christiano - freedom, consensus, and equality in collective decision making

7/30/2019 Christiano - Freedom, Consensus, And Equality in Collective Decision Making

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Freedom, Consensus, and Equality in Collective Decision MakingAuthor(s): Thomas ChristianoReviewed work(s):Source: Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Oct., 1990), pp. 151-181Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381897 .

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SURVEY ARTICLE

Freedom, Consensus, and Equality in CollectiveDecision Making*ThomasChristiano

This article examines three different approaches to the philosophical foundationsof democracy. The idea has been to address basic normative theories of thejustification of democracy. These theories differ in how they found democracy,the values they take to be basic, and also in how they conceive of democraticinstitutions. This is as it should be; the attempts of some to find the right definitionof "democracy" and then to base arguments on such a definition is clearly amisguided enterprise.' "Democracy" is a generic term which may be vaguely butnot very helpfully defined as a society in which all or most of the population hasthe opportunity jointly to play an essential if not always very formative role inthe determination of legislation and policy. More than that we cannot say. Theproper task for philosophers is to determine fundamental principles for socialand political theory and then to show that some species of democratic rule isdefensible on the basis of these principles.Before proceeding to a discussion of the theories, it will be useful to introducea distinction. There are instrumentalist, intrinsic, and mixed arguments for de-mocracy. Instrumentalists argue for democracy by showing that the consequencesof having democratic institutions are desirable. They may argue that democraticinstitutions promote the greatest welfare either because the legislation is goodor because of the effect the institutions have on the participants (Mill 1958). Orthey may simply argue that democratic institutions tend to producejust legislationor protect liberty (Nelson 1980; Riker 1982). Benevolent dictatorships could doas well, instrumentalists argue, but it is highly unlikely that they will. A benevolentdictatorship would be equally defensible if it did produce equally good outcomesand better if it produced better outcomes. Intrinsic arguments, on the otherhand, call attention to some intrinsically valuable qualities in democracy (J.Cohen 1989; Singer 1974). They are independent of whatever desirable or un-desirable effects democratic institutions have. And some thinkers defend democracyon the basis of these intrinsic merits alone. Mixed theories defend democracyon the basis of intrinsic merits but regard the consequences of democratic decisionmaking as having great importance in the overall assessment of democratic in-

* I have benefited greatly from discussion with Richard Arneson, Daniel Brudney,John Christman, Patrick Croskery, and Russell Hardin and the written comments of JoshuaCohen, Carol Gould, and William Nelson. Many disagreements remain, and I have followedmy own judgment in these cases.1. For one among many such attempts, see Arblaster (1987).Ethics 101 (October 1990): 151-181? 1990 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/91/0101-0009$01.00

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152 Ethics October1990stitutions (Christiano 1989; Gould 1988; Rawls 1972). Such views give democracyintrinsic worth on some matters but look to the consequences of the institutionson other matters. On occasion such theories will require that trade-offs be madebetween the different standards of assessment.I shall focus exclusively on some main foundational theories in democratictheory, and I shall be concerned with whether these theories can provide areasonable approach to democracy. Thus I shall not discuss the merits of thefoundational theories except insofar as they bear on issues in democratic theory.Unfortunately, exhaustiveness is impossible to achieve in an article of thislength, so I have restricted myself to examining what I take to be three recentwell-developed sets of theories which embody very different foundational com-mitments. I discuss what I call positive liberty, contractualist, and egalitariantheories respectively in the following three parts.2

It will be clear from this survey that there are no clear winners and losersin this debate. All of these theories meet with a variety of problems.3 Positiveliberty theories found democracy on the basis of the claim that democratic par-ticipation is a necessary component of liberty. Such theories face a variety ofdifficulties. Two stand out: (1) it is hard to explain why individuals should notbe permitted to trade off their own particular political liberty for other personalliberties; if individuals would be granted this permission, then the result mightwell be an inequality in political liberties; (2) there is a deep tension between theidea that individuals should be free with respect to the world they share incommon with others and the claim that this freedom should be equally distributed.It is hard to see how I can be free to have my way with regard to the commonwhen what occurs must be the result of the assent of many others. These difficultiesare addressed by some contractualist theorists. They invoke a more substantiveconception of positive liberty to include a requirement to promote the commongood and to do so through reasoned deliberation. Conflicts between citizens overthe common are interpreted as conflicts of judgment regarding the commongood, and the outcome of decision making is understood as most likely to be inthe public interest. But this kind of view relies too heavily on the possibility ofan underlying consensus for it to give us even an ideal account of democracy.Also it does not entirely escape the problem of trade-offs. Other contractualistarguments for democracy tend also to rely too heavily on consensus in variousways. On the other hand, the egalitarian theories I discuss start from the existenceof irresolvable conflict of preference and convictions, and democracy is thoughtto be ajust or fair way of making decisions regarding the common life of citizens.But some of these theories face a difficulty of self-defeatingness given theircommitment to skepticism and irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I discuss atheory which attempts to interpret conflict in terms of differing interests regarding

2. The distinctions between these different kinds of arguments are not hard and fast.In particular, some forms of contractualism seem to be based on conceptions of positiveliberty while others are interest based. For that reason, I discuss one of the arguments fordemocracy that positive liberty theorists give in the section on contractualist views.3. Methodologically, I follow the practice of giving detailed expositions of those theoristswhom I regard as having the best versions of these theories. I supplement the accountwith ideas provided by other sympathetic thinkers, and sometimes I amend the theorieswhen and where they can withstand criticisms which were not handled by the originaltheorist. I do this in order to avoid the distortions and other pitfalls of giving completelyabstract accounts of ideas with which I may not entirely sympathize.



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Christiano CollectiveDecisionMaking 153the common and democracy as a principle of equality of resources for controlover the common. There is a trade-off problem for this kind of theory as wellsince individuals may wish to trade their political resources for economic resources.But the theory can accommodate this problem. It is harder for this view to givean adequate interpretation of the role of deliberation as opposed to mere coalitionbuilding and bargaining in politics.POSITIVE LIBERTY ARGUMENTSTheFundamental rgumentI shall begin with a presentation of Carol Gould's discussion of the argumentfrom positive liberty so as to set the framework for an examination of this wholeclass of theories. The basic argument can be stated in the following claims: (1)The fundamental value in politics is that of freedom. (2) Freedom must ultimatelybe understood as self-development (Gould 1988, p. 45). (3) Each has an equalright to the conditions of self-development (Gould 1988, p. 61). (4) Participationin determining common activities is a necessary condition of self-development(Gould 1988, p. 78). (5) Therefore, each person has an equal right to participatein determining the course of common activities they are involved with (Gould1988, p. 85).Let us look at each premise in turn. The first premise is based on a kind ofKantian argument. It is based on the claims that (a) an action is valuable if andonly if it is free. Freedom is the condition under which any action and ultimatelyany object have value for a person; (b) insofar as freedom is the condition underwhich any action has value, free action reflexively confers value on itself (Gould1988, p. 63). Each person has a claim or basic interest in freedom, and that claimis a valid claim insofar as freedom is the basis of all value.The notion of freedom must be spelled out. It involves (1) the fact of agency,that is, a capacity to make a choice; (2) my ability to carry out choices withoutthe interference of others; (3) my possession of the means for carrying out mychoices and, finally and most important, (4) self-development, which amountsto the autonomous formation of my own character and my being able in thefullest sense to carry out long-term projects.4 Gould appeals to the idea thatindividuals have a natural tendency to self-development and that the fulfillmentof this tendency is what is important about notions of liberty.The idea of characterand choice are to be understood in a content-neutral way. Individuals must choosethe long-term projects and character traits they wish to develop. This conditionensures that the person is the author of his own life.5In defense of the third claim, Gould asserts that all human beings have thebasic capacity for self-development equally, and they all have a right to exerciseit. Since all human beings have a tendency to self-development whose value isaffirmed in their actions and the exercise of that capacity requires conditions,each person has a claim to the conditions of self-development. Without theseconditions, the freedom would be empty. From these two claims, Gould infers

4. For a related notion of freedom and another argument for this kind of analysis,see Taylor (1979b) and Elster (1986b).5. This is what distinguishes Gould's view from that of MacPherson (1973) who spellsout a theory of essential human capacities which are exercised in the process of self-development. Gould seems to avoid this kind of theory out of a concern to avoid theobjections of Berlin (1969).



