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China's Kashmir PoliciesJOHN GARVER aa Sam Nunn School of International Affairs ,AtlantaPublished online: 10 Aug 2010.
To cite this article: JOHN GARVER (2004) China's Kashmir Policies, India Review,3:1, 1-24, DOI: 10.1080/14736480490443058
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India Review, vol. 3, no. 1, January 2004, pp. 1–24Copyright © Taylor & Francis Inc.DOI:10.1080/14736480490443058
China’s Kashmir Policies
JOHN W. GARVER
This article analyzes the policies of the People’s Republic of China(PRC) toward the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. “Pol-icies” is a plural noun. There are at least six distinct Chinese policiesthat impinge on the Kashmir issue. These are:
1. Beijing’s formal declared position toward the Kashmir issue; 2. Chinese demonstrations of security support for Pakistan during
periods of Pakistani confrontation with India over Kashmir; 3. Steady and substantial support for development of Pakistan’s military-
industrial capabilities regardless of confrontations with India overKashmir;
4. Beijing’s stance regarding modalities appropriate for dealing withthe Kashmir issue;
5. China’s interests, and latent policies, relating to a possible substantivesolution of the Kashmir issue;
6. Chinese use of Kashmir to achieve diplomatic leverage with NewDelhi and Washington.
Beijing’s formal declared policy toward the Kashmir issue hasshifted from an agnostic position in the 1950s, to a distinctly pro-Pakistan position in the 1960s and 1970s, to an increasingly neutralposition since Deng Xiaoping took over direction of China’s foreignrelations in 1978. Distinct from China’s formal declaratory positionon Kashmir have been Chinese demonstrations of support for Pakistan’snational security during periods of Indian–Pakistani conflict overKashmir. Analytically distinct, too, has been Chinese support forPakistani efforts to further enhance its military and military-industrialcapabilities, even during periods of increased and sharp India–Pakistantension over Kashmir. (The term “military-industrial” refers to theindustrial base necessary to produce or sustain military capabilities.)
John W. Garver is Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, GeorgiaInstitute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia.
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China’s assistance to Pakistan in this regard has been large scale andnot diminished by or during Pakistani conflicts with India over Kashmir.Chinese support for Pakistan’s national security during periodsof India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, as well as its assistance indeveloping Pakistan’s military capabilities during such periods of conflict,are characterized by such Chinese diplomatic rubrics as “multidimen-sional” “all weather” Sino-Pakistan friendship “tested by adversity.”Such nomenclature is frequently used to decorate Sino-Pakistaniinteractions. It should not be dismissed as meaningless verbiage.Indeed, this article will argue that these terms refer to key aspects ofChina’s overall stance toward Kashmir. They mean that China willstand by Pakistan and support its efforts to defend itself againstIndia, even if Indian animosity against Pakistan might result fromPakistani challenges to India over Kashmir. Events during India–Pakistan confrontations over Kashmir in 1990, at Kargil in 1999, andin the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament inDecember 2001 will be used as case studies illustrating the stability ofChina’s support for Pakistan’s national security during Kashmir crises.
Regarding China’s stance toward the modalities appropriate forhandling Kashmir, the overriding issue has been the legitimacy ofresort to violence. During the 1960s China endorsed war on behalf ofthe Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination. Under Deng Xiaoping,however, China moved away from endorsement of war, and thediscussion below will explore the logic of this shift. Linked to therejection of war was Beijing’s gradual rejection of terrorism as a meansof pressuring India toward concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir.
Finally, Beijing has used the Kashmir issue to obtain leverage withboth New Delhi and Washington. This seems to have been the caseespecially during the post-Cold War period when US–India and US–China relations became more fluid. Toward New Delhi, the threat ofa more pronounced Chinese shift toward Pakistan on Kashmir hascreated incentives for India to avoid what Beijing defines as “anti-Chinese” policies. Toward the United States, China’s considerableleverage with Islamabad, and Beijing’s apparent willingness to usethat leverage in tandem with American efforts, has created incentivesfor Washington to secure Beijing’s cooperation on Kashmir. In otherwords, China’s influence with Islamabad on Kashmir demonstratesto Washington the utility of China as a strategic partner of the UnitedStates.
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China’s Kashmir Policies 3
China’s Formal Declared Position on Kashmir China’s declared position on the Kashmir dispute has been a functionof Beijing’s relations with India and Pakistan. During the days ofSino-Soviet alliance and Sino-Indian cordiality in the 1950s, Beijingavoided endorsing India’s position on Kashmir, even though theUSSR did exactly that in 1955.1 Beijing’s reticence on Kashmir duringthe 1950s probably derived from an understanding that deep conflictsbetween Chinese and Indian perspectives over Tibet, plus latent con-flicts over the boundary, might some day lead China into conflict withIndia, making convenient Chinese alignment with Pakistan. In such aneventuality, reversing a pro-Indian stance on Kashmir would provedifficult and embarrassing. Yet China did not leap quickly or easily toPakistan’s side. Even as Indian–Chinese relations deteriorated overTibet starting in 1959, collapsing altogether over the border in 1962,Beijing avoided taking sides on the Kashmir issue. Only in early 1964,as Beijing moved to establish a strategic partnership with Pakistanand, probably more importantly, as Pakistan’s rulers became willingto undertake such a partnership, did China fall into line behind Pakistan’sposition. From 1964 to 1980 Beijing’s position on Kashmir paralleledPakistan’s, to wit that the people of Kashmir were entitled to an exerciseof self-determination on whether to join India or Pakistan as had beenpromised them by various United Nations resolutions in 1948 and 1949.
By 1965 Beijing endorsed the Kashmiri people’s war of selfdetermination. An “Observer” article in Renmin ribao (People’s daily)on September 5, 1965, for example, began: “The Chinese people deeplysympathize with the just struggle of the people of Kashmir for theirright to self-determination.. .”2 A week later an editorial in Renmin ribaodeclared “The Chinese government and people...resolutely support...the Kashmir people’s struggle for national self-determination. . .the Kashmir people will surely realize their desire for national self-determination.”3 Renmin ribao was, and remains, the newspaper of theCentral Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Peter VanNess makes the point that Beijing refused in the 1960s to declare thewar in Kashmir a “war of national liberation” thus denying it fullrevolutionary legitimacy under Marxist-Maoist theory. But by declaringit a mere war of self determination, Beijing avoided the unfortunateconclusion that the “people of Kashmir” might be entitled to their ownindependent state, and paralleled the Pakistani position that the peopleof Kashmir were entitled to join either Pakistan or India.4
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After Deng Xiaoping consolidated power as Mao’s successor inDecember 1978, China’s position on Kashmir began to change. Oneof Deng’s key international objectives was to reduce tension betweenChina and its neighbors, whenever that was possible without sacrificingcore Chinese interests, in order to create an environment conducive toa sustained push for economic development. Deng was convinced thatthe confrontational foreign policies of Mao had contributed to thedire poverty that was the lot of the Chinese people by 1978, and hewas determined to set Chinese diplomacy on a new direction. Thuswhen Indian Minister of External Affairs A. B. Vajpayee visitedBeijing in February 1979 and told Deng that China’s position onKashmir was an additional and unnecessary irritant in Sino-Indianrelations, Deng was receptive. Within a year or so Beijing acceded toNew Delhi’s request. In June 1980 Deng publicly stated that theKashmir issue was a bilateral issue left over from history betweenIndia and Pakistan, and should be resolved peacefully.5 Beijing thusadopted a more or less neutral position on the Kashmir issue.
