christopher kant or cant_the myth of the democratic peace

8/14/2019 Christopher Kant or Cant_The Myth of the Democratic Peace

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Kant or Cant ChristopherayneThe Myth of the DemocraticPeace

lThe theory of the"DemocraticPeace" raises important heoretical ssues:' the contention hatdemocraticstates behave differentlyoward each other than toward non-democracies cuts to the heart of the international elationstheory debateabout the relativesalience of second-image domesticpolitics)and ofthird-image (systemicstructure) xplanationsof international oliticaloutcomes.Democraticpeace theoryhas also come to have a real-world mportance swell: Policymakerswho have embraceddemocratic eace theory ee a cruciallink between America's securityand the spread of democracy,which isviewed as theantidotethatwillpreventfuturewars. Indeed some democraticpeace theorists, otablyBruce Russett,believe that n an internationalystemcomprising criticalmass of democratic tates, "It may be possible in partto supersede the realist'principles anarchy, he security ilemmaof states)thathave dominated practiceto the exclusion of 'liberal' or 'idealist' onessince at least the seventeenth entury.2 Because of ts theoretical laims and

Christopherayne fLosAngeless an unaffiliatedcholar. e ispresentlyconsultanto the overnmentcontracts ractice roupof the aw firm fHill, Wynne,Troop ndMeisinger,which epresents ajorfirmsn thedefensendustry.

I am extremely rateful o the following olleagues who reviewed various drafts f this paperand offered elpfulcriticisms: ohnArquilla,Ted Galen Carpenter,KerryAndrewChase, JeffryFrieden, JohnMearsheimer,Benjamin C. Schwarz, Jack Snyder,Stephen Walt, and KennethWaltz. I also thank Stephen Van Evera and David Spiro forprovidingme copies of, andpermissionto quote from, heirunpublishedworks.

1. I use theterm democraticpeace theory" ecause it s a convenient horthand erm.However,strictly peaking, the claim that democracies do not fightdemocracies is a proposition,orhypothesis,ratherthan a theory.Democraticpeace "theory"proposes a causal relationshipbetween an independent variable (democraticpolitical structures t the unit level) and thedependentvariable the assertedabsence of war betweendemocratic tates). However, it s nota true theory ecause the causal relationship etweenthe ndependentand dependentvariablesis neitherproven nor,as I demonstrate n this article, dequately explained. See StephenVanEvera, "Hypotheses, Laws and Theories: A User's Guide," unpub. memo, Department ofPoliticalScience,MIT.2. BruceRussett,Grasping heDemocratic eace: Principlesor Post-ColdWarWorldPrinceton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993), chap. 7; and Russett,"Can A DemocraticPeace Be Built?"Internationalnteractions,ol. 18, No. 3 (Spring1993), pp. 277-282.Internationalecurity, ol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5-49C)1994 by the Presidentand Fellows ofHarvard College and the Massachusetts nstitute fTechnology.

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Internationalecurity9:2 | 6

policy mplications, hedemocraticpeace theorymerits areful xamination.3In this article, focus primarily n a critiqueofthe persuasiveness ofdem-ocraticpeace theory'scausal logic and ask whetherdemocraticpeace theoryorrealism s a betterpredictor f nternational utcomes.I thenbrieflyssessthe robustness of democraticpeace theory'sempiricalevidence in lightofmy conclusions about the strength f ts explanatory ower.I begin by reviewingthe explanationsof the DemocraticPeace advancedby democraticpeace theorists.There are two strandsto the theory's causallogic.One attributesheabsence ofwar betweendemocraciesto institutionalconstraints: he restraining ffects f public opinion, or of the checks andbalances embedded in a democratic tate's domesticpoliticalstructure. heother posits that t is democraticnormsand culture-a shared commitmentto the peaceful adjudication of political disputes-that accounts for theabsence of war between democraticstates. As I demonstrate,the institu-tional-constraintsrgumentfails to providea compellingexplanationforthe

absence of war between democracies. Thus, democraticpeace theory'sex-planatorypower rests on the persuasiveness of the contention hat demo-craticnormsand cultureexplainwhy,althoughdemocratic tatesfightwithnon-democracies, hey do not go to war witheach other.This article'scenterpiece s a testof the competingexplanationsof inter-nationaloutcomes offered y democraticpeace theory nd by realism.Thistest s based on case studies offour "near misses" -crises where two dem-ocratic tates almostwent to war witheach other.These fourcases are well-documented nstances ofdemocraticgreatpowers going to thebrinkofwarwithout going over it. As such, they presentan opportunity o determinewhich of the competinghypotheses advanced respectivelyby democraticpeace theory nd realism best account for nternational oliticaloutcomes.43. In this article, build upon and expand the criticisms f democraticpeace theoryfound inJohnJ.Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: nstabilityn EuropeAfter he Cold War," nternationalSecurity, ol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Americaas Modelfor heWorld?A ForeignPolicy Perspective,"PS (December 1991), pp. 667-670.4. Other cases of crisesbetween democraticgreatpowers that mightbe studiedincludeAnglo-Frenchrelationsduring the Liberalentente ordiale f 1832-48,Franco-Italian elationsduring thelate 1880s and early 1890s and, ifWilhelmineGermany s classified s a democracy, he Moroccancrises of 1905-06 and 1911 and the Samoan crisesof 1889and 1899. These cases would supportmy conclusions. For example, from1832 to 1848, the Foxite egacy disposed England's Whigsto feel a strongcommitment o France based on a shared liberal deology. Yet Anglo-Frenchrelations duringthis period were marked by intense geopoliticalrivalry ver Belgium, Spain,and the Near East, and the threat f war was always a factorn the calculationsof policymakersin both London and Paris. Foreign MinisterLord PalmerstonprofoundlydistrustedFrenchambitions and constantly urged that England maintain sufficient aval power to defend its



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Moreover,they presentan easy case fordemocratic eace theory nd a hardcase for realism.The selected cases favordemocraticpeace theorybecause,in each, the pacifying ffect f democraticnorms and culturewas bolsteredby complementary actors e.g., economic interdependence, or special tieslinking he disputants). I deduce, fromboth the democraticnorms and cul-tureargumentand fromrealism, sets of indicators-testablepropositions-thatshould be present f a crisis's outcome is explained byeitherofthe twotheories.Using a process-tracingpproach, I examine each crisis n detail.I conclude thatrealism s superior o democratic eace theory s a predictorof nternational utcomes. Indeed, democraticpeace theory ppears to haveextremely ittleexplanatorypower in the cases studied. Doubts about thevalidityof its causal logic suggest that the empirical vidence purporting osupportdemocraticpeace theory hould also be revisited.Democratic peacetheorists ontend that the theory s validated by a large numberof cases.However, a powerful rgument an be made that theuniverse ofcases fromwhichit can be tested s actually quite small. This is a crucial ssue, becauseif the theory'sempiricalsupport is based on a small-N universe,this mag-nifiesthe importanceofpossible exceptions to the rule thatdemocracies donotfight ach other for xample,WorldWarI, the Warbetween the States,the War of 1812). I conclude by discussing democraticpeace theory'strou-blesome implicationsforpost-Cold War Americanforeign olicy.TheCase for Democraticeace: ts Claims nd its LogicDemocratic peace theory does not contend that democratic states are lesswar-prone than non-democracies;they are not. The theorydoes, however,make two important laims,first, hat democraciesnever (or rarely; here sinterests gainst a Frenchchallenge. See KennethBourne,Palmerston: heEarlyYears, 784-1841(New York:Macmillan, 1982), p. 613. Also see Roger Bullen,Palmerston, uizot nd theCollapseof heEntente ordiale London: Athlone Press, 1974); and Sir CharlesWebster,TheForeign olicyof Palmerston, ol. 1: 1830-1841, Britain, he LiberalMovement nd The EasternQuestionLondon:G. Bell & Sons, 1951). Italychallenged France forMediterranean scendancy althoughthe twonations were bound by liberalism,democracy, nd a commonculture.The two statesengagedin a trade war and came close to a real war. France apparentlywas dissuaded from ttackingItaly in 1888 when the BritishChannel Fleet was sent to the Italian naval base of La Spezia.Italywas preventedfrom ttacking rance by tsmilitary nd economic weakness. See C.J. Loweand F. Marzari, talianForeign olicy, 870-1940 London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, chap.4; C.J. Lowe, The Reluctantmperialists:ritish oreign olicy1879-1902 (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1974), Vol. I, pp. 147-150; JohnA.C. Conybeare, TradeWars:The Theorynd Practiceof nternationalommercial ivalryNew York:Columbia University ress, 1987), pp. 183-188.



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a good deal of variation about this) go to war with other democracies.5AsJackS. Levy observes, the "absence ofwar between democraciescomes asclose as anythingwe have to an empirical aw in international elations.6Second, when democracies come into conflictwith one another, theyonlyrarely hreaten o use force,because it s "illegitimate" o do so.7 Democraticpeace theory xplicitly olds that tis theverynature of democraticpoliticalsystems thataccounts forthe factthat democraciesdo not fight r threatenotherdemocracies.

