christia mercer-leibnizs theodicy and the epistemological problem of evil

8/12/2019 Christia Mercer-Leibnizs Theodicy and the Epistemological Problem of Evil

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Leibnizs Theodicyand the Epistemological Problem of EvilChristia Mercer, Columbia University

University of Notre Dame, September 2010(Please dont cite without permission)

Our conference is entitled Leibniz's Theodicy: Context and Content. Its descriptioninsists:unlike typical conferences focused on a publication anniversary, this conference will alsoexplore how the views expressed fit into the larger intellectual landscape of the period, standingas it does at crucial crossroads: the waning of the post-Reformation, the maturing of the ScientificRevolution, the dawning of the Enlightenment, and the maturing of the rationalist philosophicalframework introduced in the early seventeenth century. As a result, papers will focus both onLeibniz and the text of the Theodicyas well their relation to these broader themes.

In this paper, I am very interested in contextualizing the Theodicy. Not onlybecause weve been encouraged to do so, but also because some of the subtlety andimportance of the text is best seen in doing so. One part of the context I want to delineateis philosophical, the other historical.

The philosophical problem that concerns me is both a striking feature of theTheodicyand one that (as far as I know) has not been noted, namely, what I call Leibnizsepistemological optimism (EO). In my book, I highlight Leibnizs commitment as ayoung man to a philosophy of peace. I argue that he intended to use philosophy as ameans to political, religious, personal peace.1

Noting Leibnizs irenism is important, but it is also important to take seriouslywhat might be considered the irenical features of his methodology. In the book, I discusstwo such features. The first, what I call his conciliatory eclecticism, is the method that thethoughtful philosopher is supposed to use in discovering the right or true solution to aproblem. In brief, this method is to survey prominent positions offered by majorhistorical and contemporary philosophers and then combine or conciliate the trueelements drawn from those.2Leibnizs commitment to conciliatory eclecticism reached afevered pitch around the time of the Theodicy, motivated by his fascination with the

Chinese philosophy that he was learning from the Jesuits in China. 3In his early period,Leibniz was committed to conciliating warring philosophical and Judeo-Christianpositions; in his later years, he was eager to extend the materials for his conciliation toany and every smart position he found. He became convinced that Chinese philosophyhad much to offer and so it should be studied closely as well. As he wrote to Joachim

1Leibniz Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development(Cambridge University Press: 2001), passim. MariaRosa Antognazzas rich and insightful book,Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography, is both consistent with mystudy of the youthful Leibniz and goes well beyond it by showing in wonderful detail how his commitmentto peace, i.e., his irenism, constitutes the goal around which the diverse projects of his fascinating life canbe best understood.2For more about how this is supposed to work, see chapter 1: The Metaphysics of Methodassumes thatthe true metaphysics will be constructed from the underlying truths in the great philosophical systems, willbe consistent with Christian doctrine and the claims of the revelation, and will explain the phenomena

(including the new experiments) (p. 53).3See Cook and Rosemont, eds. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Writings on China; and Cook, Understandingthe Other Leibniz.


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Bouvet in 1700:What you tell me of the traces of the true revealed religion among the ancient Chinese, whichare to be found in their ... classical books, seems to be considerable. I have always been inclinedto believe that the ancient Chinese, like the ancient Arabs (witness the book of Job), and perhapsthe ancient Celts (that is to say the Germans and Gauls) were far from idolatry, and were ratherworshippers of the sovereign principle.4

Leibniz assumed that the truth is thereto be discovered by any and all thoughtful people

regardless of their perspective.The first feature of the methodology is the means to discover the truth, while the

second is the means of encouraging others to find it themselves. In the book, I called thisthe rhetoric of attraction, which was supposed to help explain why Leibniz would sooften shift his philosophical terminology and so seldom put his philosophical cards on thetable. While I think he continues to use this rhetoric of attraction in his later period, itbecomes less prominent towards the end of his life when he more actively wants to enlistpeople to his own view. But a major goal of his rhetorical tendency remains: to engagehis interlocutors in a manner that will attract their attention so that they will see the rightway to view the problem and its solution. Were all familiar with texts like the following.Consider this often cited note from 1676:A metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstrations, but nothing shouldbe demonstrated in it apart from that which does not clash too much with received opinions. Forin that way this metaphysics can be accepted; and once it has been approved then, if peopleexamine it more deeply later, they themselves will draw the necessary consequences. Besidesthis, one can, as a separate undertaking, show these people later the way of reasoning about thesethings. In this metaphysics, it will be useful for there to be added here and there the authoritativeutterances of great men, who have reasoned in a similar way; especially when these utterancescontain something that seems to have some possible relevance to the illustration of a view.5Or consider this from1678:I am concerned, as are all who wish to hold a middle ground, not to seem too much inclinedtoward either of the two opposed adversaries. Whenever I discuss matters with the Cartesians,certainly, I extol Aristotle where he deserves it and undertake a defense of the ancient philosophy,because I see that many Cartesians read their one master only, ... and thus unwisely impose limitson their own ability.... I think that the two philosophies should be combined and that where theold leaves off, the new should begin.6

Or, as he writes in a letter to Duke Johann Friedrich of 1679:There are many sides to everything, and the way it [a philosophical proposal] is first seendetermines much. The most harmless proposals have often been rejected on false suspicions, andthe most scabby ones accepted through the ability of their supporters. People often do not takepains to examine matters thoroughly, and however acceptable views may be, they are sometimes

4Quoted in Walker, The Ancient Theology, 199. The story of the Jesuit missionaries in China is afascinating one that I cannot summarize here. Suffice it to say that, although many of Leibnizscontemporaries were outraged by their claims about the Chinese, Leibniz took their accounts of Chinesethought as significant evidence for the truth of a version ofprisca theologia. According to Leibniz, Chinesethought contained some truths because Christian wisdom had at one time found its way to China. For someof the details about the Jesuits and about Leibnizs reactions, see Walker, The Ancient Theology, chapter 4.Also, see Cook and Rosemont, eds., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Writings on China; and Cook,

Understanding the Other Leibniz.5VI iii 573f-74f: Pk 94. For other such texts, see my Leibniz Metaphysics, xx; and Antognazzas Leibniz,yy.6II.i.402: L 190

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rejected at once on a false prepossession.7Finally, in theNew Essays, written in 1703-05, Leibniz offers a summary of his

philosophy and the methodology that produced it. He writes:This system appears to unite Plato with Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes, the Scholastics withthe moderns, theology and morality with reason. Apparently it takes the best from all systems andthen advances further than anyone has yet done.... I now see what Plato had in mind when hetalked about matter as an imperfect and transitory being; what Aristotle meant by his entelechy;how far the sceptics were right in decrying the senses.... How to make sense of those who put lifeand perception into everything .... I see everything to be regular and rich beyond what anyone haspreviously conceived.... Well, sir, you will be surprised at all I have to tell you, especially whenyou grasp how much it elevates our knowledge of the greatness and perfection of God.8

One of my points today is to draw attention to the rhetorical aspect of the Theodicy. Moreon that later.