Being “left over from history” meant that the problem was not dueto the sinister intentions or actions of either India or Pakistan, but,implicitly, to the incompetence or perhaps sinister intentions of theformer British masters of the subcontinent. This can be seen, in fact, asa slight nod toward India since it entails an implicit rejection of Pakistan’sview that Indian aggression and expansionism is at the root of theKashmir problem. Being a bilateral issue between India and Pakistanalso meant that China need not take sides on the substance of thedispute. Specification of Kashmir as a bilateral issue which should besolved via India–Pakistan negotiations also embodied a slight tilttoward India. Pakistan, being the weaker power which also believed itenjoyed the advantage of majority support within Indian Kashmir,had long called for international involvement in a resolution of thedispute. India, being the stronger power and in de facto possession ofthe better part of Kashmir, insisted on settlement of any disputes viapurely bilateral talks. Until about 1990 Beijing tried to obviate theimplicit pro-India tilt of its declared Kashmir policy by mentioningoccasionally the role of the United Nations and/or United NationsResolutions in solving the issue. Once again Indian diplomats intervenedto lobby for Chinese non-reference to obsolete (from the Indianperspective) UN resolutions or mediation. And again China accededto Indian lobbying. By 1991 Chinese references to the United Nations
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China’s Kashmir Policies 5
and its resolutions in the context of Kashmir had become extremelyrare. Such references did not disappear entirely—a matter discussedbelow. But by the early 1990s the almost universal formulation ofChina’s position on Kashmir was that it was a bilateral matter to besolved via peaceful negotiations between India and Pakistan.6 In sum,Beijing has conceded a great deal to New Delhi in terms of modificationof China’s formal, declared position on Kashmir.
Chinese spokesmen frequently laid out this formal position. Duringa visit to Islamabad in November 1989, Premier Li Peng said thatChina had always maintained that disputes between Pakistan andIndia, such as Kashmir, should be resolved on the basis of the FivePrinciples of Peaceful Coexistence and through friendly consultations.7
In May 2001 Premier Zhu Rongji visited both India and Pakistan, andagain laid out China’s position on the Kashmir issue. China hadalways emphasized the need for negotiations between India and Pakistan(i.e. bilateral negotiations) to achieve a peaceful settlement of thatdispute, Zhu said.8
China’s position on Kashmir did not change following the September11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (hereafter referred to as“9–11”). Pakistan’s leaders apparently hoped that Pakistan’s renewedpartnership with the United States after 9–11, plus heightened inter-national fear that an India–Pakistan war that might further fan Islamicterrorism, would lead to stronger international pressure on India tocompromise with Pakistan on Kashmir. We will return below toBeijing’s assessment of this Pakistani tactic, but our concern here iswith the fact that this did not produce any perceptible change inBeijing’s formal position on Kashmir. As tension between Pakistanand India spiraled in May 2002, a spokesman for China’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MFA) reiterated China’s position on Kashmir:
China’s position on the issue of Kashmir has been clear cut. Wehave always maintained that the Kashmir issue is one betweenIndia and Pakistan left over by history. China hopes that the twosides should seek new ways to appropriately solve the problemthrough peaceful exchanges and negotiations and refrain frommilitary conflicts.9
In August 2002, Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf traveled toBeijing in search of further Chinese support. The visit produced no
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shift in China’s position. China hoped that Pakistan and India wouldsettle their differences peacefully through dialogue, Jiang Zemin toldMusharraf.10
Very occasional references to the United Nations and UnitedNations resolutions regarding Kashmir did not entirely disappearfrom Beijing’s stance, however. In June 1998, for example, China’sAmbassador to the United Nations Qin Huasun addressed the UNSecurity Council on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan and India should,Qin said, “look for a solution [of the dispute] . . . in accordance withthe principles of the relevant United Nations resolution and the Simlaagreement [of 1972] and through peaceful negotiations.”11 Qin thenadded the following very pointed comment: “We are opposed to anyaction which pursues regional hegemony.” “Regional hegemony” is alongstanding Chinese code word for Indian policies objectionable toBeijing. While it is possible that occasional comments such as these byQin Huasun are accidental, uninformed, and not deliberate, this doesnot seem likely. Qin’s 1998 comments came in the midst of a multifacetedChinese campaign to pressure New Delhi to withdraw its publicstatement identifying China as the primary threat spurring India’snuclear weapons tests and nuclear weaponization in May 1998.12 Inthis context, Qin’s words likely constituted a subtle but deliberatewarning to New Delhi that, if India adopted a policy of hostilitytoward China, Beijing might once again shift toward a less neutral andmore pro-Pakistan stance on the Kashmir issue.
China’s Strategic Partnership with Pakistan during Kashmir Crises Another distinct Chinese policy regarding Kashmir has been Beijing’sdetermination to maintain close military cooperation and strategicpartnership with Pakistan even during periods in which Pakistan–India relations sour because of conflicts over Kashmir. This has meantthat Chinese assistance to Pakistan, including military cooperationand assistance to the development of Pakistani military capabilities,has continued even during periods of high and rising military tensionbetween India and Pakistan over Kashmir. As noted in the introduction,the diplomatic rhetoric used to allude to this policy is that Sino-Pakistanfriendship is “all-weather” and “tested by adversity.”