THE CAUSAL LOGICDemocraticpeace theorymust explain an anomaly: democracies are no lesswar-pronethan non-democratic tates. Yet,while theywill readily threatenand fightnon-democracies, hey do not threaten r fight therdemocracies.The keychallenge for he theory, hen, s to dentify he special characteristicsof democratic tates that restrain hem fromusing coercive threats gainst,or actuallygoing to war with,other democracies. The theory dvances twoalternativeexplanations: (1) institutionalconstraints;and (2) democraticnorms and cultures.8There are two major variants of the institutional onstraints rgument.Michael Doyle, building on Immanuel Kant, explains thatdemocraticgov-ernments are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their5. Melvin Small and J. David Singer first bserved the patternof democracies not fightingdemocraciesin a 1976 article: Small and Singer,"The War-pronenessof DemocraticRegimes,1816-1865," Jerusalem ournal f nternational elations, ol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1976),pp. 50-69.Theirfindinghas been the subject of extensive furthermpirical estingwhich has produced aconsensus around thepropositions tated n the text.See StuartA. Bremer, Dangerous Dyads:Conditions Affecting he Likelihood of InterstateWar,1816-1865," Journal fConflict esolution,Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 309-341; Steve Chan, "Mirror,Mirror n the Wall . . . Are theFreerCountries More Pacific?"Journal fConflict esolution, ol. 28, No. 4 (December 1984), pp.617-648; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Type and International onflict,"JournalfConflict esolution, ol. 33, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3-35; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism ndInternationalViolence," Journal fConflict esolution, ol. 27, No. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27-71;ErichWeede, "Democracy and War Involvement,"Journal fConflict esolution, ol. 28, No. 4(December 1984), pp. 649-664.6. Jack . Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," n Robert . Rotberg nd TheodoreK. Rabb, eds.,The Origin nd PreventionfMajorWars Cambridge:Cambridge University ress, 1989),p. 88.7. Russett, Grasping heDemocraticeace, p. 33; Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies andForeignAffairs," art , Philosophynd PublicAffairs, ol. 12,No. 3 (Summer 1983), p. 213.8. This is the terminology mployed by Russett, Grasping heDemocratic eace; also see BruceRussett and Zeev Maoz, "Normative and StructuralCauses of Democratic Peace," AmericanPolitical cienceReview,Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 624-638. Russett points out (pp.40-42) that, although analytically istinct, hese two explanationsare intertwined.



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TheMythof theDemocratic eace 9

citizens.9Citizens pay the price forwar in blood and treasure; fthe price ofconflict s high, democraticgovernmentsmay fallvictim o electoralretribu-tion. Moreover, in democratic states, foreignpolicy decisions carrying heriskof war are debated openly and not made behind closed doors, whichmeans that boththe public and policymakers re sensitized to costs offight-ing. A second version of the institutional onstraints rgumentfocuses on"checks and balances"; itlooks at threespecific eatures f a state's domesticpolitical structure: xecutive selection,politicalcompetition, nd the plural-ism of the foreignpolicy decisionmaking process.10States with executivesanswerable to a selection body, with institutionalized oliticalcompetition,and with decisionmaking responsibility pread among multiple nstitutionsor individuals, should be more highlyconstrainedand hence less likely togo to war.The democraticnorms explanationholds that "the culture, erceptions,ndpractices hat permitcompromise and the peaceful resolution of conflictswithoutthe threatofviolence within ountriesome to apply across nationalboundaries toward other democratic ountries.""1 emocratic statesassumeboth thatotherdemocracies also subscribe to pacificmethods of regulatingpoliticalcompetition nd resolvingdisputes, and thatotherswillapply thesenormsin their externalrelationswith fellow democracies. In otherwords,democratic states develop positive perceptionsof other democracies. Con-sequently,Doyle says,democracies,"whichreston consent,presume foreignrepublics to be also consensual, just and therefore eservingof accommo-dation."'12 elationsbetween democratic tatesare based on mutual respect9. Doyle, "Kant,Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs," p. 205-235. See also Doyle, "Liberalismand World Politics,"American olitical cienceReview,Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Russett,Grasping heDemocratic eace, pp. 38-40.10. T. CliftonMorgan and Sally H. Campbell, "Domestic Structure, ecisional Constraints ndWar: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?"Journal fConflictesolution, ol. 35,No. 2 (June1991),pp. 187-211; and T. CliftonMorgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Take Two Democracies andCall Me in the Morning: A Prescriptionfor Peace?" Internationalnteractions,ol. 17, No. 4(Summer 1992), pp. 305-420.11. Russett, Grasping heDemocratic eace, p. 31 (second emphasis added).12. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,"p. 230. It is also argued that thepredisposition of democratic states to regard otherdemocracies favorably s reinforced y thefactthat liberal democratic states are linked by mutuallybeneficial ties of economic interde-pendence. Democracies thushave strong ncentives o act towardseach other n a mannerthatenhances cooperation and to refrainfrom acting in a manner that threatens their stake inmutuallybeneficial ooperation. bid., pp. 230-232;Rummel, "Libertarianism nd InternationalViolence," pp. 27-28. For the "interdependencepromotespeace" argument ee Richard Rose-crance, The Rise ofthe Trading tate New York: Basic Books, 1986). In fact,however,forgreatpowers economic interdependence, rather hanpromotingpeace, createsseemingly mportant



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rooted in the factthatdemocracies perceive each otheras dovish (thatis,negotiationor the status quo are the onlypossible outcomes in a dispute).This perception, t is argued, is based on a form of learning.Democraticstatesbenefitfrom ooperative relationswithone another and theywant toexpand theirpositive interactions. n turn, this desire predisposes themtobe responsive to the needs of otherdemocratic tates,and ultimatelyeadsto creationof a community f nterests.As democracies move towards com-munity, hey renounce the option to use (or even to threaten o use) forcein theirmutual interactions.13The democraticethos-based on "peaceful competition,persuasion andcompromise"-explains the absence of war and war-like hreats n relationsbetween democratic states.14 onversely,the absence of these norms in re-lations between democracies and non-democracies, t is said, explains theparadox that democracies do not fight ach other even though in generaltheyare as war-prone as non-democracies: When a democracycomes intoconflictwith a nondemocracy, t will not expectthe nondemocratic tate tobe restrained ythosenorms ofmutualrespectbased on democratic ulture].Itmay feelobliged to adapt to theharshernorms of nternational onduct ofthe latter, est it be exploitedor eliminatedby thenondemocratic tate thattakes advantage of the inherentmoderation of democracies."'15 hus it is afundamentalpostulate of democraticpeace theory hatdemocracies behavein a qualitativelydifferentmanner in theirrelationswith each otherthanthey do in theirrelationswithnon-democracies.TheRealist ase: TheSameThings ver ndOverAgainIfhistory s "justone damn thing fter nother," henfor ealists nternationalpolitics is the same damn things over and over again: war, great powersecurity nd economic competitions, he rise and fallof greatpowers, andtheformation nd dissolution of alliances. International oliticalbehavior ischaracterized ycontinuity,egularity,nd repetition ecause states are con-interests hatmust be defended by overseas military ommitmentscommitments hatcarrywith them the risk of war). See ChristopherLayne and Benjamin C. Schwarz, "AmericanHegemony-Without an Enemy,"Foreign olicy,No. 92 (Fall 1993), pp. 5-23.13. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs"; nd Harvey Starr, Democracy andWar: Choice, Learning and SecurityCommunities," Journal f PeaceResearch,Vol. 29, No. 2(1992),pp. 207-213.14. Maoz and Russett, "A StatisticalArtifact?" . 246.15. Russett,Grasping heDemocraticeace,p. 33.



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TheMyth f heDemocraticeaceI 11

strainedby the international ystem's unchanging and probablyunchange-able) structure.The realistparadigm explainswhy this is so.16 nternational olitics s ananarchic, elf-help ealm. "Anarchy,"rather han denotingchaos or rampantdisorder, refers n internationalpolitics to the fact that thereis no centralauthority apable of makingand enforcing ules of behavioron the interna-tional system's units (states). The absence of a rule-making nd enforcingauthoritymeans that each unit in the system s responsibleforensuring tsown survival and also that each is free to define its own interests nd toemploy means of ts own choice n pursuingthem. n this ense, internationalpolitics s fundamentally ompetitive.And it s competitiven a mannerthatdiffers ruciallyfromdomesticpolitics n liberalsocieties,where the loserscan accept an adverse outcome because they ive to fight nother day andcan, therefore, ltimately ope to prevail. n international olitics, tates thatcome out on the short end of political competitionface potentiallymoreextremeoutcomes, rangingfrom onstraints n autonomyto occupation toextinction.It is anarchythat gives international oliticsits distinctive lavor. n ananarchic system,a state's firstgoal is to survive. To attain security, tatesengage in both internal nd externalbalancingforthe purpose ofdeterringaggressors,and of defeating hem should deterrence ail. n a realistworld,cooperation s possible but is hard to sustain in the face of the competitivepressures thatare built ntothe nternational olitical ystem'sstructure. heimperative fsurvival n a threatening nvironment orces tates to focus onstrategiesthat maximize theirpower relative to theirrivals. States havepowerful ncentivesboth to seek the upper hand over theirrivalsmilitarilyand to use theiredge not onlyfor elf-defense ut also to take advantage ofothers. Because military ower is inherently ffensive ather han defensivein nature, states cannot escape the securitydilemma: measures taken by astate as self-defensemay have the unintendedconsequence of threateningothers.This is because a statecan never be certain hatothers' ntentions rebenign; consequently its policies must be shaped in response to others'capabilities. n the international ystem,fearand distrust f otherstates isthe normal state of affairs.16. Classic explicationsof realism are Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory f nternationalolitics Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979) and Hans J.Morgenthau,rev. by KennethW. Thompson,PoliticsAmongNations:The Struggle orPower nd Peace,6th ed. (New York: Knopf,1985).