My strategy now is this: Ill show that the Theodicyraises some puzzlingquestions about Leibnizs epistemological goals; then Ill contextualize those questionsby introducing you to what I call the Ultimate Epistemological Problem (UEP) and someof its prominent historical solutions. Then Ill turn to works related to the Theodicytoexplicate Leibnizs solution to the UEP and finally to the Theodicyitself.

I. The Theodicy and Epistemological Optimism

At the very beginning of the preface of the Theodicy, Leibniz sets up a contrastbetween the men in general, who embrace outward forms for the expression of theirreligion like ceremonies, and those who seek sound piety, that is to say, light andvirtue. He explains that because of human weakness, we are impressed by what isoutward and do not work appropriately to discover the inner essence of things (p. 49).These introductory comments suggest what might be called epistemological pessimism,namely, the view that human nature is such that few will acquire knowledge orunderstanding of the divine light and the virtue that is supposed to be related to it.

But notice how the preface continues. According to Leibniz, the aim of religion isto withdraw us from any approach to vice, to inure us to the good and to make usfamiliar with virtue. That was the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wisemen who founded religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of thepurest and most enlightened religion.9(p. 49). Leibniz adds: it happens only too oftenthat devotion is stifled by custom, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions ofmen (dvotion est touffe par des faons, p. 50). Leibniz suggests three points here:first, that one of the main goals of religion is to effect virtue; second, that Christianity isone among other enlightened religions, albeit the purest and mostenlightened and the

7II i 123: L 262.8VI ii 71-73.9 Page numbers are given to the Open Court edition, but Ive given the French when I think its worthwhile

doing so as here: "pour nous loigner des approches du vice, nous accoutumer au bien, et pour nousrendre la vertu familiere. C'toit le but de Mose, & d'autres bons Legislateurs, des sages Fondateurs desOrdres Religieux, & sur-tout de Jesus-Christ, divin Fondateur de la Religion la plus pure & la plusclaire."

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one founded by a divine personage; and finally that the divine light (lumiere divine)is there to be glimpsed for anyone (of whatever religion) who can avoid the obscurity ofthe opinions of men. These points themselves suggest something both radical andepistemologically optimistic, namely, that the divine light is available to everyone,regardless of religion, and that virtue is the point or one of the main points -- ofreligion. The epistemological optimism here consists in the assumption that humans are

capable of glimpsing the divine light regardless of their religious perspective.Leibniz then offers a history of religion. Although the Hebrews were more

enlightened than the rest of the human race so that they could understand that God is asingle source of all good, he credits the wise men of other nations with coming closeto the correct doctrine of divine substance. Leibniz suggests that Mohammed alsograsped theological truths which his followers spread abroad. In this brief history,Leibniz emphasizes the doctrine of immortality. Notice that he also suggests here thatJesus Christ is merely a part albeit a very important part -- of this history. He writes:but it was not proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil.Moses had already expressed the beautiful Ideas of the greatness and the goodness ofGod , but Jesus Christ developed fully the consequences of these conceptons,proclaiming that divine goodness and justice shine forth to perfection in Gods designsfor the souls of men (50-51).10

There appears to be a tension in the first few paragraphs of the Theodicys preface.On the one hand, Leibniz seems pessimistic about the capacity of humans to grasp thedivine light and thereby acquire the virtue that is supposed to follow from it. They fail toacquire this ultimate knowledge due to human weakness. On the other hand, he seemsoptimistic, suggesting that humans are naturally poised to discover this light and virtue.All they have to do whether Jew, Muslim, Christian, or other is avoid the obscuringopinions of men and discern the beautiful conceptions related to the greatness andgoodness of God.

Not only does the preface go on to suggest that Leibniz is epistemologicallyoptimistic, but of course the rest of the work implies both that Leibniz himself has a firmgrasp of the way the world is and that he intends to convince others of his account (inshort, that this is the best of all possible worlds). But if he really is so optimistic, whydoesnt he make this optimism more explicit in the Theodicy, which is, after all, adiscussion of the problems of evil and the perfection of the world? Its particularlystriking that the entire discussion of the Theodicyoptimistically assumes that we humanbeings can grasp the harmonious way the world is and yet it doesnt argue for his EO atall. In short, a survey of the Theodicy, leaves us with some puzzling questions aboutLeibnizs underlying epistemology. Is it easy to acquire this ultimate knowledge or not?Is it easy to be moved by the beauty of these conceptions or not? What does it mean tosay that conceptions are beautiful? In what does this beauty consists? In the end, whatare we to think about the ease of acquiring this most important, ultimate knowledge?

In order to understand Leibnizs epistemological optimism and its role in theTheodicy, we have to set things up. The set up has three parts. In Part II A, I offer anaccount of the metaphysical reasons for being epistemologically optimist; in Part II B,

10...mais elle n'toit point autoris d'une maniere populaire, jusqu' ce que Jesus Christ leva levoile...Mose avoit dja donn les belles idees de la grandeur & de la bont de Dieu...mais Jesus Christ entablissoit toutes les consequences, et il faisoit voir que la bont & la justice divine clatent parfaitementdans ce que Dieu prpare aux ames.

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theres a presentation of the ultimate epistemological problem (UEP) while Part IIIcontains a romp through the UEP in the political, philosophical, and religious context ofearly modern Germany. Finally, in Part IV, I return to the Theodicyand related texts toresolve the puzzle about Leibnizs epistemological optimism.

II. The Ultimate Epistemological ProblemA. The Metaphysical Set Up [Ive made this point elsewhere, so this is just a reminder]:For many thinkers in the history of philosophy, in different ways and to different degrees,

we human beings are divine. However undivine you may feel, you and the other products of thedivine nature are nonetheless so. The underlying assumption here is that there is an ultimatelygood source of the world that is somehow IN every creature. But how? There has been a gooddeal of disagreement about the precise relation between God and creatures in the history ofphilosophy. But for many philosophers -- both inside and outside the Judeo-Christian tradition the assumption is that the Supreme Being is in us and in the world.

Consider some classic expressions of this assumption.