This Chinese policy arises, in large part, out of a deliberate attitudeof tolerance for the policy choices, domestic and foreign, of Pakistan’s
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ruling elites—a cardinal characteristic of the Sino-Pakistan entente.Beijing’s close strategic partnership with Pakistan has waxed duringperiods of military rule in Pakistan (under Muhammad Ayub Khan,Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, Zia ul-Haq, and Parvez Musharraf) aswell as during periods of civilian rule (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, BenazirBhutto, and Nawaz Sharif). It has prospered under rule by more secularPakistani rulers, and during periods of intensifying Islamization ofPakistani politics. The roots of China’s entente with Pakistan go backto China’s understanding in 1955 of Pakistan’s decision to ally withthe United States during a period when opposition to US encirclementwas the virtual sine qua non of PRC diplomacy. The entente waxedequally during periods of US–PRC confrontation (1964–69 and 1989–97) and periods of Sino-American cooperation (1972–88 and 1997–2003). It waxed equally during periods of intense Sino-Soviet hostility(1964–86) and periods of Sino-Soviet/Russian amity (1989–2003).Pakistan was the only non-communist friend of China to escape criticismduring the Cultural Revolution; even extreme Maoist leaders putPakistan in a class by itself as a friend of China.13 Instead of encouragingrevolutionary struggle against the Pakistani government, China’sPremier Zhou Enlai in 1964 actually discouraged it.14 As the CulturalRevolution began to penetrate China’s foreign diplomatic service,with Red Guard organizations forming in many of China’s overseasdiplomatic missions, a special directive from the center forbade theformation of a Red Guard organization in China’s mission in Pakistan.15
Pakistan offers the only case with persuasive evidence that Chinadeliberately assisted a foreign country to develop nuclear weapons—once Pakistan’s leaders requested such assistance in 1972. China’sentente with Pakistan has waxed under every one of China’s paramountleaders, from Mao Zedong, to Hua Guofeng, to Deng Xiaoping, toJiang Zemin. This truly remarkable stability and tolerance rests, asI have argued at length elsewhere, on China’s recognition of the utilityof a strong Pakistan aligned with China in restraining India.16
China’s leaders understand the centrality of Kashmir to Pakistanileaders. In 1956, as Sino-Pakistan relations began to intensify, theformer PLA general newly designated as ambassador to Pakistan,Geng Biao, undertook an in-depth study of the Kashmir issue.17 InAugust 1956, shortly before the first visit by a Pakistani prime ministerto China, Geng briefed PRC Premier and Foreign Minister ZhouEnlai on Kashmir. The Kashmir question was exceptionally sensitive
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and China’s stance on it would determine to a significant degree thequality of its relations with both India and Pakistan, Geng toldZhou. In order to develop good relations with both India and Pakistan,Geng proposed, first, that China “not become involved” (bu quan ru)in the Kashmir issue, and second, that it “take the principled highground” ( jiang gongdao, jiang zhengyi). Zhou Enlai accepted Geng’sproposal, according to Geng’s account.18 When Zhou Enlai visitedIndia at the end of 1956, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharal Nehruarranged for him to visit Indian-controlled Kashmir. Understandingthat such a visit would imply some degree of Chinese support forIndia on the Kashmir issue, Zhou declined the visit, according toGeng Biao.
While much diplomatic water has flowed under the bridge since1956, one principle remains constant. Kashmir remains extremelyimportant to both India and Pakistan, so much so that each closelyexamines China’s stance on the problem. It follows from this under-standing that Chinese efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to pressure Pakistanover Kashmir, or refusal to stand by Pakistan during periods oftension with India over Kashmir, could easily have undermined theSino-Pakistan entente. On the other hand, stable, continued Chinesecooperation with Pakistan in all areas, including military cooperation,even during periods of Pakistan–Indian conflict over Kashmir, woulddemonstrate to Pakistani leaders the utility of friendship withChina—even if Beijing conceded ground to New Delhi in terms of itsformal, declared position on Kashmir. These calculations have meantthat China has stood quietly but effectively behind Pakistan duringperiods of Pakistan–India conflict over Kashmir.
Three cases of India–Pakistan confrontation illustrate the operationof this principle: the 1990 confrontation over Pakistani support forinsurgency in Kashmir; the 1999 confrontation over Kargil on the lineof control in Kashmir; and the year-long military confrontation thatdeveloped in the aftermath of the December 2001 terrorist attacks onthe Indian parliament.
The 1990 India–Pakistan crisis was rooted in efforts by India’s centralleaders (both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi) to increase controlover Indian Kashmir by engineering splits in the local Kashmiri leader-ship and manipulating Kashmir state-level elections. The result was adeepening alienation of Kashmiri Indians from the central government.By 1989 armed rebellion within Indian Kashmir was the result. By
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1990 Indian Kashmir was in a state of civil war and, in January, thecentral government dismissed the local Kashmir government andimposed central rule. This further aggravated the situation. Crowds ofhundreds of thousands of angry Indian Kashmiris challenged thepolice and demanded independence. Police firing on the crowds killedhundreds. The insurgency in Indian Kashmir found strong sympathy inPakistan. Insurgents from Indian Kashmir found sanctuary in PakistaniKashmir and easy access to Pakistani arms bazaars.19 By April IndianPrime Minister V. P. Singh was warning Pakistan against providingfurther assistance to the Kashmiri rebels on pain of Indian militaryretaliation against Pakistan. If Pakistan persisted, Singh warned, itmight pay a “very high price.”20
As tension spiraled between India and Pakistan in 1990, Beijingdemonstrably continued its military cooperation while signaling thatsuch cooperation could continue regardless of what might happen inthe international situation. In February 1990 PRC Defense MinisterQin Qiwei led a ten-man PLA delegation to Pakistan. The delegationincluded the deputy commander of the Lanzhou Military Region bor-dering on both Pakistan and India. During his stay in Islamabad, Qinexpressed strong support for Pakistan in the face of mounting Indianpressure. “The Chinese government will never change its policy [of]supporting the Pakistan government, people, and armed forces insafeguarding their state sovereignty and territorial integrity, no matterhow the international situation changes,” Qin said.21
During the 1999 Kargil episode, Pakistani soldiers disguised asKashmiri irregulars seized and attempted to hold five to six squarekilometers of strategically situated mountain tops overlooking India’smain supply line to Leh in Ladakh.22 As noted earlier, this was done inhope of levering increased international fear of India–Pakistan conflictin the aftermath of the bilateral nuclearization of May–June 1998.Pakistani leaders apparently hoped that international fear of anIndian–Pakistan nuclear war would precipitate international mediationin the Kashmir issue. India responded to Pakistan’s move by marshalinginfantry and artillery to retake the strategic hill. A mini-war thatresulted in 1,250 casualties flared from late April to mid July 1999.23
Throughout the Kargil mini-war Beijing demonstrably continuedits military cooperation with Pakistan. In May 1999 Pakistan’s ArmyChief of Staff Parvez Musharraf, prime architect of the Kargil episode,and future leader of the military coup that would end civilian rule in
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Pakistan five months later, visited Beijing. Musharraf was received byPLA Chief of Staff General Fu Quanyou. In publicized comments, Fustated that Sino-Pakistan friendship would never change no matterhow the world situation or domestic situation might change. “Themilitary ties between China and Pakistan are a vital part of the bilateralrelations between the two countries and an important part of the Sino-Pakistan comprehensive cooperative partnership,” Fu declared.24 Shortlyafter Musharraf left Beijing, a PLA goodwill delegation led by thePolitical Commissar of the PLA’s General Armaments Departmentvisited Pakistan at the invitation of the Pakistani armed forces. Pressreports indicated that the two sides discussed purchase of conventionalweapons during the goodwill delegation’s visit.
