, especially in the early
era of China's economic reform. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the large scale of Chinese
migration to Southeast Asia can be traced back to the mid-19th century. Yet in the Qing
dynasty, most Chinese emigrants were still had a strong sense of identification with their
hometowns.234
However, with the end of the World War II and the growth of
independence movements in Southeast Asia, the situation began to change. The civil
war in China had divided the country and this resulted in identity problems emerging
among the Southeast Asian Chinese community as well. More importantly, the newly
independent Southeast Asian states became preoccupied with the process of nation
building, with political elites in Southeast Asia trying to shape and actually create their
own national identities as a result.235
The sense of belonging to China began to diminish
among the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. However, as a special group, overseas
Chinese were, and are, still recognised as a valuable resource by both the People’s
232 See “Dongmeng yu zhongguo guanxi dashiji”.
233 Deng’s personal influence in redefining the role of the overseas Chinese between China and the host
countries in the reform era is critical. Thanks to Dr. Gordon Cheung for making this point.
234 Guotu Zhuang, "Lun Dongnanya De Huazu [Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia]," Shijie Minzu [World
Ethno-national Studies], no. 3 (2002).
235 Harry G. Gelber, Nations out of Empires: European Nationalism and the Transformation of Asia
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
95
Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, largely due to their economic success.236
In this regard, nothing has changed and for the purposes of this thesis, the Chinese
business network still needs to be taken seriously as it impacts largely on a
regionalisation process which is not led by the government but by business sectors in
the region As a number of scholars have noted, overseas Chinese networks, like along
with other forces such as Japanese corporations have played an important role in
underpinning regionalisation and giving the region a distinctive character.237
The impact
of the overseas Chinese, however, is particularly noteworthy. In Indonesia, the Chinese
are only 3.5% of the total population but produces 73% of the national economic output.
In the Philippines, a Chinese 2% of the population produces 50% of the economic
output. In Thailand, 10% of the population are Chinese and they contribute to 81% of
the economic output. In Malaysia, the Chinese population of 30% creates 60% of the
economic output.238
One of the reasons for the business success of the Chinese population in Southeast Asia
is their close personalised networks. It is believed that the social connections or guanxi,
based mainly on kinship and friendship, reduces the transaction costs in business
activities.239
Economic activities, based on personal relationships and mutual trust, are
thought to be more flexible than those based on rigid laws. What is especially
significant about these business networks in a Southeast Asia context is that many
ethnically Chinese business figures have lose relationships with local political elites.
236 Guotu Zhuang, Huaqiao Huaren Yu Zhongguo De Guanxi [the Relationship between Overseas
Chinese and China] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2001).
237 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Varieties of Asian Regionalism." In Asian Regionalism, ed. Katzenstein, N
Hamilton-Hart, K Kato and M Yue (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2000); Richard Stubbs,
"Asia-Pacific Regionalization and the Global Economy: A Third Form of Capitalism?” Asian Survey 35,
no. 9 (1995): 785-97; Hatch, Walter, and Kozo Yamamura, Asia in Japan’s Embrace: Building a Regional
Production Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
238 Joe Studwell, Asian Godfathers: Money and Power in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia (London:
Profile Books Ltd., 2007).
239 Gordon C. K. Cheung, “Chinese Diaspora as a Virtual Nation: Interactive Roles between Economic
and Social Capital”, Political Studies 52, no. 4 (2004): 664-84.
96
This kind of patron-client relationship potentially provides Chinese businessmen with
particular advantages in doing business.240
Although the overseas Chinese may have some advantages in transacting business with
China in the reform era, it is also clear that the overseas Chinese may not have loyalty
to the Chinese nation as such. Indeed, traditionally, and as a key element of
Confucianism, they are more likely to have a special affinity with their grandfather’s
and father's hometown. This is part of the reason why China choose to make Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou cities the four earliest Special Economic Zones.241
Likewise, most of the ancestors of today's overseas Chinese living in Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Southeast Asia came from Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan provinces. Overall,
therefore, it is clear that the overseas Chinese were among the investors following the
economic liberalisation, especially in China's south-eastern region, and that this has had
implications for the direction and success of economic development as a whole in China.
However, even though the business relationship between China and Southeast Asia had
greatly improved, through the 1980s, the progress of the state to state relationships was
not satisfactory because the structures of the Cold War still functioned. Nevertheless,
Chinese leaders did not abandon hope of improving China’s relationships with ASEAN
countries. In 1988, Premier Li Peng announced his four principles guiding the
development of the relationships with ASEAN countries at a dinner welcoming him in
Bangkok.242
He claimed that China was eager to build good relationships with ASEAN
countries to further the common goals of peace and development. The four principles
240 Gordon C. K. Cheung, “The Significance of the Overseas Chinese in East Asia”, in Routledge
Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (London: Routledge, 2012): 77-89.
241 "Guoqiaoban Fuzhuren Ren Qiliang: Jingji Tequ Fazhan Shiyuqiao, Chengyuqiao [the Deputy
Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council Ren Qiliang: The Development of
Economic Special Zones Began and Success with the Efforts of Overseas Chinese]," Overseas Chinese
Affairs Office of the State Council, http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2010/0901/20431.shtml.
242 "Zai Taiguo Zongli Juxing De Wanyan Shang Li Peng Xuanbu Tong Dongmeng Guanxi Si Yuanze
[on the Banquet Held by the Thai Premier, Li Peng Announced the Four Principles for the Sino-Asean
Relationship]", People’s Daily, http://rmrbw.net/simple/index.php?t812829.html.
97
were upholding the five principles of peaceful coexistence; Sticking to China’s policy of
opposing hegemony; following the principle of mutual benefit and joint development;
and continuing support of the independence and autonomy of ASEAN countries in
global affairs and support of their roles in constructing a peaceful and cooperative
region. The declaration of the four principles was an important political gesture that was
consciously designed to reassure its neighbours.
However, the key turning point for the Sino–ASEAN relationship came only after the
normalisation of the relationship between China and Indonesia. On 23 February 1989,
Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen met with president Suharto of Indonesia in Tokyo
when they both attended the funeral of Emperor Hirohito of Japan. The meeting was
remarkable because the relationship between the two countries had been disrupted for
23 years following the so-called 9.30 incident of 1965,243
for which Indonesia suspected
China was responsible. Qian and Suharto agreed to normalise the relationship between
the two countries according to the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the ten
principles of the Bandung Conference.244
It was an encouraging move, as Indonesia was
seen as the most powerful and influential country in ASEAN and had the largest
243 On 30 September 1965, six senior military generals were killed by Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) supporters. Major General Suharto mobilised forces to repress the coup and finally led to
extermination of the PKI across Indonesia. See "September 30th Movement." Britannica, accessed 29
September, 2012, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1439203/September-30th-Movement.
244 The ten Principles of Bandung are: 1. respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of all nations; 3. recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
4. abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; 5. respect for the
right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations; 6. abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests
of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries; 7.
refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any country; 8. settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties”
own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 9. promotion of mutual interests and
cooperation; 10. respect for justice and international obligations. See "The Ten Principles of Bandung",
Chinadaily, 23 April, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/23/content_436882.htm.
98
population in the Association. Thus, Indonesia’s attitude towards China would decide
the future of the Sino–ASEAN relationship. In August 1990, the diplomatic relationship
between China and Indonesia was formally resumed. This development accelerated
China’s rapprochement with the other ASEAN members. Two months later, China built
a formal diplomatic relationship with Singapore and, in September 1991, Brunei and
China founded their formal relationship. By then, all the members of ASEAN had built
diplomatic ties with China. High-level mutual visits between China and ASEAN
countries became increasingly frequent. In 1990, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited the
five ASEAN countries and this was followed by Chinese president Yang Shangkun’s
visit to Indonesia and Thailand in 1991.245
The mutual understanding among ASEAN
countries and China was enhanced as a consequence.
This period removed some of the obstacles to a closer Sino–ASEAN relationship and a
process of multilateral engagement was able to begin. Chinese foreign minister Qian
accepted the invitation of the Malaysian prime minister, Dr Mahathir, to attend the
twenty-fourth ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 1991, which marked the beginning
of the Sino–ASEAN dialogue. The ASEAN Plus China (10+1) mechanism was also
launched. For China’s officials and diplomats this offered important opportunities to
learn how to become an actor on the regional multilateral stage. In July 1994,
agreements on the foundation of the Economic and Trade Cooperation Joint
Commission and the Science and Technology Cooperation Joint Commission were
signed at the twenty-seventh ASEAN ministers' meeting. That same year, the vice
chairman of the Chinese Central Military Committee, General Liu Huaqing, visited
Indonesia and Singapore, closing the gap of military exchange between China and
ASEAN countries. In June 1996, Indonesia’s foreign minister formally informed China
that ASEAN had decided to upgrade China to a full dialogue partner.246
The dialogue
245 Baoliu Chen, “Zhongguo yu dongmeng guanxi de xin fazhan [The new development of the
relationship between China and ASEAN]”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations],
no. 4 (1991).
246 Writing Group of the Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, “Dongmeng yu zhongguo guanxi dashiji
99
between China and ASEAN provided a good opportunity for each other to enhance their
mutual understanding, and for China to learn the roles of regional diplomacy.
The relationship developed more quickly in the economic area than in any other. In
1991, China’s trade with ASEAN amounted to USD$7.96 billion; by 1996, this had
increased to USD$20.4 billion, comprising 7 per cent of China’s total foreign trade.247
Foreign direct investment flowing into China from ASEAN countries was growing
extremely quickly as well. Many Chinese entrepreneurs overseas invested in the
recently opened Chinese economy. After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour of China in
1992, China’s policy was more favourable to foreign investment. Compounding this, the
ASEAN founding countries had strong economic growth in the early 1990s, and thus
had the capacity for some Southeast Asian companies to invest in China.248
From 1991
to 2000, the average growth rate of foreign direct investment from Southeast Asia was
28 per cent. In 1991, the actually utilised investment was only USD$90 million; by
1998, this had increased to USD$4.22 billion.249
As a consequence of this growing interaction, some substantial projects began, such as
the Great Mekong River Subregion (GMS) programme, which was launched in 1992
and led by the Asian Development Bank. The aims of such cooperation are ostensibly to
strengthen the economic connections among the subregional countries, increase
competitiveness, and promote the economic and social development of the region as a
whole. This is the first subregional cooperative project that China has been involved in
(yi) [The chronicle of events on the relationship between ASEAN and China: Part one]”, Dongnanya
Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia], no. 11 (2006): 33–39.
247 Cui Peng, “Zhongguo Dongmeng Maoyie Zengzhang Jin 36 Bei [China’s trade with ASEAN rose 36
times]”, Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], 27 July 2011.
248 Xinwei Zhang, “Dongmeng Guojia zai Hua Touzi Xianzhuang ji Qianjing Zhanwang [Current
situation and prospects of ASEAN countries’ direct investment in China]”, Guoji Jingji Hezuo
[International Economic Cooperation], no. 12 (2003), 36–41.
249 Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, “Huhui Huli Gongtong
Fazhan—Zhongguo yu Dongmeng de Gongshi [Mutual benefit and joint development—the consensus
between China and ASEAN]”, 2007, accessed 26 February 2012,
http://caitec.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/a/m/200705/20070504726487.html.
100
and is the most developed cooperative mechanism in East Asia thus far. There are six
members in the programme: China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma and Thailand.
The subregion covers 2.57 million square kilometres and has a population of 326
million. 250
From 1992 to 1996, when GMS programme was still at an early stage, the
basic issues of the cooperation were discussed and the cooperative mechanism was
founded. Six minister-level meetings were held during this time to identify the
cooperative framework, cooperative areas and priority projects.251
The significance of
such projects is that signals a willingness on China’s part to increase its regional
presence and leverage through multilateral auspices.
Participation in the ARF was another similar and even more significant move for China,
one that had been impossible during the Cold War era. With the end of the bipolar
system, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region felt that it was necessary to build a
multilateral mechanism to strengthen dialogue on security. China joined in with
cautiousness initially, being concerned about being constrained in such a forum.
However with institutional learning, China’s diplomats gradually learned how to use the
forum to express China’s own concerns and pursue China’s specific interests. Such
processes vividly demonstrate the interconnected nature of ideational and material
interests. China's participation in the ARF will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
The question to be considered at this point is whether there are limits to the influence of
socialisation and learning processes where China’s vital national interests are considered
to be at stake. In other words, do realists still have something to tell us about the drivers
of policy?
250 “Da meigonghe ciquyu jingji hezuo [The Great Mekong river subregional cooperation]”,
Xinhuanet, 2011, accessed 9 February 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-
11/04/content_617370.htm.
251 Ruihong Fu, “Meigonghe ciquyu jingji hezuo de jieduan yanjin yu zhongguo de juese [The
evolutionary process of the Greater Mekong subregion economic cooperation and China’s role]”,
Dongnanya Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia], no. 5 (2009): 65–69.
101
The limit to learning?
One of the most sensitive issues in the region has been the South China Sea territorial
disputes. China's policy towards the South China Sea disputes has undergone a series of
changes over the past twenty years, which reflects a shifting balance of material and
ideational influences. China’s policy toward the ASEAN states is an important indicator
of its evolving foreign policy priorities as Chinese policymakers regard this region
critically important. Indeed, Southeast Asia has been the focus of China’s famous
“charm offensive” and preferential trade agreements designed to shore up its influence
in the region and reassure its neighbours about the implications of its rise.252
The
apparent recent change of direction and emphasis in China’s foreign policy is especially
noteworthy in this context and has turned the current disputes into one of the most
serious developments in the region since the Cold War. As such it has become a testing
ground for China's good neighbourhood policy and its peaceful-rise strategy.
The South China Sea problem originates in the transformation of the East and South
East Asian region from semi-colonial or colonial status, to modern nation states. It is a
legacy of colonialism. During the Colonial era, most of the littoral states were not
independent and their sea-boundaries were ambiguous. After the Second World War,
with the failure of Japanese power and the decline of Colonial powers in East Asia,
Chinese policymakers seized the opportunity to make territorial claims. In 1947, the
then KMT-ruled China drew a 'U-shaped' line on maps of the region and claimed
historical rights over and connections with a major part of the South China Sea. The
People's Republic of China, founded by Communist China, inherited these territorial
claims outlined in the now notorious nine-dashed lines.253
All the Spratly and Paracel
islands were included. When the map was originally drawn, no objections from the
252 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Chin, Gregory and Richard Stubbs, “China, regional institution-
building and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area”, Review of International Political Economy 18, no.3
(2011): 277-298.
253 Gungwu Wang, "China and the Map of Nine Dotted Lines." Straits Times, 11 July 2012.
102
littoral countries were posed. However, it should be noted that at that time, most of the
littoral countries were still colonial possessions and national liberation was their major
concern. However, since the late 1970s, with the foundation of the Southeast Asian
sovereign states and the discovery of natural oil resources in the South China Sea,
territorial disputes between China and littoral countries came to the surface, leading to
two naval conflicts with Vietnam in 1974 and 1988, in which China emerged
victorious.254
Since the 1990s, China has promoted the idea of 'shelving disputes and
seeking joint development'.255
However, such a policy has not achieved much success
and highlights the continuing ambivalence Chinese policymakers feel about the possible
disadvantages of multilateral disputes—the preferred strategy of the smaller ASEAN
states.256
In 1992, China passed a domestic law to legitimise its claim over the sovereignty of the
South China Sea. In the same year, China's oil company also signed an agreement with
Crestone Energy Corporation of the US for joint development of the oil field in the
disputed waters.257
With this background, the first formal document issued by ASEAN
was passed in the 25th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, which called on the
associated parties to use negotiation, rather than force, to solve the South China Sea
problem. However, this did not stop the escalation of the crisis. In 1994, Philippine and
US oil companies signed agreements to jointly explore oil reserves in the Spratly
Islands. In early 1995, the Philippines discovered that China was constructing
permanent buildings in the Mischief Islands, with China claiming ownership of the reef.
254 It is important to note that before the 1970s, Vietnam’s territorial ambitions were constrained because
it needed China’s help to fight against France and the US.
255 On the principle of China’s South China Sea policy, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, “Gezhi Zhengyi, Gongtong Kaifa [Shelving disputes and seeking joint development]”,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2012, accessed 28 April 2012,
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm.
256 Mark Valencia, “ASEAN floundering over sea code of conduct”, The Japan Times, March 26 2012.
257 "Beijing Offers South China Sea Oilfields for Joint Development," WantChinaTimes,
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-
cnt.aspx?id=20120627000141&cid=1102&MainCatID=11.
103
However, the disputed reef was actually located within the 200 nautical miles Economic
Exclusive Zone of the Philippines. From the Philippine perspective, China's behaviour
was little different to invasion.258
In 1997, the Philippines destroyed the boundary monuments set up by China in
Hungyang Island (Scarborough Shoal). Fortunately, both parties were restrained in their
reactions, so that the situation did not mushroom into a crisis, like the 1988 conflict with
Vietnam. China hoped to resolve the South China Sea issue by bilateral methods, but
the Philippines believed that the issue should be internationalised and wanted to seek
external support. However, during this period, the help it could obtain was limited,
because the US wanted to keep to a neutral role. The US claimed that it did not have a
responsibility to protect the Philippines in the Spratly Islands.259
The background for the disputes in the South China Sea during this period was the
change in the East Asian power configuration. With the end of the Cold War, the Soviet
Union and the US had less strategic influence over Southeast Asia, which created
something of a power vacuum in the region. China sought to take advantage of this
structural transformation of the region. The defence ministers meeting between Vietnam
and the Philippines arguably marked the beginning of China's more assertive behaviour.
In 1998, ASEAN asked the Philippines and Vietnam to draft the Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea, but the draft did not gain approval from China and did not come to a
conclusion. However, with the eruption of the financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, and the
associated economic downturn meant that attention was diverted from South China Sea
issue.
In sum, the Sino–ASEAN relationship during the 1990s developed as a result of the
258 Daojiong Zha and Mark J. Valencia, “Mischief Reef: Geopolitics and Implications”, Journal of
Contemporary Asia 31, no. 1 (2001): 86-103.
259 Daniel J. Dzurek, “China Occupies Mischief Reef in Latest Spratly Gambit”, IBRU Boundary and
Security Bulletin 3 (1995): 65-71.
104
changes in the global strategic structure, the strategic transition of ASEAN and China’s
own domestic needs. The end of the Cold War created all the preconditions necessary
and, in fact, triggered the need for regional cooperation. China recognised the
importance and possible benefits of a peaceful and stable regional environment in the
post-Cold War era. In Premier Li Peng’s Government Work Report in 1993, he pointed
out that “it is the centre piece of our diplomatic work to develop a good neighbouring
relationship with surrounding countries actively and to build a peaceful and tranquil
surrounding environment”.260
China also recognised the important role that ASEAN
played in keeping the peace and stability of the region,261
thus understood the need for a
sound Sino–ASEAN relationship.
Further, with the reform of China’s economy and its open-door policy, increasing
investment flowed into China from the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN became one of
China’s major economic partners, so economic cooperation with ASEAN was
increasingly a necessity not an option. ASEAN’s preference for non-interventionism and
non-binding institutionalisation also attracted China to join a dialogue process. It should
not be forgotten that China’s engagement with ASEAN transpired soon after the
Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. At that moment, China faced a great difficulty of
being heavily criticised by Western countries. It was of great urgency to China that
some diplomatic progress occurred in its neighbourhood. As ASEAN subscribed to very
different, non-Western, “Asian” values,262
its leaders viewed the issue as China’s
domestic affair and did not condone intervention. Thus, China felt more comfortable
with Asian-style cooperative mechanisms due to their non-interventionist values.
During this early period, China was a predominantly a cautious learner, carefully
260 Peng Li, Government Work Report (Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1993).
261 Peng Li, Government Work Report (Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1995).
262 During the 1990s a number of prominent Southeast Asian leaders promoted so-called “Asian values”
that were supposedly based on Asian cultural traditions and Confucianism. Crucially, they gave
ideologically legitimacy to “strong” states and even authoritarian rule. See, Daniel A. Bell, Beyond
Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006); Garry Rodan, “The internationalisation of ideological conflict: Asia’s new significance”, The
Pacific Review 9, no.3 (2006): 328-351.
105
considering each step. Structural forces tended to predominate and new ideas, especially
from outside China, were treated with caution. China’s active and enthusiastic support
of regional cooperation only occurred following the beginning of the AFC in 1997.
3.3 The Second Period: From 1998 to 2008
The unexpected financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 proved to be a major turning point in
China’s participation in regional cooperation. The period between this and the GFC of
2008 and 2009 was a decade in which regional cooperation accelerated. The ties
between Southeast Asia and China deepened and China became an active supporter of
regional cooperation. However, before closely observing China’s behaviour during this
time, we need to make a few brief remarks about the nature of the financial crisis that
led to the changes.
The AFC in 1997 and 1998 changed the political economy of East Asia. The initial
problems flowed from the Thai economy and the subsequent devaluation of the Thai
baht. As has been well documented,263
Thailand’s problems caused a “contagion” effect
throughout the region, with the economies of Indonesia, Malaysia and even South
Korea being particularly badly affected., Eventually, the financial market crisis in East
Asia led to a major decline in the “real” economy as economic activity declined and
footloose capital fled much of the region. The myth of the ‘East Asian miracle’ was
effectively undone.264
The Thai economy shrank by 10.8 per cent in 1998; the stock
indexes in Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia decreased
263 Ha-Joon Chang, “The hazard of moral hazard: Untangling the Asian crisis”, World Development 28,
no.4 (2000): 775-788; Robert Wade, and Frank Veneroso, “The Asian crisis: the high debt model versus
the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex”, New Left Review 228(1998): 3-23; Stephan Haggard, The
Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis (Washington: Institute for International Economics,
2000).
264 About the East Asian economic miracle, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Some Lessons from the East Asian
Miracle”, The World Bank Research Observer 11, no. 2 (1996): 151-77.
106
nearly 50 per cent in one year after the crisis.265
In reality, the crisis was, it has been argued, a crisis of globalisation.266
The integration
of the smaller Southeast Asian economies into a global system and the massive flows of
speculative capital this process exposed them to was plainly a major weakness of the
international system. While the East Asians accused US speculators of being
irresponsible, the West criticised the “crony capitalism” of East Asian countries. From
the perspective of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the West, it was a good
opportunity to try and compel East Asian countries to change the way their economies
were run.267
However, this proved to be an extremely painful process for East Asian
countries, in which the IMF’s reforms and crisis management strategies not only
infringed jealously-guarded national sovereignty, but in many cases actually made the
economic situation worse.268
The crisis made it clear to East Asian leaders that
globalisation could bring not only benefits but also dangers. The idea of building
mechanisms of regional economic cooperation to defend any future threat was thus
given a powerful impetus by this crisis and ultimately adopted by East Asian
countries.269
During the AFC, China was not affected in the same way as some of its neighbours such
as Thailand or South Korea. This was primarily due to the fact that China’s currency
was not tradeable and its value was not determined by external market forces—an
265 The Department of International Affairs, “Guoji jinrong weiji yu yazhou jinrong weiji bijiao yanjiu
[A comparison study of the Global Financial Crisis and Asian Financial Crisis]”, Ministry of Finance of
the People’s Republic of China, 2012, accessed 4 September 2012.
http://gjs.mof.gov.cn/pindaoliebiao/diaochayanjiu/201108/t20110818_587338.html
266 Richard A. Higgott, “The Asian economic crisis: A study in the politics of resentment”, New Political
Economy 3, no. 3, (1998): 333–356.
267 Walden Bello, “East Asia: On the eve of the great transformation?” Review of International Political
Economy 5, no.3, (1998): 424-444.
268 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton, 2002).
269 William W. Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial
Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
107
important lesson that remains influential to this day.270
China’s capital account had not
been opened and there was consequently no direct attack on China’s financial sector
during the crisis. Even though the non-performing loans in Chinese banks had been
estimated to be as high as 35 to 60 per cent, the Chinese public had confidence in state-
owned banks. Chinese savings accounted for about 50 per cent of the GDP during that
time and this has remained a major source of strength for the Chinese economy.
Significantly, Chinese banks did not get involved in real estate development or the stock
market during the mid-1990s.
However, China was not unaffected by the crisis. In 1998, the export growth rate
dropped to nearly zero.271
Despite some domestic pain, however, China’s leaders
decided to place long-term diplomatic influence ahead of short-term economic
difficulties and decided not to devalue renminbi. The decision helped to stabilise the
regional economy, preventing the situation from becoming worse. Additionally, when
Southeast Asian countries were in the depth of their economic problems the Chinese
Government offered aid. After the break out of the AFC, China accumulatively provided
USD$4 billion in aid to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries through both
bilateral arrangements and the framework of the IMF. China also provided export
credits and emergency medical aid to Indonesia.272
At the same time, the Chinese
Government tried to increase domestic demand and stimulate its economy to ensure
healthy and stable economic growth which was important for the regional recovery.
Overall, China had a very good crisis and significantly enhanced its standing with its
neighbours as a reliable source of stability—quite an ideational shift from its former
status as a source of potentially destabilising revolutionary ideology.
270 Paul Bowles and Baotai Wang, “Flowers and criticism: The political economy of the renminbi
debate”, Review of International Political Economy 13, no.2, (2006): 233-257.
271 Fang Zhou and Geng Xiao, “China in the Context of Asian Financial Crisis”, in China Review, ed.
Chong Chor Lau and Geng Xiao (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999): 165-178.
272 Xiaoling Wu, “Zai Yazhou Jinrong Weiji Shi Zhounian Guoji Yantaohui Shang de Jianghua” [Speech
Delivered in the International Seminar on the 10th Anniversary of the Asian Financial Crisis], 2007,
accessed 4 September 2012, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-06/22/content_658333.htm.
108
As part of China’s new position as an important and productive regional actor, it
actively promoted regional and international financial cooperation. At the sixth summit
of the APEC forum in 1998, Chinese president Jiang Zemin called for the strengthening
of international cooperation for recovery after the crisis. He also suggested reform and
improvement of international financial institutions and argued that respect should be
given to the choice of individual countries and regions regarding the way their
economies should be run.273
At the second meeting of APT leaders in December 1998,
vice president Hu Jintao similarly stressed that East Asian countries should be involved
in the reform and improvement of international financial institutions, especially with
regard to strengthening the monitoring and control of short-term capital flows. He also
suggested that East Asian countries should deepen discussions on the reform of
financial institutions. Some specific suggestions were made, including the holding of a
dialogue among deputy financial ministers and deputy governors of central banks under
the framework of APT and forming an expert group to study specific solutions for
controlling short-term capital flow. His suggestions received a warm welcome.274
Significantly, such initiatives provided the basis for regular, institutionalised patterns of
cooperation across the region which enhanced the possibility of learning, cooperation
and socialisation.275
One of the most tangible manifestations of this possibility occurred at an APT meeting
of finance ministers in Chiang Mai in 2000 which agreed to build a bilateral currency
swap mechanism, namely the CMI. The key idea of this initiative is that in facing any
future financial crisis there will be a mechanism for East Asian countries to defend
273 Zemin Jiang, “APEC summit”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1998,
accessed 17 June 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_58/zyjh/t4474.htm
274 Jintao Hu, “ASEAN plus Three three Summitsummit”, Xinhuanet, 1998, accessed 17 June 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2001-01/05/content_502401.htm
275 Jennifer Amyx, “What motivates regional financial cooperation in East Asia today?” Asia Pacific
Issues, no.76, 2005. Paul Evans, “Between regionalism and regionalization: Policy networks and the
nascent East Asian institutional identity”, in Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, ed. T. J.
Pempel (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005):195-215.
109
themselves against destabilising fluctuations in the value of their currencies. China and
Japan made significant in principle commitments to the fund, albeit with some
important caveats about the way such funds might be utilised.276
The USD$78 billion
fund was seen as essentially complementing the efforts of the IMF.277
As far as China's
leaders are concerned, financial cooperation is potentially important for a number of
reasons Firstly, China realised that how vulnerable a country's financial system could be
and how important a regional mechanism was to protect regional countries in the wake
of the AFC. Particularly, given that China is likely to open its financial sector sooner or
later to realise its promise made when acceding into the WTO, financial security
became a more and more important issue. Second, China would like to contribute more
to financial cooperation in order to construct a more responsible image in the region and
undermine Japan's influence in the financial cooperation.278
Beyond the crisis
After the AFC, the framework of the ASEAN plus China (10+1) meetings became the
most important channel for China’s multilateral engagement in Southeast Asia. The
10+1 has developed into a comprehensive cooperative system that includes various
mechanisms. With economic cooperation as its focus, it has gradually expanded into the
areas of politics, security and culture. There are five key cooperation fields for the 10+1
framework—namely, agriculture, information communication, human resource
development, mutual investment and the development of the Mekong River
subregion.279
276 Both China and Japan were wary about making open-ended commitments to their neighbours and
wanted the IMF to continue monitoring regional economies. See John Ravenhill, “A three bloc world?
The new East Asian regionalism”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 2, no.2, (2002): 167-195.
277 Shunyou Liao, “Duobian Qingmai Xieyi (CMMI)”, APEC Newsletter, 2010, accessed 17 June, 2012.
http://www.ctasc.org.tw/02publication/APEC-125__-p12-14.pdf.
278 Notably, China rejected Japan’s initiative to found an Asian Monetary Fund to prevent Japan from
gaining the leadership of the region. See Shaun Narine, “The Idea of an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’: The
Problems of Financial Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific”, Asian Perspective 27, no. 2 (2003): 65-103.
279 “Dongmeng yu zhongguo (10+1) lingdaoren huiyi [The China-ASEAN leaders meeting (10+1)]”,
110
However, possibly the most important mechanism of the 10+1 grouping is the leaders’
meetings. Many important documents have been signed at these meetings. For example,
in December 1997, Chinese president Jiang attended the first Sino-ASEAN leaders
meeting, during which Chinese and ASEAN leaders signed the Joint Statement to
Establish a Twenty-first-century-oriented Partnership of Good-neighbourliness and
Mutual Trust. The Sino–ASEAN relationship thus entered a new stage. To develop the
Sino–ASEAN relationship further, at the sixth Sino-ASEAN leaders meeting in
November 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation and set up the goals to found the Sino-ASEAN
free-trade area in 2010. In October 2003, during the seventh Sino-ASEAN leaders
meeting, Premier Wen Jiabao and ASEAN leaders signed the Joint Declaration on
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. Also at this meeting, China joined the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, becoming the first non-ASEAN
country to do so. Even if such actions are seen as serving China’s ‘national interest’ the
manner in which this is conceived and the prominent role played by international
cooperation is noteworthy as is the fact that, for a while, at least, mutual trust increased
further.280
The leaders’ meetings comprise more than just discussion; even though many
of the documents are not legally binding, they still have moral and political significance,
and that is not to mention the most significant of these agreements, the China-ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).
CAFTA also has its background in the financial crisis. By 2000, even though the
economies of ASEAN countries were reviving, they still faced many troubles. In
contrast, the Chinese economy continued to rise rapidly. Due to China’s remarkable
economic rise and successful accession into the WTO, ASEAN desired to strengthen
Xinhuanet, accessed 24 January 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-10/25/content_607545.htm
280 “Zhongguo-dongmeng guanxi fazhan licheng [The developmental history of the China-ASEAN
relationship], Xinhuanet, accessed 24 January 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
06/30/content_944141.htm.
111
cooperation with China to benefit from the country’s growth. Despite the fact that such
a fear seems overstated, ASEAN was concerned foreign direct investment would be
attracted to China at its expense.281
At the leaders’ meeting of 2000, Chinese premier
Zhu Rongji suggested that the two parties should consider building a long-term
economic cooperation relationship and trade arrangement. A team consisting of experts
from China and ASEAN countries was formed to study the feasibility of a free-trade
area. Seven months later, the finished research report suggested that China and ASEAN
should begin to build a free-trade area. The report was submitted to the 10+1 leaders’
meeting in 2001 and gained support from the leaders of all parties. In 2002, the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation was signed which
was the cornerstone of CAFTA.
To promote CAFTA, China made several unilateral concessions, arguably the most
important of which was the Early Harvest Programme (EHP). When the expert team
visited Southeast Asia to collect opinions, an official from Burma enquired whether an
early harvest was possible. China accepted this idea and chose to open the agriculture
sector to Southeast Asia first.282
From 1 January 2004, China began unilaterally to
reduce tariffs on more than 500 products and these products were tariff-free to Southeast
Asian countries by 2006.283
The point to emphasise here is that, as Chin and Stubbs
point out, “the CAFTA is as much about economic statecraft and geo-economics as
purely economics.”284
Put another way, as Chinese policymakers began to recalculate
281 John Ravenhill, “Is China an economic threat to Southeast Asia?” Asian Survey 46, no. 5 (2006):
653–674.
282 Yunling Zhang, “Dongya hezuo xuyao chuangxin [Innovation is needed in East Asian cooperation]”,
Guoji Jingji Pinglun [International Economic Review], no. 1 (2010): 29–37.
283 “Zimaoqu xiao zhishi wenda: “zaoqi shouhuo jihua” zhi shenme? [Q and A on FTA: what is the
meaning of “Early Harvest”]”, Gxnews, 2009, accessed 29 February 2012,
http://www.gxnews.com.cn/staticpages/20091117/newgx4b01d3fe-2407523.shtml.
284 Gregory Chin and Richard Stubbs, “China, regional institution-building and the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area”, Review of International Political Economy 18, no.3 (2011): 292; Economic statecraft can be
simply defined as ‘using economics as an instrument of politics’ by ‘offering economic rewards or
withholding economic advantages’ to influence other international actors, for one of the best theoretical
work on this issue, see David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
112
their priorities and long-term diplomatic goals, short-term economic sacrifices became a
politically attractive prospect and part of a strategy to cultivate good regional relations.
Nevertheless, the question of whether the free-trade agreement benefits China is hotly
debated. Qiu and Cheng believe that the CAFTA can reduce strategic containment,
mitigate regional strategic competition and promote the development of the region.
However, there was geopolitical risk in the process of developing the CAFTA. They
argue that it is possible that China’s economic compromise was too great and that this
will increase the cost of China's economic policy in relations to ASEAN countries.285
Similarly, Wang also has doubts about the benefits of the agreement. He argues that the
Sino–ASEAN relationship is a very complex multilateral issue. There is a long tradition
of ASEAN playing the game of the balance of powers; the CAFTA cannot change this
situation fundamentally and may generate other problems.286
For example, the CAFTA
has attracted attention from other countries. Japan and South Korea followed quickly,
also entering into free-trade agreements with ASEAN countries. Whatever the merits or
drawbacks of the CAFTA, it has strengthened the economic relationship between China
and ASEAN. In fact, ASEAN now depends more on China’s economy as a result.287
The general structure of East Asia’s political economy has changed and China is now at
its centre.288
The creation of CAFTA may be a glaring example of what Jushua Kurlantzick called
1985).
285 Danyang Qiu and Yonglin Cheng, “Zhongguo-dongmeng ziyou maoyiqu de diyuan zhengzhi
xiaoyong fenxi [The geopolitical analysis on the impact of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area]”, Shehui
Zhuyi Yanjiu [Socialism Studies], no. 3 (2005): 114–117.
286 Yuzhu Wang, “Zhongguo-dongmeng ziyou maoyi qu de yingxiang fenxi—jingji liyi yu zhanlue
guanxi [Analysis of CAFTA: Its impacts on economic interests and strategic relationship]”, Dongnanya
Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia], no. 1 (2010): 12–18.
287 Yuzhu Wang “China, Economic Regionalism, and East Asian Integration”, Japanese Journal of
Political Science 12, no. 2 (2011): 195-212.
288 DilipK Das, “A Chinese renaissance in an unremittingly integrating Asian economy”, Journal of
Contemporary China 18, no. 59 (2009): 321 - 338.
113
China's “charm offensive” strategy.289
Not only did it involve new thinking about
regional policy, but also contain tangible material sacrifices regarding the CAFTA. For
instance, China's tropical fruit farmers lost heavily with the opening of the market to
ASEAN. China extended the principle of taking less and giving more. Compared with
the unilateralism which was implemented by the US during the same period,290
China's
multilateralism in East Asia gained a warm welcome. China's CAFTA policy is not only
due to a recognition that regionalism has become an important trend in the global
political economy, with Europe and North America among many others having formed
their own economic blocs, but also a result of the economic statecraft which China used
to improve its national image and gain more influence in the region. China was now not
seen as a threat but as the provider of an economic opportunity.291
The economic
interdependence created between China and ASEAN countries has also arguably
contributed to peace in the region, with the small economies in Southeast Asia
recognising that they would suffer more in any possible crisis which undermined their
relationship with China.292
China therefore gained more political and even strategic
leverage by drawing the small countries in the region into its economic orbit.293
In other
words, ‘realist’ goals were pursued through the logic of liberal interdependence—a
possibility that was increasingly recognised by policymakers and commentators in
China.294
289 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
290 T.J. Pempel, “How Bush bungled Asia: militarism, economic indifference and unilateralism have
weakened the United States across Asia”, The Pacific Review 21, no. 5, (2008): 547-581.
291 “Reaching for a renaissance: A special report on China and its region”, The Economist, March 2007,
Accessed 30 September, 2012. http://www.siboni.net/resources/China+Region.pdf
292 Michael A. Glosny, “Heading toward a win-win future? Recent developments in China’s policy
toward Southeast Asia”, Asian Security 2, no.1, (2006): 24 - 57.
293 Gregory Chin and Richard Stubbs. “China, Regional Institution-Building and the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Area”, Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 3 (2011): 277-98.
294 Yuzhu Wang, “Zhongguo Dongmeng Guanxi Zhong De Xianghu Yilai Yu Zhanlue Suzao
[Interdependence and Strategic Formation in the Sino-Asean Relations]," Guoji Wenti Luntan, (Autumn
2008): 54-66.
114
Another project that shows the efficacy and logic of China's charm offensive strategy
was China's participation in the GMS programme. In the late 1990s, due to the AFC, the
GMS programme was forced to slow down. To help overcome the financial crisis, it was
decided to develop ‘economic corridors’ in the subregion to facilitate trade. These
corridors between China and Southeast Asian countries are those from Kunming (China)
to Laos to Thailand (the western line); Kunming to Hanoi to Hai Phong (the middle
line); Nanning (China) to Hanoi (the eastern line); and Kunming to Burma (the northern
line). The establishment of these corridors was listed as a priority project in the GMS
programme and gained support from the Asian Development Bank. From 2002 to 2008,
the GMS programme was accelerated. The strategic plan during this period focused on
long-term economic development and the development of cooperative mechanisms.295
China was a major participant in and promoter of the programme and had invested more
into it than any other country. For example, China provides 86.8 per cent of the
governmental investment to the 34 loan projects of the programme.296
The construction
of the GMS Economic Corridors is potentially another major way for China to
participate in the programme. China is also interested in promoting international
shipping cooperation in the Lancang and Mekong rivers and the Pan-Asia railway.297
China has seen this cooperative mechanism as an effective way to engage with the
region and something in which it can play a constructive role. It also offers another way
of physically reinforcing the centrality of China in the region’s economy. However,
China's development in the Great Mekong river region is also controversial. Take the
dam construction for example: countries along the downstream of the Mekong complain
that China's massive dam construction has changed the ecological environment of the
river. The ensuing conflict over water became more and more serious in the region,298
295 Fu, “Meigonghe ciquyu jingji hezuo”, 67-68.
296 Ibid, 67.
297 Zhi Liu, “Da meigonghe ciquyu jingji zoulang jianshe yu zhongguo de canyu [China’s participation
in the establishment of Greater Mekong subregion economic corridor]”, Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary
Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 3 (2009): 58–65.
298 “Mekong/Lancang River”, accessed 30 September, 2012.
115
providing a sobering reminder of the material limits to, and constraints on, regional
cooperation.
By contrast, the South China Sea was relatively tranquil during this period. In
November 2002, China and ASEAN countries signed the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea in Phnom Penh. The declaration stresses that the South
China Sea disputes should be resolved peacefully through friendly consultation and
negotiation. The document stipulates that all parties should exercise restraint and avoid
complicating and magnifying the issue prior to its solution. Further, it states that China
and ASEAN countries should endeavour to build mutual confidence through other
avenues, such as in the areas of marine environmental protection, marine search and
rescue, and in the apprehension of cross-border criminals. This is the first agreement
that has been signed between China and ASEAN countries on this issue.299
Though it is
not legally binding, it provides guidance for political resolution over the disputes. In
2005, oil companies from China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed an agreement on
jointly conducting exploring work. The three parties agreed to determine the amount of
the oil and gas reserves together. The joint exploration ended in 2008.300
This was
widely viewed as a positive move for the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea
disputes. However, as we will see in the next section, the peaceful status was only
temporary. The fundamental conflicts were not solved with this cooperative initiative.
Since 2009, a new period of tension began.
http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/mekong-lancang-river.
299 Governments of the Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed November 2002, accessed
17 June 2012. http://www.asean.org/13163.htm.
300 “Zhongguo xu jiasu kaifa nanhai youqi [China should accelerate the exploration of the oil and gas in
the South China Sea]”, 2011, accessed 29 February 2012. http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/14977958.html;
“Gezhi zhengyi gongtong kaifa zhongfeiyue lianhe kantan nanhai shiyou [Putting the dispute aside for
joint development, jointly exploring the oil in the South China Sea by China, the Philippines and
Vietnam]”, Xinhuanet, 2005, accessed 29 February 2012.http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-
03/16/content_2702718.htm
116
Overall, however, it was a golden decade for the Sino-ASEAN cooperation. The
structural or geopolitical reason for this development was that the US’s attention had
moved to the Middle East in the first decade of the new century. After September 11, the
US announced its “war on terror”. Its strategic attention was focused on the Middle East
and Central Asia, which provided an opportunity for the development of East Asian
regionalism without too much external intervention. Internal demand for the
development of regional institutions and a relatively benign external environment thus
gave China the motivation to be further involved in regional cooperation.