--- In the New Testament, Paul writes that there is:One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and inyou all (Ephesians, 4:6).For in him we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28). God is that of whom all things

are, through whom all things are, inwhom all things are (Rom.11: 36).--- Anselm of Canterbury, 11th century,Monologion: The supreme essence is in and through allthings. All things are through and in - and out of - the supreme essence (sect. 14);--- Augustines Confessions, Book I, sect. 1: Without you, whatever exists would not exist. Butdoes what exists contain you? I also have being ... which I would not have unless you were in me.Or rather, I would have no being if I were not in you.

So, God is in us and in the world. The divine nature is there to be glimpsed, loved, and(for some philosophers) experienced. [slide of St Teresas Ecstasy?].

B. The ProblemBut this intimate relation between God and the world in general and between God

and humans in particular generates what I consider to be a striking philosophical problem(it is not one, as far as I can tell, that has been properly noted).

The problem goes like this. The divine nature is diffused, expressed, or emanated(or whatever relation suits you) throughout the world and moreover the same nature is inus, who are the divine products, expressions, or modes of God. Given the closeness ofthis relationship, it would seem to follow that those creatures capable of knowledge of theworld say, creatures like us human beings would have intimate knowledge of thedivinity. After all, given that the divinity is everywhere in nature and (many ofphilosophers maintain) constitutes our nature, it would seem to follow that we wouldhave lots of knowledge of it. To make the point another way, the close metaphysicalrelation between God and creatures would seem to imply a close epistemological relation.

But of course this is not the case. Not only do we not have intimate knowledge ofGod, we dont have any direct knowledge of God at all. In fact, it seems very, verydifficult to acquire such knowledge.

My inclination is to see this problem as a version of the problem of evil. The

problem faces anyone who assumes that the divine nature is in the world and in all itsparts. The severity of the problem seems to increase the more fully the divine nature is inthe world and in us. That is, the more the divine nature is supposed to be IN things, the

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easier it should be to know it. How can God be so fully thereand yet not be moreapparent? Given that the divine nature is so difficult to know, it would seem to follow thatsomething has gone wrong. But with God things are not supposed to go wrong. So, theapparent paradox is: God is everywhere, but nowhere to be found.

Nor is this just an academic problem. According to many of the philosophers whomaintain the close metaphysical relation between God and us, the goodness of our souls

depends on glimpsing God. That is, its not just that it would be nice to see God, say, likeit would be nice to see Barack Obama succeed or social justice prevail. Rather, for manythinkers who insist that God and the world are so intimately related, they also insist thatwe must glimpse God in order to be virtuous or righteous or good. For them, one cannotlive a proper life without glimpsing the divine nature. Moreover, for some people, thisunrequited desire to know the divine creates a kind of suffering. I know or stronglybelieve that the divine nature is there to be glimpsed, but cannot see it myself.

Is there a solution to the problem, a way to avoid the paradox? Lets be clearabout what a solution might look like. For those philosophers who maintain that God isthoroughly in the world and who want to solve (or circumvent) the ultimateepistemological problem, they will have to explain precisely what it is about humans thatprevent them from immediately finding God. I propose that they will need to answerthree questions:

1. What prevents people from (more or less easily) glimpsing the divine nature?2. What will allow them to get better at it?3. Is it ever easy to do so and if so, how?

III.Prominent Historical Solutions to the Ultimate Epistemological ProblemThe Theodicyoffers a solution to the Ultimate Epistemological Problem. Within

the context of this philosophical problem, we can better appreciate the power of the work.But to grasp the subtlety and originality of Leibnizs solution, we need also to place thework in its broader historical scope. Lets do that now.

A. Epistemological Pessimism and Original SinThe Christian doctrine of original sin offers a brilliant solution to the problem and

neatly answers our questions. Its easy to forget how radical this position is. Let meremind you.

Because of original sin in brief, because of our tainted natures we turn awayfrom God and seek the truth by mistaken means. Because of original sin, the only way toglimpse God within the world is through grace, i.e., with direct divine help. Either we areutterly lost to sinfulness and foolishness, or God aids us in recognizing the divinity and(however pathetically) following the right course. Paul explains in Romans that, on theone hand, those who have sought the truth are without excuse in that what can beknown about God has shown it [the truth] to them. Ever since the creation of the worldhis invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in thethings that have been made. On the other hand, admits Paul, they became futile in theirthinking and their senseless minds were darkened so that claiming to be wise, theybecame fools (Romans 1:18-23). Although Pauline letters are hardly systematic, the

suggestion is that grace is necessary for ultimate knowledge. Paul is vividly clear aboutwhat happens if we are not properly helped. Such people are Full of envy, deceit,craftiness, they are gossipers, slanderers, insolent, haughty, boastful, foolish, heartless,ruthless (I: 29).

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Augustine offers a systematic philosophy that offers direct answers to ourquestions. He does not shy away from the fact that God is evident in the world. Hewrites: God is wholly everywhere and the mind lives and moves and has its being inhim. The mind acquires knowledge by turning towards the Lord, as to the light whichin some fashion had reached it even while it had been turned away form him(Confessions XIV.15.21). So, for Augustine, God is there to be discovered; it ought to be

easy to find God.But it is not. Because of the sinful nature we inherit from Adam and Eve, werarely glimpse the divinity in the world. So, in answer to our first question, it is our(proper) punishment for original sin that prevents us from glimpsing the divine nature. Ashe makes the point in the Confessions: But from the disappointment I suffered Iperceived that the darknesses of my soul would not allow me to contemplate thesesublimities (VII.xx.26).

Is there anyway out of this epistemological trap? Or as Augustine himself poisesthe question: What will wretched man do? (VII.xx27). In answer to our secondquestion, he explains that we will be delivered from this state only through the grace ofJesus Christ (ibid.). Thus, human nature by itself is not capable of finding God, and willdo so only with direct divine help.

In answer to our third question, is it ever easy? The short answer for Augustine is

a resounding NO. But, with the help of God, some of us can nonetheless struggle toremain in contact with the divinity and live something like a proper life (as book 10 ofthe Confessionsmakes clear, it is a constant struggle to live properly).

However morose the doctrine of original sin might make us, it offers a tidysolution to the UEP: although God is metaphysically very close to human beings, theycannot grasp the divinity due to their fallen nature; grace is necessary for any properepistemological relation to God.

