chong ho yu - interpretations and misinterpretations of classical skepticism (2004)

8/9/2019 Chong Ho Yu - Interpretations and Misinterpretations of Classical Skepticism (2004)

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Interpretations and Misinterpretations of Classical Skepticism

in Western Intellectual Tradition

Chong Ho Yu

(May 3, !!"#

$%stract

According to Frede and Groarke, classical skepticism, represented by Pyrrho and Sextus

Empiricus, has been widely and unfairly confused with dogmatic skepticism by many scholars.

Frede traced this misunderstanding back to icero and St. Augustine, while Groarke related this

problem to the pro!reason and pro!science mentality in "estern culture. As a supplement to these

notions, this article briefly illustrates a wide spectrum of interpretations and misinterpretations of

Pyrrhonism by both hristian and secular scholars throughout "estern intellectual history. #t is

fascinating but pu$$ling to see that Pyrrhonism was adopted by different scholars in supporting

of ri%al claims. For example, early hristian anti!intellectualism employed Pyrrhonism to

denounce secular knowledge. &y$antine scholars re'ected skepticism in order to defend

(rthodox spirituality. )he atholic ounter!*eformation mo%ement saw it as a powerful weapon

against Protestants. Protestants regarded it as a way to challenge the papal authority and to

restore doctrinal purity. #t is argued that the problem of misinterpretation should not be blamed

only on the interpreters. *ather, classical skepticism carries certain properties that make it

%ulnerable to open interpretation. For instance, the skeptic attitude is a disposition rather than an

assertion+ the skeptical goal of mental tranuility is %irtually unattainable. As a result, the tool of



skepticism is used as an auxiliary instrument to assist other schools of thought in accomplishing

their own goals.

Introduction

Greek skepticism is one of the ma'or achie%ements of Greek philosophy. Skepticism

began with Pyrrho of Elis -/0!120 &3, and thus skepticism is also known as Pyrrhonism.

4owe%er, Pyrrho did not write anything+ his philosophical ideas were presented in Sextus

Empiricus5s Outline of Scepticism.678 Although many branches of Greek Academicians and

Pyrrhonians treated Stoics as a common enemy, Academicians held a more radical position than

Pyrrhonism in terms of epistemology and metaphysics. 9ue to their differences, the former is

regarded as classical skepticism while the latter is associated with dogmatic skepticism.

Expert on ancient skepticism :ichael Frede pointed out that many scholars confused

classical skepticism with dogmatic skepticism. #n opposition to the Stoic %iew that clear and

distinct rational impressions could be the criterion of truth, classical skeptics argued that we

should not take impressions to be true and thus assent should be suspended. ;e%ertheless, we

could still li%e a normal life by following the probable or what appears to be the case while

making no ontological commitment. (n the other hand, dogmatic skepticism is a radical position

which asserts nothing can be known. (b%iously, there is a wide gap between these two %ersions

of skepticism, but Frede found that most people attacked a straw man by misdirecting all

criticism of skepticism to the dogmatic branch.

http://www.creative-wisdom.com/education/hps/skeptic.htm#_edn1




According to Frede, this misunderstanding could be traced back to icero and St.

Augustine. As a dogmatic skeptic who wrote in <atin, icero distorted classical skepticism in

support of his world%iew. 4owe%er, most people in the <atin "est were not proficient in the

Greek language, and thus the mistake of mixing classical skepticism and dogmatic skepticism

was unnoticed by many. <ater St. Augustine attacked dogmatic skepticism based upon icero5s

account. Since St. Augustine was a prominent figure in "etsern intellectual history, the "est

European %iew of skepticism was strongly influenced by his %iew throughout the :iddle Ages.

)he uestion of knowledge became an important issue again in the late :iddle Ages due

in part to (ckham5s doctrine of intuiti%e cognitions. (ckham accepted the position that

cognitions are entities that could exist independently from the ob'ect corresponding to our

cognition. #n this context, scholars paid attention to Sextus Empiricus in an attempt to explore

the uestion of the possibility of knowledge. 4owe%er, the "estern Europeans mispercei%ed

classical skepticism as being dogmatic, and e%en worse, the influence of Eastern Europe during

the *enaissance reinforced this %iew. #n brief, Frede concluded that the widespread

misunderstanding of skepticism was partly owing to its :edie%al heritage.618

#n a similar %ein to Frede, Groarke was also disappointed by the fact that many scholars,

such as *ussell, misinterpreted the position taken by the classical Skeptic school as the dogmatic

one. <ike Frede, Groarke asserted that classical skeptics had no difficulty in accepting the

appearance, and not surprisingly, he associated modern anti!realism with ancient skepticism. &ut

unlike Frede, Groarke ga%e a different explanation to the widespread misunderstanding of the

classical skeptic school=





Gi%en the plausibility of scepticism, one must wonder why it has been so

drastically misinterpreted, misunderstood, and underestimated, and why the

notion that we must defeat the sceptic has become such a central feature of

philosophical inuiry. )he answer has more to do with the social forces that shape

philosophical inuiry that with the logic of sceptic %iews. Scepticism is dismissed,

not because it has been studied carefully and found wanting, but because it goes

against the spirit of "estern thought as modern philosophy has portrayed it. )hat

account glorifies the use of reason, the possibility of science, and the human

ability to establish truth, and has no patience with skeptics to attack these ideas.