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154 Ethics October 1990that individuals have a valid claim on the conditions of self-development. Butsince they are equal with respect to the possession of the basic capacity, theyeach have a prima facie equal right to the conditions of self-development.6 Thisprinciple of equal positive freedom is her basic principle of justice.The application of this principle to democracy follows from the fact thatindividuals pursue their self-development necessarily in two different contexts.They pursue personal projects and goals which do not require the cooperationof others (at least not locally), and they pursue activities which are "common."These require the willing cooperation of others and have as their goals objectswhich could not be achieved by individual action. Such activities determine muchof what we are. Gould argues, therefore, that insofar as self-development requiresthat we are the determiners of our own characters as well as the ends we pursue,participation in determining the course of these common activities is a necessarycondition for self-development. There are three ways in which participationcontributes to self-development. These are the bases of two different positiveliberty arguments for democracy. (1) Participationtends to form a person's characterinsofar as it demands that participants be capable ofjustifying their views of howthings should go to others, it requires that they be open to a multiplicity of pointsof view, and it requires that a person be capable of taking other persons' pointsof view seriously enough to accommodate them. These are character traits thatindiviuduals acquire from being active citizens (Gould 1988, p. 79). (2) Insofarasothers participateand develop these capacities,participation will involve members'mutually supporting each other's concerns, enhance the self-esteem of each ofthe members, and provide conditions under which the first effect of participationon self-development can be fully realized (Gould 1988, p. 73). Inasmuch asparticipation has been thought to contribute to self-development, this has beenoffered as an argument for democracy. Let us call it the participation argument.(3) Most important, the common activities have three main effects: (a) theydetermine the environment within which our characters are formed; (b) theyare the necessary basis of products which we use to pursue our purposes; and(c) they form the circumstances in which we define our projects. Intuitively,positive liberty theorists argue that if one does not participate in determiningthe course of these common activities others will be able to impose upon us thebasic aspects of our charactersand projects. Hence our participation in determiningthe common activities is necessary if we are to be the authors of our own lives(Gould 1988, p. 79; J. Cohen 1986b; Taylor 1979a; Graham 1986). Let us callthis the argument from self-rule.From the principles of equal positive liberty and the conception of the personas essentially bound up with common activities, Gould derives the conclusionthat each person has an equal right to participate in determining the course ofthe common activities they engage in. This she calls the "principle of democracy"(Gould 1988, p. 84).ProblemswithParticipationand Self-DevelopmentI shall first discuss the argument from participation and three objections: theself-defeatingness argument, the claim that participation is not necessary to self-development, and finally what I call the trade-off problem. The first two are

6. Gould introduces some other potentially conflicting principles in chap. 7, hencethe qualification "prima facie."



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Christiano CollectiveDecisionMaking 155addressed to different theories within the broadly described "participationist"school (Arendt 1963; Bacharach 1967; Mill 1958; Pateman 1970, 1985). In thenext section I will examine some versions of the argument from self-rule.Part of Gould's argument for democracy is that the interaction required init has an effect on the characters of the participants. It produces the peculiartraits of citizenship. This has been a standard claim for participationists. Manyparticipationists are primarilyconcerned with showing that participatoryinstitutionswould not have the deleterious effect on collective decision making that theoristssuch as Schumpeter claimed they would have (Schumpeter 1956). They arguethat the more individuals participate in decision making, the more adept theywill become at doing so, and that the net effect on collective decision makingwould actually be an improvement over a less participatory decision-makingprocess. In addition, Gould argues that this effect on character is not only in-strumentally valuable but that it is intrinsically valuable as well because of itsrelation to self-development.One objection to such an argument for participation has been presented byJon Elster (Elster 1983). He claims that such "arguments for political institutionsand constitutions are self-defeating since they justify the arrangements in questionby effects that are essentially by-products" (Elster 1983, p. 92). A by-product forElster is a result of an activity which one cannot intentionally or intelligentlybring about by that activity. The paradigm examples are sleep and belief. Wecannot intentionally and directly aim at falling asleep without undermining ourplan to fall asleep.7 Elster objects that the main benefit or purpose of a politicalsystem cannot be found in the educative effect on citizens. He claims that ifdemocracy is not superior to other systems of decision making in terms of itsjustice or efficiency, then it cannot be publicly advocated for its educative effect.This is because the educative effect of democracy is a by-product. If "the democraticmethod were introduced solely because of its side effects. . . and no one believedin it on any other grounds, it would not produce them" (Elster 1983, p. 96).These are not the only grounds of Gould's advocacy of democracy, butElster'sobjection would fail even if that were her only argument. The last supportingpremise is ambiguous. The antecedent may refer either to an advantage ofdemocracy over other forms of government or to the desirability of democracyover no system of political decision making. Elster's argument might work if weinterpret the antecedent in the second way, but the participationist argumentsgenerally refer to the first. They do not deny that, as Brian Barry has said,"politics is a serious business" and that the actual substance of political decisionmaking is important. Their theses are concerned with how one should go aboutmaking those decisions. It is perfectly coherent to claim that political decisionsare of fundamental significance for people while asserting that what makes de-mocracy preferable to other methods of making such decisions is its educativeeffect. This rationale need in no way undermine the seriousness of citizens whenthey confront the hard issues of politics in a democratic context. We might thinkof democratic institutions as regulating the process of decision making and, touse Elster's terms, a kind of indirect technology for the production of desirable

7. Of course,we can fall asleep by intentionallyusing a kind of indirecttechnologysuchas sleeping pillsor distractingourselvesby thinkingof some soothing object,but thefirsttechnologyis unaffectedby whether we are aimingat sleepingor not and the secondrelies on our being distracted rom aimingat sleeping.