B.Mitigated Epistemological Optimism in Lutheran Germany1. Luthers Trouble

Famously, at the Leipzig Disputation in 1519, Luther denied the authority of theChurch. For our purposes, what is particularly important is that, in doing so, he denied along established criterion of truth, namely, traditional church authority. At the center ofLuthers rebellion are the denial of authority and the acceptance of his own conscience asa criterion of truth. As you know, Luther wrote volumes of commentaries on Biblicaltexts, full of epistemological darkness and doom. Among the most relevant of these is hislong commentary on Galatians, which both Luther and many of his followers consideredone of his most important. The epistemology of the Galatians commentary is terrifying.Luther complains bitterly about the ease with which the truth may be hidden from sight,even for those believers who have just been shown the way to it. Even those who arewell-established in the truth may become lost. Indeed, we make little headway in thepursuit of the truth because the devil seduces people into misbelief. There are fourpoints here especially relevant to the Theodicy, each more terrifying than the next. First,the truth about God often escapes the arduous truth-seeker. Second, one can glimpse thedivinity and almost immediately lose sight of it. Third, one can glimpse the divinity and

yet be seduced by the devil in to mistaken belief. Finally, to be mistaken is to be doomed.For Luther, either you find the truth or you are utterly lost, no better than a Jew, aMohammedan, and any other old or new heretic [citations].

The epistemological pessimism here is striking. Human nature is weak and easily

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deceived. Acquiring anything like a stable knowledge of the divinity requires grace. Thedivine nature will not be grasped without grace.

[Interesting and relevant historical facts:]When Luther cast aside the stabilizing influence of authority, he opened the door to

epistemological chaos. If Luthers conscience is good enough to overthrow authority, then whyisnt mine? He may think that hes justified in his truth, but what if the devil is seducing him? Andof course chaos ensued. I remind you of the many immediate problems: the Peasants Revolt, thedevelopment of radical splinter groups like Anabaptists, the Zwickau Prophets of Wittenberg(in the period 1521-22) who claimed that they regularly had conversations with the Holy Spirit(beer apparently helped!). Such groups merely pushed Luthers epistemological strategy to itslogical conclusion.

Fast forward to the seventeenth century. Between the beginning of the Thirty Years Warin 1618 and the Peace of Westphalia in1648, close to one-third of the population of the Germanstates (roughly 6 million people) died. Many of these deaths were not direct casualties of war, butdue to its disruption and illness. The soldiers carried disease and ravaged food supplies. Onehistorian has written that, by the end of the war, Germany was in economic ruin, her fieldsdevastated and blood-soaked.

During the period and beyond, the truth was a very unstable matter. My favorite exampleis that famous moment in Prague (May 1618) when angry Calvinists threw two Catholic

representatives from a high window in the castle. The men survived their fall. According to theCatholic story, angels appeared and carried the men to safety. According to the Protestantaccount, a large pile of manure spared the men.

Dick Popkin and others have emphasized the importance of skepticism in the period as aresponse to this epistemological chaos. The moral that I want to draw is slightly different: theProtestant revolt and the political and religious horrors that ensued encouraged many truth-seekers (i.e., non-skeptics) to be pessimistic about achieving their epistemological goals with anyease. It would have been foolhardy in the seventeenth century to assume that a stable system ofknowledge could be generated with ease. The task of glimpsing God and using that knowledge asa means to generate either a political structure or an ethics must have seemed extremely arduous.

2. Philip Melanchthon to the Rescue: Mitigated Optimism

But Luthers right-man was willing to try. Melanchthon was justifiably given thetitle Praeceptor Germaniae. His theological, philosophical, and literary achievementswere extraordinary. Here are some of the highlights relevant to us:

a. He composed the first systematic treatise of Reformed theology, theLociCommunesand theAusburg Confession, the first Protestant manifesto (which Leibnizsites frequently in the Theodicy).

b. Given the epistemological chaos of the 1520s (see above), it becameMelanchthons task to create a stable environment for a Lutheran life. In response to thechaos that followed his mentors rebellions, he came to see poor education as the mainsource of the problem, and turned to philosophy for a solution. He created a universitycurriculum that was supposed to educate the proper Protestant citizen and that survivedthrough much of the seventeenth century. (For us, it is especially noteworthy that headvised on educational reforms for the university in Leipzig.)

c. Luther emphasized the distrust of reason in understanding God and Gods will.Melanchthon used Aristotle to help build a clear distinction between philosophy as the domain ofreason and theology as the domain of faith. He begins On the Distinction between the Gospel and

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Philosophyof 1527 with a misreading of Paul:When Paul says: See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy (Colossians 2:8), hedoes not reject philosophy but its abuse. Paul is speaking of the kind of abuse that is mostharmful in the Church, namely, when Scripture is received as though it taught nothing other thana knowledge of human reason. For it is easy for cunning men to transform the Gospel by skilfulexplanation, into philosophy, that is, the teaching of human reason But [when properlyrestricted] philosophy is a good creation of God, and a thing that is necessary in thiscorporal and civic life, such as food, drink or public laws.

d. Within its proper domain, Melanchthon argued that reason has two very importanttasks. In the first place, the proper use of reason can produce certain. Here, the underlying ideaseems to be that God made human reason and philosophical truths so that they perfectly suit oneanother. Human reason, a divine gift, will simply acquiesce to philosophically derivedconsequences and the proper order of ideas. [Should we tell our logic students this?] The otheruse of reason is the a posterioristudy of Gods footprints in the natural world. Here the idea isthat God made the world and reason so that reason could discover the providence of God within.Melanchthon explains that knowledge of natural causes and effects is possible because theworld is arranged by God and so philosophy should study that divine order.

e. Despite its importance in philosophy and the study of nature, reason cannotapprehend the truths contained in the Gospel. Certainty about many such truths is onlyavailable to the faithful. It is important, however, that philosophy and its divine reason

preparethe mind for theology. [citations]f. It is the nature of this preparation that is the final point to emphasize. Given the

chaos of the 1520s, it is particularly striking how optimistic Melanchton becomes aboutthe powers of mind and its reason. Through the proper use of reason, the mind will seeand assent to the truths.

In summary, Melanchthon appears to believe that the mind is the kind of thingthat can be ordered or harmonized, the right education (i.e., a rigorous one based in theclassics) will produce such an order, and a stable society is constituted of such orderedminds. In Melanchthons system, there is virtually no place for civil disobedience. Toexaggerate somewhat, there are ordered states created out of ordered minds within whichthe faithful with their individual consciences can flourish. He brilliantly creates a rolefor authority that will offer a stable environment within which to live and be consistentwith the basic theological teachings of Luther.

In the end, we have an interesting solution to our UEP and answer to ourquestions:1. What prevents people from (more or less easily) glimpsing the divine nature?Part of the reason that people cannot glimpse the divine nature is that they have notdeveloped an ordered and harmonized mind and they have not developed an ordered andharmonized mind at least partly because they have not lived in an ordered state.2. What will allow them to get better at it?The right education.3. Is it ever easy to do so and if so, how?Part of Melanchthons point in focusing on the importance of civil order is to avoid thehorrors of disorder. But there is some reason to believe that he was prepared to say that,while it is never be easy to glimpse God and while grace is always required to do, a stablestate and a stable mind will create a circumstance in which glimpsing God (andapparently receiving grace) is easier.

