churchill - the unlikely ally

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WINSTON L. S. CHURCHILL:

THE UNLIKELY ALLY,

1919-1939

by

WILLIAM MICHAEL WA TTS , B.A.

A THESIS

IN

HISTORY

Submitted to the Graduate Facultyof Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved


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7 5

No, 59 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

dop'^ I sincerely appreciate the time, effort andguidance of the members of my thesis committee. Dr.

James W. Harper and Dr. Brian L. Blakeley.

1 1


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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. CHURCHILL: THE MAN AND HIS CAREER

II . CHURCHILL: IN HARMONY WITH THEAMERICAN PEOPLE

III. CHURCHILL: AT ENMITY WITH THE

AMERICAN PEOPLEIV. CHURCHILL: THE AUTHOR

V. CONCLUSIONS: THE UNLIKELY ALLY

SELECTED SOURCES

1 1

1

4

16

46

74

100

111

1 1 1


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INTRODUCTION

Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill received on the

ninth of April,1963, the only honorary grant of United

States citizenship that the Congress has ever given. '-

This was a singular outpouring of feeling and honor for

the then ailing leader of Britain during World War II,

a person who was probably the most famous and popular

foreigner in United States' history. At this time it

could be easily recorded that Churchill had a warm and

positive relationship with the American people . '

This thesis will attempt to ascertain the image

Churchill cast in the American mind during the period

1919-1939. During this period Churchill gained great

exposure in the American press. He cast a complex, but

predominately unfavorable impression. He appeared to be

a mos t unlikely ally of the American people.

In selecting the time period 1919-1939, the utmost

consideration was to view Churchill's activities before

the Second World War began. After the war errupted and

Churchill became Prime Minister, his influence in the

Writers and Editorial Staff of the New York Tim es,Winston S. Churchill: The Man of the Century (New York:Barton Books , 1965), p. 141.


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United States grew immensely. It is beyond the scope of

the present research to ascertain the wartime influence

of the British Prime Minister in any depth. Al so, an

extended coverage of the pre-1919 era would call into play

the war relations of the United States and its allies,

clouding Churchill's personal influence. Thus, this time

period was selected as a limited epoch, largely ignored

in Churchill's life, in which to view the influence he

garnered in the minds of Americans.

The problems with "finding the American mind" on

any subject were readily discernible. It was difficult to

determine one generally distinguishable attitude of the

American people toward Churchill. However, within limits

one could obtain a feeling of the majority of American

people by reading the comments of leading periodicals and

studying monographs on the issues that arose. Als o, one

could discern certain intellectual and political groups

which had kindred feelings for many of Churchill's policies

and actions .

A second problem was the selection of publications

that were read by the general public of that age, and were

readily available for research. In selecting the New York

Times and the periodicals, the idea of general circulation

and mass appeal was uppermost in consideration. The New

York Times was perhaps the leading eastern newspaper; and

the head of a large chain of paper s, that reflected the


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attitudes of the parent paper. Also , the New York Times

was the paper mos t interested in European affairs . It

especially dealt with British news, thus Churchill would

appear in the Times more than other American papers.2 The

periodicals were selected from the Reader's Guide to Peri

odical Literature, the best source of general reading

periodicals.

As with all research and reporting, a large number

of individuals must be acknowledged for their contributions

to this thesis. First, I would thank my wife for her patience, understand ing, and long hours of labor in typing

and proofreading this undertaking.

Also, I appreciate the time, effort and direction

offered by Dr. James Harper and Dr. Brian Blakeley. It

was their experience in helping in research that led me

through the long hours of labor in completing this work .Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the

libraries at S t. Mary's University, Trinity University,

The Public Library of San Antonio, as well as the Texas

Tech University facilities for the use of their materials.

It is only with the assistance of those aforementioned that

this project reached completion.

^Oswald Garrison Villard, Some Newspapers and Newspapermen (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), p. 4. OswaldVillard, editor of the Natio n, and the New York Evening Postdiscussed the accusation that the New York Times was controlled by British interests, but explained that the paperwas owned by Americans who had a great deal of interest inthe events of Europe and especially Britain.


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CHAPTER I

CHURCHILL: THE MAN AND HIS CAREER

Winston Churchill's heritage, beliefs, and the

offices he held all had profound influence upon his image

in the United States. The future Prime Minister was direct

ly related to John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, a

noted and honored hero to the English. This heritage placed

Winston in one of the aristocratic ruling families of the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The posi

tion of his father. Lord Randolph Churchill, also introduced

young Churchill to acquaintances in high places. His father

was the rising star of the Tory Party in the early 1880 's,

until he resigned his post as Chancellor of the Exchequer

over a cabinet dispute on the size of army estimates.

After his resignation Lord Randolph suffered deep depression2

and died early in life, a broken man. The death of

Churchill's father caused him to make his own way in life,3

in some cases in spite of his paternal heritage.

Winston Churchill's maternal heritage was equally

-'Robert Rhodes James, Churchil l: A Study in Failu re ,1900-1939 (Cleveland: World Publishing Co ., 1970), p. 8.

^Ibid., p. 7. Lord Randolph Churchill died inJanuary, 1895 at the age of 45 from paresis.

-^J.T. Wool f, "Feature Article" , New York Times ,July 20, 1930, sec. 5 , pp. 3 and 22.


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as influential, yet not as illustrious as his paternal

relationship. His mother was Jeanette (Jennie) Jerome,

the daughter of Leonard Jer ome , wealthy part-owner of the

New York T ime s. Winston's m.aternal grandfather was well

known in the political, social, and financial society of

the day. He served as consul at Trieste, was known as the

"King of Wall Street", and made horse racing an honorable

sport of the elite society, for which he was named "Father

of the American Turf".4 The maternal relationship made

Churchill half American and gave him entry into the leading

society in the United States; an access which a middle

aged Churchill would use to gain support for his views.^

After attending several public schools, Churchill

embarked on a military career, entering Sandhurst, the

British West Point.^ Graduating eighth in his class of

1894, he entered the twin careers of soldier and war corre

spondent, which provided him an income for the next few

years. ' Churchill took a commission in the Fourth Hussars

^Ralph G. Martin , Jennie: The Life of Lady RandlophChurchill, The Romantic Years, 1854-1895 (Englewood Clif fs;Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 1 and 16.

^Philip Guedella, Harper's Ma gazine, June , 1927,

pp. 21-25. Churchill's maternal heritage, according toGuedella , a biographer of Churchill, gave him his pugnaciouspersonality.

^Winston S. Churchill , My Early Li fe, A RovingCommission (2nd. ed.. New York: Charles Scribners Sons,1958) p. 9. Churchill attended Saint James PreparatorySchool, Brighton and Harrow and did not distinguish himselfat any of the three schools.

7Ibid., pp. 10 and 5 0.


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and immediately went to Cuba to observe the Spanish

attempt to stop the revolt that had begun on the island.

To supplement his military pay young Churchill also reported

his observations to the Daily Graphic a London paper.^

From Cuba he went to Bangalore, India in 189 7, where he

joined in an expedition against the Pathans , a rebel Moslem

group in Northwest India. Denied permission to go in a

military capacity, Churchill once again turned to journal

ism and wrote as a war correspondent for the Daily Tele-Q

graph. His dispatches were later compiled into a book

on the expedition entitled the Malakand Field Force.

The book was very well received in America and in most

British circles; but because of its abundant suggestions

as to military strategy, not by the military.

In 1898 Churchill used his mother's influence to

obtain a commission in the Nile Expeditionary Force , over

the objections of the commander. General Sir Herbert

Kitchener. This episode also led to another book.

The River War , a history of the expedition, and a novelo

Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill:Youth (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1966), p. 256.

9lbid., p. 342

^^Winston Churchill, The Story of the MalakandField Force (Longmans, 1898).

llchurchill, W. S. Churchill: Youth, pp. 379-380Lady Churchill spoke to Prime Minister Salisbury and afriend in Parliament Sir Evelyn Wood, to arrange theappointment to the force.