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156 Ethics October1990character traits in citizens (Elster 1983, p. 53). Self-development is a by-productof citizens' having to resolve political questions in a democratic context.One might ask, however, whether participation in determining the courseof common activities is a necessary condition of self-development in the way thatGould describes. Commenting on earlier, less sophisticated theories, WilliamNelson argues that the capacities which result from participation are not necessarilydesirable qualities and that the desirability of many such capacities is predicatedon the desirability of participatory institutions themselves (Nelson 1980). Hence,it is not clear that the production of these character traits is a possible justificatoryground for democratic participation. The issue is a serious one for Gould sinceshe endorses a conception of self-development which avoids any appeal to essentialhuman attributes and which requires that self-developing persons decide forthemselves what qualities they are to develop (Gould 1988, p. 52). She does notdefend the objective worth of any traits of character; these traits must simply beessentially tied to the process of self-development. She lists a number of charactertraits which democratic institutions tend to foster: a tendency to rationally justifyone's actions to others, openness toward others' views and opinions, and moregenerally, a disposition to reciprocity which is a capacity and tendency to takeother people's interests seriously as on an equal footing with one's own (Gould1988, p. 291). Also she thinks that participation gives individuals "the opportunityto exercize and develop their social, moral and intellectual capacities" (Gould1988, p. 79). We might ask, Is democracy necessary for these traits? and, Howare these traits connected with self-development?Consider these two questions from the point of view of the individual alonefirst. The claim that democracy is necessary for the development of these traitsseems overstated. It is certainly the case that individuals have had these qualitiesin a wide variety of circumstances.Also, it seems wrong to claim that they are essentially tied to self-developmentin the content-neutral way that Gould describes. There are two ways in whichone might argue that they are so tied. One is that any self-developing individualwould tend to develop these qualities as outcomes of a process of self-development.But this claim seems to be false. We can certainly imagine individuals who areautonomous and free thanks to a life of solitary contemplation but, due to sucha life, they are less than enthusiastic about listening to the positions or beingconcerned with the interests of others.Another interpretation of the claim that these traits are essentially tied toself-development may be that these are the best all-purpose means to self-de-velopment. Virtually anyone might benefit by possessing them. They are a kindof psychological primary good. Of course, the analogy between traits of openmindedness and the capacity to give reasons and goods like money and powermay break down. At some point, increases in the former may bring harmfulmarginal results such as indecisiveness while more money or power may havediminishing but never negative marginal returns.If we consider that in a democracy most will acquire these traits, then it isplausible that democratic institutions are most likely to produce such traits ofcharacter. Individuals would benefit from having these traits and would alsobenefit from others' willingness to engage in open-minded, rational debate. Itshould be clear, however, that (1) not all forms of self-development need befurthered by these traits and (2) we cannot say more than that democracy is mostlikely to promote these traits.



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Christiano CollectiveDecisionMaking 157These two concessions are important because Gould's argument works onlyif it can be shown that democratic participation is necessary for self-development.Gould rightly thinks there are activities outside participation in which one canpursue self-development. And they require conditions as well. But if participationis only conducive and not necessary to self-development, it is not clear why theprinciple of equal positive freedom should apply directly to determining thecourse of common activities. A general principle of equality of conditions forpositive freedom does not entail directly that every kind of condition of positivefreedom must be distributed equally. All that is entailed is that each person'sbundle of resources should be equal to everyone else's. If some pursue self-development in a way that requires little or no political participation, they wouldnot need opportunities to participate in collective decision making in their bundleof resources. Therefore, the principle of equal positive freedom does not entaila principle of democracy. This is what I call the trade-off problem.Gould would respond that not to have the opportunities to participate inthe common activities in which they are involved is to be dominated by thosewho do have them. And this domination by others is more serious than the casein which a person has the opportunity but intends never to exercise it. In favorof this, one might argue that to forfeit all opportunities of participation maysubject one to the risk of being enslaved. But as long as we assume that allpersons' total bundles of resources for self-development remain equal, this dangercannot arise. Hence, it is not clear why the having of an unused opportunity to

participate makes one more free than the circumstance in which one has forgonethat opportunity for some other resource. Indeed, it may be argued that a greaterliberty is afforded citizens if they have the freedom to make exchanges. As longas overall equality were maintained the more particularequalities might legitimatelybe disrupted. But if this were permitted, the outcome would not necessarily bedemocratic.Participationand Freedomto Determinethe Courseof CommonActivitiesHistorically, the most important argument for democracy has been on the basisof a principle of self-rule (Rousseau 1967). I will review two versions of thisargument: one in this section and the other in the part on contractualist theories.MYcriticalremarks will focus on two main objections: the incompatibility objectionand the trade-off problem, and attempts to evade these difficulties. The self-ruleargument begins with the premise that human beings are social beings in threemain ways: their characters, goals, and knowledge are socially conditioned; thewealth, institutions, education, and other means by which to further their endsare based on the activities of many people working in concert; and their pro-jects are to a great extent defined in terms of a set of social relations.8 Insofaras these are social products, the only way in which persons can be said to be self-developing is if they have a part in determining all of this cooperative activity.Free persons will wish that the circumstances in which they live and which theyshare with others be a product of their own free action. Rousseau's view, Cohenargues, is that "a [self-consciously free] person wants more than the availabilityof alternatives within a system of laws and institutions that they view as a set ofconstraints imposed by others on their action. Rather, they want to be able toregard those institutional constraints as themselves conforming to their own

8. See Sher (1989) for a good discussion of various forms of social involvement.



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158 Ethics October1990judgments of what is right.... The free person wants to affirm the frameworkof rules itself; they want to 'have their own will as a rule"' (J. Cohen 1986b, p.286). From here, we can establish a more direct relation between participationand freedom. In this section I will discuss one interpretation of "having one'sown will as a rule." It is that the common activities are subject to their actualchoice. Participation is a necessary part of self-development, because one therebychooses the circumstances which determine one's life. Participation is free action,and living in a society in which one participates in determining its character ispart of being a free person. One is not merely free concerning the choice ofwhether to participate or even how one should participate. The claim is that oneexercise one's freedom with regard to the nature of the society one lives in. Onelives subject only to laws that one chooses.There is an obvious difficulty here. I cannot be free to determine the courseof an activity I share in common with others in a democracy. For whatever Iwant done must require the assent of some proportion of the other participants.This seems like a paradigmatic case of unfreedom. With regard to the commonactivity C which is democratically controlled by all the participants, I may be freeto participate or not, and to participate in whatever way I wish, but I am notfree to dispose of C as I wish. Put briefly, if I share roughly equal control overthe common activities, then I am not free with respect to C. And if I am freewith respect to C, then I have more than equal control. This is the incompatibilityproblem; it asserts an incompatibility between democracy and self-rule.

In response to this, Gould claims that a different kind of freedom is involved:"since the form of such common activity differs from individual activity, in whichone makes decisions about one's own actions independently of others, the natureof decision making in common activity must also differ" (Gould 1988, p. 89). Letus look at some proposals concerning the nature of collective decision makingand how it is an exercise of freedom despite the problem above.One argument that Gould and others have given is "participation in jointdecision making remains an exercise of autonomy, inasmuch as the individualshave freely chosen to participate in the activity and in the determination of theshared ends" (Gould 1988, p. 233). This claim can be interpreted in two ways.It may merely mean that I am more free if I am permitted to participate thanif I have no such permission. But, from this version of the claim above it doesnot follow that my participation itself is an exercise of freedom with regard tothe common activity in the sense that the rules determining the common activityare self-imposed. The scope of this freedom is just my action of participation.Furthermore, if this first interpretation is correct, it is not clear that this particularfreedom is necessary to self-development. It is true that all other things beingequal, I am more free if I may participate in joint decision making since I haveone more opportunity. But it does not establish that the freedom to participateor not will increase my freedom all things considered. This can only be evaluatedfrom the point of view of the overall effects of a system of participatory democracyon the society as well as on the individual, and it is not clear which way theevidence points for a society as a whole. Also, it is not clear, as I argued above,given the aims of some individuals that this is necessary to increase their freedom.Another interpretation is that my freely chosen participation constitutes akind of free endorsement of the outcome of the joint decision-making processeven when the decision is quite different from the outcome I desired (see Gould[1988], pp. 232-39, for another version of this). This kind of argument is similar



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Christiano CollectiveDecisionMaking 159to arguments that suggest that individuals indirectly consent to the outcomes ofdecision procedures when they freely participate in them. But it is false to saythat individuals consent through their participation since someone can actuallysay without incoherence that they do not consent to outcomes they oppose bytheir participation. Some have claimed that participants do something like freelyconsent when they participate and thereby incur a self-imposed obligation tocomply with the outcomes (Singer 1974, p. 50; Plamenatz 1963, p. 239; Jenkins1970, p. 60). This may be a way of understanding the idea that one imposes therules of the common activity on oneself. This is Singer's argument:

1. If there is a continuing system of voting, then that system must besuch that individuals generally comply with the outcomes of the votes.Otherwise, the system would go out of existence.2. Hence, if X votes, it is reasonable to expect that X will comply withthe results and to rely on that compliance.3. If by X's conduct, one is reasonably led to rely on X's compliancewith the results of the vote, then X has an obligation to comply with theresults of the vote.