3.The Peace of Westphalia and Conciliatory Optimism

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At the end of the Thirty Years War, as the German states, universities, town lifestabilized, statesmen and philosophers because obsessed with peace. The Peace ofWestphalia of 1648 proclaims in Article 1: There shall be a Christian and UniversalPeace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity among the previously conflictingpolitical groups. Moreover, the article demands that this peace and amity be observedand cultivated with such a sincerity and zeal that each party shall endeavor to procure the

benefit, honor, and advantage of the other; that thus on all sides there may see this peaceand friendship flourish.The language of the article commands that peace be made out of a diversity of

interests. So did many German seventeenth-century philosophers. That is, throughout theGerman states, philosophers claimed that a harmonized and true philosophy could beconstructed out of diverse elements. These elements may not easily cohere, but whencultivated with sincerity and zeal, they could be made into a harmonious whole. Forphilosophers in the German states, the goal of peace became rather like an 11thCommandment: Thou shall honor and seek peace!

Johann Adam Scherzer (1628-83)andJakob Thomasius(1622-84) wereprominent professors at Leipzig who influenced Leibniz. Each was aware of the presentchaos of philosophy and yet optimistic about the possibility of peace. For each, the properuse of the history of philosophy and the proper education was the root of success.

Briefly, consider, the title page of a text by Adam Scherzer. His Vade mecumwent through at leastfive editions from 1564-1704. For now, notice that Plato (here without beard!) stands on one sideof sphere with Aristotle on the other. The triangle, a symbol of the trinity sheds light on the stag, asymbol of the faithful Christian. Plato and Aristotle point toward the light illuminating the stag.

There is not time for many examples here, but consider the title page of a book by JakobThomasius (1622-84), who is often called the father of the Enlightenment figure, ChristianThomasius, a wellknown figure in Leipzig , and mentor to the young Leibniz. I argue elsewherethat Leibniz was much influenced by Thomasius methodological and philosophical proposals.For Thomasius, the proper philosophical system will be constructed out of a harmony of truthsthat corresponds to the harmony of Gods attributes. Each discipline gives insight into some set oftruths, but each set is connected to all the others. The system is a web of interrelated truths.[see slides in Nijmegen lecture; slide of peace]

Finally, lets consider Johann Christoph Sturm, a contemporary of Leibniz (1646-1716).For us, Sturm is particularly important as a system builder whose system is a powerful response

to the need for intellectual peace. SturmsEclectic Philosophy of 1686 wonderfully representswhat happens to the conciliatory methodology when it is charged with the task of assimilating thenew natural philosophy. Not only does Sturm not exemplify the Cartesian spirit, he considersDescartes thought only one of several sources of truth. According to Sturm, his period hasreached a dangerous state of "envy and malice" because his contemporaries have been botharrogant in their own views and ignorant in their opinions of others. The Cartesians areespecially guilty. If his fellow Cartesians will but "open their eyes, it will become clear that nosingle philosopher is sufficient when it comes to understanding "the whole wonderful immensityof Nature."

What these German philosophers all have in common:a. The problem with the pursuit of knowledge in general and of God and nature in

particular in mid-seventeenth-century Germany is that there is too much discord and notenough harmony among philosophers. (Scherzer: as many philosophies as

philosophers).b. The causes of this philosophical chaos is (at least): the lack of care in using thehistory of philosophy (so that obscurity results); the lack of clarity in defining and using

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philosophical terms (so that confusion and then discord results).c. The solution to this problem is the proper method in philosophy which

involves: (i) proper study of history of philosophy so that the real views of historicalauthors are understood (including Jewish and other non-Christian sources); (ii) carefuldiscrimination among these so that only the true and accurate views are selected; and (iii)great care in presentation of these views so that these true elements of philosophy can be

understood and used.d. The underlying metaphysical assumption is that God emanates the divineattributes so that the world contains and reflects the divine harmony. God is in that sensethere to be glimpsed.

e. The underlying epistemological assumption is that through the careful use ofthe proper methodology, we can glimpse the attributes of God and the harmony of theworld.

f. In conclusion, they all share a mitigated epistemological optimismin that theybelieve human beings can glimpse the truth, including truths about God, and even createa philosophical system that corresponds to the divinely ordained truths, but it requireseducation and hard work.

4. Epistemological Optimism and the Beauty of Insight

[Ive written about this elsewhere, but to remind you]Plotinus is surely one of the most epistemologically optimistic philosophers in the history

of philosophy. His attitude and language is often strikingly like Leibniz, who read him as a boy. Afew words about him will help.

In Plotinus essay on Beauty(which for centuries, was the only treatise of the Enneadsavailable), we find the surprising notion that the beauty in a physical object a statue, a sunset, achilds embrace can act as a first step in the epistemological journey to knowledge of thedivinity. Very simply, the claims are: the beauty of the supreme being (the One) is diffusedthroughout the world so that everything is a manifestation of the beautiful itself. Thus, when ahuman being recognizes the beauty even in a physical object, she is glimpsing the beautiful itselfand recognizing (at some level of consciousness) her own connection to it. Plotinus writes: Thebeauty, then, of bodily forms comes about in this way from communion with the intelligiblerealm. According to Plotinus, then, it is easy to glimpse the beautiful and be drawn towards it.Concerning our first qstn and why so few people see the divinity in nature, the short answer is

that their souls have just not been directed in the right way and therefore have not had theopportunity to glimpse the divinity. Theanswer to our second question is that we will becomebetter at glimpsing the divine in nature, as soon as we contemplate the beauty in the world. Oncewe glimpse physical beauty, it will become easier to recognize moral beauty (e.g., the beauty ofsouls). Every virtue is a beauty of The Soul. And, having glimpsed the beauty of virtuous souls,it is easier to accustom ones eye to the beautiful itself. But how? In order to answer our thirdquestion, we need to explain why, when you glimpse the beauty in something, this glimpsingmakes it easier to move to the higher epistemological state, one more closely related to the divinenature. Plotinus writes: The soul is delighted when it sees any signs of its kinship or anythingthat is akin to itself, takes its own to itself, and is stirred to new awareness of whence and what itreally is [sect. 2]. He continues: All souls tend to the Good. Anyone who has seen it knowswhat I mean, in what sense it is beautiful. As good, it is desired and towards it desire advances[sect.7].