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Savrola . Speaking engagements concerning these adven

tures and laudatory reviews of his books brought Churchill

his firs t not ice in the American press.-' Churchill 's

last youthful adventure was in another of the "glorious

little wars", the Boer War.^^ Once again sword and pen

became Churchill's companions as he took an active military

part in the war , as well as reported it for the Morning

Post. -' It was during this episode that he was captured

by Louis Botha, future general and Prime Minister of South

Afri ca. Also stemming from this escapade were more books

on the conduct of the war itself. The military exploits

of the young Chu rchil l, captured in his books and the

legend that he helped originate, served him well in the

United Sta tes . Persons reading his v/orks and hearing of

him were impressed with this young aristocrat and his love

12Winston Churchill, The River War (Longmans Green,

1902) and Savrola (Longmans, 1900).'R. Churchil l, W. S. Churchil l: Youth, p . 524 ,

New York Times Book Review, April 30, 1898, p. 296, January 6, 1900, p. 1. The River War was in such demandthat it ran through three separate editions by 1903.

Harold Callender, "When Churchill Thunders AllBritain Takes Heed", New York Times , November 22 , 1936,sec. 8, p. 5.

^^Winston S. Chur chill , My Early Life (2nd ed.,New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1958), p. 230.

Winston Chu rchill, London to Lady Smith ViaPretoria (Longmans Green, 1900) and Ian Hamilton'sMarch (Longmans Green, 1900).


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of action. 1*7 This was a time of military conquest in

United States' history, and the many accounts of a

Theodore Roosevelt charging up San Juan hill in Cuba

illustrate the popular passion for young military heroes.

Churchill's ability to play on this emotion through his

books at home and in America evoked awe and respect from

Britons and America ns.

Even before the Boer War, Churchill revealed a

boredom with soldiering and desire to enter politics.

Unsuccessful in his first campaign, he utilized his war

time notoriety to win as a Conservative candidate at

Oldham in 1900. ' He remained a Conservative only until

1904, when he "crossed the aisle" because of disagreement

with the protectionist trade policies of the Conservatives.

Leaving O ldham, Churchill ran for and won a seat as a

Liberal in the North West Manchester constituency in the

election of 1906 . Also in this year he published the

20memorial book to his father. Lord Randolph Churchill.

19

17Each of Churchill's military works during this

period received praise in the New York Book Review. Ineach case the powerful writing was lauded and the accuracyof military writing was mentioned. Also , the reviewersmentioned his personal exploits. New York Times BookReview, April 30, 1898, p. 296, January 6, 1900, p. 82,June 2, 1900, p. 35 4, January 12 , 1901, p. 19, and February 21, 1903, p. 115.

18w. Churchill, My Early Life, p. 360.

l^Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill:Young Statesm.an (Boston: Hough


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Churchill also received in this same year an office in

Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman's cabinet,

as Under Secretary of the Colonies.^1

When in 1 908, the new Liberal Prime Minister

Herbert Asquith appointed Churchill to the Presidency of

the Board of Trade , Churchi ll h'ad to be endorsed in a

special election by his North West Manchester District.

He lost a close election, but was returned in a by-election

from the district of Dundee, insuring his new office in0 0

the cabinet.-^^ The youthful Churchill's aggressive person

ality and ability to work led him to the office of Home

Secretary in 19 10, and to the prestigious office of First

Lord of the Admiralty in 191 1, a time ripe for advancing

his career.23

In the year 1911 the first glimmer of war to come

had begun to appear and the First Lord was one who caught

sight of the approaching world crisis. With the aid of

Sea Lord Sir John Fisc her, Churchill began the improvement

of the British Royal N a v y . ^ Acting on his own authority

in preparing the fleet, and placing it in strategic posi

tions, Churchill initiated a series of actions that depicted

21James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, p. 25 .

22ibid., p. 25 .

23vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretto n, Winston Churchilland the Royal Navy (New York: Coward McCann , Inc., 1968),p. 44.

24 Ibid., p. 44 .


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his brilliant though at times erratic military mi nd.

The war found the fleet ready, but Churchill

planning another master stroke did not find the execution

so propitious as the preparation of the fleet. The masterly planned but ill executed Gallipoli campaign began

Churchill's fall from power to depths from which most

politicians would never have recovered.^^ It was Church

ill's effort and failure to break the western deadlock by

an attack at Gallipoli that caused him unwanted exposure

and notoriety in Europe as well as in the United St ates.This episode illustrated a supposedly erratic military

strategy in a stubborn mind that would haunt Churchill at

home and abroad until he returned to the same office

twenty-four years later. This disaster and an earlier

futile attempt to hold the harbor at Antwerp led to his

removal as First Lord.

Leaving office Churchill took a variety of posi

tions in the government and played an active military part

in the war . However , the new Prime Minister of the

National Governmen t, David Lloyd G eorge, recalling the

abilities of Churchill from their association in Asquith's

25see Churchill's account in his history of WorldWar I, The World Cris is, for a defense of his actions.Robert Rhodes James gives a differing account in his work,Gallipoli.

2^Churchill was given the office of Chancellor ofthe Duchy of Lancaster and later served with the 6th RoyalFusiliers in France.


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govern ment, offered the former First Lord the office of

Minister of Munitions .^^ Churchill served there until

1918, when he was appointed Secretary of State for War

and for the Air Ministry , an important position due tothe demobilization and reorganization of the military

after the great war and the development of a military

policy toward Russia.^^ Still serving under Lloyd Geor ge,

Churchill was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies

where he was part of the difficult negotiations with the. ^ 29

Irish.

In the 1920's and 1930's Churchill maneuvered in

and out of parties showing an independe nceor opp ort uni sm

that did not go unnoticed in the United Sta tes. The Liberal

Party decreasing in power, but still in a coalition govern

ment with Conservative support, began to move more toward

a Labour position. Churchill, an anti-socialist, split

with the Liberals and started the move that would eventually

bring him back into his old Tory Party. Still running as a

Liberal in 1 922 , he lost his seat in Dundee and a by-

election in Leichester during 1923. The movement by the

Liberals toward the Labour Party and his defeat in 1923

by a Socialist caused Churchill to run as an independent

27

28

James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, p. 102.

Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: The Years ofPreparation (Westport: Greenwood Pres s, 1958) , p. 288.

2^Broad, Churchill: Years of Preparation , p. 306.


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anti-socialist in the Abbey Division of Westminister,

thus breaking his twenty year relationship with the

30Liberals. Even though he lost the election, Churchill

made a very good showing in this dominantly Conservativedistrict . It was no surprise that in the by-election in

Epping Fores t, Churchill, running as a Constitutionalist,

won a seat in Parliament, returning after a three year

absence. The movement between parties caused British and

American observers to doubt Churchill's loyalty and depend

ability. Howeve r, the maneuver to the right in Britishpolitics allowed Churchill to come back into association

with the Conservative Party, which won the general election

in November of 1924.

Upon the selection of the new cabinet of Stanley

Baldw in, Conservative Prime Minister, the nation was com

pletely surprised to find Churchill included with the31prestigous portfolio of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

From this post as the second most powerful man in the

govern ment, Churchill was to have great impact on the

United Stat es, both from the positions he took on major

issues and the exalted office he held.

^Qlbid., pp. 431-432.

New York Ti me s, November 7, 19 24 , p. 1:1.

Churchill would have great economic effect onthe United States as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He broughtBritain back to the gold standard and negotiated the debtsettlemen ts, as well as took part in the General Strikethat paralyzed Britain in 1926.


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Churchill occupied this office from 1924 through

1929, in the second government of Stanley Baldwin. After

the fall of the Conservatives and the coming to power of

the second Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald,

Churchill served in the shadow cabinet of the Tori es.

As MacDonald led Labour, the depression struck Britain

as it had the United States . MacDonald's government fell

in 1931 due to the financial crisis. At this point King

George V asked MacDonald to head a National government and

when the Conservatives agreed to join, Churchill began to

move toward an independent position. The final break with

the Conservative Party came with Churchill's opposition to

dominion status for India. The once rising star of a not

so youthful Churchill was once more in decline.33

The former Chancellor of the Exchequer was now

out of party; out of power . His role seemed destined to

be a "voice crying in the wilde rness ", a critic of all

who held power. Her e, in this back bench position,

Churchill fought the battles for the old ruling aristocracy,

over India, Edward VIII's abdication and the other issues

of the day. It was also from this lonely critic's position

that he began to prophecy the coming of World War II and

warn of German rearmament. This warning came at a desper

ate time for Britain and Churchill. For Britain it led to

a state of semi-preparedness, for Churchill a return to

33New York Times , January 31, 1930, p. 16:3.