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Here democraticpeace and realism part companyon a crucial point. Theformerholds thatchanges within states can transform he natureof inter-national politics.Realism takes the view thateven ifstateschange internally,the structureof the internationalpolitical system remains the same. Assystemic tructure s the primarydeterminant f international oliticalout-comes, structural onstraintsmean that similarly laced stateswill act simi-larly,regardless oftheirdomestic political systems. As Kenneth Waltz says:"In self-help ystems, he pressures of competitionweighmoreheavily thanideologicalpreferences r internalpoliticalpressures.17 Changes at the unitlevel do not change the constraints nd incentives mbedded at the systemiclevel. States respond to the logic of the situation n which theyfindthem-selves even thoughthis may result n undesirableoutcomes,from he break-down of cooperation to outrightwar. Statesthat gnorethe imperatives farealistworld runthe riskof perishing. n a realistworld, survival nd securityare always at risk, and democratic states will respond no differently odemocratic ivals than to non-democratic nes.Testing emocratic eace TheoryInstitutional onstraintsdo not explain the democraticpeace. If democraticpublic opinion reallyhad the effect scribed to it, democracies would bepeaceful in their relationswith all states, whether democratic or not. Ifcitizens and policymakersof a democracywere especially sensitive to thehuman and material osts of war, that ensitivityhould be evidentwhenevertheir state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary sdemocratic: he lives lost and money spentwill be the same. Nor is demo-craticpublic opinion, per e, an inhibitor fwar. For example, in 1898 it waspublic opinion that mpelled the reluctantMcKinleyadministrationnto warwithSpain; in 1914war was enthusiasticallymbracedby public opinion inBritainand France. Domestic political structure-"checks and balances"-does not explain the democraticpeace either. "This argument,"as Morganand Schwebach state,"does not say anythingdirectly bout thewar-prone-ness ofdemocracies," because it focuses on an independent variable-deci-sional constraints mbedded in a state's domesticpolitical tructure-that sassociated with, but not exclusive to, democracies.17. Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Reply to My Critics," n Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealismnd ItsCriticsNew York:Columbia University ress, 1986), p. 329.



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TheMythoftheDemocratic eace 13

Because these explanations fall short, the democraticnorms and cultureexplanation must bear the weight of the democraticpeace theory's causallogic. It is therewe must ook to find hat"something n the nternalmakeupofdemocratic tates" that explains thedemocratic eace.18Democratic peace theory not only predictsa specific outcome-no warbetween democracies-but also purports to explain why that outcome willoccur.It is thus suited to being testedby the case study method,a detailedlook at a small number of examples to determine fevents unfoldand actorsact as the theory redicts.The case studymethod also affords he opportunityto test the competingexplanations of nternational oliticaloutcomes offeredby democraticpeace theory nd by realism.To test the robustnessof dem-ocratic eace theory's ausal logic, the focus here s on "nearmisses," specificcases in which democratic states had both opportunity nd reason to fighteach other,but did not.The case studies in this article use the process-tracingmethod (openingup the "black box") to identify he factors owhichdecisionmakers espond,how those factors nfluence decisions, the actual course of events, and thepossible effect f other variables on the outcome.19As Stephen Van Everasays, ifa theoryhas strongexplanatorypower, process-tracingase studiesprovide a robust test because decisionmakers "should speak, write, andotherwisebehave in a manner consistentwiththe theory'spredictions.20Democratic peace theory, fvalid, should account powerfully or the factthat serious crises between democratic states ended in near misses ratherthanin war. Ifdemocraticnormsand cultureexplain the democraticpeace,in a near-warcrisis,certain ndicators fthe democratic eace theory houldbe inevidence: First, ublic opinionshould be strongly acific.Public opinionis importantnot because it is an institutional onstraint, utbecause it is anindirectmeasure of the mutual respectthat democracies are said to have foreach other.Second, policymaking lites should refrain rommaking militarythreats gainst other democracies and should refrain rommaking prepara-tionsto carry ut threats.Democraticpeace theoristswaffle n thispoint by

18. Maoz and Russett,"Normativeand Structural auses," p. 624.19. AlexanderL. George and TimothyJ.McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organiza-tionalDecision Making,"in RobertF. Coulam and RichardA. Smith, ds., Advances n nformationProcessingnOrganizations, ol. 2 (Greenwich,Conn.: JAIPress, 1985),p. 35.20. Stephen Van Evera, "What Are Case Studies? How Should They Be Performed?"unpub.memo, September1993,Departmentof PoliticalScience,MIT, p. 2.



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TheMyth f heDemocraticeace 15

powers for everalreasons. First, nternational elations heory s definedbygreatpowers: theyare the principalcomponents of the nternationalystem,and their ctions-especially theirwars-have a greatermpacton the inter-national system hando those of smallpowers.23Moreover,while democraticpeace theory hould apply to bothgreat nd smallpowers,realistpredictionsabout great power behavior are not always applicable to small powers, be-cause the range ofoptionsavailable to the atter s more constrained.24 risesbetween democraticgreatpowers are a good head-to-headtestbecause dem-ocraticpeace theory nd realismshould bothbe applicable.25The cases selectedshould favordemocratic eace theory ormore thantheobvious reason that none of them led to war. In each crisis, backgroundfactorswere presentthat should have reinforced emocraticpeace theory'spredictions. n the two Anglo-American rises, a common history, ultureand language, and economic interdependence were important onsidera-tions.26n the Fashoda crisis,the factors hat ed to the 1904Anglo-Frenchententewere alreadypresentand bothcountriesbenefited ignificantlyromtheir economic relations.27 he Franco-GermanRuhr crisis tested both theWilsonian prescriptionfor achieving security n post-WorldWar I Europeand thebelief increasinglywidespread amongFrench nd Germanbusinesselites, and to a lesser extent the politicalelites) thatthe prosperity f bothstateshinged on their conomic collaboration.latent military ower), as "a great world power," notwithstanding he fact that twas not anactiveparticipantn the European state system. EphraimDouglass Adams, GreatBritainnd theAmerican ivil War New York: Russell and Russell, 1924), Vol. I, p. 10. In 1895 theperceptionofAmerican power had heightened n Britain nd in other eading European powers. In 1923,Germany, although substantially disarmed pursuant to Versailles, remained Europe's mosteconomicallypowerful state. As most statesmenrealized, itwas, because of tspopulation andindustry, latent ontinental egemon. Democraticpeace theorists ave classified ll eight tatesas having been democracies at the time of their nvolvementn the crises underdiscussion. SeeDoyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and ForeignAffairs," art , pp. 214-215. Russett,Grasping heDemocratic eace,pp. 5-9, briefly iscusses theVenezuela and Fashoda crises, but his bibliog-raphy has few historicalreferences o these two crises (and related issues), and omits moststandardsources.23. Waltz, Theoryf nternationalolitics, p. 72-73.24. See RobertL. Rothstein,Alliances nd Small Powers New York: Columbia University ress,1968), especiallychap. 1.25. As noted above, other such crises also supportmy argument.26. For a briefdiscussion of the cultural, ocial, and economic bonds betweenBritain nd theUnited States during the mid-nineteenth entury, ee MartinCrawford,TheAnglo-AmericanCrisisof the Mid-Nineteenthentury: he Times nd America, 850-1862 (Athens: University fGeorgia Press, 1987), pp. 39-55.27. Stephen R. Rock, WhyPeace BreaksOut: GreatPowerRapprochementn Historical erspective(Chapel Hill: University fNorth Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 91-119.



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ANGLO-AMERICAN CRISIS I: THE TRENT AFFAIR, 1861In 1861, tensionsarisingfrom he War Betweenthe Statesbrought he Unionand Britain othebrink fwar. The most mportant auses ofAnglo-Americanfriction temmedfrom he Northernblockade of Confederateportsand theconsequent loss to Britain of the cotton upon which its textile ndustrydepended. The immediateprecipitating ause of theAnglo-American risis,however, was action of the USS San Jacinto hich, actingwithout expressordersfromWashington, ntercepted heBritishmailshipTrent n November8, 1861. The Trentwas transporting amesM. Mason and JohnSlidell, theConfederacy's commissioners-designate o Great Britain and France; theyhad boarded the Trent, neutralvessel, in Havana, Cuba, a neutralport.Aboarding partyfrom he SanJacinto,fter earchingthe Trent, laced Masonand Slidell under arrest.The Trentwas allowed to complete tsvoyagewhiletheSan JacintoransportedMason and SlidelltoFortWarrennBoston harbor,where they were incarcerated.When word was received in Britain, he public was overcome with warfever."The first xplosion of the Press, on receiptof the news of theTrent,had been a terrificne."28An American citizenresiding n England reportedto Secretary f State WilliamH. Seward, "The people are franticwithrage,and were the countrypolled I fear 999 men out of 1000 would declare forwar. 29 From Edinburgh, another Americanwrote, "I have never seen sointensea feelingof indignation n mylife."30The Britishgovernmentwas hardly ess bellicose than the public and thepress. Fortified y legal opinions holding thatMason and Slidell had beenremoved fromthe Trent n contravention f internationalaw, the Cabinetadopted a hard-linepolicy that mirrored he public mood. PrimeMinisterLord Palmerston'sfirst eaction othenews of the Trentncidentwas to writeto the Secretary of State for War that, because of Britain's "precarious"relationswiththe United States,thegovernment econsider uts in militaryexpendituresplanned to take effect n 1862.31At the November 29 Cabinetmeeting,Palmerstonreportedly egan by flinginghis hat on the table and

28. Adams, Britain nd theCivil War,Vol. I, p. 216.29. Quoted in Gordon H. Warren,Fountain fDiscontent: he TrentAffairnd Freedomfthe eas(Boston:NortheasternUniversity ress, 1981), p. 105.30. Quoted in Adams, Britain nd theCivil War,Vol. I, p. 217.31. Quoted in Norman B. Ferris,The TrentAffair: Diplomatic risis Knoxville:University fTennessee Press, 1977), p. 44.