China’s intellectual elites provided positive support for developing cooperation between
China and ASEAN. For example, Lu, from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has
argued that ASEAN had a very important role in China’s overall strategy and that the
enlargement of ASEAN was good for the “multi-polarisation” of the Asia-Pacific. China
should develop a good relationship with ASEAN to build a peaceful regional
environment for future domestic development.301
Further, Zhang, of Peking University,
has suggested that China should take more responsibility in security cooperation and
support East Asian integration to mitigate ASEAN countries’ concerns in this area.302
However, Chinese scholars have also recognised the balancing strategy of ASEAN. As
Pang has pointed out, the role of ASEAN in the region was weakened after the AFC.
Thus, ASEAN wished to strengthen cooperation with China and other Northeast Asian
countries to restore its position in international affairs.303
Moreover, Cao notes that
China’s relationship with ASEAN is important for isolating Taiwan given that Taiwan
has been very active in developing relationship with Southeast Asia since 1994 when its
Go-South Policy was issued. Further, as ASEAN is a large market with a population of
301 Jianren Lu, “Shiji zhi Jiao: Zhongguo dui Dongmeng de Waijiao Zhanlue [At the beginning of the
new century: Chinese foreign strategy on ASEAN]”, Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], no. 1 (1998):
42–47.
302 Xizhen Zhang, “Zhongguo tong Dongmeng de Mulin Huxin Huoban Guanxi [The good neighbouring
relationship between China and ASEAN]”, Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 2
(1999): 26–29.
303 Zhongying Pang, “Dongmeng yu dongya: weimiao de “dongya diqu zhuyi” [ASEAN and East Asia:
a subtle East Asian regionalism]”, Taipingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal], no. 2 (2001), 29–37.
117
500 million, Cao has suggested that it could be an ideal destination for China’s exports
and investment.304
Thus, generally speaking, Chinese scholars support China’s
engagement with ASEAN and suggest that the country should take an active role in the
cooperation.
In sum, in the period from 1997 to 2008, China became increasingly active in regional
cooperation. The AFC provided China with an opportunity to take on a more significant
role in the region. During the crisis, China successfully constructed an image of itself as
a responsible power by assisting its East Asian neighbours. China’s efforts in promoting
the free-trade agreement with Southeast Asian countries and its signing of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea were designed to reassure
ASEAN members that China had no intentions to regional hegemony, and they were at
least partly successful. Drawing on these “charm offensive” strategies, China managed
to create a regional environment that was broadly supportive of China’s national
development, 305
one of the key goals underpinning China’s overall regional and foreign
policies
3.4 The Third Period: From 2009 to the Present
While crises may represent important turning points, not every crisis has aided the
development of the Sino–ASEAN relationship. For example, in the aftermath of the
recent GFC, it seems that, at least from the perspective of Chinese policy elites, the
regional environment has become suddenly hostile to China.306
At the same time,
observers outside China feel that the country has become more assertive, if not
304 Yunhua Cao, Zhongguo yu dongmeng guanxi: xianzhuang yu jianjing [Sino-ASEAN relations: the
status quo and prospect], Dongnanya Yanjiu [Southeast Asian Studies], no. 1 (2002): 55–63.
305 Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, “Charmed or alarmed? Reading China’s regional relations”, Journal of
Contemporary China 21, no. 73 (2012): 35–51.
306 Xiaochen Chen and Jian Liang, “Jinzhang De Dongya, Zhongguo Ruhe Yingdui [How Should China
Deal with simmering East Asia]”, Diyi Caijing [No.1 Finance], 16 July 2012.
118
aggressive toward its neighbours since 2010.307
This poses a very important question for
the central theme of this doctoral study—namely, has China changed its attitude towards
regional engagement? If China has changed its attitude towards regional cooperation
fundamentally, or has even lost interest in regionalism altogether, what will be the
implication of this be for the future of the Sino–ASEAN relationship? I will attempt to
answer these questions in this section.
I argue that despite the difficulties in the regional cooperation at this moment, in the
near future, it can be expected that China will continue to support regional cooperation
with ASEAN countries to nurture a peaceful environment for its national development.
However, China’s enthusiasm for regionalism may not be as great as before unless there
is a major transformation in the regional order. But before we begin our analysis, the
differences between the GFC and the AFC should be examined.
The most apparent difference between the GFC and the AFC is that the current crisis
began in the US then spread to Europe and other economies. This has undermined the
US’s position as the dominant economic power in the world.308
The behaviour of
American financial institutions has damaged the reputation of the US model of
economic organisation and reduced the esteem in which the so-called Washington
Consensus was held.309
This relative decline of the US’s economic power has alarmed
US elites. The Europeans are also in difficulty due to their sovereign debt problems,
which have damaged the credibility of the euro. At the same time, however, China’s
economy continues to do well. This has meant that China has become a very powerful
engine for the world’s economic growth. Both the US and Europe are increasingly
307 Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China”, In China Leadership Monitor, 2010; John.
Pomfret, “Concerned about China’s Rise, Southeast Asian Nations Build up Militaries”, accessed 20
September 2012.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/08/AR2010080802631.html.
308 Roger C. Altman and Richard N. Hass, “American profligacy and American power: The
consequences of fiscal irresponsibility”, Foreign Affairs 89, no.6 (2010): 25-34.
309 Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, “The Post-Washington Consensus”, Foreign Affairs 90, no.2
(2011): 45-53.
119
reliant on China’s capital to bail-out their economies, as China holds the largest foreign
currency reserves in the world.310
As such, the relative standing that countries have in the global economy is changing.
China has begun to ask for more decision-making power in the world’s economic
organisations, for example, in the IMF.311
In addition, the governor of China’s central
bank has proposed to reform the international monetary system and the
internationalisation of the renminbi, an initiative that has been viewed as an effort by
China to challenge the hegemony of the US dollar.312
However, even more threatening
to the US, is the possibility that the “Chinese model” and the so-called Beijing
Consensus are becoming increasingly attractive to countries in the developing world.313
Concurrently, new forms of East Asian cooperation, were threatening to exclude the US.
Naturally, these developments were viewed as threats to the US’s dominant position in
the region. Thus, the US has become increasingly concerned about “returning” to the
region, in part at least, to counter China’s rising power—even if American officials
never actually say as much.314
The Obama administration has thus begun to deploy a revamped Asia-Pacific strategy
as part of its so-called “pivot” toward the region.315
Hillary Clinton’s 2011 article in
Foreign Policy clearly indicates that the US’s strategic focus will be on the Asia-Pacific
310 Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the
International Monetary System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
311 “China Targets More Voting Power at IMF in $43bln New Contributions”, 20 June 2012,
http://english.caijing.com.cn/2012-06-20/111904540.html.
312 Xiaochuan Zhou, “Reform the International Monetary System”, BIS Review,
http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf.
313 Gracia Abad, “The Beijing Consensus in the Shadow of the Global Financial Crisis”, Madrid:
Research Unit on International Security and Cooperation (UNISCI), 2010.
314 AaronL Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An alternative US China policy”, Foreign Affairs 91, no.5
(2012): 48-58.
315 Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. plans naval shift toward Asia”, Wall Street Journal, June 2 2012, accessed 30
September 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303552104577439943137674490.html
120
over the next ten years.316
The US does not want to relinquish its leadership in the
region. China, which seen as a potential challenger to the US’s leadership, is targeted
for containment—at least, according to many Chinese scholars.317
Adding to the challenges of regional institutional development has been ASEAN’s
performance “in the driving seat” of East Asian cooperation. For the past ten years or so,
ASEAN has always been at the core of regional cooperation, from agenda setting to the
consensus building during the regional processes. ASEAN's power did not base on its
military or economic strengths but a kind of soft power.318
ASEAN provided norms and
rules for the regional cooperation.319
China and Japan are potentially well disposed to
this type arrangement largely in that neither of them would easily accept the other's
leadership.320
Also, the fact that China is not the standard bearer may help to reassure
the US and other regional countries that it did not have aggressive regional ambitions.
Now, however, ASEAN countries are concerned that their leadership position is in
doubt. This was noted by Chinese scholars as early as 2009. Han, from the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, has pointed out that the power of ASEAN has been
weakened by the crisis and that there are many internal disagreements among ASEAN
members on many regional issues.321
Facing the GFC, ASEAN countries revealed their
316 Hillary Clinton, “America’s pacific century”, Foreign Policy 189 (2011): 56-63.
317 For example, see Shenggang Bao, “Meiguo Yi Cuoguo Ezhi Zhongguo Jueqi De Shiji [the US Has
Missed the Opportunity to Contain China]”, 4 August 2012, accessed 30 September 2012.
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/56049.html
318 Richard Stubbs, “The ASEAN alternative? Ideas, institutions and the challenge to ‘global’
governance”, The Pacific Review 21, no.4 (2008): 451-468.
319 Amitav Acharya, “The Strong in the World of the Weak: Southeast Asia in Asia’s Regional
Architecture”, In Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for Community,
ed. Michael J. Green and Bates Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 172-89; Eaton, Sarah,
and Richard Stubbs, “Is ASEAN Power? Neo-Realist Versus Constructivist Approaches to Power in
Southeast Asia”, The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 135-55.
320 Christopher M. Dent ed. China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2008).
321 Feng Han, “Dongya hezuo yu zhongguo dui dongmeng zhengce [East Asian cooperation and China’s
ASEAN policy]”, Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 1 (2009): 39–40.
121
inability to deal with economic crisis. People began to doubt whether the ASEAN
Community could actually be realised in 2015. However, the prospects for ASEAN
integration are not good. While China’s influence in the region is growing, the power of
the ASEAN countries is declining. In these circumstances, the best strategy for ASEAN
is arguably to play the balance of power game. To this end, some members of ASEAN
have tried to draw the US’s attention back to the region to contain the rise of China.
When Lee Kuan Yew visited the White House in 2009, he suggested to Obama that the
US should continue to participate in the Asian affairs to offset China, otherwise the US
would risk losing its world leadership.322
The prelude to the whole drama in the South China Sea was the US-China vessel clash
in March 2009, when five Chinese vessels besieged an American hydrographical survey
vessel 120km to the south of China's Hainan Island. The incident increased the concern
of China's neighbouring countries regarding China's intentions in the Sea. In May 2009,
Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a document which claimed their sovereignty over
some islands and waters in the South China Sea to the UN Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, which alarmed Chinese governmental officials over their rights in
the Sea. Immediately, China submitted the Nine-dotted Line map to the Commission. In
2010, the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) dispute between China and Japan further
worried China's Southeast Asian neighbours. According to the media reports from the
West, a Chinese senior diplomat began to view the South China Sea issue as one of the
core national interests of China in talks with their foreign counterparts.323
In April 2010,
the Chinese navy conducted a large scale of military exercise, which sent a powerful
signal to neighbouring countries about China's intentions. In the first half of the year
2011, there were five clashes between Chinese and Philippines vessels. In the same year,
Chinese vessels cut the cables of Vietnamese earthquake monitoring ships twice.
322 “Li Guangyao rang meiguo zhiheng zhongguo, tixing le shui? [Lee Kuan Yew asked the US to
balance China, who should wake up?]” 2009, accessed 29 February 2012.
http://www.21cn.com/weekly/liguangyao/index.shtml
323 However, no official document or public speech has shown that China put South China Sea in the
same rank as Taiwan or Tibet.
122
Overall, events happening in the South China Sea after the GFC seem to demonstrate
that China has changed its “charm offensive” mindset and is becoming more and more
assertive.
There are several different explanations for this change in China's South Sea policy. The
contrast in the opinions of Chinese academia and Western academia over this issue is
striking. According to many Western scholars and journalists, China's increasing
confidence after the GFC and its ambitions to transform the regional order are the main
driving forces for the change in its policy over the South China Sea issue.324
Some of
the research focuses on China's domestic politics, such as the ICG's report which
revealed the lack of coordination among the law forcing agencies of China, and argues
that competition and a lack of coordination between various bureaucratic agencies and
other foreign policy actors is a key explanation for the shift in Chinese foreign policy.325
The Bureau of Fisheries Administration, China Marine Surveillance, local governments,
the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and energy
companies all have their own interests. Different interests sometimes can generate
conflicting actions. For example, various law enforcement agencies often have less
concern on the international repercussions of their behaviour than the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Others argue that as the once-a-decade leadership change is
approaching in China, the Communist Party would like to divert people's attention from
serious domestic problems, such as food security, environmental pollution, the high
inflation rate, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the corruption of party and
governmental officials.326
Some scholars focus on the competition for resources in the
324 See Micah Springut, “Managing China’s Growing Assertiveness in the South China Sea”, World
Politics Review, 27 July 2009, accessed 1 February, 2010.
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4124/managing-chinas-growing-assertiveness-in-the-south-
china-sea
325 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea ”, 23 April, 2012, accessed 20
September, 2012.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-
i.aspx
326 Bonnie S. Glazer, “Tensions Flare up in the South China Sea”, (paper presented at The CSIS
123
region and argue that energy interests are major factors behind the policy change.327
Therefore, China's changing policy toward the South China Sea should not be
interpreted using a single analytical lens. Analytical eclecticism highlights the different
dynamics and forces that are influencing policy in this area. Indeed, as the
aforementioned ICG report reminds us, different individual agencies and actors may
have different policy priorities and preferences: the PLA clearly takes a “realist” view
while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more attuned to the importance of ideas,
perceptions and the potential impact of diplomacy. The fact that the PLA is actually
becoming more influential in this issue area while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
relatively marginalised helps to explain the shifts in policy. We also need to remember
that China’s foreign policy-making generally may be less coherent and coordinated than
it has been in previous eras as more actors seek to exert an influence over its direction.
As we have seen, China’s increasingly visible and influential nationalist voices in the
internet to some extent limited the freedom of manoeuvre of policymakers to respond to
the rapidly shifting geopolitical environment in this area.
Regarding the South China Sea issue, traditional realist power politics between the US
and China in the region also plainly provides a larger background context and a major
“structural” condition.328
The US relatively neglected the importance of the Asia-Pacific
region and Southeast Asia during the Bush Administration, when most of the attention
was directed to the Middle East and Afghanistan. The Obama administration's pivot
towards Asia led China to feel itself to be in a strategically vulnerable position. The high
profile intervention in the South China Sea dispute, especially when the US claimed that
free navigation in the South China Sea was related with its core national interests, gave
the ASEAN countries more opportunity to play the game of power balancing or hedging
Conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea conference, Washington D. C. , June 20, 2011).
327 Leszek Buszynski, “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry”,
The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012): 141-43.
328 AaronL Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
124
between the US and China.329
The involvement of the US in regional affairs is gaining
renewed momentum and many observers in China are concerned that this may be at
China’s expense.330
This is the geopolitical background of China's policy shift.
The sizzling nationalistic sentiment mentioned earlier is another new but increasingly
important factor. Given that Chinese people have been told that China has long-standing
sovereign claims over the South China Sea, this leaves the government with little space
for manoeuvre. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already been criticised by the
public as being too soft in its response to pressure from the international community.331
Having said that, Chinese nationalism has moved beyond a top-down political ploy or
tactic that can be easily implemented by the Communist Party and popular nationalism
now has its own dynamics. Even the Party cannot fully control the development of the
nationalist movement and it is very careful when dealing with nationalism, as the
sentiment of the people can easily turn into an anti-government atmosphere.332
All the
above factors make the South China Sea problem very difficult to solve. What is
especially significant about the current deadlock is China refuses to have the issue
considered in a multilateral arena. The only major attempt to discuss this issue in a
multilateral context has been in the ARF, about which I will make a more detailed
observation in Chapter 6. The point to make at this stage is that China’s policymaking
329 Jae Jeok Park, “The US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific: hedge against potential threats or an
undesirable multilateral security order?” Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (2011): 137-158. Another classic
example is the Sino-Australian relationship, though this thesis will not focus on. See Baogang He, “The
Politics of Accommodation and the Rise of China: The Case of Australia”, Journal of Contemporary
China 21, no. 73 (2012): 53-70.
330 Xinchang Guo and Jing Zhang, "Yatai Diqu Xingshi Yanbian Dui Zhongguo Zhoubian Haiyang
Xingshi De Yingxiang Ji Duice [Influence of the Changes in Asia-Pacific Region on China's Marine
Situation and the Countermeasures," Dongnanya Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia], no. 6 (2012).;
Jiangxia Yu and Gongde Yu, "Meiguo "Chongfan Yazhou" Zhiheng Zhongguo Nanyi Chengshi [the Us
"Returns to Asia" to Contain China Will Not Success] " Xuexi Yuekan [Study Monthly], no. 11 (2012).
331 A senior official from the Ministry mentioned in a Track Two conference that some citizens even sent
calcium tablets to the Ministry. They satirize that Chinese diplomats are too weak and need to have more
calcium for a stronger back, Beijing, August 2012.
332 Guo Yu, "Dynamics of Popular Nationalism in China's Japan Policy in Post-Cold War Era" (PhD
diss., University of Birmingham, 2012.)
125
elites remain cautious about allowing this particular issue to be broached in a context in
which they cannot be confident of exerting power and control. In other words, a
traditional realist policy calculus appears to be in operation. A similar attitude is
displayed toward legal constraints such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).China has rejected the Philippines’ initiative to bring the dispute to
the International Court of Justice.333
3.5 Conclusion
The development of China's engagement with Southeast Asia over the last 20 years has
not progressed smoothly. It can be divided into three different stages with three distinct
turning points. The first turning point was the end of the Cold War. As a consequence of
major structural changes in the international system, especially the end of the bipolar
Cold War stand-off between the superpowers, there were more opportunities for China
and its Southeast Asian neighbours to engage. Following the Cold War, ideological lines
became less important. After China attended its first dialogue meeting with ASEAN, the
bilateral relationship was gradually progressed. However, in this first stage, China was a
cautious participant in international diplomacy and one that learned a good deal through
its regional interactions. Understandably enough, however, initiatives for regional
cooperation on the part of China were very limited. China attended the ARF but with
great caution.
The second turning point was the 1997 and 1998 AFC. During and after the crisis,
countries in Asia-Pacific realised that a regional mechanism that could be used to deal
with future threats should be built. China’s responsible behaviour during this period was
highly praised and reinforced the view that regional diplomacy and even multilateral
institutions could be utilised as constructive and effective parts of China’s overall
333 Jojo Malig, "China Fears Unclos, Think-Tank Says" ABS-CBNnews.com, 12 May, 2012, accessed 1
October, 2012, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/05/11/12/china-fears-unclos-think-tank-says.
126
foreign policy approach. This represented a significant example of “learning” and a
major shift in the way that China’s foreign policy had been pursued and even conceived.
In the decade following the crisis, China successfully built an image as a good
neighbour and became very active in regional cooperation, leading many observers to
talk about China’s soft power augmentation in the region and the effectiveness of its
charm offensive. Again, this marked a major shift in the hitherto predominantly realist
policy paradigm. The benefits of this new thinking and approach appeared to be
confirmed in the development of the 10+1 and APT frameworks. Likewise, the
relationship between China and ASEAN achieved great progress, including
developments such as the CMI, the CAFTA, the relative calm in the South China Sea
and the Mekong River development. China was an enthusiastic promoter of regional
cooperation in this period.
However, since 2008 and 2009, the global, regional and domestic environment has
changed again, China now appears to be more assertive to its Southeast Asian
neighbours, especially on the South China Sea issue. Many Chinese policy and
intellectual elites appear to have realised or learned that further integration of the region
will be hard to achieve in the short term unless China’s policy is seen as relatively non-
threatening by its neighbours. Consequently, many believe that China should adopt a
more pragmatic method of dealing with regional cooperation. However, there is a single
crucial reason for China’s continued participation in regional cooperation that has not
wavered over the past 20 years: China needs a peaceful and stable regional environment
for its national development. The key issue is whether those elite policymakers who
favour a diplomatic approach to this question will prevail over those who want China to
adopt a more assertive position. In other words, will diplomacy, discourse and ideational
factors prove more enduring that traditional realist perceptions and claims about the
utility of material power? While we cannot know what the answer to such questions is
likely to be, we can at least employ an analytical framework that will allow us to
identify the forces that will influence the outcome of such contests.
127
Chapter Four: China in Northeast Asia
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will analyse China’s participation in Northeast Asia’s regional processes
and will explore the motivations for China’s regional policies. I shall suggest that,
despite the well-known “structural” drivers of intra-regional relations; these are not the
only influences on Chinese policy. Although the dominant discourse for analysing
international relations in Northeast Asia is broadly realist, this paradigm generally
neglects the growing impact of economic interdependence on regional relations, which
appear to be having precisely the impact predicted by liberal theories.334
While Northeast
Asia may be a long way from creating a common identity, there are already
institutionalised patterns of cooperation that are at odds with some of the more
pessimistic, realist-inspired predictions about the region’s future. 335
“Northeast Asia” is generally taken to comprise China (including Taiwan and the Hong
Kong and Macau Special Administration Regions), North Korea, South Korea and
Mongolia.336
In addition, the Russian Far East is often considered part of the region.
However it is described, the separation between North and South Korea, and between
mainland China and Taiwan, are powerful reminders of the impact of the Cold War and
the fact that there are profound divisions to be overcome. These present particular
challenges for Chinese policymakers, as do a series of other “flashpoints”, including the
Taiwan Strait issue and territory disputes between China and Japan, South Korea and
334 Erik Gartzke, “The capitalist peace”, American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 166-191.
335 Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia”, International Security
18, no.3 (1993/94): 5-33.
336 United Nations Statistics Division, Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions,
geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings. 2011, accessed 24 April, 2012.
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#ftnb.
128
Japan, and Russia and Japan. As a consequence, many observers consider the region to
be inherently unstable. And yet despite these formidable problems, the region has been
relatively stable.
One possible explanation for this stability, which is given particular emphasis by liberal
theorists,337
is that, apart from the impoverished North Korea, the region is
economically the fastest developing area in the world. Not only does it contain several
of the world’s largest economies, but they are becoming increasingly inter-connected in
ways that increase the potential costs of conflict. Before the rise of China attracted so
much attention, Japan—one of China’s most important historical rivals—was actually at
the centre of the region’s transformation, underpinning the “East Asian miracle” and
creating the so-called “flying geese” pattern of development and integrating the
economies of East Asia.338
Despite growing levels of economic integration, the development of regional
cooperation in Northeast Asia has been much slower compared to its Southeast Asian
neighbours. This is not only due to the difficult history between the countries of
Northeast Asia, but also the current “security dilemma” that characterises regional
relations.339
Under these circumstances, regional cooperation is, I shall suggest, very
often crisis-driven. The key strategic manifestation of this possibility is the regional
multilateral framework that has developed around the “Six-Party Talks”, created to
solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Equally significant, has been the trilateral
cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea which was triggered by the
337 Thomas Berger, “Set for stability? Prospects for conflict and cooperation in East Asia”, Review of
International Studies 26 (2000): 405-428.
338 Terutomo Ozawa, The Rise of Asia: The “Flying Geese” Theory of Tandem Growth and Regional
Agglomeration, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009).
339 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World
Politics. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008); Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the
Security Dilemma in East Asia”, International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 49-80.
129
1997/1998 AFC. Soon after the crisis, the three parties decided to begin a dialogue
which ultimately led to the creation of the trilateral cooperation mechanism, first under
the framework of the ASEAN plus Thee and then becoming an independent
mechanism—and potentially the most significant institution of its kind. Both of these
initiatives are examined in detail in what follows as they highlight the potential for and
constraints on greater regional cooperation in China’s Northeast Asian relations.
The general point that emerges from the following analysis is that China’s participation
in the regional cooperation of Northeast Asia cannot be explained by a single paradigm.
China’s foreign policy-making is distinguished by pragmatism in the face of complex
strategic, political and economic challenges. The main driving force for China’s
regional engagement in Northeast Asia, as it has been in other regions, is to build a
peaceful and stable environment. External stability is seen as crucial for national
development. Even for authoritarian China, where the state remains a pivotal actor, the
relationship between “domestic” and “external affairs” is becoming more complex and
mutually constitutive.340
This is a central theme of China’s regional policy, which is no
different in other sub-regions such as Central Asia and Southeast Asia. However, the
task is made more challenging in Northeast Asia because, as I explain below, it is
burdened with the legacy of the Cold War and unresolved territorial disputes, especially
between China and Japan.341
At the outset, however, it is worth pointing out that while
these territorial disputes are about unresolved material claims, their origins and political
significance may be found in the way the region is conceived and considered in the
minds of national populations.342
340 James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
341 Yuka Hayashi and Tejada Carlos, “China, Japan Face Off near Disputed Islands”, Wall Street Journal,
July 11, 2012.
342 Christian Wirth, “China, Japan, and East Asian Regional Cooperation: The Views of ‘Self’ and
‘Other’ from Beijing and Tokyo”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 9, no. 3 (2009): 469-96;
Baogang He, “Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia”, Global
130
The research methods used in this chapter are the same as those used in the previous
chapter on Southeast Asia. Section 2 reviews China’s policies towards Taiwan, Japan
and two Koreas. Section 3 is an observation of China’s role in the Six-Party Talks.
Section 4 discusses China’s participation in the trilateral cooperation between China,
Japan and South Korea. Section 5 is a case study on the functional cooperation, the
Tumen River Development, which is followed by the conclusion.
4.2 China’s Northeast Asian Strategy
Among China’s neighbouring regions, Northeast Asia is arguably the most important.
Historically, China’s authority in East Asia has largely been based on its dominant
position in Northeast Asia. Significantly, its influence has not been primarily militaristic
or dependent on “hard” power, however. On the contrary, one of the most important
sources of Chinese influence and authority has been the transmission of many of its
traditionally political ideas and culture to Japan and Korea.343
This does not mean that
all was peaceful and stable while China was in the ascendant: Japan occasionally tried
to challenge China’s authority, and the Korean Peninsula was effectively a buffer zone
and a site of competition as a consequence. In ancient times, wars between China and
Japan were often caused by competition over Korea. Even in relatively modern times
Korea has remained a flashpoint: China’s defeat in the Sino–Japanese War from 1894 to
1895 meant it lost control of the Korean Peninsula. This marked the end of China’s
leadership in East Asia and created the conditions for the Japanese invasion of China, as
the Korean Peninsula is the gateway to China’s Northeast region. Only after World War
Governance 10 (2004): 227-46. Jennifer Lind, “Apologies in International Politics”, Security Studies 18,
no. 3 (2009): 517 - 56.
343 Gilbert Rozman, The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991).
131
II and China’s intervention in the Korean War, did China regain influence over Korea.344
Northeast Asia was thus the strategic core area for China in the past, as we saw in
Chapter 2The point to re-emphasise here, therefore, is that these historical episodes
remain crucially important in a region where political elites have long memories, and
where national populations may be highly sensitive about historical legacies. This is
nowhere more obvious and important than in China’s relationship with Taiwan.
China and Taiwan
For Chinese intellectual and political elites, Taiwan is regarded as a domestic problem,
rather than an international one, or something that is governed by regional relations.
However, Taiwan is more than a renegade province; it is an autonomous actor with an
elected government, and it has diplomatic relations with 23 countries and de facto
official relations with many other countries in the world. Indeed, relations between
China and Taiwan have a profound effect on regional affairs in Northeast Asia. Even
more significantly, of course, the US has been deeply involved in the China–Taiwan
issue since World War II, which makes it a major test ground for the Sino–US
relationship.345
Before we consider how China has managed this potentially profound
constraint on its policy autonomy, it is useful to say something about the evolution of
relations between Taiwan and the PRC.
The Taiwan issue originated from the Chinese civil war, in which “two Chinas” were
formed after the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Both the Communist
government in the mainland and the KMT government in Taiwan claimed sovereignty
over all of China and to be the only legitimate government. Until as late as 1971, the
KMT government in Taiwan occupied a seat in the security council of the United
344 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, 5th edition. (New
York: Knopf, 1973).
345 “Taiwan and U.S. -China Relations”, accessed 1 July, 2009.
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_taiwan.htm.
132
Nations, before it was replaced by Communist China. The PRC’s indisputable material
or structural importance in the international system was confirmed in 1979, when the
US cut official diplomatic ties with Taiwan and moved towards China.346
Despite this
recalculation of American priorities and the explicit recognition of the PRC’s growing
material importance, the Taiwan Relations Act was also passed by the US Congress in
1979, reaffirming the US commitment to protect Taiwan from the attack of China.347
This commitment is pivotally important because theoretically, China and Taiwan are
still at war, as no peace treaties have been signed to date. However, a rapprochement
between China and Taiwan began in the late 1970s, when China opened and reformed
its economy. In 1979, the standing committee of the National People’s Congress of
China published a document (Message to Compatriots in Taiwan) stating that Taiwan
and the Mainland should develop economic relations and direct post and transportation
should be facilitated.348
In 1987, KMT leader Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the Martial Law
and the restriction on Taiwanese residents visiting the mainland. Economic and trade
cooperation, as well as humanitarian cooperation, began to develop quickly. In many
ways, therefore, this would seem to confirm the liberal insight that economic
interdependence has the potential to trump strategic or even ideological divisions.349
In 1991, two semi-official organisations were founded in Taiwan and China respectively:
the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations across the
Taiwan Straits (ARATF). The two organisations represented the respective governments
and began to negotiate for functional cooperation, such as direct transportation, direct
post and economic cooperation. In 1993, the presidents of the SEF and ARATF—Koo
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
348 The Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s Congress, “Message to Compatriots in
Taiwan”, accessed 3 July 2009. http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7943.htm.
349 Steve Chan, “Commerce between Rivals: Realism, Liberalism, and Credible Communication across
the Taiwan Strait”, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 9, no. 3 (2009): 435-67.
133
Chen-fu and Wang Daohan—met in Singapore, which was the first high-level contact
after the 1949 split.350
In many ways, this also seemed a confirmation of the importance
of institutional development in transforming bilateral ties and attitudes.
However, after Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US in 1995 and the missile crisis in 1996, the
bilateral relationship was seriously damaged. In 1999, Lee enunciated his “two
countries” theory, which claimed that the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland
China was actually between two countries, or at least a special country-to-country
relationship.351
The planned third meeting between the presidents of the SEF and
ARATF in that year was cancelled. After Chen Shui-bian became President of Taiwan in
2000, his pro-independence stance made the bilateral relationship even more difficult.352
Relations improved in 2005 after KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited China and met
Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing. It had been 50 years since the last meeting of
the two party leaders—Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek in 1945. James Soong of the
People First Party and Yok Mu-ming of the New Party visited China and met with Hu
after Lien’s visit. The three Plan-Blue (pro-unification political force) parties’ visits
formed the basis for the improvement of the bilateral relationship after Ma Ying-jeou
became the President of Taiwan in 2008.353
In June 2008, the heads of the SEF and
ARATF resumed negotiations on functional cooperation, which had been delayed for
almost 9 years. In November 2008, the meeting between the two heads was held in
Taiwan for the first time, and direct flights, marine transportation and direct post were
350 Chung-Chian Teng and Yeh-Chung Lu, “Butter Versus Guns: Economic Interdependence and the
Cross-Strait Relations”, (paper presented at APSA Annual Conference, Seattle, USA, 2011).
351 Lijun Sheng, “How China Is Going to Respond to Lee Teng-Hui's ’Two States’ Theory" (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999).
352 Teng and Lu, “Butter versus guns”.
353 Ibid.
134
finally agreed, which marked significant progress.354
It can be plausibly argued, therefore, that the stable status of the cross-Strait relationship
is due to the rise of China and its economic effects. China is now the engine of East
Asia’s economic development, and it has a significant influence on neighbouring
countries. For example, as its largest trading partner and investment destination, China
is critical for Taiwan’s economic development. Just how important can be seen by the
scale of industry transfer from Taiwan to the mainland that began in the 1980s.
Consolidating the bilateral relationship’s economic importance to both sides, were
policies such as the 1987 Regulations for Encouraging Investment by Taiwan
Compatriots, which were issued by the PRC government, with which Taiwanese
businessmen can enjoy favourable investment facilitations.355
In the 1990s, with China’s
deepening economic reform and Taiwan’s increasing production costs, many Taiwanese
companies moved their factories to the mainland. Taiwan’s economic dependency on
China is shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2 below.
Figure 4-1: Cross-Strait Trade Relations (Unit of Value: US$ million)
354 Ibid.
355 Raymond J. M. Chang and Pei-chen Chang. “Taiwan’s Emerging Economic Relations with
PRC”, In Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle, ed. Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau (M.E.
Sharpe, 1992), 275-297.
135
Figure 4-2: Degree of Dependence in Cross-Strait Trade Relations, 1979-2010
(Unit: %)
Source: Chung-Chian Teng and Yeh-Chung Lu, “Butter Versus Guns: Economic Interdependence and the
Cross-Strait Relations”, (paper presented at APSA Annual Conference, Seattle, USA, 2011): 9-10.
In 2010, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed
between the two parties, which was another step forward for economic integration. The
tariffs of 539 categories of Taiwanese products are reduced by China which took 16% of
Taiwan’s export to China in 2009. China also gains benefits from ECFA. Tariffs of 267
categories are reduced by Taiwan which was 10.5% of China’s export to Taiwan in
2009.356
Ma’s reason for concluding the ECFA with China was that economically the
development of East Asian cooperation was placing Taiwan in danger of being isolated.
China, Japan and South Korea signed free trade agreements with ASEAN, which has
increased Taiwan’s worries. Taiwan needs to conclude its free trade agreement with
China quickly so it can indirectly join in the regional economic cooperation network.
Moreover, Ma believes that further economic integration will reduce the possibility of
conflicts.357
356 Frederik Balfour, “China Draws Taiwan into Economic Embrace with Trade Pact”, accessed 10
October, 2010. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-28/taiwan-to-sign-first-trade-treaty-with-
china-cementing-economic-relations.html.
357 Shu-ling Ko, “Ecfa Will Reduce Chance of War: Ma”, Taipei Times, 20 November, 2009, accessed 10
136
Despite the Democratic Progressive Party’s criticism of ECFA it gained the support of
the public, especially Taiwanese people who had business interests in China.358
The
latest data show that by the end of 2007, there were 75146 Taiwanese companies
registering in the mainland. It is estimated that there are more than 1.5 million
Taiwanese people working and living in mainland China.359
They directly benefit from
the cross-strait economic relationship and would not like to see any confrontation
between China and Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwanese businesspeople also play an important
role in promoting cross-strait exchange and cooperation, and even political progress.
Robert Ross suggests that they represent a “Commercial fifth column”, and are exerting
a powerful pacifying influence on cross-Strait relations.360
The economic exchange across the Strait has therefore improved the political
atmosphere. Institutionalised cooperation, such as ECFA and direct cross-Strait currency
clearing mechanism, arguably decreased the likelihood of any serious dispute. This
economic cooperation helped Taiwan’s economic development, which led to the ruling
KMT party gaining support from the public, as shown in the 2012 presidential election.
However, the issue remains far from settled, and Taiwanese people still prefer the status
quo rather than unification or immediate independence.
In fact, on issues such as democracy and human rights, Taiwan and China have very
different postions, though since Ma became Taiwan’s president, he has kept a relatively
low profile as far as criticising China’s human rights record and issues such as the
December, 2010. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/11/20/2003458946.
358 Zhichuan Xie, "Minjindang Fan Ecfa Jiushi Fanshang [Dpp's Resistance to Ecfa Is Anti-Merchant],"
National Policy Foundation, http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/7354.
359 Kang, Miao, Huiying Li and Su Hu, “Touzi Dalu Ershinian Taishang ‘Denglu’ Jincheng De Sanci
Rechao [Investing in the Mainland for Twenty Years, Three Waves of Taiwanese Businessmen Landing]”,
accessed 2 September, 2009. www.huaxia.com/sw/tzdl/2008/00794753.html.
360 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in
East Asia”, Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 355-95.
137
Tiananmen Square incident are concerned. However, that does not mean that Ma agrees
with China’s political institution, foreign policies or supports unification. As Ma
comments, the unification should be set on the precondition of democratisation of the
mainland.361
Indeed, the limits of agreement can be seen in the continuing strategic tensions that
characterise relations at times. One major crisis occurred in 1996 when China launched
a “missile test” in the waters around Taiwan after President Lee expressed his pro-
independence opinions at Cornell University in 1995. In 1999, Lee developed his theory
on special relations between the two countries which again irritated China. Chen’s
“yibian yiguo lun” (China and Taiwan are different countries on each side of the
Strait)362
and the cease of the Guidelines for National Unification and the National
Unification Council of Taiwan in 2006 were seen by the Chinese government as a
dangerous move towards de jure independence. Given that the Taiwanese motivation
and enthusiasm for independence has been increasingly growing, the Anti-Secession
Law was passed by the National People’s Congress of China in 2005 as a response.
With this law, the Chinese government formalised the option of using military force to
prevent the secession of Taiwan from China. During Ma’s presidency, the situation has
become much better. However, US arms sales to Taiwan remain a sensitive issue. The
US generally welcomes the detente between China and Taiwan but it also wants to
maintain some sort of strategic balance, too. Likewise, the US security umbrella is still
regarded by the Taiwanese as crucial for their survival.363
Despite the undoubted
361 “Ma Yingjiu: Tongyi Qianti Dalu Minzhu Mahu ‘Xiangjian Buru Bujian’ [Ma Ying-Jeou: The
Precondition for Unification Is the Political Democratisation of the Mainland, the Meeting between Ma
and Hu ‘It Is Better Not Meeting’]”, accessed 1 September, 2012. www.newnews.ca,
http://newnews.ca/?action-viewnews-itemid-59322.
362 Huasheng Chen, "Chen Shuibian Zongtong "Yibian Yiguo" Lun Yu "Huojia Rentong" Wenti Zhi
Yanxi [a Study on "One State on Each Side" and "National Identity"]," in NPF Research Report (National
Policy Foundation, 2002).
363 "Su Zhenchang: Pan Meiguo Jianchi Baozheng Taiwan Anqaun [Su Tseng-Chang: Wish the Us
Continuing to Secure Taiwan]," accessed 3 October,
138
improvements in relations that have emerged as a consequence of economic
interdependence, therefore, this most intractable of security issues still has a very
important strategic component. Indeed, some realist scholars argue that Taiwan remains
a non-negotiable issue over which China remains prepared to fight, no matter how
unlikely the prospect of “victory”.364
Ironically, this possibility may be reinforced by the
emergence of vocal nationalists who perceive these issues in a particular way. Once
again ideational and material constraints seem to matter.
China and Japan
While the theory of liberal interdependency appears to work well for China–Taiwan
affairs, it does not work quite as well for the Sino–Japanese relationship. As with the
China–Taiwan relationship, there is also remarkable degree of economic
interdependence between China and Japan. Indeed, China overtook the US to become
Japan’s largest trading partner in 2007, and by April 2012, Japan’s accumulative
investment in China amounted to 82.5 billion US dollars and Japan was the third largest
source of investment.365
However, the economic relationship did not lead to a cordial
political relationship. On the contrary, the bilateral relationship has occasionally become
very tense. The mistrust between the two countries in the field of security has never
been eliminated; it is described as “zhengleng jingre” [politically cold and economically
hot] in China.366
http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/1/detail_2012_08/18/16906216_0.shtml.
364 Michael D. Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan”, Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (2004): 30-49.
365 Anyuan Zhao and Meichen Jin, “Riben Duihua Touzi Yu 800 Yi Meijin Cheng Waizi Disanda
Laiyuan [Japan’s Investment in China Exceeded 80 Billion Us Dollars and Japan Came the Third Largest
Source of FDI]”, accessed 1 September, 2012.
www.chinanews.com, http://www.chinanews.com/shipin/2012/05-30/news72196.shtml.
366 Xide Jin, “Zhong Ri ‘Zhengleng Jingre’Xianxiang Tanxi [an Analysis of the Phenomenon of ‘Cold
Politically While Warm Economically’ in Sino-Japanese Relations]”, Riben Xuekan [Japanese Studies],
no. 5 (2004): 8-23.
139
As constructivists point out, perceptions can redefine conceptions of national interests
in bilateral relationship, or at least the way such interests are pursued.367
In the case of
the Sino-Japanese relations, memories on their troubled history have not dissipated over
time and often play a negative role in shaping the relationship. That is particularly true
since the 1990s. With the completion of economic “catch up” inform the 1980s, Japan
began to focus more on seeking a “normal state” status, especially given that the Cold
War had ended and Japan wanted to play a role in the evolving international order.368
However, for many Japanese nationalists, the first course of action before becoming a
normal state was to rewrite the history of World War II.369
Although Japan’s left wing
maintained a critical view of the past, many young people know very little about Japan’s
war history, something that is highlighted in the continuing debates over Japanese text
books.370
Many Japanese people have a negative view of both China and South
Korea,371
A feeling that is often warmly reciprocated in Japan’s neighbours. In short, the
conflicts of the twentieth century, and Japan’s perceived failure to acknowledge its
wrong doing, continue to cast long shadows over contemporary relations.372
The bilateral relationship reached a low point between 2001 and 2006, when Junichiro
Koizumi became the Prime Minister of Japan. Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine,
367 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory and
constructivism”, European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3(1998): 259-294.