#nstead of trying dispassionately to understand the skeptics or the subtleties of

their %iews>philosophers treat them the way most heretics are treated?with

little emphasis on the details of their %iews, with little or no reser%e in exploiting

the misunderstanding this encourages, and with rhetorical appeals to the notion

that truth and reason must be sa%ed. E%en when philosophers argue for positions

that resemble skepticism, they present their %iews as an attack on it. ;ot

surprisingly, the resulting picture of the sceptic is an easy target and a focus of

bad feeling. @)ruth and reason are always %indicated, though the truth and

ob'ecti%ity that the skeptics attack are relinuished in the process, replaced with a

sub'ecti%e notion of belief and a new definition of the word true. 68

"hile both Frede and Groarke, to some certain extent, ga%e plausible explanations of the

widespread misunderstanding of classical skepticism, their account may not adeuately illustrate

the complexity of this issue. )o be specific, although St. Augustine was influential throughout the

:iddle Ages, there was more than one interpretation of skepticism in the <atin "est and the





Greek East. For example, *omans treated skepticism as an ally of atheism+ hristian apologetics

cited skepticism to support anti!intellectualism. 9uring the reformation, the atholic ounter!

*eformation mo%ement %iewed skepticism as a weapon against Protestantism that emphasi$es

personal 'udgment+ certain Protestants also employed skepticism to promote religious toleration

and to challenge the infallibility of the atholic hurch. :ore importantly, these skeptic

orientations held by hristians were not dogmatic, because it is impossible for hristians, who

ha%e a firm belief in God, to subscribe to a world%iew that nothing can be known. *ather, they

replace the ob'ecti%e notion of truth with the sub'ecti%e one.

E%en though modern science rose in the "est since the 72th century, embracing reason

and science does not seem to be the primary moti%e for re'ecting skepticism or misinterpreting

classical skepticism as being dogmatic. For example, 4ume adopted a naturalistic approach to

re'ect dogmatic skepticism because belie%ing is said to be our undeniable and natural inclination.

#n other words, 4ume misinterpreted and refused classical skepticism on psychological rather

than philosophical ground. #nterestingly enough, in the early 10

th

century thinkers who were

sympathetic to empiricism, logical positi%ism, and anti!realism did not see skepticism as anti!

reason or anti!science. #nstead, classical skepticism was praised as a precursor to the anti!

metaphysic position embraced by empiricism, beha%iorism, pragmaticism, and logical

positi%ism. #n brief, acceptance, re'ection, and distortion of ancient skepticism could not be

simplified to the influence of St. Augustine and its :edie%al heritage or an obsession with

reason, ob'ecti%ity, and scientific knowledge.

)his ob'ecti%e of this article is to illustrate how skepticism was interpreted by different

people throughout different periods of history, including thinkers who were in ri%al parties. #t is



important to note that it is not the goal of this article to e%aluate which thinker5s interpretation is

closer to the original position of the classical skeptic school, nor will # place an emphasis on

analy$ing why these thinkers tend to misinterpret ancient skepticism. Actually, different eras

generate different central issues, and as a result, different concerns lead to different conclusions

based on the same ancient philosophy. 4owe%er, certain inherent properties of classical

skepticism play a ma'or role in in%iting this wide spectrum of interpretation and

misinterpretation. )o be specific, the skeptic is a disposition rather than an assertion+ the

skeptical goal of mental tranuility is %irtually unattainable. As a result, the tool of skepticism is

used as an auxiliary instrument to assist other schools of thought in accomplishing their own

goals.

Tertullian and $nti&intellectualism

Although the *oman Empire inherited the Greek culture, *omans were much less

interested in intellectual inuiry than Greeks, and not surprisingly, classic texts were not

seriously studied by *omans. Skepticism was mentioned in only a few lines by Emperor Bulian

and was treated negati%ely, since he %iewed skepticism as an ally of atheism.6C8 #nterestingly

enough, certain hristian thinkers did not see skepticism as an ally of atheism. (n the contrary,

)ertullian borrowed the notion of skepticism to downplay the %alue of secular knowledge. 4is

anti!intellectualism was manifested in the following passage=

For philosophy is the material of the world5s wisdom, the rash interpreter of the

nature and dispensation of God. #ndeed heresies are themsel%es instigated by

philosophy> "hat indeed has Athens to do with BerusalemD "hat has the

Academy to do with the hurchD "hat ha%e heretics to do with hristiansD (ur





instruction comes from the porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that the

<ord should be sought in simplicity of heart. Away with all attempts to produce a

Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic hristianity "e want no curious disputation after

possessing hrist Besus, no inuisition after recei%ing the gospel When we

believe, we desire no further belief. For this is our first article of faith, that there

is nothing which we ought to believe besides -emphasis added3.68

As the preceding passage illustrates, )ertullian was hostile to Stoics and Plato, but not

Pyrrhonians. For )ertullian the state of ignorance of secular knowledge was compatible with the

final aim of ataraxia!!mental transuality?proposed by Pyrrhonians. uriosity is a %ice that

could disturb the mental tranuility achie%ed by knowing nothing except God. 4owe%er, Floridi

pointed out that the differences between classical skepticism and hristiani$ed skepticism are

substantial. (nce doubt has been instilled, classical skepticism steps back into suspension of

'udgment while hristiani$ed skepticism leaps forward into faith. )he hristian thinker did not

deny the full intelligibility of the ultimate reality, which is the spiritual realm+ rather he ranked

the pursuit of secular knowledge much less %aluable than the lo%e and worship of God.6/8 )he

same theme, as illustrated later, recurred throughout the era of *eformation.