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declaring to his colleagues, "I don't know whether you are going to standthis, but I'll be damned if do "32The Cabinet adopted a dual-track pproach towardsWashington:Londonused military hreats o coerce the United States ntosurrendering iplomat-ically, while on the diplomatic side, Foreign SecretaryLord John Russelldrafted note to theUnion government n which, while holding firm o thedemand thatMason and Slidellbe released,he offeredWashington n avenueofgraceful etreat y indicating hatLondon would accept, as tantamount oan apology, a declaration that the San Jacintoad acted without officialsanction. Nevertheless,the note thatwas actually ransmittedoWashingtonwas an ultimatum.Although the Britishminister nWashington, ord Lyons,was instructed o present thecommunicationn a fashioncalculatedtomax-imize the chances of American compliance, his charge was clear: unlesswithin even days ofreceipt he Union government nconditionally cceptedBritain'sdemands, Lyonswas to ask forhis passports and depart the UnitedStates. As Russell wrote to Lyons: "Whatwe want is a plain Yes or a plainNo to our very simple demands, and we want that plain Yes or No withinseven days of the communication f the despatch."33Although some, notably ncluding Russell, hoped that the crisis could beresolved peacefully, heentireCabinet recognizedthat tsdecision to presentan ultimatumto Washington could lead to war. The Britishbelieved thattherewas one hope forpeace: that Washington,overawed byBritain'smili-tarypower and itsreadiness to go to war,would bow to London's demandsrather than resistingthem.34As the Undersecretary f State for ForeignAffairs tated, "Our only chance of peace is to be found in workingon thefears of theGovernment nd people ofthe United States."35Driven by the belief thatWashingtonwould give in only to the threatofforce,London's diplomacywas backed up byostentatiousmilitarynd navalpreparations. Anticipating possible conflict, he Cabinet embargoed theexportto the United States of saltpeter November 30) and of arms andammunition December 4). Underscoringthe gravity f the crisis,foronly32. Ibid., p. 109; Howard Jones, Union n Peril:TheCrisisOverBritishnterventionntheCivilWar(Chapel Hill: University f North Carolina Press, 1992), pp. 84-85.33. Quoted in Jones, Union n Peril,p. 85.34. Jenkins,Warfor heUnion,p. 214.35. Quoted in Kenneth Bourne, Britain nd the Balance of Power n NorthAmerica, 815-1908(Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1967), p. 219.



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the fourth ime in historythe Cabinet created a special war committee ooversee strategic lanningand war preparations.Urgent tepswere takentoreinforce ritain's naval and military ontingentsn North America. Begin-ning in mid-December, hastily organized sealift ncreased the number ofregularBritish rmytroops n Canada from ,000to 17,658, and Royal Navyforces n NorthAmerican waters swelled from25 to fortywarships, with1,273 guns (compared to just 500 beforethe crisis).36 hese measures servedtwo purposes: they bolstered London's diplomacy and, in the event diplo-macy failed, they positioned Britain o prevail n a conflict.London employed big-stick iplomacybecause itbelieved that a too-con-ciliatory olicy would simply mbolden the Americans o mount ncreasinglyserious challenges to British nterests.37 oreover,Britishpolicymakers e-lieved that England's resolve, credibility,nd reputationwere at stake nter-nationally,not just in its relationswiththeUnited States. The commentsofonce and futureForeign SecretaryLord Clarendon were typical:"What afigure . . we shall cut in the eyes oftheworld, ifwe lamelysubmitto thisoutragewhen all mankind will know thatwe should unhesitatingly avepoured our indignationand our broadsides into any weak nation . . . andwhat an additional proof twill be of the universal . . . beliefthatwe havetwo sets of weights and measures to be used accordingto the power orweakness ofour adversary."38 hus "theBritishwere preparedto accept thecost of an Anglo-Americanwar . . . rather han sacrifice heirprestigeas agreatpower byheadlong diplomaticdefeat."39London's hard-linepolicywas fortifiedy its"general optimism bout theultimateoutcome" of an Anglo-Americanwar.40Queen Victoria aid a warwould result n "utterdestruction o the North Americans" and Secretary f36. The figures re fromWarren,Fountain fDiscontent, p. 130,136. Foran overview of Britishmilitarynd naval activitiesduringthe Trentcrisissee KennethBourne, "BritishPreparationsforWarwith theNorth, 1861-1862,"EnglishHistorical eview,Vol. 76, No. 301 (October1961),pp. 600-632.37. Ferris,TrentAffair, . 56; WilburDevereux Jones,TheAmericanroblemnBritish iplomacy,1841-1861 London: Macmillan,1974), p. 203. In international elations heory erms,London'sview ofAnglo-American elationswas based on a deterrencemodel rather han a spiralmodel.See RobertJervis, erceptionndMisperceptionn Internationalolitics Princeton:PrincetonUni-versity ress, 1976), pp. 58-111. Coexisting uneasilywiththepositive view of an Anglo-Amer-ican communitywas the Britishmage of the United States as a vulgar "mobocracy" hat,unlessfirmly esisted, would pursue a rapacious and bullyingforeign policy. Warren, FountainofDiscontent,p. 47-51.38. Quoted in Bourne, Balance fPower, . 247.39. Bourne, "BritishPreparations,"p. 631.40. Bourne, Balance fPower,p. 247.



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The Lincoln administrationwas aware ofthe strength f anti-Britishen-timent mong the public and in Congress (indeed, in early December, Con-gress passed a resolution ommending heSanJacinto'saptainforhis action).There is some evidence that in order to placate public opinion, PresidentLincoln was inclined toward holding on to Mason and Slidell, notwithstand-ing the obvious risks of doing so.46Nevertheless, after irst oyingwith theidea of offering ondon arbitration n an attemptto avoid the extremesofwar or a humiliatingclimb-down,the United States elected to submit toBritain'sdemands. Given that Washington "could notback down easily," itis important o understand why it chose to do so.The United States bowed to London because, already fully ccupied mili-tarily rying o subdue the Confederacy, he North could not also affordsimultaneous war with England, which effectively ould have broughtBrit-ain into theWar Between the States on the South's side.47This was clearlyrecognized by the Lincoln administration hen the cabinet met for wo daysat Christmas to decide on the American response to the Britishnote. Thecabinethad before ttwocritical ieces of nformation. irst,Washingtonhadjust been informed hatFrance supported London's demands (ending Amer-ican hopes thatBritainwould be restrainedby its own "waterbird"worriesthat France would take advantage of an Anglo-Americanwar).48 Second,Washingtonhad abundant information bout the depth of thepro-warsen-timent of the Britishpublic. The American minister n London, CharlesFrancisAdams, wrote that he English"werenow all lashed up into hostility"and that: "The leading newspapers roll out as much fiery ava as Vesuviusis doing, daily. The Clubs and the armyand the navy and thepeople in thestreetsgenerally re ravingforwar."49 enator Charles Sumnerpassed on tothe Lincoln administration etters rom henoted Radicalmembersofparlia-ment,Richard Cobden and JohnBright.Whiledeploringtheirgovernment'spolicy and the tenor of Britishpublic opinion, both Cobden and Bright

46. Warren,Fountain fDiscontent, p. 184-185;Adams, Britain nd theCivilWar, . 231. HowardJones,however,suggeststhat Lincolnprobably ntendedto give up Mason and Slidell and thathe may have been posturing n order to shiftto other members of his cabinet the onus ofadvancing the argumentfor surrendering hem.Jones,Union nPeril,pp. 91-92.47. Ferris,TrentAffair, p. 177-182; Jenkins,War or heUnion,pp. 223-226; Warren,Fountain fDiscontent, p. 181-182.48. See Jenkins,Warfor heUnion,pp. 225-226.49. Quoted in Ferris,TrentAffair, p. 154, 147 and see also pp. 66-67, 139-141; Jones,Union nPeril,p. 89.