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his old position as First Lord of the Admiralty. "

This background of Churchill's life would not be

complete without an attempt to capture the man's person

ality. A man wh o, as Lord Berkenhead described, was

"easily contented with the best of everything."^^ Churchill

was not satisfied only with the' best, but with being the

best at everything. His versatility read like the credits

of a combination of men. He wa s: an excellent painter,

a bricklaye r, an orator unequalled in modern British

Parliame nt, a prolific as well as lauded writer, and as

has been mentioned a soldier, journalist, and politician.

In each area of endeavor the attempt to excel drove

Winston Churchill.

This attempt to excel led to many misunderstand

ings and critical mistakes in his career. Churchill's

ability in making the complex, simple and in dogmatically

pursuing an idea led many to feel he was of shallow mind,

when in reality his was a genius far deeper than most men

comprehended.

The pugnacity and impetuosity with which Churchill

grasped an idea or thought, and the extremes he took to

carry it through , caused critics to infer that he wa s:

treacherous, he followed his own star, and he owed allegiance

" Ibid. , September 4, 1939 , p. 8:4.

^^Ibid., November 29 , 1931, sec. 9, p. 2:3.


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to no one but himself.^^ These were charges that followed

the entire Churchill family. Journa lists, in speaking of

Winston Church ill, constantly alluded to the treachery,

the militarism, and the depression that shadowed his

family; from the first Duke of Marlborough to his father.

Lord Randolph.

Churchill was at times a pugnacious advocate of

an aristocratic time passed, a fighter for an age that

had vanished. In other instances he contributed to social

change and reform in a "Tory democracy" tradition. He

was- an adventurer in the military during the "glorious

little wars" and this carried over into his political

affa irs, where he loved political fights. Zealous and

brilliant though sometimes erratic, Churchill often evoked

37

mistrust and criticism as a man of no character. How

ever, through all he was loyal to Britain as he imagined

her.

^^David John Marshall , "Winston Churchill: AStudy of England's Political Bad Boy", Living A ge , Apr il,1929, pp. 96-98.

- New York Ti mes, Apri l 4, 19 21 , p . 12:7. "Hiseffect on men is one of interest and curiosity not admiration and loyalty. His power is the power of gift s,not character."


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CHAPTER II

CHURCHILL: IN HARMONY WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

One might readily assume that Churchill's tremen

dous popularity in the United States arose from his per

formance as a World War II ally. However, a study of

Churchill's image in the American press before 1939 reveals

that he had laid a base of popular support in the United

States. Churchill's American heritage and his visits to

the United States gave him a distinct advantage in appeal

ing for American support. Through the period 1919-1939,

he cultivated this advantage by calling for Anglo-American

amity and cooperation. Most important, Churchill mirrored

and in some cases anticipated American public opinion on

a variety of issues ranging from Zionism to economic policy.

Thus, the man who would become England's wartime leader won

a position of influence and affection among important seg

ments of American public opinion well before the formation

of the wartime alliance.

Churchill's personal relationship with the American

peop le, through his mother's birth, was a strong contact

with the populace of the United States. A review of Church

ill's book. The World C ris is, by Filson Young brought out

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the importance of this relationship. In his review Young

contended that the book was well received by the American

public because of the author's place in English politics

and his American heritage.-'- In an article for the New YorkTimes, J. L. Garvin of the Sunday Observer made the same

observation. When discussing the relations of Britain

and the United Sta tes , Garvin declared that it was well

for England and the Empire to have Churchill in offi ce.

Churchill, being half American, would be the man to keep

the United States and Britain together and keep a strong2

imperial and maritime policy.

The personal advantages of Churchill can be seen

in his visit to the United States in 1929. While in New

York he was entertained at the home of the arch-Anglophobe

William Randolph Hearst. Only Churchill's background as

a journalist and his American mother's family connections

could open the door to the home of the perpetual Britain-

baiter, Hearst.

When visiting in the United States, Churchill

called upon the leading society of the nation. The door

to dire ct, personal influence was open as early as 1901.

The social calls he made during this speaking tour included.

New York Times, November 18, 1923, sec. 3, p. 7:1.

^Ibid., January 30, 1921, p. 2:4.

^Ibid., October 19, 1929, p. 12:2 .


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then President William McKinley, Senator Chauncey Depew,

and the recently elected Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt.

Also, the speaking engagements were a social succ ess, the

highlight being an introduction by Mark Twai n, at a NewYork engage ment. The noted American author introduced him

by relating, "Churchill by his father is an Englishman, by

his mother he is an American, no doubt a blend that makes

the perfect man ." Later in the 1920's and 1930's Churchill

mixed with the same type of company. At the Hearst dinner

mentioned above , the guests included: the Asto rs, theVander bilts, Jay Gould, Jimmy Walker, and others of econom-

ic, poli tica l, and social importance.

Howev er, these gatherings did not draw a great

deal of interest from the press nor the general public

but rather from the social and economic elite to whom

Churchill mainly spoke. In an editorial on Churchill's

visit in 19 29, the New York Times mentioned that his visit

was overshadowed by the meeting of Prime Minister Ramsay

MacDonald and President Herbert Hoover. The article went

on to say that Churchill , "who loomed in vast affairs years

before either of them did, was inconspicuous in New York."

The quiet atmosphere of Churchill's trip in 1929

^R. Churchill, Winston Churchill: Youth, p. 524.

^New York Time s, October 19, 1929, p. 12:2.

^Ibid., November 10 , 1929. sec. 3, p. 4:6.


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was almost duplicated in a return visit in 1931. However,

in this instance the future Prime Minister was struck by

an automobile while crossing the street in New York."^ The

accident and the reports of his recovery kept Churchill's

name in the news, and it also called forth sympathetic

inquiries as to his health from the American people.

Churchi ll, who has been called "that great embodi

ment of the partnership" between Britain and the United

States, used his American visits to preach Anglo-American

cooperation and to bring the two English speaking nationsp

together. Long before he began to warn the world of Nazi

rearmament and the need for cooperation among the democ

racies of the world, he called for the close interworking

of British and American policies. In the two journeys

Churchill made to the United States during this time period,

he emphasized the need for international cooperation between

Britain and America on the economic problems of the day.

Howeve r, Churchill's exhortations were not always

a call for economic, political , or military cooperation as

evidenced in his speech to open an air show in England.

Here he noted that the seas divided the Anglo-American

people, but it was his belief in the future the air would

'ibid., December 14 , 1931, p. 1:7.D

William Clark, Less Than Kin (London: HamishHamilton, 1957) , p. 3.


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unite them.^ On another occasion he spoke at a dinner

honoring George Washington, whom he called a hero to all

Engli sh speaking people."*- The essence of Churchill 's

thoughts on Britain's and America's close relationshipwas found in his article, "The Union of English-Speaking

People", for News of the World, a London newspaper, on

May 15 , 1938.

The beginnings of American history are to befound, not across the Atlantic, but where theThames flows between green lawns and woodlandsdown to a grey sea.

Britain and America are joint sharers in agreat inheritance of law and letters. Ourpolitical institutions, under the mask of outwarddiffer ence, bear the marks of a common originand a common aim.

We are both democraciesand to-day our countriesare, with France, the last great strongholds ofParliamentary government and individual liberty.

It is the English-speaking nations who, almostalone, keep alight the torch of Freedom.

These things are a powerful incentive tocollaboration.

With nations, as with individuals, if you caredeeply for the same thing s, and these things arethreatened, it is natural to work together topreserve them.

Collaboration of this kind does not imply anyformal union of the English-speaking peop les. Itis a union of spirit, not of fo rms, that we seek.

There need not even be an alliance.All that is necessary is a willingness to

consult together, an understanding that Britainand America shall pursu e, side by side, theirmutual good and the good of the whole w o r l d . H

% e w York Times, May 2, 1919, p. 13:2.

IQibid., July 13, 193 2, p. 11:1.

-'-Kay H al le , ed. , Wins^or> r-hurchill on Americaand Britain (New York: Walker and Co ., 1970), pp 292-293 and 300.


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In an earlier speech in New York on February 8,

1932, Churchill called for the more practical symbol of

amity, economic cooperation to help pull the world out of

depression. He suggested that a close working partnership

between England and the United States would stimulate

international trade and the movement of currency, as well

as help bring other nations out of world wide economic. . 12crisis.