$gathias and $nti&metaphysics

At the end of the fourth century, Academic skepticism transmitted in <atin had become

the brand of skepticism known to philosophers and theologians, at the expense of classical

skeptics. Greek texts became inaccessible to most people, and as a result, the classical skeptic

work was largely forgotten by the <atin "est throughout the :iddle Ages. Fortunately, scholars

in the (rthodox East were %ersed in the Greek language, and occasionally the work by classical








skeptics was cited in intellectual debate. For example, in the / th century &y$antine historian

Agathias -1!03 praised Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus for their dismissi%e attitude toward

useless and endless debates o%er unsol%able uestions.628 Agathias5s academic background and

personal beliefs could help us to appreciate why he endorsed the classical skeptic %iew. At the

age of thirty Agathias turned to the writing of history and composed a fi%e!%olume book entitled

On the Reign of Justinian, which relates to the e%ents of 1!, such as the wars with the

Goths, Handals, and Franks, as well as those against the Persians and the 4uns. As a prudent

historian, he relied on eyewitness accounts as well as other %erifiable sources as the basis of

reconstructing historical facts, and thus he saw the classical skeptic school as his ally in

opposition to metaphysical speculations. (b%iously, he did not read the classical text carefully

enough to learn that e%en eyewitness accounts are doubted as genuine knowledge by classical

skeptics. 4owe%er, it appealed to him because in his lifetime he experienced mass destruction by

wars and to him there were many more urgent matters than metaphysical speculations. Also,

Agathias was a pagan, not a hristian, and there is a good match between the skeptic philosophy

and his suspension of 'udgment regarding non!%erifiable, spiritual matters.68

'rthodo Spirituality and )egati*e +pistemological ogmatism

As Frede mentioned, (ckhamism generated the impetus for studying skepticism during

the 7Cth century. #n (ckham5s %iew, God is omnipotent and thus nothing is as it is necessarily+

e%erything could ha%e been otherwise. )his raised a number of doubts about the nature of reality

and the criterion of truth. #n this academic context ;icholas of Autrecourt worked on the

skeptical theme and subseuently attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention. #n the

same century, &y$antine culture also re%i%ed the intellectual debate about skepticism. *eligious








contro%ersies and a renewal of literary studies are probably behind the re%i%al of interest in

skepticism.

After studying Sextus Empiricus, )heodore :etochites -7120!713 and his student

;icephorus Gregoras -71I0!73 condemned Sextus5s theses. )hey asserted that doubt, in

contrast to faith, was a disease that could threaten the church. ;e%ertheless, :etochites still

extracted certain notions from Sextus5s philosophy in rendering his own theology. #t is important

to point out that distrust of human rationality and 'udgment by classical skeptics aligns to some

degree with the doctrine of the fall of humanity caused by original sin. ;o wonder :etochites

repeatedly emphasi$ed that the intellect is inseparably connected to the irrational soul, and

constantly hampered by it. :etochites5s epistemological pessimism is tied to his partial defense

of ancient skepticism. 4owe%er, the similarities end there. :etochites misconstrued skepticism

as @negati%e epistemological dogmatism, embracing the notion that nothing can be known. 4e

was a realist who held true the realms of natural phenomena and human life, and maintained that

by di%ine re%elation knowledge of reality is possible.6I8 Another &y$antine scholar, St. Gregory

Palamas -71I/!7I3, argued that knowledge of God can be obtained by grace, and thus he also

disliked the skeptic %iew of Pyrrhon. Palamas promoted a form of spirituality known as

@4esychasm, which means @inner stillness or @inner peace.6708 ;eedless to say, classical

skepticism, which is uninterested in groundless assertions, was at odd with (rthodox mysticism.

Michel Montaigne, Counter&-eformation and Catholic .yrrhonism

#n the 7/th century, atholic scholars such as Gentianus 4er%etus and :ichel :ontaigne

%iewed skepticism as a powerful weapon for religious contro%ersy in defense of atholic

orthodoxy. :ontaigne -7!7I13 was regarded as the most significant figure in the 7/ th century








re%i%al of ancient skepticism. :ontaigne insisted that true religion can only be based on faith and

that any human foundation for religion, such as rationality, is too weak to enable us to recei%e

di%ine knowledge. #n support of his fideism, :ontaigne uoted St. Paul5s declamation in First

Corinthians 7=7I!17= @For it is written, # will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to

nothing the understanding of the prudent. "here is the wiseD "here is the scribeD For after that

in "isdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of

preaching to sa%e them that belie%e. Along with citation of St. Paul5s text, :ontaigne offered

arguments from Sextus Empiricus and other ancient skeptics to demonstrate how unreliable

human knowledge is and how futile intellectualism is. ontrary to Eastern (rthodox scholars,

not only did :ontaigne not see skepticism as a disease, but he also defended Pyrrhonism with an

explanation of its %alue for religion. )o :ontaigne, Pyrrhonism was different from negati%e

epistemological dogmatism as described by :etochites. Pyrrhonism stated that any assertion, if

successful, shows the opponent5s ignorance+ if unsuccessful, their own ignorance. :ontaigne

asserted that this mentality is the finest of human achie%ements and the most compatible with

true religion.6778

:ontaigne5s skepticism did not arise out of a %acuum. 4e was deeply upset by the

brutality and chaos resulting from religious wars between atholics and Protestants. #n 7/

atholic forces besieged astillon, a Protestant stronghold near where :ontaigne li%ed, and he

found the actions of these plunderers loathsome. Further, :ontaigne was skeptical of al%inists5

insistence upon knowing God5s will. )his situation of anomie fed :ontaigne5s doubt about the