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stressedthat war would result unless theUnited States gave in to London.Cobden observed:FormerlyEngland feared a war with the United States as much from thedependence on your cotton s from dread ofyour power.Now thepopularopinion (however erroneous) is thata war would give us cotton.And we,ofcourse, consider your power weakened by your Civil War.50

Facing the choice of defying London or surrendering o its demands,Washingtonwas compelled to recognize both that Britainwas serious aboutgoingto war and that uch a war almost certainlywould result n the Union'spermanent dissolution. During the cabinet discussions, AttorneyGeneralEdward Bates suggested that Britain was seeking a war with the UnitedStates in order to breakthe Northern lockade of Southern cottonportsandhe worried hatLondon would recognizethe Confederacy. he United States,he said, "cannot afford uch a war." He went on to observe, "In such a crisis,with such a civil war upon our hands, we cannot hope forsuccess in a ...war with England, backed by the assent and countenance of France. Wemust evade it-with as littledamage to our own honor and pride as possi-ble."'51Secretary f State Seward concurred, stating hat t was "no timetobe divertedfrom he caresofthe Union into controversieswithotherpowers,even if just causes for them could be found."52When the United Statesrealized that Britain's threat to go to war was not a bluff, trategic ndnational interest considerations-the "waterbird dilemma"-dictated thatWashingtonyield to Britain.The Trent ffair's utcome is explained by realism, not democraticpeacetheory.Contrary o democraticpeace theory's expectations,the mutual re-spectbetween democracies rooted in democraticnormsand culturehad noinfluence n British olicy. Believing hatvital reputational nterests ffectingitsglobal strategic osturewere at stake, London played diplomatichardball,employed military hreats, nd was preparedto go to war ifnecessary.Boththe public and the elites in Britainpreferredwar to conciliation.Across theAtlantic, ublic and governmental pinion n the Northwas equallybellicose.An Anglo-American onflictwas avoided only because the Lincoln admin-50. Quoted in ibid., p. 172 (emphasis in original). Bright's etterwarned: "Ifyou are resolvedto succeed against the South, have nowar withEngland."Quoted in Adams, Britain nd theCivilWar,p. 232 (emphasis in original).51. Quoted in ibid., p. 182.52. Quoted inJenkins,Warfor heUnion,p. 224.



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istration ame to understand thatdiplomatichumiliationwas preferable o awar thatwould have arrayedBritainwiththeConfederacy nd thusprobablyhave secured the South's independence.ANGLO-AMERICAN CRISIS II: VENEZUELA, 1895-96In 1895-96, the United States and GreatBritain ound themselvesembroiledin a serious diplomaticconfrontationrisingout ofan obscure ong-standingdispute between London and Caracas over the Venezuela-BritishGuianaboundary. By 1895, Caracas was desperatelybeseeching Washington opres-sure London to agree to arbitrate hedispute. The Cleveland administrationdecided to inject the United Statesdiplomaticallynto theAnglo-Venezuelandisagreement,but not out ofAmerican solicitude for Venezuela's interestsor concern for the issue's merits.53 or the United States, the Anglo-Vene-zuelan affairwas part of a larger picture.By 1895,Americanpolicymakers,conscious of the United States's status as an emerging great power, wereincreasingly oncerned about European political and commercial ntrusioninto the Western Hemisphere.54For Washington, the controversy etweenLondon and Caracas was a welcome pretext or ssertingAmerica'sclaimtogeopolitical primacy n the Westernhemisphere. t was for this reason thatthe United States provoked a showdown on the Anglo-Venezuelanborderdispute.55The American position was set forthn Secretary f State Richard Olney'sJuly 0, 1895,note to the British overnment.56he UnitedStates stated thatits "honor and its nterests"were involved n the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute,"the continuanceofwhich it cannot regardwith indifference."Washingtondemanded thatLondon submit the dispute to arbitration.n grandiloquentterms, Olney asserted that the Monroe Doctrine not only gave the United53. WalterLaFeber demonstrates hattheUnited States injected tself nto the crisis to protectits own interests, ot Venezuela's. LaFeber, TheNew Empire: n InterpretationfAmericanxpan-sion,1860-1898 Ithaca: CornellUniversity ress, 1963), chap. 6.54. The relationshipbetween security oncerns and Americanforeign nd strategicpolicy isdiscussed in Richard D. Challener,Admirals,General nd Foreign olicy, 898-1914 (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1973) and J.A.S. Grenville nd George B. Young, Politics, trategy,andAmerican iplomacy: tudies n Americanoreign olicy, 873-1917 New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1966).55. WalterLaFeber, "The Backgroundof Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy:A Reinterpretation,"American istorical eview,Vol. 66 No. 4 (July 1961), p. 947; Ernest R. May, Imperial emocracy:TheEmergencefAmerica s a Great ower New York: Harcourt,Brace and World, 1961), p. 34.56. The fulltextof the note can be found n Foreign elationsf heUnited tates, 895 Washing-ton, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice),Vol. I, pp. 542-576.



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Although there s no "smoking gun," compelling circumstantialvidencesupportsthehistorians' onsensus opinionthatBritainwas constrained romgoing to war in 1896 by an unfavorable distribution fmilitary apabilitiesvis-a-vis- he United States and by a deterioratingnternational ituation.London, Lord Salisburyexcepted, had become concernedabout the outcomeof an Anglo-Americanwar because of Britain's nability, ue to threats lse-where, to spare warships to reinforce ts naval presence in North Americanwaters; fears that Canada would be conquered by the United States; andfearsthat in a prolonged war, the United States would be able to force astalemate and possibly even prevail because of its enormous economicstrength.63 oreover, between November 1895 and mid-January 896,Brit-ain's international osition tooka sharp turn fortheworse: "England stoodcompletely solated at the beginning of 1896. Her positionwas scarcelyen-durable.64 Anglo-Germanrelations had been plunged into crisis by theKruegertelegramthat Kaiser Wilhelm I had dispatched in thewake of theJamesonraid on the Transvaal. Elsewhere, the threatsfromBritain'smainrivals,Russia and France, seemed only slightly ess menacing.Britain oncluded that t must settlewith Washingtonbecause it could notaffordyetanother enemy. At the criticalJanuary 1, 1896, Cabinet meeting,Salisbury emained steadfastlyommitted o his November "no negotiations"policy, but his colleagues decided to resolve the crisis with Washingtonpeacefully.As Grenvilleand Young point out: "In NovembertheybelievedthatBritainheld all the trump ards [but] the mood was no longer confident.The Cabinet was now inclined to cut Britain's osses in a world which ap-peared to have become suddenly hostile."65Overruledby the Cabinet, Sal-isbury-who believed that eventual war with the United States was "some-

63. See Bourne, TheBalance fPower n NorthAmerica, . 340-341;A.E. Campbell, Britainnd theUnited tates,pp. 29-40; Eggert,RichardOlney,pp. 232-233;Paul Kennedy, The Realities ehindDiplomacy: ackgroundnfluences n British xternal olicy, 865-1980 (London: George Allen &Unwin, 1981), pp. 107-109; ArthurJ.Marder,TheAnatomy fBritish eaPower:A History fBritishNaval Policy n thePre-Dreadnoughtra, 1880-1905 New York: Knopf,1940), pp. 254-257. In anearly January 896 letter o Theodore Roosevelt, Lord Bryce said thatnothingcould be fartherfromhis countrymen'sminds than nterfering ith America's rights r the hemispheric alanceof power because: "Our hands are more than sufficientlyull elsewhere." Quoted in A.E.Campbell, Britain nd the United tates,pp. 59-60.64. Marder, Anatomy fBritish ea Power, . 257.65. Grenville nd Young, Politics, trategyndAmerican iplomacy, . 170; Grenville,LordSalis-bury, p. 67-69.



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thing more than a possibility"-apparently considered resigning thepremiership.66There is virtuallyno evidence that supports a democratic peace theoryexplanation of the Venezuela crisis's outcome. Although the crisis endedbeforeeither London or Washingtoncould make war-likethreats,both theUnited States and Britainbegan planning militarily ora possible conflict.67This suggests that both British nd American policymakers onsidered thatwar, or at least the preparationfor t,was a legitimate omponentof theirdiplomatic trategies.Itdoes not appear, either, hatpublicopinionaffected olicyon either ideof the Atlantic. n Britain, he Cleveland administration's emands initiallywere greetedwithhostility.Nevertheless,even beforeJanuary 896,Britishpublic opinion overwhelmingly avored a peaceful settlement f theAnglo-American crisis. There is, however, no evidence in the historical ecord thatpublic opinion had any effect n the Cabinet'sJanuary 1 decision to resolvethe crisispeacefully. ndeed, during the Venezuela crisis,Britain'spolicy-makingelite had a different iew ofAnglo-American elationsthan did theBritish ublic.Atthe timeof the Venezuela crisis herewas still an enormousgulf between the advocates ofan Anglo-American approchement ased onracial kinship "and the hard-headed realism of the school of professionalpoliticians nd strategists eaded by Salisbury."68On the Americanside of the Atlantic,Cleveland's bellicose December 17message elicited widespread public support. As WalterLaFeber notes, "Ex-pansionist-minded Americans heartilyendorsed the President's message,thoughmost of them also fully hared his hopes thatno war would result."69However the public's enthusiasm ratherquickly subsided, and importantgroups, especially the churches and some elements of the financial andmanufacturing ectors,recoiled at the prospectof an Anglo-Americanwar.Nevertheless, fwar had occurred, the public would probably have unitedbehind the Cleveland administration.American public opinion viewed theprospectofwar withEngland "not with enthusiasm but as, though regret-66. See J.L.Garvin,Life fJoseph hamberlainLondon:Macmillan,1934),Vol. III, p. 161; Salisburyquoted in Bourne, The Balance fPower nNorthAmerica, . 339.67. BothLondon and Washingtonplanned for North Americanwarduring early1896. Amer-ican planningfocused on invading Canada, Britain'son defending t. See Bourne, The BalanceofPower nNorthAmerica, p. 319-331.68. Bourne,BalanceofPower,p. 340. Marder,Anatomy fBritish ea Power,pp. 254-255, showsthatBritain'snational security lites took a veryhard-line tance during theVenezuela crisis.69. LaFeber, NewEmpire, . 270.