But this argument rests on an equivocation. Premise 2 is not equivalent to theantecedent of premise 3. It may be true that we can expect participants in avoting system to comply with the outcome of the vote, but this is quite differentfrom claiming that they put me in the position of relying on them by participatingin the voting procedure. Yet the latter is required at least for them to incur anobligation to comply with the outcome of the vote (Nelson 1980, p. 44; Christiano1989, pp. 19-24). The same problem holds for the argument that since I cannotexpect unanimous agreement and I know that the common activitycannot proceedif dissenters refuse to go along with the outcome, my free action of participatingconstitutes a free endorsement of the outcome of decision making.It should be noted that this version of the argument may work for very smallgroups where participation may be the best sign that the participant is willingto comply with whatever choice is made and where that sign is crucial for relyingon the participant, but the argument does not generalize to larger groups andin particular not to the state since citizens hardly can or do rely on each others'compliance with the law on the basis of their participation.A second argument for the claim that participation can lead to the free self-imposition of the law is presented by Graham (1986). His argument is that incommon activities, individuals' desires and goals are likely to conflict, and, insofaras their desires conflict, their autonomous activities conflict. Hence, it is sometimesnecessary to limit some peoples' autonomous activity in favor of others. Sinceconflict is inevitable and must be resolved somehow we must give up the ideathat the right to autonomy operates as a side constraint and think of autonomyas a goal to be maximized. This will resolve conflicts of autonomy. The best wayto maximize autonomy in common activities is to introduce majority rule where,in each case, conflicts of autonomy between different individuals are resolved infavor of the greater number of individuals and therefore the greater amount ofautonomy.Each inference is problematic here, but what this argument seems to implyis that a great deal of democracy will always maximize freedom. The argumentis at this point an instrumentalist one, and it is not clear whether given all theevidence it will produce an argument for democracy or not. This is so if we take



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160 Ethics October1990into account the fact that we may be free in ways that are independent of par-ticipation and that the outcomes of democratic decision making may restrict thatfreedom. Furthermore it assumes the claim that merely to get what you want isa case of freedom if you participated in the action that got you what you wantedeven though you could not have gotten it if others had not assented. It is unclearstill whether participation constitutes an exercise of freedom over outcomes atall. Let us look at this more closely. Perhaps one can argue that we are freerwith respect to some outcome range if we have more power or resources withwhich to determine that outcome. That freedom would be compatible with atotal absence of effect on the outcome. We might say that there is a kind ofanalogy between having more money to buy some object and having more resourceswith which to determine the outcome of a collective decision process. We mightthen say that the more resources we have to influence some outcome, the freerwe are. But both cases are cases in which one's desire can be blocked by someoneelse (seller or other voters) depending on their preferences. The increase ofresources does not in itself increase my freedom to do something unless I cando that thing without the assent of others.Perhaps we could modify this stringent condition by claiming that once Ihave the assent of others to my choosing between a and b, then I am free tochoose between a and b. Hence, once a seller has agreed to sell me an object atthe price I offered, then I am free to buy the object or not, even though I wasnot free to do so before they agreed to sell it to me. Remember that in thedemocratic case a and b do not stand for my actions merely but for the outcomesof the decision procedure. But this condition will be satisfied in a democracyonly in very rare circumstances, namely, when my wishes are the same as themajority's wishes and when my vote can be said to be decisive in some sense.Even on the broadest possible account of decisiveness, I will rarely be free todetermine the course of common activities. Moreover, that freedom will be quitelimited since it will only exist after the agenda has been formulated and thealternatives are supported fairly evenly by all the other members. This wouldbe a freedom that would appear only at the very end of the decision-makingprocess. Surely this is not what these theorists have in mind.9Hence, it appears that the first two arguments do not adequately supportthe contention that democratic participation is an instance of freedom over thecommon life. I shall discuss another argument for this position in the next section.CONTRACTUALIST ARGUMENTSContractualism has been another important source ofjustification in democratictheory. The contractualist conception of morality can be expressed by means ofthe formula provided by Thomas Scanlon: "An action is wrong if its performanceunder the circumstances would be dissallowed by any system of rules for theregulation of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed,unforced general agreement" (Scanlon 1982, p. 110). Such a principle has also

9. It might be objected that my criticismrelies on an identificationof democraticparticipationwith voting. And this is certainlynot all that is involvedin democracy.Myresponse is that voting is an important partof democraticdecisionmaking, especially ncasesof conflict,and that any theory of democracymust give a reasonableaccountof itsrole.



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Christiano CollectiveDecision Making 161been applied to specifically political justification. The idea has been that the basicstructure of society or that laws and policies should conform to principles thatno one could reasonably reject. Such views are generally quite different fromwhat are described as contractarian positions. The latter type theory is based onthe idea that individuals with self-interested motives willbargain over the cooperativesurplus that is produced in joint activities (Gauthier 1986). Political institutionsare seen by these theorists as the outcome of bargaining processes among rationallyself-interested persons (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).10 The emphasis in con-tractualist views, on the other hand, is on the notion of "reasonableness" incontrast to rational self-interest. Though this notion is differently understood bydifferent theorists, it is minimally different from rationalist views in that theindividuals attempt to reach agreement by appealing to more than just the dis-tribution of power among the parties. They wish to take each others' interestsinto account not merely in order to advance their own good but in order toadvance everyone's good.The bases that have been offered as justification for this way of conceivingof political justification are: (1) skepticism about externally defended moral andpolitical principles; (2) the idea that "institutions that can be justified in this waycome as close as possible to the ideal of respect for each person's final authorityover the conduct of her own life" (Beitz 1989, p. 104); and (3) the claim thatmoral principles motivate and that there is a specifically moral kind of motivationwhich is that individuals desire to be able to justify their actions to others. Theselatter two ideas are founded in different philosophical traditions: positive liberty(Rousseau 1967) and Humean, and I shall discuss theories of each type in turn.Recent contractualist theories of political justificatioin of democracy haveranged over a spectrum of views from the claim that democratic institutionswould be the object of agreement among individuals who were devising rulessuch that no one could reasonably reject them (Beitz 1989), to the view thatdemocratic institutions, suitably described, would themselves be the circumstancesin which reasonable agreements about political institutions could be made (J.Cohen 1989). In the middle stands a view that democratic institutions are sufficientlylike circumstances of reasonable agreement that they are likely to produce legislationwhich is morally acceptable from a contractualist point of view (Nelson 1980).PositiveLiberty nd the CommonGoodSome contractualist arguments such as those which have their inspiration inRousseau are founded on a particular conception of positive liberty (J. Cohen1986a, 1986b; Dent 1989). They employ a version of the argument from positiveliberty which relies on a more substantial notion of liberty than the theoriesoutlined in the first part. The boldest expression of this notion of liberty can beexpressed in the following way: a free person must promote the common goodin collective decision making. With respect to decisions concerning the commonactivities, in order to be free a person must promote the common good. Thisversion of the argument provides a different gloss on the notion, mentionedearlier, of "having one's own will as a rule." The notion of the will in such theoriesgoes beyond mere reflective choice and involves a substantive commitment tothe common good.