The militaristic speeches of Churchill were

directed most strongly against Germany in the 1930's,

and as early as 1 929 , he appealed for United States help

in naval armaments in a speech to the Iron and Steel Manu

facturers Association. In October, 1929, Churchill called

for understanding on both sides of the ocean, as each

nation attempted to build navies suitable for their indi-

13vidual needs . Finally, Churchill spoke about the needs

of the English-speaking people to band together against

Communism and the disintegration of Europe. At the time the

former Chancellor said that only the strong leadership

of the two English democracies could give guidance to

Europe and hold back the movement of Communism.

Churchill's themes of Anglo-American politic al.

-'- New York Ti me s, February 9, 19 32 , p. 44: 1.

'-' Ibid. , October 26, 1929, p. 3:3.

' Ibid. , February 8, 1932, p. 3:5.


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economic, and military cooperation presaged later diplo

matic developments and may have struck a responsive note

among certain Amer icans. Certainly animosity between the

United States and Great Britain had waned since 1900.Moreo ver, the fact that a prominent British political

figure seemed solicitous of the goodwill of the United

States pleased American egoes , as well as those who were

engaged in promoting an active international American

foreign policy . However, political isolationism and

economic nationalism ran strong in America from 1921-

1939 and any calls for an Anglo-American alliance or

"unique relationship" would have to await a serious crisis

for fulfillment.

Yet Churchill's multi-faceted activities and inter

ests took him into many other areas that evoked a much

broader appeal and a more deeply felt response from

Americans. His actions, statements, and policies on the

Bolshevik revolution, the resumption of the gold standard

by Brit ain, the anti-Nazi speeches of the 1930' s, and other

issues paralleled opinions of large numbers in the United

States.

One such concern of the American people and Church

ill was the Russian revolution and the power of the Bol

sheviks. This fear was to remain open and pronounced until

the attack by Hitler on the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics in 1941. At the end of World War I, as the


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23

Bolsheviks brought Russia out of the war with Germany,

some of the Allies (Japan, Great Brita in, and the United

States) sent troops into Russia. The reasons given were

to keep supplies at Archangel from falling into Germanhands, to help Czechoslovakian soldiers entrapped in the

interior of Russia, and primarily to reinstate the eastern

IS

front against Germany. -" The Communists disputed these

reasons and claimed the Allies were attempting to help

the White Russians in the Civil War then being waged.

Although denied by President Wilson and other allied

leaders, there was evidence to support the Moscow alle-^.. ^ 16gations.

The sending of troops into Russia seemed to be

well received by the American public until a number of

soldiers were killed in clashes with the Bolsheviks.

At this point the American populace demanded the removal

of American troo ps, which took place during the next few

months. The American people opposed and feared the

15Leonid T. Strakhovsky, The Origins of American

Intervention in Northern Russia (2nd ed.; New York: HowardFertig, 1972), p. 75 . The author concludes that it was thepolicy of the United States to reinstate the eastern front.Howev er, Britain and France wanted to overthrow the Bolsheviks, as well as continue against Germany.

Ibid., p. 75 , and Thomas A. Bailey, America Fac^sRussia (Ithaca: Cornell University Pres s, 1950) , pp. 242-243.

Peter G. F ilene, Americans and the Soviet Experi-men t (Cambridge: Harvard University Pre ss, 1967) , pp. 268-269


27/120

24

Bolshevik government because of its communistic nature and

because of its advocacy of a world revolution. Als o, the

Communist government had concluded a separate peace with

Germany and in doing so had repudiated Russia's war debt.

These practical reasons were fused with the idealistic

American concepts of individual ownership of private

property and a belief in God, both of which the Bolshevik

government denounced. The American position, both public

and private, then became one of isolation toward Russia

and a purge of any Socialist or "foreign" influence with

in the United S tates. The American people, in a movement

toward isolation in world affairs, were not willing to

return to war to overturn the Communist government in

Russia.

At this time Churchill was the Secretary of War

and Air Ministry of Lloyd George's government, and inthis capacity he shared responsibility with the Prime

Minister for the actions of the British forces in Russia.

The Secretary of War and Air called the placing of troops

in the Soviet Union an "interallied action" taken to obtain

a government acceptable to the allies in Russia. This

concept of interallied action and the actual use of Americantroops was attacked by Senator William E. Borah, Republican

from Idaho, who was one of the leading critics of the

1 RLeonid I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel

(2nd ed. New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), pp. 169-170.


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25

United States' policy toward Russia. "'" Once the American

troops were recalled; however, the continued verbal attacks

of Churchill and his use of troops in Russia were greeted

in the United States with enthusiasm, as shown by the closeattention given to his actions in the New York Times. ^^

Many Americans opposed the Bolshevik government and wel

comed others who tried to end the control of the Communists

in Russia.21

During the period, 1919-1922, the American public

plunged into the "Red Scare", a condition perfect forChurchill to gain influence because of his strong stand

against Communism. Churchill's animosity toward Russia

was illustrated in journalistic debates with H. G. Wells,

the noted novelist and a prominent defender of the polit

ical left. Wells attacked Churchill's conservative phi

losophies, and accused the Secretary of having no alternatives to Communism, but was simply anti-everything. The

novelist claimed Churchill was against Communism because

it was new and Churchill was an aristocrat who could not

see the truth but only what he wished to see. For this

reason. Wells continued, Churchill had sent troops into

Russia and had almost brought Britain into a state of war .

l New York Ti mes , September 6, 191 9, p. 4:1.

20Fourteen articles concerning Churchill and hisinvolvement in Russia ran during the year 1919.

2lFilene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment,p. 272.


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26

with no authorization from the government. Churchill

argued that Communism was a cancer that would kill Russia.

The Bolsheviks should be stopped while the time was ripe,

before they spread over the world.22

Churchill rejoined that, "they (Bolsheviks) rep

resented the principles of death." Continuing, he stated,

" . . . they closed the gates both to the paths which make

life tolerable here below and to those which we hope lead

on to serener forms of existance." They "thrust on man

kind universal slavery, disguised as universal equality"23

This debate became the subject of two letters to

the edito r of the Nev7 York Tim es, which in both cases

backed Churchill' s argument.24 This close ideological

identification between Churchill and the public of the

United States continued until the 1930's. Robert Murray

in his book. Red Scar e, illustrated the opinion of the

American public during these later years.

22"winston Churchill v. Well s, Further Echoes ofthe Controversy over Russia", New York T imes, January 9,1921, sec. 8, p. 2. In conjunction with this debate theLabour Party in Britain had earlier charged that Churchill'sholding office was a national disgrace. New York Tim es,July 26, 1920 , p. 2:8. Als o, they had asked for his impeachment. New York Times, August 4, 1920, p. 1:2.

23"churchill v. Wells ," New York Tim es, January9, 1921, sec. 8, p. 2.

24lbid., January 16, 1921, sec. 6, p. 8:2 and sec.7, p. 3:3.


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27

. . . antiradical emotionalism emanating from theScare affected both governmental and privatethinking for almost a decade to come and left itsunmistakable imprint upon many phases of Americanlife. Continued insistance upon ideologicalconformi ty, suspicion of organized labor, public

intolerance toward a liens , and a hatred for SovietRussia . . . wer e, partially at least, outgrowthsof the Scare period. "

It was not until 1933 , under Franklin D. Roosevelt's admin

istration that the United States recognized Soviet Russia.

Churchill continued his attacks upon the Soviets until

he became more engrossed with Germany, and saw the need

for a counterbalance to Germany in the East , Russia.Thus, on this vital issue Churchill and the American people

saw eye to eye on the distrust and hatred of Russian Commu-

ism.

Another area of agreement between Churchill and

the American populace was closely connected to the fore

going discussion of Communism. This issue was the growth

of the socialistic Labour Party in Britain, which Churchill

considered a forerunner of Communism. The American people

in the midst of the Red Scare also made this invalid

assumption about American labor and Socialism.

In reading many of the comments that were made by

Churchil l, the American people found a champion for an

antisocialist position. In a speech to his Dundee constit

uency, Churchill declared that the Labour Party was "not

2^Robert K. Murray, Red Scare (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1955) , p. 263.