%alidity and legitimacy of the Protestant claims.6718 )o :ontaigne, since the complete skeptic

had no positi%e %iews, he could not ha%e the wrong %iews. And since the Pyrrhonians accepted

the laws and customs of his community, he would accept atholicism. :ore importantly, the








complete skeptical mind was in the ready mode for recei%ing di%ine re%elation. #n other words,

skepticism was interpreted by him as conser%atism. Since one is incapable of 'udging anything,

the best course of action is to stay in the current position assigned by God. 678

;e%ertheless, according to Schiffman, :ontaigne did not straightly euate the true

religion to the atholic hurch and the Pope. *ather, he tried to make hristians see themsel%es

as nothing but mere creatures incapable of knowing God5s will. Schiffman asserted that

:ontaigne was not a @atholic Pyrrhonist+ actually it was :ontaigne5s followers who identified

with Pyrrhonism,67C8 thinking that they had found the best defense against *eformation. After

the ouncil of )rent in 7/C, Pyrrhonism was employed by atholic scholars like Francoise

Heron as a @machine of war to remo%e two Protestant principles, namely, Sola Scriptura and

personal 'udgment. For atholic Pyrrhonians, indi%idual interpretation of the Scripture was

doomed to open a Pandora5s &ox, while personal 'udgment was unreliable due to our corrupted

intellect. #nterestingly enough, Protestant intellectuals adopted the same philosophy to deny the

notion that atholic authority is the criterion of truth.678 Sextus was doubtful of the existence of

a criterion of truth. 4e further maintained that e%en if such a criterion exists, who should set the

criterion remains an unresol%ed uestion.67/8 4ence, for Protestants, atholic Pyrrhonians

%iolated the principle of skepticism by their self!appointment of sole authority. ;e%ertheless,

:ontaigne5s %ersion of Pyrrhonism strongly influenced the atholic hurch, and to some certain

extent, :ontaignians shared a common thread with Protestants in their belief that a skeptical

attitude depresses our intellectual pride and prepares us to recei%e di%ine gifts. ;ot only did

atholic &ishop Pierre!9aniel 4uey stand firmly in the :ontaigne tradition, but his

contemporary Pierre &ayle, who was a al%inist, also utili$ed skepticism to promote fideism.

6728















.ierre /ayle, -eligious Toleration and Cal*inism

#n the late 72th century, the re%i%al of skepticism had penetrated both philosophy and

theology. For instance, in philosophy Simon Foucher -7/CC!7/I/3 raised uestions about the

artesian system using the arguments he founding both the Academic and the Pyrrhonian skeptic

schools.678 #n theology, English Protestant thinker "illiam hillingworth -7/01!7/CC3 was also

a fan of skepticism. (nce he left Protestantism for atholicism, and then left the atholic hurch

for the Anglican hurch. #n both con%ersions his Pyrrhonian attitude led him to uncertainty in

religious doctrines. After he re!examined the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, he reali$ed that

although both Protestantism and atholicism could not be pro%en to be the absolute truth, he

could still 'ustify his inclination toward Protestantism based upon probabilistic inferences. &ut he

re'ected the atholic hurch for its insistence upon certainty and infallibility of doctrines.67I8

French al%inist Pierre &ayle -7/C2!720/3, who was called a @super!skeptic by Popkin,

was a prominent figure in the Pyrrhonian mo%ement.6108 <ike hillingworth, at first &ayle was a

al%inist, but later he abandoned Protestantism for atholicism. A few months later, he returned

to al%inism. 9ue to the French law forbidding con%ersion from atholicism to al%inism under

penalty of death, &ayle was forced to flee from city to city in 4olland. 9uring his exile between

7/C and 7/, his father and brothers died as a result of religious persecution. (wing to his

suffering he de%oted tremendous efforts to writing against superstition, dogmatism, and

intolerance. &ayle presented himself as an ad%ocate of uni%ersal toleration, calling for toleration

of e%en Bews, Juakers, Knitarians, and atheists.6178 After 7/ when tolerance for al%inism

ceased in France, &ayle sought to influence European opinion against <ouis L#H, who wanted to

purge his country of heresy. 4e was also %ocal in opposition to his Protestant friend Pierre












Burrieu5s attempt to enforce al%inist orthodoxy in his home country. 9ogmatism of religious

fanatics played a %ital role in dri%ing &ayle towards Pyrrhonism, whose theme of suspension of

'udgment pa%es the way to religious toleration.

As mentioned before, &ayle was con%erted from al%inism to atholicism and then

returned to his original sect. &ayle did not switch religious affiliations arbitrarily+ rather, he made

these decisions based on serious intellectual consideration. omparing al%inism to atholicism,

&ayle was con%inced that the al%inist emphasis on the corruptness of human nature, both

morally and intellectually speaking, could help the boastful to be humble. 6118 Following the path

of classical skeptics, he interrogated e%ery argument for all theological claims. 4is strategy was

to analy$e and dissol%e any theory on its own terms. #n doing so, he relied much more on the

anti!metaphysical sections of Sextus5s writings than on the epistemological ones. #n his process,

e%ery aspect of a theory was thoroughly inspected, and after persistent uestioning, the theory

disintegrated into insurmountable contradictions. )o &ayle an intellectual inuiry was like

peeling an onion until at last nothing was left.618 &ut unlike classical skeptics, &ayle offered a

transcendental sal%ation. &ayle agreed with the classical skeptics that reason fails to make the

world intelligible. ;e%ertheless, re%ealed knowledge leads us to reality and truth.