Again during the 2002 India–Pakistan military confrontation,China demonstrably continued its military cooperation with Pakistan.India responded to the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian parlia-ment in New Delhi by Pakistan-based terrorists by mobilizing alongPakistan’s borders forces adequate for a for a full scale attack on Pakistan.Pakistan launched a counter-mobilization, and the two countriesstood eyeball-to-eyeball on the brink of war for over a year.25 Furtherterrorist attacks on dependants of Indian army personnel in May andJuly 2002 poured more fuel on the flames.
As the crisis unfolded in late December 2002, Pakistan’s (by then)President Musharraf made a five day visit to China. Musharraf metwith PRC Defense Minister and Vice Chair of the Central MilitaryCommission Chi Haotian. Chi declared that Sino-Pakistan friendshipwas “time tested” and “all-weather.” The strong bond between thearmed forces of the two countries would continue and develop furtherin the twenty-first century, Chi said.26 President Jiang Zemin alsoreassured Musharraf that Sino-Pakistani friendship had withstood thetest of time, was all-weather, and was deeply rooted. He said thatChina would continue to aid Pakistan and forcefully further the twocountries’ all-round cooperative partnership.27 During Musharraf’s visit,seven agreements were signed on Chinese economic and technologicalcooperation with Pakistan.
An “All-Weather” Friendship As with the dog that Sherlock Holmes noticed did not bark in thenight—a fictional creation of English writer Sir Arthur ConanDoyle—what is important in these three cases is what did not happen.
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China did not suspend its military cooperation with Pakistan duringperiods of India–Pakistan military conflict. That cooperation continuedunimpeded by the conflict over Kashmir.
In the context of the 1999 and 2002 confrontations over Kashmir,China also gave Pakistan major assistance in the enhancement of itsnational defense capabilities. Yearbooks of the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Project (SIPRI) indicate a number of new orders andlicences granted by China to Pakistan during these years. In 1999, forexample, China agreed to sell or licence to Pakistan advanced fighteraircraft and ground attack aircraft.28 In April 2002 China delivered toPakistan the first batch of 20 F-7 PG fighter aircraft developed jointlyby Pakistan and China.29 In September 2002 China’s North ChinaIndustries Corporation was awarded a $100 million contract for coop-eration in manufacture of a new tank.30 While long-standing Chinesepolicy prohibits suspension of already approved orders to states asexpression of disapproval for various policies (sanctions are deemed tobe an instrument of “big power bullying” in which China does notengage), Beijing could easily have deferred conclusion of new agree-ments until well after India–Pakistan tension over Kashmir had passed.This does not seem to have happened. Chinese arms sales to Pakistanseem to have continued uninfluenced by various India–Pakistanconfrontations over Kashmir.
In fact, some Chinese assistance to Pakistan seems specificallylinked to addressing Pakistani vulnerabilities revealed during the 1999and 2002 confrontations over Kashmir. During the later days of the1999 Kargil confrontation New Delhi had ordered deployment of anIndian fleet off Pakistan’s Karachi port. This surprise move effectivelybottled up the bulk of Pakistan’s navy and threatened closure of theport that handled 90% of Pakistan’s foreign trade. In response to theIndian move, Pakistan’s leaders had Chinese experts draw up extremelyambitious plans for the development of a new harbor complex at Gwadarin Pakistan’s Baluchistan. The new Gwadar port was to includetwenty-three deep-water berths, onshore wharf and cargo handlingfacilities, plus new highways and rail lines linking Gwadar to the rest ofPakistan. While economic considerations having to do with acceleratingdevelopment were part of Pakistan’s calculations regarding the Gwadarproject, strategic concerns about strengthening Pakistan’s ability towithstand a potential Indian naval blockade were central to Islamabad’sdecision to move ahead with the Gwadar project. During a May 2001
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visit to Pakistan, Premier Zhu Rongji committed China to major supportof the Gwadar project. In August of the same year, China agreed toprovide $198 for the first stage of the project plus another $200 millionfor modernization of Pakistan’s railway system.31
Once again during the 2002 crisis India deployed its navy offPakistan.32 About a year after that deployment, China agreed to providePakistan with four frigates to upgrade its naval capabilities.33 Chinaalso supplied large amounts of aid that contributed to strengtheningPakistan’s ability to withstand Indian pressure. In the two yearspreceding Pakistan Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali’s visit toChina in March 2003, China had supplied Pakistan over $2 billion inassistance. Most of this went to the Gwadar project, expansion andimprovement of Pakistan’s railways, and electrical power generation.During Jamali’s visit China extended another soft credit of about $500million to further develop Pakistan’s railways. Beijing also agreed to setup another 300 megawatt nuclear power plant at Chasma, Pakistan.34
In sum, China made very substantial contributions to Pakistan’s abilityto withstand Indian pressure during a period when Pakistan repeatedlyresorted to proxy military force to push New Delhi toward settlementof the Kashmir issue.
Beijing’s Policies toward Modalities for Resolving the Kashmir Conflict Beijing has balanced its “all-weather” “tested by adversity” supportfor Pakistan during periods of Kashmir-induced India–Pakistan conflictwith support for peaceful and bilateral resolution of the Kashmirissue. Beijing has urged both India and Pakistan to avoid war overKashmir and to solve the issue via bilateral negotiations. Whiledirected more or less evenly at both Islamabad and New Delhi, thisChinese prompting is especially important as regards Pakistan, for it isthere that Beijing enjoys greater positive leverage. While not entirelyruling out the possibility of international mediation—including possibleChinese mediation (a possibility that is popular with Pakistani com-mentators)—Beijing has consistently refused (at least since DengXiaoping took power) to support Pakistan’s efforts to internationalizethe Kashmir issue.
During the various India–Pakistan crises over Kashmir since Dengcame to power in 1978, Beijing has called and worked for avoidance ofwar. During the 1990 crisis, for example, Chinese People’s Political
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Consultative Conference vice chair Wang Renzhong visited Pakistan.In Islamabad Wang called for solving the Kashmir dispute via peacefulnegotiations and without resort to military force or causing escalationof tension.35 During the 1999 Kargil crisis, Foreign Minister TangJiaxuan told visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz that Chinahoped Pakistan and India would find a political solution to the Kashmirconflict through negotiations and consultations. The Kashmir issuecould only be solved by peaceful means, Tang said, and the internationalcommunity was greatly concerned with the recent increased conflictover Kashmir.36 Later the same month Pakistani Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif called in Beijing seeking greater Chinese support onKashmir. Jiang Zemin told Sharif that as a neighbor of South Asia,China was much concerned with the conflict in Kashmir. Chinahoped, Jiang said, that India and Pakistan would jointly ease the currenttense situation in Kashmir and settle existing problems through dialogueand talk.37 Zhu Rongji delivered the same message to Sharif.