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28

fit to rule."26 This statement and later charges that the

Labour Party was part of a plot by Russia against England

were probably a part of the electioneering that was taking

place.27 However , the idea that Labour was a growing party

and that some Liberals were moving toward that group caused

Churchill in 1919 to suggest the formation of a Centre

Party. This party, led by Lloyd Ge orge, would actively

oppose Labour and consolidate gains made during World War

1.28 This idea of taking the moderates of both the Liberals

and Conservatives met with high praise in an editorial in

the New York Times . The article concluded that this new

party would fill a void in British politics and stop the

growth of the Labour Party.29

Although Churchill's hope of a Centre Party never

became reality, the American people of all political groups

continued to watch Churchill's stance against the Labour.o

Party . In running for re-election in Dundee in 192 2,

Churchill made the front page of the New York Times because

he was howled down by some Socialists at a campaign meeting.^0

In 1924 Churchill ran for Parliament as an Independent

Anti-Socialist in an election closely watched in the United

26New York Times , February 15 , 1920, p. 4:2.

27ibid., November 5, 1920, p. 17:7.

28ibid., July 17 , 1919, p. 1:4.

29ibid., July 18 , 1919, p. 10:3.

30ibid., November 14 , 1922 , p. 1:6.


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29

States. The coverage of speeches and tactics used by

all contestants was extensive. Finally, in defeat

Churchill once again made the front page of the New York31

Times. The defeated candidate, who lost to a Socialistin 19 23, and who was defeated twice while taking a strong

anti-socialist position had many conservative sympathizers

in the United States.

The American people, paralleling Churchill, had

their own purge of Socialism. This was best illustrated

by the removal of five duely elected Socialists from theNew York State Assembly on the grounds that they were

32

subversive. The politically conservative post-war United

States was as much against Socialism, Communism, and

other "radicalisms" as was Winston Churchill. This anti-

socialist stand lingered on in the United States into the

1930's. Chur chil l, commenting that Socialism would ruin

Brit ain, noted that he "pictured the United States as

the greatest and most admirable contrast to the Soviet33

System." The United States was a land that had totally

stopped any drift to the left in American politics. Thus,

one was able to see a close continuity in the actions of

Churchill and the powerful conservative Americans toward

the Socialist and Communist philosophies of government.

^^Ibid., March 21 , 1922, p. 1:2.

^F re de ri ck Lewis Alle n, Only Yesterday (New York:Harper and Brothers, 1931), p. 69.

^^New York Tim es, February 13, 1929, p. 8:1.


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30

This ideology held by Churchill and the American political

right was perhaps his strongest area of identity with the

American people and helped furnish Churchill a base upon

which he could build in the war years.Not only the broad appeal of anti-communism and

socialism attracted Americans to Churchill, but also his

support of var ious ethnic groups elicited the same response,

Churchill's advocation, as Secretary of State for the

Colonies, of a Jewish national homeland, and his role in

the settlement of the Irish question touched a responsivechord in the United States and won him the respect of two

influential group s.

In 1921 , Churchill, the new Secretary of the Colo

nies, took an investigating trip throughout the Middle East,

During this time he became closely involved in the Jewish

quest for a national home. While in Jerusalem in March and

Apri l of 1921 , Churchill announced that Britain would

34continue to back the Balfour Declaration. In 1930 ,

Churchill spoke against Ramsay MacDonald's White Paper,

which did away with the Balfour Declaration. This same

stand was continued in 1939 , when he called for increased

immigration of Jews into Palestine, protesting Neville35

Chamberlain's strict limitation on the influx of Jews.

^^New York Times , April 1, 1921, p. 2:5.

Rufus Lear si, The Jews in America: A History(New York: World Publishing Co ., 1954) , p. 286. New York

Times, November 25, 193 8, p. 13:2.


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31

Churchill's positions were close to the attitudes

within America of Gentiles and Jews alike. President

Wilson in the conference at Versailles was in favor of a

Jewish national state in Palestine. The American peoplewho were knowledgeable of the issue were for the formation

of a Jewish state. However, in 1919 no American pressure

on Britain to make a Jewish national homeland was found.

Later in 1930 and 1939, the American public berated

Britain for the two White Papers previously mentioned.

Also, by 193 9, most of the Jews in the United States had37come to support the idea of Zionism. The American

people, Jew and Gentile, had much the same vision for a

Jewish national home. Thus, by supporting the Balfour

Declaration, which called for a national home for Jews,

and by opposing the White Papers of 1930 and 1939,

Churchill mirrored the stance of many Americans , especially

the highly influential Jewish population.

The other ethnic group in America with which the

Secretary came into contact was the continual disrupters

of Anglo-American relations, the Irish. Churchill, as

Secretary of State for the Colonies was one of the prime

negotiators that undertook the settlement of the age-old

dispute between the Irish and Brita in, ultimately resulting

36 Learsi, Jews in America, p. 286.

37Nathan Glazer, American Judaism (Chicago:

University of Chicago, 1957), p. 104.


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32

in dominion status for Southern Ireland. "^

When discussing the relations between Ireland and

Bri tain, the overall sympathy and support of the American

peop le, both Irish and non-Gaelic, would lie on the side

of Eir e. That the American people could have a favorable

opinion of a Britisher on the Irish question was paradox

ical. However , the treaty of December 1921 gave Ireland

dominion status and interest in the Irish question de

clined within the United States. In fact some of the

editorial comment after the treaty was in support of the

British position and against the Republicans of Eamon de

Valera , who led them in a civil war in Ireland in 1922.

Churchill as Secretary of State for the Colonies

became chairman of a committee to work out the problems

of civil war that was being waged in Ireland. He also

was to attempt to settle the boundary dispute between

39Ulster and the recently formed Irish Free State.

Churchill's strong stand against de Valera and his support

of the Irish Constitution in Commons garnered praise in

the United States. In an editorial in the New York Times

the Irish Republicans were blamed for the problems of

3oEdward Norman, A History of Modern Ireland(Coral Gables : University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 284.

39Mary C. Bromaze, Churchill and Ireland (South

Bend: University of Notre Dame Press , 1964), p. 74."Neither before nor after did he (Churchill) fill thepowerful and influential role as far as Ireland wasconcerned that he did throughout most of 1922."


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33

Ireland, and the British and Churchill in particular were

praised for their fairness and patience.^^ Even the Irish-

American became disgusted with de Valera. As Carl Wittke

in The Irish in America wro te, "In the United States, evenDevoy and the Gaelic America became disgusted with the turn

of events, and blamed de Valera for continuing a civil war

over a quibble."^1

The Secretary also realized the importance of the

Irish question in Anglo-American relations. Speaking to

the English-Speaking Union before the treaty was signed,Churchill avowed that the Irish problem hurt British-

American relations; but if promptly solved, relations

would be closer than ever.^^ Thus, Churchill managed by

the strong stand he took on Ireland to once again reflect

the same opinion as did many Americans. Churchill worked

for and obtained dominion status for Ireland, an option

Irish-Americans favored. When civil war broke out in

Ireland, Churchill and the American people , both Irish

and non-Irish reacted in the same mannera complete

rejection of the goals of the Irish Republicans.

In 192 4, Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer

^^New York Times, June 2, 1922, p. 16:2.

' '"Carl Wi ttke , The Irish in America (Baton Rouge:Louisana State University Press, 1956), p. 292. The GaelicAmerica wa s the voice of the hard core Irish supporters inAmerica.

^^New York Times, December 17 , 1921, p. 6:6.


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34

took stands on policies that won both support and rebuke

in the United States. On the positive side his support of

the return of Great Britain to the gold standard won much

acclaim and goodwill in the conservative dominated Amer-43lean press. -

Britain during World War I had suspended the gold

standard that backed the British currency. After the

Treaty of Versailles was signed, there had been some pres

sure both in and out of Britain for a return to the prewar

standard. The generally poor economic conditions in Europe

had delayed the return under the Liberal, Labour, and

National governments.

The return to gold came in Churchill's first bud

get as Chancellor of the Exchequer and was received in

Britain with the "height of enthusiasm." ^ The return to

the gold standard came under attack in Britain at a later

date, but the American people and government were very

4 Spleased with the action of their chief trading partner.

The return of Britain to its old prewar rate of

exchange made the United States' goods less expensive in

the United Kingdom and caused the British export's cost to

The negative policy of Churchill concering America was his war debt decision , and will be discussed inthe next chapter.

^ % e w York Tim es, April 2, 1925, p. 1:8.

^--Ibid., May 5, 192 5 , p. 1:7.