&ayle contended that rational people find the claim @;othing comes from nothing to be

plain truth, but it would be completely refuted by Creation ex nihilo -creation out of nothing3.

61C8 #n addition, by common sense no one would dispute that the summation of @three does not

eual @one, yet the doctrine of the )rinity denies this intuiti%e notion. #n ethics, it seems ironic

that one ought to pre%ent e%il, but God does not stop all e%ils in the world. E%idently, people











should not be punished for crimes that they did not commit, but the doctrine of (riginal Sin

contradicts the preceding notion.618

#nspired by classical skeptics who had reser%ations about making inferences beyond

appearance, &ayle de%eloped the notion of doctrinal minimalism, an attenuation of formal belief

that sought the barest doctrinal necessities. 4e could say that hrist was the :essiah, but he

would not make further elaboration of what this statement means.61/8

#nterestingly enough, &ayle insisted that he was not ad%ocating Pyrrhonism, but only

orthodox al%inism. (nce the Protestant leader, <a Placette, asked &ayle whether he were a

Pyrrhonist, and &ayle shook his head and replied, @# know too much to be a skeptic and too little

to be a dogmatist. 6128 Put simply, for &ayle, skepticism is the means and al%inism is the end.

)hrough Pyrrhonism the futility of human rationality is exposed, but hristian faith opens a door

to redemption. :oreo%er, Pyrrhonism can help us to strip all erroneous con%entions from

religious institutions. &ayle always compared al%inist doctrinal simplicity and indi%idual

conscience to atholic idolatry, superstition, and autocracy. &ut at the same time, he encouraged

his al%inist colleagues to maintain a skeptical mind to all human teachings and warned them

not to fall into the same traps of atholic corruption.618

a*id Hume, Irrational )ature and .sychological Tran0uility

9a%id 4ume -7277!722/3, a ma'or philosopher in the 7 th century, construed skepticism

in a dogmatic manner. Sextus Empiricus attempted to list a series of arguments and then

suspended 'udgment on them, but 4ume misinterpreted Sextus5s position as dogmatically

holding that all uestions are unanswerable. :oreo%er, 4ume5s rendering of Pyrrhonism omits














any reference to the basis that Pyrrhonism offers for deciding practical uestions once the

skeptical attitude has been adopted. Sextus maintained that the skeptic could accept appearances

undogmatically and li%e naturally. )his misinterpretation was partly due to the fact that 4ume5s

knowledge of Greek was inadeuate for reading Sextus.61I8 According to (lshewsky, in 4ume5s

time at least two well!written texts on ancient skepticism were a%ailable= )homas Stanley5s he

!istor" of #hilosoph" -7/3 and Pierre &ayle5s $ictionnaire !istori%ue et Criti%ue -7/I3.

(lshewsky asserted that the accounts of both Stanley and &ayle match up well with the contrast

between dogmatic skepticism and classical skepticism in Sextus5s writing, and therefore it is

implausible that 4ume interpreted Pyrrhonism with reference to these texts.608 Actually,

misinterpretation of classical skepticism by 4ume is tied to the intellectual atmosphere in the 72 th

century, maintaining that science and philosophy were enterprises of producing factual

knowledge based on ob'ecti%e inuiry.678 #n reaction to this impassionate attitude, 4ume

identified irrationality as our human essence and refused skepticism on naturalistic and

psychological grounds.

4ume is well known for his doubt of the con%entional notion of causation. )o 4ume

many so!called cause and effect relationships are nothing more mere association. 4ume drew

support from Pyrrhonism in his anti!causation claim= All our e%idence of causation is based upon

a con'unction at a gi%en moment, but there is no rational basis to belie%e that this association

ha%e been constant in the past and will remain so in the future.618 <ike his predecessors, 4ume

attempted to use Pyrrhonism to demonstrate the inadeuacy of human reasoning. &ut 4ume

disagreed with Pyrrhonians that suspension of 'udgment could lead to mental tranuility. #n

contrast, 4ume argued that a complete skeptic will not obtain peace of mind at all, but instead

will be insane+ because humans are led by a natural instinct to suppose that there is an external













reality existing independently of our sense+ Pyrrhonism goes against our nature. (n one hand,

4ume accepted the gloomy %iew that rationality could not bring any intellectual inuiry to a

conclusi%e closure. (n the other hand, 4ume held that a complete skeptical attitude is not

applicable to common sense beliefs and e%eryday life. 4e maintained that to lead a normal life

day by day we must hold opinions instead of suspending 'udgment since nature forces us to do

the former. #t is not a uestion of what we should do philosophically, but what we ought to do

psychologically. Paradoxically, although we cannot determine the true cause and effect

relationships among e%ents and ob'ects, it is nature and not philosophical reasoning that leads us

to make all causal inferences. 4ume went e%en further to claim that there is something right

about the fact that we function irrationally.68

#nterestingly enough, unlike :ontaigne and &ayle who employed skepticism to defend

religion, 4ume was a consistent anti!religionist. Although he contended that belief in the

existence of God was natural, he characteri$ed all religion as the product of fear and error.6C8

4ume classified religions into two types, namely, popular religion and true religion. Popular

religion de%elops from polytheism to monotheism, not by reasoning, but by a gradual

exaggeration of one of the deities whom people regard as the most powerful and dependable.