368 Yoshihida Soeya, David A. Welch, and Masayaki Tadokoro, Japan as a “Normal Country”? A Nation
in Search of Its Place in the World (Toronto Buffalo London: University of Toronto Press, 2011).
369 Leszek Buszynski, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Interdependence, Rivalry and Regional Security”,
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 31, no. 1 (2009): 143-71.
370 “Qiqi Shibian 70 Nian: Riben Nianqingren Dui Benguo Qinlueshi Bushen Liaojie [70 Years
Anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident: Japanese Young People Know Little about History of
Japanese Invasion]”, accessed 1 October, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-
07/06/content_6339412.htm.
371 Kenta Tanamichi, “The Youthful Face of Japanese Nationalism”, Far Eastern Economic Review 168,
no. 10 (2005): 33-36.
372 Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2008).
140
which includes 1,068 convicted war criminals and 14 convicted Class A war criminals,
aroused popular anger in China and South Korea. In 2005, the Japanese government
touched another nerve of its neighbours by authorising the use of a history textbook
written by a right wing figure, which glossed over Japan’s war crimes in World War II.
The Japanese right wing also denied the existence of the so-called “Comfort Women” or
the Korean women who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese army. All of these
controversies resulted in a 2005 anti-Japan riot in China, which had a detrimental
impact on the bilateral relationship.373
Besides the troubled political relationship, in recent years, the mistrust between China
and Japan in the field of security has also deepened, particularly with China’s growing
naval power. As 85 per cent of Japan’s oil is imported through the Malacca Strait,
Japan’s feeling of insecurity is increasing with China’s marine power, which is a
potential threat to the sea lanes through which Japan’s energy supplies must pass. The
US has also asked Japan to take more responsibility in the East Asian seas, and this has
further stoked tension between the two neighbours.374
China’s growing blue water
projection capability stimulated Japan to develop its own navy, creating a classical
realist-style security dilemma in the region.
The territorial disputes mentioned earlier could prove to be the most dangerous issue of
all. If conflict does break out, the most likely cause will be a fight over the disputed
territory between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which are still a
major unresolved problem in the bilateral relationship. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
dispute is a legacy of World War II, and the US’s original trusteeship over the islands. In
1972, the US transferred the administration rights to Japan. However, when a report
produced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in
373 Buszynski, “Sino-Japanese Relations”, 153.
374 Ibid.
141
1968 discovered a rich reserve of oil under the Islands waters375,
China and Taiwan both
claimed sovereignty over the islands. The islands dispute remains unresolved, largely
due to Deng Xiaoping’s idea on “shelving the disputes and seeking joint development”
and postponing its resolution.376
Yet, China’s enlarging resource appetite and the
growing desire of many of its people and leaders to reassert Chinese claims are making
the issue increasingly dangerous.
In 2010, Japanese marine police captured Chinese fishermen around the islands.
Compared with China’s previous response, it was more assertive this time. The Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs used strong wording to request Japan to release the
fishermen without conditions. In addition, in a surprising demonstration of neo-
mercantilist statecraft, China immediately began to restrict rare earth exports to Japan.
China is the largest rare earth exporter in the world, with 95 per cent of the market share.
Rare earth is critical for advanced weaponry and semi-conductor products, and it is very
important for Japan’s electronic industry. Although China claimed that the restrictions
were due to concerns over environment pollution rather than diplomatic revenge, most
doubted China’s claims and many of China’s neighbours became more nervous of
China’s assertive behaviour.377
Such a policy is also viewed as part of the changes of
China’s strategy towards its neighbours since 2010, as we have seen in Chapter 3.
375 S. M. Hali, "China and Diaoyu Islands," Opinion Maker, http://www.opinion-
maker.org/2012/09/china-and-diaoyu-islands/.
376 Deng decided to shelve the disputes when China and Japan were negotiating for a formal diplomatic
relationship. According to Deng’s analysis, there are four concerns. First, it is hard for China to talk about
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands given that Taiwan is also a claimer. The consensus between China and Taiwan on
this issue is hard to reach. Second, Japan has real control over the islands and Japan is very sensitive on
territory disputes issues after the World War II. Third, the US is the actor who creates the problem and a
major player. Both the US and China do not want to disturb the bilateral relationship for the islands.
Fourth, China wants to focus on development and need a stable international environment. See Xin Geng,
“Jiemi: Gantong Meisu Liangjian De Zhongguo Weihe Gezhi Diaoyudao [Demystifying: Why Did China
Want to Shelf the Disbutes of the Diaoyu Islands If It Was Even Not Afraid of the US and the USSR]”,
accessed 10 September, 2012. http://mil.huanqiu.com/history/2012-08/3080632.html.
377 “China Denies Japan Rare-Earth Ban amid Diplomatic Row”, accessed 2 February, 2011.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/23/AR2010092300277.html.
142
Therefore, as Buszynski rightly points out, interdependence is sometimes asymmetric;
one party usually relies more on the other. The stronger party may take advantage and
become more assertive because it expects that the weaker party will make
concessions.378
In the case of Sino-Japanese relations, Japan’s growing economic
reliance on China has arguably encouraged the latter’s more assertive policy. Chinese
leaders calculate that Japan will comprise as it has too much to lose. So far, at least, this
judgement looks largely correct, although Japan is taking steps to reduce its
vulnerability.379
As far as Chinese policymakers are concerned, at least the behaviour
and reactions of Taiwan and Japan are relatively predictable. Unfortunately, that may be
not the case of the Korean Peninsula.
China and the Korean Peninsula
With the end of the Cold War, China’s intellectual elite began to reconsider strategic
options in the region, particularly regarding the Korean Peninsula. During the 1990s, a
series of changes took place in Northeast Asia, which encouraged Chinese scholars to
adjust to the new changes.380
The initial change occurred in the region’s political
structure with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the strategic contraction of the
US.381
The consequences were that ideological barriers in the region became less
important and cooperation among regional countries became more possible. At the same
time, the bi-polar stability was replaced by a relative power vacuum as there was no
378 Buszynski, "Sino-Japanese Relations”, 145.
379 Ben McLannahan and Jonathan Soble, “China rare earths quota spurs Japan”, Financial Times, 20
March, 2012, accessed 10 September, 2012. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a6082b3e-70d0-11e1-8456-
00144feab49a.html
380 Xiangjun Tu, “Hou Lengzhan Shiqi de Dongbeiya Zhanlue Geju [The Strategic Situation of
Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War Era]”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics],
1995(1): 57-60; Chenghao Piao, “Dongbeiya Xin Zhixu yu Chaoxian Bandao [Northeast Asia’s New
Order and Korea Peninsula]”, Shehui Kexue Jikan [Social Science Journal], 1996(1): 78-81.
381 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995(UK: Routledge, 1996).
143
widely accepted regional leader, although many realists claimed that the US maintained
stability through a form of “off-shore balancing”382
It was in the above circumstances that China’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula
underwent a sea change after the Cold War ended. The overall evolution in thinking
among influential analysts in China is evident in Zhang Liangui and Chen Longshan’s
article written in 1989,383
who argued that South Korea is not a puppet state and colonial
economy of the US. Obviously, this argument flied in the face of the mainstream
discourse on China’s South Korean policy in the Cold War era. Zhang and Chen praised
the achievement of national development in South Korea, and argued that China should
open itself economically to South Korea and build a normal relationship with the
country. In the field of politics and security, they suggested that China should try to
avoid being involved in military conflicts and should not blindly support any party on
the peninsula. Given that the Cold War had not even concluded at that time, their
opinions were surprising, as they opposed the hitherto prevailing idea that China should
support North Korea unconditionally and treat South Korea as an enemy. Radical as
such ideas seemed at the time, their opinions effectively became state policy when the
bipolar system ended and China embarked on systematic reform and “opening”. In 1992,
China and South Korea established a formal, diplomatic relationship, which was
followed by fundamental changes to the relationships between China, South Korea and
North Korea.
In the mid to late 1990s, China’s scholars enjoyed more freedom of thought regarding
the Korean Peninsula, which was seen as increasingly important to China. The evolution
in thinking about Korea Peninsula is epitomised by as Chen Fengjun who argued that
382 Christopher Layne, “From preponderance to offshore balancing: America’s future grand strategy”,
International Security 22, no.1 (1997): 86-124.
383 Liangui Zhang and Longshan Chen, “Chaoxian Bandao Xingshi he Women de Sikao [The Situation
in Korean Peninsula and Our Thinking]”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics], no.2
(1989): 34-39.
144
China needed a stable external environment, and that peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula was a prerequisite for this. It also became more widely accepted that China
needed to develop good relations with South Korea to promote China’s economic
development. South Korea was seen as a source of vital technology and economic
expertise.384
Other analysts argued that the Korean Peninsula was important for China’s
political security. As Lu Junyuan pointed out, the collapse of the North Korean regime
could affect the authority of the Communist Party of China as well. Moreover, a large
number of Koreans live in Northeast China; peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
is potentially directly connected with China’s domestic stability.385
The economic
development of China’s Northeast region also requires a stable international
environment. The stability of the Korean Peninsula is vital; otherwise, China’s
Northeast border area could be marginalised economically.386
Indeed, for many analysts
in China, North Korea remains a source of strategic vulnerability and the peninsula is
viewed as a gateway for any country that wants to invade China.387
Seen in that context,
it is important to recognise that the Korean Peninsula serves as something of a buffer
zone between China and the US in particular.
However, North Korea’s method of seeking security—by developing nuclear
weapons—creates a classic “security dilemma” in precisely the way realist scholarship
might predict. And there is indeed, plentiful evidence of increased military spending
384 Fengjun Chen, “Chaoxian Bandao de Zhanlue Diwei ji qi Fazhan Qianjing [The Strategic Position of
Korean Peninsula and the Prospect for its Development]”, Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [Studies of
International Politics], no.4 (1995):1-9.
385 Shale Horowitz and Min Ye, “China’s grand strategy, the Korean nuclear crisis, and the Six-Party
Talks”, Pacific Focus 21, no. 2 (2006): 45-79.
386 Qiangyi Jin, “Zhongguo de dongbeiya quyu zhanlue yu dongbeiya zhengzhi jiegou [China’s regional
strategies and political structures in Northeast Asia]”, Yanbian Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban)
[Journal of Yanbian University (Social Science)], 40 (2007): 5–11.
387 Junyuan Lu, “Chaoxian Bandao dui Woguo Guojia Anquan de Diyuan Zhengzhi Zuoyong ji Wo
Anquan Duice Sikao [The Geopolitical Influence of Korean Peninsula on China’s National Security and
China’s Security Policy to it]. Tiedao Shiyuan Xuebao [Journal of Suzhou Railway Teachers College]” ,
no.1 (1997): p. 36-41.
145
throughout Asia, even if not all of it is attributable to North Korea’s actions.388
However,
even here, where China’s traditional “realist” thinking might be expected to dictate
policy, there is evidence of new thinking among Chinese scholars. For example, Lu
captures the new more flexible thinking that is emerging, when he argues that China
should strengthen cooperation with North and South Korea and support peaceful means
rather than military means to actualize the unification of the peninsula. In this sense,
China should promote the building of the multilateral security mechanism and try to
gain the initiative.389
Indeed, growing numbers of analysts believe that building a
cooperative security mechanism in Northeast Asia is the best way forward. Scholars
such as Hou Hongyu, for example, believe that new issues such as non-traditional
security, terrorism, environmental problems and diseases, have become very serious and
ought to be the focus of greater policy attention. Significantly, there is growing
recognition in government circles that these problems cannot be solved by a single state
or traditional military alliance. In this regard, the growing, regional economic
cooperation in Northeast Asia has provided an important exemplar of the benefits of
cooperation, which can potentially be transposed to the security sphere.390
New strategic thinking
The influence of new thinking can be seen in Chinese discussions of the security
architecture in the region, which became serious after the Six-Party Talks391
began. In
2004, the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) held a
388 “Asia defence spending to overtake Europe”, Financial Times, March 7, 2012, accessed 1 October,
2012. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0aab435c-6846-11e1-a6cc-00144feabdc0.html
389 Ibid.
390 Hongyu Hou, “Jianli Dongbeiya Anquan Jizhi de Biyaoxing yu Kexingxing [The Necessity and
Possibility of Building the Security Mechanism in Northeast Asia]”, Dangdai Shijie [The Contemporary
World], no.4 (2006): 27-29.
391 The Six-Party Talks are a series of talks among China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan and
the US for a resolution in relation with the North Korean nuclear crisis.
146
seminar on developing a possible Northeast Asia cooperative mechanism. The CICIR is
the major research organ of China’s intelligence service and is widely regarded as
influential in the policy-making domain.392
The suggestions made in the meeting
indicated the ambition of the Chinese intellectual and policy elites about a possible
regional cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. Participants agreed that security
mechanisms in Northeast Asia should not be measured by the standard of institutions
such as the European Security Council. Lin Limin, Deputy Director of the Institute of
World Political Studies believes that the mechanism ought to have three goals.393
First,
the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved. Second, the stability of the
peninsula should be upheld. Third, the balance of the interests of all parties should be
secured. Ma Junwei, Deputy Director of the Institute of Northeast Asian Studies
believes that such a security mechanism should also cover non-traditional security
issues, such as energy security.394
However, there was also a recognition that security
mechanisms are not easy to build. The question is whether all parties in the region have
the will to cooperate and whether they have mutual confidence. Ji Zhiye, Director of the
Euro-Asian Studies believes that the Six-Party Talks should be fixed and
institutionalised to discuss the regional security problem regularly.395
The overall
perspective that emerged from this influential forum was that, China should take an
active position in building a regional security mechanism.
These developments need to be seen in the context of an overall desire on the part of
China’s policymakers to use the Northeast Asian region to counterbalance what are seen
392 Bill Gertz, "Chinese Think Tank Also Serves as Spy Arm: Officials from West Visit Often " The
Washington Times, 28 September 2011.
393Bojiang Yang et al., "Dongbeiya Anquan Jizhi: Xianshi Yu Qianjing [the Security Mechanism of
Northeast Asia: Present and Prospect]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations],
no. 4 (2004). 49.
394 Ibid., 50.
395 Ibid., 43.
147
as “containment” strategies on the part of the US.396
At the same time, however, there is
a recognition that China needs to cooperate with the US to address many regional issues.
This paradox is reflected in the debate regarding the role of the US in Northeast Asia
among Chinese leading scholars. On the one hand, some scholars, such as Yuan Peng,
take a negative attitude towards the US’s Northeast Asian policy. According to Yuan,
the strategic objectives of the US in Northeast Asia have four points: to prevent the rise
of regional power, especially China; to maintain alliances that affect its ability to deploy
its forces; to prevent the regional hot spots getting out of control; and to prevent the
formation of a closed economic bloc which will be a threat for the global liberal
economic order.397
On the other hand, scholars like Li Kaisheng believe that the existence of the US in
Northeast Asia could stabilise the regional situation. He argues this for three reasons.
First, although the alliance between the US and Japan and the alliance between the US
and South Korea are products of the Cold War, the US can use the alliance to constrain
Japan and South Korea, which is in line with China’s interests. Second, because of the
region’s troubled history, China and Japan, and South Korea and Japan, do not have
good relations; the US can help to maintain stability in the region. Third, regarding the
North Korean nuclear issue, the final settlement of the problem requires the cooperation
of the US.398
The two overall positions presented above are not necessarily contradictory, and the
influence of both can be detected in the evolving policy toward the region. They can be
396Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on US global strategy”, Political
Science Quarterly 116, no.3 (2001): 343-365.
397 Peng Yuan, “Zhoumei guanxi yu dongbeiya anquan [The Sino-US relationship and the security of
Northeast Asia]”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics], no. 9(2007): 7-9.
398 Kaisheng Li, "Dongbeiya Anquan Jizhi Jiangou Guocheng Zhong De Meiguo Yinsu [the Us Factors
in the Process of the Construction of the Security Mechanism of Northeast Asia]," Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics] No. 9(2007).9-11.
148
seen as two faces of a single coin. China certainly dislikes the US’s containment and
hegemony in the region, but Chinese policymakers recognise that they need the US to
provide regional public goods from which it can benefit. Regarding the relationship
between the US and China in this region, Li believes that the US and China can
cooperate in the fields where their fundamental or “core” interests do not clash. As we
have discussed in Chapter 2, although there is currently scope for cooperation between
the US and China, it remains to be seen whether the growth of China’s power will
inevitably lead to greater competition.399
Yuan is more optimistic about the prospects for
cooperation. He observes that, because there is no multilateral security mechanism in
this region, and China and the US have an opportunity to work together. In the Six-Party
Talks, for example, China and the US deepened cooperation on certain issues, although
doubts continued regarding whether they can overcome mutual distrust.400
The evolving
security debate reflects the complexity of China’s position and the absence of a
definitive, widely supported “grand strategy” for the region or for the world more
generally.401
The changing nature of alliances
The lack of a regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia has its origins in the
aftermath of the Second World War. With the foundation of the PRC and the implosion
of Korean War soon after it, a bipolar Cold War structure developed that was
characterised by competition and confrontation between the capitalist and communist
camps. However, the US’s policy in East Asia was different from its policy in Europe. A
hub-spoke structure with several pairs of bilateral security arrangements appeared in the
region, rather than the collective security pattern that developed across the Atlantic. This
399 Ibid., 10.
400Kenneth Lieberthal and Jisi Wang, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," (The John L. Thornton
China Center at Brookings, 2012).
401 Feng Zhang, “Rethinking China’s grand strategy: Beijing’s evolving national interests and strategic
ideas in the reform era”, International Politics 49, no.3 (2012): 318-345.
149
was a conscious policy orientation toward Asia that reflected deeply held American
attitudes towards the region.402
The direct result has been that there is an institutional
gap in the region.403
The previous strategic triangle between the US, USSR and China collapsed with the end
of the Cold War. Although the US-Japan Alliance, the South Korea-US Alliance, and the
special relationship between China and North Korea have survived through the post-
Cold War era, the nature of these alliances or quasi alliance has changed dramatically.
For the “hub-spoke” structure developed as part of the contest with communism, and
the common enemy is now less clear. The Soviet Union has disappeared and
“communist” China has conducted an open door policy and embraced a market
economy. The basis for the alliances has been weakened, or they ought to have, at least.
Even the US-Japan alliance has faced difficulties.404
The US and Japan have developed
different ideas about the future of the region. Japan has been quite ambitious with
regard to regional cooperation since early 1990s, but the vehement objections and
resistances from US have meant that some of Japan’s ideas have finally died on the vine.
Likewise, although South Korea indeed needs the US to stay in the peninsula for its
security, the two allies have some fundamental differences on their attitudes towards the
North. For the US, North Korea is a rogue state which is seemingly doomed to fail. The
US’s major concern is how to deal with its nuclear weapons capability. However, for
402 Christopher Hemmer and P. J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity,
regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism”, International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 575-607.
403 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, “Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast
Asia: An Analytical Overview, in Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration?” ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal, et al.
(Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008).
404 Mulgan, A. George, “Japan and the Bush agenda: Alignment of divergence?” in Bush and Asia:
America’s Evolving Relations with East Asia, ed. Mark Beeson, (London: Routledge, 2006), 109-127.
150
South Korea, Korean reunification is the first priority,405
at least before the conservative
Lee Myung-bak became the president. The “Sunshine policy” of the South was very
different from the hawkish American policy of late 1990s and early 2000s, which has
seen the South move away from the policy objectives of the US, presenting a diplomatic
opening for China. Even with the rise of China and the potential threats perceived by
US allies becoming more notable, the relationship between China, Japan, South Korea
and the US is quite different from that in the Cold-War. The basic reality is that the four
actors are deeply interdependent on each other in trade and economic development and
this gives a potentially different dynamic to their interaction.
The relationship between North Korea and China has undertaken a great change as well.
After China established the diplomatic relationship with the South in 1992, the former
bilateral trust between China and the North was undermined. The ideological positions
and the way of governing each country became so different that the traditional cordial
relationship born of common struggle during the Cold War was gradually replaced by a
much more pragmatic approach on the part of Chinese policy-makers, something that
once again reflects shifting perceptions and evolving debates within China itself.
All the above changes have led to a restructuring of the regional order in Northeast Asia.
The two nuclear crises of the North t revealed just how weak the current regional
system is. This has encouraged Chinese strategists to believe that the region needs a
new security mechanism to manage emerging challenges. China wants to become one of
the architects of any possible mechanism, and the Six-Party Talks provide a useful
prototype and testing ground.406
As such, it represents a new, multilaterally-based form
of diplomacy that is becoming the hallmark of China’s more sophisticated foreign
405 John S Park, “Inside Multilateralism: The Six-Party Talks”, The Washington Quarterly, 28, no.4
(2005): 75-91.
406 It has been said that China played a proactive role in the institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks from
the very beginning. See, Jaewoo Choo, “Is Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks Possible?” East Asia
22, no. 4 (2005): 39-58.
151
policies. Even in the most difficult areas, with the most traditionally-hostile of
neighbours, there are signs that Chinese policymakers are developing new strategies and
learning new ways of interacting with the region.407
Overall, however, influential Chinese scholars suggest that a future multilateral
mechanism in Northeast Asia is required to resolve the major security threat in the
region; namely, the North Korean nuclear crisis.408
Chinese scholars and policymakers
generally have a positive attitude towards the Six-Party Talks and hope that it can
develop to become an important multilateral mechanism—or at least they did before the
2009 missile launch of North Korea. The next section discusses the mechanism of the
Six-Party Talks and China’s role in more details. Thus, it is possible to develop a clear
view of China’s motivations in participating in multilateral regional cooperation.
4.3 The Thinking behind Six-Party Talks
The Six-Party Talks are a result of the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, the
problem has not yet been solved. The question arises, therefore, are the Six-Party Talks
an effective regional multilateral mechanism? What role is China playing in the
mechanism, and what are its motives and goals? This section attempts to answer these
questions. I will explain the causes of the nuclear crisis and the development of the Six-
407 Guanghou Wang and Jianbo Wang, "Zhongguo Canyu Quyu Duobian Hezuo De Lishi Fenxi [a
Historical Analysis on China's Participation in Regional Multilateral Cooperation]," Zhonggong Tianjin
Shiwei Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Party School of Tianjin Committee of the CPC], no. 1
(2011).29-33.
408 See Feng Zhu, "Liufang Huitan De Zhidu Jianshe Yu Dongbeiya Duobian Anquan Jizhi [the
Instituionalisation of the Six-Party Talks and the Multilateral Security Mechanism of Northeast Asia],"
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] No. 3(2007); Xiao Ren, "Liufang Huitan
Yu Dongbeiya Duobian Anquan Jizhi De Kenengxing [Six-Party Talks and the Possibility of Building a
Multilateral Security Mechanism in Northeast Asia]," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], no. 1
(2004); Ling Wei, "Dongbeiya Duobian Anquan Jizhi Jianshe - Yi Chaohe Wenti Liufang Huitan Weili
[Multilateral Security Mechanism Building in Northeast Asia - Study of the Six-Party Talks]," Waijiao
Pinglun [Foreign Affairs Review], no. 87 (2006).44-50.
152
Party Talks, followed by a review of Chinese scholars’ observations of the talks.
The North Korean nuclear crisis became an issue in the early 1990s. Based on satellite
evidence, the US believed that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons and
wanted to inspect North Korea’s nuclear facilities as a result. North Korea denied the
accusation; it declared that it did not have the will or capability to develop nuclear
weapons, and criticised the US for deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea, which
threatened its security. This is the so-called first Korean Peninsula nuclear crisis.409
In October 1994, to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, the US and
North Korea signed an agreement on nuclear control in Geneva, Switzerland. According
to the agreement, North Korea would seal its nuclear facilities and the US would be
responsible for providing North Korea with aid for the construction of a nuclear power
station, which was important for North Korea’s electricity supply.410
However, the
agreement is only a product of a reluctant compromise. In reality, the US and North
Korea are still divided about how to implement the agreement. On the one hand, the US
refused to take much responsibility for the building of the nuclear power station. On the
other, North Korea opposed the suggestion that the nuclear reactor must be built by
South Korean, even though South Korea offered to pay 75% of the total cost. These
disputes unjustified the agreement.411
409 Aming Liu and Xiaomei Yao, “Chaoxian Hewenti yu Zhongmei Liyi Boyi [North Korea Nuclear
Issue and Sino-US Interest Calculation]”, Guoji Guancha [International Review], no.2 (2007): 73;
“Chaoxian He Wenti [North Korean Nuclear Issue]”, Xinhuanet, accessed 1 October, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/08/content_683434.htm.
410 Jianyi Piao, “Chaoxian Hewenti ji Weilai Zouxiang [North Korea Nuclear Issue and its Prospection]”,
Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-pacific Studies], no.3 (2003): 23-24; “Chaoxian He Wenti [North
Korean Nuclear Issue]”.
411Jinhu Jin and Ying He, '"Mei Chao He Wenti Xieyi' Yu Eluosi De Chaoxian Bandao Waijiao ["Us-
North Korea Nuclear Agreement" and the Korean Peninsula Diplomacy of Russia]," Jin Ri Dong Ou
Zhongya, no. 2 (1995).20-23.
153
In the first nuclear crisis, China kept a low profile and did not become directly involved.
It followed the traditional policy line that China would not intervene in other countries’
affairs. China stressed that the US and North Korea should solve the problem bilaterally.
Even in 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongjin was still arguing that North Korea is a
sovereign state, and that it is not China’s business to decide whether it should develop
nuclear weapons or not.412
Nevertheless, China’s behaviour underwent a dramatic
change after the second nuclear crisis.
In October 2002, James Andrew Kelly, the assistant US Secretary of State, visited
Pyongyang. Back to US, however, he publicly claimed that North Korea was developing
nuclear weapons. In response, the North claimed it had the right to develop nuclear
power. In December 2002, the US stopped providing heavy oil to North Korea, and
North Korea then removed the seal on its nuclear facilities. In January 2003, North
Korea pulled out of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.413
Unlike the first crisis, China actively tried to mediate to solve the North Korean nuclear
crisis peacefully. Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen’s last working visit in his tenure in
government was to visit South and North Korea to try and solve the problem. In April
2003, a three-party discussion between China, North Korea and the US was held in
Beijing. The talks offered an opportunity for North Korea and the US to negotiate;
however, the dialogue turned out to be very difficult.414
Initially, North Korea hoped to hold bilateral negotiations with the US; however, the US
412 Feng Zhu, "Zhongguo Chaohe Zhengce He Celue De Bianhua [the Change of China's North Korean
Nuclear Policy and Strategy]," Center For Strategic and International Studies,
http://www.irchina.org/xueren/china/view.asp?id=796. 2-7.
413Liangui Zhang, “Chaoxian He Wenti: Huigu yu Sikao [North Korea Nuclear Issue: Retrospection and
Contemplation]”, Dangdai Shijie [Contemporary World], no. 11(2008):22-25; “Chaoxian He Wenti
[North Korean Nuclear Issue]”.
414Xiangli Sun, “Chaohe Wen Shizhi yu Fazhan Qianjing [North Korea Nuclear Issue: Nature and
Future]”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no.6 (2007): 13-16.
154
refused and requested all concerned parties to join in. Eventually, North Korea and the
US reached consensus to hold talks with all six parties, but bilateral contact between
North Korea and US was still possible within the Six-Party Talks.415
China again took
an active stance on the North Korean nuclear issue, reflecting its growing desire to be a
force in multilateral negotiations, especially where its own interests were seen to be
directly at stake. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dai Bingguo, acted as a special
envoy and visited Moscow, Washington and Pyongyang to coordinate the viewpoints of
all parties. Dai visited North Korea to speak directly with Kim Jong-il, and successfully
persuaded North Korea to join in the talks.416
In August 2003, the Six-Party Talks, involving China, North Korea, South Korea, the
US, Japan and Russia, were held in Beijing, with the aim of peacefully negotiating a
solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Since then, six rounds of Six-Party Talks
have been held in Beijing.417
In the first round, the US refused to contact with North Korea bilaterally and insisted
that the talk between the two parties must involve the other parties. The first round tried
to make a joint statement but failed in the end. Similarly, in the second round in
February 2004, the negotiation rapidly descended into stalemate. In order to keep the
talks going, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing talked with Secretary of States Colin
Luther Powell on the phone and persuaded the US to compromise. However, no joint
statement was published either. The third round was in June 2004. Because there were
disputes between the US and North Korea on the scale and method of the nuclear
415 Weidi Xu. “Chaoxian Bandao Heweiji de Huajie yu Bandao Zouchu Lengzhan [Defusing the Nuclear
Crisis and Moving the Korean Peninsula away from the Cold War]”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World
Economics and Politics], no.9 (2003): 59-64.
416 Xian Wen, Qing Yu and Li Wang, "Liufang Huitan Fangfeiyuan Jishi [a Record of the Six-Party
Talks in the Fangfeiyuan]," Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 26 September 2005.
417 “Chaoxian He Wenti [North Korean Nuclear Issue]”.
155
abolishment, no substantial agreement was reached. 418
The breakthrough occurred in the fourth round from July to September in 2005. The
Chinese Chair Wu Dawei persuaded all the parties to make some compromises.
Through the two stages of hard negotiation, a joint statement (9.19 Joint Statement) was
finally passed. In the statement, North Korea promised to give up all of its nuclear
weapons and nuclear plans. The other five countries agreed to provide energy aids to
North Korea.419
The fifth round included three phases. Phase one was in November 2005. A Presidential
Statement was published and restated the principle of “promise to promise and action to
action”. However, because North Korea opposed the financial sanction of the US, the
talks were abandoned. Phase two was in December 2006. In the Presidential Statement
issued after the talk, the countries reclaimed that they would put the 9.19 joint
statements into practice based on the principle of action to action, conducting the
coordinated steps and practising the joint statement step by step. Phase three was in
February 2007. A joint document (2.13 Joint Document) was issued. The document
confirmed that North Korea would shut down and seal the nuclear facility and invite the
officials of IAEA to monitor and certify its actions. The other countries should provide
aid to North Korea.420
The two phases of the sixth round in 2007 tried to make sure that the 9.19 Joint
Statements and 2.13 Joint Document could be implemented. A joint statement was
issued in October which requested North Korea to disable the nuclear facilities before
418 Xian Wen, Qing Yu and Li Wang, "Liufang Huitan”; “Chao He Wenti Beijing Liufang Huitan [North
Korean Nuclear Issue and Beijing Six-Party Talks]”, Xinhuanet, accessed 06 January, 2010,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-11/06/content_1164512.htm.
419 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round
of the Six-Party Talks”, 19 September, 2005, accessed 1 June, 2010,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm
420 “Chao He Wenti Beijing Liufang Huitan [North Korean Nuclear Issue and Beijing Six-Party Talks]”.
156
the end of 2007, and that the US realise its promise based on the actions of North
Korea.421
However, there are a number of issues that have undermined the talks and
caused them to be suspended: the US and North Korea have disputes about how to
verify the termination of North Korea’s nuclear plans; there are disputes between North
Korea and Japan on the kidnap issue;422
and there are continuing tensions and disputes
between the North Korea and South Korea. On 5 April 2009, North Korea claimed it
had launched a satellite successfully which the US believed was a missile. The UN
criticised the actions of North Korea and North Korea subsequently decided to quit the
Six-Party Talks and restart its nuclear plan. On 25 May 2009, North Korea completed a
second nuclear test. The security council of UN again issued a statement criticising the
behaviour of North Korea. China also published a strongly worded statement and
requested North Korea stop doing nuclear test and return the Six-Party Talks, which
marked a remarkable change in China’s policy towards the Korean peninsula issue.423
China’s new policy tells us at least two things. Firstly, China does not have as big an
impact on North Korean behaviour as the international community believes. In the case
of missile launches and nuclear tests, China could not stop North Korea. Secondly,
China is willing to take more responsibility in just the way that many members of the
“international community” hope and expect. China’s criticism of the behaviour of North
Korea in the United Nations is a clear illustration.
A success or failure?
421 “Chao He Wenti Beijing Liufang Huitan [North Korean Nuclear Issue and Beijing Six-Party Talks]”.
422 During the 1970s and 1980s, several Japanese citizens were kidnapped by North Korean agents and
forced them to teach in the North Korean agents’ school. Since 1990s, the abduction issue came to the
surface and became a key issue on the relationship between Japan and North Korea. See Emma Chanlett-
Avery, “North Korea’s Abduction of Japanese Citizens and the Six-Party Talks”, CRS Report for
Congress, March 2008, accessed 1 September, 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22845.pdf
423 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China”, 25 May, 2009, accessed 1 October, 2011. http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-
05/25/content_11433191.htm
157
Although the Six-Party Talks have not produced the sort of result some people hoped,
many in China believe that the talks were a valuable experiment in pursuing a peaceful
resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and this is why they merit detailed
discussion here. For example, Shi Yuanhua optimistically argues that, to an extent, the
Six-Party Talks changed the international structure of this region formed in the Cold
War era and contributed to the stability of the regional security environment. The model
can even contribute to the peaceful solution of other international disputes, he argues.424
It is also important to recognise that the talks illustrate an important shift in China’s
foreign policy thinking and practise, and have provide an arena in which new ideas and
policy approaches can be tested, particularly on the practice of multilateral
diplomacy.425
However, as shown in the above historical review, the Six-Party Talks also faced great
challenges and difficulties. China’s principal delegate argues that the biggest obstacle
for the Six-Party Talks is the lack of confidence between the parties. If the parties do not
trust each other, progress is hard to achieve. Leading newspaper commentator Ding
Gang believes that the most insurmountable difficulty in the Six-Party Talks is
Washington’s overall strategic intentions. He argues that Washington tries to use the
Six-Party Talks to build a future environment for the region that fits its own national
interests, namely dominating the region. It uses the Six-Party Talks to control the pace
of the settlement of the Korean problem.426
Similarly, as early as 2007, Xue Li claimed
that the role of the Six-Party Talks was limited, and that the countries could not rely on
424 Yuanhua Shi, "'Liufang Huitan' Jizhihua: Dongbeiya Anquan Hezuo De Nuli Fangxiang [the
Institutionalisation of the Six-Party Talks: The Direction of the Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia] "
Guoji Guancha [International Survey] No. 2(2005).
425 Feng Zhu, “Liufang Huitan Yu Chaoxian Qihe: Duobian Zhuyi Weishenme Neng Fahui Zuoyong?
[the Six-Party Talks and North Korean Abolishment of Nuclear Weapons: Why Multilateralism Can
Function]”, Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International Politics Quarterly], no. 4 (2007): 157-73.
426Gang Ding, "Liufang Huitan De Zhenzheng Nandian [the Real Difficult of the Six-Party Talks],"
Dongfang Zaobao [Dongfang Daily], 1 September 2010 2010., accessed 10 October, 2011.
http://www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2010/9/1/514375.shtml
158
them. Xue believes that that North Korea cannot easily give up nuclear weapons
because it is too poor to guarantee its security in any other way. Thus, the Six-Party
Talks cannot fundamentally solve the North Korean problem.427
Chinese thinkers have consequently attempted to modify the current mechanism in ways
that remind us that policy is a consequence of discussion and reaction to changing
circumstances in the way constructivists have argued. Even on the Korean peninsula,
discourse and questions of identity can influence political outcomes.428
Due to China’s
evolving domestic debate and the process of learning it has encouraged, many Chinese
observers now believe that if the Six-Party Talks want to play a role in the future, they
must be reformed. For example, Zhu Feng from Peking University believes that the Six-
Party Talks should have a functional upgrade and strengthen the mechanisms of
implementation. That is, if a country chooses to quit the mechanism, other countries
have a right to impose sanctions. If any party undermines the institutionalised rules of
the Six-Party Talks, a collective response and coercive punishment should be
conducted.429
Similarly, Zhang Liangui also urges institutional reform of the Six-Party Talks. He
points out that the six parties do not have enough confidence in the talks after North
Korea’s launch of the missile. He also worries that the talks will betray the original aims
and issues. Therefore, institutional innovation and reform is required in line with
changes in evolving debates in order to eliminate concerns regarding the Six-Party
427Li Xue, "Chaoxian Wenti De Zhiben Zhidao: Yong "Lianheguo Fangan" Daiti "Liufang Jizhi" [the
Fundamental Solution of North Korean Problem: Using the United Nations Scheme to Replace the Six-
Party Mechanism]," Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics] No. 9(2007).
428 Roland Bleiker, Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2005).
429Feng Zhu, "Erci Heshi Hou De Chaohe Weiji: Liufang Huitan Yu "Qiangzhi Waijiao" [the North
Korean Nuclear Crisis after the Second Nuclear Test: The Six-Party Talks and "Coercive Diplomacy"],"
Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] No. 7(2009).
159
Talks.430
All the above efforts by influential Chinese scholars on how to improve the
Six-Party Talks show how Chinese officials and commentators value this mechanism.
Significantly, it is in line with Chinese diplomatic initiatives and reflects major changes
in China’s policy thinking about regional multilateralism over the last ten years in
particular.
Chinese enthusiasm for the Six-Party Talks is a consequence of both short-term
calculation and a long-term strategic view. As we have seen in the last section on
China’s Northeast Asian strategy, the stability of the Korean Peninsula is one of China’s
core national interests. This willingness to use multilateral forums is especially striking
given the backdrop of world politics after the September 11, when the US’s
unilateralism reached a new height.431
Part of China’s active response to American
unilateralism at this time was to initiate the multilateral framework of the Six-Party
Talks, not only to pacify the Korean Peninsula, but also to prevent the US from
conducting unilateral policy towards North Korea, as the US had in Iraq.432
Overall,
therefore, the Six-Party Talks have been viewed by Chinese policy makers and scholars
as a platform for building a future Northeast Asian security mechanism and as a method
of off-setting the influence of the US.433
To put the point another way, Chinese
policymakers are learning to adapt and utilise multilateral institutions in pursuit of their
own regional and global foreign policy goals.
430Liankui Zhang, "Wending Bandao Bixu Chongqi Liufang Huitan [the Six-Party Talks Should Be
Restarted in Order to Stablise the Peninsula]," Guofang Shibao [National Defence Journal], 1 December
2010 2010.
431 Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (New
York: Basic Books, 2003).
432 John S. Park, “Inside Multilateralism: Six-Party Talks”, The Washington Quarterly 28 (4):75-91.
433 Yuanhua Shi, “Liufang HuitanJizhihua: Dongbeiya Anquan Hezuo De Nuli Fangxiang [the
Institutionalisation of the Six-Party Talks: The Direction of the Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia]”,
Guoji Guancha [International Survey] No. 2 (2005): 15-20.
160
4.4 Trilateral Cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea
China, Japan and South Korea are closely linked geographically as well as culturally.
But, due to the region’s problematic geopolitical environment and complicated history,
trilateral cooperation was long overdue. The mechanism for trilateral cooperation was
established in 1999 at a breakfast meeting at the initiative of Japanese Prime Minister
Keizo Obuchi, when the three national leaders participated in the APT Summit in the
Philippines. In a second breakfast meeting in 2000, the leaders of the three countries
decided to hold meetings on a regular basis within the framework of the APT. Since
then, 11 meetings have been held. On 13 December 2008, leaders of the three countries
met independently for the first time in Fukuoka, Japan, which was a historical
breakthrough.434
In September 2011, the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat was launched
in Seoul, Republic of Korea.435
If we examine the background leading to the breakthrough to trilateral cooperation, we
discover clear, crisis-driven features. Soon after the AFC in the late 1990s, East Asian
cooperation came into being. The development of the APT provided an important
platform for the three Northeast Asian countries to cooperate. When the first meeting
was held in 1999, economic cooperation was the priority. The GFC in 2008 promoted
further cooperation between the three countries. Originally, the meeting scheduled in
September was postponed due to a change in Japan’s Prime Minister—a recurring
problem for Japan and its partners. In the grim situation of the GFC, the three countries
decided a meeting needed to be held at the end of the year to discuss countermeasures.
After the meeting, a Joint Statement on the International Finance and Economy was
434 Degui Lian, "Zhong Ri Han Baochun De Huiwu [the Meeting among China, Japan and Rok, a
Harbinger of Spring]," Dangdai Shijie [The Contemporary World], no. 1 (2009).38-40.
435 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Zhong Ri Han Hezuo [Trilateral
Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea]”, 2011, accessed
23 April, 2012. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/zrhhz/jbqk/.
161
issued,436
which demonstrated the collective commitment of the three countries to
overcome the crisis. The leaders also signed a Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership
and confirmed their commitment to cooperation in principle. The three countries were
“determined to pursue comprehensive cooperation including political, economic, social
and cultural fields within both governmental and non-governmental frameworks in the
future-oriented manner”.437
This indicates that the mechanism of trilateral cooperation
had entered a new stage. Currently, 17 ministers” level meeting mechanisms and 50
consultative mechanisms have been established, and more than 100 cooperative projects
have been undertaken.
Functional cooperation has produced some notable achievements, such as in the fields
of environmental protection, Informational Technology (IT) and logistics
standardisation, and financial cooperation. The developmental policies of the three
countries create a demand for the harmonisation and standardisation of regulations in
the region in order to enhance domestic development,438
in precisely the way liberal
theorists of regional regimes might lead us to expect.439
The three countries work
together for the standardisation of facilities (for example, the size of containers) to
improve the efficiency of transportation and logistics. A Northeast Asia logistics
information service network is under construction in the framework of the trilateral
cooperation.440
Many projects like this in the trilateral cooperation mechanism have
436 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit: Joint Statement on the
International Finance and Economy”, 13 December, 2008, accessed 2 September, 2009.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit0812/economy.html.