For our purposes, what is important is that the simple recognition of a beautiful thing

changes you. It makes the soul that lingers on a beautiful object better and hence more capable ofgoing to the next stage. Your soul becomes better and better, until it is finally ready for moreprofound knowledge (IV.9.5). Using elements from Platos cave analogy, Plotinus writes: For the

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eye must be adapted to what is to be seen, have some likeness to it, if it would give itself tocontemplation. No eye that has not become like unto the sun will ever look upon the sun; nor willany that is not beautiful look upon the beautiful. Let each one therefore become godlike andbeautiful who would contemplate the divine and beautiful (I 6 [9]).

Plotinus goes on to say that, every part of knowledge contains also all the other partspotentially and therefore the knower in knowing [one part] brings in all the others by a kind ofsequence. In short, Plotinus solution to the ultimate epistemological problem is to say: the

divinity is everywhere in the world to be found, and we will indeed find it there and do so withgreater and greater ease as we learn to recognize the beauty in things.

IV. Leibnizs Extreme Epistemological OptimismThe elaborate historical context set in Section III allows us to grasp the subtlety

and originality of Leibnizs solution to the UEP. As with so many other philosophicalproblems, Leibniz responded to the UEP with finesse. For him it was obvious that God iseverywhere, that everything is in God, and even that we are intimately related to Godepistemologically. I propose that his extreme epistemological optimism was due to hisfundamental belief both that there is an intimate relation between God and creatures andtherefore that there must be an intimate epistemological relation as well. Unlike Paul andAugustine, he did not think that original sin infected the human reason and

understanding; unlike Luther, he did not think that, having glimpsed the divinity, it waseasy to be misled. Although he agreed with Melanchthon that a stable mind was easier toproduce in a stable society, he did not think grace was required for insight into mosttruths about the divinity (i.e., the non-revelatory ones). And, while he agreed with hisGerman Lutheran predecessors that the proper methodology would help people arrive atthe truth, he went much further than they dared do. His extreme EO is rooted in the view(as it was for Plotinus) that the beauty of the truths themselves would draw and motivatehumanity.

Lets consider his solution to the UEP. I remind you that the severity of theproblem seems to increase the more fully the divine nature is in the world and in us. Themore the divine nature is supposed to be inthings, the easier it should be to know it. Theapparent paradox is: God is everywhere, but nowhere to be found. Leibnizs response to

this paradox is to claim that God is everywhereand

thereforeeverywhere

to be found. Hebelieves that to have any sort of knowledge is to glimpse God and moreover to have anysort of knowledge is to love it and want more. So, whatever sort of knowledge it is, onehas taken a step toward knowledge of the divine.

Consider first Leibnizs view that the intimacy of the metaphysical relationbetween God and humanity entails an epistemological intimacy. For Leibniz, evenconfused perceptions contain potentially knowledge of the whole. The following, wellknown passages take on a slightly new sense when placed in the context of the UEP.For our soul expresses God, the universe, and all essences, as well as all existences ( 26,Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686).

The monad therefore already envelops its past and future states in itself, so that an omniscientbeing could read them from it; and monads agree between themselves, being mirrors of the sameuniverse to infinity, although the universe itself is of an infinite diffusion (Letter to PeirreDangicourt, 1716 (Shorter Texts, p. 54)).

Each soulis a world in miniature, representing things from the outside according to its point of

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view, and confusedly or distinctly according to the organs which accompany it, whereas Godincludes everything distinctly and eminently (Letter to Electress Sophie 6 February 1706(Shorter Texts, p. 82)).

Every individual substance contains in its perfect notion the entire universeand everything thatexists in it, past, present, and future.indeed, all individual created substances are differentexpressions of the same universeand different expressions of the same universal cause, namely

God (Primary Truths, 1689: AG 33)).

Because both God and the entirety of the divine creation is available to each mind, eachaspect of creation is available to the mind as something to know. In short, the wholeworld, its order, and infinity are available to each mind.

An obvious question arises: how does a mind come to glimpse the divinity withinthis infinity of states and expressions? In an essay written in German, probably in thefinal years of the seventeenth century, Leibniz confronts the Ultimate EpistemologicalProblem head on. In theMystical Theology, he offers one of the boldest of hisepistemological claims, namely, that each created thing or self-being is of God[Selbswesen von Gott],. In each and every creature is everything, but with a certaindegree of clarity[Kraft der Klarheit]. For Leibniz, in order to glimpse God, all we haveto do is have a momentary insight in any area of knowledge. He explains: Within ourself-state [Selbststand] there lies an infinity, a footprint or reflection of the omniscienceand omnipresence of God.... Every single self-state, such as I or you, is a unified,indivisible, indestructible thing.... In each and every being there is everything thoughwith a certain degree of clearness (On the True Theologica Mystica, L 608). When weconsider the footprint of God in our minds and manage to grasp a property of anattribute of God, we have thereby grasped some part of Gods essence. All suchknowledge is knowledge of God. Whats most important for our purposes here is that tograsp the essence of something just is to begin our journey to God. That is, for Leibniz, tograsp the essence of something is to take a first step toward more thorough knowledge ofGod. Leibniz summarizes the point: God is the easiest being to know.

A distinction will help. [Ive written about this elsewhere.] In the PhilosophersConfessionof 1672-73, he makes a distinction that diminishes the severity of our trap:

Even an accurate cognition [exacta cognitio] can increase, not by novelty of matter, butby novelty of reflection. If you have nine units accessible to you, then you havecomprehended accurately the essence of the number nine. However, even if you were tohave the material for all its properties, nevertheless you would not have its form orreflection [formam seu reflexionem]. For even if you do not observe that three timesthree... and a thousand other combinations are nine, you have nonetheless thought of theessence of the number nine.... I will give an example of a finite thing representing[praebentis] properties that are infinite without any comparison with external things. Hereis a circle: if you know that all the lines from the center to the circumference are equal, inmy opinion, you consider its essence sufficiently clearly. Still you have notcomprehended in virtue of that innumerable theorems.

We have here a distinction between the cognition of the essence of something and its completecognition. The former consists of an understanding of an essential property; the latter involves thecognition of all its properties.

Leibnizs point may be put as follows: to have complete knowledge of an essenceE is to know all its properties. Since, according to Leibniz, every essence of the relevant

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sort has an infinity of properties, only God can have this sort of knowledge. But finitehuman beings are capable of having some knowledge of E: when we grasp somepropertyof E, we thereby have knowledge of E, though only partial. By piecing together these andother clues, we attain the following:for any essence E, whether infinite or finite, there is arange of possible cognitions of it, from partial to complete, where a partial cognition of Eis to grasp one of its properties and a complete cognition of E is to grasp every such

property. Moreover, for any essence E, whether infinite or finite, it may be representedor expressed more or less clearly, although each property of E is a partial expression ofit.