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35

increase in world trade markets. Thus, the American public

and press felt that farmers as well as businessmen in the

United States would enjoy more prosperity. The public's

pleasure with Britain was illustrated in an editorial in

World 's Wor k. The article explained that Britain was one

of the most highly taxed nations in the world, and one who

had stood by her debt payments. Now Britain with courage

and endurance had returned to the gold standard and taken

its place as one of the banking centers of the world. The

British, led by Churchil l, had shown themselves to be cou

rageous and capable of sound economic planning and leader

ship.^^

The United States ' government was also in favor of

the gold standard resumption by Great Britain. John Parke

Young, Senate Investigator for the Committee on Gold and

Silver Investigation, wrote an article for the New York

Times discussing Britain's policy. He concluded that

Britain's return to the gold standard would lead Europe

out of economic distres s. He also stressed that the move

by Churchill was approved by the government of the United

States. The administration felt that not only the United

^^"The British Sovereign Back From the War ",Literary D igest, May 9, 1925 , p. 9.

47"The Result of Britain's Courage and Endurance",World's Work, June, 1925, pp. 123-]24.


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36

States ' , but the wor ld's economy would be improved."^^

The government also indirectly gave its approval with a

loan of gold to back the British in case a run was made

on the Pound.

The economic move by Churchill created a very

warm feeling for Britain and himself in the United States

during this period. The New York Times still editorial

ized on the genius of Churchill's budget and gold standard

actions in August of 1925.^^ This later editorial gaveexcellen t proof of the profound impression Churchill's

policy made on the United States. This aurora of good

will lasted until the debt payment problem erupted in 1926

Another issue in which the Chancellor agreed with

conservative Americans was in the area of labor relations.

During the Chancellor's four years of office, a number of

crippling strikes swept Britain. The rash of strikes

that broke out in 1926 were directly related to the eco

nomic problems of postwar Britain and Churchill's return

to the gold standard, which depressed British exports,

especially in the coal industry. Falling wages and

worsening working conditions caused the miners to walk

off their jobs on April 30 , 1926. This movement to pro

test the lowering of wages garnered support from fellow

^8John Parke Young, "Gold Extends Its Realm Overthe World", New York T imes, May 3, 1925, sec. 9, p. 3:1.

^^New York T imes , August 18, 1925 , p. 18:2.


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37

laborers and led to "sympathy strikes" in most of the

major industries.

Churchill, because of his aristocratic beliefs

and the precarious position of his budget, attacked the

strikers with his various skills. He was made editor

and publisher of the government controlled Gazette, the

51only newspaper published during the strike in Britain.

Churchil l's attack on the strikers in the paper and the

subsequent negotiations by the government led to the col

lapse of the General Strike by May 1 2, 1926. The majority

of people in Britain supported the actions the Baldwin52

government had taken. To illustrate this support, many

British people recognized and cheered Churchill for his

prominent role in the anti-strike leadership when he53appeared at the Empire Theatre.

Even though the General Strike ceased, the coal

miners continued their walkout through the summer and into

the fall mon ths . During this crisis, Churchill also

played a dramatic ro le. In strong negotiations and with

a show of force , he attempted to settle the issue, only

The services struck were : transportation, ga s,electricity, pri nting, construction, and heavy industry.The mass of industries struck caused this episode to becalled the General Strike.

51

New York Times , May 11 , 1926, p. 4:4.

^^Ibid., May 13 , 1926, p. 1:1.

^^Ibid., May 14 , 1926, p. 6:6.


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38

to have the mine owners balk at a final settlement. By

September the only other alternative would have been

nationali zation of the mines.^^ This course of action

was not philosophically attractive to Churchill. Once

again Churchill was praised by the people and even the

Labour Party, which conceeded Churchill was "erratic,

but is clever and courageous." He was the "only strong

man in the government."

This statement about Churchill may well have been

the feeling of the majority of Americans. Although no

editorial comment was discovered on Churchill's actions

during either strike, many of the American people were

definitely in favor of his stand on this issue. The

United Stat es, a few years before the General Strike, had

undergone a wave of strikes. These episodes in steel,coal, and other heavy industries helped lead to the "Red

Scare." Also, because of the unsuccessful nature of the

strike and the general prosperity in the United States,

56

the strike was on the decline. The labor unions in

America, who had attempted to gain higher wages and better

working conditions through walkouts and strikes, were now

decl ining . The American consumer public had never accepted54

Ibid., September 8, 1926, p. 4:4.

^^Ibid., October 10 , 1926, sec. 2, p. 1:2.

Allen, Only Yesterday, p. 176.


42/120

3957the strike as a weapon to be used in America.

Once again Churchill was very close to the feeling

of conservative Americans on the labor issue. His stands

coincided with those of American consumers and industrial

ists. As mentioned concerning the Communist scare in the

United St ate s, there was a continued suspicion of organized

58labor that lasted.into the 1930's. The pro-business

nation of postwar United States was receptive ground for

the labor view s of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

After the resumption of the gold standard and the

breaking of the s trikes, Churchill did not make as great

an impression on the United States as he had in the pre

vious yea rs. In 1929 the Conservative Party was defeated

in the general election. It also was during this time that

Churchill split with the Tory Party over the question of

India's position in the Commonwealth. Being out of power

the former Chancellor did not have the opportunity to make

decisions that would favorably influence and effect the

United States. However, two minor issues did arise late

in the 1930's to help draw attention to Churchill and bring

him closer into harmony with America.

The first issue that won Churchill support among

romantically inclined Americans was his stand on the abdi-

^"^Ibid. , p. 176.

58Murray, Red Scare, p. 263.


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40

cation in December of 1936 of Edward VIII. The King

chose to step down from the throne to marry the twice

divorced M rs . Wallis Simpson of New York. This scandal

in English aristocracy and ruling society had its rever

berations in the relationship of Churchill and the Ameri

can public.

Edward VIII, who had just succeeded his father

and was about to be crowned, announced he wished to marry

Mrs. Simpson. This marr iage , deemed unworthy because

Mrs. Simpson was a commoner and not a British citizen,

was further hindered by her marital status and her pre

vious divo rce. The King renounced his crown because of

family and governmental pressure; but not before Churchill

had made a much larger political issue of the whole un

pleasant affair. Churchill's attempt to oust the Conser

vative government of Stanley Baldwin and retain the young

King was rejected by Edward and drove the former Chancellor59

further from power.

For whatever reason Churchill attempted his po

litical maneuvering, it helped him in the eyes of the

American people. American citizens felt, due to Mrs .

Simpson's nationality, the actions of Stanley Baldwin were

a direct snub at the American populace. This time on a

59New York T ime s, December 5, 1936, p. 1:8.William Clark, Less Than Kin (London: Hamish

Hamilton, 1957) , p. 57.


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41

highly emotional issue, the half American Churchill had

come to the defense of a disparaged American woman and a

slighted American peop le. Probably without realizing it ,

Churchill had made a very strong tie with the American

people.

The last appeal to the United Stat es, and perhaps

in retrospect the most important, was Churchill's prognos

tication of a conflict with Germany and the role the United

6 0States should play in averting such an event. Churchill

warned of the growth of the German air force and army,

along with his attack on Hitler's and Mussolini's intentions

in Europe . Churchill also advocated a strong unified mili

tary policy by Britain and France working through the League

of Nations to oppose the dictators. Finally, Churchill

called for the United States to begin military preparation

and take a position against the totalitarian leaders. This

outcry began Britain's preparation and affected America's

thoughts on the world situation.

The warnings began in 193 2, but they were not heeded

by the majority of people in Britain or abroad. However,

the actions of the Italians in the war with Ethiopia,

fascist support of Franco, and the reoccupation and rearming

'-Time, December 14 , 1936, p. 21.

^^Chapter III will deal with the adverse reactionin the United States that greeted Churchill's plea forcooperation against Germany.


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42

of the Rhineland began to cause governments as well as

their populaces to become concerned about Germany and

Italy.

As early as 1 935 , the people and press of Britain

were speculating as to the probability of Churchill's

return to Cabinet position, due to his accurate forecast

ing of the world situation. Personal clashes between

Churchill and the party leaders caused Stanley Baldwin

(1935-37) and later Neville Chamberlain (1937-40) not to

have the former Conservative Party member in the Cabinet.

Also, Germany's protests of Churchill's remarks and insinu

ations about her intentions in Europe influenced the party

leaders' decision. Thus, because of personal and political

disagree ments, the prophet of Germany's future military

actions remained out of a position of power. This ostra

cism was to end in September of 1939, when Churchill

returned to power as First Lord of the Admiralty.