Beijing’s message was the same during the confrontation thatfollowed the December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament.Shortly after that attack, a PRC MFA spokesperson expressed thehope that both India and Pakistan would continue to show restraintand avoid new tensions in South Asia.38 A week later, as tensionspiraled, the MFA spokesperson said that China was “deeply worried”about the exchange of gunfire across the India–Pakistan border and“very concerned” about the situation developing there. China hopedthat India and Pakistan would resolve the issue properly throughdialogue and consultation so as to safeguard peace and stability in theregion.39 During a visit by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to Islamabadin May 2002, Musharraf briefed his visitor on efforts taken by Pakistanto bring about a de-escalation of tensions with India. Tang expressedsupport for these positive steps by Pakistan. China was of the view,Tang said, that it was important to maintain an impetus towardde-escalation of tense relations in South Asia and that every side shouldbe calm and move toward solution of the problem via negotiations.40
Beijing has also declined to support Pakistan’s efforts to “inter-nationalize” the Kashmir issue—to raise the issue at the United Nations,or to mobilize international attention on Kashmir in hopes of pressuringIndia to make concessions. As noted earlier, internationalization hasbeen linked repeatedly to Pakistan’s use of proxy military forces tocreate crises. By creating military crises, Pakistan hoped to play on
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international fears of nuclear weapons use to secure internationalintervention on Kashmir. Beijing declined to support both aspects ofthis Pakistani ploy. During both the 1999 and 2002 crises, Beijing’sadvice to Islamabad was to discuss the Kashmir issue directly withIndia. On neither occasion did China raise the Kashmir issue in theUnited Nations. Efforts to raise the issue at the United Nations wouldonly encourage further Indian intransigence, Beijing told Islamabad.Beijing did not rule out some sort of international consideration ofKashmir, or even the possibility of international mediation. But neitherdid it call for such international action, or endorse Pakistani calls.
It also seems that following the 9–11 attacks on the United States,Beijing began advising Pakistan to abandon sponsorship of terroristattacks against India as a way of attempting to produce movementtoward a Kashmir settlement. Solid evidence about Sino-Pakistanidiscussions in this regard is absent, but circumstantial evidence doespoint in this direction. It apparently took several months for China’sstrategic analysts to rethink the implications of Pakistan’s tactics inthe post-9–11 world. This author happened to be in Beijing as part ofan unofficial “track-two” US–PRC security dialogue in mid-October2001 when the Anglo-American campaign to oust the Taliban inAfghanistan began. The author’s assigned role in the delegation was tounderline possibilities for expanded US–PRC cooperation in SouthAsia. In line with this, the author raised during discussions at a dozenor so official and semi-official think-tanks the problem of terroristinfiltration from Pakistani-controlled territory into India-controlledKashmir, the argument being that halting these attacks was an areawhere China and the United States might cooperate more effectively.When analysts on the Chinese side responded to these proposals theyinvariably denied that any such infiltration from Pakistan was goingon. Assertions to the contrary were the result of either misinformationor malign intentions, they said.
The outrageous nature of the December 13, 2001 attack on theIndian parliament, plus India’s subsequent mobilization for an attackon Pakistan, apparently led Beijing to conclude that such tactics wereunacceptable. Several days after the December 13 attack, an MFAspokesperson said that China opposed and condemned any form ofterrorist activities and was against any country that launched terroristattacks through organizations or individuals. The spokespersonrefused to comment directly on Indian charges that the attack on the
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Indian parliament was sponsored by Pakistani intelligence services.41
Regarding the scheduled visit to China by Pakistan President Musharraf,Chinese President Jiang Zemin told a Pakistani reporter that he hopedMusharraf’s upcoming visit would forcefully further the two countries’all-round cooperative partnership.42
As terrorist attacks against India continued into 2002, China’sMFA routinely denounced them. A July 2002 attack on civiliandependants inside an Indian army base in the Jammu region of Jammuand Kashmir produced a Chinese statement of condemnation, deepsympathy for the victims, and condolences for the families of the victimsof the attack.43 Attacks on two temples in Jammu City in November2002 produced another MFA statement of shock and condemnation.44
China also lauded Pakistani efforts to suppress cross-borderterrorism. In January 2002, President Musharraf publicly promised tostamp out cross-border infiltration into India, and in June 2002 hegave further commitments in that regard to US Deputy Secretary ofState Richard Armitage. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangyalauded these actions. “We fully support President Musharraf in hiseffort to fight against terrorism and bring peace in South Asia,” hesaid.45 When India sought assurances from Beijing about its non-supportfor Pakistan-based terrorist attacks against India, Foreign MinisterTang Jiaxuan was definitive. China denounced any link of violentterrorist actions, Tang told Indian Minister of External Affairs JaswantSingh in July 2002. Tang also noted that Pakistan had similarlyexpressed clear, definite, and resolute opposition to any kind of terroristactions.46 Renmin ribao elucidated some of the logic of Beijing’s oppo-sition to Pakistani resort to terrorist tactics. Commenting on India’s“aggressive” military build-up against Pakistan in the aftermath of vari-ous terrorist attacks, a “news analysis” by the paper’s Pakistan-basedreporter concluded that “if Pakistan continues to hold on to its anti-terrorist stand following the September 11th incident and seeks to settlethe Indian–Pakistan clash through diplomatic channels, easing theIndian–Pakistan tensions is still possible.”47 In other words, resort toterrorist tactics was unacceptable because it dangerously increased therisk of India–Pakistan war.
Beijing’s policy of support for avoidance of war over Kashmirmarks a change from policy of the Mao era. Beginning in 1964 Chinastarted supporting the “Kashmiri people’s” war of “self-determination.”During 1964 and 1965 that support was translated into political and
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material support for Pakistan’s efforts to launch an insurgency insideIndian-controlled Kashmir. That effort was a catastrophic failure andhelped trigger the 1965 India–Pakistan war. But the policy of supportingthe Kashmiri people’s armed struggle for self-determination continuedby inertia until Mao’s death. Deng Xiaoping in effect scrapped thispolicy in 1980 when he shifted China’s formal position on Kashmir toneutrality. Deng’s implicit—but only that!—renunciation of armedstruggle by the Kashmiri people was part of a broader push to demilitarizeChina’s foreign relations and international environment. About the sametime that Deng was dropping support for armed struggle in Kashmir,he was also scrapping long-standing CCP support for insurgencies inIndia’s northeastern states, in Thailand, in Malaysia, and (over a some-what longer time frame) in Burma. Whereas Mao had seen revolutionarywar as moving history in a progressive direction, Deng saw it as helpingto keep China poor.