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The Myth ftheDemocratic eace 27

table, necessary iftherewere no otherway of establishingthe paramountpositionof theUnited States in the westernhemisphere."70Recent generations have come to regard the Anglo-American special re-lationship" as an immutable factof international ife. ndeed, in some waysit is considered an archetype of relations between democratic states. The"great rapprochement"upon which the special relationshipwas built wastheepilogue to theVenezuelan crisis.But whateverAnglo-American elationsarguablyhave become, theimpetus for he rapprochement etween Londonand Washington like theimpetus for he settlement fthe Venezuelan crisisitself)was, as C.S. Campbell points out, rooted n geostrategic oncerns andnot in the considerations hat underlie democraticpeace theory.71By 1898, the effectsof Britain's by then not-so-splendid solation werebeing painfully elt, nd London's overtures o Washingtonmust be viewedas part of the dramatic end of solation" process of strategic nd diplomaticreadjustment hat London undertook after he Boer War.72The Britishdidnot welcome the rapid expansion of American power; rather heyreconciledthemselves to something they could not prevent and which, unlike theGerman, Russian and French challenges, did not seem immediately hreat-ening to vital British nterests. The Anglo-Americanrapprochementwaspossible because on every issue in dispute between them,London yieldedto Washington's demands. As Bourne dryly observes, "All this was notsimplyor even perhaps at all significantfany special goodwill towards theUnited States."73Britaincould not afford o make any more enemies, andleast of all could London afford o incur the enmityof the United States,with which the Britishknew theycould no longer compete geopolitically.ForLondon, the "special relationship"was a mythdevised "to enable Britain

70. A.E. Campbell, Britain nd the United tates,p. 41.71. Charles S. Campbell, Anglo-American nderstanding,898-1903 (Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversity ress, 1957), pp. 8-24. KennethBourne and Paul Kennedybothpoint out thatmanyof the same non-strategic actors nderlying he Anglo-American approchement "Anglo-Sax-onism," economic nterdependence)had been strongly resent ince at least 1850.Theydid not,however, noticeablymitigateAnglo-Americanhostility. hese factors nly came into play afterthechanging nternational ituation orced ondon to reassess its grand strategy. ourne, BalanceofPower, . 343; Kennedy, Realities ehindDiplomacy, . 118.72. There is strong consensus on this point among diplomatic historians. Bourne, Balance ofPower, p. 409-410; A.E. Campbell, Britain nd theUnited tates,pp. 208; C.S. Campbell, Anglo-American nderstanding,. 346, 184-185; Bradford erkins,The GreatRapprochement:ngland ndtheUnited tates, 895-1914 New York: Atheneum, 1968) pp. 156-157; Kennedy, Realities ehindDiplomacy, p. 118-119.73. Bourne, Balance fPower, . 343.



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to withdrawgracefully" rom hoseareas where British nterests lashedwithWashington's, nd its functionwas to makethe "pill" ofappeasing the UnitedStates "morepalatable to swallow."74The outcome of the Venezuelan crisis s better xplained by realismthanby democratic eace theory.Consistentwithrealist xpectations, othBritainand the UnitedStates began planningforwar.Although, s democratic eacetheorywould predict, herewas no war fever n eitherBritain r the UnitedStates, there s no evidence thatpublic opinionplayed any rolein London'sdecision-makingprocess. It was London's decision to reverse its initiallyuncompromising tance and instead seek an amicable diplomatic solutionwithWashingtonthat allowed Britain nd the United States to avoid war.All available evidence supports the realist explanationthat London madethis decision solely for strategic easons.THE ANGLO-FRENCH STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE NILE: FASHODA, 1898The Fashoda crisis markedthe culmination ftheAnglo-French truggleforsupremacy over Egyptand the headwaters of the Nile.75Until 1882 Egypt,althoughnominallypart ofthe OttomanEmpire,had been administeredbyan Anglo-Frenchcondominium. In 1882, Britain ntervenedunilaterally osuppress a nationalistrevolt. Because the Suez canal was the vital arterylinkingBritainwith ndia and itsotherfar astern mperial nterests, trategicconsiderations verrodeLondon's initial nclination owithdraw uicklyfromEgypt afterthe 1882 intervention.By the early 1890s, Lord SalisburyandotherBritish olicymakershad determined hat n order to safeguardEgypt,Britainhad to exertcontrolover theNile's source and its entirevalley.For France, Britain's post-1882 Egyptian primacywas an affront nd,spurred by France's colonial party,Paris periodically ooked forways inwhich itcould compel London to honor itspledge to withdrawfromEgypt.74. Ronald Hyam, Britain's mperial entury, 815-1914:A Study fEmpirendExpansionLondon:B.T. Batsford,1976), pp. 202, 205; C.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, TheMirage of Power:BritishForeign olicy, 902-1914,Vol. I (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 99.75. For accounts of the Fashoda crisis and itsbackground,the following re excellent ources:WilliamL. Langer,TheDiplomacy f mperialism,890-1902,2d ed. (New York:Knopf, 1965),pp.101-144, 259-302; Ronald Robinson and JohnGallagher with Alice Denny, Africand theVicto-rians:TheOfficialMind of mperialismLondon: Macmillan, 1981,rev. ed.), pp. 76-159, 290-306;G.N. Sanderson, England,Europe, nd theUpperNile,1882-1899 Edinburgh:EdinburghUniver-sityPress, 1965), chaps. 12-15; and Sanderson, "The Origins and Significance f the Anglo-French Confrontation t Fashoda," in ProsserGifford nd WilliamRoger Louis, eds., France ndBritainn Africa: mperial ivalryndColonialRule New Haven: Yale University ress, 1971),pp.285-332.



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Frenchpolicymakers"deluded themselves" into thinking hatby takingFashoda theycould forceLondon to negotiatetheEgyptian ssue.80As earlyas March 1895, when London had its firstntimations bout Frenchdesignson the upper Nile, Sir Edward Grey,thenparliamentary ndersecretary orforeign ffairs, ad statedbluntly hatsuch a move "would be an unfriendlyact and would be so viewed in England."'81n spring1898, responding toreportsthatFrance was driving on the upper Nile, London decided on anall-out reconquest ofSudan.Aftervictory t Khartoum,Field Marshal Lord Kitchenerwas ordered toadvance to Fashoda and instructed, n the event he encountered Frenchforces, o do nothingthat "would in any way implya recognition n behalfofHerMajesty's Government fa title n behalfofFrance . . toany portionof the Nile Valley."82On September 19, 1898, Kitchener's forces reachedFashoda, where they were greeted by Marchand's band. Althoughthe op-posing forces reatedeach otherwith elaboratemilitary ourtesy, heirmeet-ing plunged London and Paris into a deep diplomaticcrisis. The Anglo-French "quarrelwas not about Fashoda, or about the fate of the Sudan, oreven about the securityof the Nile waters and of Egypt;it was about therelative tatusof France and Britain s Powers.83Once the crisisbegan, Delcasse quicklyrecognizedthat France was in anuntenableposition. The British mbassador in Paris reportedthatDelcassewas "preparedto retreat.. ifwe can build him a goldenbridge.84 Delcassebelieved his maneuveringroom was seriouslycircumscribed y the poten-tiallyvolatile domesticpoliticalsituation n Francestemming rom heDrey-fus affair.To accept a humiliatingdiplomaticdefeat would probablymeanthe Brisson cabinet's falland, it was widely feared,even a military oup.85Delcasse reportedly egged London, "Do not driveme intoa corner."86 nOctober11, he told the British mbassador that fLondon made it easy for80. Langer,Diplomacy f mperialism,p. 550-551.81. Quoted in James Goode, The FashodaCrisis:A Survey fAnglo-Frenchmperial olicyon theUpperNile Question,1882-1899 (Ph.D. diss., North Texas State University, 971), p. 150; andDarrell Bates, The Fashoda ncident f 1898: Encountern theNile (New York:Oxford UniversityPress, 1984),p. 24.82. Lord Salisbury's nstructions uoted in Robinsonand Gallagher,Africand theVictorians, .368.83. Sanderson, "Origins and Significance fFashoda," p. 289.84. Quoted in Sanderson, TheUpperNile, p. 346.85. Brown,FashodaReconsidered,p. 99-100, 127.86. Quoted in T.W. Riker,"A Surveyof BritishPolicy in the Fashoda Crisis," Political cienceQuarterly, ol. 44, No. 1 (March 1929), p. 63.