437 Lian, "Zhong Ri Han Baochun De Huiwu [the Meeting among China, Japan and Rok, a Harbinger of
Spring]." Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit, Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership, December
2008, accessed 23 April, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit0812/partner.html.
438 Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Searching for the Mode of
Governance," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10(2010).
439 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes”, International Organization 36, no.25
(1982): 325-355.
440 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Full Text: China-Japan-ROK
162
brought real benefits and reinforce cooperative momentum.
China has been very active in trilateral cooperation, especially regarding economic
coordination, which probably attracts more attention than any other field. The three
countries reached a consensus about building a free trade area in 1999. Since 2003,
scholars from the three countries have conducted joint research. However, even though
the interdependency among the three economies is very clear (see the Table 4-1 below)
and the research results have been positive, progress was initially quite slow without
political support. After the financial crisis in 2008, however, joint research between
government, industry and academia accelerated the progress.441
Once again, crises
provided an important catalyst for regional cooperation. On 16 December 2011, the
joint research work on the free trade area was completed. The joint research report will
be submitted to the summit meeting for the leaders to determine the period and roadmap
of the negotiations.442
Cooperation (1999-2012)”, 10 May, 2012. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t930436.htm.
441 Yuzhu Wang, “Yi Wushi Taidu Tuidong Zhong Ri Han Zimaoqu Jianshe [to Promote the Building of
the Free Trade Area between China, Japan and ROK Concretely]”, Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan
[Chinese Cadres Tribune], no. 8 (2012): 51-53.
442Jiuchen Wang and Fei Ma, "Zhong Ri Han Zimaoqu Guan Chan Xue Lianhe Yanjiu Baogao Tongguo
[the Approval of the Industry-Academia-Government Joint Research Report]," Renmin Ribao [People's
Daily], http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-12/17/c_122437455.htm.
163
Table 4-1: Trade Relations between China, Japan and South Korea
(billion US dollars)
China Total exportation
(TE)
Exportation to
Japan (ETJ)
Exportation to
Korea (ETK)
ETJ+ETK/TE
2005 762.0 84.0 35.1 15.6%
2010 1577.8 121.0 68.8 12.0%
2011 1898.4 148.3 82.9 12.2%
Japan Total exportation
(TE)
Exportation to
China (ETC)
Exportation to
Korea (ETK)
ETC+ETK/TE
2005 594.9 80.1 46.6 21.3%
2010 769.8 149.5 62.4 27.5%
2011 823.3 162.1 66.2 27.7%
Korea (South) Total exportation Exportation to
China (ETC)
Exportation to
Japan (ETJ)
ETC+ETJ/TE
2005 284.4 61.9 24.0 30.2%
2010 466.4 116.8 28.2 31.1%
2011 555.2 134.2 39.7 31.3%
Source: Yuzhu Wang, “Yi Wushi Taidu Tuidong Zhong Ri Han Zimaoqu Jianshe [to
Promote the Building of the Free Trade Area between China, Japan and ROK
Concretely]”, Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan [Chinese Cadres Tribune], no. 8
(2012): 52.
China’s policy elites are equally enthusiastic about an FTA in Northeast Asia. Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stressed in the ministers” meeting of the three countries
that the three countries should strengthen cooperation and make efforts to promote the
construction of a free trade area and deepen the future-oriented partnership of the three
164
countries.443
However, many difficulties still exist. None of the three countries are
unambiguously enthusiastic about or committed to neoliberal ideals generally or trade
liberalisation in particular, and they are all quite concerned about the possible negative
impact of such a FTA on their domestic economies.444
If nothing else, this is a reminder
that ideas can matter, even when they are not liberal per se and the sort that usually
feature in constructivist analyses.445
There are, of course, also more specific and contingent obstacles to cooperation. It was
said when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji imitated the FTA in 2002, Japanese Prime
Minister Koizumi did not support the proposal and wanted to see if China had reduced
tariff barriers domestically under the framework of WTO. Besides economic
considerations, political issues also matter. It has been said that South Korea and Japan
worried that the FTA would pull them too close to China, which would definitely affect
their links with the West.446
On one hand, the difficulty of shaping strategic and
economic alignment is a perennially stumbling block to regional cooperation. On the
other hand, it comes down to Japan’s apparent interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP)447
initiated by the US. Whether Japan will be able to overcome domestic
opposition to this agreement is a moot point, after all, foreign policy everywhere has
443 Lijuan Shan, "Yang Jiechi: Nuli Tuijin Zhong Ri Han Zimaoqu Jianshe [Yang Jiechi: To Promote
the Construction of the China-Japan-Rok Fta Hard]," CRI online,
http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/03/06/5311s3587371.htm.
444Yoshimatsu, "Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Searching for the Mode of Governance."
445 Jeffrey M. Chwieroth, “Testing and measuring the role of ideas: The case of neoliberalism in the
International Monetary Fund”, International Studies Quarterly 51, no.1 (2007): 5-30; Martha Finnemore
and Kathryn Sikkink, “International norm dynamics and political change”, International Organization 52,
no. 04(1998): 887-917.
446Sheng Zhong, "Nachu Yongqi Tuidong Zhong Ri Han Zimaoqu Tanpan [Bravely Promoting the
China-Japan-Rok Free Trade Negotiation]," accessed 3 October 2012,
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/16928428.html.
447 TPP was origionally a free trade agreement of several small economies and gained wide attention
with the US participation in the negotiation in 2009. More discussion on TPP can be found in Chapter 6.
165
powerful domestic roots.448
China’s proactive participation in the trilateral cooperation since the late 1990s is driven
by a similarly complex set of motives, and a calculation about the external environment
and internal needs. First, changes in global and regional order have created a need for
cooperation in Northeast Asia. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, the AFC revealed the
weakness of the political economy of East Asia.449
South Korea was seriously affected.
Against this background, the development of APT provided a platform for the three
Northeast Asian countries to cooperate further, which is why the first trilateral meeting
was held in the context of an APT meeting.
Second, the growing regional economic integration detailed earlier means that both
South Korea and Japan have little option other than to cooperate with China. For
example, it is suggested that a 1% decrease in Chinese economic growth or slowing
down will bring about 0.4% to 0.6% growth or slowing down in Japan. Likewise, China
is the ROK’s biggest trading partner with an enlarging trading deficit.450
With the
accession of China into the WTO, East Asian countries worried about China’s possible
effect on their own economies as its importance as a trade hub took off.451
Thus,
strengthening economic cooperation is actually an urgent priority from a self-interested
national perspective in the way economic realists might suggest.452
Yet the overall
impact of economic interdependence will also play a positive role in underpinning the
448 Rick Wallace, “Japan pulls pin on Trans-Pacific Partnership”, The Australian, November 11, 2011;
449 Stephan Haggard and Andrew MacIntyre, “The political economy of the Asian economic crisis”,
Review of International Political Economy 5, no.3, (1998): 381-392.
450 Xianzhu Li, “Zhonghan Maoyi Jiqi Jiegou Bianhua [China-ROK Trade Relations and Changes in
Bilateral Trade Structure]”, Guoji wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], no.6 (2010): 48-49.
451 Françoise Lemoine, “Past successes and new challenges: China’s foreign trade at a turning point”,
China & World Economy 18, no.3: 1-23.
452 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Ithaca: Princeton University Press,
1987).
166
stability of Northeast Asia’s security as liberal interdependence theorists rightly claim.
The higher the degree of the economic integration, the greater the potential cost for the
destruction of the partnership. Under such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to infer
that the triangular relationship will become more stable—that is certainly the view held
by many prominent Chinese observers, at least. 453
Third, and following from this, the tripartite pragmatic cooperation can ensure that the
three countries gradually build up mutual political trust. The potential importance of
regional confidence-building measures is apparent in the fact that the free trade
negotiations between the three countries started very late. Recognition of the possible
importance of encouraging dialogue is evident in Xide who argues that cooperation
between the three countries should not be merely in the economic field; political and
security cooperation must be taken seriously, too, otherwise, cooperation will always be
limited.454
In this context, a tripartite mechanism for cooperation will not only be
conducive to the establishment of strategic mutual trust, it may also generate
cooperation on non-traditional security issues in a positive “spill over” effect.455
Fourth, from China’s perspective, tripartite cooperation will help to achieve China’s
national strategy that places economic development at the centre. From China’s point of
view, the complementarities between the three economies are high. Not only are there
potential benefits to be gained from economic cooperation, but policymakers in China
are increasingly aware that this is a potentially crucial component of their overall
453 For example, Qu Xing, President of China Institute of International Studies compares the FTA with
the European Coal and Steel Community and argues that the FTA will promote the detente of the region.
See Song Xu, Zhengyu Li, and Xinyang Cao, “Zhuanjia: Zhong Ri Han Qidong Zimaoqu Tanpan Juyou
Zhongda Zhanlue Yiyi [Experts: There Are Significant Meanings for the Launch of the Negotiation of the
China-Japan-Rok Free Trade Area]”, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-05/13/content_2136154.htm.
454Xide Jin, "Zhong Ri Han Sanjia Mache Qibu? [Do the Three Carriages of China, Japan and Rok
Start?]," Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], no. 2 (2009).
455Zhijiang Wei, "Zhong Ri Han Sanguo De Zhanlue Xinlaidu Fenxi [on the Strategic Reliability among
China, Japan and Korea]," Dongjiang Xuekan [Dongjiang Journal] 28, no. 1 (2011).
167
strategy of creating a stable external environment to facilitate internal development. Not
only is this evidence of an increasingly sophisticated approach to an evolving “grand
strategy”, but it is one that shows a growing awareness of the relationship between
foreign and domestic policies.456
4.5 The Tumen River Development
As the only Northeast Asian sub-regional development project and the earliest regional
initiative proposed by China, the development of the Tumen River illustrates the
complex motives behind China’s participation in regional cooperation and the
difficulties it has faced in promoting regional cooperation. It also serves as an important
example of “sub-regional” development, which is more geared to parochial, often sub-
national concerns and driven by more localised politics.457
For many scholars,
especially those working in a broadly conceived geographic tradition, such local forms
of regionalism are a key aspect of the overall response to macro level regionalism and
even globalisation.458
The Tumen River is at the junction of the borders of Russia, China and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and has direct access to the Sea of Japan. However,
for historical reasons, China has no right to access the sea by the river, even though the
Chinese city of Hunchun is only 15 km away from the Tumen River. Historically, a
series of treaties signed between China and Russia allowed the free navigation of
456 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
457 Gordon MacLeod, “New Regionalism Reconsidered: Globalization and the Remaking of Political
Economic Space”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, no. 4 (2001): 804-829.
458 See, Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, “Regions, globalization, development”, Regional Studies 37,
no.6-7 (2003): 579-593; Changhe Su, "Zhongguo Difang Zhengfu Yu Ci Quyu Hezuo: Dongle, Xingwei
Ji Jizhi [Bring Chinese Local Governments Back in Sub-Regionalisation]," Dangdai Shijie yu Zhengzhi
[World Economics and Politics] No. 5(2010).
168
Chinese-flagged vessels through the Tumen River into the sea. However, after China
established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992, the relationship between the
DPRK and China dropped to a low point. The DPRK chose not to hold up China’s
accession to the sea from the Tumen River. China had to negotiate with the DPRK for
its approval. However, it was a long process for the negotiation. This greatly limits the
economic and trade development of the Tumen River area of China’s Jilin Province, and
even the entire Northeast region. Thus, it was left to the Jilin local government to fight
for the right of free navigation in the Tumen River and the development of the Tumen
River Area.
In 1990, China submitted a proposal for the economic development of this region to the
UN Development Programme (UNDP).459
In October of the next year, the UNDP
nominated the Tumen River development project as its preferred project to support in
Northeast Asia, and planned to invest $30 billion over 20 years, making this region a
new centre of international trade, manufacturing, industry, finance and logistics. In 1992,
the city of Hunchun was liberalized and became an open-border city. The establishment
of the first border cooperation zones in China’s inland provinces were also approved,
giving them the same treatment as similar coastal open-city development zones.460
However, in the past 20 years, the Tumen River Area Development process has not
progressed as quickly as expected. As a result, in November 2009, China’s State
Council adopted the development of Tumen River area as part of its overall national
strategy. This marks an attempt to accelerate the development of this region.
Since then, great progress has been achieved. For example, in March 2010, China began
459Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo, "Economic and Security Institution Building in Northeast
Asia: An Analytical Overview," in Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration?, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal, et al.
(Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2008).
460Honglian Zheng and Yucheng Zheng, "Tumenjiang Quyu Guoji Hezuo Kaifa De Lishi Jincheng Ji
Fazhan Qianjing [the Historical Process and Developmental Prospect of the International Cooperation and
Development of the Tumen River Region]," Yanbian Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of Yanbian Party School]
23, no. 4 (2008).
169
to rent the Rjin Port of North Korea for a tenancy of ten years, through which Chinese
goods can be transported to Japan by sea. It now only takes around 12 hours to reach the
port of Niigata in Japan. Originally, it would take three or four days from Dandong and
Dalian to Japan. Parked tonnage in the Rajin Port can reach 50,000 tonnes. Since
December 2010, Northeast China’s coal has started being shipped to Shanghai from the
Rajin Port. Japan and the US registered their worry that China would turn this port into
a geopolitical advantage. Japanese policy and intellectual elites are consequently
anxious about China’s development of Tumen area, which may finally place Japan in a
disadvantageous position.461
The main goal of China’s active participation in the Tumen River Area Development
project is to develop the economy of the Northeast. Northeast China has long been in a
semi-closed state. With the exception of the Liaodong Peninsula and the coastal city of
Dalian, which benefit from their convenient locations, the hinterland of the Northeast,
as well as the surrounding countries and regions, such as Far East Russia, North Korea
and Mongolia, remain underdeveloped. As a result, the Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces
cannot take full advantage of Japan and South Korea’s capital and technology. Although
the central government developed a strategy to revitalise the Northeast’s old industrial
base as early as 2003, the development of Northeast China still lagged far behind by the
coastal areas. China’s Tumen River development has made this region an important
economic growth area and promoted the development of the entire Northeast region in
order to narrow the gap with the eastern coastal areas.462
It is also why the local
governments spare no efforts to lobby the central government for strategic attention to
461 A typical response can be seen in Nihon Keizai Shimbum, “China Leads the Acceleration of the
Development of Tumen River Region”, September 26, 201l, accessed 23 April, 2012.
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/2011-09/27/c_122093723.htm.
462 “Tumenjiang kaifa shengji guojia zhanlue dongbei quanmian zhenxing tisu [Tumen River
Development has been upgraded to be a national strategy, the acceleration of the comprehensive
restoration of Northeast region]”, 18 November, 2009, accessed 23 April, 2012.
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-11-18/110315020.html.
170
this region. 463
The above analysis has highlighted China’s official strategy towards the Tumen River.
However, the significance of the Tumen River Area Development is not merely
economic. As Professor Yi Baozhong from Jilin University argues, the possibility that
North Korea’s independent development can be enhanced through the development of
the region gives this initiative potentially geopolitical significance. Closer Sino–DPRK
economic ties will enable China’s influence in North Korea to have a greater material
basis and its sub-regional strategies consequently need to be understood as part of
China’s overall, multi-faceted regional strategies. Through the development of the
region, regional peace and stability will be improved, and so will the overall
environment in which China’s domestic development can continue.464
China also
acquires an increased influence over the management of the Sea of Japan, of which a
view that many Chinese scholars are keen to promote.465
Gaining navigational rights to
the Sea by the Tumen River is important for China’s overall maritime strategy. The
aforementioned views on the strategic significance of the Tumen River are becoming a
growth industry in not only Chinese academia, but also nationalist blogs.466
While it is
difficult to know exactly how influential such voices are in shaping national debates,
463 Changehe Su, "Zhongguo Difang Zhengfu Yu Ci Quyu Hezuo: Dongle, Xingwei Ji Jizhi [Bring
Chinese Local Governments Back in Sub-Regionalisation].", Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics
and Politics], no.5 (2010): 4-24.
464Baozhong Yi, "Cong Guojia Zhanlue De Gaodu Kan Tumen Jiang Quyu Hezuo Kaifa [the
Cooperation and Development of Tumen River Region from the Height of National Strategy]," cctv.vom,
http://news.cctv.com/special/C19198/20070820/109324.shtml.
465 Ya-na Liu, Ying-tong Gao, Zai-liang Wang, “Guojifa Shiyuxia Tumenjiang Guoji Tonghang Wenti
Jiejue Lujing Tanxi”[An International Law Perspective of Search for the Solution to the Problems of
International Channels for Tumen River], Dongbei Shida Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of
Northeast Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)], no.1 (2012).
466 See, 96 Nian Zhongguo Sangshi Tumenjiang Chuhaikou De Tonghangquan? [Did China Lose the
Right to Navigate in the Mouth of Tumen River in 1996?] to, 2010, xinu.jinbushe.org/index.php?doc-
view-2354.html ;
171
there is growing evidence that this is something policymakers take more seriously.467
The development of the Tumen River Region is also important because it is arguably the
result of several crises or critical junctures of a sort that have been influential in the
development of the Northeast Asian region as a whole.468
Obviously, the first one is the
end of the Cold War. Without the collapse of the Cold War structure, it is unthinkable
that China would have submitted such a proposal to cooperate with Russia, North Korea,
South Korea, and Mongolia and seek joint development of regional resources. That
being said, it needs to be acknowledged that for most of the 1990s and early 2000s,
progress was limited. Thanks to the GFC, however, renewed economic growth became
even more critical when responding to global economic challenges and domestic
developmental pressures. In this context, developing the Northeast region becomes even
more imperative and an illustration of how regional policies are seen as contributing to
the achievement of broader national and international policy goals. Under such
circumstance, the Tumen River Development became a national strategy of China in
2009.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the policy thinking and practice of China’s elites, and their
participation and motivations in regional cooperation. The particular focus of this
chapter has been Northeast Asia, a region with an especially difficult history and set of
intra-regional relations. Chinese strategists have developed the view that regional
cooperation is a crucial part of their overall foreign policy strategies. Maintaining peace
and stability in Northeast Asia is seen as crucial for China’s national development and a
way of managing common threats in the region, especially the nuclear threats in the
467 David Pilling, “China crashes into a middle class revolt”, Financial Times, 3 August 2011, accessed
4 September, 2011. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0558876e-be1b-11e0-bee9-00144feabdc0.html.
468Kent Calder and Min Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011).
172
peninsula. In the long run, Chinese officials believe that regional cooperation and
regional multilateral mechanism such as the Six-Party Talks have great potential to
develop into a regional security mechanism, which could fundamentally change the
regional order to China’s overall advantage: functional and economic cooperation may
promote China’s national interests and facilitate détente in the region.
The chapter began with some observations about China’s bilateral relations in the region,
namely China-Taiwan and China-Japan relations, and China’s policies towards the two
Koreas. The importance of these bilateral relations is that they have become key parts of
China’s overall multilateral diplomacy. Many of the opportunities and constrains in the
multilateral frameworks are the consequences of the cooperative or competitive nature
of the bilateral relationships. From this analysis, we can see that, although China’s
Northeast Asian neighbours have interdependent economic relations with China, this
has not automatically translated into productive political and security relations.. In the
case of Taiwan, economic cooperation leads to a détente between the two parties, and
the goal of unification has been effectively put to one side. In the case of Japan,
realpolitik tends to dominate the field of territorial disputes. Yet, identity and history
continues to impact two countries’ definitions of their interests and the way Sino-
Japanese relations are conceptualised and understood. By contrast, the continuing
importance of strategic issues would seem to reinforce the importance of realist thinking,
but even here it is important to recognise that questions of identity help to shape
attitudes and expectations among the region’s key actors469
on the Korean Peninsula.
The three case studies including Six-Party Talks, the trilateral cooperation between
China, South Korea and Japan, and the Tumen River Development highlight that, once
again, different factors exert different levels of influence in different issue areas at
different times. Ideas and interests, material and ideational power, may prove more of
less influential according to circumstance and may reflect—or even shape—the
469 David C. Kang, “International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War”, International Studies
Quarterly 47 (2003): 301-24.
173
preferences of foreign policy officials as a consequence. It is also apparent that
moments of crisis may be particularly important in explaining apparent changes in
direction, emphasis or priority in foreign policy-making. Plainly, the end of the Cold
War, the AFC and the recent GFC were major critical junctures that help to account for
changes in China’s policies towards its Northeast Asian neighbours. Similar overall
dynamics are at work in Central Asia, although with some significantly different
priorities and results as we shall see in the next chapter.
174
Chapter Five: China in Central Asia
5.1 Introduction
“Central Asia”, in this chapter, refers to the Asian sub-region consisting of the five
former Soviet Republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has been a kind of
“black hole”, as described by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his famous book The Grand
Chessboard.470
Though Russia still has influence in the region, it can hardly be regarded
as the regional hegemon. China as a rising economic power has become an important
player in regional relations, and since 9/11, the US has also increased its presence in the
region. The region is attracting more and more attention from the major powers in the
world.
The geopolitical importance of Central Asia is obvious. It is at the crossroads between
the West and the East. Given that Central Asia and the Caspian Sea are famous for their
rich reserve of hydrocarbon resources, the region is even more attractive. Therefore, for
many observers, a new version of the “Great Game” has begun as the major powers
compete for dominance in Central Asia.471
At the same time, however, the region is still
rather unstable. To its south, Afghanistan is still a source of strategic tension. To its west,
Iran’s possible nuclear proliferation poses a threat. Even within the Central Asian
countries themselves, the potential vulnerability of these regimes means they should be
approached with caution.
Against this background, China’s participation in Central Asia appears quite remarkable.
China is normally viewed as an East Asian power, given that its political and economic
gravity is in the east coast of China, which has seen rapid development especially since
470 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives
(New York: Basic Books, 1997).
471 See Martha Brill Olcott, "The Great Powers in Central Asia", Current History 104, no. 5 (2005): 331-
35; Niklas Swanstrom, "China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?"
Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 45 (2005): 569-84.
175
the late 1970s. Indeed, for quite a long time in the reform era, China ignored its far west
in its overall economic strategy. The situation remained fundamentally unchanged until
the early 2000s when the Chinese government launched the Western Regional
Development Strategy, “Xibu Da Kaifa Zhanlue”, which will be discussed in more
detail below.472
The so-called “Shanghai Five” grouping, which began in 1996 and later developed into
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), is the most important regional project in
which China participates. China’s active engagement with Central Asia since the 1990s
has consequently aroused widespread interest among academics and policymakers. Thus,
the main questions asked in this chapter are: What is the main driving force for China’s
participation in regionalism in Central Asia, specifically, the SCO, and what does this
tell us about China’s regional policies more generally?
Analytical eclecticism will be employed in the chapter. Given that China’s engagement
with Central Asia is multidimensional, any single factor explanation cannot provide a
comprehensive view of China’s policy behaviour. We need to distinguish different issue
areas in which China conducts different approaches. Therefore, power, economic
interest, ideas and even domestic politics all play a role in respective issue areas.
Similarly to the case in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, China has a set of policies
rather than a single policy.
Thus, this thesis argues that China’s motivation is multifaceted and has changed over
time. The Shanghai Five was originally founded for the resolution of border disputes
between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and was used to
facilitate confidence building in the region.473
Facing the new challenges of terrorism in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, the SCO, as promoted by China, takes
resisting the “three evils” - terrorism, separatism and religious extremism - as its new
mission. With the US intervention in the Afghanistan, the SCO is also becoming a
platform for balancing US influence in the region, which is in line with China’s interests.
472 Heike Holbig, "The Emergence of the Campaign to Open up the West: Ideological Formation,
Central Decision-Making and the Role of the Provinces." The China Quarterly 178, (2004): 335-57.
473 Amalendu Misra, "Shanghai 5 and the Emerging Alliance in Central Asia: The Closed Society and Its
Enemies." Central Asian Survey 20, no. 3 (2001): 305-21.
176
China also tries to use the SCO forum to pursue its interests in energy security and
economic development, and to exercise its diplomatic ideas.474
The first section of this chapter examines China’s perceived national interests in Central
Asia. They are security interests, economic interests, energy interests and opposition to
US hegemony. Of particular importance here is the recurring desire to secure national
borders. In this context the status of Xinjiang is especially significant and this is
considered first. In the second section, I will assess whether China’s interests have been
realised in the SCO. China’s diplomacy in Central Asia is not only for its narrowly
defined national interests, but also for its longer-term strategy to reform the current
international order defined by the West, which will be explained in section three. The
discussion is summarised in the conclusion.
5.2 China’s National Interests in Central Asia
Regional security and social stability in Xinjiang
As pointed out in chapter two, sovereignty and territorial integrity has always been
China’s core interests, and they have been a major part of the narrative for China’s
rejuvenation since 1840. No Chinese regime would like to take the responsibility of
losing any of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
To some extent, China’s traditional concern about territorial integrity has been
eliminated by the Shanghai Five mechanism (which will be discussed in the following
section on the development of the SCO). In the twenty-first century, China’s regional
cooperation strategy has been largely focused on the independence movement in
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (hereafter Xinjiang for short) - China’s own
“Central Asia” - and how this may threaten the core national interests of China. The so-
called “three evils” are potential threats to the social stability of Xinjiang. This is the
474Fei Gao, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China's New Diplomacy," in Discussion
Papers in Diplomacy (Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2010).
177
most serious sovereignty problem for China in this region.475
Given that under Hu Jintao’s leadership in the past decade, economic development and
social stability were the two core objectives of China’s development476
, the “three evils”
posed a great threat to the Chinese government. Since the late 1990s, Chinese
policymakers realised the importance of the stability of Central Asia for containing the
Xinjiang independence movement, as instability in Central Asia could be transmitted
directly to Xinjiang
The potential sources of instability are the transnational populations and ethnic groups
living in Xinjiang and the Central Asian countries.477
These cross-border nationalities
are a product of regional history. As discussed in chapter two, ancient Central Asia,
including China’s Xinjiang area, was not unified for most of its history. The nomadic
style of living of many of the indigenous populations of the region left these ethnic
groups widely dispersed. Modern, independent nation states only appeared after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Nation building is consequently still an issue for all the
countries in the region. The nationalist impulse was transmitted to Xinjiang through
these cross-border nationalities. The rise of nationalism among the minority groups in
Xinjiang, especially the Uighur people, raises difficult questions about the legitimacy of
Beijing’s rule.
When nationalism combined with religious extremism and terrorism, social stability in
Xinjiang was greatly threatened. Terrorism and riots not only intensified conflicts
between Han people and Muslims in Xinjiang but also led to a loss of confidence
among the Han people in Xinjiang in the Communist Party. A key example occurred
after the 2009 riot, when the Han people demonstrated against the perceived “weakness”
of the government and demanded that the then party boss of Xinjiang Wang Lequan step
down478
.
475 David Kerr and Laura C. Swinton, "China, Xinjiang, and the transnational security of Central Asia."
Critical Asian Studies 40, no. 1 (2008): 89-112.
476 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
477 Kerr and Swinton, “China, Xinjiang, and the transnational security of Central Asia”, 89-112.
478 Edward Wong and Xiyun Yang. "New Protests Reported in Restive Chinese Region." The New York
Times, 4 September, 2009.
178
Beijing realised that nationalist sentiments and a desire for autonomy or even
independence was transferred from Central Asia to Xinjiang with the opening up of
China in the 1990s and the free movement of cross-border nationalities. In fact, anti-
Chinese feeling in Central Asia occurred as early as the Cold War era, following the
split between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s. The Soviet Union encouraged
minorities in Xinjiang to flee to Central Asia. The legacy of this period is that many
Xinjiang people have kin in Central Asia. In the twenty-first century, people-to-people
interaction has become more and more frequent between China and Central Asia.
Religious and political ideas which are different from the main ideology promoted by
the Chinese government are more easily transferred from Central Asia to China.479
Even
more ominously, the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda have supported some radical groups
in the independence movement in Xinjiang. According to the Chinese government,
forces like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement gained support from Al Qaeda and
many cadres were trained there.480
Under such circumstances, the “three evils” have
been considered by the Chinese government as a cross-border issue. From a Chinese
perspective, though the origin of the threat was from within—for example, the relative
imbalance of the economic status of different nationalities—the more violent and
destructive elements are supported by external factors and guided by the extreme
religious ideology from Central Asia.481
Significantly, and an important source of
interstate cooperation, all the states in Central Asia are facing similar problems. The
cross-border transfer of terrorism, widespread extremism and the growing problem with
illegal narcotics cannot be solved by any single state. Paradoxically, this kind of
negative regionalisation provides the motivation for increased regional cooperation
between states.
468 One dangerous idea is Islamic fundamentalism which comes from Central Asia. It has been suspected
that many participants in the riot in Urumqi on 5 July, 2009 were actually from South Xinjiang where
Islamic fundamentalism has become more influential. See Liang Zheng, "Islamic Fundamentalism: An
Ignored Specter in the Xinjiang Riot," The China Beat, 2 October, 2012,
http://www.thechinabeat.org/?p=950.
480 Voice of America, "What Is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement?" 4 June, 2012,
http://www.voanews.com/content/what-is-the-east-turkestan-islamic-movement-126763973/167829.html.
481 Jiang, Xinwei. "Zhongya Guojia De Minzu, Zongjiao Wenti Yu Zhongguo Xinjiang De Shehui
Anquan Yu Wending [the Nationality and Religious Issues in Central Asian Countries and the Social
Security and Stability in Xinjiang, China]." Huanqiu Shiye [Global View], no. 289 (2010).
179
Therefore, China’s first core interest in Central Asia can be defined as follows: China
hopes to strengthen cooperation with Central Asian countries in the area of non-
traditional security, especially in fighting the “three evils”, protecting the stability of the
internal and external environment, containing the development of independence
movement in Xinjiang and securing the unity of the Chinese sovereignty.482
However, as mentioned above, the development of Xinjiang’s independence movement
is not only due to external factors; the fundamental cause is domestic conflict among
different nationalities. The root of the conflict, in Beijing’s view, is the growing
economic imbalance and a lack of development.483
Thus, economic development is the
second core interest of China in Central Asia.
Economic interests
As discussed in chapter two, the basic strategy for China’s transformation since 1978 is
to make economic development its central task. Most of China’s domestic policy and
foreign policies are developed to serve this goal. Though in recent years the definition
of China’s national interests has become more and more complex, economic
development remains the centrepiece. In the view of the Chinese policy-making elites,
economic development is the foundation for national development and the major area of
competition among nations in a globalised world.484
More importantly, perhaps, the
source of legitimacy for the rule of the Communist Party is economic growth.485
As a result, Beijing’s view of the problem of Xinjiang’s instability has been seen
primarily from an economic perspective. For example, after the riot in Urumqi in 2009,
482 Kevin Sheives, "China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy Towards Central Asia," Pacific
Affairs 79, no. 2 (2006): 205-24.
483 Wei Shan and Cuifen Weng, "China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and Its Challenges," East Asian Policy
2, no. 3 (2010): 58-66.
484 Hu, Jintao. "Zai Qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang Chengli 90 Zhounian Dahui Shang De Jianghua
[Speech in the Conference for Celebrating the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party
of China] " Xinhuanet, 5 June, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-07/01/c_121612030.htm.
485 Bruce Gilley, “Legitimacy and institutional change: The case of China”, Comparative Political
Studies 41, no. 3 (2008): 259-284; Yuchao Zhu, “‘Performance legitimacy’ and China’s political
adaptation strategy”, Journal of Chinese Political Science 16, no. 2 (2011): 123-140.
180
Beijing formulated a new plan for Xinjiang’s development, which stressed that the
fundamental solution for Xinjiang’s problem is economic development. It certainly
appears that there is a direct correlation between Xinjiang’s economic backwardness
and the conflicts between nationalities there.486
In fact, Xinjiang’s development problem is not exceptional but arguably a reflection of
the problems in China’s overall economic modernisation. Firstly, the development of
regional economies in the eastern and western parts of China is unbalanced. In the
reform in 1980s and 1990s, China had a developmental strategy that prioritised the east
coast. This is partly because China’s open door policy mainly targets developed
countries or regions such as the US, Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, which can provide
China with advanced technology, capital and management experiences.487
The
geographical advantage of the east coast is obvious, as it can provide ample human
resources which are crucial for labour-intensive industry. The north-western and north-
eastern regions, which were China’s heavy industry centres, fell behind, as did Xinjiang.
During the 1960s when the relationship between the Soviet Union and China
deteriorated, Xinjiang faced a direct security threat because it was a border province and
also a centre for China’s nuclear industry. While the security threat has largely
dissipated following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Xinjiang still borders the
economically disadvantaged economies of the former Soviet republics. Xinjiang has
consequently had few opportunities to integrate into the world economy dominated by
Western developed countries.
The gap between Xinjiang and eastern China continues to widen. In terms of GDP, in
2000, Xinjiang’s GDP per capita was RMB 7,372, ranking twelfth among the 31
provincial level governments (excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) of China and
amounting to 93.8 per cent of the national average. However, in 2010, Xinjiang’s GDP
per capita increased to RMB 25,034, but it only ranked nineteenth among all the
486 Sheives, "China Turns West”, 205-24.
487 Yongnian Zheng and Minjia Chen. "China’s Regional Disparity and Its Policy Responses."
(Nottingham: China Policy Institute, 2007.)
181
provinces and amounted to 83.5 per cent of the national average.488
Moreover, the gap between the country and the city is another problem. The Chinese
economy is a dual system, consisting of a rural economy and an urban economy.
China’s industrialisation is largely prioritising industry at the expense of agriculture.
Agricultural products have to be sold to the city cheaply, but rural residents have to buy
the manufactured goods at a high price from the city. Though Premier Wen Jiabao and
his government have tried to rectify the gap since 2003 by delivering specifically
targeted rural policy489
, the problem has not been resolved. In Xinjiang’s case, in 2003
the urban residents” disposable income was RMB 7,006, while the net income of
farmers was RMB 2,106, so the income gap was RMB 4,900. In 2010, the urban
residents” disposable income is RMB 13,644, while the net income of farmers is RMB
4,643. The income gap reached RMB 9,001.490
The gap is narrowing only slowly.
However, in Xinjiang, this problem has become associated with issue of national
identity and development. The agricultural poor mainly live in the minority group
district in South Xinjiang. By the end of 2004, the minorities there amounted to 96 per
cent of the total number of impoverished people in Xinjiang, according to Chinese
poverty standards.491
Therefore, the gap between the urban and rural citizens in other
parts of China has been translated into a gap between the Han Chinese, who are mostly
urban citizens and the minorities, who are mostly rural citizens. This has led to tension
between the Han and the minority group who believe that they have been disadvantaged
economically.
Chinese policymakers realised the seriousness of this problem, and the government
initiated a regional development strategy in 2000 for 12 provinces in western China,
488Bureau of Statistics of Xinjiang, "Xinjiang Kuayueshi Fazhan Zhong Jige Zhongyao [an Analysis on
Some Important Indicators in the Leapfrog Development of Xinjiang]," (Xinjiang Statistical Information
Net, 2011).
489 The policy is a comprehensive package which includes tax reduction, agricultural subsidies, social
safety net construction in countryside, etc. Since 2005, a campaign to build the socialist new countryside
has been started in China. See "New Socialist Countryside - What Does It Mean?", Beijing Review, 5
June, 2012, http://www.bjreview.com/special/third_plenum_17thcpc/txt/2008-10/10/content_156190.htm.
490 Sheives, "China Turns West”, 205-24.
491 Li Jing, "Shaoshu Minzu Renkou Pinkun Wenti De Duojiaodu Fenxi [an Multi-Dimensional Analysis
on Poverty among Minorities] " Shengchanli Yanjiu [Productivity Research], no. 3 (2008): 61-63, 103.
182
dubbed “Xibu Da Kaifa Zhanlue” (Western Regional Development Strategy). Through
tariff reduction, large infrastructure construction and developing the western resources
industry, it was expected that the economic position of the western region would be
improved. To be sure, there has been some achievement, such as the “Xiqi Dongshu”
project, which extracts the natural gas in Xinjiang and transports it to Shanghai, but the
resources industry has not changed the disadvantaged status of minority groups. As
minorities in Xinjiang are mostly rural residents, their chances of benefiting from the
energy sector dominated by large corporations are limited.
This problem is compounded in the cities of Xinjiang, where more and more Han
Chinese are migrating from the east to Xinjiang to do business.492
However, the
minority youth in Xinjiang are facing serious difficulties in finding jobs. Due to barriers
of language, culture and education, it is hard for them to find jobs in the city.
Unemployed young people have become a destabilising element in society.493
Similar
problems were observed in the Arab spring of 2010 and 2011, where young people
became the main force to destroy the authoritarian regimes.494
. In the Urumqi riot in
2009, many participants were young people, including college students and young
intellectuals.495
Regarding the economic problem in Xinjiang, the Chinese government has two goals: to
strengthen economic interaction between Xinjiang and eastern China by direct aid from
developed Eastern provinces, and to strengthen economic cooperation between Xinjiang
and Central Asian countries.496
Sub-regional cooperation is a good way for Xinjiang to
492 The Han population has risen to 40 percent (8.4 million) in 2008. It is a dramatic change compared
with 6.7 percent (220, 000) in 1949. Preeti Bhattacharji, "Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region," Council
on Foreign Relations, 12 September, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/china/uighurs-chinas-xinjiang-
region/p16870.
493 Remi Castets, "The Uyghurs in Xinjiang - the Malaise Grows," China Perspectives, no. 49 (2003),
http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/648; Lingui Xu, "China’s Xinjiang Tackles College Unemployment
with Massive Training Program," Tianshannet, 5 June, 2012,
http://www.aboutxinjiang.com/Science/content/2011-03/25/content_5703907.htm.
494 Adeel Malik and Bassem Awadallah, "The Economics of the Arab Spring," in CSAE Working Paper
WPS/2011-23 (Centre for the Study of African Economics, University of Oxford, 2011.)
495 The author conducted an interview with a local official from Xinjiang, Nanjing, 29 October 2011.
496 Shengwen Zou and Ruizhen Gu, "Xinjiang Gongzuo Zuotanhui Zhaokai Hu Jintao Wen Jiabao
Fabiao Zhongyao Jianghua [the Symposium on the Work of Xinjiang Was Held, Hu Jiantao and Wen
183
escape its landlocked situation. Chapter 3 and 4 illustrated how sub-regional
cooperation such as the Tumen River regional development and Greater Mekong River
development are designed to support the development of China’s backward and usually
landlocked provinces. Cooperation between Xinjiang and Central Asia is another
example of such a strategy. In this case, the leaders in the Central Government and
Xinjiang believe that the Central Asian and Chinese economies complement each other
and Chinese-made goods can supply expanding Central Asian markets.497
However,
whether this strategy could work remains doubtful and will be examined later in this
chapter. At the same time, oil and gas from Central Asia are needed by China. Another
important point is the geographical advantage of Central Asia, where the famous Silk
Road was located in ancient times. If a new “Silk Road” can be built, Xinjiang could
escape its current isolated situation.
Thus, China’s second most important interest in Central Asia is economic, which to
some extent is much more about Xinjiang’s local economic interests. In other words,
China hopes to strengthen cooperation with Central Asia to stimulate Xinjiang’s
economy and develop the whole western region, which would help ease the tense
relationship between the minority groups and the Han Chinese.
Energy security cooperation
In the economic interaction between China and Central Asian countries, energy trade
plays a major role. China’s foreign investment in Central Asia mainly focuses on energy.
However, energy trade is not merely an economic issue but a strategic issue498
and one
Jiabao Delivered Important Speeches]," Xinhuanet, acccessed 5 June, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-05/20/c_12125041.htm.
497 This view can be seen in the major plans made by the Central Government and the Xinjiang
provincial government. For example, in the twelfth five-year plan of Xinjiang’s economic and social
development made by the Xinjiang government, Xinjiang is positioned as the gateway of China opening
to Central Asia. See Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, "Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu Guoji Jingji He
Shehui Fazhan Di Shierge Wunian Guihua Gangyao [12th Five-Year Plan for Xinjiang Economic and
Social Development]," Tianshannet, 12 September, 2012,
http://www.tianshannet.com.cn/special/2011xj125ghgy/node_87470.htm.
498 In an article written by Liu Tienan, Director of China’s National Energy Administration, he
emphasizes the strategic dimension of energy industry. See Tienan Liu, "Xin Xingshi Xia Zhongguo
184
that reflects China’s more “comprehensive” view of national security.499
Therefore,
energy security is another critical interest for China in Central Asia.
Energy security has long been a concern all over the world. Two oil crises in the 1970s
impressed upon people the direct link between the stability of energy supplies and
economic development.500
On facing the exhaustion of non-renewable resources in the
world today, competition over energy has become extremely intense.501
Many people in
China, including scholars and the public, believe that the US invasion of Iraq was not
over weapons of mass destruction or its autocratic regime but to secure oil supplies.502
As a popular Chinese commentator argues, the era of natural resources competition has
come: “the country which can control the natural resources will own the future”.503
Energy security is particularly vital for a rising China. As its economy takes off, rapid
industrialisation creates a growing demand for energy. China’s oil consumption has
increased from 1765.00 thousand barrels per day in 1980 to 9394.64 thousand barrels
per day in 2010 (see Figure 5-1).504
China is the second largest consumer of oil after the
US. In 2009, its oil consumption is up to 9.9 per cent of the world total consumption.505
Currently, China’s domestic oil production can only satisfy no more than fifty cent of its
consumption, and by 2035, 75% of its consumption will rely on importation, because
Nengyuan Fazhan De Zhanlue Sikao [Strategic Thinking on China Energy Development in the New
Situation]," Qiushi, no. 13 (2012), http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/0703/c83846-18433972.html.