Beijing’s post-1980 policy of support for avoidance of war overKashmir stems from two sources. The first was alluded to in the previousparagraph: war in China’s neighborhood, especially one between twosignificant powers like India and Pakistan, could easily spoil the inter-national environment for China’s development drive. An India–Pakistan war would cause the flight of foreign investment, businessmen,and tourists spending foreign currency, from adjacent regions ofChina. An India–Pakistan war would also make difficult profit-driveneconomic cooperation between China and the belligerent countries. Itwould disrupt the flow of Chinese goods via nearby belligerent countriesto global markets. It would necessitate tighter internal securitycontrols that would be antithetical to market-driven economic activity.And it would force increased military spending and preparedness atthe expanse of increased attention to China’s economic and socialdevelopment needs. In short, an India–Pakistan war would retardChina’s drive to raise itself to a modest level of prosperity by the middleof the twenty-first century.
The second reason for Beijing’s desire to avoid an India–Pakistanwar over Kashmir is that such a war would endanger two fundamentalelements of China’s South Asia strategy: (1) maintaining Pakistan as abalance to India and (2) improving relations with all the states ofSouth Asia.
Regarding the maintenance of Pakistan as a balance to India,another major India–Pakistan war raises the specter that India would
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finally rouse itself, mobilize its overwhelming national strength, and oneway or another finally and decisively subordinate Pakistan. Confrontedby such an eventuality, Beijing would face a Hobson’s choice: tointervene and wage a war with India to prevent such an outcome, orstay out of the conflict and see overthrown the South Asian balance ofpower upon which China’s policy in that region has rested since the1950s.
Regarding Beijing’s objective of fostering cooperation with all thestates of South Asia, an India–Pakistan conflict would present consid-erable difficulties. In the first instance, since China would almostcertainly render political and material support to Pakistan in the eventof such a war, a conflict would deal a severe blow to Sino-Indian ties.This would be the case even if China did not intervene in the war.Mere support for Pakistan would probably be sufficient to devastateSino-Indian ties. Chinese support for Pakistan in the event of anotherIndia–Pakistan war would also greatly exacerbate Indian apprehen-sions about Chinese ties with other South Asian states—Nepal, Bangla-desh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, etc. For a lengthy period of time followingan India–Pakistan war in which China supported Pakistan, Indiawould likely be more vigilant about using its great influence in SouthAsia to stunt Chinese ties, especially military-security ties, withIndia’s small South Asian neighbors. Decisive Indian subordination ofPakistan—should that be the outcome of an India–Pakistan war—would also strengthen the Indian conviction that South Asia was itsnatural security zone from which China ought to be militarilyexcluded. Thus an India–Pakistan war over Kashmir would probablyretard the development of China’s multidimensional, friendly, coop-erative ties with the countries of South Asia.
China’s Interests regarding a Substantive Settlement of the Kashmir Issue While China’s interests regarding a possible substantive settlement ofthe Kashmir issue do not, apparently, influence current Chinese policy,they could—should conditions for such a settlement coalesce. Chinahas two major interests in seeing Kashmir resolved substantively, i.e.,a settlement which would genuinely resolve the dispute that hasplagued relations between India and Pakistan since partition.
China’s first interest involves a Kashmir settlement that wouldtransfer to India Hunza or perhaps Hunza and Gilgit. Transfer of
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Hunza and/or Gilgit to Indian sovereignty and control would meanIndian-controlled territory now separated Pakistan and China,eliminating a China–Pakistan border. It would also mean that theChina-constructed Karakorum highway would run through Indianterritory, giving India control over Chinese overland access to Pakistan.Although Chinese cargoes might still transit the Karakorum highwaywere it under Indian sovereignty, such transit would be contingent onIndian consent. Transfer of Hunza and/or Gilgit to Indian sovereigntywould be in line with the formal Indian position that all of Kashmirlegally acceded to Indian sovereignty through the acts of its Marahajahin 1947. Some Indian politicians continue to uphold this extremeposition. While Pakistani cession of these territories to India is extremelyunlikely, it could conceivably happen in the aftermath of a decisiveIndian defeat of Pakistan. Territorially isolating a rump Pakistani statefrom its erstwhile Chinese supporter could be a major Indian mechanismfor preventing Pakistan’s revival as a threat to India—were Indianstrategists to reach that conclusion in the aftermath of a bitter, perhapsnuclear, “fourth round” between Indian and Pakistan. Over thecourse of thirty-some years China has invested considerable resourcesin the construction of the Karakorum highway which transits Hunzaand Gilgit. At present, that highway ends at Rawalpindi, south ofwhich radiate rail and roads that are objects of major Chinese-aidedefforts at improvement in 2001–03. This would diminish China’s positionvis-à-vis India. Rather than having secure overland access to theIndian Ocean dependent on its “all-weather” friend Pakistan, Chinawould find that access now dependent on an India inclined toward“regional hegemony.” Thus, preventing the disappearance of a Sino-Pakistan border would probably be a major Chinese objective ininfluencing a postwar settlement between Pakistan and India.
China’s second interest in a possible Kashmir settlement is thatsuch a settlement might lead to a basic improvement in India–Pakistanrelations, undermining—perhaps even ending—the cleavage that hasprovided China such important leverage since the mid-1950s. There is,of course, debate over whether resolution of the Kashmir conflictwould fundamentally ease tension between India and Pakistan. It can beargued that conflict arises out of basically conflicting national identities,with each nation grasping the other as its essential, negative referent—as what each is not. If this is the case, even resolution of the Kashmirissue might not lead to a qualitative improvement of India–Pakistan
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relations. Were genuine progress toward a Kashmir settlement todevelop, Chinese strategists would probably debate this thesis in full,and their conclusions would influence Chinese policy.
It is useful to recall that during the 1950s and 1960s US and Britishrepresentatives devoted considerable energy to finding a Kashmir settle-ment so as to bring India and Pakistan closer together in the “joint defenseof the subcontinent.” Anglo-American leaders saw reconciliation ofthose two countries as the best way of minimizing PRC capabilities inSouth Asia, and tried repeatedly, and at high levels, to accomplish thatby finding a solution to Kashmir.48 China’s geostrategic interestswere, and remain, the mirror opposite of those of the US.
This is not to say that Beijing would necessarily oppose or seek toblock a Kashmir settlement. Beijing would not want to be seen as aspoiler. Development of such a perception in India would carry heavycosts for China’s ties with the major South Asian power. But it doessuggest that China would have many concerns about a possible Kashmirsettlement, concerns which it would seek to have addressed. It alsosuggests that Beijing might not be the most enthusiastic proponent ofa Kashmir settlement, and would be highly suspicious of Americanenthusiasm for such a settlement.
Kashmir as a Source of Chinese Leverage with New Delhi and Washington Beijing’s ability to tilt toward either India or Pakistan on the Kashmirissue gives China significant leverage with New Delhi. Managing thecontradiction between maintaining the Sino-Pakistan entente cordialeand pushing ahead with greater Sino-Indian cooperation is the heartof China’s strategic problem in South Asia.49 Kashmir has served as auseful mechanism in Beijing’s management of that contradiction.