10. For discussion of this important class of theories, see the essays in Brennan andLomasky (1989) as well as critiques in Nelson (1980) and Barry (1965).



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162 Ethics October1990The argument for this principle is: (1) It is a condition of my own full,secure, self-possession of my personhood that I acknowledge and meet othersas free and equal persons. The arguments for this crucial premise are that myrecognition of myself as a human being depends on my having some significancefor others. We depend crucially on the esteem and respect of others to even havea conception of ourselves as moral persons. If nothing I ever do commandsrespect from others or moves others to action on a voluntary basis my conceptionof myself might be incapacitating. My capacities require a social context for theirrealization. But the condition under which others give me the respect and esteemI need, must be that they share an equal status with me. The approbation ofchildren or insane persons is not sufficient for my self-esteem. I need the presenceof other individuals who are equals at least in their moral and intellectual capacities.Nor am I moved by the esteem of those who are forced to say good things of

me. They must have the real opportunity to express their approval and disapprovalin actions or words. Hence, I cannot merely treat others as individuals whoseinterests and needs and understanding are completely insignificant to me, for ifI do that then I stand alone and cannot have the esteem I need (Elster 1986b;Hegel 1977, pp. 111-18).This will mean that I cannot reasonably act without reference to the beingand needs of others. (2) If I cannot rightly demand that I decide and act withoutreference to the being and needs of others, then I must act in accordance withthat rule which is for the common good and not merely my own isolated good.A further premise states that (3) what is a requirement for my personhood isnot a violation of my freedom but rather a requirement for my being free.Therefore, (4) being required to follow a rule which is for the common good isa necessary component of my freedom (Dent 1989, chaps. 4-5).There are some difficulties which should be noted with this argument: (a)it is not clear that the equality that is required is strong enough to motivate aconcern for the common good; one might still will that one be preeminent amongpersons who have the minimal capacities to appreciate one's projects. Also (b)it does not appear necessary that one think of all people in this way; hence itmay be necessary that I have some companions who are equals in some way tome but the universal equality that seems to underlie a concern for the commongood does not seem necessary for my self-esteem. An aristocratic society foundedon inequality does not seem inconsistent with the first premises of this argument.The next step in the argument, will be to show that (5) deciding and actingin accordance with the common good not only involves obedience to the rulewhich is for the common good but also consists in determining what that ruleis. This is a crucial step for theorists of democracy. This premise asserts anintrinsic connection between the common good and democratic participation. Itdoes not merely assert that democratic participation is a reliable way of securinglaws that accord with the common good. That would not be strong enough forthe argument to go through. The notion of the common good is not definableindependently of the idea of democratic deliberation. The reason for this is thefollowing. The common good is not understood as some function of interestsand convictions which are given prior to democratic decision making. Insteadsuch decision making has a transformative effect on those interests. Deliberationshapes our conception of the common good and insofar as we wish to decideand act in harmony with the common good this deliberation also transforms ourpersonal interests and convictions themselves (J. Cohen 1989, p. 29). Hence,



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Christiano CollectiveDecisionMaking 163the common good is intrinsically connected to the outcome of democratic delib-eration.This is where the idea of the epistemic conception of democracy comes in.The idea is that (6) participating in a democracy consists in deliberating aboutand voting for certain conceptions of the common good and that this will realizeeach person's interest in promoting the common good. Citizens participate indemocratic processes ideally by advancing opposing conceptions of the commongood and trying to secure reasoned agreement on these conceptions. Whendeliberation ends, citizens vote on the basis of what they conceive to be the correctconception of the common good. Finally, the position that garners the mostsupport in the process is thought to be that position for which there is the mostevidence that it is the common good. It has the force of the better argument onits side. This will be true especially if we assume roughly equal judgmentalcompetence among the citizens and they have a more than fifty/fifty chance ofbeing right about the common good. In such a circumstance, majority rule willbe the best rule for producing outcomes which are the common good (J. Cohen1986b; Coleman and Ferejohn 1986; Manin 1987; Rousseau 1967, bk. 4).11 Ofcourse other rules and institutions may, under different circumstances, be morelikely to produce alternatives which are in accordance with the common good.This provides the solution to the problem of incompatibility which was discussedin the first part since the free person will affirm the results of the decision makingeven if she voted against it.

Hence, participation in democratic processes is compatible with freedomwith regard to the common activities we engage in. Also, it appears that democraticparticipation is a necessary condition of freedom. But there is still a problemwith premise 5. The argument for it does not establish a sufficiently strong versionof the claim. It is one thing to argue that deliberation plays a crucial role inimproving the understanding that individuals have of the common good. It isanother thing to argue that the common good is to be understood only as theoutcome of deliberation. The stronger claim does not follow from the argumentfor premise 5, while the weaker claim does. Deliberation will advance the commongood, but this is because it is a good means to advancing it; it does not defineit. This is important since positive liberty theorists wish to avoid the claim thatdeliberation and democratic participation is a good in and of itself and a necessarypart of the good life."2 But if democratic deliberation cannot be thought of asmore than a means to advancing the common good it cannot be seen as anecessary condition for being a free person even if the claim that a free personmust advance the common good is true.It is still the case that a person or group of persons might prefer to pursuemore fervently their own personal good rather than deliberate over conceptionsof the common good. As long as it is thought that there are two different contextsfor self-development, as all these theorists think, it is possible for there to be atrade-off between the freedom that is had in participation and the freedom thatcan be experienced in the pursuit of one's own personal projects. If so, then itwill still not be true that participation is a necessary condition of freedom overall.

11. Such arguments were originally expressed by Aristotle (1988, bk. 4).12. Civic republicans, whose theories I do not discuss here, do advance such a position(see, e.g., Arendt 1963; Sunstein 1985).



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164 Ethics October1990Another premise may help secure the conclusion that democratic participationis not only free action but a necessary condition for any freedom. I shall call thisthe primacy principle. This principle states that the primary influences on in-dividuals' lives are the social and political institutions that can be produced bycollective decision making. Of course the meaning of "primary" is unclear. Itmight mean: (1) the only influences on our lives, at least when considered cu-mulatively, are the social and political institutions we live under; or (2) theseinstitutions are more significant influences than all the other influences puttogether; or (3) these influences are the most significant of all.Version 1 seems to be clearly false, and version 3 seems clearly too weak tosupport the argument that participation is necessary for freedom overall. Onlyversion 2 has a chance of being both plausible and strong enough to supportthe argument.