This return was prompted by the accuracy of his

prophecy, the need for a strong organization in the navy,

and the pressure of the public on the Conservative Party.

After the failure of appeasement , Britain needed a man of

Churchi ll's personality and philosophy.^^ The reaction in

the United States was much the same as in Britain. The

United Stat es, as will be seen, heard and read Churchill's

6 3Harold Call ende r, "Now They Listen to Churchill'-,

New York Time s, August 13, 1939, sec. 7, p. 3.


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43

pronouncements; a few, mostly liberal internationalists,

agreed with his judgments; however, the country like

Britain did not respond to the call to arms until outside

events forced their actions.

The influence which Churchill had during this

period in America was immeasurable. The future and former

First Lord was virtually a one man propagandist. In the

years from 1931-1939, Winston Churchill visited the United

States o nc e, spoke over the radio to the American people

many times stressing the menace to the world in the form

of Fasc ism, and wrote fifty articles for magazines . Most

of the articles were for Colliers of which forty per cent

dealt wi th the renewal of militarism in the totalitarian

states.

In most cases Churchill was cognizant of the iso

lationist sentiment in the United States. In so being,

Churchill did not attempt to suggest overt actions to be

undertaken by the United State s; but rathe r, he stressed -

the bonds between the nations. From this relationship

Churchill attempted to relay a feeling of responsibility

to the American people for their actions in the world.

This attempt was well advised. Nevertheless, the

majority of American people both conservative and liberal

continued to feel their responsibility was at home and

not in Europe or Asia . The American public led by an iso-


47/120

44

lationist C ong res s, as well as the internationally conser

vative newspapers of the midwest, did not want to become

involved in another European war . The disillusionment of

World War I was still evident in the attempts to remain

neutral through legislative acts. Most people, as shown

in a poll by American Institute of Public Opinion in

Sep tember , 1939 , were anti-Fascist and pro-British.^"^

Thus, they mirrored the attitude of Churchill toward the

totalitarian powers . The depth of their conviction,however, did not include any support for force to stop

the movements of Germany, Italy, or Japan.^^ Churchill,

while carrying the majority of Americans with him in his

judgments of the dicta tors, did not receive the response

from his transatlantic kinsmen that he had desired. As

world events propelled him to heights of power in Britain,

in the United States the Fall of France and Pearl Harbor

would transpire before Churchill's admonitions were totally

heeded.

In the interwar period Churchill's words and

actions placed him in the American public eye. Certain

Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, War Propagandaand the United States (New Haven: Yale University Pre ss,1940) , pp. 42-43. In 19 39, the United States favoredBritain 84% to 2% for Nazi Germany.

Ibid., p. 332. After the invasion of Scandinavia,the American people still did not favor the use of forceagainst Germany. 96.3% of the people were against war withGermany and 3.5% were for war.


48/120

45

of his stands received considerable support. However,

his main appeal was to American conse rvativ esfo rces

driven into retreat with the coming of the Great Depres

sion. More importantly on many other issues the mani-

faceted Churchill evoked a hostile response from the

American side of the Atlantic.


49/120


50/120

47

"unstable as water ."! With the former Chancellor's unpre

dictability a charge of treachery and deviousness was also

called forth . In an editorial for the New York Tim es,

Elmer Davis alleged that Churchill showed a sinister and

"manoeuvre" nature.2 He was also referred to as a "ter

rible enfant" in British politics.-^ P. W. Wilson , again

casting darts at Churchi ll, wrote that his "philosophy

is distilled poison. . . ."4 Another instance of the lack

of trust for Churchill was a review of his book The After-

niath. The Springfield Republican praised his writing and

imagination, but also related "Churchill is not always

trustworthy or even sincere."5 These articles gave the

American people the picture of a devious, untrustworthy

individual with very persuasive powers.

That Churchill followed his own star is open to

deba te. Robert Rhodes James in his book, Churchill: A_

Study in Failu re, 1900-1939, contended that Churchill was

continually attempting to achieve position and power with -

^New York Ti mes, January 31, 193 0, sec. 3, p. 16:3.

2Elmer Davis, "Churchill Holds a Post Mortem",New York Tim es, November 4, 1923, sec. 3, p. 1:1.

3"Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of War, theTerrible Enfant of the British Cabinet", New York Time s,August 10, 1920, p. 2.

^P. W. Wil son, "Mr. Churchill Plays With Fire ",New York Time s, March 17 , 1929, sec. 4, p. 1.

^Springfield Republican, April 28 , 1929, sec. E ,

p. 7.


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48

ou t respect to his individual philosophy. Howeve r, if

Churchill's career is closely observed his actions were

no t those that would raise an individual to powe r, but

drive him from it. In most cases his changes in party and

his movement away from his party's direction were called

for by loyalty to his own aristocratic idea of the role of

governmen t. He was not as unstable as others tended to

view him, but loyal to his own philosophy. The American

people, when reading of Churchill's actions and the com

ment on his unpredictability, could not see the loyalty

to his "cause." Reading the unfavorable comments, the

people of the United States would relegate Churchill to

a position of a hack politi cian, who was interested only

in himself. Only when a detailed study of the positions

Churchill took was completed, could one observe the con

sistency of Church ill. The American people had not reached

the point of looking back in depth at Churchill's career.

Thus, Churchill did not enhance his image in America with

his opportunism and his movement among pa rtie s, due to the

reporting of this aspect of his career.

The second aspect of Churchill's nature that dis

enchanted the United States was his aristocratic political

theory. Churchill 's hostility to democracy and his lean

ings toward aristocracy and strong man rule ran counter to

deep American tradition. His critique of democracy was

especially strong in the early 1930's. In November of 1930 ,


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Churchi ll asserted that Parliament was no longer able to

mee t the problems of the day. This opinion came during

the dark days of world depression, when he was speaking

of economic prob lems . The former Chancellor alleged that

the electorate was too large and did not consider the

grea t mat ter s of state. He fel't all they were interested

in was who won the Sweepstakes.^ Churchill continued in

this vein when he avowed that the governments of Britain

had overextended the right to vot e. When visiting the

United States on his speaking tour in 1932, he declared

that the people could not achieve economic success and that

a great man needed to step forth to lead the nation. Most

poli tici ans, he charged, were too worried about getting

into office and getting others out to be effective. A

review of his book Amid These Storms brought out this samepoint. Churchill claimed that the brilliant men were no

longer going into government, but into industry. He alleged

that democracy without leadership followed the course of

least resistanc e.

In an editorial on January 31 , 1932, the New York

Times asserted that Churchill's comments about the need for

New York Times, November 20, 1930, p. 13:3.7

Ibid., March 29, 1931, sec. 9, p. 2:2.g

Ibid., January 26, 1932, p. 2:5.

^Ibid., November 26, 193 2, p. 13:1.

^ * TECH UBR/lfly


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50

a great man were unfounded. The editorial alleged that

great leaders were only recognized years afterward, and

that the leaders were ones who led the people and did not

make decisions arbitrarily.

More important than Churchill's conservatism was

his outspokennes s on a number of disputes between Britain

and the United State s. These diplomatic conflicts included

problems arising from the failure of Wilson to bring the

United States into the League of Nations, the military con

flicts over naval armaments and a rearming Germany, and

most importantly the debt issue.

Churchill took office as Chancellor of the Exchequer

at a time when the debts that were incurred during World War

I were funded. The debate on both sides of the Atlantic

over this dispute was one of the most serious in Anglo-

American relations. Previous to 1924, Churchill had not

been too vocal on the debt issue. In 1921 , he had called

for a meeting of Britain and the United States on financial

matte rs, hoping that it would work out a debt settlement.

After the signing of the debt funding agreement between

Britain and the United Stat es, Churchill criticized the

Commission in Britain for not achieving better terms. Als o,

he said the Commission should have brought the United States

-'- New York Ti me s, January 31, 1 932, sec . 3, p . 1:2.

''Ibid., November 30 , 1921, p . 5 :5 .


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into European counsels to help work out the problems gen-12erated by war .