)rue religion, in contrast, does not arise from fear or child!like dependency+ rather it arises from

recognition of the order in the uni%erse. ;onetheless, both religions are based upon a uni%ersal

propensity to belie%e in an in%isible and omnipotent being. &esides religious faith, humans also

possess many other irrational beliefs. )o 4ume, our irrational nature supercedes the Pyrrhonian

attitude. &y embracing irrational natural instincts and mechanisms human societies can continue

to perse%ere.68










+mpiricism, .ositi*ism, .ragmatism, /eha*iorism,

.henomenalism, and +pistemological $narchism

)here is no doubt that many modern philosophers were hostile to skepticism due to

misinterpretation. 4owe%er, many others read Sextus Empiricus correctly and treated him as an

ally. #n the 7Ith century the supposition that Pyrrhonists li%e in accordance with 'ustified beliefs

based on non!epistemic impressions had generally pre%ailed among commentators on Greek

skepticism. For example, in 7/I ;orman :acoll published a work in which he attributed the

notion of accepting the appearance to Pyrrhonism and sub'ected it to a Mantian criticism. <ater

the Pyrrhonian %iew was seen as highly meritorious when it was associated with empiricism.

:ary :ills accepted :acoll5s account of Pyrrhonism but was sympathetic to the Pyrrhonian

position. #n 7I1I she published a book which claimed that the Pyrrhonian way was %irtually

identical to the modern scientific method.6/8 #n 7IC7 *oderick hisholm praised Sextus5s

contributions to philosophy and presented him as a precursor of empiricism, positi%ism, and

other modern schools of thought=

4is most significant contributions are= first, the positi%istic and beha%ioristic

theory of signs which he opposed to the metaphysical theory of the Stoics+

secondly, his discussion of phenomenalism and its relation to common sense

claims to knowledge+ and, thirdly, his account of the contro%ersy o%er the

principle of extensionality in logic, where the anticipation of contemporary

doctrines is perhaps most remarkable.628








hisholm praised Sextus for his anti!metaphysical position by saying that his theory @was

a clear statement of the essential principles of positi%ism, pragmatism, and beha%iorism.68 )o

him ancient skeptics and *eichenbach shared a high degree of resemblance since both held that

we can make probable assertions about non!empirical ob'ects. Such assertions ha%e an initial

probability if based upon clear and distinct impressions. )his probability can be increased by

corroborating the reports of the different senses and by in%estigating all the conditions under

which the obser%ation occurs. )hus, we can attain a reasonably high degree of probability for

some assertions.6I8

#n philosophy of science, Sextus Empiricus was highly regarded by Alan &ailey.6C08

&ailey compared Sextus to Paul Feyerabend by saying, @Feyerabend, despite claiming to be an

epistemological anarchist rather than a sceptic, is perhaps the 10 th century philosopher who most

closely conforms to the role and strategy of Sextus5 Pyrrhonist.6C78 Feyerabend was skeptical of

scientific progress, but he also re'ected Marl Popper5s philosophy of science by showing that his

falsificationism would actually ha%e hindered science from making progress. A common counter!

argument against Feyerabend is that if he doubts scientific progress, then accusing Popperian

philosophy of science of stalling scientific progress is contradictory. ;e%ertheless, &ailey

asserted that Feyerabend5s position is defensible because it resembles Sextus5s methodology.

Sextus uestioned the criterion of truth, which at first glance is self!defeating, because there

would be no criterion for Sextus to deny other people5s criteria. &ailey argued that Sextus might

deny all criteria but still challenge his opponents because they accept some sort of criteria. #n

short, the game rule applies to opponents only. &y the same token, although Feyerabend

dismissed scientific progress, he could use it to challenge Popper because @progress and












@falsification are internally consistent within the Popperian system. #n short, to &ailey Sextus

and Feyerabend are allies in terms of epistemological anarchism.6C18

#t is out of the scope of this article to discuss whether classical skepticism is compatible

with modern empiricism, positi%ism, pragmatism, beha%iorism, phenomenalism, and

epistemological anarchism. ;onetheless, it is fascinating to see that :ills and hisholm, unlike

4ume, did not %iew classical skepticism as the end of the possibility of knowledge, and that

modern philosophers from a wide %ariety of schools regarded Sextus as their ally.

iscussion

As illustrated abo%e, interpretation and misinterpretation of ancient skepticism are so

di%erse that not only is a coherent mo%ement absent, but also implications and conclusions made

by different skeptics and anti!skeptics are found to contradict each other. *omans saw

Pyrrhonism as atheistic in essence. Early hristian anti!intellectualism employed Pyrrhonism to

denounce secular knowledge in support of pursing spiritual knowledge. &y$antine scholars

re'ected skepticism in order to defend (rthodox spirituality. )he atholic ounter!*eformation

mo%ement considered it a powerful weapon against Protestants. Protestants regarded it as a way

to challenge papal authority and to restore doctrinal purity. 4ume accepted the skeptics5

implication that there is no certainty of knowledge, but re'ected this attitude in fa%or of

psychological comfort. :odern philosophers found compatibility between Pyrrhonism and

empiricismNpositi%ism, as well as many other schools. #n brief, the entire picture is much more

complicated than Frede5s assertion of St. Augustine5s distortion and :edie%al heritage, or

Groarke5s thesis that scholars re'ected skepticism out of a pro!science and pro!rationality agenda.