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him "in formhe would be conciliatory n substance."87On October 27 theFrenchambassador to London, tellingSalisburythat Marchand would soonleave Fashoda, pleaded forBritain o make some concession in return.88Meanwhile, notwithstanding oth the pleading tone of Frenchdiplomacyand thepossible repercussionsof Britain's tance on French nternalpolitics,London adamantly refused to give Paris an alternative o the bleak choice oforderingMarchand's humiliatingwithdrawalorgoingto war. On September18, theBritish mbassador in Paris toldDelcasse "categorically" hatLondonwould not consent to any compromiseof the Fashoda dispute.89On Septem-ber 30, responding to Delcasse's statement hatFrance would fightratherthan submit to a Britishultimatum, he British mbassador reiterated hatthere could be no discussions until Marchand withdrewfromFashoda. Sal-isburywas determined "to compel, rather than persuade, the French towithdraw. 90London's hard-linediplomacywas overwhelmingly upported bybellicosepublicopinion. Even beforeFashoda, because of the tensionsengenderedbytheAnglo-French olonial rivalry, war with France was not exactlydesiredin England, but it would be accepted without hesitation f the occasionarose. 91 Once the crisis began, the press overwhelmingly upported thegovernment'sdecision to refuse negotiations with France, and duringthecrisis "the Britishpopular press indulged in an orgyof scurrility.92 "Therewas plentyofwarlikespirit n the country," nd British ublic opinion was"aggressively ingoistic"overFashoda.93 The unequivocal expressionof Brit-ish opinion" was solidly behind the Cabinet's hard-linepolicy.94 This nodoubtwas true because the British ublicbelieved England's prestigewas atstake and consequentlywas "in a mood torespondvigorously" o theFrenchchallenge.95The public mood was matched by that ofBritain'spoliticalelite. As Chan-cellorof theExchequer Michael Hicks Beach said on October 19,"The country87. Quoted in KeithEubank, "The Fashoda CrisisRe-examined,"TheHistorian, ol. 22, No. 2(February1960), p. 152.88. Quoted in ibid., p. 154.89. Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher,Africand theVictorians, . 370.90. Sanderson, TheUpperNile, p. 334.91. Ibid., p. 372.92. Ibid.; Riker, British olicy n theFashoda Crisis," pp. 65-67; Sanderson, The UpperNile, p.348.93. Robinson and Gallagher,Africand theVictorians, . 376; Sanderson, TheUpperNile, p. 354.94. Riker, BritishPolicy n theFashoda Crisis," pp. 66-67.95. Sanderson, "Origins and Significance fFashoda," pp. 295, 300.



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has put its foot down."96 The government'suncompromising tance wassupported strongly ythe opposition Liberal mperialists, otablyLordRose-bery,H.H. Asquith, and SirEdward Grey.97 osebery, former rimemin-isterand foreign ecretary, ecalledthathis Cabinethad warned theFrenchaway from he UpperNile in 1895 and declared that nyCabinet that howedsigns of conciliatingParis over Fashoda would be replaced within a week.Indeed when, in the crucial October 27 Cabinet meeting,Salisbury efttheimpression n some minds that he was leaning towards compromise withParis, the majority fministers uicklypoured cold water on that dea andtheAdmiraltywas ordered to put thenavy on a war footing.The Britishknew that if Paris did not capitulate, armed conflictwouldensue. London regarded thatprospectwith equanimity nd, indeed, confi-dence. Because theybelieved both Britain'scredibilitynd its reputation sa greatpower to be at stake, the British elt heyhad no alternative o forcinga showdown with theFrench:"Had Britain ollowed less intransigent olicyin the circumstancesof October 1898, there would certainlyhave been atemptation,not only in Paris but also in St. Petersburg nd Berlin,to writeher off s a Power who would never riska war, however great the provo-cation. 98In October 1898 the Britishnavy enjoyed a decisive superiority ver theFrench fleet n both numbers and quality,and the outcome of an Anglo-French war was a foregone conclusion.99 ondon manifestedno reluctancein pressing its strategic dvantage. During October, the Royal Navy madepreparationsfor war with France.100 n October 15, theChannel fleetwasassembled. By October26, theRoyalNavy had drawn up detailedwarplans.On October 28 the reserve squadron was activated and concentrated atPortland; oon theChannel fleetwas deployed toGibraltar nd the Mediter-raneanfleetwas moved to Malta. As thesemeasuresbecame knownin Parisfromntelligence eports nd stories n the British ress, theymade a strongimpression on Frenchpolicymakers.There s no question thatFrancewas finally ompelled toaccept a crushingdiplomaticdefeatbecause of tsmilitarynferiorityis-a'-visritain.The Royal96. Quoted in Langer,Diplomacy f mperialism,. 553.97. Langer,Diplomacy f mperialism,p. 552-553; Robinsonand Gallagher,Africa nd theVicto-rians,pp. 376-378; Riker, "BritishPolicy in the Fashoda Crisis," p. 67; Sanderson, TheUpperNile, p. 347.98. Sanderson, "Origin and Significance fFashoda," pp. 301-302.99. On theRoyal Navy's advantages and London's confidence nBritish ea power, see Marder,Anatomy fBritish ea Power,pp. 320-331; Langer, Diplomacy f mperialism,p. 559-560.100. Marder,Anatomy fBritish ea Power, p. 321-328.



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of France's policyof security nd Germany'spolicy of seeking revisionof theVersaillesTreatysystem.The reparations ssue was the immediatecause ofthe Ruhroccupation, but althoughit had economic significancen itself, tstrue importancewas that Paris and Berlin regarded it as symbolicof thegeopoliticalcompetitionbetween them.106For Paris, compelling Germanyto adhere strictly o its reparationsobliga-tions was seen as crucial to maintaining the Versailles system. Moreoverreparationswere, as the Ruhroccupation demonstrated, leverforFranceto reviseVersailles n its favorby imposing politicaland territorialanctionson Germanywhen Berlindefaultedon itspayments.ForGermany, btainingmodification f reparationswas a wedge to open the issue of revisingtheentireVersaillesframework. he "fulfillment"oliciesadopted byBerlinweredesigned to forcerevisionby demonstratinghatstrict ompliancewithrep-arations obligations was beyond Germany'scapacity and would lead inevi-tablyto Germany's financial nd economiccollapse.107Although Germany had been defeated and its short-term ower con-strainedby the Versailles ettlement,heunderlying ources of tsgeopoliticalstrength-its ndustrial ase and population-remained intact.Frenchpolicy-makerswere obsessed about theresurgenceofa Germansecurity hreat nddeterminedto prevent t by imposing military, erritorialnd economic re-strictions n Germany.France's postwar German policy was rooted in the aims that Paris hadpursued during the war. As early as 1915, ForeignMinisterDelcasse hadenvisioned breaking up the German Reich into a numberof small states,coupled withannexationby France, Holland, and Belgiumof theRhine's leftbank.108By late 1917, Paris had decided to leave a truncatedReich intactwhile annexingAlsace-Lorraineand the Saar, and creating n independentContinuityrBreak? Leamington Spa, U.K.: Berg, 1987), p. 47; DetlevJ.K. Peukert,TheWeimarRepublic: he Crisis ofClassical Modernity,rans. Richard Deveson (New York: Hill and Wang,1992), p. 61; Hermann J.Rupieper, The CunoGovernmentndReparations, 922-1923:Politics ndEconomicsThe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 979)p. 96.106. Peukert, Weimar epublic, . 55; Marc Trachtenberg, eparationn World olitics: rance ndEuropean conomic iplomacy, 916-1923 (New York: Columbia University ress, 1980), p. 122;StephenA. Schuker, The EndofFrench redominancenEurope:The FinancialCrisis f1924 and theAdoption ftheDawes Plan (Chapel Hill: University f North CarolinaPress, 1976), p. 6.107. On Berlin's strategy f seeking revisionthroughfulfillment,ee David Felix, Walther ath-enau and theWeimarRepublic:The PoliticsofReparationsBaltimore:Johns Hopkins UniversityPress); and Rupieper, TheCuno Government.108. D. Stevenson, FrenchWarAimsAgainstGermany,914-1919 Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982),pp. 26-27.



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TheMythof theDemocratic eace 35

French satellite state in the Rhineland.109 rance's military nd economicsecuritywould be enhanced by imposing reparationson Germanyand bygivingFrance control f the ron and coal thatwere crucial o West Europeanindustrial upremacy.Afterthe war, France's objectives did not change. Paris sought militarysecurity, eparations,and the establishment f France as Europe's leadingsteel producer.At Versailles, o avoid alienatingBritain nd the United States,France abandoned its annexationist spirations n the Rhineland; however,throughout the period from the Armistice to the Ruhr occupation, Pariscovertly upported Rhenish separatismwhile continuing o harborhopes ofcontrolling he leftbank.110 ven while appearing to abandon France's terri-torial claims in the Rhineland, French PremierClemenceau had achievedmuch oftheir ssence by coupling thereparations nd securityssues: undertheVersailles Treaty's provisions, as long as Germanyremainedin defaulton reparations,French troops could remain n the Rhineland.The government's German policywas strongly upported by the Frenchpublic. French public opinion had demanded a peace settlement hatwould"impose the greatest possible restrictions n Germany's influence andpower," and the French public's Germanophobia carriedover intothe post-war period.111 ublic and policymakers like believed thatGermanyshouldbe forced o pay all ofthecosts Francehad sustainedin connectionwith thewar (including reconstruction f German-occupiedFrench territory),ndofficialnd public opinionwere mutuallyreinforcing.ndeed, Frenchpublicopinion, which French Prime Minister Poincare had done much to shape,was so anti-German n late 1922 that it is doubtfulthat he would havesurvivedpoliticallyhad he notmoved to occupytheRuhr.112The French military nvasion of theRuhr was promptedby Paris's mount-ing frustration ith Germany'scampaign to obtaina significant eductionofits reparations obligations. Althoughthere s some disagreement s to theexact nature of Poincare's objectivesin occupyingthe Ruhr,the balance of109. On Frenchwar aims see WalterA. McDougall, France'sRhineland iplomacy, 914-1924: TheLast Bid for a Balance of Power n Europe Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1978), p. 25;Schmidt, Versailles o theRuhr,pp. 22-23; Stevenson, FrenchWarAims,pp. 38-39.110. Stevenson, FrenchWarAims,pp. 195-196. The definitive ccount of France's Rhenish policyis McDougall, Rhineland iplomacy.111. Stevenson, FrenchWarAims,pp. 135-136. Leaders such as Poincare actively romoted nti-German attitudes, not a particularly ifficultask. See Schmidt,FromVersailles o theRuhr,p.231.112. Rupieper, The Cuno Government,p. 88, 96; Schmidt,FromVersailles o theRuhr, . 52.