The Trade-offArgumentAgainAs stated above, one difficulty is that the requirements of participation anddeliberation may reduce the amount of time and energy one may wish to contributeto the pursuit of personal goals-all of this not because participation is a goodin itself but rather because it is a condition for that freedom which is peculiarlypolitical. The loss of some freedom to pursue personal goods is not a loss tofreedom overall only if the primacy principle is sufficiently strong to justify theclaim that participation is necessary for freedom overall. But it is not clear thatthis principle can sustain that weight. Let us distinguish between the primacyprinciple and some other principles that are similar.First, the primacy principle is not the same as the first premise of the generalargument. The first premise says that other free and equal people are necessaryfor one's self-development. But this is a much weaker claim than the idea thatthe social and political institutions that one lives under are the principal influenceson one's life. The first principle has a far wider scope, including all social rela-tionships. The primacy principle may be thought to be the claim that the socialworld that one lives in is the most important determinant of one's life. But whilethe latter claim is surely true it is not the same as the primacy principle. Thesocial world one lives in is affected by many more things than social and politicalinstitutions, especially if one espouses a principle of pluralism. A member of apluralistic society will be a member of voluntary and involuntary groups includinguniversities, families, religious groups, and so on. Some aspects of these groupswill be shaped by the basic social and political institutions, but many will not.And they will have a very serious formative effect on their members. They willalso have a large effect on nonmembers. Furthermore, the effects that social andpolitical institutions have on many of the prominent elements of smaller groupsas well as other social phenomena are frequently diffuse and unintended, whileeach person's contribution to those outcomes is likely to be very small for anysufficiently large society. Hence, it is simply not clear that a person must participatein choosing those institutions in order to be free given the ample opportunitiesfor pursuing self-development in less collective realms. Free persons may wellbe content to pursue their self-development through the alternatives availableunder the system of laws which they recognize as being for the common goodwhile not actually participating in determining those laws. Hence, another versionof the trade-off problem seems to threaten this view.



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Christiano CollectiveDecision Making 165Incompatibility nd theProblemof ConsensusThe resolution of what I called the incompatibility problem in the first partdepended on an epistemic conception of democracy. But there is a problem inthat there must be sufficient consensus in a society for an individual to be ableto affirm the choice of the majority as his own even when he originally voteddifferently. The epistemic conception of voting is meant to provide a link betweena dissenting person's judgment and that of the majority by means of the claimthat the majority vote will provide the best evidence for judgments about thecommon good when there is disagreement. In this way the dissenter mayjustifiablythink that the majority judgment is his own insofar as the dissenter wishes toaffirm the most reasonable judgment about the common good. But the epistemicconception requires two premises which may be false. The first is that individualshave equal judgmental competence not only overall but on each issue, and thesecond is that they have a better than fifty/fifty chance of being right on theissues. But the first is unlikely to be the case. It may well be the case that somecitizens have more competence on some issues and other citizens will have moreon others while overall they have equal competence. In such cases, individualsmay be quite justified in thinking that sometimes the choice of the majority waswrong and hence not be able to affirm the choice of the majority. But even ifthere is equal judgmental competence, there is a difficulty with the second claimthat everyone has a better than fifty/fiftychance of being right. This claim requiresthat the issue space is relatively simple. There cannot be a great number ofproposed alternatives on each issue. The more alternatives there are, the lessthe odds are that individuals will make the right choice and hence the less reasonthere is for affirming the choice of the majority, if there is one. Perhaps the issuespace will be simplified by deliberation in some cases, but this is a claim that maysimply not be true in many circumstances. Hence it appears that this view dependstoo much on a notion of consensus to defeat the incompatibility problem.Democracyas the Conditionof PoliticalJustificationJoshua Cohen has recently proposed an account of a democratic association (J.Cohen 1988, 1989; Barber 1983).13 His account is as follows: "Outcomes aredemocratically legitimate iff they could be the outcome of a free and reasonedagreement among equals" (J. Cohen 1989, p. 22). Individuals are free in thesense that they are bound only by the results and preconditions of such a procedureand the participants can take their deliberation as sufficient grounds for complyingwith the result of the deliberation. Their arguments are reasoned in the sensethat only the force of the better argument is exercised and that the decisions arethe outcome of actual deliberation among individuals who have different pref-erences and ideals except that they want to reach agreement. They are formallyand substantively equal, that is, they have an equal say at all levels of decisionmaking and the power and resources are distributed in a way that does not shapetheir chances to contribute. Finally, consensus is the fundamental aim of idealdeliberation. And when consensus cannot be had, the citizens have recourse tomajoritarian procedures.

13. There are some affinities between this view and the view presented in the previoussection. Cohen's actual view is the one I will now present, though I elaborated some ofthe previous theory with the help of his earlier papers.



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166 Ethics October1990These four conditions specify what an ideal deliberative procedure is. Thisprocedure is an ideal for citizens in a pluralistic association where conceptionsof the good are diverse and none are mandatory. These citizens wish to reachreasoned agreement on the terms of their political association. And such reasonedagreement among free and equal citizens as well as the conditions under whichit is possible are the only basis of legitimacy. It is intrinsically valuable not asembodying a particular conception of the good life or some sectarian ideal. Cohendescribes the ideal deliberative procedure as the context in which political jus-tification ought to take place. The notion of an ideal deliberative procedure isto provide a model for democratic institutions to mirror or approximate as muchas possible. But in this way it is also to be distinguished from Rawls's notion ofan ideal legislative procedure. Rawls's notion is instrumentalist in that the ideallegislative procedure is evaluated in terms of whether it produces just legislationwhere justice is externally specified by his theory.Though Cohen's ideal procedure embodies a kind of pure procedural justice,he distinguishes his view of the ideal deliberative procedure from an initialposition in social contract theory. This is because the ideal deliberative procedureis a model for actual social institutions and not merely the basis upon which theyare justified. The question is, Why are social institutions justified in this way?The basis for developing such a principle is to account for a variety of commonintuitive beliefs associated with the idea of a democratic association. First, it helpsaccount for the common belief that political debate should be concerned with

considerations of the common good and not merely a process of bargaining. Italso accounts for the roles that the ideas of the common good and autonomy ofthe citizens play in a democratic society (J. Cohen 1989, p. 19). The answer tothis lies in a conception of persons and liberty which is distinct from the Rawlsianone. 14SomeObjectionso theOverallViewAn obvious objection to such a view of democracy is its unrealism, most particularly,its commitment to consensus, the view that only the force of the better argumentshould hold sway,and the idea that citizens willbe concerned to spend a considerableamount of time deliberating only in terms of the common good. These along

14. It may be useful to explore this difference. If we compare the ideal deliberativeprocedure and the original position, which play similar roles in some ways, we can see thedifference in conceptions of the person which underlie these closely connected views. WithRawls the use of the original position as a fundamental justificatory device embodies aKantian conception of the person as being independent of and prior to their natural andsocial positions and conceptions of the good (at least from the point of view of a politicalconception of justice). And this is expressed by means of the insulation of the originalposition from the influence of these factors. On Cohen's view, deliberation takes placegiven a set of preferences and convictions on the part of the participants. Participants willadvance their own good as well as take into account the good of others. The freedom andequality of these persons is expressed by the strong constraints placed on the conditionsof deliberation. Persons are not entirely identified with their preferences since it is expectedthat preferences will change as the result of deliberation. Nevertheless, the participantscome to deliberation with a conception of the good and with ideas about the commongood which may change but need not. Indeed, it is only because they bring their preferencesand convictions with them that democratic deliberation is necessary. This more concreteconception of the person is also what explains the possibility of lack of consensus. For