;o wonder after re%iewing theories of skeptics spanning across the 7/th to 7th centuries, Stunkel

made this comment=

#f :ontaigne, &ayle, and 4ume shared one thing in common, it was their

sympathy for a common life and dislike of intellectual rigidity. (therwise, their

agendas seldom con%erged>)hey did not think about the world in the same

frame of reference, except for a common attachment to the sur%i%ing literary

heritage of classical antiuity>"hat they shared was a pro%isional commitment

to reason and a re'ection of absolutes. 6C8

E%en worse is that certain claims made by some skeptics are so ambiguous that modern

scholars cannot tell exactly what they mean. For example, while Popkin considered :ontaigne to

be a atholic Pyrrhonian who defended the hurch orthodoxy, Schiffman saw :ontaignian

skepticism as a tool for self!examination of our inner world+ the apologetic character of atholic

Pyrrhonism was found in his followers instead. Further, &racken pointed out that researchers

could not come to consensus on whether Pierre &ayle was a skeptic or not.6CC8 Similarly,

Menshur uestioned whether &ayle5s fideism was the telos of the skeptical method or an

alternati%e to it.6C8 :oreo%er, although 4ume is said to be a skeptic in causal inferences and

certainty of knowledge, he was a skeptic of skepticism. (n one hand, he claimed to be

pessimistic that the ob'ecti%e of inuiry he identified can be achie%ed. (n the other hand, he was

also seen as a supporter of ;ewtonian system of science and set out to become ;ewton5s

counterpart in modern sciences.6C/8

)he di%ersity of interpretation and misinterpretation of classical skepticism may be partly

due to certain attributes in Pyrrhonism. First, the Academic %ersion of the skeptical notion













@nothing can be known is self!defeating because this statement seems to be a notion of

knowledge claim. )his statement has the same self!refuting effect as putting up a sign saying

@Please ignore all signs or telling people @9on5t belie%e anything # say. )he Pyrrhonians

attempted to a%oid the paradox of dogmatic skepticism by presenting their idea as a disposition

or wa" of thin&ing rather than a doctrine. "hile this openness frees followers of Pyrrhonism from

dogmatism, it also opens itself to interpretation or e%en abuse. )he character of Pyrrhonism as

dispositional instead of doctrinal makes classical skepticism an auxiliary tool to other thoughts in

philosophy and theology. #t is fascinating to see that no philosopher and theologians mentioned

abo%e adopted Pyrrhonian as their central identity. atholicism was primary to :ontaigne+

skepticism was only secondary to him. &ayle admitted that he was more a al%inist than a

skeptic. Although Sextus Empiricus was considered an ally of empiricism, logical positi%ism,

and anti!realism, philosophers in those camps would rather call themsel%es empiricist, logical

positi%ist or anti!realist than skeptic. &luntly speaking, the notion of suspension of 'udgment

calls for no further course of action. )he skeptical disposition can at most ser%e as a starting

point for thinkers in the process of intellectual inuiry, but other schools of thought must be

introduced in order to lead inuirers to go beyond the point of departure. "hen a branch of

philosophy is used as a tool to support another school of thought, it is expected that the former

will be somewhat twisted to ser%e the latter. )he selecti%e use of skepticism can easily be found

in the preceding scholars. For example, by using Pyrrhonism to humble himself, &ayle regarded

the doctrines of )rinity and (riginal Sin as di%ine re%elation abo%e human intellect. 4owe%er, by

using the same skeptical attitude as a tool to challenge atholic authority, he mocked the

atholic doctrine of )ransubstantiation as absurdity rather than respecting it as di%ine mystery.

6C28





(ne may argue that Pyrrhonism did offer a goal rather than a starting point or a means.

)o Pyrrhonians the end product of the process of doubt is mental tranuility, also known as

ataraxia, de%oid of contemplating with ri%al claims. 4owe%er, this goal is too unrealistic or too

unnatural to achie%e, and thus it is not surprising to see many scholars subscribing to only the

skeptic way of inuiry, but not the goal of euanimity. Menshur argued that the fact that the

balancing of opposing propositions conduces to the goal of ataraxia would at least seem to imply

a truth claim. "e ha%e to assume that we could e%entually collect adeuate information in

support of making a conclusion that all opposing arguments ha%e been exhausted and hence the

search has to be gi%en up. 4owe%er, if we constantly maintained a skeptical examination of

e%ery claim and e%ery piece of e%idence, the search would go on and on fore%er, and the goal of

mental calmness would ne%er be reached.6C8 As mentioned before, 4ume had pointed out that

the skeptical goal of mental tranuility is so unnatural that the possibility of achie%ing it is

extremely remote. 4ume is not alone. ;iet$sche also pointed out that e%ery skeptical tendency

constitutes a great danger for life and it is better to assert than to doubt. 6CI8 &y the same token,

American pragmaticist harles Sanders Peirce said that we are satisfied with stable beliefs rather

than doubts. Although knowledge is fallible in nature, and in our limited lifetime we cannot

disco%er the ultimate truth, we still ha%e to fix our beliefs at certain points rather than doubting

infinitely.608 Actually, from early hristian anti!intellectualism to al%inism and atholicism

during the *eformation, no hristian thinkers regarded the goal of ataraxia as attainable+ all of

them substituted fidelism for it. "ithout a plausible ultimate ob'ecti%e that can attract undi%ided

commitment, Pyrrhonism remains nothing more than a tool to assist other philosophies and

theologies to achie%e their own goals. )hus, it is not surprising to see such a wide array of












interpretations and misinterpretations of skepticism when different scholars manipulate it for

different orientations of ultimate concerns.

-eferences

678 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism -ambridge= ambridge Kni%ersity Press, 7IIC3.

618 :ichael Frede, @)he Sceptic5s two Minds of Assent and the Juestion of the Possibility ofMnowledge, 'ssa"s in ancient philosoph", ed. :ichael Frede -:inneapolis, :;= Kni%ersity of

:innesota Press, 7I23, 712!71+ @)he Sceptic5s&eliefs, he Original Sceptics( ) Controvers",

ed. :yles &urneyeat and :ichael Frede -ambridge= 4ackett Publishing ompany, 7II23, 7!1C.