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opinion s thatthe Ruhroccupation was undertakenn an attempt o advanceFrance's goals of revising theVersailles system n its favor. The Ruhroccu-pationclearlywas intended to bolsterFrench ecurity y cripplingGermany'seconomy while simultaneouslyenabling Paris to realize its ambitionof es-tablishing rance as Europe's leading economicpower. At a minimum,Parishoped thatthe Ruhroccupation would inflameRhenish separatism nd leadtheRhineland to break away from he Reich; there s some evidence thattheRuhroccupation was undertakenspecifically o advance the Frenchaims ofannexing the Rhineland and dissolving the Reich.113Once the Ruhr crisiscommenced,Franceactively betted theRhenishseparatists.In the Ruhr crisis,France did not hesitate to use military orceagainstdemocraticWeimar Germany n pursuitof Frenchsecuritynterests. ndeed,what leaps out from histories of the period between 1915 (when Frenchpolicymakers egan to think eriously bout theirwar aims) and 1923 is therepeatedFrenchrejection f"second image" arguments hatFrance'spostwarsecurityposition would be enhanced ifGermany were transformednto ademocracy.Unlike the British,who soon afterthe war came to believe ademocraticGermanywas thekey to maintaining he peace in Europe,Francepreferred o put Germandemocracy t risk rather han abandon its strategyof protecting ts securitywith tangible guarantees. As WalterMcDougallobserves:The Quai d'Orsay perceivedlittle onnectionbetween forms fgovernmentand foreignpolicies. The Wilsonian idea thatdemocracies choose peacefulforeignpolicies, while authoritarian egimesare aggressive,found few dis-ciples n theFrenchgovernment nd military... A strong nitedGermany,whethermonarchist r republican,would pose a threat o France and surelycome to dominate the economies of the Danubian and Balkan regions.114

The French military ccupationof theRuhrprovokeda major crisis-if nota Franco-Germanwar, at least a quasi-war. A real war was avoided onlybecause Germany acked thecapabilities owage it. Still heGermans resistedthe occupation fiercely. f anythingunited the fractiousGermans of the113. McDougall argues thatRhenishseparation from he Reichwas Poincare'shope but nothisspecific oal intheRuhroperation.McDougall, Rhineland iplomacy, p. 247-249.Schmidt rguesthat Poincare undertook the Ruhr occupation forthe specificpurpose of gaining permanentterritorialontrol f the Ruhrand Rhinelandand promoting heReich'sdisintegration. chmidt,FromVersailles o theRuhr,pp. 232-233.114. McDougall, Rhineland iplomacy, . 114.



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thehope thatGermany'spostwar democratic nstitutionswould mitigate hegeopolitical consequences flowingfromthe underlyingdisparitybetweenGerman and French power.Theoreticalonclusions.Proponents have made sweeping theoretical laims for, and have drawnimportantpolicy conclusions from,democraticpeace theory.These claimsrest on a shaky foundation, however. The case studies presented abovesubjectbothdemocratic eace theory nd realism oa robust est. t s strikingthat neach of thesefour ases realism,notdemocratic eace theory, rovidesthe more compelling explanation of why war was avoided. Indeed, thedemocratic eace theory ndicators ppear not to have played any discerniblerole in the outcome ofthese crises.In each ofthese crises, at least one ofthe democratic tates nvolved waspreparedto go to war (or,in the case of France n 1923,to use military orcecoercively)because it believed it had vital strategic r reputational nterestsat stake. In each of these crises, war was avoided only because one sideelected to pull back from the brink. In each of the four crises, war wasavoided not because of the "live and let live" spiritof peaceful disputeresolutionat democraticpeace theory's core, but because ofrealistfactors.Adversedistributions fmilitaryapabilities xplainwhyFrance did not fightoverFashoda, and whyGermanyresistedthe Frenchoccupationof the Ruhrpassivelyrather hanforcibly. oncernsthatotherswould takeadvantage ofthe fight the "waterbirdsdilemma") explain why Britainbacked down intheVenezuela crisis, and theUnion submitted o Britain'sultimatumn theTrent ffair.When one actually ooks beyond the result f these fourcrises("democracies do not fightdemocracies") and attemptsto understandwhythese crises turned out as they did, it becomes clear thatdemocraticpeacetheory'scausal logic has onlyminimalexplanatory ower.Although democraticpeace theory dentifies correlation etween domes-ticstructurend the absence of war betweendemocracies, tfailsto establisha causal link. Because democratic peace theory'sdeductive logic lacks ex-planatory ower, a second look at thetheory's mpirical upport s warrantedto see if the evidence is as strongas is commonlybelieved. The statisticalevidence that democracies do not fight ach other seems impressivebut infact, t is inconclusive, because the universe of cases providing empiricalsupportfordemocraticpeace theory s small,and because several mportant



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cases of wars between democratic tatesare notcountedforreasons thatarenot persuasive.

QUANTITATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE THEORY: HOW BIG AN N?Democratic peace theorypurportsto be validated by a large number "N")of cases. A large N is achieved by aggregating henumber ofpossible dem-ocraticdyads. Thus Switzerlandand Sweden, or Austria and Israel, countas democratic dyads validatingdemocratic peace theory.The result is theappearance of a large numberof nteractionswith ittle rno conflict etweendemocracies. Notwithstanding he theory's claim, however, the universe ofsupporting cases is small. There are three reasons why this is so. First,between 1815 and 1945 therewere very few democracies and the N wouldshrinkfurtherfonly dyads involvingdemocraticgreat powers are consid-ered). Second, the possibilityof any dyad (whether democratic,mixed, ornon-democratic)becoming involved in a war is small, because wars are arelatively are occurrence. States, even great powers, do not spend most oftheir ime at war. 17 As David Spiro points out, ifall nations are unlikely ofightwars, the claim thatdemocracies do not fight ach other oses much ofits power. He states that fnations are rarely twar, and liberal dyads are asmall proportion of all possible pairingsof nation-states, hen perhaps weshould be surprised fdemocracies ever do go towar,butnotat the absenceofwars among democracies.118Third,not all dyads are createdequal. For the purposes oftestingdemo-craticpeace theory, dyad is significant nly if it represents case wherethere is a real possibilityof two states going to war. To fight, tates needboth the opportunitythat is, the abilityto actually project theirpower toreachan opponent) and a reason o do so. Only dyads meeting heseprecon-ditions are part of the appropriateuniverse of cases fromwhich democraticpeace theory an be tested.

117. On the striking ecline in the frequency f greatpower war during thepast two centuriessee Jack . Levy, War nd theModernGreat ower ystem, 495-1975 Lexington:University ressofKentucky, 983), chap. 6.118. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance f the Liberal Peace," Internationalecurity, ol. 19,No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86. Spiro concludes that the statistical vidence for heliberalpeace isweak: either the data are ambiguous, or random chance would predictthe absence of warsbetween democracies. Spiro is sympathetic o the democraticpeace theory.He suggests thatthe tendency of liberal states to ally with, instead of opposing, each otheris important ndprobably s rooted in liberalnorms.



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issue of whether democratic norms and culture do, in fact, result in thepeaceful resolutionof disputes withindemocracies. The War Between theStates cuts to the heart of the democratic peace theory's causal logic: ifdemocraticnormsand culturefailto prevent he outbreakof civilwar withindemocracies, what reason is there to believe that theywill prevent the out-break of interstatewars between democracies?In the case of the Union and the Confederacy, he characteristics t theheart of democraticpeace theory-the democratic thos of respect forotherdemocracies, a political culturethatemphasizes thenon-violent ispute res-olution, the shared benefits of cooperation, the restraining ffect f opendebate and public opinion-failed conspicuously to assure a peaceful result.Indeed, if a democracy as tightly nit-politically, conomically, ulturally-as the United Stateswas in 1861 could split nto twowarring uccessorstates,we should have little confidence thatdemocracywill prevent great powerconflictsn an anarchic, competitive, elf-helprealmlike international oli-tics.An even more important example is the issue of whetherWilhelmineGermany was a democracy. Even ifWorldWar I were the only example ofdemocracies fighting ach other, it would be so glaringan exception todemocratic peace theory as to render it invalid. As even Michael Doyleconcedes, the question of whetherWilhelmineGermanywas a democracypresents a "difficult ase."1123 ndeed, it is such a difficult ase that, in afootnote,Doyle creates a new category n which to classifyWilhelmineGer-many-that of a bifurcateddemocracy: pre-1914Germany was, he says,democraticwith respect to domesticpoliticsbut not in the realmofforeignpolicy.124Doyle does not consider mperialGerma

christopher kant or cant_the myth of the democratic peace

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