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RELEASE: DATE:I5-Jul-2011

HR70-14 NUE 1 i-5-5 93 November 1959035591

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-5-59(Supersedes NIE 11-5-58, Memorandum to Holders of

NIE 11-5-58, and Advance Portion of NIE 11-5-59)

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES

AND SPACE VEHICLES

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE AS SANITIZED

Submitted by theDIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTE .BIMAN'OB- -• •

The following intelligence organizations participated in thepreparation of this estimate: The Centraiaateiligence Agency..and the intelligence organizations of the Departments ofState, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,

AEC and NSA.

Concurred in by theUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 3 November 1959. Concurring were the Director of Intelli-gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chiefof Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-ant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department ofthe Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the AtomicEnergy Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistantto the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and theDirector of the National Security Agency. The AssistantDirector, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sub-

ject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copyis for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction ona need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by thefollowing officials within their respective departments.

a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of Stateb. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Armyc. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, for the Department of

the Navyd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Forcee. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stafff. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commissiong. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigationh. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the Department

of DefenseL Director of NSA for the National Security AgencyJ . Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or

Agency2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable

security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement withthe Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retainit for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimateshould either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission shouldbe requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC—D-69/2,22 June 1953.

4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:CONFIDENTIAL

WARNI

formation affectingof the United States

of the espionage laws,93 and 794, the trans-

which in any mannerIs prohibited by law.

VIM material cthe National Defwithin the meaninTitle 18, USG, Bemission or revelto an unautho

DISTRIBUTION:White HouseNational Security CouncilDepartment of StateDepartment of DefenseOperations Coordinating BoardAtomic Energy CommissionFederal Bureau of Investigation

on od perso

C00267656

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageTHE PROBLEM 1

FOREWORD

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 2

SIMPLIFIED TABULAR SUMMARY 5

DISCUSSION 6

I. AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS 6Surface-to-Air Missile Systems 6Air-to-Air Missile Systems 10

II. AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS 11

III. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. 13

IV. NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS 20

V. RELIABILITY OF MISSILE SYSTEMS 22

VI. REACTION AND RELOAD TIMES 24

VII. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 25

VIII. SPACE PROGRAM 27

IX. SUMMARY TABLES 35

Tor ODORET k

FIGURES AND TABLES

DescriptionFollows

page

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Figure 1 Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow 6Area

Figure 2 Typical Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the 6Moscow Area

Figure 3 Surface-to-Air Missile (Guideline), 7 November 71957 Moscow Parade

Figure 4 A. Photograph: Launcher Emplacements Shown 7Through Camouflage Netting at Glau, SovietZone, Germany

B. Line Drawing: Launcher Locations ShowingCable Layout of Surface-to-Air Missile Site atGlau, Soviet Zone, Germany

Figure 5 A. Photograph: Surface-to-Air Missile Guidance 8System, Glau, Soviet Zone, Germany

B. Perspective Drawing: Surface-to-Air MissileGuidance System, Glau, Soviet Zone, Germany

Figure 6 New Type Surface-to-Air Missile Site Near Moscow 8(Glau-type)

Figure 7 A Typical Guidance/Flight Profile for the Komet 11(AS-1)

Figure 8 Possible Aircraft/Missile Compatibility (ru-16 11with Two Missiles Suspended)

Figure 9 Typical Mission Profile—Badger/One Komets 11(AS-1)

Figure 10 Typical Mission Profile—Badger/Two Komets 11(AS-1)

Figure 11 Surface-to-Surface Missile (SCUD), 7 November 141957 Moscow Parade

Figure 12 Surface-to-Surface Missile (SHYSTER), 7 Novem- 14ber 1957 Moscow Parade

Figure 13 "Z" Class Submarine Conning Tower 20Figure 14 Kildin and Kotlin Class Destroyers 20

PageTable 1 Estimated Reliabilities of Soviet Missiles 22Table 2 Soviet Earth Satellites and Space Probes 29Table 3 Possible Soviet Space Development Program 34

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T01' 3ECRET-APPRNED FOR RELEASE

CiA HISTONAL-REVIBY PROGRAM

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACEVEHICLES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development ofguided missiles, and the major performance characteristics and dates of operationalavailability of such 'missiles. Further, to estimate the technical capabilities of theSoviets in space including the earliest possible dates of achievement of -importantspace ventures.