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Christiano CollectiveDecision Making 167with the condition that the only terms of association that citizens will live by arethose which are the condition or the result of such deliberation. The responseto this will be that though the ideal deliberative procedure cannot be easilyinstantiated it can be approximated sufficiently closely for the ideal to providea model for democratic institutions.Elster, though in general sympathetic to such views, has presented someinteresting criticisms of them (Elster 1986a). Among his criticisms is that such asystem will demand an unusually high degree of participation from the citizens.There are two different ways in which this criticism can go. Elster claims that itis unrealistic to assume that all will participate equally extensively, and hence asystem which required such extensive participation might actually favor individualswho are especially inclined to activism. This inclination toward activism may beassociated with other traits of individuals in the population such that the resultof deliberation will be skewed in favor of the opinions and, possibly, interests ofcertain parts of the population. Hence the deliberation will be affected by variousmorally arbitrary facts.Along somewhat different lines, it is hard to see how the very strong emphasison participation can be compatible with the pluralism that Cohen espouses. Suchpluralism is hard to reconcile with the commitment to such active citizenshipbecause it entails that many preferences regarding how one should live are goingto be incompatible with this conception of democratic citizenship. A pluralisticapproach to politics would seem to be more compatible with a somewhat lessdemanding view of citizenship such as the one Rawls proposes.Another pair of difficulties which Elster brings up is that there may beirresolvable differences of opinion over the common good given which evenunlimited deliberation could not produce consensus and that there are timeconstraints on discussions (Elster 1986a, p. 115). Cohen would respond that, inthe absence of unanimity, majority rule should be used to make decisions. Butif the point of political association is to achieve consensus through reasoneddebate among equals, what principle will justify cutting off debate and leavingthe decision to the force of the greater number? Efficiency or some other measureof the quality of the decision might be the answer as it is in ordinary deliberation,but Cohen does not include this consideration in his ideal, and we are told thatmembers are "bound only by the results of deliberation and by the preconditionsfor that deliberation" (J. Cohen 1989, p. 22). Perhaps it can be argued that toomuch deliberation on one issue may undermine deliberation on other issues andthat we must foreswear unanimity on any issue in order to increase or improvedeliberation overall. But this itself is a highly speculative claim both factuallyand conceptually, for the idea of increasing or improving deliberation wouldneed a good deal of work in clarifying.

Elster argues that in certain circumstances deliberation may go on for toolong in that the quality of the decisions may deteriorate. This criticism does notmake any sense on Cohen's model if the end point of deliberation is consensussince there is no external standard by means of which to evaluate the decisions.

Rawls there is consensus and that fact expresses the basic sameness of persons. Hence thenotion of the common good for Rawls is not influenced by the particular interests ofpersons, while for Cohen those interests are what the participants bring to deliberationand hence influence the outcome.



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168 Ethics October 1990The context of deliberation is the condition of political justification. But thecriticism does make sense for decisions which are less than consensual.A ContractualistAccount of the Outcomesof DemocraticGovernmentNelson's view is that the institutions of a democratic society are not themselvesthe circumstances in which the informed and unforced agreement will be reached.His claim is that the situation of citizens in a democracy is sufficiently like thatof parties trying to reach agreement on the terms of their association that it islikely that the outcome of democratic processes will be legislation and policywhich is morally acceptable from a contractualist point of view. More formally,he states that:

1. Morality is a system of overriding rules of behavior on which therecan be a consensus and which can be publicly avowed by free and independentpersons and will be stable over time. [Nelson 1980, p. 126]2. A good system of government is a system that leads people toformulate conceptions of fundamental rules of behavior which can be theobject of a possible consensus and to adopt laws and policies compatiblewith such rules. [Nelson 1980, p. 118]3. A system of representative government with an educated citizenrywhich promotes serious open discussion of governmental policy and leg-islation should lead people to formulate principles to justify legislationwhich can be the object of a possible consensus and to adopt laws andpolicies compatible with such rules. [Nelson 1980, p. 118]It should be clear that Nelson does not think that the democratic process per seis intrinsically important. Unlike Cohen, his account is instrumentalist in that heevaluates a system of government in terms of the outcomes of legislation. Nelsonadheres to a contractualist view of morality and to an analytical claim about howliberal democratic societies are likely to work. Furthermore, unlike positive libertytheorists, his account of the moral motive is based on a set of psychologicalclaims. First, members of a group will be unlikely honestly to choose rules whichare especially advantageous to themselves since this is likely to result in instability

and, in a society where there is a fair amount of social mobility, is likely to berisky (Nelson 1980, p. 106). Second, "it will hardly satisfy us to know that wecan justify our conduct to others only because they have come to accept certainprinciples under duress or some psychological constraint" (Nelson 1980, p. 108)since we want to live openly and in good faith with our neighbors.Therefore, he thinks that the process of democratic deliberation, in whichindividuals participate in discussion and decision making, will have two importanteffects on citizens. It will tend to produce "active,self assertive persons concernedwith improving the environment" (Nelson 1980, p. 116), and it will get peopleto think in terms of the common good since discussion on public policy will notproceed in terms of the private interests of each of the citizens. The public debatewill tend to lead them to appreciate the situation of others, and it will requirethem to formulate positions which take (at least in appearance) everyone's concerninto account. Theirjustifications of policy and legislative initiatives will be framedas objects of a possible consensus among individuals.In this way, citizens in a representative democracy will tend to acquire thosemotivations which are identified as the peculiarly moral motives by contractualists.And the principles they advance in public debate will be formed from thesemotives. It is these principles which "satisfy at least a necessary condition for



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Christiano CollectiveDecision Making 169adequate moral principles. And if we assume a populace sufficiently well educatedto understand the consequences of legislative proposals, laws that can pass thetest of public justifiability will be morally justifiable laws" (Nelson 1980, pp.117-18).The view is that the different platforms on which politicians proceed representcompeting bases of possible consensus for the citizens, and therefore presumablyany of the platforms or alternatives which might be chosen are compatible withthe requirements of an adequate morality. There does not have to be any actualconsensus for the whole society, but the fact that there is actual consensus in thegroup that has been persuaded and that the principles are formulated in a wayso as to appeal to all entails that it is a possible consensus for the whole society.ObjectionsBeitz objects to the purely instrumentalist theory that is proposed here. It doesnot take sufficiently into account the dimension of procedural fairness itself andthe demeaning effects of procedural inequality on the participants. The opennessand deliberative aspects are compatible, as they were with Mill, with a system ofplural voting wherein the votes of the most intelligent or qualified count formore than others. This, claims Beitz, would appear to violate a fundamentalinterest that citizens have in democracies: the interest in a public recognition oftheir equal status as citizens (Beitz 1989, p. 109; see also J. Cohen 1989, p. 19).Perhaps Nelson might respond that if all citizens have a basic interest in beingpublicly recognized as having equal public status, then, on his account, this mightbe part of what is chosen among the laws in a liberal democracy. Indeed, Nelsonhimself recognizes that some requirement of procedural equality might be partof an overall agreement among citizens concerning the terms of their association.Another difficulty in understanding Nelson's view is that the notion of apossible consensus is ambiguous. We might parse it out in one of the followingways:

Principles P are a possible consensus among a set of free and independentpersons S if and only if it were one of a set PX of mutually exclusiveprinciples which would be agreed on in circumstances where there are notransaction costs and,1. P1 constitutes a consensus among S given an unlimited domain ofpreferences (universal possibility). S would agree on one among this set ofprinciples no matter what preferences the members have, as long as theyare free and independent and recognize each other as such; or2. P2 constitutes a consensus which S given the particular preferencesof the members would agree on (actual psychological possibility); or3. P3 constitutes a consensus which S would reach were it to have aparticular set of preferences which it may not now have (logically possibleconsensus); or4. P4 constitutes a consensus which, given all that a particular memberknows about S, would be reached (epistemic possibility).