68 <eo Groarke, *ree& Scepticism( )nti+Realist rends in )ncient hought -&uffalo, ;O=:cGill!Jueen5s Kni%ersity Press, 7II03= 7.

6C8 <uciano Floridi, Sextus 'mpiricus( he ransmission and recover" of #"rrhonism -(xford=

(xford Kni%ersity Press= 10013, 7.

68 Juoted by B. Ste%enson, ) ew 'usebius( $ocuments -llustrating the !istor" of the Churchto )$ / -<ondon= SPM= 7I23, 7//!7/2.

6/8 Floridi, 1001, 7.

628 #bid., 17.

68 )homas Shahan, atholic Encyclopedia= Agathias, 6database on!line8 a%ailable from

http=NNwww.newad%ent.orgNcathenN0710Cb.htm -accessed April 12, 100C3.

6I8 &or'e &yden, heodore 0etochites1 Stoicheiosis )stronomi&e and the Stud" of #hilosoph" in 'arl" #alaiologan 2"3antium -9octoral 9issertation, Gteborg Kni%ersity= 10073.

6708 Bohn :eyendorff , St. *regor" #alamas and Orthodox Spiritualit" -restwood, ;.O.= St.

HladimirQs Seminary Press, 7III3.

6778 *ichard Popkin, he !istor" of Scepticism( from Savonarola to 2a"le -(xford= (xfordKni%ersity Press, 1003, CC!/.

http://www.creative-wisdom.com/education/hps/skeptic.htm#_ednref1








http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01204b.htm




















6718 Menneth Stunkel, @:ontaigne, &ayle, and 4ume= 4istorical 9ynamics of Skepticism,

'uropean Journal , -7II3= C!/C.

678 Popkin, 100, 7.

67C8 Rachary Schiffman, @:ontaigne and the *ise of Skepticism in Early :odern Europe= A*eappraisal, Journal of !istor" of -deas, C -7IC3= CII!7/.

678 Stunkel, 7II, CI.

67/8 *. B. 4ankinson, he Sceptics -<ondon= *outledge, 7II3, 7I!7I/+ Sextus disputed against

the dogmatist5s claim that man should be the criterion of all things by asking @which manD

6728 Popkin, 100, 12C!11.

678 #bid., 12C!12.

67I8 #bid., /.

6108 #bid., 1.

6178 *ichard Popkin, @)he Skeptical Precursors of 9a%id 4ume, #hilosoph" and

#henomenological Research, 7/ -7I3= /7!27+ Stunkel, 7II, C.

6118 Stunkel, 7II, /.

618 Popkin, 100, 1I.

61C8 #bid., 100, 1!01.

618 Popkin, 7I, /C!/.

61/8 Stunket, 7II, /.

6128 Popkin, 7I, /C!/2.

618 Stunkel, 7II, .

61I8 <eo Groarke and Graham Solomon, @Some Sources for 4ume5s Account of ause, Journalof the !istor" of -deas, 1 -7II73, /C!//.

608 )homas (lshewsky, @)he lassical *oots of 4ume5s Skepticism, Journal of the !istor" of

-deas, 1 -7II73, 1/I!12.

678 Stunkel, 7II, 2.











































618 *ichard Popkin, @9a%id 4ume= 4is Pyrrhonism and 4is ritiue of Pyrrhonism,

#hilosophical 4uarterl", 7-7I73= !C02.

68 Popkin, 7I7, I7!I+ <oeb argued that besides 9a%id 4ume, *ene 9esartes and harlesSanders Peirce also adopted a naturalistic approach to accomplish intellectual tranuility. See

<ouis <oeb, @Sextus, 9esartes, 4ume, and Peirce= (n Securing Settled 9oxastic States, ous, 1 -7II3, 10!10.

6C8 Stunkel, 7II, 0.

68 Popkin, 7I7, I2!C00.

6/8 Alan &ailey, Sextus 'mpiricus and #"rrhonean Scepticism -(xford= larendon Press, 10013,

17C!17.

628 *oderick hisholm, @Sextus Empiricus and :odern Empiricism, #hilosoph" of Science,

-7IC73, 27!C.

68 hisholm, 7IC7, 21.

6I8 #bid., 2!2I

6C08 Alan &ailey, Pyrrhonean Scepticism and the Self!*efutation Argument, #hilosophical

4uarterl", C0 -7II03= 12!CC.

6C78 &ailey, 7II0, C0.

6C18 #bid., C0!C7.

6C8 Stunkel, 7II, C.

6CC8 4arry &racken, @&ayle not a ScepticD Journal of the !istor" of -deas, 1 -7I/C3= 7/I!70.

6C8 (scar Menshur, @Pierre &ayle and the Structure of 9oubt, 'ighteenth Centur" Studies, 17

-7I3 1I2!7.

6C/8 <oeb, 7II, 10/+ Stunkel, 7II, 1!C.

6C28 &racken, 7I/C, 722.

6C8 Menshur, 7I, 1I!1II..

6CI8 ;iet$sche, Friedrich. he *a" Science. )rans. E. S. 9allas -<ondon= hapman and 4all,

7//3.

608 harles Sanders Peirce, @)he Fixation of &elief, #opular Science 0onthl", 71 -7223 7!7.









































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chong ho yu - interpretations and misinterpretations of classical skepticism (2004)

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