FOREWORD

This estimate supersedes NIE 11-5-58,"Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missilesand Space Vehicles," dated 19 August1958, "Memorandum to Holders of NIE11-5-58," dated 25 November 1958, andthe "Advance Portion of NIE 11-5-59,"dated 8 September 1959. It is made onthe basis of our belief that the USSR doesnot now intend to initiate general wardeliberately and is not now preparing forgeneral war as of any particular date. Itassumes that there will be no interna-tional agreement on the control of arma-ments or outer space.

In view of the paucity of positive intelli-gence on Soviet missile and space pro-grams, we have given considerable weightto estimated Soviet military require-ments, estimated Soviet capabilities inrelated fields, and US guided missileexperience.

For guided missiles, except where notedotherwise, the initial operational capa-bility dates given are the years duringwhich we estimate one or more series pro-duced missiles could probably have beenplaced in the hands of trained personnelin one operational unit, thus constitutinga limited capability for operational em-ployment. For space flight activities, thedates given are the earliest possible timeperiods by which we believe each specificobjective could be achieved, although webelieve it unlikely that all these objectiveswill be achieved within the specified timeperiods.

Forthcoming estimates will consider towhat extent the USSR has the resourcesand industrial capacity to produce themissile systems described herein, togetherwith the ancillary equipment necessaryto their deployment.

Toe sEcanT 1

Revised paragraph 6 tobe attached to back of

• -t page 1.

Tor OLICRDT

6. We estimate Soviet ICBM guidance at IOC date as a combinationradar track/radio command/inertial system which is called "radio-inertial," although an all-inertial system is possible. Soviet capabilitiesIn related components at IOC point to a theoretical CEP of about 2 n.m.with the radio-inertial system. The Soviets probably will incorporatethe all-inertial system in their ICBM sometime during the 1960-4962period and, should they adopt this system in 1960, they could achieve atheoretical CEP of about 3 n.m. The data available for estimating boththe above theoretical CEPs are far from exact. The precise amount ofdegradation which would be introduced by operational factors is un-known, but we estimate a CEP under operational conditions at IOCdate of about 3 n.m. with the radio-inertial system; with an all-inertialsystem the operational CEP in 1960 would be about 5 n.m. We furtherbelieve that the Soviets will be able to improve the accuracy of theirICBM following IOC, and that over the next few years, and probablynot later than during 1963, the operational CEP for an all-inertialsystem could be reduced to about 2 n.m., and the operational CEP ofthe radio-inertial system would be somewhat better.*

• The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army,believes that this re-examination which resulted in the estimated betterSoviet ICBM accuracy either reflects, or was suggested, by recent US ICBMtest experience which caused certain members of the USES to revise theirJudgment as to the validity of the most recent intelligence study of this prob-lem conducted for the USIB by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelli-gence Committee (GMAIC). The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the Army, recognizes that it is prudent to estimate thatthe Soviets would sooner or later, if not currently, possess an ICBM systemof an accuracy comparable to that of the US ICBM. However, at present,he perceives no Justification for abandoning the estimates derived fromso recent an analysis of all available technical intelligence information.A further significant consideration is that estimates of operationalaccuracy are based on theoretical degradation of test range performancewhich further increases the uncertainties in such estimates. Accordingly,it is believed that there is no present intelligence basis for changing the con-clusions as to operational accuracy as contained in the GMAIC reportand, therefore, that the more likely range of operational accuracy forSoviet ICBM at IOC, using "radio-inertial" guidance, Is on the orderof a 3-5 n.m. CEP; that by sometime in 1983, with the all-inertial system,the CEP could be reduced to 2.5 n.m., although the operational CEP of the"radio-inertial" system would be somewhat better.

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T 0 P S-E-G-R T

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Soviet programs in the development ofguided missiles and in space flight have beencarried forward on a wide front over the pastyear. As these Soviet programs and our ownintelligence collection and analysis have ad-vanced, we have acquired considerable newinformation on both specific developmentsand the extensive scientific and technical ca-pability underlying them. In general, thisinformation has confirmed progress along thelines indicated in previous estimates. Of the19 Soviet missile systems estimated as probablyavailable for operational use now or withinthe next two years, we have evidence on theexistence of 13. The others are inferred fromSoviet requirements and technical capabilities.Evidence on some systems is extensive, butfor most there are serious deficiencies, not onlyin the quantity and quality of information butalso in its timeliness.

Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles

2. Missiles in this category which we know theUSSR has developed or has under developmentinclude those with maximum ranges of about75 nautical miles (n.m.), 200 n.m., 350 n.m.,700 n.m., 1,100 n.m., and an intercontinentalballistic missile (ICBM). These missiles prob-ably meet high standards in reliability, ac-curacy, and other performance characteris-tics. We believe that in the development oflonger range systems, maximum use has beenmade of proven components.

3. Mobility appears to be a basic design con-sideration. Systems with ranges of 700 n.m.and less are probably road mobile. The1,100 n.m. system is probably road and/or railmobile. The available evidence suggests thatthe Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile, but wedo not know whether the ICBM system as awhole will consist of rail mobile units, fixedinstallations, or a combination of the two.In any case, the system will be heavily de-pendent on the Soviet rail network.

4. ICBM. During 1959 the Soviet ICBM testfiring program resumed after a period of vir-

tual inactivity in the second half of 1958. Re-cent firing schedules indicate that the pro-gram as a whole is proceeding in an orderlyfashion rather than on a "crash" basis. Wedo not know that series production of ICBMshas actually begun, nor do we have evidenceof operational launching facilities. However,there has been ample time for the USSR tobegin turning out series produced ICBMs, asimplied by Soviet claims. Evidence derivedfrom Soviet ICBM flight tests is consideredadequate to gauge the general progress of theprogram. We cannot state with certainty theprecise timing of the initial operational capa-bility (IOC) of a few—say, 10—series producedICBMs. In light of all the evidence, webelieve that for planning purposes it shouldbe considered that the IOC will have occurredby 1 January 1960.

5. On the basis of correlated data from ICBMand space vehicle launchings, we believe theSoviet ICBM to be a one and one-half or par-allel staged vehicle, employing liquid oxygen/kerosene propulsion, capable of delivering a6,000 pound nuclear warhead to a range of5,500 n.m. if employed with a heat-sink nose-cone. A reduction in warhead weight wouldpermit an increase in range; use of an ablativenosecone would permit a heavier warhead ore tended range. ,

p ls • - bad tp Io We estimate Soviet ICBM g idatke at 10dat s a combination radar track/radio • •rn-mand/ rtial system, although an al ertialsystem is • essible. Soviet capab les in re-lated compon • ts point to a eoretical ac-curacy (CEP) of : .out 3 . The amountof degradation which • • • d be introduced byoperational factors • own, but we esti-mate that CEP der opera .nal conditionswould be no ? eater than 5 n.m. t IOC dateand may • better, say between 3 a • 5 n.m.In an vent, we estimate that under • sera-tio • . conditions a CEP of 3 n.m. in 1963 a

n.m. in 1966 will be feasible.

7. Other Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles.By late 1958 or early 1959, research and devel-

2

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3

opment work on an 1,100 n.m. missile had ad-vanced to the point where this system wasprobably ready for operational use. Testfirings on this and shorter range ballistic mis-siles have continued during 1959; c

3 Although no units or installa-tions have yet been identified with these mis-siles, all systems from 75 n.m. to 1,100 n.m.are probably now in operational use. Fromlaunching sites within the USSR, 700 and1,100 n.m. missiles could deliver 3,000 poundnuclear warheads against a large majority ofcritical targets in Eurasia and periphery, withCEPs of 1-2 n.m. and about 2 n.m., respec-tively. All-inertial guidance could probablybe available now or by the end of 1960.

Air Defense Missiles

8. In the surface-to-air missile category, anew system is being added to the defenses ofSoviet industrial and population centers. Itprobably became operational in 1957, and hasbeen deployed extensively during at least thepast year, including some units in East. Ger-many. In contrast to the massive, immobilesystem which has been employed at Moscowfor the past several years, the new system isflexible and employs small fire units. It can,at relatively low cost, be deployed widely fordefense of large areas, smaller fixed points,and forces in the field. Both the old and newsystems can effectively deliver high explosive(HE) or nuclear warheads against presentWestern bomber types, except at very low al-titude.

9. In the absence of evidence, but consideringSoviet technical capabilities and probableneeds, we estimate that within the next yearor two the USSR will probably have availabletwo additional surface-to-air missile systems,one designed primarily to engage very low al-titude targets, the other for long-range (onthe order of 100 n.m.) engagement of targetsat altitudes up to 90,000 feet. These systemswill have increased kill capabilities againstaircraft and cruise-type missiles. We alsobelieve that in 1963-1966 the Sovietswill have available an antiballistic missile

system with undetermined capability againstICBMs, IRBMs, submarine-launched, and air-launched ballistic missiles.