499 Muthiah Alagappa, “Asian practice of security: Key features and explanations”, in ed. Muthiah
Alagappa Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1998): 611-676.
500 The 1973 and 1979 oil crises led to economic stagnation in major advanced economies. See Cutler J.
Cleveland, Concise Encyclopedia of the History of Energy (Waltham, Oxford: Academic Press, 2009).
501 Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy, (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2008).
502 For example, Yujun Feng and Zhuyun Zhang. "Yilake Zhanzheng Yu Guoji Shiyou Zhanlue Geju
[the Iraq War and the International Oil Strategy]." Renmin Luntan [People’s Tribune], no. 5 (2003),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper85/9244/858099.html.
503 Hanbing Shi, "Ziyuan Weiwang Shidai Daolai [the Coming of the Era of Resources], " hexun.com, 8
February, 2009, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://shihanbingblog.blog.hexun.com/29053866_d.html.
504 "China Crude Oil Consumption by Year." IndexMundi, accessed 5 June, 2012,
http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=cn&product=oil&graph=consumption.
505 "Consumption (Most Recent) by Country." NationMaster.com, accessed 5 June, 2012,
http://www.nationmaster.com/red/pie/ene_oil_con-energy-oil-consumption.
185
the growth of consumption is faster than the growth of domestic production (see Figure
5-2).506
However, it is not only China that is increasing its oil consumption. Other rising
powers, such as India, the fourth largest energy consumer in the world, are also facing
similar problems. In the first decade of the 21st century, oil consumption in India rose up
58% and up 8% in 2010.507
In 2010 almost 70% of Indian oil consumption is met by
importation, which is the world fifth largest importer of oil.508
It is estimated that the
percentage will hit 90% in 2013.509
These statistics illustrate how fierce the completion
over energy is now and will be in the future.
Figure 5-1: China’s Petroleum Consumption from 1980 to 2009
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Petroleum Consumption."
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH#pet.
506 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "China," accessed 13 September, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
507 "Update on Oil Consumption," Green Econometric, accessed 13 September, 2012,
http://greenecon.net/update-on-oil-consumption/energy_economics.html.
508 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "India," accessed 13 September, 2012,
http://204.14.135.140/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IN.
509 "Crude Oil Dynamics in India." India Biznews, accessed 13 September, 2012,
http://www.indiabiznews.com/?q=node/1766.
186
Figure 5-2:
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "China," accessed 13 September, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
In this context, Beijing needs wider and more stable energy sources. Hitherto, the top
three oil exporters to China are Saudi Arabia, Angola and Iran510
(see the Figure 5-3
below). 51% per cent of the oil is imported from the Middle East in 2011.511
It indicates
how vulnerable China’s energy security is. China wants to pursue a diversification
strategy in the energy field. The Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011 further revealed a
potential threat for China’s energy security. Viewed from Beijing, it has been very
difficult for China, as a latecomer, to secure a good position in the international energy
market. Consequently, China, despite the damage to its international image, cooperates
with countries with bad human rights records in order to access their resources.512
The
typical case in point is China’s support of the Mugabe regime in Sudan. Similarly, when
the West laid sanctions on Iran, Chinese oil companies quickly filled the gap. The
former US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns made the critique on
510 U.S. Energy Information Administration, "China".
511 Ibid.
512 Roland Dannreuther, "China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity." International Affairs
87, no. 6 (2011): 1345-64.
187
China that “t[T]hey (Chinese) have fundamentally undercut the sanctions regime.” 513
.
Figure 5-3:
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "China," accessed 13 September, 2012,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH.
Undoubtedly, energy cooperation in Central Asia has great potential. It is estimated that
the proven reserves of oil in the Caspian region514
take 3.5% of the world reserves, and
remaining recoverable reserves take about 5%. The proven gas reserves in the region
take 7% of the global reserves. It is prospected that in the latter half of 2020s, the region
will take 9% of the global oil market, and by 2035 it will take 11% of the gas
sales.515
Resource-rich Central Asian countries realise that the basis for their national
development is the energy and resources industry. However, they do not have the capital
and technology needed for exploration and extraction, so foreign investment is needed.
Furthermore, they also want to diversify their markets and stabilise supplies, initiatives
that could lift national incomes and help to cast off their dependence on Russia. This is
513 "Chinese Firms Fill in Gaps Left by Iran Sanctions: Nicholas Burns." PRESSTV, 5 June, 2012,
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/233074.html.
514 Countries in the Caspian region are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia,
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan. The oil reserve in last four countries only takes 1.3% of the
whole region and the gas reserve only takes 0.3% of the whole region, which is insignificant. The
discussion here uses Caspian region instead of Central Asia given that Azerbaijan is an important oil and
gas exporter.
515 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2010, (Paris2010),
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weo2010.pdf.
188
clearly an opportunity for China.
The importance of Central Asia for China’s energy strategy is not merely because it is a
major supplier of oil and good for the diversity of China’s energy importation. The
geographic location of Central Asia makes it a potentially optimal energy transportation
route. This could ease the current so-called “Malacca dilemma”. Currently, 77% per
cent of China’s imported oil must go through the Malacca Strait.516
China sees this
transportation route as quite vulnerable, as the US and its allies exercise a powerful
presence in this area. In the event of any conflict between China and the US, the
prospect of cutting off energy supplies poses a major danger for China. In order to
resolve this dilemma, on the one hand China has actively developed its blue navy forces,
such as refurbishing an aircraft carrier and actively participating in the Gulf of Aden
peacekeeping activities to practise its long-range projection capability. On the other
hand, China is actively searching for a substitute energy transportation route.517
Transporting oil and gas resources from the Middle East through the Central Asia
pipeline would be an effective way of improving China’s energy transportation
security.518
To sum up, in an energy-starved China, energy security is not only part of economic
security but, more broadly, it is a key element of overall national security. The fact that
China is highly dependent on oil means that policymakers are anxious to diversify
suppliers. The rich reserves of oil in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea are consequently
seen as potentially vital parts of energy security policy and interests. China also needs
Central Asia as an important transportation route to resolve its Malacca dilemma. In
many ways, therefore, energy politics is a quintessential example of a “realist” foreign
policy problem. Interestingly, however, Chinese policymakers are trying to use, regional
institutions to encourage cooperation, something an exclusive focus on realist variables
might miss. Indeed, the new institutional architecture that is emerging in Central Asia
516 Zhongxiang Zhang, "China's Energy Security, the Malacca Dilemma and Responses," Energy Policy,
no. 39 (2011).
517 You Ji, "Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply." Strategic
Analysis 31, no. 3 (2007): 467-89.
518 Xuanli Liao, "Central Asia and China’s Energy Security." China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4, no.
4 (2006): 61-69.
189
also reflects new ideas and norms about the optimal ways of organising intra-regional
relations, as we shall see in the following sections.
Resisting “American hegemony”
Due to its rich oil resources and geographical advantages, Central Asia has an important
role in geopolitics. As discussed in chapter two, one of the central themes of China’s
overall Asian strategy is resisting what it sees as American balance and containment to
China.519
This point is also applicable in Central Asia. Despite the deepening of
interdependence in a globalised world, which seems to reduce the possibility of wars
between nations,520
the competition between China as a rising power and the US has
intensified.521
Chinese elites are consequently anxious about China’s strategic
vulnerability in Asia.
There are many security threats in China’s surrounding environment. In Northeast Asia,
the North Korean nuclear issue remains fundamentally unresolved, and the antagonism
between the US and North Korea has not been eliminated. In Southeast Asia,
competition over South China Sea resources has, as we saw in Chapter 3 intensified
over the past two years, as China’s foreign policy has become more assertive, if not
aggressive. The confrontation between China and the Philippines over the
Scarborough/Huangyan shoal is a typical recent case in point.522
In South Asia, the
border issue between China and India is still a potential problem, particularly given the
modernisation of the Chinese and Indian militaries. Under such circumstances, peace
and security in the northern and north-western borders is vital for China’s strategic
environment. It is why Central Asia is called by many Chinese scholars as China’s
519 Yunling Zhang, "Zhongguo Zhoubian Huanjing De Xin Bianhua Yu Duice [New Changes in China's
Surounding Environment and the Respond]," Sixiang Zhanxian [Thinking] 38, no. 1 (2012): 1-3.
520 Michael Mousseau, “The Social Market Roots of Democratic Peace”, International Security 33, no.
4 (2009): 52-86; Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1
(2007): 166-191.
521 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2011).
522 Brian Spegele. "Philippines Accuses China of Fanning Sea Tensions." The Wall Street Journal, 23
May, 2012, accessed 5 June, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304065704577421952278868514.html.
190
strategic rear.523
Central Asia is also regarded as the region which China can have
strategic breakthrough from the containment of the US.524
During the Cold War, Chinese policymakers quite rightly felt that they had to contend
with an overt containment policy exercised by the US as part of its “grand strategy” in
Asia and the world.525
Despite American protestations to the contrary, many observers
believe this kind of thinking and strategic orientation continues to inform American
policy.526
Since 9/11, the US gained the best reason to step in to fight the Taliban in
Afghanistan. The US intervention eliminated the terrorist threat faced by the regional
states, which was widely welcomed. However, it also affected the current power
structure in the region, which caused China great concern.527
As part of its so-called “war on terror”, the US set up several military bases in Central
Asia. The US airbase in Kazakhstan is only 200 kilometres from the Chinese border.
This is viewed by China as a direct threat to its national security. From the perspective
of many Chinese strategists, China’s east has been contained by the US and its allies
and now China’s west is also under pressure.528
Russia also feels this pressure, as it is
already very unsatisfied with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s efforts to
523 For example, Yi Cheng, "Daguo Juezhu Yu Zhongya Zhanlue Zoushi - Zonghe Lishi Yu Diyuan
Zhanlue De Shijiao Fenxi [the Game of Great Powers and the Strategic Situation in Central Asia - an
Analysis from a Perspective Combing History and Geostrategy]," Guoji Zhengzhi Yanjiu [International
Politics Quarterly], no. 3 (2005): 54-61.
524 Chang Liu, "Zhongguo Shixian Zhongya Zhanluexing Tuwei De Jiyu Yu Tiaozhan [Opportunities
and Challenges for China to Realise the Strategic Breakthrough in Central Asia]." 21ccom.net, 13
September, 2012, http://www.21ccom.net/articles/qqsw/zlwj/article_2012061161627.html.
525 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security
Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
526 Emre İşeri, “The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century”,
Geopolitics 14, no. 1 (2009): 26 – 46; Robert E. Kelly, “American dual containment in Asia”, Geopolitics
15, no. 4 (2011): 705 - 725.
527 For example, Longgeng Zhao, "Shixi Meiguo Zhujun Zhongya Hou De Zhanlue Taishi Ji Qi Dui
Woguo Anquan Liyi De Yingxiang [a Probe on Strategic Posture after US Troop Stationing in Central
Asia and Its Impact on China’s Security Interests]," Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu [Russian Central
Asian & East European Studies], no. 2 (2004): 68-73.
528 Xiquan He et al., "Daguo Zhanlue Yu Zhongya Diyuan Bianju [Great Powers” Strategy and the
Changing of Geopolitics in Central Asia]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International
Relations], no. 2 (2002): 42-51.
191
expand into what it sees as its sphere of influence. This has led to a kind of convergence
between Russia and China on Central Asian strategy: namely, opposing US hegemony.
Therefore, counterbalancing the US in the region and making sure that China’s west is
not being threatened are China’s key strategic interests in Central Asia. As many
commentators note, a new Great Game is in place in the region.529
Will China use the
SCO as a tool to play the game? This question will be explored in the following sections.
5.3 The SCO
China’s core interests in Central Asia, as discussed above, are security, economics,
energy security and geopolitics (in reality, anti-US hegemony). The key question is
whether China’s leaders will be able to secure all these interests through regional
cooperation. Through a detailed exploration of China’s role in the SCO we can see how
effectively its interests can be pursued, and whether its behaviour reflects new thinking
about the best ways of pursuing national interests.
The development of SCO
The fact that the SCO is the first regional organisation named after a Chinese city and
has its secretariat in China gives an indication of how influential China has been in its
development. Significantly, the SCO and its predecessor, the Shanghai Five, are both
products of border negotiations, a key concern of China’s overall foreign policy. The
border negotiations between the former Soviet Union and China resumed in 1989
immediately after the normalisation of the bilateral relationship. After the Soviet Union
collapsed, negotiations continued between China, Russia and the Central Asian
countries. From 1991 to 1995, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
negotiated as one group with China. This reflected these countries growing concerns
that the ambitions of a rising China might have on their territory. Until 1996, all the
countries except Tajikistan had achieved good progress through negotiation, which was
a precondition for the establishment of the Shanghai Five. The five countries signed an
agreement on strengthening military confidence and agreement on disarmament in
529 Rajan Menon, "The New Great Game in Central Asia." Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 187-204.
192
Shanghai (1996) and Moscow (1997) respectively.530
The third Shanghai Five summit was held in Almaty in 1998. Unlike the previous two
summits, the five participants participated in the summit as individual parties. More
importantly, beginning from this summit, the Shanghai Five strengthened coordination
regarding the challenge of terrorism.531
In the Almaty Declaration, improving regional
security cooperation and economic development became important issues. Since then,
the Shanghai Five have begun to focus on non-traditional security, which eventually led
to the foundation of the SCO.
In 2000, Uzbekistan began to attend the Shanghai Five summit as an observer. The
Chinese president Jiang Zemin suggested transforming this ad hoc meeting into an
institutionalised multilateral cooperation mechanism, something that reflected China’s
growing enthusiasm for multilateralism.532
On 14 June 2001, the sixth summit was held
in Shanghai, and Uzbekistan became a full member of the Shanghai Five. The next day,
the foundation of the SCO was announced.533
The six members signed the declaration
marking its foundation, according to which the aim of the SCO is to: strengthen the
mutual trust and good-neighbourliness and friendliness; to encourage the effective
cooperation among member states in politics, economic and trade, science and
technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environment protection and other
areas; to collectively undertake to preserve and protect the peace, security and stability
of the region; and to build a democratic, just and equitable international political
economy. 534
The guiding principle of the organisation is the “Shanghai Spirit” based on mutual trust,
530 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi [Shanghai
Cooperation Organization]," last modified July 2011, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_59/.
531 Jing-Dong Yuan, "China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO)," Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 67 (2010): 855-69.
532 Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional
Security, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).
533 "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi (Shanghe Zuzhi) [Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)]." Xinhuanet,
accessed 6 June, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-06/01/content_418824.htm.
534 "Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization." Xinhuanet, 15 June,
2001, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-05/27/content_889169.htm.
193
mutual advantage, equality, joint consultations, respect for cultural diversity, and the
desire for joint development. Although some observers are critical about the role and
efficacy of the SCO and the rhetoric that accompanies its activities,535
at the very least
this focus on norms and ideas is not easily explained by a narrow realist interpretation
of events. The six countries claimed that the SCO abides by the aim and principles of
the UN Charter and insisted that all counties are equal and all problems would be
resolved by consultation. In the first summit, the six countries also signed a convention
on attacking terrorism, separatism and extremism.
Following its foundation, the SCO saw rapid development. In the St Petersburg Summit
in 2002, the SCO Charter was signed. In August 2007, the treaty for the good-
neighbourliness and friendliness cooperation of the SCO member states was signed. In
January 2004, the SCO secretariat was established in Beijing, and in June in the same
year, the anti-terrorism structure was established in Tashkent, the capital of
Uzbekistan.536
SCO members insist that they are non-aligned, not aimed at a third country and
supportive of the principle of regional openness. At the beginning of 2004, the SCO
started the observer mechanism in June 2004, Mongolia became the first one. In
November 2005, Afghanistan and SCO signed an agreement to develop a liaison group.
In July 2005, Pakistan, Iran and India became observers. On 28 August 2008, the heads
of each state met in Dushanbe and passed regulations on dialogue partnerships, which
regulate cooperation with associated countries. In June 2009, the ninth summit of the
SCO granted dialogue partnership to Sri Lanka and Belarus. On 11 June 2010, leaders
of the SCO approved the new member rule and the procedure for joining the SCO,
which marked a significant step in its institutional maturity and reflects the growing
confidence Chinese and regional policymakers had in institution-building more
generally537
.
535 Roy Allison, “Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia”, Central
Asian Survey 27, no. 2 (2008): 185-202; David Kerr, “Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China’s
strategic emergence”, International Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010): 127-152.
536 “Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi (Shanghe Zuzhi)”.
537 Ibid.
194
The SCO is also active in building relationships with other international organisations.
In December 2004, the SCO was granted an observer in the United Nations. On 12 April
2005, the Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the General
Secretariat of the SCO signed a memorandum, which became the first international
organisation cooperating with the SCO. On 5 April 2010, the SCO member states signed
a joint declaration on cooperation between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the
Secretariat of the SCO to strengthen cooperation in security preservation, economic
development and social and cultural development.538
Since the establishment of the SCO, regional cooperation has developed rapidly, in both
military and economic areas. The SCO members launched a multilateral military
exercise under the framework of the SCO, and in September 2004, a framework for
multilateral economic cooperation was approved by the premiers of the six countries.
This latter agreement has 11 fields and 127 projects, suggesting that the SCO has
developed substantial mechanisms to encourage cooperation in the fields of economic
cooperation and trade. The Interbank Consortium of the SCO was founded in Moscow
in October 2005 with development banks of member countries participating in it. The
Interbank Consortium is responsible for credit granting and funding for joint investment
projects.539
A business council was held in Shanghai in June 2006, composed of
business and financial sectors, with the aim of improving cooperation in economic and
trade in the SCO and providing information to facilitate direct contact among
entrepreneurs from member states.540
On 22 May 2006, the SCO Forum was founded,
which provided a platform for the experts of SCO countries to contribute intellectual
support for the development of the organisation.541
The general point to emphasise here is that China has been very active in the
development of the SCO, and this suggests that a significant process of learning has
taken place among policymakers. This indicates that China’s leaders have growing
538 Ibid.
539 "The Interbank Consortium of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation," The Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, 16 March, 2009, access 2 October, 2012, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=51.
540 "The Business Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation," The Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=52.
541 Julie Boland "Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost Decade? A Partner for
the U.S.?" in 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper (The Brookings Institution, 2011).
195
confidence in, and familiarity with institutional development and innovation. Even if the
SCO has a modest agenda and limited capacity to realise it, this still marks an important
shift in the thinking and perhaps the normative assumptions that are currently informing
the policymaking practices and goals of Chinese officials. The next four sections will
examine China’s activities and illustrate the thinking behind China’s involvement in the
SCO.
The SCO’s role in regional security
As discussed above, the SCO began with cooperation in the traditional security area of
border security. The SCO and its predecessor, the Shanghai Five, achieved success in
confidence building and resolving outstanding border issues between China, Central
Asia and Russia. All the outcomes in this field are very important for China. As Chinese
SCO expert Pan Guang comments, the SCO assures the security of China in the north
and west borders. This is the first time in the past few centuries that China has not been
threatened from the north or northwest. Significantly, this allows China to focus more
on any potential crisis in East Asia and Taiwan.542
In the twenty-first century, the SCO
has also made significant progress on non-traditional security areas and anti-terrorism
cooperation. In fact, non-traditional security cooperation has become the main activity
of the organisation. There is a common realisation among SCO members that terrorism
is threatening the common security of the region, and that no country can deal with
these issues individually. This is the fundamental driving force of regional security
cooperation. Rather than relying exclusively on its own national capabilities, China has
realised some of its security interests through the cooperative platform of the SCO.
The SCO has established an institutionalised organisational structure to facilitate
security cooperation. The institutional mechanisms of the Secretaries of State Security
and the meeting for the Ministers of Public Security and Interior have gradually become
more elaborate and established. In addition, there are meetings of Ministers of Defence,
542 Guang Pan, "Zouxiang Disange Shinian De Zhongguo-Zhongya-Eluosi Guanxi - Jianlun Shanghe
Zuzhi Mianlin De Tiaozhan He Jiyu [Towards the Third Decade of the Sino-Central Asian-Russian
Relations - a Discussion on the Challenges and Opportunities Faced by the SCO]," Center of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Studies, SASS, 2011, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.coscos.org.cn/201109191.htm.
196
the High Courts, the Inspectors General and leaders in charge of foreign affairs in the
military discussing the anti-terrorism campaign. The Regional Counter-terrorism
structure founded in Tashkent in June 2004 marked the deepening of anti-terrorism
cooperation within the framework of the SCO. This structure is responsible for the
collection and analysis of intelligence, assisting the training of anti-terrorist experts and
developing cooperative relationships with other organisations on anti-terrorist activities.
According to the Secretary General of the China National Research Centre in the SCO,
Chen Yurong, from the foundation of the antiterrorism structure in 2004 up to 2010, it is
claimed that more than 500 terrorist incidents were prevented with the cooperation and
coordination of the anti-terrorist structure of the SCO.543
Military exercises are an important format of cooperation under the auspices of the SCO.
So far, 10 major military exercises have been held, of which the so-called “Peace
Mission” exercise has been the most important. The scale of these exercises is
expanding, and they are all notionally aimed at deterring “three evils” and at the same
time, strengthening the actual combat ability of the armies. From 6 to 12 August 2003,
the first multilateral anti-terrorism exercise in the framework of the SCO was held in
Kazakhstan and China. The “Peace Mission”, from 9 to 17 August 2007, was the largest
joint military exercise so far with all six member states participating. The multilateral
military cooperation also promoted bilateral military cooperation. Quite a few of the
“Peace Mission” exercises involve bilateral cooperation between Russia and China.
Though the purpose of the exercises is said to be anti-three evils, their significance
extends far beyond anti-terrorism. For example, the Sino-Russian exercise of the “2005
Peace Mission” was located in Russia’s Far East and China’s Shandong Peninsula and
its marine area. It involved nearly 10,000 personnel with the most advanced weapons.544
Though both countries claimed that they were not targeting any third party, it attracted
the attention of many Western countries.
543 Yurong Chen, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Zouguo Shinian Huihuang Licheng [Ten Years” Glorious
Journey of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization]," Dangdai Shijie [The Contemporary World], no. 7
(2011): 41-44.
544 Qiong Yang, "Pandian Zhonge Linian Junyan: ‘Shanghe Zuzhi’ Yu ‘Fankong’ Cheng Liang Da
Guanjianci [to Take Stock the Past Sino-Russian Military Exercises: ‘SCO’ and ‘Anti-Terrorism’ Are
Two Key Words]," CRI online, 23 April, 2012, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/04/23/5951s3654027.htm.
197
Afghanistan is a hotbed for regional instability and terrorism and this has consequently
also become a major focus for the SCO. For example, in March 2009, the SCO held a
meeting on Afghan affairs. The Secretary General of the United Nations, the senior
officials of the US, NATO, Iran, the European Security Organisation and other
international organisations participated, which confirmed the importance to the SCO of
Afghanistan issue. The SCO also saw new developments on the anti-drug issue in
Afghanistan.545
In the past 10 years, through sharing intelligence and joint law enforcement, it is
claimed that the SCO ascertained the existence of and destroyed 200 terrorist military
bases, capturing more than 700 terrorists, confiscating thousands of illegal weapons and
tens of thousands of bullets, tens of thousands of explosives and narcotics and arrested
more than 30 terrorists during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.546
Even if these claims
are inflated and the definition of “terrorism” may be questionable, such cooperative
efforts are at odds with the stereotype of an inward-looking China that is preoccupied
with a narrow view of its national interest.
Despite the success achieved above, there are some problems with security cooperation
in the SCO. First of all, there is criticism of the capabilities and limitations of the
organisation. The status of the SCO came into question after the US intervened in
Central Asia after 9/11, when member countries chose to cooperate with the US, rather
than take any collective actions in the framework of the SCO. The SCO was regarded as
incapable of dealing with or contributing to the situation in Afghanistan.547
This is rather
ironic for a regional organisation that made non-traditional cooperation its main issue.
However, this kind of argument overlooked the fact that the SCO was still a new
organisation. Even more importantly, perhaps, neither China nor Russia wanted to
shoulder the burden of intervention in Afghan affairs. In early 2010, for example, the
UK invited China to send troops to Afghanistan, but China rejected the initiative and
545 Meena Singh Roy, "Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Afghanistan: Scope and
Limitations," Strategic Analysis 34, no. 4 (2010): 545-61.
546 Haiyun Wang, "Shanghe Zuzhi Xuyou Gengda Zuowei [the SCO Must Play Larger Roles]."
Huanqiu.com, 22 April, 2012, accessed 6 June, 2012, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/column/mjzl/2012-
04/2647457.html.
547 Jyotsna Bakshi, "Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation (SCO) before and after September 11."
Strategic Analysis 26, no. 2 (2008): 265-76.
198
only wanted to contribute to the construction of Afghanistan economically.548
The non-interference principle of the SCO also prevented the organisation from playing
a constructive role in maintaining the stability of the region. For example, in the
aftermath of the Andijan incident and the riot in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the SCO did little
to respond to the emergency, which questioned the organisation’s legitimacy and
capability.549
However, this situation may change in the future. The senior consultant for
the China National Research Centre on the SCO, Major General Wang Haiyun,
suggested that the SCO should try to remove obstacles to collective action.550
Likewise,
the Chinese vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping told journalists that the SCO will
strengthen its capability for maintaining stability and security in emergency
situations.551
The SCO is also facing competition from other regional organisations in the field of
security, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which was
organised through the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. There is
a joint directorate and rapid response forces in the CSTO intended to face security
threats emerging in Central Asia.552
NATO has also provided military assistance through
the Partnership for Peace framework, notably engaging Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.553
In spite of some problems, overall, the SCO has been employed as an effective platform
to fight the threats posed by the so-called the “three evils”. To some extent, China’s
security interests have been realised through a cooperative mechanism. The Regional
Counter-terrorism Structure has strengthened the capability of member states in fighting
548 "The Chinese Policy toward Afghanistan: From Military Bases to Industrial Bases." International
Strategic Research Organisation, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/myazdir.asp?id=2291.
549 Julie Boland "Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”.
550 Friedberg, A contest for supremacy.
551 "Cheng Guoping: Shanghe Zuzhi Beijing Fenghui Yuqi Chengguo Henduo You Sida Liangdian
[Cheng Guoping: Many Prospective Outcomes and Four Lightspots]." Xinhuanet, 29 May, 2012,
accessed 6 June, 2012, http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/05/29/3365s3704261.htm.
552 Andrei Kazantsev, "Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region." Europe-Asia
Studies 60, no. 6 (2008): 1073-88.
542 S. Neil Macfarlane, "The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia," International Affairs 80,
no. 3 (2004): 447-61.
199
against terrorist groups. In China’s case, the cross-border Uyghur independence force
has been suppressed in the name of anti-terrorism. Military cooperation has been
successfully implemented in the SCO, which is a breakthrough for China’s non-
alignment foreign policy. The stability achieved in Central Asia leaves China more
energy to focus on its Eastern and South-eastern neighbourhood, which is arguably
more important in the long run.
The SCO and economic cooperation
Economic cooperation has been a central pillar of the SCO from its inception. Both
functionalism and its modified version neo-functionalism stress the importance of
economic cooperation and its spill-over effect on other sectors in the regional
integration process.554
Such claims seem to be confirmed from a Chinese perspective, as
the fundamental route to realising regional security is the development of the regional
economy. Economic backwardness is potentially a hotbed for crime and terrorism. As
discussed above, China also sees the solution to the Xinjiang problem from an
economic perspective. In discussing economic and security cooperation, Chinese
renowned SCO expert Zhao Huasheng believes that the SCO should strengthen
economic cooperation in the long run555
. He argues that economic cooperation can be
sustained because the results of economic cooperation can generate new demands and
these new demands can promote further economic cooperation. Therefore, he suggests
that SCO should prioritise economic cooperation.
According to the SCO Charter, the aims for the SCO’s economic cooperation can be
generalised as the following three points. First, the SCO should promote the coordinated
development of the regional economy and improve people’s livelihood. Second, the
SCO should be conducive to the formation of a new international economic order. Third,
the SCO should strengthen the friendship between people of the SCO member countries
554 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting Europe (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1958).
555 Huasheng Zhao, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi: Pinggu Yu Fazhan Wenti [Shanghai Cooperation
Organization: Assessment the Development]," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International
Relations], no. 5 (2005): 17-23.
200
by economic cooperation.556
Regional economic cooperation is the focus of every SCO summit meeting. The
memorandum on the basic goals and directions for regional economic cooperation and
launching a process of facilitating trade and investment was signed in September 2001.
It became the general principle and plan of regional cooperation. In 2003, the outline of
the multilateral economic and trade cooperation of SCO member states was issued and a
goal of achieving the free movement of goods, services, technology and capital were set
up. In 2004, the implementation plan for the outline was passed, which covers 11 key
areas and 127 specific projects. In 2009, the joint initiative for strengthening
multilateral economic cooperation, coping with the GFC and keeping the sustainable
development of the economy was passed.
According to the SCO charter, the Council of Heads of Government holds a meeting
every year mainly focusing on the issue of economic cooperation. At the same time,
there are meetings of Economic Ministers, Transportation Ministers, Science and
Technology Ministers, Agricultural Ministers, Governors of Central Banks and Finance
Ministers to discuss cooperation in specific areas. Several specific committees are set up,
such as the e-business working group led by China and the custom working group led
by Russia.
In order to finance important projects such as energy, transportation infrastructure,
agriculture and central and small enterprises, the SCO founded the SCO Interbank
Consortium on 16 November 2005. In June 2006, with the promotion of the bankers”
consortium, a series of business and loan contracts were signed among enterprises and
banks in the framework of the SCO. The total amount was nearly two billion, which
includes the 900 million exportation credit with a two per cent rate and a 15-year loan
lent by China to the Central Asian countries. Since 2009, in order to overcome the
challenges of the GFC, the member banks of the consortium have undertaken measures
556 "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi De Jingji Hezuo Licheng [the Process of Economic Cooperation in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization]," SCO-EC.GOV.CN, 17 August, 2007, accessed 6 June, 2012,
http://www.sco-ec.gov.cn/crweb/scoc/info/Article.jsp?a_no=83446&col_no=290.
201
such as local currency settlement557
and loans.558
For example, China and Belarus
(RMB 20 billion), Tajikistan ($US5 million), Kazakhstan (RMB 7 billion) achieved
local currency settlement.559
This mechanism reduces the risk of value changing of the
US dollar and promotes the internationalisation of RMB as well. In order to promote
cooperation among enterprises within the SCO and to provide capital raising and
information, a business council was founded in October 2005. It is a non-governmental
organisation that united the industrial and financial sectors of the SCO member states.560
These sorts of initiatives suggest that tangible cooperative networks are beginning to
give substance to the idea of regionalism even in an area where sovereignty concerns
still predominate.
In trade, according to the official statistics, similar progress is being made: intra-
regional trade among the six member states of the SCO reached $US3.71 trillion by the
end of 2010, or triple the amount in 2001. Trade between China and the other five
member states reached $US84.7 billion in 2010, up from $US12.2 billion in 2001. The
growth rate exceeded 30 per cent. China became Kazakhstan’s second trading largest
trade partner in 2009 and its largest export market in 2010. Trade between China and
Kazakhstan rose from $1.29 US billion in 2001 to $US 20.43 billion in 2010. China is
also the second largest trading partner of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. For
quite a long time, China enjoyed a trade surplus in Central Asia; however, after the GFC
and with the construction of the energy pipeline, the situation began to change. The
growth rate of China’s imports from Central Asia is higher than China’s exports.
China’s investment is increasing as well. By May 2010, accumulated loans from
557 Local currency settlement uses the currencies of relative parties rather than the third currency
(normally the US dollar) for trade settlement. For example, in the trade between China and Russia,
Renminbi and Russian Ruble can be used instead of the US dollar.
558 "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi De Jingji Hezuo Licheng”; "Shanghe Zuzhi Yinlianti: Jiaqiang Duobian
Hezuo Gongcu Quyu Fazhan [SCO Inter-Bank Consortium: Strengthening Multilateral Cooperation
Improving Regional Development]," Xinhuanet, 26 October, 2010, accessed 6 June, 2012,
http://economy.gmw.cn/2010-10/26/content_1336628.htm.
559 Xin Li, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Jingji Hezuo Shinian: Chengjiu, Tiaozhan Yu Qianjing [Ten Years
of Economic Cooperation in the SCO: Achievement, Challenge and Prospect]." Xiandai Guoji Guanxi
[Contemporary International Relations], no. 9 (2011): 9-15.
560 "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Zhongguo Shiyejia Weiyuanhui Jianjie [an Introduction on the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization China Business Council]." The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
China Business Council, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://www.scobc.cn/guanyuwomen/index.html.
202
China’s National Development Bank to Central Asia reached $US31.4 billion, which
supported a series of energy, electrical and infrastructure projects.561
Moreover, in transportation, China is very interested in building a “new Silk Road”.
China took a positive view of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor Technical
Assistance Plan. China supported EU plans to build a second transport route (so called
the Second Land Bridge) which does not need to pass through Russia, though China has
kept a relatively low profile on this project partly because it is led by the EU and partly
because it is a sensitive issue for Russia. However, China hopes that the land bridge can
be built, as it will strengthen the link between China’s west and the outside world. The
development in transportation cooperation has been very slow so far, despite being
discussed by the SCO every year, because the conditions of the member states are so
different and their interests are so divided.562
However, despite significant achievements in economic cooperation, there are still
many problems. First, countries in the organisation still have different opinions about
whether to develop security cooperation or economic cooperation first. It is particularly
apparent in discussions about a possible Free Trade Agreement. In the Premiers”
meeting as early as 2001, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji initiated such a goal, but Russia
was worried that its position in Central Asia would be weakened by the growing
influence of China, therefore it rejected the proposal.563
Russia had its own initiative to
build a unified economic space in the framework of a Euro-Asia economic community
and Custom Union which excludes China. The establishment of the Custom Union
among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan affected China greatly. For example, the
average tariff in Kazakhstan increased from 6.2 per cent to 10.6 per cent. The
importation tariff for mechanical and electrical products increased from five per cent to
10–25 per cent.564
Central Asian countries are also worried about their domestic
economy being controlled by China and becoming a provider of raw materials for China.
561 All dates are drawn from Li Xin’s research, “Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Jingji Hezuo Shinian,” 10-11.
562 Joseph Y. S. Cheng, "The Shanghai Co-Operation Organisation: China’s Initiative in Regional
Institutional Building," Journal of Contemporary China 41, no. 4 (2011): 632-56.
563 Alyson J. K. Bailes, and Pal Dunay, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Regional Security
Institution," in SIPRI Policy Paper (SIPRI, 2007): 1-29.
564 Wu and Lansdowne, China Turns to Multilateralism.
203
The different interests of the parties slow down the implementation of the agreement
signed by the SCO. Synthesizing divergent interests is needed for sustainable economic
cooperation.565
As mentioned before, economic cooperation between China and Central Asia largely
focuses on China’s western region, particularly on the development of Xinjiang—
something that reflects China’s desire to address the problem of the social stability in
the region. In 2011, Xinjiang’s foreign trade reached a new high of $US22.82 billion.
Trade volume to Kazakhstan exceeded $US10.6 billion.566
Trade volume between
Xinjiang and Tajikistan takes up 83 per cent of the total trade between China and
Tajikistan567
. Alashankou of Xinjiang is the busiest custom border on land in China.568
As the General Secretary of the SCO Muratbek Sansyzbayevich Imanaliev points out,
the economic cooperation and trade interaction in Central Asia is mainly through the
“big channel” of Xinjiang569
. Xinjiang, as the main channel, has become the bridge
between China and Central Asian countries. However, as Liu Huaqin from the think
tank affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce suggests, Xinjiang should not only be the
corridor; more importantly, more products should be manufactured in Xinjiang
565 Fazal Ur-rahman, "SCO: Problems of Enhancing Economic Cooperation." Eurasia Critic, April, 2008,
accessed 13 September, 2012, http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/sco-problems-enhancing-economic-
cooperation.
566 Qiangwei Chen and Suohuai Zeng. "Xinjiang 2011 Nian Dui Ha Maoyie Shouchao Baiyi Meiyuan
[Xinjiang’s Trade Amount with Kazakhstan in 2011 Exceeded 10 Billion US Dollars]." Tianshannet, 7
February, 2012, 2 October, 2012, http://www.tianshannet.com/news/content/2012-
02/07/content_6548439.htm.
567 "2011 Nian Xinjiang Yu Tajikesitan Maoyie Zhan Zhong Ta Maoyie Bizhong Gaoda 83% [the
Trade Amount between Xinjiang and Tajikistan Took up 83% of the Trade Amount between China and
Tajikistan]." Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of
China in the Republic of Tajikistan, 16 February, 2012, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://tj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/201202/20120207968444.html.
568 Xiaoling Li, "Woguo Zuida Lulu Kouan Qunian Maoyie Zeng Sicheng Duo [the Trade Volume in
China’s Busies Land Border Crossing Quadrupled Last Year]." Xinhuanet, 14 February, 2012, accessed 2
October, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-02/14/c_111523534.htm.
569 Feng Liu, "Shanghe Zuzhi Jingji Hezuo Xinjiang Zheng Cheng "Qianyan Zhendi" [Xinjiang Is
Becoming the Foward Position in the Economic Cooperation of the SCO]," Xinjiang Daily, 1 September,
2011, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/2011-09/01/content_23598661.htm.
204
locally.570
There are, therefore, potential limits to the ameliorative impacts of economic
interdependence despite the new thinking about such issues on the part of China’s
policymaking elites.
Overall, China has strengthened its links with Central Asian countries and Russia
through trade facilitation via the platform of the SCO. This economic cooperation is
intended to promote the development of Xinjiang’s economy. However, as Russia and
Central Asian countries are nervous about the growing influence of the Chinese
economy, the potential for SCO-inspired economic cooperation is still under developed.
In Russia in particular, some are plainly still concerned that too much economic
cooperation may actually accelerate Chinese growth to Russia’s disadvantage.571
All of
which suggests that ideas may be important, but they may well still reflect older
understandings of geopolitics and international relations.
Energy cooperation
As illustrated in the section 5.2, with the rapid development of the Chinese economy,
there is an increasing demand for energy. China must seek a more stable energy supply
from regions besides the Middle East. Central Asia is a rich potential area in this regard.
By the end of 2007, the SCO member states and observers accounted for one fourth of
global oil reserves and production, nearly one third of the gas reserves and production,
nearly half of coal reserves, more than half of world coal production, and 50 per cent of
the uranium ore in the world572
. As a consequence, there are major potential reasons for
SCO members to cooperate. On the one hand, China and India (SCO observers) have
great demand for oil and gas. On the other hand, for fossil fuel exporters such as Russia
and Kazakhstan, oil exportation is a major source export and source of revenue. This
570 Rong Li, "Shanghe Zuzhi Chengyuanguo Yujian Ziyou Maoyiqu Jiang Daidong Xinjiang Fazhan [the
SCO Member Countries Are Trying to Build the Free Trade Area, Which Will Lead the Development of
Xinjiang]," Huanqiu.com, 3 September, 2011, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://finance.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-09/1972982.html.
571 Alexandros Petersen and Katinka Barysch, Russia, China and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central
Asia, (London: Centre for European Reform: 2011).
572 Yongxiang Sun, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi De Nengyuan Hezuo [the Energy Cooperation of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization]." in Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Fazhan Baogao (2009) [Report for the
Development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2009)], ed. by Guangcheng Xing (Beijing:
Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009).
205
section addresses the question of whether China has successfully achieved its goal
which is to guarantee its energy security to fuel its fast economic and social
development through the framework of the SCO.
Energy cooperation was on the SCO agenda from a very early stage, and in June 2006,
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the founding of an energy club within the
framework of the SCO, with the aim of connecting the energy suppliers, consumers and
transporters.573
In June 2007, the first energy ministers” meeting was held. After that,
the mechanism was fixed to discuss issues on energy cooperation. In April 2012,
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced in the meeting of the SCO Foreign
Ministers that the development of the energy club had entered the final straight, which
will be an open and informal platform for discussion on energy cooperation.574
Despite
this, however, at the most recent meeting of the SCO no agreement was achieved
between Russia and China on developing a gas pipeline, suggesting there may still be
old suspicions and difficulties to be overcome.575
Nevertheless, China is very active in promoting energy cooperation with the SCO
countries. In December 2006, the crude oil pipeline linking Kazakhstan and China was
launched, the first to be owned by China. When the pipeline was planned, China and
Kazakhstan agreed to invest based on an equal share of the cost. However, when the
project was finished, China paid 85 per cent of the total cost. The return for this
payment has been worthwhile, however: by 2010, imports had reached 73.3 million
barrels per year, and it is estimated that imports will reached 146.7 million barrels per
year by 2013. By 2011, the oil of Kazakhstan took up 15 per cent of China’s crude oil
573 Lihua Han, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Kuangjia Xia De Nengyuan Hezuo [the Energy Cooperation in
the Framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization]." Studytimes, 25 March, 2004, accessed 2
October, 2012, http://www.china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2006-12/04/content_7455644.htm.
574 "Establishment of SCO Energy Club Enters “Final Straight” - Lavrov." Interfax, 11 March, 2012,
accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?y=2012&m=5&d=11&pg=11&id=330785.
575 Alexander Cooley, “In Central Asia, public cooperation and private rivalry”. New York Times, 8
June, 2012, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/in-central-asia-
public-cooperation-and-private-rivalry.html?_r=0.