Given that it has been Pakistan’s most trusted foreign supporter,China enjoys considerable influence and prestige in Islamabad.Throughout the process of Sino-Indian rapprochement, Indian leadershave been desirous of edging China away from Pakistan, especiallyregarding Kashmir. A Pakistan with lesser rather than greater Chinesesupport would be less likely to adopt risky policies involving militaryadventures against India. A Pakistan with lesser levels of Chinese supportwould also, plausibly, be more likely to agree to turn the line of controlin Kashmir into a de jure international boundary. A more pro-Indian,less pro-Pakistan Chinese stance on Kashmir would also suggest that,
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in the extreme event of another India–Pakistan war, China would notonly remain non-belligerent, but also offer Pakistan a lesser level ofpolitical and material support.
On the other hand, Indian policies angering Beijing have riskedpushing China toward a more pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir.Beijing can use shifts in its stance on Kashmir to punish Indian policieson a wide range of issues, from Tibet and Taiwan, to nonproliferation,to emphasis on “the China threat.” Thus, in the aftermath of NewDelhi’s explicit naming of China as “enemy number one” as justificationfor its May 1998 nuclear weaponization, Beijing had Qin Huasun atthe United Nations raise the possibility of China returning to a 1960’stype pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir.
New Delhi’s desire to influence Beijing’s stance on Kashmir hascreated a set of incentives for India to accommodate China. The utilityof this set of incentives is suggested, perhaps, by the fact that mostIndian leaders are generally satisfied with the post-1980 changes inChina’s Kashmir policy and have generally acquiesced to the continuationof China’s broad support for the development of Pakistani militarycapabilities and defense industrial complex. The Kashmir issue is soemotional—linked closely to the national identities of both India andPakistan—and so dangerous, that by changing its formal declaredposition on it, Beijing was able to secure Indian acceptance of anongoing strategic military partnership between China and Pakistan.This was not a bad deal for China. Again, this seems to suggest themagnitude of the leverage that Kashmir gives Beijing.
Kashmir also gives China leverage with Washington. BecauseChina, as Pakistan’s most trusted foreign supporter, has considerableleverage with Islamabad, it is extremely convenient for Washington tohave Chinese cooperation in management of matters related to Pakistan.We know exceedingly little about how China has actually exercised itsinfluence with Islamabad. It is clear, however, that Washington hasbelieved that it was useful to secure Chinese cooperation in SouthAsia. Thus the US–PRC Joint Statement produced during JiangZemin’s October 1997 visit to the United States declared the “greatpotential for cooperation in maintaining global and regional peace andstability,” with South Asia as one area in which such cooperationmight occur.50 The US–PRC Joint Presidential Statement on SouthAsia issued in the aftermath of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of1998 also embodied the US desire for Chinese cooperation in South
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Asia. That statement declared the US and China “committed to assistwhere possible, peaceful resolution of difficult and long-standingdifferences” between India and Pakistan, “including the issue ofKashmir.”51
The utility to Beijing of offering its good offices to Washington incooperation regarding Kashmir should be seen in the light of theextreme volatility of Sino-US relations in the 1990s. Following theBeijing massacre in June 1989 and the collapse of the USSR in 1991,the consensus within the United States that had emerged in 1972regarding China policy collapsed. It was replaced by an increasinglypartisan debate over China policy. Two main positions in that debatecan be identified. One, associated with both Presidents George H. W.Bush and William Clinton, advocated US engagement and cooperationwith the PRC. The other, associated with congressional opposition onboth the right and left wings of the political spectrum, feared thatcooperation with China was a dangerous illusion since the PRC wasan undemocratic, rival peer competitor of the United States. Anadverse outcome of this debate (from Beijing’s perspective, of course),would have endangered the very basis of China’s post-1978 developmentdrive. In the context of this intense debate, cooperation with theUnited States in South Asia and on Kashmir offered Beijing a way ofdemonstrating its utility and credibility as a partner of the UnitedStates. Cooperation with the US on Kashmir became a small but usefulbargaining chip used by Beijing to protect its vital cooperative relationwith the United States.
Conclusion Beijing’s mix of Kashmir policies involves an attempt to balanceChina’s interests with both Pakistan and India. It entails an attempt tobalance China between those two countries, enabling China to furtherits ties and interests with both. China’s objective is to foster cooperativerelations with all South Asian countries, including both India andPakistan, and the particular menu of Chinese Kashmir policies thathas evolved is a reflection of this objective.
Beijing has given India a considerable amount in terms of China’sformal, declared policy toward Kashmir. It does not blame India for theconflict in Kashmir. It does not endorse internationalization of the issueor reference of the conflict to the United Nations. Chinese representativesdo not publicly mention plebiscites or the will of the Kashmiri people,
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and only very rarely mention the United Nations. Beijing calls insteadfor bilateral talks, consultations, or negotiations between India andPakistan as methods of resolution. And recently Beijing has come outagainst cross-border terrorism on the Kashmir issue and urged Pakistanto suppress such activity.
At the same time, China has continued robust assistance to Pakistan’snational security efforts and persisted with that assistance regardlessof vicissitudes in India–Pakistan relations. In fact, during times of badweather between Pakistan and India, Beijing has invariably demonstratedits continuing support for Pakistan’s national defense, even thoughsome of the storms Pakistan faced might have derived from the Kashmirpolicy choices of Pakistan’s rulers. Chinese visitors to Pakistan mightwell tell their hosts, “watch what we do, not what we say.”
This mix of policies seems to have served Chinese interests fairlywell. Beijing has, in fact, sustained its strategic entente cordiale withPakistan, while navigating toward ever-deeper cooperation with India.
NOTES
1. Regarding the Soviet position toward Kashmir, see Hemen Ray, How Moscow SeesKashmir (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1985).
2. Renmin ribao, September 5, 1965, in Survey of China Mainland Press (hereafter SCMP),US Consulate, Hong Kong, No. 3535, September 13, 1965, pp. 33–34.
3. “Indian Reactionaries are Plain Aggressors,” Renmin ribao, September 11, 1965, inSCMP, No. 3538, September 16, 1965, pp. 31–34.
4. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, Peking’s Support for Wars ofNational Liberation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 97.
5. John W. Garver, Protracted Contest, Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 228.
6. It may well be that in off-the-record comments with audiences in Pakistan Chinesespokesmen are more liberal in their references to United Nations Resolutions andimportance of reference to the will of the Kashmir people. At least Pakistani commentatorsfrequently express the view that this is China’s position.