10. We continue to estimate that the USSRhas several types of short-range (up to 6 n.m.)air-to-air missiles with HE warheads, for em-ployment with day and all-weather inter-ceptors. Additional types, with longer rangesand capable of carrying nuclear warheads,will probably become available in 1960 andafter.

Air-to-Surface Missiles

11. A subsonic air-launched antiship missile,capable of delivering nuclear or HE warheadsfrom a maximum range of 55 n.m., is now as-signed to jet medium bomber units in widelyseparated coastal areas of the USSR. The So-viets will probably have available in about 1961a supersonic missile which Will provide me-dium and heavy bombers with a standoff ca-pability of at least 350 n.m., and will be adapt-able for use against land targets or ships atsea. They may now have in operation an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavybombers.

Naval-Launched Missiles

12. We estimate that at least one and perhapstwo types of submarine-launched missiles withnuclear warheads are operational in smallnumbers of modified, long-range, convention-ally-powered submarines. One is a subsoniccruise-type system with a maximum range of150-200 n.m., low altitude cruise capability,and CEP of 2-4 n.m. In addition, some sub-marines may have been modified to launchballistic missiles of similar range and accuracy.Both these systems would require the sub-marine to surface before launching a missile.Based chiefly on Soviet requirements and ca-pabilities, we estimate that in 1961-1963 theUSSR will probably achieve a system capableof delivering ballistic missiles with nuclearwarheads to a maximum range of 500-1,000n.m. from a submerged submarine.

13. The Soviet Navy's modernization programincludes the arming of surface ships with mis-siles. Some destroyers are being modified

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•4

and others constructed to launch subsoniccruise-type missiles, probably of 30-40 n.rn.range, in lieu of main battery guns and tor-pedoes. It is logical to suppose that suchmissiles will be installed on any modified ornewly-constructed Soviet cruisers. Ground-launched surface-to-air missiles will probablybe adapted for use by surface ships. TheUSSR will probably also develop missile sys-tems for antisubmarine warfare: surface ship-launched and submarine-launched versionscould probably enter service between 1962 and1966:

Space Program

14. The probable main objectives of the Sovietspace program are: to conduct scientific re-search, to develop military applications, to at-tain manned space travel, and to support So-viet propaganda and policy. The actuallaunching program has, like the ICBM testfiring program, proceeded at a fairly deliberatepace. Its recent emphasis has been on scien-tific and propaganda objectives. In additionto high altitude research vehicles, the program

since mid-1958 has included three space ve-hicles which reached the vicinity of the moon.All three lunar probes were major feats oftheory and technology.

15. Supported by high thrust propulsion sys-tems and a wealth of scientific and technicalknow-how, the Soviet space effort will achievelarge and increasingly refined satellites andspace vehicles with scientific and perhaps mil-itary utility. Judging by the USSR's knownand estimated capabilities, and in light of theobvious Soviet desire to achieve worldwidepropaganda and psychological impact, we be-lieve that during the next 12 months or sothe Soviet space program will include one ormore of the following:

a. vertical or downrange flight and recoveryof a manned capsule;

b. unmanned lunar satellite or soft landingon the moon;

c. probe to the vicinity of Mars or Venus;d. orbiting and recovery of capsules con-

taining instruments, an animal, andthereafter perhaps a man.

er pertinent infor-Soviet capabilities

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5

SIMPLIFIED TABULAR SUMMARY

PROBABLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM •

ARBITRARYDESIGNATION OPERATIONAL, DATE MAX/MUM RANGE

MAXIMUMWARHEAD

WEIGHT

ACCURACY(CEP) OTHER

Surface-to-SurfaceBallistic Missiles

tbs.Deployment

ConceptSS-1 SCUD 1954-1957 75 n.m 1,500 1,200 ft Road mobileSS-2 1954 200 n.m 2,000 n.m Road mobile