206
exports.576
China is also interested in direct investment in Central Asia’s energy industry.
In 2005, China’s bid for PetroKazakhstan was the biggest acquisition deal by Chinese
enterprise, priced at $US4.18 billion.577
In December 2009, China opened a gas pipeline
connected with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.578
In particular, China
seized the opportunity brought by the GFC and secured its energy imports. For example,
in February 2010, China provided $US25 billion to Russia for a 20-year oil supply.579
However, as discussed above, even though the cooperation between China and Central
Asian countries developed rapidly, most of the deals were arranged on a bilateral basis
rather than in the framework of the SCO.580
Even though in the 2003 outline for
multilateral economic and trade cooperation of the SCO members there are 19 projects
in relation to energy cooperation, most of the proposed multilateral projects are still
under negotiation.581
This is due to conflicts over the energy interests of different parties.
As argued by Chinese scholar Yang Cheng, there is hidden competition between China
and Russia over energy cooperation in the SCO. Russia’s attitude toward China’s energy
cooperation with Central Asia is very conflicted. Russia is trying to build a gas OPEC,
which includes gas producers such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and
gas transporters in the region, to take advantage in the gas trade with China and
Europe.582
Traditionally, Russia enjoys the leadership role in energy sector in this area;
576 Jean A Garrison and Ahad Abdurahmonov, "Explaining the Central Asian Energy Game: Complex
Interdependence and How Small States Influence Their Big Neighbors," Asian Perspective, no. 35 (2011):
381-405.
577 Loretta Ng, "China Wins Petrokazakhstan Bid, Repels India, Russia (Update 5)," Bloomberg, 26
October, 2005, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGEKDqarn9S4&refer=canada.
578 Haiyan Wang, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Chengyuanguo Nengyuan Hezuo: Qushi Yu Wenti [Energy
Industry Cooperation of SCO Member States: Trend and Problems]." Eluosi Yanjiu [Russian Studies], no.
3 (2010): 94-103.
579 Yeongmi Yun and Kicheol Park, "An Analysis of the Multilateral Cooperation and Competition
between Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Issues and Prospects," Pacific
Focus XXVII, no. 1 (2012): 62-85.
580 Yaping Wang, "The First Ten Years of Shanghai Cooperation Organization," Carnegie China Insight
Monthly, no. 71 (2011), http://chinese.carnegieendowment.org/newsletter/pdf/june11.pdf.
581 Chen, "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Zouguo Shinian Huihuang Licheng”.
582 Cheng Yang, "Guanyu Zai Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi Kuangjia Nei Jianli Tongyi Nengyuan Kongjian
De Jidian Sikao [Some Thoughts on How to Build the United Energy Space within the Framework of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization]," Xiboliya Yanjiu [Siberian Studies] 35, no. 1 (2008): 26-29.
207
because of the former Soviet Union energy transportation network, natural gas exports
have been almost monopolised by Russia. Therefore, Central Asian countries would like
to strengthen cooperation with China to reduce their dependency on Russia. China,
Russia and Central Asian countries consequently have different positions on the energy
trade with conflicting interests. The involvement of the US, Europe and Japan in the
Central Asian energy competition also encourages the SCO member states to focus
more on their own interests and ignore the efficiency of the organisational cooperation.
Given the above difficulties, China has traditionally had a preference for bilateral
cooperation and deal making. It has only become active in multilateral energy
cooperation in recent years. However, in line with new thinking about resource security
in particular, Chinese scholars have begun to place more value in multilateral
cooperation. As China’s leading energy security expert Major General Wang Haiyun
argues:
“(China) should develop the international energy order in the direction that is
conducive to serve China’s and other emerging countries” energy interests, expand
our discursive power in the international energy field, and use these mechanisms as
much as we can. We are the world’s largest energy producing and consuming country
and our global energy interests are expanding. Even for China’s self-interest, we must
participate in the multilateral energy cooperation mechanisms.” 583
In conclusion, the SCO’s multilateral energy cooperation is still in its formative stages.
Thus far, most of the cooperation between China and Central Asia is in a bilateral rather
than multilateral format. China’s energy security has only been partly achieved through
the platform of the SCO. In other words, while the SCO represents an important
example of China’s new diplomatic thinking and practise, it is important not to overstate
its importance or potential at this stage.
583 The author’s translation. Haiyun Wang, "Zhongguo Ying Jiji Tuidong Shanghe Zuzhi Duobian
Nengyuan Hezuo Jizhi [China Should Be Active to Promote the Multilateral Energy Cooperation
Mechanism in the SCO]." Dongfang Zaobao [Dongfang Daily], 27 July, 2011, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.dfdaily.com/html/51/2011/7/27/636500.shtml.
208
Geopolitical interests
Many commentators in the West think that China is using the SCO and its predecessor
the Shanghai Five to seek leadership in Central Asia and use it as a counterweight the
US influence in the region and NATO’s expansion.584
This thesis argues that China is in
fact using the SCO to prevent the US from dominating Central Asia and containing
China on its western side, but it does not intend to make the SCO an anti-US or anti-
West organisation in the same manner as the Warsaw Treaty Organization585
or to seek
hegemony itself in Central Asia. All in all, the complex interdependence between the
US and China makes direct confrontation and serious conflict difficult for rational
leaders to contemplate under current circumstances. China and the US also have
common interests in combating terrorist groups in Central Asia. In other words, there
are elements of both cooperation and competition in the Sino-US relationship in Central
Asia.
Geopolitical games have always been played in Central Asia. One of the reasons that the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation proved successful was that China recognised
Russia’s changed position and historical role. Although Russia was a much reduced
power, it was still the biggest regional influence in Central Asia because of its historical
role and links there. Chinese leaders were careful to acknowledge Russia’s special
interests and concerns. As a result, Russia acquiesced in China’s growing economic
influence in Central Asia.586
Central Asian countries were also happy to see a balance of
584 For example, Bates Gill, "Shanghai Five: An Attempt to Counter U.S. Influence in Asia?" The
Brookings Institution, 4 May, 2001, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2001/05/04china-gill; William E. Carroll, "China in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Hegemony, Multi-Polar Balance, or Cooperation in Central Asia."
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 1, no. 19 (2011): 1-8.
585 Warsaw Treaty Organization was the security alliance of most countries in the Socialist camp which
was in rivalry with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the Cold War era. See Office of the
Historian, "The Warsaw Treaty Organization," U.S. Department of State, accessed 14 September, 2012,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/WarsawTreaty.
586 Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, "Chinese-Russian Convergence and Central Asia," Geopolitics,
no. 16 (2011): 865-901.
209
power between China and Russia in the region.587
However, China’s leaders seemed
unwilling to make the same sort of compromise for the US as it did for Russia.
From a Chinese perspective, with the end of the Cold War the international system
changed from bipolarity to unipolarity, with the power of the US reaching a peak during
the Bush administration (2000-2008). Though China’s economy had become deeply
integrated into the world system in the decades after opening, China’s intellectual and
political elites still see themselves as being contained by the US strategically, especially
because traditional alliances between the US and some Asia-Pacific countries are still in
existence.588
China felt particularly pressured in its eastern and south-eastern coastal
regions, the perceived first and second islands chains that are containing China.589
With
the US paying more attention to the Asia-Pacific during the Obama administration,
China’s distrust of the US is deepening.590
In that context, it is even more important for
China to have a stable western environment and strategic space to protect its energy and
economic interests. From this perspective, it is apparent that China does not want the
US to expand its influence in Central Asia. As Zhao Longgeng, Senior Fellow of the
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argues that the US stationing
forces in Central Asia has four major impacts on China’s security. 591
First, in terms of
military, the US troop presence imposes pressure on China’s Western border. Second,
587 Venera Galyamova, "Central Asian Countries and China: Managing the Transition," in China-
Central Asia Countries: Making New Partnership (the Impact of Change in Modern China), ed. Yunling
Zhang (Reading: Paths International, 2010).
588 Chinese Air Force Colonial Dai Xu’s book is representative of such a view. See Xu Dai, C Xing
Baowei: Neiyou Waihuan Xia De Zhongguo Tuwei [C-Shap Containment: China's Breakthrough from the
Internal and External Challenges] (Shanghai: Wenhui Books, 2010). Recently, Ruan Zongze, Vice
President of the China Institute of International Studies commented on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
disputes and also linked the issue with the US containment. See "Zhuanjia: Diaoyudao Wenti Shi Meiguo
Ezhi Zhong Ri Liangguo Yike Qizi [Expert: The Diaoyu Islands Problem Is a Chessman in Containing
China and Japan]," CNTV, 13 September, 2012, accessed 2 October,
http://hi.people.com.cn/n/2012/0913/c231187-17478155.html.
589 Of course, from the viewpoint of the US government, the two chains are lines of defense rather than
containment. For the two islands chains, please see "People's Liberation Navy - Offshore Defense."
GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-
doctrine-offshore.htm.
590 Kenneth Lieberthal and Jisi Wang. "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." (The John L.
Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2012).
591 Zhao, "Shixi Meiguo.”
210
the US can support the Xinjiang Independence force more easily. Third, the solidarity of
the SCO is weakened. Fourth, China’s energy security is threatened.
When the US first intervened in Afghanistan, China held a positive attitude because the
US’s anti-terrorism activities in Central Asia arguably enhanced the stability of the
region. However, it also meant that China needed to put more strategic resources in the
west to counter what it saw as US expansion, which an additional burden. China is
concerned not only by the presence of the US troops in Central Asia but also by the
democratisation movement supported by the US in Central Asia, which has led to
instability in the region. Thus, the US presence is potentially a threat to China’s
geopolitical interests in the region. In this respect, China and Russia’s strategic interests
tend to converge. So do those of the non-democratic elites in the central Asian countries.
Therefore, China wants the SCO to remain an organisation which has no
institutionalised relationship with Washington. As David Kerr puts it, “t[T]his creation
of regional spaces “without America” is a necessary part of the Chinese strategy for
securing its neighbourhoods.”592
Significantly, the US and its Western allies did not see the SCO as a threat initially,
partly because many doubted the real capability of the organisation.593
The turning point
was 2005. In the 2005 at the SCO summit, a joint declaration was issued to ask the US
troops to withdraw from Central Asian bases, which was a shock for the West generally
and the US in particular. The background for this was the regional instability caused by
the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the Anjian Incident in Uzbekistan. The political
elites of Central Asian countries criticised the US for its support of the democratisation
movement and began to maintain a distance from the US. It alarmed many Western
commentators who hitherto believed that the SCO is a NATO in the East.594
However, China’s policy elites do not intend to use the SCO to form an anti-Western or
592 Kerr. "Central Asian and Russian Perspectives”, 148.
593 For example, in as early as 2002, Stephen Blank from the US Army War College had already begun
to talk about the failure of the SCO. See Stephen Blank, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its
Future" Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 22 May, 2002, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/272.
594 Willy Wo-lap Lam, "Combating American Hegemony." CNN.com, 20 June, 2001, accessed 2
October, 2012, http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/19/china.russia.willy/.
211
anti-US alliance like the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the Cold War era. Rather, the
SCO is very much a defensive mechanism rather than an offensive mechanism. For
China, maintaining good relations with the US and the West is a key to its national
development. China’s modernisation is still progressing, and it still needs capital and
technology from the West.595
In fact, China also clearly understands that Central Asian
countries do not want the SCO to be used as a tool against the US. A number of Central
Asian states want to use the power of the US to balance the influence of Russia and
China596
, a reality that limits the anti-US stance. Moreover, making the SCO a military
alliance does not fit with China’s diplomatic tradition of non-alignment either. As a
result, the SCO has not developed a coherent attitude towards the US and NATO.
Indeed, the SCO’s policy toward the US can change from time to time according to
different circumstances. In terms of fighting terrorism, the SCO members welcome the
US. In terms of a potentially destabilising force promoting democratisation, the US is
seen as a major threat. Overall, however, competition with the US is managed and
should not lead to confrontation. Pragmatism is still an important feature of China’s
Central Asian strategy.
5.4 Beyond National Interests
Overall, China’s active policy in Central Asia and practice in the SCO has important
practical and comparative implications which merit spelling out. China’s participation in
international society is quite a new development and, as Ian Johnston argues, its
participation in multilateral cooperation is part of a general learning process.597
As we
have seen in earlier chapters, China has accepted many existing international norms. By
contrast, thus far at least, the conventional wisdom has it that the ideas and norms
contributed by China are limited.
595 Chien-peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-Operation Organization: China’s Changing Influence in
Central Asia." The China Quarterly, no. 180 (2004): 989-1009.
596 Svante E. Cornell, "Finding Balance: The Foreign Policies of Central Asia's States," in Domestic
political change and grand strategy, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington: The
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007-2008).
597 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008).
212
However, in the SCO China is not only a norm taker but also a norm maker. The SCO is
the only organisation in which China is a main sponsor with a central and decisive role.
We can even say that the SCO is the brainchild of Chinese leaders.598
The best example of China beginning to exert an ideational influence, therefore, would
be the birth of the so called “Shanghai Spirit”. The Shanghai Spirit means mutual trust,
mutual benefits, equality, consultation, and respect for cultural diversity and common
development, which has become the cornerstone of the SCO. The Shanghai Spirit is in
fact a reflection of the new security concept promoted China since the end of the Cold
War. On March 26 1999, Jiang Zemin illustrated his new security concept in the
Conference on Disarmament for the first time. He pointed out that the core for the new
security concept is mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. On June 15
2001, Jiang Zemin declared in the SCO founding meeting that:
“the Shanghai Five first initiated the new type of security concept with mutual trust,
disarmament, and cooperative security as its contents, enriched the new type of
international relations which were invented by China and Russia with partnership
rather than alliance as the core, provided the new type of cooperative model with co-
leading by large and small countries equally, and with security first, mutual benefit
and coordination as the new characteristic. The Shanghai Spirit of mutual trust,
mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and common
development has significant realistic meaning for the promotion of a justice and
rational international political economy new order.”599
Therefore, we can see that the Shanghai Spirit is a manifestation of China’s new
security concept. Even if critics are correct, as noted above, to point to its possible
shortcomings and self-serving nature of the Shanghai Spirit, it still stands in marked
contrast to the new-interventionism and pre-emptive Strike strategy of the US and
598 Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman. "China’s New Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central
Asia and Implication for U.S. Interests." (The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003).
599 "Jiang Zemin Zhuxi Zai "Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi" Chengli Dahui Shang De Jianghua [the Speech of
Jiang Zemin in the Founding Meeting of the 'Shanghai Cooperation Organisation']." Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 22 June, 2001, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_59/zyjh/t4637.htm.
213
NATO.600
From a Chinese perspective, the US and its allies are still subscribing to a
cold war mentality that is out of date. In contrast, Chinese officials suggest that the
Shanghai Spirit will contribute more to a more peaceful world. Indeed, President Hu
Jintao, claims the success of the SCO is primarily owed to the Shanghai Spirit.601
The development of the SCO certainly follows the principles contained in the Shanghai
Spirit. In terms of security, partnership rather than alliance is the key feature of the
SCO. Likewise, as non-alignment is the core of China’s own new security concept, it is
hard to imagine that the SCO will turn into a military alliance. Whether it will prove
capable of cultivating a collective attitude to joint security challenges remains uncertain,
but the very fact that it has articulated an original vision and modus operandi is
significant in a region synonymous with conflict and geopolitical tension.
In terms of economic development, China’s new development concept is another key
element of the SCO. China has been always willing to promote economic cooperation
within the SCO. China sees poverty is the main cause of terrorism and social instability.
Therefore, developing the regional economy should become the main policy focus,
rather than the sort of democratisation or human rights that are promoted by the West.
This pragmatic concept of development has been termed the "Beijing Consensus",
which some observers claim is an expression of Chinese soft power and normative
innovation.602
The “Beijing Consensus” was first generalised by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former
600 For the definition of pre-emption and new interventionism, see Abraham D. Sofaer, "On the
Necessity of Pre-Emption," European Journal of International Law 14, no. 2 (2003): 209-26. Michael J.
Glennon "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law." Foreign Affairs,
(May/June, 1999): 2-7.
601 "Hu Jintao: Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi De Chenggong Jingyan Zaiyu Jianchi ‘Shanghai Jingshen’ [Hu
Jintao: The Successful Experiences of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Owes to the Upholding the
‘Shanghai Spirit’]." Xinhuanet, 15 June, 2006, accessed 2 October, 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-06/15/content_4701138.htm.
602 Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the
Twenty-first Century, (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Xin Li, Kjeld E. Brødsgaard and Michael
Jacobsen) “Redefining Beijing Consensus: ten economic principles”, China Economic Journal: The
Official Journal of the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) at Peking University 2, no. 3 (2009):
297 - 311.
214
foreign editor of the Time Magazine. Ramo argues that there are three guidelines for
Beijing Consensus.603
First, innovation and experimentation are seen as the key to
successful economic development, while the “Washington Consensus” promoted by the
US, IMF and World Bank is considered too doctrinaire and lacking in “pragmatic” spirit.
Second, GDP per capita is not the only measure of success: the sustainability of the
economic system and distribution of the wealth are equally important indicators. Third,
economic sovereignty and policy self-determination are important for developing
countries, issues that are neglected by the Washington Consensus. The fact that the
Beijing Consensus is not accompanied by a politically contentious domestic reform
agenda has also added to its potential attractiveness in many emerging market
economies.604
John Williams has provided one of the most detailed critiques and expositions of the
Beijing Consensus and he argues it has five main points, namely incremental reform,
innovation and experimentation, export led growth, State Capitalism, and
authoritarianism.605
The point to emphasis here is that this Beijing consensus or “China
model” is not only based on an economic logic but has a primarily political logic or
rationale. The state is the dominant actor in economic development. As Ian Bremmer
argues, in countries where a state capitalism prevails, market mechanisms are used for
political purposes, the principal one of which is maximising the state’s power and the
survival of the leadership, not necessarily maximising economic growth.606
This model obviously will appeal to those developing countries which have been
unhappy with the Washington Consensus and its agenda of neoliberalism, market-
oriented reform, small government and even political democratisation.607
As with
China’s investment in many other places in the world, China’s aid and investment in
Central Asia is not bound with any extra political conditions, which are of course
welcomed by the authoritarian states of the region. Undoubtedly this is helping to
603 Joshua Cooper Ramo, "The Beijing Consensus," (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004).
604 Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, “The post-Washington consensus”, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2
(2011): 45-53.
605 John Williamson, "Is the ‘Beijing Consensus’ Now Dominant?", Asia Policy, no. 13 (2012): 1-16.
606 Ian Bremmer, "State Capitalism Comes of Age," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (May/June 2009):40-55.
607 See Halper, The Beijing Consensus.
215
increase China’s “soft power”, even if it has a powerful material base and is not
predicated on the sort of liberal norms and values that are associated with American
hegemony.608
The Shanghai Spirit and Beijing’s development model are the two bases for the SCO. It
has generated what Andy Yee has described as “autocratic peace”. By strengthening the
authoritarian regimes in the region, stability has been maintained. In this way, the so
called universal values promoted by the West have been challenged.609
Therefore, beyond narrow national interests, the SCO has also been instrumental in
transferring emergent norms and practices associated with China. In terms of security,
the Shanghai Spirit is actually another version of China’s new security concept. As we
have seen in the above discussion, from the outset, China has tried to promote the
development of the SCO in a way which is different from a traditional military alliance.
China’s economic development and aid strategies, which come without the sort of
political conditions associated with the US and the international financial institutions,
are also welcomed its Central Asian neighbours. The impact of Chinese assistance is
especially evident in the energy trade, where Chinese investment and demand has
underpinned the rapid growth of the local energy industry. Consequently, the Chinese
mercantilist model helps to secure the power of the authoritarian regimes that control
the region’s resources. In this regard, the SCO has become a testing ground for China’s
evolving foreign policies and international relationships.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the reasons for China’s active participation in the Central
Asian cooperation process, specifically the SCO. It has examined four points pertaining
to China’s national interests, which are defined in distinctive ways in Central Asia.
608 Jan N. Pieters, Globalization or Empire?, (London: Routledge, 2004).
609 Andy Yee. "Autocratic Peace and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation." East Asia Forum, 11
May, 2011, accessed 2 October, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/05/11/autocratic-peace-and-
the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation/.
216
First, China needs a stable regional environment that is seen as the key to its domestic
social stability and territorial integrity. The so-called “three evils” faced by all the
countries in the region are viewed by the Chinese government as the biggest threat to its
sovereignty and security in the western region and the SCO offers a vehicle with which
to address these interconnected concerns.
Second, economic cooperation and integration between China and Central Asian
countries will help to develop the economy of China’s western region, which has been
relatively neglected compared to the east coast. Moreover, Central Asia is an important
route for trade between China, West Asia and Europe: a new silk road in the twenty-first
century.
Third, energy security is a major issue for China. As China’s economy is still booming,
it is expected that China’s energy consumption will continue to accelerate. China needs
natural resources and energy from Central Asia to fuel its modernisation.
Last but not least, strategically China needs a friendly regional environment that will
not contain China’s rise. This largely refers to balancing the increasing presence of the
US in the region since 9/11. As China sees its strategic space in East Asia as being
squeezed by the US, it seeks to minimise the US presence in Central Asia
China has tried to use the SCO as a platform for these traditional national interests.
What is distinctive in Central Asia, however, is the way Chinese policy elites are
attempting to pursue and even conceive of their national interests in this region. Not
only is cooperation in the area of non-traditional security recognised as an important
component of countering the “three evils”, but it is significant that it is the SCO itself
that is seen as an appropriate, “functional” vehicle for achieving these aims. In other
words, multilateralism and the promotion of common understandings of threats and
challenges to common security are best seen as pursued through multilateral auspices—
a judgement that stands in marked contrast to Chinese policy in Southeast Asia. Policy
reflects an intersection of contingent material circumstances and a shifting
understanding of the best way of dealing with it.
217
In critical arenas such as energy security, the SCO has thus provided a framework for
establishing good regional relations and pursuing national goals. Although most
cooperation in the field between China and Central Asian countries is still based on
bilateral rather than multilateral means, it is part of a larger regional context which is
surprisingly stable and cordial. Within this overarching regional context, economic
cooperation and even “pipeline politics” are played out in ways that reflect and
reinforce a region that remains relatively stable. The SCO has even played some role in
balancing the US power in the region, and negotiating the potentially different positions
of the various regional powers. While it is important not to overstate the importance and
capabilities of the SCO which remains relatively new and untested, it is perhaps the fact
that it exists at all and that China has played a pivotal role in its development that is of
greatest significance here.
At the very least China’s participation in the SCO is an important indicator of the
growing sophistication and ambition of its policy elites and the evolving ways they seek
to achieve China’s national interests. In this context, the SCO is a vital testing ground
for China to convey its ideas about the international system and practice its nascent
leadership role. As such, it arguably contributes to China’s efforts to transform the
current international order by using multilateral diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.
218
Chapter Six: East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: China’s Policies
toward APEC, ARF, APT and EAS
6.1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters, I have examined China’s regional policies in the three
sub-regions of Asia: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. I suggested that
China’s attitude and behaviour towards the different institutions and organisations in the
sub-regions varied in significant ways, even though there was an overall desire to
pursue the “national interest”. Although this way of analysing Chinese foreign policy in
separate regions is an illuminating heuristic, in reality, it is important to acknowledge
that all these sub-regions are linked with each other in terms of economic, political and
strategic relations. As outlined in the beginning of the thesis, the purpose in dividing
China’s surroundings into the three sub-regions is to identify the differences and
similarities in China’s pragmatic and flexible regional policy in different regional
contexts and functional areas, and compare the efficacy of China’s regional policies
toward different regions. This chapter, by contrast, demonstrates the possible limits to
this approach, especially where the boundaries of the region itself are less certain, and
where there are competing regional originations representing different visions of
possible regions and the purposes to which regional bodies might be put. As a result,
China’s foreign policy in the “Asia-Pacific” and “East Asian” regions highlight both the
arbitrary nature of regional definitions, and the practical challenge of developing a
suitable and consistent set of regional policies.
China’s regional policies are multi-faceted and operate on various levels, and the
complexity of the policy making process and domestic policy debate is illustrated in
China’s attitude toward East Asia or Asia-Pacific regional institutions. The key
219
institutions in this context include the APEC forum, the ARF, the APT and the EAS.
China joined APEC in 1991, the ARF in 1994, the APT in 1997, and the EAS in 2005.
Each of these East Asia and Asia–Pacific regional institutions has a different focus,
rationale and principal issue area. China’s policies toward these organisations also vary
as a consequence. Once again, analytical eclecticism provides insights into the differing
goals and motivations that drive policy in the various organisations.
In this chapter, therefore, I will address the following questions:
1. Why does China wish to participate in these regional institutions?
2. How has China’s policy evolved toward these different regional institutions?
3. What does China’s approach in these institutions and regions tell us about regional
policy more generally and Chinese policymakers” ability to accommodate potentially
competing priorities?
All these regional institutional interactions indicate the complexity of China’s foreign
policy. A comparison helps us develop a better understanding of the nature of China’s
regional cooperation with these institutions and the strategies China’s elites are
developing in response to both the growing importance of East Asia/the Asia Pacific,
and to the expanding number of institutions that seek to govern its development. In this
chapter, I will review the evolution of China’s participation in these regional institutions,
and explain China’s evolving attitudes towards these institutions. Consequently, the
following discussion revolves around the four East Asia and Asia–Pacific institutions,
examining China’s participation in each of them, before drawing out their overall
comparative significance.
220
6.2 China’s Policy toward the APEC
Nick Bisley argues that no regional institution in Asia or the Asia–Pacific has ever
attracted so much attention but become so ineffective as quickly as APEC.610
Part of
APEC’s difficulties flow from the fact that in a region with different levels of economic
development, cultural differences and various political systems, it is simply too difficult
to have a regional community like the European Union.611
It is even a challenge to
define where the boundary of the region actually lies, and which countries should be
members. In the last two decades, APEC has also faced challenges from other regional
institutions, such as the APT since 1997, and an enlarged EAS since 2010. APEC’s
original goal of trade liberalisation has not been fully achieved so far and has been
regarded as “a failed venture” as a result.612
However, China is still a regular participant
in the forum. Given that the member states of APEC have a population of 2.7 billion,
accounting for 40.5 per cent of the world population, 53 per cent of the world economy
and 43 per cent of world trade,613
China simply cannot ignore it. Indeed, APEC is
actually the only major meeting in the region in which the Chinese president has
participated every year. The question is why China is still active in the forum if it has
not brought delivered many concrete achievements.
610 Nick Bisley, "APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation," in Routledge Handbook of Asian
Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 350.
611 Philomena Murray, “Comparative regional integration in the EU and East Asia: Moving beyond
integration and snobbery”, International Politics 47, (2010): 308-323; Walter Mattli, The Logic of
Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
612Sung-Hoon Park and Hong-Youl Kim, "Increasing Sub-Regionalism within Apec and the Bogor
Goals: Stumbling Block or Building Block?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftswissenschaften [Journal of Social
Economics] 37(2006).143-68.
613 "Yatai Jingji Hezuo Zuzhi (Yatai Jinghe Zuzhi APEC) [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC)]." Xinhuanet, accessed 3 October, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-
10/11/content_598763.htm.
221
The origins of APEC
The birth of APEC was not a sudden event; as has been the case with other international
organisations. APEC experienced a long period of gestation and the trail-blazing
activities of other “Track II” organisations.614
It is widely believed that the realisation of
APEC was the result of a joint effort by Australia and Japan in the late 1980s.615
However, if we retrace APEC’s origins, the genesis of APEC can be found in the 1960s.
The famous Japanese scholar Kiyoshi Kojima initiated the idea of trade liberalisation in
the region, especially the idea of building free trade among the major developed
countries, such as Canada, Australia, the US, New Zealand and Japan.616
In 1968,
Kojima launched the Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), a
community of scholars in the region. In the same year, the industry elites in Asia-Pacific
founded the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). Possibly the most influential
forum in the region was the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), founded in
1980. The PECC is a dialogue between academics, business leaders and government
officials, each acting independently.617
Chinese scholars began to pay attention to
Pacific Rim cooperation from the early 1980s. For example, Ye Qixiang, from an
official think tank, wrote an article in 1984 to discuss the future of Pacific economic
cooperation. He argues that even though an economic community is hard to build in the
short term, more economic and trade cooperation would be pursued by regional
614 Lawrence Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International
Relations, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993). A simple definition on Track Two Diplomacy could be that
private individuals meet unofficially to find a common ground for international relations. For a short
history on Track Two Diplomacy, please see Charles Homans, "Track Ⅱdiplomacy: A Short History."
Foreign Policy, July/August, 2011.
615 Takashi Terada. "The Origins of Japan’s APEC Policy: Foreign Minister Takeo Miki’s Asia-Pacific
Policy and Current Implications." The Pacific Review 11, no. 3 (1998): 337-63.
616 Takashi Terada. "The Japanese Origins of Paftad: The Beginning of an Asian Pacific Economic
Community." (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1999).
617 Mark Beeson. Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: Asean, Apec and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2009).
222
countries and that China ought to take notice.618
Similarly, Huan Xiang, one of China’s
leading International Relations scholars after the Cultural Revolution, also argued that
China should take the initiative in Asia-Pacific cooperation.619
In order to learn from the
economic development experience of, and develop more economic cooperation with,
other regional countries, Huan Xiang suggested that Chinese leaders China should join
the PECC. China began to participate from 1986.620
Though all of the above institutions are informal and non-governmental in nature, the
concept of regional economic cooperation was becoming widespread. The idea of
building a Pacific free trade region and an economic cooperation organisation such as
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) became more
and more accepted.621
However, as critical juncture theory reminds us, fundamental
change is only likely to happen as a result of external pressure or an internal crisis that
breaks the pattern of the path dependency.622
The end of the Cold War was undoubtedly
such a crisis. Former Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke exploited the opportunity to
promote the foundation of APEC.623
The year 1989 changed the strategic environment of the region. Although the Soviet
Union had not yet collapsed, and East Europe and East Germany were still stable, Cold
War constraints were weakening. Gorbachev’s New Thinking announced the failure of
618 Qixiang Ye, "Taipingyang Diqu Jingji Hezuo Wenti De Youlai Yu Fazhan Qushi [the Origin and
Developmental Trend of the Pacific Regional Economic Cooperation]." Guoji Maoyi [International
Trade], no. 9 (1984): 22-26.
619 Xiang Huan, "Yatai Diqu Fazhan Qianjing Yu Huan Taipingyang Hezuo [the Prospect of the
Development in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Pacific Rim Cooperation]," Guoji Wenti Ziliao
[Materials for Internatioanl Studies], no. 4 (1985): 2-9.
620 Xinchuan Wang and Guodong Liang. "Chongzhen PECC [Restore the PECC]." Jingji, 23 February,
2006, accessed 3 October, http://biz.cn.yahoo.com/060223/147/g3ld.html
621 Christopher M. Dent, "APEC and Asia-Pacific Trans-Regionalism." in East Asian Regionalism,
(London: Routledge, 2008): 117-146.
622 Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." World Politics 59, (2007): 341-69.
623 Yasumasa Komori, "Asia’s Institutional Creation and Evolution." Asian Perspective 33, no. 3 (2009):
151-82.
223
the Soviet Union’s ideology.624
The end of the Cold War was a remarkable issue that
was very important for Asia–Pacific region, which had long been divided along
ideological lines.625
During the Cold War, ideologically opposed regional countries
simply could not increase economic cooperation easily, even if they wanted to.
Although the changing regional environment provided the potential for greater
economic cooperation, it was the regional integration developing in Europe and North
America in the 1980s that was a major challenge for regional leaders in East Asia,
Australia and New Zealand and which provided the trigger for action. With the passing
of the Single European Act and the conclusion of the North American free trade
agreement, those regional countries that had been relying on European and US markets
came under pressure as worries about possible protectionism in Europe and the US
surfaced. As most countries in the Asia–Pacific region, including Japan, the four tigers
(Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) and Australia, followed a broadly
export-oriented developmental model, trade liberalisation and continuing market access
was crucial. Japan and Australia in particular wanted to use a regional institution to lock
in the US and to ensure continuing access to its market.626
The Uruguay Round
negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had failed to make
progress, so countries in the Asia–Pacific sought the space for trade liberalisation at the
regional level.627
The US also hoped to influence East Asian countries’ domestic
economic policy and force East Asian economies to abolish their trade barriers.628
624 Joseph S. Nye, "Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War." Project-Syndicate, accessed 3
October, 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mikhail-gorbachev-and-the-end-of-the-
cold-war.
625 Gareth Evans, "The Asia Pacific Region after the Cold War," in The Pacific Rim Forum
(Beijing1994).
626 Bisley, “APEC”, 352.
627 Fred Bergsten. "APEC and World Trade: A Force for Worldwide Liberalization." Foreign Affairs 73,
no. 3 (1994): 20-26.
628 Ninggeng Wu and Wei Qiu. "APEC Chuxian De Lishi Biranxing Ji Qi Qianjing [the Emergence of
Apec: Historical Necessity and Prospects]." Beijing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal
of Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences)] 35 (1998): 20-28.
224
Against this backdrop, the finance ministers of the 12 Asia-Pacific countries held the
first meeting in Canberra in 1989, which marked the birth of APEC.629
China’s participation
Chinese policymakers had originally planned to join APEC as one of its founders.
However, following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China’s international reputation
deteriorated. It was not until two years later, in the 1991 meeting, that China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan (known in the forum as Chinese Taipei) were accepted as
members.630
APEC was one of the earliest multilateral mechanisms in which China
participated. Yet even before the foundation of APEC, Chinese scholars had already had
much discussion about possible active participation in the regional institutions. Liu
Jiangyong’s paper in 1988 is most interesting in this context. He argued that China
should use the opportunity of Pacific cooperation to further develop its economy,
especially by accessing the American and Japanese markets. He further suggested that
China’s participation in Asia-Pacific cooperation should be based on the following
principles: avoiding cooperation being dominated by powerful countries; limiting
cooperation to the areas of economics, science and technology, and culture; respecting
the autonomy and voluntarism of participants; mutual benefits and common
development; openness; and sustainable bilateral relationships.631
These principles
actually became the official basis of China’s APEC policy during the 1990s.
629 Dent, “APEC and Asia-Pacific Trans-regionalism”, 118.
630 Taiwan’s participation is constrained in economic affairs. In the early days, Taiwan, as the world
14th largest trading state plays even more important role than China in the economic sphere. It is the basis
for Taiwan’s participation. However, its president and premier are not allowed to participate the leaders’
summit, and Taiwan is rejected to be the chair of the APEC summit as well. China is very keen on the
“One China Policy” in the APEC forum. For an early discussion on Taiwan’s participation, see Gary
Klintworth, "China's Evolving Relationship with Apec," Internatonal Journal 50(1994/1995).488-515.
631 Jiangyong Liu, "Xian Jieduan Taipingyang Jingji Hezuo Xingshi [the Current Status of the Pacific
Economic Cooperation]." Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics], no. 12 (1988): 14-
20.
225
In fact, APEC reflects all the above features and they were prerequisites for China’s
participation. The most important one for China was that all APEC’s decisions should
be based on consensus. Mutual benefit, respect for difference and consensus building,
operation through consultation and exchange of views, and recognising the important
roles of private sectors were enshrined as the mode of operation of APEC in the 1991
Seoul meeting.632
Although such practices reflected the so-called “ASEAN Way” and
suited Asian participants who were nervous about Western-style legalism,633
the
decision making mechanism of consensus-building has been widely criticised for its
inefficiency634
—as will be seen in the following discussion about APEC’s effort to
promote trade liberalisation. APEC also follows the principle of “open regionalism”, or
not seeking exclusive policies that only benefit the countries of the region—something
China supports. For example, at the first informal leaders’ meeting of APEC countries
in 1993, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin stressed that APEC should be an open,
flexible and pragmatic economic cooperation forum and focused on consultation, rather
than a closed institutionalised economic group.635
In 1993, a report by the “Eminent Persons Group” led by C. Fred Bergsten tried to
define the main activities of APEC. After a series of negotiations, the member states
reached a consensus on the major task of APEC, namely, the three pillars: trade and
investment liberalisation, business facilitation, and economic and technical
cooperation.636
Although the objectives of the organisation have since changed (as will
be discussed later), the three pillars still form the basis of APEC, at least in name.
632 "Seoul Apec Declaration," in 1991 APEC Ministerial Meeting (Seoul1991).
633 Miles Kahler, “Legalization as a strategy: The Asia-Pacific case”, International Organization 54, no.
3 (2000): 549-571.
634 Johnny C. Chiang and Chen-Sheng Ho, "Assessment of APEC Process: Seeking Greater Efficiency"
(paper presented at the 2009 APEC Study Centers Consortium Conference, 2009).
635 Zemin Jiang, "Jiang Zemin Zhuxi Zai Apec Diyici Lingdaoren Feizhengshi Huiyi Shang De Jianghua
[President Jiang Zeming’s Speech in the First Leaders” Informal Meeting of Apec]." Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 20 November, 1993, 3 October, 2012,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_58/zyjh/t5236.htm.
636 Jianren Lu, "APEC 20 Nian: Huigu Yu Zhanwang [Apec Twenty Years: Review and Prospect]."
Guoji Maoyi Wenti [Journal of International Trade], no. 1 (2010): 3-9.
226
However, the problem is that member states have different views about these goals.
Members set objectives that fit with their own interests, which were not always easily
reconciled, especially given that the economic development of member states is at very
different stages. Developed countries tended to be more concerned with trade
liberalisation and the reduction of trade barriers, while developing countries were more
concerned with economic and technical cooperation.637
Chinese policymakers chose to
have a parallel strategy on developing economic and technical cooperation and the trade
liberalisation at the same time. China’s policy was clearly shown in Jiang Zemin’s 1996
speech in APEC when he said that “without highly effective economic and technical
cooperation, there will be no significant progress for the liberalisation of trade and
investment.”638
The most important task for APEC is the so-called Bogor Goals, which were initiated at
its second leaders” meeting in 1994. The Bogor Goals postulated that the developed
economies in APEC should realise free and open trade in the region in 2010, and
developing economies should achieve trade liberalisation by 2020.639
However, no
country in the region—with the possible exception of Australia640
—was keen to make a
unilateral sacrifice. Against this background, APEC began the Early Voluntary Sectoral
637 The leaders of Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation. 2012. The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
accessed 4 July 2012, http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/topic/index.php?did=16; Yasumasa Komori, “Asia’s
institutional creation and evolution,” Asian Perspective 33, no. 3 (2009):151-182.
638 Zemin Jiang, "Jiang Zemin Zhuxi Zai Apec Disici Lingdaoren Feizhengshi Huiyi Shang De Jianghua
[President Jiang Zemin’s Speech in the Fourth Leaders” Informal Meeting of Apec]." Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 25 November, 1996, accessed 3 October, 2012,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_58/zyjh/t5233.htm.
639 For a detailed assessment on the progress of the Bogor Goals, see "APEC 2010 Bogor Goals:
Achieving the APEC Bogor Goals Progress by Australia and the Region." (Canberra: The APEC Branch
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010).
640 Because Australia had actively championed the merits of trade liberalization in the region, its leaders
felt obliged to a policy of tariff reduction independently. See, Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut “The
Pacific: An application of a general theory of economic integration”, in, C.Fred Bergsten and Marcus
Noland Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System, (Institute for International Economics,
1993):183-223.
227
Liberalisation (EVSL) plan. Under this plan, countries could choose from nine specific
sectors to reduce tariff voluntarily. However, member states were generally not
particularly enthusiastic about achieving the goals of the EVSL.641
It was difficult to
achieve any real progress with the EVSL. The failure of the EVSL not only affected
trade liberalisation; more importantly, it caused a number of states to lose confidence in
the institution. For example, Japan, one of the original champions of APEC, chose to
retreat from its liberalization commitments because of domestic pressures.642
Consequently, regional states began to conclude bilateral agreements as a way of
pursuing their own national economic interests.643
However, this kind of activity was
contrary to the principles of openness of APEC. Chinese scholars were particularly
critical of the idea of EVSL. China’s leading APEC expert Lu Jianren argues that the
EVSL was doomed to fail because the goal of the EVSL is even more ambitious than
the WTO and even harder to realise, especially in the aftermath of the AFC. 644
Equally
importantly, the process of making the EVSL deals was completely at odds with
APEC’s principles. EVSL agreements only give member states the power to approve or
veto, which is not based on APEC’s voluntary way. Chinese policymakers are
particularly opposed to the effort by the US to make APEC a more formal rule-making
organisation.645
The AFC in 1997 and 1998 was another blow to APEC and a major critical juncture as
far as regional institution-building was concerned. APEC was not capable of dealing
641 Dent, “APEC and Asia-Pacific Trans-regionalism”, 127-131.
642 For a detailed analysis on Japan’s decision making process on EVSL, see Tatsushi Ogita, "Japan’s
Policy Making in the APEC EVSL Consultations: Its Actors, Process and Interpretations." (APEC Study
Centre, Institute of Developing Economies, 2000.)
643 Jeffrey J. Schott "APEC and Trade Liberalization: Towards Greater Integration." Business Times, 10
November 2009; Christopher M. Dent, New Free Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific, (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2006).
644 Jianren Lu, "Yatai Jinghe Zuzhi Cunzai De Wenti Ji Qi Qianjing [the Problem in APEC and Its
Prospect]." Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [ World Economics and Politics], no. 12 (1999): 60-64.
645 Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang. "China, Apec and Economic Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific."
Journal of East Asian Affairs 13, no. 2 (1999): 361-411.