7. Beijing domestic radio, November 16, 1989. FBIS-CHI-89–221, pp. 8–9. In ForeignBroadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS). Prior to July 1996 FBIS is available inhard-copy from the National Technical Information Service, in Washington, DC. Frommid-1996 to mid-2003 it was available only online from NTIS. As of mid-2003 it wasretrievable online through World News Connection at wnc.dialog.com
8. “Yet another proof of the enormity and depth of eternal Sino-Pak friendship” (Editorial),Jang, May 12, 2001. Trans., FBIS; wnc.dialog.com
9. Foreign Ministry spokesman’s press conference on May 30, 2002. www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/30672.htm.
10. “PRC President Jiang Zemin Hopes For Peaceful Settlement of India–Pakistan Dispute”Xinhua (English), August 2, 2002. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
11. United Nations Security Council, 3890th Meeting, June 6, 1998. S/PV.3990, p. 12. Availablethrough www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact1998.htm
12. I analyze this campaign in “The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity following India’sNuclear Tests,” The China Quarterly No. 168 (December 2001), pp. 865–89.
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13. J. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy, Chinese Foreign Policy and the UnitedFront Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 173, 180–81.
14. Mohammed Yunus, Reflections on China, An Ambassador’s View From Beijing (Islamabad:Services Book Club, 1988), p. 152.
15. Author’s interview with Chinese diplomat Zhang Wenjin in Beijing, 10 May 1990. 16. Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 188–89. 17. Geng was one of a number of PLA generals shifted from military to diplomatic struggle
after CCP victory in 1949. In 1950 he became PRC ambassador to Sweden. See Zhonggongren ming lu [Record of Chinese Communist personnel] (Taipei: Institute of Inter-national Relations, 1999), p. 312. Regarding the intensification of Sino-Pakistan relationsin 1956, see Anwar H. Syed, China and Pakistan: Dipolomacy of an Entente Cordiale(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).
18. Geng Biao, “Tuidong zhongguo he bajisitan guanxi chuanxiang youhao fazhande ji cizhongyao waijiao xingdong,” [Several important diplomatic activities promoting thedevelopment of Sino-Pakistan cordiality], Xin zhongguo waijiao fengyun [Vissicitudesof New China’s Diplomacy], Volume 2 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1991), pp. 57–63.
19. Robert Hardgrave and Stanley A. Kochanek, India, Government and Politics in aDeveloping Nation, 5th ed. (Forthworth: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers,1993), pp. 162, 304.
20. Facts on File (New York: Facts on File Inc., 1990), pp. 73–74, 164–65, 293. 21. “Says Friendship Solid,” Xinhua, February 22, 1990, FBIS-CHI-90–036, pp. 10–11. 22. Ahmed Rashid and Pramit Mitra, “Military Instrusion,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
June 17, 1999, p. 16. “Army preparing for a long haul at Kargil,” The Hindu, May 26,1999.
23. The casualty figure is from a database on violent conflicts created and maintained byPeter Brecke at Georgia Institute of Technology. It is available at: www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/taxonomy/html.
24. “Fu Quanyou Holds Talks With Pakistani Military Officer,” Xinhua (English), May 15,1999. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
25. “India and Pakistan Add to War Footing,” and Brahma Chellaney, “India Is Ready toDefend Itself,” New York Times, December 28, 2001, pp. A8 and A17. For an analysisof Indian strategy see Josey Joseph “Exercise in Futility,” India Abroad, December 27,2002, p. 10.
26. “Chi Haotian Meets Pakistani President,” Xinhua (English), December 21, 2001. ViaFBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
27. “PRC: Jiang Zemin Interviewed by Pakistani Correspondent on Ties, Afghanistan,”Xinhua (English), December 18, 2001. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
28. “Register of the Transfer and Licensed Production of Major Conventional Weapons,”from SIPRI Yearbook, 2000, p. 409, and SIPRI Yearbook, 2001, p. 385 (Stockholm:Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).
29. “China Briefing,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 11, 2002, p. 24. 30. “Pakistan To Engage Chinese Firm on Al-Zarar Tank,” The News (Islamabad),
September 7, 2002. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com. 31. The Gwadar project is discussed at some length in John W. Garver, “The Security
Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations,” India Review Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 1–38.32. See Ahmad Faruqui, “India Losing the Initiative,” Asia Times, June 5, 2002.
www.atimes.com/india-pak/DF050102.html 33. “China Agrees to Give Four Frigates for Pakistan Navy,” The Nation (Islamabad),
March 26, 2003. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com. 34. “Report: China to Help Pakistan in Setting Up Another Nuclear Plant,” The News
(Islamabad), March 25, 2003. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com. 35. “Gulf, Kashmir Discussed,” Xinhua, December 1, 1990, p. 13. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.36. “Tang Jia Xung, Pakistan Counterpart Discuss Kashmir,” Xinhua, June 11, 1999. Via
FBIS; wnc.dialog.com. 37. “President Jiang Meets Pakistani Prime Minister,” People’s Daily, June 30, 1999.
www.peopledaily.com.cn/english/199906/30/enc_19990630001001_TopNews.htr.
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38. “PRC FM Spokeswoman: China Hopes India, Pakistan Will Show Restraint,” Xinhua,December 18, 2001. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
39. “PRC FM Spokeswoman Views India–Pakistan Border Clash,” Xinhua, December 26,20001. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
40. “Pakistan’s Musharraf, PRC Foreign Minister Tang Meet, Discuss Ties,” Xinhua,May 15, 2002. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
41. “FP: PRC FM Spokeswoman on Indian Parliament Bombing, Musharraf’s Visit,” AFP,December 18, 2001. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
42. “PRC: Jiang Zemin Interviewed by Pakistani Correspondent on Ties,” Xinhua, December18, 2001. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
43. “More on PRC FM Spokesman: China Condemns Killing in Kashmir, Terrorism inAny Form,” Xinhua, July 15, 2002. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
44. “PRC FM Spokesman: China Condemns Terrorist Attacks on Kashmir Temple,” Xinhua,November 27, 2002. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
45. “China Commends Pakistan’s Role in Combating Terrorism,” The News (Islamabad),September 14, 2002. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
46. “PRC Foreign Minister Meets With Indian Minister of External Affairs,” Xinhua,July 31, 2001. Via FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
47. “Indian–Pakistani Crisis Escalate Again,” Renmin ribao internet version, May 21, 2002.Trans., FBIS; wnc.dialog.com.
48. See S. Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas, the USA, China, and South Asiain the 1950s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
49. I develop this theme in Protracted Contest, pp. 216–42. 50. “Joint United States-China Statement,” October 29, 1997. Full text available from the
Nuclear Threat Initiative at www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/uschst97.htm 51. “Sino-US Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia,” Beijing Review, July 20–27,
1998, p. 17.
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iona
l Def
ence
Uni
vers
ity -
Isl
amab
ad]
at 2
1:28
22
Febr
uary
201
5