• SS-3 1954 350 n.m 2,000 n.m Road mobile88-4 SHYSTER 1956 700 n.m 3,000 1-2 n.m Road mobileSS-5 Late 1958-early 1959. 1,100 n.m 3,000 2 n.m Road and/or rail

mobile.SS-6 ICBM See pares. 4, 73 5,500 n.m 6,000 See pares. 6, 78,

79.Rail mobile and/

or fixed sites.SS-antitank Prior to 1958 5,000-6,000 yds 20-40 2 ft

Ground-LaunchedSurface-to-Air Effective

Missiles AltitudeSA-1 Moscow 1954 20-30 n.m 450-700 65-120 ft 3,000-60,000 ft.SA-2 GUIDELINE.... 1957 25-40 n.m 450-700 65-120 ft.(?) (?)-60,000 ft.SA-3 About 1960 10-25 n.m 150-250 20-50 ft. 50 ft.-40,000 ft.SA-4 1960-1961 About 100 n.m 450-700 100 ft Up to 90,000 ft.SA-5 1963-1966 Undetermined capabi ity against ballistic missiles

Air-to-Air MissilesConditions

for UseAA-1 1955-1956 2-5 n.m 40 20 ft All weatherAA-2 1955-1956 1-4 n.m 25 10 ft LimitedAA-3 1958 2Y6-6 n.m 25 15 ft All weatherAA-4 1960 5-20 n.m 150 10-50 ft All weatherAA-5 1963 5-20 n.m 150 10-50 ft All weather

Air-to-SurfaceMissiles Speed

AS-1 Komet 1956-1957 55 n.m 3,000 150 ft. againstships.

Subsonic

AS-2 1961 At least 350 n.m.... 3,000 2 n.m. on land,150 ft. againstships.

Supersonic

Submarine-LaunchedMissiles

Conditionsfor Use

SS-7 cruise-type 1955-1956 150-200 n.m 2,000 .2-4 n.m SurfacedSS-9 ballistic 1961-1963 500-1,000 n.m 1,000 2-4 n.m Submerged

Other Naval- DeploymentLaunched Missiles Concept

33-8 cruise-type 1958 30-40 n.m 2,000 150 ft Destroyers,cruisers.

SS-10 ASW 1062-1064 20 n.m See para. See para. 94.... Surface ship94 launched.

1963-1965 Submarinelaunched.

SA-2, SA-3, and SA-4 will probably be adapted to surface ships.

• For a detailed summary of each missile category, covering all estimated characteristics and othmation including possible developments, see Section IX. For a detailed summary of estimatedin space flight, see Section VIII.

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itETRNED FOR RELEASE• CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

DISCUSSION

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T

I. AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS

16. At the end of World War II the Soviets,realizing the future importance and role ofsurface-to-air guided missiles (SAMs), tooksteps to develop a capability in this field.They appropriated German missile hardwareand designs and deported to the USSR tech-nical personnel who had worked on GermanSAM projects during the war. These effortsadvanced their state of the art more rapidlythan if the Soviets had initiated research anddevelopment in this field without assistance.Thus when the Soviets decided to proceedwith the development of a missile system tocounter the threat posed by growing Westernair capabilities, they had a considerable back-ground of research and development on whichto base a choice.

17. In late 1949 or early 1950, the SAM systememploying a guidance scheme known as theB-200 was selected and its development wasplaced on a priority basis. The Soviets de-ployed this system for the defense of Moscowin a vast complex to the exclusion, at thattime, of protection of other potential targetsin the USSR. This was the first in a familyof surface-to-air missile systems the Sovietshave developed or are believed to have underdevelopment. Each of these systems is de-signed to counter a specific threat, fill a par-ticular gap, or take advantage of scientific andtechnical advances to assist in solving air de-fense problems.

SA-1 System18. This is the arbitrary US intelligencedesignation of the Soviet SAM system whosedeployment is limited to the Moscow area.The system employs the B-200 track-while-scan guidance system and the V-301 com-mand-guided missile. Because German sci-entific and technical personnel assisted in thedevelopment of this system, and because ithas been under observation for about sixyears and fully deployed for about three years,

more information is available on this than onany other Soviet SAM system.