228
with the difficulties faced by the East Asian economies.646
The US and international
financial institutions tried to promote reform in the East Asian economies, which
stimulated East Asian countries to form their own regional community, the APT (see
discussion in this chapter). APEC faced competition from the APT, and the sense of
community was further weakened.647
In dealing with the AFC, Chinese leaders tried to
utilise the opportunity to promote China’s ideas about a possible new international
political and economic order. For example, President Jiang made three suggestions for
cooperation in the Sixth Leaders’ Summit of APEC, which was held in the aftermath of
the crisis. Jiang called on developed countries to help the developing countries in the
region, and for the reform of the international financial institutions. He emphasised that
the sovereignty of the countries affected by the AFC should be respected.648
In contrast
with Western countries’ critiques on the East Asian modal of capitalism, China’s
comments won approval from regional countries and helped improve China’s overall
status and place in regional politics.
The agendas of APEC have also expanded from economic cooperation to other areas
such as anti-terrorism, environmental protection, disaster relief, etc. and China is
actually playing a role in this process. The Shanghai Summit was held immediately
after the September 11, 2001. China, as the chair of that year’s APEC, agreed to bring
the anti-terrorism issue on the table.649
However, the expansion of APEC’s agenda has
646 Vinod K. Aggarwal and Kun-Chin Lin. "APEC as an Institution." in Assessing APEC’s Progress:
Trade, Ecotech, and Institutions, ed. Richard E. Feinberg and Ye Zhao, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), 177-
90.
647 Douglas Webber, “Two funerals and a wedding? The ups and downs of regionalism in East Asia and
Asia-Pacific after the Asian crisis”, The Pacific Review 14, no. 3 (2001): 339-372.
648 Zemin Jiang, "Jiang Zemin Zhuxi Zai Yatai Jinghe Zuzhi Diliuci Lingdaoren Feizhengshi Huiyi
Shang De Jianghua [President Jiang Zemin’s Speech in the Sixth Leaders” Informal Meeting of Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum]." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
18 November, 1998, accessed 3 October, 2012,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_58/zyjh/t4474.htm.
649 "APEC Meeting Concluded with the Leaders” Declaration." China Daily, 21 October, 2001, accessed
3 October, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/english/20933.htm.
229
been criticised as it may dilute the attention of the organisation, which has had great
difficulty in pursuing the original goal of trade liberalisation.650
Despite some of APEC’s problems and shortcomings, one of its major achievements
was arguably the formation of the Leaders” Summit. Since the Seattle Summit in 1993,
the Leaders’ Summit has become the highest profile and most notable meeting in the
Asia–Pacific. The Leaders’ summit has been important for solving the bureaucratic
deadlock and promoting the development of specific agendas.651
APEC has also
provided an opportunity for leaders to gather, and has rather ironically become a major
platform for bilateral diplomacy between the regional countries. In the case of China,
APEC has provided it with opportunities for bilateral interaction with many important
countries of the region, most notably with the US. This helps to explain China’s
continuing interest in a support for APEC.
China has also tried to become something of a policy entrepreneur in the forum,
developing its own ideas about regional development. For example, at the 2006 APEC
Summit, China’s suggestion about building a “harmonious Asia–Pacific” was included
in the statement of the summit. Prominent Chinese scholar Zhang Yunling argues that
the adoption of China’s harmonious conception shows that members of the Asia–Pacific
have changed their views on promoting the development of the region and dealing with
relationships in the region. The adoption of this new idea by APEC also demonstrates
the increasing influence of China.652
650 Jae-Seung Lee, "Beyond Trade Liberalization: Rethinking the APEC Agenda." (paper presented in
APEC Study Center Consortium Conference. Jeju, Korea, 2005); Jae-Seung Lee, "Rethinking Apec’s
Security Agenda: The Challenges of Functional Expansion." Issues & Studies 46, no. 4 (2010): 73-100.
651 Bisley, “APEC”, 358-359.
652 Yunling Zhang, "Tuidong Goujian Hexie Yatai Diqu De Yiyi [the Significance of the Promoting the
Construction of a Harmonious Asia-Pacific Region]." Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific
Studies], no. 1 (2007): 3-4.
230
At the 16th
Informal Leadership Meeting on 23 November 2008 in Lima, Peru, President
Hu Jintao discussed how to deal with the challenges of the world financial crisis. He
used the opportunity to initiate new thinking about restructuring the international
political economy. He specifically advocated strengthening member countries’
macroeconomic management and information exchange and maintaining international
financial stability; building new international financial order and looking after
developing economies” interests; and developing a more suitable developmental model
and solving the deeper problems of economic development.653
No matter how such
suggestions or ideas may be received, their development shows that Chinese leaders
have become more and more confident about using organisations such as APEC as
platforms to influence regional politics and economic policies.
To sum up, the rationale for China’s participation in the APEC has gone through an
evolutionary process. In the early 1990s, China joined APEC mainly because it served
its economic reform and open door policies. In addition, as Ravenhill argues, China was
also motivated by a desire to prevent the US and/or Japan from dominating regional
processes of cooperation. China’s APEC experience also helped to prepare it for the
accession to the WTO.654
More recently, with China’s economic and political power
increasing in the new century, China has used APEC as a platform to play an influential
role in reshaping the regional political and economic order by proving new ideas and
initiatives. There has certainly been a learning process at work here that is reflected in
China’s evolving goals and participation, but it is not simply a one-way street. Chinese
policymakers are increasingly confident about using organisations such as APEC to
653 Hu, Jintao. "Hu Jintao Zai Yatai Jinghe Zuzhi Di Shiliu Ci Lingdaoren Feizhengshi Huiyi Shang De
Jianghua (Quanwen) [Hu Jintao’s Speech in the Sixteenth Leaders” Informal Meeting of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation Organization (Full Text)]." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China, 23 November, 2008, accessed 3 October,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_58/zyjh/t523400.htm.
654 John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
231
promote their own views and ensure that they are not dominated by other powerful
regional actors—however the region is actually defined.
6.3 China’s Policy toward the ARF
APEC is, as we have seen, an organisation that is primarily concerned with promoting
economic cooperation, and we would expect that liberal ideas about the logic of
economic interdependence ought to apply and help to explain actor behaviour. And to a
large extent they do, China’s realist traditions of foreign policymaking notwithstanding.
The ARF, by contrast, is a regional forum which focuses primarily on security issues in
the Asia-Pacific region, and we might expect that realist calculations of the national
interest would predominate and realist theory would be most appropriate for
understanding state interaction. Again, the realists have much to tell us,655
but they
cannot provide a complete story, and so I draw on a range of insights to develop a fuller
picture of China’s participation in the ARF and the impact of the ARF on Chinese
policymakers.
Like APEC, the ARF has been criticised by the likes of Japan, which considers it has
failed to live up to expectations.656
As its name suggests, the ARF still exists as a forum,
and has not formed a concrete multilateral security organisation. Moreover, it now faces
competition from other organisations, for example, the increasingly important Shangri-
La Dialogue, the EAS and the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).
However, the ARF has arguably made some important contributions to regional stability
and peace. As the earliest multilateral security dialogue in the region it must have
655 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, (London:
RoutledgeCurzon: 2003).
656 Takeshi Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy and the ASEAN Regional Forum: The Search for
Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
232
played some role in the continuing “East Asian peace”,657
that is such a surprising
feature of the region and dramatically at odds with realist expectations.658
Significantly,
the ARF was the first regional security mechanism in which China participated since the
end of the Cold War. It was also an important vehicle for the learning process in which
China’s policymakers adapted to multilateral security mechanisms and accepted certain
international norms and rules,659
which will be analysed in detail in this section.
The ARF was founded in 1994 by ASEAN. However, the idea of building a multilateral
security meeting in the region can be dated back to 1990, when it was initiated by
Australia and Canada, who wanted to build a an organisation like the Conference for
Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe.660
In 1991, when the Japanese foreign
minister suggested developing the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) into a
multilateral political dialogue mechanism at the PMC meeting, however, the response of
ASEAN was unenthusiastic.661
More importantly, the US also opposed such a
multilateral arrangement in the Asia–Pacific because it would undermine its hub-spoke
alliance structure in the region.662
The attitude of ASEAN changed in 1992 with the dramatic transformation of the
international situation. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the possible withdrawal of
the US as a major strategic actor in East Asia increased the concerns of ASEAN
657 Mikael Weissman, The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peace Building,
(Basingstoke: Palgrave: 2012).
658 Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for rivalry: Prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia”, International Security
18, no. 3 (1993/94), 5-33; John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise." Current History 105. (April,
2006): 160-62.
659 Alastair I. Johnston, “Socialization in international institutions: The ASEAN way and international
relations theory”, in, G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno International Relations and the Asia-
Pacific. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003):107-162.
660 Takeshi Yuzawa, The ASEAN Regional Forum: challenges and prospects. in Routledge Handbook of
Asian Regionalism, ed by M. Beeson and R. Stubbs. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012): 339-340.
661 Yuzawa, “The ASEAN Regional Forum”, 339.
662 Ibid.
233
countries about regional security in the Post-Cold War Era.663
The ASEAN countries
hoped to build a regional security dialogue mechanism that could guarantee the
continued strategic engagement of the US in the region and prevent the re-militarisation
of Japan and the expansion of China.664
China’s participation
In July 1993, an informal dinner organised by ASEAN was held in Singapore. During
the dinner, the foreign ministers of ASEAN and dialogue countries agreed to found the
ARF as a ministerial-level and multilateral dialogue platform with which to consider the
political and security issues of the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese policymakers supported
the initiative, but Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen stressed that the ARF should
not become an organisation aimed at any particular country, any particular region or any
specific issue; China feared being in a vulnerable position on this multilateral
platform.665
As Johnston points out, the concomitant Chinese insistence on consensus
and voluntarism is not only in keeping with the ASEAN Way, but also ensured that
“China would never be on the losing side in any majoritarian voting system”.666
China’s acceptance of the idea of a regional security dialogue was the result of the
international background during that time. When the ARF was founded, the
international context for China was actually not very propitious. With the end of the
Cold War, there was widespread discussion of the so-called China Threat Theory (see
chapter 2). Further, after the 1989 Tiananmen incident, China was facing international
663 Evelyn Goh, “Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing regional security
strategies”, International Security 32, no. 3 (2008): 113-157.
664 Pingshan Tang, “Luetan dongmeng diqu luntan [A brief discussion on the ASEAN Regional Forum],”
Yatai Yanjiu [Asia-Pacific Studies], no. 6 (1994):43-47.
665 Anonymous, Zhongguo tong dongnanya guojia lianmeng de guanxi [The relationship between China
and the Association of Southeast AsianNations], in Zhongguo Waijiao Gailan (1994) [China’s Foreign
Affairs (1994)], ed. by Jianzhang Pei. (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1995): 570-71.
666 Alastair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Relations, 1980-2000, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press; 2008), 163.
234
isolation. At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, several confrontations occurred over
the South China Sea issue, most seriously, the military confrontation with Vietnam in
1988.667
At the ASEAN foreign ministers” meeting in July 1992, ASEAN passed the
Declaration on the South China Sea, which was the first collective consensus on the
South China Sea issue.668
Chinese policymakers felt that it was necessary to use a
multilateral forum to respond to the pressure of ASEAN’s collective behaviour and
prevent the formation of any possible alliance against China.669
Another issue that
influenced China’s behaviour was Taiwan’s Look South Policy, which was initiated in
1993. Taiwan has tried to build closer ties with ASEAN countries and expand its
diplomatic space. Consequently, participating in the ARF to ensure that the One China
policy was upheld by ASEAN countries was another important motivation for the
mainland.670
China’s decision to join the ARF, the first of its kind in the field of security
cooperation, was prompted by a complex calculus, which although it had realist
components was to be conducted through multilateral channels. This in itself was a
measure of how far Chinese thinking about foreign policy had come.
In July 1994, the first meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok. In the meeting, the
Chinese foreign minister made five suggestions for regional security cooperation, the
first being that cooperation should be based on the Charter of the United Nations and
the five principles for peaceful coexistence, with the aim being to build a new type of
international relationship. Secondly, equal, mutually beneficial and cooperative
economic relationships between countries should be strengthened for the common goal
667 “China and Vietnam: a timeline of conflict,” CNN, 27 June, 2011, accessed 4 July 2012,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-27/world/china.vietnam.timeline_1_china-and-vietnam-paracels-spratly-
islands?_s=PM:WORLD.
668 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea,” 22 July,
1992, accessed 4 July 2012, http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm.
669 Yiding Chen, “Dongmeng diqu luntan de fazhan dui zhongguo anquan huanjing de yingxiang [The
influence of the development of ASEAN Regional Forum on China’s security environment],” Dongnanya
Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia], no.4 (2003):56-58.
670 See Jie Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia.
(Northampton, M.A.: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, 2002.)
235
of economic development. Thirdly, the principle of equal consultation and peaceful
resolution should be followed when dealing with disputes among nations. Fourth, the
armament race should be discontinued. The final suggestion was that the nuclear non-
proliferation policy should be upheld.671
These general principles were not new to China
or its neighbours. However, they formed part of China’s effort to take part in the ARF’s
agenda-setting and reflected an increasingly sophisticated understanding of how
multilateral institutions and even international norms could be utilized to pursue China’s
foreign policy goals.
Working on the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) to promote security cooperation
in the region became stage one of regional security cooperation after the foundation of
the forum.672
At the second ARF meeting in 1995, the countries agreed on some benign
CBMs, such as the issue of the defence white paper by the member states, and
registration with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA).673
Since
2004, the ARF Security Policy Conference has provided a platform for communication
between defence officials, an important contribution to regional security.674
However,
because all agenda items need to be based on voluntary consensus, and because ARF
members disputed the method of achieving increased military transparency, the CBM
has achieved limited success.675
Although measures such as the Annual Security
Outlook and the communication between Defence Academies and Universities may
671 Policy Research Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the P.R.C., “Zhongguo tong dongmeng
diqu luntan de guanxi [The relationship between China and ASEAN Regional Forum],” in Zhongguo
Waijiao [China’s Foreign Affairs], (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chuban She, 1996).
672 Stage two is the development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Stage three is the development
of conflict-resolution mechanisms. See “The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,” Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, 1995, accessed 4 July 2012, http://www.aseansec.org/3635.htm.
673 Yuzawa, “the ASEAN Regional Forum”, 340.
674 See “ARF Security Policy Conference - An Agreed Concept Paper,” ASEAN Regional Forum,
accessed 4 July, 2012,
http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/library/Terms%20of%20References%20and%20Concept%20Pa
pers/Concept%20Paper%20-%20ARF%20Security%20Policy%20Conference.pdf.
675 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Neither Scepticism nor Romanticism: the ASEAN Regional Forum as a
Solution for the Asia-Pacific Assurance Game,” The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (2006): 219-237.
236
have helped increase the understanding between members in the security field, this did
not fundamentally assuage the concerns of member states about the uncertainty of
regional security, as we can see in the recent case of the South China Sea conflict.
China’s participation in the CBM has undergone an evolution. Initially, when China
joined the ARF it was cautious and suspicious. As we have seen in Chapter three, only
in and after the AFC, did Chinese policymakers seize the opportunity to have a more
active policy on regional cooperation. From 1997 to 2010, China held 17 Confidence
Building inter-sessional meetings, which was the highest number among the non-
ASEAN countries.676
During this period, Thailand and Singapore held the most inter-
sessional meetings of the ASEAN members, also 17 times respectively.677
The meetings
held by China covered subjects including disaster relief, non-proliferation, confidence
building, counter-narcotics, and defence and security policy. China’s participation was
very active. It hosted these conferences, set agendas and contributed ideas. Among all
the meetings held by China, the topics of defence policy and security issues were the
most discussed.678
China tried to show its good faith in increasing military transparency.
With respect to CBMs between 1995 and 2005, the forum established 51 measures.
Nine of them were proposed by China.679
These proposals were passed by the ARF and
implemented.
Preventive Diplomacy (PD) was set as the second stage of the ARF security cooperation.
However, the development of PD in the ARF has not been easy due to the non-
676 See Jian Zhang, “Zhongguo Canyu Dongmeng Diqu Luntan de Jincheng yu Mubiao [The Process
and Objectives for China’s Participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum]” (Masters diss., China Foreign
Affairs University, 2011): 18.
677 Ibid.
678 Ibid., 20..
679 Huanrong Xiao and Hong Zhu, “Canyu, Jieshou yu Jiangou - Yi 1997-2005 Nian Zhongguo Canyu
Dongmeng Diqu Luntan de Guifan Jiangou Weili [Participation, Acceptance and Construction - Taking
the Case of China’s Construction of Norms in ASEAN Regional Forum in 1997-2005],” Dongnanya
Yanjiu [Southeast Asian Studies], no. 4 (2009): 40-45.
237
interference principle which is held by ASEAN.680
Beijing also maintains that PD
should be based on non-interference principle and consensus building mechanism.681
The different understanding on the concept of PD between member countries of ARF
leads to the limited implementation of any concrete progress on this area.682
Since the late 1990s, the ARF has begun to focus more on non-traditional security.
Especially after 9/11, the ARF has enhanced its anti-terrorism cooperation dimension in
forum activities.683
In June 2003, the first Desk-top exercise was held by the ARF to
simulate anti-terror cooperation.684
The ARF also strengthened cooperation on maritime
security and disaster relief. The ARF played an important role in confronting the threat
of piracy in the Malacca strait and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean. For example, at the
10th
ARF, an ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to
Maritime Security was released in June 2003.685
In the 14th
ARF in 2007, the ARF
General Guidelines for Disaster Relief Cooperation was adopted.686
In 2009, the first
field exercise of the ARF was held in the Philippines from 4-8 May to practice an
international humanitarian relief following a hypothetical super-typhoon, joining in by
14 countries.687
China has been quite active in promoting non-traditional security
cooperation in ARF. China submitted its Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the
Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues in 2002 to ARF. In the paper, China states its
680 “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy,” The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations, 2001, accessed 5 July, 2012, http://www.aseansec.org/3571.htm.
681 Shixin Zhou, “Shilun Zhongguo dui Dongmeng de Hezuo Anquan Zhengce [An Analysis on China’s
Cooperative Security Policy towards ASEAN]. Chuangxin [Innovation], no. 2 (2010):5-9.
682 Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A
Failure in Practice”, In RSIS Working Paper, (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
2009).
683“Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation”, accessed 5 July 2012,
http://www.globalct.org/resources_factSheets_arf.php
684 Jurgen Haacke, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: from dialogue to practical security cooperation?”
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3(2009): 429.
685 Ibid.
686 Ibid.
687 Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Exercise a Significant
Milestone”, accessed 5 July 2012. http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/2009/126073.htm.
238
principles on non-traditional cooperation, which are: trans-national cooperation is
needed to tackle with the trans-national problems; cooperation should be in all possible
forms and taken in a step by step manner; preventing a potential conflict from
happening is better than solving it afterwards; settlement of traditional security
problems may help to the solution of non-traditional security cooperation; and the
principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference should be upheld.688
China has hosted many conferences under the auspices of the ARF to discuss possible
ways of enhancing cooperation.689
Despite this, the effectiveness of the ARF’s institutions and cooperation has also been
questioned. In particular, many people have criticised the leadership of ASEAN, and
pointed to ASEAN’s inability to form a coherent policy.690
For example, in the sixth
senior officials’ meeting in 1999, the US representative suggested that the ARF be co-
chaired by an ASEAN country and a non-ASEAN country, and that a secretariat be
established.691
However, this initiative received a cold response, as the ASEAN
countries did not want to give up their leadership. Significantly, China supported the
leadership of ASEAN in the forum. As Chinese scholars Ma Weimin and Sun Jian
suggest, ASEAN’s leadership role can limit the intervention of external powers.
Moreover, ASEAN’s position on democracy, human rights and other issues is similar to
China’s.692
Despite the problems described above, the ARF is still significant as a platform for
dialogue and consultation. The ARF plays a role in restricting the behaviour of the
688 “China’s Position Paper on Enhanced Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues”,
accessed 5 July 2012. http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/t15318.htm.
689 Zhang, “Zhongguo Canyu Dongmeng”, 15-8.
690 Paul Lim, “ASEAN’s role in the ASEAN Regional Forum: will ASEAN remain in the driver’s seat? -
A European Perspective”, Dialogue + Cooperation, no. 2(2003): 5-11.
691 Yuzawa, the ASEAN Regional Forum
692 Weimin Ma and Jian Sun, “Dongmeng diqu luntan de fazhan, zuoyong yu zhongguo de zhengce
xuanze [The ASEAN Regional Forum: its developments, functions and China’s policy options]”, Heping
yu Fazhan [Peace and Development], no.3 (2011): 63-67.
239
members of the forum and this can suit China’s interests, although it can also inhibit it,
too. Although the ARF has no compelling force on the member states, it can apply
diplomatic and political pressure. For example, on the South China Sea issue, the forum
has put a great deal of pressure on China, even if it is difficult to know how effective
that has been given recent developments.693
In the 2010 ARF meeting, China was
criticised for its increasingly assertive policy, although more recent meetings have
revealed major divisions within the ASEAN states.694
The US has also demonstrated a
renewed strategic commitment to the South China Sea issue.695
In the 2011 ARF
meeting, guidelines to implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct were agreed by
China and ASEAN, which represented some potential progress in resolving these
tensions.696
The ARF also provides an important platform for the meeting of the foreign ministers in
the region. This is particularly important for those countries that have tensions between
them. For example, many deadlocks between the US and China were broken within the
ARF. After the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
2001 air crash in the South China Sea, the US and Chinese foreign ministers resumed
contact in the ARF. As Yuzawa observes, choosing to meet in the ARF could avoid the
problem of national prestige. Issues such as which country proposes the meeting first
693 Max Boot, “China starts to claim the seas”, Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2012, accessed 10 August,
2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304782404577486302897095274.html
694 Patrick Barta and Carlos Tejada, “Sea dispute upends Asian summit”, Wall Street Journal, 15 July,
2012, accessed 10 August, 2012.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303919504577524133983292716.html
695 Daniel Ten Kate and Nicole Gaouette, “Clinton Signals U.S. Role in China Territorial Disputes after
ASEAN Talks”, bloomberg.com, 23 July, 2007, accessed 5 July 2012.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-23/u-s-says-settling-south-china-sea-disputes-leading-
diplomatic-priority-.html.
696 Daljit Singh, “South China Sea Developments at ASEAN Regional Forum”, eastasiaforum.org,
accessed 5 July 2012. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/03/south-china-sea-developments-at-the-
asean-regional-forum.
240
sometimes can produce conflicts.697
Operating through the ARF can allow countries to
save face, still an important consideration for Chinese policymakers.
By participating in the ARF, China has achieved several goals. First, the ARF was a
platform for China to promote its ideas about its “peaceful rise” and undermine the
China Threat Theory.698
China’s active participation in the ARF showed that China was
willing to accept a degree of self-restraint, which was useful for reassuring surrounding
countries, as we have seen in Chapter Three. China’s active engagement with the
regional multilateral mechanism did much to change China’s image into one as a
relatively benign power, at least until 2010. Second, Chinese policymakers also
succeeded in preventing the development of Taiwanese independence as a force in
regional affairs. Because of China’s objection, Taiwan was not able to join the ARF and
even Track II platforms such as the Council of Security Cooperation for the Asia Pacific
(CSCAP), which is closely linked with the ARF.699
Third, as the ARF was an important
institution for maintaining regional stability, it was also in China’s interest to promote a
better and more stable surrounding environment by participating in the forum. As
suggested by Liu Shan, the former president of the China Foreign Affairs University,
China was able to use multilateralism to balance the influence of the US and promote
the multi-polarisation of regional and international relations.700
However, it is important to recognize that while China has been able to utilise and
benefit from ARF membership, this has also affected China, or its elite policymakers, to
be more precise. China’s participation in the ARF has also been part of a continuing
697 Yuzawa, “The ASEAN Regional Forum”, 347.
698 Simon Rabinovitch, “The rise of an image-conscious China”, China Security 4, no.3 (2008): 33-47.
699 Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power (London:
Routledge, 2005).
700 Cited in Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Zhongguo canyu dongmeng zhudao de diqu jizhi de liyi fenxi [An
analysis of China’s interests in involvement in the ASEAN-led regional regimes]”, Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 9 (2004): 53-59.
241
socialisation process.701
We can see how Chinese policy elites’ ideas have changed in
regard to multilateral security cooperation. Initially, they had doubts about joining the
ARF, as they worried that the ARF would be dominated by the US and would be used
as a mechanism to “contain” China. This was why China originally joined the ARF only
as a consultative member in 1994.702
After a period of participation in the ARF,
however, China found that the forum was not controlled by the US, and China gradually
adapted to the operations of the regional multilateral mechanism. Chinese policy elites
participating in the ARF have gradually changed their approach, from questioning
multilateralism to gradually accepting the concept of multilateral security.703
China’s policymakers have gradually learned how to use the forum to express their own
concerns and make suggestions that suit policymakers’ conceptions of the national
interest. For instance, at the second meeting of the ARF in July 1995, foreign minister
Qian suggested that its members should gradually reduce maritime and space detection
activities; that the joint military exercises that set another member as the imaginary
enemy should be stopped; and that the forum members should be informed of any joint
military exercise which observers should be invited to monitor.704
In fact, all these
suggestions reflected China’s own concerns about counterbalancing the influence of the
US and its allies.
701 For a detailed analysis, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions,
1980-2000. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
702 See Rabinovitch, “The rise of an image-conscious China”.
703 Chien-Peng Chung, “China’s Approaches to the Institutionalization of Regional Multilateralism”,
Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 57(2008): 747 – 764; Christopher R. Hughes, “Nationalism and
multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy: Implications for Southeast Asia”, Pacific Review 18, no.
1(2005):119-135; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “China’ s evolving multilateralism in Asia”, in, Kent E. Calder
and Francis Fukuyama East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability (Baltimore: John
Hopkins Press, 2008):109-142; Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, “International multilateralism with
Chinese characteristics”, in China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security, ed.
Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne (London: Routledge, 2008), 3-18.
704 Policy Research Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Zhongguo tong Dongmeng Diqu Luntan
de Guanxi [The relationship between China and ARF]”, in China’s Foreign Affairs (Beijing: World
Knowledge Publishing House, 1996).
242
However, as Chinese policy elites had anticipated when China joined the ARF, the
multilateral platform also restricted China’s behaviour.705
As the situation in the South
China Sea became more intense, the ARF became a place for the countries of the region
to criticise and put pressure on China. The ARF consequently represents an interesting
insight into the evolving nature of China’s regional policy. Given that the ARF is
mainly a security-issues focused forum, we might expect an old-fashioned notion of
realism might prevail and explain China’s actions. As we have seen, however, the
motivations for China’s regional policies in this venue are more complex and even have
emerging normative components. China’s participation demonstrates a surprising
degree of flexibility and pragmatism that is shaping its overall regional policy and
requires a complex, multi-dimensional explanation. Certainly China has tried to use the
forum to protect its perceived national interests, but it has done so in ways that
recognize the efficacy of multilateral institutions in which promote its own ideas and
even create new norms such as cooperative security. The current crisis in the South
China Sea represents an important test of the ARF’s ability to influence China’s
behaviour and the degree to which outside pressure actually matters to Chinese
policymakers.
6.4 China’s Policy toward the APT
Compared with APEC and the ARF, China is much more active in the APT. As the only
regional multilateral mechanism that excludes the US, the APT has been seen as the
main vehicle for East Asian regional cooperation. However, after over a decade of
development, it has also faced challenges especially with the perceived strategic return
of the US and the enlargement of the EAS. The future of the APT is consequently
uncertain. As I shall explain in this section, China’s participation and policy has
705 Qingsong Chen and Xiaohong Wan, "Dongmeng Quyu Anquan Jizhi Chutan [an Exploration on the
Asean Regional Security Mechanism]," Nanyang Wenti Yanjiu [Southeast Asian Affairs] No. 2(1994).
39-42.
243
contributed to the development of a narrower conception of the region and made the
APT the most important mechanism in East Asia. However, it is also clear that some of
China’s neighbours are concerned about its increasing power and reluctant to further the
mechanism. On balance, China’s status and role have become the key determinants of
the APT’s future.
As with the other regional institutions, the APT has a specific historical background.
The idea of building an exclusive regional organisation was conceived by Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir, who proposed the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) in the
early 1990s.706
However, this idea was opposed by the US. The US put pressure on
regional countries not to join, which led to the proposal being rejected. Japan actually
backed and even contributed to the birth of Mahathir’s proposal initially but finally
chose to follow its strategic ally, the US, rather than taking the leadership of East
Asia.707
During this period, China’s economic influence was still not significant. The
relationship between China and ASEAN was in its early stages and the formal dialogue
between the two sides had just begun. However, Chinese leaders did show interest and
sympathy in Malaysia’s initiative. When Malaysian head of state Azlan Shah of Perak
visited China in 1991, then Chinese Premier Li Peng told him that China believed that
EAEC would play an active role in the regional economic cooperation and wished it
success.708
However, as Chinese scholar Wang Zhile pointed out in a paper published in
1992, as EAEC would be hard to realise given that the US strongly opposed it, China’s
best strategy was to support it rhetorically but not participate.709
706 See Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN plus Three: Emerging East Asian regionalism?” Asian Survey 42 (3),
2002, 440-455.
707 Personal interview with a retired expert from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who was an
active figure in the early period of interaction between China and ASEAN in late 1980s and early 1990s,
Beijing, 25 November 2011.
708 “Woguo duiwai guanxi dashi ji (1991 nian 9 yue-11 yue) [Events of China’s Foreign Relations
(September - November 1991)]”, Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies] no.1 (1992): 53-62.
709 Zhile Wang, “Zhongguo canjia yatai quyu hezuo de mubiao xuanze [The choice of China in
participating the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation]”, Yatai Jingji [Asia-pacific Economic Review], no.5
(1992):1-6.
244
While Mahathir did not give up his idea of an exclusive form of East Asian regional
cooperation, it took the shock of the AFC in1997 and 1998 to make it happen. As
discussed in Chapter Three, the AFC was a key catalyst on the cooperation among East
Asian countries. The Western countries and the Internal Monetary Fund (IMF),
dominated by the US, did not “bail out” the East Asian economies in the way that East
Asian countries had hoped. On the contrary, “the West” seemed more interested in
opening up the markets of East Asian countries, and forcing them to reform their
economic policy in the direction of a more Anglo-American model of capitalism.710
The
“rescue package” from the IMF was regarded as threatening the East Asian countries’
economic sovereignty, which led to the renaming of the AFC as the “IMF crisis” by
some countries in the region.711
Given this background, East Asian countries wanted to
develop ways of becoming more self-reliant. A regional mechanism that could
minimize the negative influence of external forces was seen to be urgently needed.712
Mahathir invited the leaders of the three Northeast Asian countries, China, South Korea
and Japan, the so called “plus three”, to have an informal meeting together in 1997,
which marked the beginning of the APT process. The meeting’s symbolic meaning was
especially important as it was the first time the East Asian countries’ leaders came
together without external powers. The process of APT only became institutionalised
after the Haoni Summit in 1998, with the name “APT” coming into common use after
the finance ministers’ meeting in March 1999.713
In the Manila conference in 1999, the
710 Walden Bello, “East Asia: On the eve of the great transformation?” Review of International Political
Economy 5, no.3 (1998): 424-444; Rodney B. Hall, “The discursive demolition of the Asian development
model”, International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): 71-99.
711 Elaine Hutson, and Colm Kearney, “The Asian financial crisis and the role of the IMF: A Survey”,
Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 4, no. 3 (1999): 393-412.
712 Mark Beeson, “ASEAN plus Three and the rise of reactionary regionalism” Contemporary Southeast
Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 251-268.
713 Takashi Terada, “ASEAN Plus Three: becoming more like a normal regionalism?” In Routledge
Handbook of Asian Regionalism, edited by M. Beeson and R. Stubbs. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, 364.
245
Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation was published, which defined the key areas
of cooperation in the economic and social fields, including economic cooperation,
monetary and financial cooperation, social and human resources development, scientific
and technical development, cultural and information area, and development
cooperation.714
It became a guiding document for the future development of the
mechanism. Since then, the APT has covered more than twenty fields and includes
summits, fourteen minister-level meetings, nineteen senior official-level meetings,
eighteen technology-level meetings and several Track II diplomatic mechanisms.715
Though the development of the APT was greatly driven by the crisis, the rationale for
different parties to attend the mechanism varied. For ASEAN, attempting to maintain an
effective balance of power has always been a feature of the statecraft of ASEAN.716
The
AFC also provided China with a good opportunity to build its leadership credentials in
East Asia.717
China’s policy of maintaining the value of the renminbi, rather than
devaluing it, won great approval and gratitude from regional countries.718
Through the
platform of the APT, China has made several initiatives to promote the financial
cooperation. For example, at the 1998 summit, Vice President Hu Jintao suggested
holding meetings between the ministers of finance and the governors of the central
banks.719
Following China’s suggestion, the first meeting of the ministers of finance and
the central bank governors was held in Vietnam in March 1999. At the third meeting in
714 Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation. 2012. Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1999 [cited
6 July 2012]. Available from http://www.aseansec.org/5469.htm.
715 Terada, “ASEAN Plus Three”, 364.
716 Kai He, “Institutional balancing and international relations theory: Economic interdependence and
balance of power strategies in Southeast Asia”. European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3
(2008): 489-518.
717 Robert G Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2007), 205-236.
718 William W. Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics of Financial
Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
719 Jintao Hu, “Hu Jintao zai dongmeng - zhong ri han lingdaoren feizhengshi huiwu shang fabiao
jianghua [Hu Jintao delivers speech in the ASEAN-China, Japan and Korea leaders’ informal meeting]”,
1998, accessed 6 July 2012. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2001-01/05/content_502401.htm.
246
November 1999, Premier Zhu suggested making the meeting of the financial ministers
and central bank governors a regular arrangement,720
and subsequent meetings were held
on this basis.
Given that the APT was created in the midst of the AFC, the first attempts at
cooperation centred on finance. The APT played a role in managing the aftermath of the
AFC and it was hoped it might prevent any future crisis. Japan proposed building an
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), but this was opposed by the US and China. The US was
concerned that this kind of monetary fund would pose a challenge to the authority of the
IMF.721
Chinese policy elites were concerned that Japan would gain leadership in East
Asia. As the Chinese economist Huang Fanzhang, who works for the research institute
of the National Development and Reform Commission, put it, Japan had four
motivations for establishing the AMF: gaining a dominant position in the East Asian
economy; weakening the influence of the US and the IMF; internationalising the
Japanese currency; and improving Japan’s image in East Asia, 722
all of which posed a
potential challenge to China. However, China’s opposition began to reduce in 1999.
Most notably, the Director of the Policy Research Office of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and Economic Cooperation (the predecessor of the Ministry of Commerce) Wang
Zixian argued that China should take a positive view of the AMF for four reasons: first,
the AMF can balance the US’s domination of the IMF and increase China’s influence in
international financial affairs; second, in the next 10-20 years, China could catch up
with Japan in terms of economic development and play a more important role in
regional and international affairs; third, Japan, in fact, does not have the power to
dominate the financial cooperation as many people believe; four, it is prepares the way
720 Rongji Zhu, “Zhu Rongji zongli zai dongya guojia lingdaoren di san ci feizhengshi huiwu shang de
jianghua [Premier Zhu Rongji’s speech in the third informal meeting of East Asian leaders]”, 1999,
accessed 6.July 2012 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_13/zyjh/t25702.htm.
721 Phillip Y. Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund proposal”, Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3
no. 1 (2003): 93-104.
722 Fanzhang Huang, “Guanyu Riben Tichu de Jianli ‘Yazhou Huobi Jijin’ (AMF) ji Women de Duice
[On Japan Initiated ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ and Our Policy]”, China-Review, 1999, accessed 6 July
2012. http://www.china-review.com/sao.asp?id=3020.
247
for China to open its capital account in the future.723
Although China’s policymakers
did not favour Japan’s AMF, they welcomed a similar mechanism founded in the
framework of the APT.724
In this context, the CMI was established in 2000, and
developed region-wide bilateral currency swap agreements. Under this mechanism,
countries in the region were theoretically able to provide emergency funds for each
other at times of crisis, although it has not proved very effective in the most recent
economic downturn.725
Nevertheless, the GFC in 2008 and 2009 further stimulated the development of the
multilateral financial cooperation in East Asia.726
The CMI developed into a multilateral
currency swap mechanism, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM).
China began to take leadership in the CMIM. China (including Hong Kong) and Japan
contribute to 32 per cent of the US$120 billion fund respectively. South Korea
contributes 16 per cent of the fund. The ASEAN countries contribute 20 per cent of the
fund. In May 2009, the CMIM was formally founded. China, again, tried to use the
opportunity of the GFC to promote its image as a responsible power. At the 12th
APT
summit in 2009, China promised to provide US$200 million to support the regional
credit guarantee and investment mechanism, and promote the construction of the Asian
bond market. However, we should notice that the development of CMIM has not led to
an Asian Currency Unit or Asian Monetary Fund. Hassdorf argues that it is because of
the rivalry of China and Japan on national security concerns and also because of the
723 Zixian Wang, “Ouyuan yu dongya quyu jinrong hezuo [Euro and East Asian regional financial
cooperation]”, Shijie Jingji [World Economy], no. 3(2000): 70-72.
724 Yunling Zhang, “Yazhou jingji: qiangjin fantan, dan reng cunzai zhuduo buqueding yinsu [Asian
economy: strong rebound, but many uncertainties still exist]”, Guoji Jingji Pinglun [International
Economic Review] no. 1-2 (2000): 7-8.
725 Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill, “Asian and global financial crises: consequences for East Asian
regionalism”, Contemporary Politics 17, no.2 (2011): 133 - 149.
726 See the discussion on the relationship between the GFC and the formation of the CMIM and more
details on the mechanism, William W. Grimes, “The Asian Monetary Fund reborn? Implications of
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization”, Asia Policy 11 (2011):79-104.
248
incompatible regimes of domestic economic policy-making.727
Significantly, it has been
argued that both Japan and China are reluctant to make open-ended commitments to
their smaller neighbours and happy to let the IMF retain a prominent role in the region’s
economic affairs.728
However, the nascent regional identity produced in the crisis and the cooperation that
occurred in the financial sector provided further motivation for regional cooperation in
East Asia. In this process, the leadership of ASEAN has been a very important feature.
The reason ASEAN became the leader in promoting regional cooperation is largely
because of the strategic mistrust between China and Japan.729
Although ASEAN is a
collection of small and middle powers and even has internal disputes, it arguably helps
maintain the balance between the China and Japan—.in “normal” circumstances, at
least.730
This is a potentially crucial role because even from the first meeting of APT in
1997, competition between China and Japan seemed likely to intensify. Given that in
the mid-1990s, Japan was trying to strengthening the relationship with the US and
Russia to constrain the growing influence of China, it was not a surprise that the two
countries” competed in the APT from the very beginning.731
China’s active participation
and initiatives in the APT has stimulated Japan to put more investment into East Asian
regional cooperation.732
727 Wolf Hassdorf, “Much ado about nothing? Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and East Asian
exchange rate cooperation” , Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies 10 (2011): 121-142.
728 John Ravenhill, “A three bloc world? The new East Asian regionalism”, International Relations of
the Asia Pacific 2, no. 2(2002): 167-195.
729 Endy M. Bayuni, “Can ASEAN seriously lead East Asia?” The Jakarta Post, 14 November, 2006,
accessed 10 September, 2009. http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/11/14/can-asean-seriously-lead-
east-asia.html
730 At the time of writing the territorial dispute between China and Japan is presenting a major test of the
region’s crisis management practices. I say more about this in the conclusion.
731 Ying Yuan, “Dongmeng yu zhong ri han shounao fei zhengshi huiyi [The informal leaders’ meeting
of ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea]”, Guoji Ziliao Xinxi [International Data Information], no.
1(1998): 8-10.
732 Joel Rathus, Japan, China and Networked Regionalism in East Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011).
249
However, ASEAN’s regional leadership has not been unchallenged. As discussed in
Chapter Four, cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea has accelerated since
the GFC. Prior to 2010, the trilateral summit was mainly held in the framework of the
APT, but since 2010, the three countries have held trilateral summits outside the APT.
The strengthening of trilateral cooperation has brought into question ASEAN’s
leadership role in the APT. Currently, the three countries” GDP accounts for up to 90
per cent of the total GDP of all the APT countries, and their three way trade accounts 75%
of the East Asian total.733
Obviously, the three countries are much larger and more
powerful than ASEAN countries. Whether ASEAN is still capable of sitting in the
driving seat is questionable. Chinese scholars, such as Jin Xide and Zheng Xianwu,
have openly criticised the capacity and even willingness of ASEAN to take the
leadership role in East Asian regional cooperation.734
As an Indonesian diplomat
humorously points out regarding ASEAN’s leadership role, “I’m always in the driving
seat, but it’s my wife, whether seated next to me or in the back seat, who nags me where
I should go, and how fast or how slow I should drive”.735
Be that as it may, the official
policy of China has not changed. In a report jointly produced by ten ministerial level
officials of China, ASEAN’s leadership is once again confirmed. They argue that first,
ASEAN is still willing to lead the East Asian cooperation and would not like to see
other major powers usurp its position; second, from a realist point of view, China’s
leaders recognize that the US will not accept any one of the Plus three states playing the
lead role in regional cooperation.736
733 Sen Peng and Zhenmin Liu, “Jiji yingdui shijie geju bianhua wushi tuijin dongya quyu hezuo
[Actively respond to the change of world order, pragmatically promote East Asian regional cooperation]”,
Xin Yuanjian [New Thinking], no. 11(2011): 8-18.