The bad news is that no finite human being will be able to have a completecognition of any infinite essence and therefore of any divine attribute. Leibniz writes inPrinciples of Nature and Graceof 1714: But since each distinct perception of the soulincludes an infinity of confused perceptions which embrace the whole universe, the soulitself knows the things it perceives only so far as it has distinct and heightened [reveles]perceptions; and it has perfection to the extent that it has distinct perceptions. Each soulknows the infiniteknows allbut confusedly. It is like walking on the seashore andhearing the great noise of the sea: I hear the particular noises of each wave, of which thewhole noise is composed, but without distinguishing them (L 211). But the good news isthat the attributes and eternal ideas of God are all around us to be glimpsed and to cause

felicity. He continues, in Principles of Nature and Grace: It is true that supreme felicity(with whatever beatific visionor knowledge of god it may be accompanied) can never becomplete, because, since God is infinite, he can never be entirely known (Principles ofNature and Grace, Based on Reason(AG, 213)). Or, as he makes the point in 1711:

So, inasmuch as we receive our finite perfections from his, which are infinite, we areimmediately affected by them. And it is thus that our mind is affected immediately by theeternal ideas that are in God, since our mind has thoughts that are in correspondence withthem and participate in them. It is in this sense that we can say that our mind sees allthings in God (Philarte and Ariste, L 1021).

For Leibniz, then, our minds are created to find God easily within them. All wehave to do is to pay attention: It would indeed be wrong to think that we can easily readthese eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetors edict can be read on his notice-board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that they can be discovered within us bydint of attention: (New Essays, Preface 51). Now consider this striking passage: Notonly has God endowed the soul with the faculties it needs to know him, but it has alsoimprinted upon it characters which delineate him (New Essays, Chapter iii, p. 435).

Notice also that Leibnizs God has constructed the world to have enormousepistemological and moral benefits. He writes in 1702:

Perception, too, cannot be explained by any mechanism, whatever it may be. We canconclude then that there is also something immaterial everywhere in created beings, andparticularly in us, where this force is accompanied by a fairly distinct perception, andeven by that light of which I have spoken above, which makes us resemble God in

miniature not only through our knowledge of orderbut also through the order which wecan ourselves impart to the things within our grasp, in imitation of that which Godimparts to the universe. It is in this, also, that our virtue and perfection consist(On What Is Independent of Sense and of Matter, Letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte, L

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897-898).

The ascent to God is the recognition of this order in the world and in us. There areechoes of Melanchthon here: our minds can be ordered and will be through the study andcontemplation of divine order. In the process, God helps us: Meanwhile, it can be saidthat because of the divine concourse which continuously confers upon each creature

whatever perfection there is in it, the external object of the soul is God alone and that inthis sense God is to the mind what light is to the eye. This is that divine truth whichshines forth in us (Letter to Hansch, 1707, L 964).

Nor is that all. Like Plotinus, Leibniz thinks that the recognition of some piece ofknowledge will lead us to seek more and that, once we begin the process, a certainhappiness is already in our power. He insists in 1699: the principle of order proves thatthe more we analyze things, the more they satisfy our intellect (Letter to De Volder, L837). Or consider this fascinating comment in theNew Essays: There are confused ideaswhere we cannot expect complete knowledge, such as the ideas of some sensiblequalities. But with distinct ideas there is reason to hope for everything (376). Accordingto Leibniz, there is an underlying pleasure and beauty in this pursuit. In 1714, he writes:One could know the beauty of the universe in each soul, if one could unfold all its folds,which only open perceptibly with time. (Principles of Nature and Grace, L 211). An

astonishing feature of Leibnizs account of knowledge is that the path to knowledge itselfis both pleasurable and never ending. Even heaven is a place where there is perpetualpleasure and beauty. He explains: even when the blessed have been admitted to God,i.e., to the universal harmony and the supreme reason, nevertheless [they] have delightwithout end because they multiply their delight to infinity. Since there is no pleasurewithout perpetual novelty [citation].

Lets review. Whether I have a partial understanding of justice or triangularity, Ihave only remotely glimpsed the infinite complexity and glory of the divine nature. But Ihave nonetheless glimpsed it. If I come to understand a property of justice, then I have apartial cognition of the essence of justice. Since justice is a divine attribute, it followsthat I also have a partial cognition of God. Although there is a huge epistemologicaldivide between a partial and complete understanding of justice, and an even greater onebetween a partial understanding of justice and a complete understanding of God, it isnonetheless true that to understand any attribute partially is to have a partialunderstanding of God and hence be on the path to a more complete knowledge.Moreover, for Leibniz, one is motivated along this path by the beauty and pleasure of theknowing.11

A question arises at this point: if its so easy to grasp the supreme being and if themore humans know, the better they become, then why do so few know God more fully?Lets return to theMystical Theologywhere he acknowledges the epistemologicaldifficulties that follow. He writes:

Every perfection flows immediately from God. Only the inner light that Godhimself kindles in us has the power to give us a right knowledge of God. The

11In the end, Leibnizs EO is quite like that of Plotinus: the metaphysical intimacy of the relation between

the supreme being and its creatures entails an epistemological intimacy; the parts of the world areconnected so that knowledge of any one part can lead to knowledge of all the others; human beings areripe with knowledge of the whole; when they acquire knowledge of any part, they recognize the beautyin it and are drawn to know more; and the more knowledge they acquire, the better they become.

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divine perfections are concealed in all things, although very few know how todiscover them there. Hence there are many who are learned without beingillumined, because they believe not God or the light but only their earthly teachersor their external senses and so remain in the contemplation of imperfections.

Echoing some of the epistemological pessimism we find in Paul and Augustine, Leibniz

suggests that it is difficult to have right knowledge of God. On the one hand, the divineattributes or perfections are in everywhere in the world, waiting to be discovered. Onthe other, they are very difficult to glimpse. Echoing Platos cave analogy, Leibniz assertsthat it is easy to be trapped in this shadow world. Now, consider this early text:

since every mind is like a mirror, there will be one mirror in our mind, another in otherminds. Thus, if there are many mirrors there will be a greater light, the mirrorsblending the light not only in the [individual] eye but also among each other. Thegathered splendor produces glory. This is part of the reason for the deformity in mind:otherwise there would be nothing in the shadow to be magnified through the reflection ofthe mirrors (VI i 464).