On Augus t 1, 19 22, after signing the agreement

with the United Sta tes, Arthur J. Balfour, Secretary of

State for Foreign Aff air s, sent a notice to Britain's13

debtor nations. This note, which laid down the British

princip les for debt settlement, stated that Britain would:

(1) take into consideration the amount she owed the United

States, (2) take into consideration the ability of thenations to pay her d ebt , (3) not receive more than she had

14to repay. This statement of principle s, known as the

Balfour N ot e, was to be the guide for all future British

governments and their debt settlements. Thus, Britain,

which had argued for a general cancellation of de bts , now

placed the need for repayment by her debtors squarely on

the shoulders of the United States. As Churchill took

offi ce, the resentment toward the United States' debt

policy wa s growing.

' Ibid. , November 22 , 1923, p. 1:2.

13Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts

and World Prosperity (New York: The Century Co ., 1932),p. 84 . The agreement Churchill so readily deplored was tobe a repaymen t of "the whole amount of the loans made toher by the American Treasury and the unpaid accrued interest from April 15 and May 15 , 1919 to December 15 , 1922 in62 annual i nstal lment s, with interest at the rate of 3 percent per annum during the first ten years and 3.5 per centduring the remaining 52 years."

^^Ibid., pp. 111-113.


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The United States demanded full payment of the

British debt. The American people, led by the Coolidge

admini strati on, felt that the nations of Europe should

pay their d eb ts , or the American taxpayer would be the

one who paid for the war . Although there was some edi

torializing in the New York Times for a change in policy,

the vast majority of people were for the payment of debts

by the Europeans as called for in the Congressional Debt

15Act of February 9, 1922. The American populace viewed

the war debts as a business loan, and in the business

minded United States of the 1920's all loans were made with

the understanding they would be repaid in full, along wi th

the interest accrued. This attitude of repayment came from

the general business oriented philosophy of most Americans

during the "Roaring Twenties ." Business was supreme and

all were devoted followers of its supremacy. What was good

for business pr act ices , must likewise be good for govern

mental policy , both domestic and foreign.

After Britain proclaimed the Balfour Note and as

the United States continued to have meetings with other

nations, the new Chancellor announced that all nations

which paid the United States should proportionally pay

-'- New York Ti me s, January 29 , 1926 , p. 20:1,March 26, 1926, p. 20:1, Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in theStreet (New York: The MacMillan Co ., 1948), p. 249, andHarold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, World War Debt Settle-

men t (New York: The MacMillan Co ., 1926), p. 111.


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Britain. Thus, Britain would be assured of an income

from the European debtors to supply the needed money for

payment to the United States. Immediately, Missouri

Senator James A. Reed attacked Churchill for interfering

in Franco-American affairs . The Treasury Department, how

ever, felt that the statement was logical and obvious and1 n

no interference was intended.

In January of 1925 , as the allied nations met to

distribute the German reparations, Churchill sought a mee t

ing on inter-allied debts. In private talks American

officials granted lower debt payments to England, only to

have the United States Senate reject any scaling down of

18the amount owed. Although angry at his failure to achieve

a reduction, Churchill promised that England would still

make her paymen ts and the issue of debts seemed to die out .

A year later, in March of 1926, Churchill made

headlines in America by claiming the United States was a

"fabulously wealthy nation which was squeezing stricken19Europe." Churchill's outbur st, caused by financial and

labor problems in Britain, sparked a year long debate.

Churchill's budget was about to be prepared and the debt

New York T imes , December 11 , 1924, p. 1:8.

'- Ibid. , December 12 , 1924, p. 1:2.

18Ibid., January 6, 1925 , p. 3:4 and January 19,1926, p. 1:2.

1 QIbid., March 25 , 1926, p. 1:3.


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dispute would provide a release from the problems facing

him at home.

The editorial comment on this first outburst sur

prisingly favored Churchill's position. On March 26 , and

April 6, 1926, the New York Times ran editorials stating

that Churchill had a good point'. The American government

should look a long time at his position and not at the20

manner in which he stated it. However, as the summer

progressed and Churchill became more vocal in his attacks ,

editorial comment became more anti-Churchill. Even though

his basic idea of general debt reduction was acceptable

to the pa per , these aggressive attacks began to wear on

the newsmen. One article accused Churchill of "setting

21on edge the nerves of people both at home and abroad."

On July 20 , 1926 , the French government fell and

many blamed the United States debt policy for the French

demise. On this same date . Chancellor Churchill attacked

Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon for earlier state

men ts he had made about Britain. Secretary Mellon had

charged that Britain spent war loans on commercial activ-

22ities rather than the war . This accusation by Mellon

2^Ibid., March 2 6, 1926, p. 20:1 , and April 6,1926, p. 28:2.

'Ibid. , July 20 , 1926, p. 1:6.

22Stewart B each, "What the World Is Doing",

The Independent, August 7, 1926, p. 166.


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and a rejoinder by Churchill continued the debate over the

debt issue.

Through the summer, the argument proceeded between

Churchill and Mel lon . In the United States Churchill

continued to be berated for his lecturing and his claimed23

moral superiority. However, -the New York Times continued

its support of the basic British premise and criticized

the Treasury and Senate for their uncompromising ways.^^

By August of 1926, the uproar subsided and Britain was

praised for its return to a sound economic philosophy

and its return as the financial center of the world.^^

The next year Churchill and Secretary Mellon once

again exchanged verbal bl ows , this time over the Dawes

Plan. Mellon claimed that Britain was not following the

Balfour N ot e, as her payments from debtor nations werelarger than the payments to the United States. Churchill

denied the accusation and attacked the United States for26

its insistence on full payment. The New York Times in

an editorial of great insight alleged that Britain and

the Chancellor were playing for the people at home and in

Europe.27 They were acting as the spokesman for the frus-

- New York Tim es, July 21 , 1926, p. 18:1 .

^"Îbid. , July 24 , 1926, p. 1:6.

2Îbid., August 6, 1926, p. 14:5 .

2Îbid., May 5, 1 927, p. 1:7.

2' Ibid. , May 6, 1927, p. 22:1.


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trations of the tax burdened Englishman and the resentful

economically depressed European. Thus, the attack by

Churchill was not what he wished, but when choosing be

tween his government and his relationship with the United

States, the former held sway.

The debt issue died out for Churchill after this

episode; howev er, he had damaged his image in the United

States. The American people were most definitely for full

paymen t. Churchill would declare when out of office that

Britain should not jeopardize relations with the United

28States by defaulting in her debt payments . Howeve r, the

taxpayer could not forget with a few sentences that man

who had denounced the United St ates' policy and had at

tempted to lower the debt payments . Earlier Churchill had

won support in his financial policies with the return to

the gold standard. This praise was greatly outweighed

in the United States by the debt issue. The debt payments

were more readily understood and a more emotional issue to

the American people than the nebulous economic advantages

of returning to the old standard.

Churchill also caused friction with his views on

the military activities of the 1920's and 30'snaval

disarmament and a rearming Germany. Churchill's life

28New York T ime s, February 9, 1 932 , p. 44: 1,and April 24, 1936, p. 10:2.


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previous to 1919 provided the background for his critics

to malig n him as a militarist. Churchill directed his

early life toward the military. It was a military school

he att ended, his first gainful employment was with themil ita ry, hi s fame as a writer first appeared in military

accounts, and his leadership in government came as a war

leader.

The militarism of the future Prime Minister evi

denced itself throughout the time period under investi

gation. Only in 1939, with the approaching war with

Germany, did Americans begin to welcome the presence of

this type of individual. Before 1939, a great amount of

comment attacked Churchill for his particular attitude

about war . In 19 23, P. V7. Wilso n, while reviewing

Churchill's The World Crisis for the New York Time s,

asserted that the former First Lord of the Admiralty

loved wa r. Wilson further observed that Churchill cast

himself in the role of his ancestor Marlborough, hoping,

Wilson claimed , to be able to save England as had his29illustrious forebearer. Also reviewing the same work

for the New Republic, the noted historian and diplomatC. J. H. Hayes called Churchill's mind that of a mili-

30tarist, and a dangerous one at that. In 1927, Ernest

2^P. W. Wi lson , "Churchill Casts Up His Account" ,New York Times , April 8, 1923, sec. 3, p. 1:1.

^^C. J. H. Ha yes, "The V7orld Cr isi s", New Republi c,November 6, 1923, p. 48.


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Marshall, also reviewing one of the volumes of Churchill's

history of Wor ld War I, stated that he "loves a fight. ""

P. W. Wil s

churchill - the unlikely ally

Documents