734 See Xide Jin, “Dongya hezuo jinru le ‘shenshuiqu’ [East Asian cooperation enters the ‘deep water’]”,
Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], no. 10 (2008): 16-18; Xianwu Zheng,
“Dongya gongtongti yuanjing de xuhuanxing xilun [An analysis on the unreality of the East Asia
Community]”, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] no. 4 (2007): 53-60.
735 Yuan, “Dongmeng yu zhong ri han shounao fei zhengshi huiyi”, 8-10.
736 Peng and Liu, “Jiji yingdui shijie geju bianhua wushi tuijin dongya quyu hezuo”, 8-18.
250
Changes in the regional situation, especially the US’s “pivot” back to Asia (see chapter
2), worries about China’s intentions, and the growing importance of competing
organisations such as the EAS, mean that the future of the APT is not so assured. As
mentioned above, the most notable feature of the APT is that the US was excluded—
largely a consequence of the behaviour of the US in the AFC. However, the US is still
viewed by many regional states as a major economic partner and stabiliser of
security.737
With the US fully participating in the EAS in 2011, it has cast doubt over
the future of the APT, as the EAS could become more institutionalised rather than
merely a dialogue venue as has been suggested by some American strategists.738
The
competition between EAS and APT will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
However, it is important to emphasise here that China still maintains the view that APT
should be the main vehicle for East Asian regionalism. As Premier Wen Jiabao suggests,
“Stronger 10+3 cooperation is essential to the revitalization of East Asia. For the sake of
our common interests, we must take on this historic mission and fulfil it with tireless
effort.” 739
The reason that China values and invests most in the APT is that the APT is
a mechanism that excludes the US, which is in line with China’s anti-hegemonism
policy. It is believed that Chinese policymakers want to use regional institutions to
achieve similar ends by undermining US influence in East Asia.740
Overall, therefore, since the foundation of the APT China has successfully used this
platform to implement its charm offensive strategy discussed in Chapter 3 and built a
relatively friendly environment for its national development. The stress on economic
737 Victor D. Cha, “Complex patchworks: U.S. Alliances as part of Asia’s regional architecture”, Asia
Policy 11(2011):27-50; E. S. Medeiros, “Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability”,
Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1(2005-06): 145-167.
738 Ernest Z Bower, “East Asia Summit: Next Step is Structure”, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, 2011, accessed 6 July 2012. http://csis.org/publication/east-asia-summit-next-step-structure.
739 Jiabao Wen, “Remarks by H.E. Wen Jiabao Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China at the 13th ASEAN plus Three Summit”, 2010 , 6 July 2012.
http://english.qstheory.cn/resources/speeches/201109/t20110925_112690.htm
740 Samuel R. Berger, “The US stake in greater Asian integration”, Global Asia 1, no.1 (2006): 25-27;
David Shambaugh, Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamism (University of California Press, 2005).
251
and financial cooperation in the APT gave China more opportunity to pursue leadership
ambitions in the region because of its growing economic importance. China wisely
supported the leadership of ASEAN and open regionalism, which reassured
neighbouring countries and the US of China’s intentions. Notably, all the above
progress is only possible in the aftermath of the AFC in late 1990s and the responsible
role China’s played in the crisis. However, it is interesting to notice that the GFC has
not brought the same result. In contrast, though the financial and economic cooperation
is still developing, the APT has faced challenges from the EAS and the ASEAN
countries have been increasingly concerned about their leadership role. A similar
motivation for further integration is largely absent due to China’s growing power and
consequently its regional neighbours’ increasing fears.
252
6.5 China’s Policy toward the EAS
The creation and development of the EAS once again proves how difficult it is to define
where the boundary of the region is in East Asia or the Asia-Pacific.741
In the EAS,
countries traditionally recognised as external powers were also included, such as India,
Australia, New Zealand, the US and Russia. The decision to admit the US and Russia in
2010 attracted even more attention to the EAS. To some degree, the EAS and the APT
have become competitors. The enlargement of the EAS has marked the widening, rather
than deepening742
of East Asian regional cooperation, and has caused much concern
from Chinese policymakers about the future of East Asian regional cooperation. In this
section, I will explain how China has responded to the development of the EAS which
potentially threatens its own vision of a more narrowly conceived East Asian region
with China at its centre.
The concept of the EAS was initiated by the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
in the APT in 2000 and gained support from the Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong.743
Both the report of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) in 2001 and the report
741Zhongying Pang, "Yatai He Dongya De Zhenglun: You Yiyi De Haishi Wuwei De? [a Debate
between Asia-Pacific and East Asia: Meaningful or Meaningless?] " China National Committee for
Pacific Economic Cooperation, http://pecc-china.org/2011-12-06/A305.html; Zerui Yang, "Dongya
Hezuo Haishi Yatai Hezuo - Zhongguo Yu Diqu Geguo Mianlin De Liangnan Xuanze [East Asia
Cooperation or Asia-Pacific Cooperatio - a Dilemma Faced by China and Regional Countries]," China
Review Academic Publishers Limited, http://www.zhgpl.com/crn-
webapp/cbspub/secDetail.jsp?bookid=14781&secid=14792.
742 See David Camroux, "The East Asia Summit: Pan-Asian Multilateralism Rather Than Intra-Asian
Regionalism," in Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 375-383.
743 Xiao Ren, “Lun dongya fenghui ji yu meiguo de guanxi [On East Asia Summit and its relationship
with the US]”, Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], no. 4 (2007): 49-54.
253
of the East Asian Study Group (EASG) in 2002 also suggested establishing the EAS.744
The original plan had been to upgrade the APT to the EAS in order to better utilise the
powers of the three Northeast Asian countries. It is envisaged that Summits will be held
in ASEAN countries and the Northeast three in turn. Malaysia and China were
particularly enthusiastic about the proposal and applied to be the host country in the
2005 summit and the 2007 summit, respectively.745
This brought forward the
establishment of the EAS. Chinese strategists had a positive view on the role of EAS in
the format of an institutionalised APT and initially proposed that China should take
more leadership role in such an institution.746
However, on the question of whether new members should be included in the EAS,
China, Japan and some Southeast Asian countries disagreed. There were even internal
disputes among ASEAN countries. For example, Singapore hoped that the EAS would
include more countries, while Malaysia and China wanted a more limited
membership.747
Although the EAS was eventually expanded to include 16 members, the
APT was still defined as the main vehicle for the East Asian community. EAS was
regarded as adding to East Asian regional cooperation, rather than replacing the APT.748
The establishment of the EAS needs to be seen in a regional context where China’s
influence had increased dramatically after 2000. As China’s capability to provide more
leadership in the APT became more and more evident, introducing new members to
744 See East Asia Vision Group, “Towards East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and
Progress” 2001; East Asia Study Group, “Final Report of the East Asia Study Group”, Phnom Penh:
ASEAN +3 Summit 2002.
745 Yasumasa Komori, “Asia’s institutional creation and evolution”, Asian Perspective 33, no. 3 (2009):
151-182.
746 Bojiang Yang, Shulin Dao, Limin Lin, Junhong Liu and Wenjing Yang, “Dongya fenghui yu quyu
zhenghe de shenhua [East Asia Summit and the deepening of regional integration]”, Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], no.3 (2005): 39-48.
747 Komori, Asia’s institutional creation and evolution.
748 Shuangqing Zhou and Xiaochun Yue, “Qianxi dongya fenghui kuoda yuanyin ji woguo yingdui celue
jianyi [The internal reasons for the expansion and evolvement of East Asia Summit and its suggested
counter measures]”, Dongnanya Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia], no. 8 (2006): 31-36.
254
balance China’s influence became the preferred option for some ASEAN countries.749
ASEAN does not want to give up the leadership role. This could clearly be observed in
the criteria for joining the APT. In April 2005, the ASEAN countries named three
conditions for any country that wanted to join the EAS: the candidate must have a close
relationship with ASEAN, the candidate must be ASEAN’s dialogue partner and they
must sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).750
The EAS has gained some momentum in the area of functional cooperation. At the first
summit in 2005, 17 specific fields of cooperation were identified. At the second summit
in January 2007, specific objectives and solutions for the East Asian energy cooperation
were discussed. At the third summit held in Singapore in November 2007, cooperation
on climate change, energy and the environment were promoted. At the fourth summit in
Thailand in October 2009, the leaders discussed their standpoints on the
denuclearisation of North Korea. The leaders agreed to strengthen cooperation on
economics, education and climate change. In October 2010, the fifth EAS was held in
Vietnam. The leaders discussed the development and direction of East Asian
cooperation, economic restoration and sustainable development. The sixth EAS was
held in Indonesia in November 2011. The Declaration of the EAS on the Principles for
Mutually Beneficial Relations and Declaration of the 6th
EAS on ASEAN Connectivity
were passed in the meeting. Nevertheless, as far as Chinese policymakers were
concerned, the EAS should be mainly a forum for political and strategic dialogues, and
concrete cooperation should be conducted in the framework of APT.751
749 Ibid.
750 Regional Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “General Information on East Asia
Summit (EAS)”, December 2005, accessed 7 July 2012.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/outline.html.
751 Yongkun Luo, "Dongya Lingdaoren Xilie Huiyi: Xin Jiyu Xin Tiaozhan [East Asian Leaders'
Meetings: New Opportunities and New Challenges]," China.org.cn, 11 November, 2011, accessed 3
October, http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2011-11/17/content_23941249.htm.
255
Japan has played an active role in EAS. In fact, as early as December 2003, the
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made it very clear that Japan wanted to become the
core of an East Asian Community through the ASEAN-Japanese summit. However,
when Japan realised that its chances of becoming the leader of the regional cooperation
were limited, Japan put its efforts into supporting India, Australia and New Zealand to
gain membership of the EAS to balance China.752
In 2010, when Japan supported US
membership of the EAS, it had to compromise by also allowing Russia to join (Russia
and Japan have territory disputes). However, for Japanese part, it is worthwhile to make
this sacrifice because of China’s increasing military and economic power.753
China’s
ascent is also causing other countries to rethink their regional policies.
India’s “Look East Policy” which it adopted in the early 1990s was an important
precondition for its participation in the EAS. However, India’s interest in Asian regional
cooperation can be dated back to the 1950s. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, the
Indian Premier Nehru, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and Indonesia president Sukarno
were quite enthusiastic about Asian regional cooperation.754
However, the Cold War
context meant that Asian regional cooperation could not be developed and India’s
initiative was undermined. After the Cold War ended, then finance minister,
subsequently Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, initiated the Look East Policy, which
tries to bring India closer to East Asia. However, India’s economic importance to
ASEAN is still limited compared with China, reducing its influence in the EAS.755
As
Camroux points out, the insignificant role of India in the EAS makes Chinese
752 Benny Cheng Guan Teh, “Japan-China rivalry: What role does the East Asia Summit play?” Asia
Pacific Viewpoint 52, no. 3 (2011): 347-360.
753 Camroux, “The East Asia Summit”, 381.
754 Acharya Amitav, Whose ideas matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2009).
755 Reddy G. Jayachandra, “East Asia summit: interests and expectations”, International Journal of
Peace and Development Studies 1, no. 3 (2010): 35-46.
256
policymakers feel more tolerant about the enlargement issue. Consequently, Chinese
leaders were less concerned about other powers joining.756
Australia and New Zealand’s economies have been deeply bound up with East Asia
during Japan’s economic boom period coupled with the “economic miracle” of the
newly industrialised East Asian countries.757
In order to engage with the region further,
Australia has always been very active in contributing ideas for regional cooperation758
,
such as the idea to found APEC discussed earlier. The Asia–Pacific Community
initiated by the former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2008 was another example of
Australia’s enthusiasm about regional cooperation, albeit one that was not well
received.759
Initially, Australia felt reluctant to sign the TAC which was a compulsory
condition for joining in the APT, as Australia was afraid that the TAC might conflict
with its security ties with the US. In the end, Australia gained assurance from ASEAN
that TAC would not affect the US-Australian alliance.760
From the Chinese point of
view, due to the special relationship between Australia and the US, Australia was seen
as playing a role as a US proxy in the EAS.761
The view was also shared by Malaysia’s
Mahathir who initially opposed the idea of inviting Australia and New Zealand to
join.762
756 Camroux, “The East Asia Summit”, 380.
757 Tweedie Sandra, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993 (Sydney: University of New South
Wales Press, 1994).
758 Frank Frost, “Australia’s regional engagements in East Asia and the Asia Pacific”, 7 July 2012.
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/Briefi
ngBook43p/regionalengagements
759 Baogang He, “The awkwardness of Australian Engagement with Asia: The dilemmas of Australian
idea of regionalism”, Japanese Journal of Political Science 12, no.02 (2011): 267-285.
760 Xiaohong Wan, “Shoujie dongya fenghui yu dongya quyu hezuo [First EAS and East Asia area
cooperation]”, Dongnanya Zongheng [Around Southeast Asia] no. 9 (2006): 5-10.
761 Hu Liu, “Dongya fenghui yu dongya yitihui [East Asia Summit and East Asia integration]”, Dangdai
Shijie [The Contemporary World] , no. 3( 2006): 23-25.
762 Wan, “Shoujie dongya fenghui yu dongya quyu hezuo”
257
The proposal to accept the US and Russia as members of the EAS was made at the
Hanoi ASEAN ministers’ meeting in July 2010, and was passed by the leaders in the
EAS in the same year.763
This is an important part of the background to the strategic
“return” of the US to Asia. The US hoped to use more diplomatic measures to regain its
decline influence in East Asia.764
The participation of the US in regional institutions has
been a major part of its strategic approach to East Asian countries.765
From the
perspective of ASEAN, the US can play a balancing role to counter China’s more
assertive policy. However, ASEAN also needs China for economic benefits and does
not want to see the two countries” relationship deteriorate. As ASEAN’s leading expert
Jusuf Wananadi suggests, ASEAN wants to use the EAS as a platform for the US and
China to develop more cooperative, less confrontational relations.766
The US’s
participation in the EAS has reignited concerns about the leadership role of ASEAN and
the ASEAN way. Washington would like to see the EAS become more efficient and
institutionalised and use it as a platform to cooperate with the regional countries on
issues such as maritime security, nuclear proliferation and so on.767
However, the US
also understands ASEAN’s concerns: Secretary Clinton reassured ASEAN that the US
respected its central role in regional affairs.768
Not surprisingly, Chinese scholars and
policy makers are especially sceptical about the US’s presence in the EAS. As a former
senior diplomat suggests, the US’s participation is part of its strategy to contain China
763 Guanghou Wang, “Meiguo yu dongya fenghui [The United States and the East Asia Summit]”, Guoji
Luntan [International Forum] 13, no. 6 (2011): 29-33.
764 Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century." Foreign Policy, November 2011, accessed 3 October,
2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.
765 Asia Society, “U.S. - East Asia Relations: A Strategy for Multilateral Engagement Asia Society”,
November 2011: 1-49.
766 Wanandi Jusuf, “Strategic developments in East Asia: the East Asian Summit”, accessed 30
September, 2012.
http://www.pecc.org/resources/doc_view/1755-strategic-developments-in-east-asia-the-east-asian-summit.
767 David Capie and Amitav Acharya, “The United States and the East Asia Summit: A new beginning?”
PacNet, no. 64 (2011), accessed 1 February 2012.
http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-64-united-states-and-east-asia-summit-new-beginning.
768 Asia Society, “U. S.-East Asia Relations”, 18.
258
and China’s regional environment is worsening as a result.769
Chinese policy elites have
been particularly uncomfortable with the US’s initiative to discuss the South China Sea
issue in the EAS. Premier Wen Jiabao suggested that the EAS was not an appropriate
venue to discuss the South China Sea issue and stressed that solidarity, development
and cooperation were the main themes of the EAS and that the attention of EAS should
not be distracted by other issues.770
The interests of Russia in the East Asian regional cooperation are often underestimated.
Russia has a large land mass in its Far East region which has not been fully developed
and which is seen as being vulnerable to Chinese influence.771
With the change of the
world’s centre of gravity to the Asia-Pacific, Russia has also paid more attention to its
eastern region. Russia sees the participation in EAS could enable to exert more
influence in the Asia-Pacific, promote Russia’s modernisation and innovation and the
development of Siberia and Far East region. Russia hopes to use EAS as a tool to realise
a “comprehensive, balanced and open Asia-Pacific regional security architecture.”772
Chinese leaders have generally been supportive of Russia’s membership, as they see
Russia as a way of balancing the US.773
However, as Sumsky from the Russian Foreign
Ministry related MGIMO University argues, “a clear-cut choice between the US and
769 Tiegen Zhang, “Dongya fenghui xishou mei e canjia ji qi yingxiang [The admission of the US and
Russia into the East Asian Summit and its effects]” Yafei Zongheng [Asia & Africa Review], no. 5 (2010):
7-11.
770 “Wen Jiabao jiu Nanhai Wenti Chanming Zhongfang Lichang [Wen Jiabao Reiterate China’s
Position on the South China Sea Issue]”, 19 November, 2011, accessed 7 July 2012,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-11/19/c_111180192.htm.
771 David Kerr, "Central Asian and Russian Perspectives on China's Strategic Emergence," International
Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010).
772 Kai Liu, “E Waijiaobu Shuo Jiaru Dongya Fenghui Jiang Tuidong E Xiandaihua Fazhan [The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Said that Joining in the East Asia Summit Would Benefit Russia’s
Modernisation Development]”, 16 November, 2011, accessed 7 July 2012.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-11/16/c_111172437.htm.
773 Camroux, “The East Asia Summit”, 380.
259
China is not an option.”774
Thus, Russia wants to play a flexible role rather than
counterbalancing either the US or China. Managing relations with its great regional
neighbour remains one of the great challenges confronting Chinese policymakers;
regional institutions offer a new way of achieving this.
Consequently, Chinese policymakers have not been overly pessimistic or alarmed about
the enlargement of the EAS. On the contrary, with the number of members increasing,
the efficiency and coherence of the EAS is reduced giving China further reason to insist
that the APT should be the main channel of the East Asian regional project. China’s
endorsement for open regionalism in EAS also helps to reassure its neighbour that it has
no ambition to gain regional hegemony.775
Wang Guanghou even believes that the US
involvement could bring some benefits via the EAS given that it is such an important
stakeholder in East Asia. Without the participation of the US, many problems can’t
achieve fundamental resolution.776
Wei Ling, an important figure of the Network of East
Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT) in China, argues that China should not be too unhappy
about an apparent setback of East Asia regionalism due to the enlargement of the EAS
and should realise that it is a predictable reaction for regional countries to balance China
given its dramatic rise. As a result, she argues, China should seek to take more regional
responsibility and promote further regional cooperation.777
To sum up, Chinese policymakers have been quite tolerant of the existence and
enlargement of EAS in the past few years, though they have tried to decrease any
possible negative impacts it might have on the APT. Once again, this shows the
774 Victor Sumsky, “ASEAN’s agenda and Russia’s East Asian Summit membership”. ASEAN Monthly
Commentary, http://drandrewbutcher.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/111031-asean-monthly-commentary-
october-2011.pdf.
775 Camroux, “The East Asia Summit”, 380.
776 Wang, “Meiguo yu Dongya Fenghui”, 31.
777 Ling Wei, “Dongya jincheng yu zhongguo waijiao: xin geju, xin junheng, xin zuowei - cong dongya
fenghui shuokai qu [East Asian process and China’s diplomacy: new structure, new balance, new conduct
- beginning from an analysis on East Asia Summit]”, Waijiao Pinglun [Foreign Affairs Review], no. 6
(2011): 49-60.
260
increasingly flexible nature of China’s regional policy. China’s process-oriented policy
towards East Asia regionalism is more focused on the nature of the interaction between
China and its neighbours. The intention is to nurture a friendly environment for its
development and gradually transform the regional order, rather than achieving a
particular target of regional integration within a specific time frame. Chinese policy
elites understand the rationale behind the foundation and enlargement of the EAS and
take a supportive attitude to reassure its neighbours as a result.
6.6 Conclusion: Does China Have a Strategy toward East Asia or Asia-
Pacific Regionalism?
Since joining APEC in 1991, we can observe that China has progressed from seldom
participating in regional cooperation or regional multilateral mechanisms to its current
active role in regional institutions. APEC, ARF, APT and EAS are the four most
representative regional mechanisms in the Asia–Pacific and East Asia in which China
has been an active member. An analysis of China’s role in and attitude toward these
institutions helps us to understand the evolution of and thinking behind China’s regional
policies more generally.
The differences in China’s policy towards the four regional institutions are based on the
differences in the institutions’ organisational features and goals. Although China has
had significant influence in the APT and the EAS, its influence has been weakened by
the fact that ASEAN actually provides notional leadership in these two institutions,
even if there is still some scepticism about ASEAN’s effectiveness.778
As Nicholas
Thomas argues, the Sino–ASEAN relationship is the core of Asian regionalism.779
The
relationship between China and ASEAN largely determines the quality of regional
778 David M. Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “Making process, not progress: ASEAN and the evolving
East Asian regional order”, International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 148-184.
779 Nicholas Thomas, “China-ASEAN relations: the core of Asian regionalism”, In Routledge Handbook
of Asian Regionalism, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 138-153.
261
cooperation in East Asia. China generally plays the role of a participant, rather than
founder or leader, in the four institutions. China’s foreign policy must therefore adapt to
the agendas set by the institutions. However, this does not mean that China can only
play a passive role. China has tried to maximise its national interests through regional
cooperation, as discussed earlier in the chapter, and it has done so in novel ways that
reflect the increasing confidence of its policymakers in their ability to successfully
operate in multilateral forums. In this context, China has tried to promote its interests
while avoiding being too constrained by regional mechanisms. This process-oriented
form of East Asian cooperation has also led Chinese policymakers to focus less on the
concrete outcomes of participation, and more on the process itself. The key objective
here is entrenching the generally good relations that regional institutions have
nurtured.780
This has contributed to and reinforced the centrality of China’s increasingly
flexible and pragmatic policy in the four regional institutions, something that is clearly
seen in its selective participation in functional areas and different commitment to
different institutions.
For example, in APEC, China’s major focus is on economic and technological
cooperation. When APEC was founded, the original objective was to facilitate the trade
liberalisation in the Asia–Pacific region. However, for China in the 1990s, the major
concern has been attracting more investment from the countries in the region, and
facilitating technology transfer. It was in China’s interest to have more access to the
developed economies in the region, but China also needed to protect its infant industries.
Thus, trade liberalisation could not be wholeheartedly supported by China.
In the ARF, China’s participation in CBM and PD has also been limited, although
China has accepted the idea of CBM and PD in principle, and as described earlier,
China has been relatively active in some CBM and PD areas. However, because the
780 Yaqing Qin and Ling Wei, “Jiegou, jincheng yu quanli de shehui hua [Structures, processes, and the
socialisation of power: China and regional cooperation in East Asia]”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World
Economics and Politics], no. 3(2007): 7-15.
262
CBM promoted by the US, Australia and many other countries could constrain China’s
military modernisation, and PD could obstruct the non-interference principle held by
China, China has chosen not to participate in the regional security cooperation to the
same extent as the US, Japan and Australia, who have sought to increase military
transparency.
China has been more active in the APT than in the other institutions. The APT began
because of a common regional goal to promote financial cooperation in the wake of the
AFC, and there is much transnational understanding in this domain between China and
other East Asian countries. China has also been very active in other areas of functional
cooperation in the framework of APT. In particular, Chinese policymakers are very
enthusiastic about economic cooperation and FTA building, something they have been
able to utilise to pursue larger regional goals.781
The flexibility of China’s policies is even more obvious in the EAS. Although Chinese
policymakers were initially hostile to the EAS and tried to prevent its membership from
increasing, China has since accepted that growth in membership is unavoidable.
Chinese policymakers also realise that with the enlargement of the EAS, the efficiency
of the organisation will also be affected. Ironically, this has helped to secure the status
of the APT as the main channel for regional integration in East Asia.
The above examples demonstrate the flexibility of China’s policy in regional
cooperation. For China, being a participant rather than an outsider in regional
cooperation is very important. In other words, the process is in some ways more
important than the result. Particularly with the emergence of the China Threat Theory at
the end of the Cold War, China has had to show its good faith and reassure its
781 Gemma Estrada, Donghyun Park, Innwon Park and Soonchan Park, “China’s Free Trade Agreements
with ASEAN, Japan and Korea: A Comparative Analysis”, China & World Economy 20, no.4 (2012):
108-126.
263
neighbours through the multilateral platforms. However, this does not mean that China
does not have its own agenda in the East Asian or Asia–Pacific forms of cooperation.
Such an agenda may not have existed from the very beginning of its participation, but
with China’s growing experience of participating in multilateral institutions, and with
its increasing power, China has more potential to shape the regional order. China hopes
to shape the regional environment and develop a regional order to further its own
interests though regional institutions.
East Asia cooperation has gained a good deal of momentum during this period.
However, since 2010, a series of crises in the region has significantly disturbed the
regional process. Not only has the APT, the main channel of East Asia cooperation as
perceived by Chinese policymakers stagnated, but new regional groupings have also
formed which poses a challenge to existing institutions. The TPP which was originally a
free trade agreement of Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore coming into force in
2006 has the potential to become more important. Particularly, after the US joined in the
negotiation in 2009, the TPP has attracted more attention, especially from Chinese
commentators. 782
Chinese intellectual and policy elites have been concerned with the
economic and strategic implication of the so called “high quality” TPP, which in reality
makes it very difficult for China to join. Chinese scholars see the TPP is an American
response to the development of East Asian regional cooperation in the past decade and
also a strategy to contain China’s rise. China’s leading Asia-Pacific expert Li
Xiangyang claims that the TPP will harm APEC, East Asian cooperation and China’s
interests. He points out that APEC will be divided into two camps, the TPP countries
and non TPP countries. It will further undermine the role of APEC in the regional
economic cooperation. The economic cooperation of” “ASEAN +” will be stalled since
TTP looks more attractive for Japan and some ASEAN countries. Likewise, the
782 For the development of TPP, see Ian F. Fergusson, and Bruce Vaughn, “The Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement”, Congressional Research Service, 25 June 2010, accessed 20 July 2011.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145583.pdf
264
leadership role of ASEAN in regional cooperation will be lost due to the internal
division over the TTP issue.783
While it is still too early to be certain what the effect of
TTP will be, it is reasonable to assume that the current process of East Asian regional
cooperation will be affected.
In short, China has conducted a flexible multilateral regional policy, which it has
adjusted towards different regional institutions. China’s participation in the East Asian
and Asia–Pacific regional institutions has always been an ongoing process to reflect its
changing views on the definition of the region and the future of the regional order.
Maybe Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying on the nature of China’s economic reform can
also be well applied here, “mozhe shitou guohe” (Crossing the river by touching the
stones). What is most significant in this context is that this has involved a process of
learning and adjustment to changing geopolitical circumstances. While China’s
approach to foreign policy may remain broadly “realist” in many respects, the way
policy goals are pursued reflects a new attitude to the region and the way it can be
utilised to achieve what are perceived to be national interests.
783 Xiangyang Li, “Kuo taipingyang huoban guanxi xieding: zhongguo jueqi guocheng zhong de
zhongda tiaozhan [Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A major challenge to China’s rise]”, Guoji
Jingji Pinglun [International Economic Review], no. 2 (2012): 17-27.
265
Conclusion
This thesis set out to discuss the evolution of China’s regional policies in the twenty
years from 1991 to 2011. The emphasis in the dissertation is on policies rather than
policy because there are subtle but important differences in the content and conduct of
regional policy in different regions and across different issue areas. The thesis has tried
to uncover the factors that have shaped China’s regional policies by conducting a
comparative analysis. Previous research has often focused on China’s policy thinking
and practice in a particular region or on a specific issue. The contribution of this thesis
is to provide a more comprehensive view of China’s regional policies in the past two
decades.
Chapter 1 introduced the theoretical framework and research methods of this thesis. The
chapter began by defining some core concepts which were critical for the discussion
here. In particular, I made a detailed analysis of the nature of “regionalism”, an idea
which has generated great interest in China and the world. Thereafter, the chapter
evaluated the efficacy of the so-called mainstream IR theories, namely neorealism,
neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism, and their capacity to on explain China’s
regional policies. It was argued that China’s regional policies were so complex that any
single-factor analytical paradigm could not provide a complete explanation.
Consequently, the thesis employed an increasingly influential approach – analytical
eclecticism – as the theoretical framework. It is important to realise that analytical
eclecticism is not a theory as such, but an approach to analysis. It is based on the
philosophy of pragmatism, and suggests that international relations should be examined
from multiple perspectives. The advantage of this approach was revealed when I used it
to explain why China’s foreign policies had significant variations in different sub-
regions and across different issue areas. I employed process tracing to highlight
differences in the development of China’s foreign policies in three sub-regions of Asia,
266
namely Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Central Asia.
Chapter 2 highlighted and explained the complex nature of China’s foreign policy
making by introducing its decision, coordination and implementation mechanisms.
Though China is still an authoritarian state controlled by the CPC, more and more actors
with different, and sometimes contradictory, interests have come to influence China’s
foreign policy making. The growing number of diverse, uncoordinated influences helps
to explain the sometimes unpredictable nature of policies, such as those we have seen in
the case of South China Sea. Although some of the principles of China’s foreign policy
remain the same, such goals have been pursued differently in different periods. In
contemporary China, playing a more important role in the world and developing the
national economy and society are the two major tasks of diplomacy, but they are often
pursued in different ways in different regions. This is partly because that specific
regional environment reflects different historical legacies. One of the key ideas that
emerged from the comparative analysis undertaken in the thesis is that contingent
regional factors help to determine the goals and content of China’s regional policies. As
the current territorial disputes in North and Southeast Asia remind us, history continues
to matter in China’s regional relations.
This possibility was demonstrated in the case studies of three sub-regions in Asia. Of
the three cases, the relationship between China and Southeast Asian countries was the
most important and revealing from an analytical perspective. Over the twenty year
period on which the thesis focused, the relationship between China and Southeast Asia
improved the most quickly and cooperation was more deeply institutionalised than with
other regions. Southeast Asia has been the major area for the implementation of China’s
“charm offensive” strategy. Although there appears to have been a shift in policy
priorities of late, for much of the period under consideration China’s policy
demonstrates significant evidence of “learning” and “socialisation” as Chinese
policymakers became increasing comfortable in multilateral forums. The thesis detailed
267
this process and highlighted a number of specific initiatives in which China has played
an increasingly prominent part. I illustrated the manner in which Chinese officials were
able to respond to a range of economic and strategic pressures. China’s utilisation of its
growing economic leverage, especially during and after the AFC was an important
example of increased policy sophistication and engagement. The key question now, of
course, is whether the logic of interdependence will prove sufficient to restrain the more
“traditional” realist, foreign policy goals that have (re) emerged recently.
The potential continuing importance of such issues and contradictions was highlighted
in the discussion of China’s Northeast Asian policies. International relations in
Northeast have always been complicated, partly because China has a longer record of
interaction with Northeast Asian countries than other regions of Asia. Indeed, China’s
Northeast Asian policy highlights a complex amalgam of realpolitik, economic
interdependence, history and ideas. Nothing illustrates this more starkly that China’s
relationship with Taiwan. While there is quite compelling evidence to suggest that
economic interdependence has redefined cross Strait relations in positive ways despite
profound “structural” obstacles, the same logic may have reached its limits in Sino-
Japanese relations, where mistrust has not been eliminated with the economic
interaction. Territorial disputes and the rise of nationalism in China have made the
whole issue even more complicated and left the Chinese government less space for
manoeuvre. However, China’s experience on the Korean peninsula suggests that change
is possible, and even the most deeply held ideas are subject to review in the right
circumstances. In the past twenty years, China’s foreign policy has changed from
supporting North Korea without condition and non-interference over the Korean nuclear
issue to actively playing a mediating role and promoting the peaceful resolution of the
issue. China’s role in the Six-party talks and its role in other projects such as the Tumen
River Development suggest that, given conducive contingent circumstances, China is
increasingly capable of playing a leadership role in regional affairs.
268
China’s regional policy toward Central Asia provided perhaps the best example of this
possibility. China’s policies in this region demonstrate an increasing capacity to
accommodate complexity. Facing a difficult and potentially incompatible mix of
strategic, economic and territorial issues, China’s policymakers have managed to
balance sub-national, national and regional pressures and objectives. Given the
importance of simultaneously combating “terrorism”, securing energy supplies, resisting
US “hegemonism” and maintaining order in restive provinces, China’s leaders have
proved surprisingly effective. Perhaps the most significant development in this region,
both in terms of its symbolism as part of China’s new diplomacy and policy thinking
and because of its effectiveness as part of China’s overall policy approach has been the
development of the SCO. Although the driving force for China’s enthusiastic support of
the SCO is the pursuit of national interests, the SCO is also an important platform for
policy experimentation and the promotion of China’s ideas about how to manage the
world affairs, notably the new security concept and China’s developmental model.
A number of comparative points emerged from the analysis of China’s subregions. The
most important point to emphasise is that different forces have shaped China’s policy
priorities at different times. Southeast Asia was initially the focus of China’s charm
offensive and a critical venue for learning and institutional innovation as far as China’s
policymakers were concerned. Ideas and institutions were consequently important parts
of the policymaking process, as liberals and constructivists might lead us to expect. Of
late, however, a concern with unresolved territorial disputes has led some to question
whether regional institutions can actually contain China’s “realist” goals. Even if the
sceptics are right, however, it is important to recognise that even here questions of
identity and an increasingly influential nationalist discourse are pushing China’s
policymakers to pursue national interests in ways that they might not choose to, all
things being equal. A similar story can be told about Northeast Asia: economic
interdependence is important, but it is not clear that it is important enough to encourage
269
serious institutional development, much less overcome deeply embedded historical
animosities. Where China’s elites are unencumbered by such unresolved historical
problems, however, as in Central Asia, institutional development is still seen as a useful
and effective part of overall policy toward the region.
My final case study shifted the focus from China’s foreign policies in the three
subregions to consider China’s engagement in a broader regional context. By analysing
China’s policies toward East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, it is possible to get an enhanced
sense of the different factors that drive policy in different contexts. One of the most
important considerations in this regard was the sheer number of potential forums in
which China has participated and the difficulty of consistently pursuing national goals
in arenas populated by powerful actors such as the US. Although this chapter
highlighted processes of learning and socialisation, it also illustrated the potential limits
to such processes, especially where they come into conflict with core strategic concerns.
China’s somewhat ambiguous attitude to the ARF illustrated this possibility, as does its
views about military transparency: China does not want to follow the standards set up
by the US and Australia if they obstruct its military modernisation.
Nevertheless, China’s participation in the APEC and ARF have been important parts of
its overall learning process, although it is important to remember that the catalyst for a
deeper involvement in the regional cooperation in East Asia was the AFC. Although
there is no doubt that the crisis played a major role in shaping Chinese thinking about its
regional role, and in the way many of its neighbours thought about China, China’s
ability to build on this initial promise through the creation of its own preferred
institutions has not gone entirely smoothly. The birth of the EAS in its current format
and the relative decline of the APT could be seen as a response of regional countries to
the growth of China’s power. Generally, however, China’s attitude towards regional
institutions changed from passive participation to active support. China’s policymakers
have recognised that multilateral mechanisms could be utilised to realise China’s
270
national interests. The flexibility and pragmatism of China’s foreign policy has become
the hallmark of its regional policies as a consequence.
The relatively long timeframe (from the end of the Cold War to the aftermath of the
GFC), large geographical area (covering most of China’s surrounding areas exclude
South Asia), and a wide range of issue areas (including politics, economy, security, and
social culture) was particularly suitable to the comparative case study methodology. As
we have seen in the previous chapters, China’s regional policies have broadly similar
grand strategic objectives but different approaches. From the perspective of China’s
overall policy objectives, there are two dimensions. One is primarily an inward looking
goal, which is that China’s regional policies should serve domestic economic and social
development by creating a stable regional environment. The other is mainly outward
looking. This goal became more important with the growth of China’s national power.
As a result, China is trying to exert greater influence across various regions and using
regional policies as the basis of its evolving global role. Though these goals form part of
one overarching strategy, we can see that they have been translated into different
policies and reflect internal and external influences that interact in complex ways.
“Internally”, new ideas about the content and conduct of policy have changed the
thinking of foreign policy makers in China. This can be seen in the change of Chinese
policy elites’ attitudes toward regional multilateral diplomacy. Domestic policy making
process also contribute to policy differences, as shown in the example of how local
governments shape the decision-making of the central government on sub-regional
cooperation projects.
However, internal forces can only provide one aspect of the analysis. External forces
have the potential to be an equally important influence on the development of China’s
regional policies. In this context, the power structure emphasized by neorealism may
still be influential—a possibility highlighted by China’s response to the recent “pivot”
in American foreign policy. More generally, the power structures in different sub-
271
regions present China’s policymakers with different geopolitical contexts within which
to implement its foreign policy. As the world’s only superpower, the presence of the US
in a region can affect China’s policy behaviour: the reason that China could successfully
promote the SCO, for example, is partly because that the presence of the US in Central
Asia is not as strong as the other parts of Asia.
However, material power cannot explain everything. One of the most influential
arguments developed by liberal scholars such as John Ikenberry, for example, is that
even the US itself is constrained by institutions sometimes. That is particularly true for
the Clinton and Obama administrations, which arguably placed more emphasis on
institutions and multilateralism than the Bush administration. In the past twenty years,
China has also realised that institutions can facilitate information flows, lower transition
costs and help countries to achieve absolute gains. Even in the short run, when regional
cooperation may not bring immediate benefits, the long-term benefits that flow from
stability and predictable relations may be enough to keep the process of cooperation
going. That is certainly the case in the development of APT. The building of economic
institutions, such as the free trade agreements and the CMI, increase the degree of
interdependence between countries. Interdependence may not guarantee stability in
international relations but it may increase the cost of any potential conflict, and
consequently become a stabilizing force in regional peace.
In the past twenty years, we have witnessed a change in Chinese policymakers’
perception on the world. Especially, after the GFC, it seems that China’s policy makers
have become more confident. They have developed a new understanding of China’s
national power and its potential, even though Chinese policy elites may not know
exactly what role a powerful China will play in the future world order. However, they
certainly realise that the world is going to be very different and China would play a
more important role. This is the ideational driving force for China’s assertive regional
policies since 2010.
272
China’s regional policies are so complex and changing so quickly that Chinese policy
makers themselves may not have a completely coherent plan they can follow. Policy is
frequently ad hoc, unpredictable and reactive. With so many policy influences and
variables in play analytical eclecticism is an especially useful theoretical framework. In
time it is possible that distinctively “Chinese” approach to international relations theory
will be developed, and such insights may be added to an even more comprehensive
eclectic approach. What is evident from the analysis of this thesis is that no single factor
or paradigm can explain the core features of Chinese foreign policy thinking and
behaviour.
It is tempting try to predict what role China will play in the future world order after
having undertaken this sort of analysis. Although China’s future will not necessarily be
determined by its past, it will undoubtedly be influence by it. Understanding the
historical influences on Chinese policy is therefore vital, even though China’s likely role
in the international system may prove to be unique. After all, no country has ever risen
quite as fast on quite such an epic scale. There is consequently no model in the history
that China can imitate, and it remains a question whether the Western experience can be
applied on China.
In any case, the era in which world affairs are determined by one or two countries may
have passed. China’s rise is only part of the story of the rise of developing world. India,
Russia, Brazil and South Africa are some other names which have great potential to
become major powers. There appears to be a major diffusion of power in the world in
which regions may play a more prominent part. Paradoxically, the challenges brought
by the globalisation cannot be tackled by any individual country. Regional governance
may help to solve common challenges and address local interests at the same time.
Regional institutions are created to provide public goods in different issue areas, and
China’s experiences may help it to adjust to a world in which regions become more
273
prominent and influential. An important future research agenda in this context is how
the nation state adjusts to being only one actor in the world of regions. Non-
governmental organisations including civil society may well play more important roles
and sub-regional and inter-regional cooperation may increase. In short, China may well
find itself part of a form of regional governance with multiple agendas, multiple levels
and many actors. It will be an era of “complex regionalism” in which China’s recent
history may allow it to play a productive and influential part.
China is unlikely to replace the US as the world’s next hegemon but perhaps no country
will. It may be a world without a hegemon in which China will play a more important
role in its various regions. On some issue areas, China will take leadership role, on
others, China may cooperate or even simply be a follower. The analysis conducted in
this thesis suggests that China is surprisingly well placed to exert its influence on the
world through regional platforms, if it can resolve some of the historical legacies that
make relations with its neighbours difficult at times. The current territorial disputes
provide an important test of the importance China’s policymakers attach to regional
versus national interests.
In order to arrive at such a future, Chinese policy makers may need to give up much of
the realist way of thinking with which they are widely associated. Likewise, China’s
neighbours may need to get used to living with a giant. The US may also need to accept
that its undisputed, unipolar global leadership is coming to an end. Obviously, none of
these possibilities are easy to realise. However, as Dr Sun Yat-sen reminds us: “Tianxia
Dashi, Haohao Shangshang, Shunzhizhe Chang, Nizhizhe Wang” (the global trend is
surging forward: those who go along with it will prosper and those who go against it
will perish). The world of great power politics and fighting for hegemonic dominance
may be coming to an end and a world of regions may be beginning to rise. By following
this trend, the tragedy of great power politics may be avoided and common human
values may be developed.
274
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