For Nelson's conception of morality in premise 1 to be a plausible one, P2 is themost likely interpretation of the idea of a possible consensus. It is a genuinecontractualist notion, and it does not require actual agreement (since actualagreement will introduce transaction costs), nor does it require that there be aunique set of principles. It may be that the interests and morals of the groupunderdetermine the principles (hence the requirement that there only be a set



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170 Ethics October1990of principles). It is also considerably weaker than the requirement for PI, but itis probably sufficient for the task.Principles P2, P3, and P4 are clearly not equivalent sets of principles, andindeed many principles which passed the tests of P3 or P4 would be experiencedas oppressive by the members of the group defined by P2 (i.e., with preferencesconstant). These principles would therefore not satisfy the (specifically moral)need that Nelson attributes to people to be able to justify their actions to others.Hence, P3 and P4 are not candidates for the best interpretation of the idea ofa possible consensus.Yet Nelson's argument seems to rely on the claim that either P3 or P4 aresufficient for an adequate morality in the premise 2 that I described above aboutgood government. On his view it is sufficient that a position be formulated onthe basis of some conception of a possible consensus for it to be the basis of anadequate morality.And if P3 or P4 were the right interpretation, Nelson's argumentmight actually go through since politicians and citizens do for the most partattempt to cast their positions as being in the common interest. The trouble hereis that P3 does not identify a notion of possible consensus which will support aplausible version of premise 1. Furthermore this will remain a problem even ifwe impose the further condition on preferences and convictions in P3, that theyall pass a test of being evaluable on the basis of a common set of standards.'5Even if we do suppose that there are commonly held standards by which toevaluate political decisions and institutions, the diversity of convictions that willlive up to these standards is likely to be so great that for any conviction therewillbe a group of people in the societywho will feel oppressed by the implementationof those convictions into law.But if P2 is the right interpretation, then Nelson's view, like positive libertyviews, seems to rely excessively on the claim that there is an underlying consensus.And it lacks any basis for dealing with the inevitable situation in which there isno underlying consensus. This is a problem because it is at most wishful thinkingthat there might be consensus even without transaction costs in modern societies.We ought to question the motivational claims that Nelson makes as well.Whether the fear of instability or the riskiness of assigning advantages to oursocial situation in a socially mobile society will actually dissuade individuals fromadvancing proposals which are to the advantage of their own social class or groupis not clear. First of all, the choices people make will depend on their assessmentof the risk to themselves, and they will also vary with different levels of aversionto risk. Hence, the extent to which individuals will have an interest in discoveringa possible consensus will depend on these factors. And given Nelson's accountof motives, it is not clear that politicians and citizens would be as interested infinding consensus as he claims. In most cases, politicians are primarily concernedwith finding a sufficient amount of support for their candidacy and do so byappealing to the interests or convictions of a sufficiently large group of peopleregardless of the potential for unanimity in the society at large.Another question we might askof Nelson's view is, Suppose we had a consensuson the fundamental charter of a public system of justice and we were in a well-ordered society, would this mean that democracy was no longer useful? How

15. See Nagel (1987) for an account of the reasonableness of a conviction which isbased on the idea that the conviction can be publicly evaluated (but not necessarily endorsed)on the basis of a common set of standards.



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Christiano CollectiveDecision Making 171would we regulate all those aspects of our lives in common which are left openby the fundamental charter? Perhaps democracy would have to be present so asto guarantee the consistent application of these principles to every new subjectof controversy. Nevertheless it appears that moral principles underdeterminethe possible solutions to problems concerning the lives we live in common. Forexample, if we have a circumstance where we must choose between pollutioncontrol and defense because of limited resources, it is not clear that morality, onNelson's account, is going to give us a clear answer as to what to do here. UnlessNelson thinks that the citizens would agree to a utilitarian position here or someother moral principle which gives answers to all possible questions, it appearsthat a democratic method of making the decision would have no special significance.But these are ideal cases in which democratic decision making might come in.It provides each person with an equal say in determining what is to be donewhen their interests in the common features of the society conflict.EGALITARIAN THEORIESEgalitarian theories attempt to derive a conception of democracy directly froma principle of equality. I discuss three varieties of egalitarian theory. They startwith the observation that there are fundamental conflicts of interests and convictionsin a society. Some form of democracy is then seen as a kind of fair orjust processfor making decisions despite these differences. In contrast to contractualists,egalitarians emphasize the problem of there not being consensus on many issuesand that arguments on the merits fail. Egalitarians differ over what should bedecided on as well as over what the basic principle of equality is.Equal Considerationof InterestsA common egalitarian theory of democracy requires determining the laws andpolicies of a society on the basis of some notion of equal consideration of everyone'sinterests (Dahl 1979; Jones 1983). It is not clear what this principle is supposedto mean to the theorists who use it. It can be interpreted as a kind of utilitariantheory where the interests of each are to count for one and only one. Or it couldbe a kind of equality of welfare theory. In either case, it seems to me that theconnection between the satisfaction of the principle of equal consideration ofinterests and political equality would be purely contingent (Mansbridge 1980).No intrinsic defense of democracy would be possible here. The reason for thisis that votes will not always be cast on the basis of interests or desires. A votemay be cast on one of a variety of bases (moral or aesthetic judgments), orindividuals may choose not to vote at all, in which case the outcome of the votewill not necessarily reflect an aggregation of interests. The outcome of a votemay, of course, produce the greatest amount of satisfaction or even an equaldistribution of welfare, but this will be a contingent matter.Equality s a CompromiseA very different egalitarian argument is presented by Peter Singer (1974). Hestarts with the view that among individuals there are ineliminable differences ofopinion concerning how society as a whole ought to be organized. These differencesare ineliminable insofar as the individuals are unable, by arguments on the merits,to get others to agree on what is the proper way to organize society. The questionis, When individuals differ concerning how to arrange things and some agreementmust be reached on these arrangements, how are we to reach agreement? There



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172 Ethics October1990are two kinds of disagreement at issue here. One concerns who is to makedecisions and the other concerns what those decisions are supposed to be. Sincethe issue of what decisions are to be made varies with each individual and noone can adjudicate between these different views the idea is that some higherlevel procedure which takes all these different views into account is supposed toresolve the dispute. Singer argues that, when individuals disagree over competingconceptions of fairness and they must reach some agreement, the only way toresolve such issues is to compromise. He then claims that there can be somestandard of fairness concerning the nature of the compromise even if there isno accepted standard of what he calls "absolute fairness" (Singer 1974, p. 32).Singer uses an analogy with irresolvable factual disagreement to illustratehis point. For example, if two people make competing claims to some set ofgoods and no agreement as to how those goods should be divided up can bereached, there may still be a way to resolve the dispute by means of a faircompromise. Let us suppose that each agrees that the goods should be distributedon the basis of contribution. Each individual may still claim a larger share of thegoods because they contributed more to their production. An arbitrator who wasunable to resolve the dispute by determining the merits of either position mightdivide the goods up equally as a kind of compromise. Or if the good is indivisible,he might flip a coin to determine who is to get the good (Singer 1974, p. 33).Singer thinks that we can apply this kind of compromise procedure witheven more fundamental kinds of disagreements, for example, over issues concerningthe very principles of distribution of power or wealth. The way this is to beunderstood is that if everyone disagrees as to how the society is to be set

christiano - freedom, consensus, and equality in collective decision making

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