This passage contains a striking response to our question and is a more optimistic version

of Melancthons point about the development of ordered minds. The deformity of mindprecludes the possibility of our minds grasping God easily, but it also prepares us to beready to do. That is, according to Leibniz, this deformity is a good thing, since itcontributes to the harmony and goodness of the world. As he writes in an essay probablyof 1675: It is a great boon to the human race that infinite things resist our finiteunderstandings. Because of our limited understandings, we cannot so easily crawlstraight into the middle of the brambles where we would become lost. Rather, our finiteunderstanding forces us to develop morally at the right pace. He suggests here that it is agoodthing that the human race progresses towards improvement only gradually.Moreover, once we begin the process, a certain happiness is already in our power, andthis is a happiness that deserves development. Leibniz seems to think not only that therecognition of some piece of knowledge will lead us to want more, he also suggests thatour slow but steady epistemological progress goes hand-in-hand with moral development.

Lets return to our questions and review Leibnizs solution to the UEP. Whatprevents people from glimpsing the divine nature? The deformity of mind. In a sense,Leibniz agrees with Augustine that minds are deformed, but he disagrees with him aboutthe cause of this deformity: they are not deformed out of punishment, rather, they aredeformed because their deformity contributes to the goodness of the world. They arelimited as they are so that they can progress to virtue at the right pace.

What will allow them to get better at glimpsing the divine nature? Leibniz flatlyrejects Luthers pessimism about the ease in which humans are lead astray. For Leibniz,despite this deformity, minds are poised to grasp the divinity, which they do as soon asthey grasp an essence. To grasp an essence is to have a partial cognition of God and tohave such knowledge is to begin the epistemological journey to God.

Is it every easy to do so and, if so how? For Leibniz, it is enormously easy to

glimpse God and to be set on a path to virtue. Moreover, each step in the journeycontributes to the splendor or glory of the world and thereby makes the world a betterplace.

In his usual fashion, Leibniz has solved a problem -- the UEP -- with finesse.

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V. Theodicy and the Epistemological Optimism

Lets finally return to the Theodicyitself and the questions raised by the preface.Those questions were: Is it easy to acquire this ultimate knowledge or not? Is it easy to be

moved by the beauty of these conceptions or not? What does it mean to say thatconceptions are beautiful? In what does this beauty consists? In the end, what are we tothink about the ease of acquiring this most important knowledge?

In the context set by the UEP and its main historical solutions, we can glimpse (ifnot God, then) Leibnizs brilliant solution to the problem. And in the context of Leibnizssolution, we learn a good deal both about the epistemology of the Theodicyand his placein the dawning of the Enlightenment. The Theodicyis supposed to offer beautifulconceptions about the goodness of the world and allow people to move from thedeformity of mind, to the recognition of Gods goodness, and ultimately to virtue. Thetext assumes epistemological optimism in that its author works hard not just to argueagainst Bayle and situate his own ideas in a wide historical context, but to offer hisreaders a glimpse of the extraordinary harmony and beauty of the world. In this sense, theTheodicysgoal is to lead its readers to a greater ordering their minds and a greater sense

of the beauty of the divine nature. By asking his readers to glimpse the perfection of theworld and hence that of its creator, Leibniz works hard to move them towardenlightenment, love, and virtue. He writes in the preface just after the passages discussedin Section I:It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that the Divinityshould be the object of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy byanticipation, and gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there isnothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is that mental statewhich makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object of our love, and there isnothing more perfect than God, nor any greater delight than in him. To love him itsuffices to contemplate perfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas ofthese within ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possessesthem in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops have been granted;there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but in God they are all intheir entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delight us; painting and music are samples ofthese: God is all order; he always keeps truth of proportions, he makes universalharmony; all beauty is an effusion of his rays (51). 12

This is a wonderfully rich passage. The perfections of God are in our souls and are easy

12Lon voit que Jesus-Christ, achevant ce qui Mose avoit commence, a voulu que la Divinit ft lobjet,non seulement de notre crainte & de notre veneration, mais encore de notre amour & de notre tendresse.Ctoit rendre les homes bienheureux par avance, & leur donner ici-bas un avant-got de la felicit future.Car il ny a rien de si agreeable que daimer ce qui est digne damour. Lamour est cette affection qui nousfait trouver du plaisir dans les perfections de ce quon aime, & il ny a rien de plus parfait que Dieu, ni riende plus charmant. Pour laimer, il suffit den envisager les perfections; ce qui est ais, parce que noustrouvons en nous leurs ides. Les perfections de Dieu sont celles de nos ames, mais il les possede sans

bornes: il est un Ocean, dont nous navons reu que des goutes: il y a en nous quelque puissance, quelqueconnoissance, quelque bont; mais elles sont toutes entieres en Dieu. Lordre, les proportions, lharmonienous enchantent, la Peinture & la Musiqueen sont des chantillons; Dieu est tout ordre, il garde toujoursla justesse des proportions, il fait lharmonie universelle: toute la beautest un panchement de ses rayons.

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to contemplate. Leibniz is explicit here about the aesthetic aspect of the movementtoward greater understanding of God. In a passage quoted in Section I, Leibniz mentionsthe beautiful conceptions of the greatness and goodness of God. Here he goes muchfarther to claim that the aesthetic pleasure of painting and music delight us and arethemselves samples of the order that God both creates and is. But even more striking stillis the claim that all beauty is an effusion of his rays. Leibniz seems very optimistic

indeed about knowledge: God is order, the world God created has order, the order andperfections of God are in our soul, and order delights us so that we move closer to thebeauty and hence toward the rays.

Briefly, lets return to the rhetorical strategy of the Theodicy. The pessimisticmanner in which Leibniz begins his preface is wonderfully suitable: human weaknessleads us to be impressed by what is outward and to not work appropriately to discoverthe inner essence of things (p. 49). Leibniz thereby prepares his reader for the difficultyof the task ahead. Because they have been taken with the wrong opinions (including thoseof Bayle), it is appropriate for him to lead them in slow but steady steps to glimpse theharmony of Gods world and eventually to love it. Echoing the methodologicalprescriptions of his German predecessors, he offers a history lesson of the relevantproblems, carefully discriminates among prominent historical and contemporary figuresso that the true and accurate views are selected, and presents his own views with care

so that the elements of his solutions can glimpse.Finally, this view of the Theodicyand its author makes them seem more forward

looking than one usually thinks of Leibniz. He rejects the Augustinian idea that grace isrequired for knowledge of God and goes well beyond the Reformation notion thatChristianity is required for virtue. For Leibniz, everyone whether pagan, Jew, Muslim,or other can recognize the beauty and harmony in the world, love it, develop moreknowledge of it, and ultimately acquire virtue. The only thing that limits humanity in thispursuit of knowledge is the opinions of men, but with the proper contemplation of theharmony in the world they can attain virtue. The grandiose plan is to improve thecondition of humankind. Its a pity it didnt work.

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christia mercer-leibnizs theodicy and the epistemological problem of evil

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