19. The priority assigned to the SA-1 systemin late 1949 or early 1950 resulted in a telescop-ing of development time. Components andsubassemblies of the B-200 system were re-ported to be in production at Plant No. 304,Kuntsevo, and in plants in Leningrad asearly as 1952. The herringbone or chevron-type ground installations typical of the SA-1system were under construction at least asearly as mid-1953. Deployment of the sys-tem was begun in 1954 and the entire . com-plex was probably operational by 1956. Thesites required approximately three - to fouryears to construct and necessitated a consider-able expenditure of manpower and materials.To date, 47 missile sites have been located withaccuracy sufficient to indicate that the over-alldeployment pattern consists of two concentricrings with radii approximately 25 and 45 n.m.from the center of Moscow. (See Figure 1)There are probably 56 sites in the defensecomplex, of which 22 are on the inner ringand 34 on the outer. A typical site has 60launch positions joined by a road network.(See Figure 2) Missile erection equipment forthese sites was probably produced at "Mashin-ostroitel" Moscow.

20. Each of these large, fixed sites incorporatesa track-while-scan radar (designated "Yo-Yo"by US intelligence) , having about 540 coveragein both the vertical and horizontal planes,and a maximum radar range capability ofabout 32 n.m. The system uses missile andtarget track data obtained from the Yo-Yofor computing missile corrections, which arethen transmitted to the missile by a radio link.It is believed that the system, as originally de-ployed, utilized four tracking consoles, eachcapable of handling five missile-target pairs,thus giving each site the capability of engag-ing as many as 20 targets simultaneously.This individual site capability, together withthe spacing of adjacent sites for mutual sup-port and the deployment of an inner ring of

TOP ZECRET 6

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TOP 4,ECR-B-i1 7

sites for backup, enables the system to directan extremely high rate of fire against incom-ing targets.

21. The V-301 missile originally designed foruse with this system is unboosted and employsa liquid propellant sustainer motor. While itsmaximum speed is on the order of Mach 2.5,it has a low initial velocity which limits some-what its engagement capability againstsupersonic targets. Its maximum interceptrange will vary between 20-30 n.m. dependingupon the approach and the type target; forexample against a directly incoming high alti-tude B-52 type target its range is on the orderof 20 n.m. Data indicate it was designed tocarry an HE payload of 450-700 pounds. Weestimate its CEP to be 65-120 feet. Althoughprobably designed for an altitude capability ofup to 60,000 feet, the missile should have someeffectiveness up to about 80,000 feet, particu-larly if carrying the nuclear warhead whichit could now employ. Its minimum effectivealtitude is approximately 3,000 feet.

22. The Soviets will probably continue to uti-lize the SA-1 system at Moscow as long as ithas any real effectiveness against the aircraftthreat. Nevertheless, we believe that the sys-tem was selected primarily to counter themassed raid concept of the late 1940s andearly 1950s. By the time the Moscow deploy-ment was completed, it is probable that con-cepts of the threat to be expected had changedand that other defense techniques were con-sidered more appropriate. Moreover, the lim-ited azimuth coverage of each site makes thesystem rather inflexible, and in its presentconfiguration it is completely immobile. Themagnitude of effort involved in its deploymentprobably also argued against its use in lesscritical areas.

23. German returnees reported that in mid-1951 the V-301 missile was in R&D prototypeproduction at Plant No. 301 in Khimki and bythe end of 1952 production engineered missileswere being produced at Plant No. 82, Tushino,and probably at Plant No. 464, Dolgoprudnaya.Stabilization and control components (includ-ing gyro assemblies) and other subassembliesand components were produced at MoscowAircraft Instruments Plant No. 122, Moscow

Clock Plant No. 2, and an electronic plant,No. 567, also in Moscow. We estimate thatcurrent production of this missile is for re-placement only and that the bulk of the pro-duction capacity is being utilized for the pro-duction of the SA-2 missile.

SA-2 System

24. We have recently observed the extensivedeployment of a new, more flexible SAMsystem. The first identification of a siteemploying this system was at Glau, EastGermany (see Figure 4) in June 1959. Inretrospect, components of the system—includ-ing the Guideline missile (see Figure 3) we be-lieve it employs—can be traced back to 1957.Recent identification of radar signals ema-nating from the Glau site has permitted iden-tification of similar signals from other localesbeginning in mid-1957. Based on the Moscowparade sighting of the Guideline missile andElint intercepts probably associated with theguidance systems, we believe the system be-came operational in 1957.

25. Revetted SA-2 sites have definitely beenidentified in various stages of construction atGlau and Jueterbog, East Germany, and atMoscow, Rostov, Kiev and Sverdlovsk, USSR.In addition, we believe sites exist at manywidespread locations, possibly including Cen-tral USSR (Omsk), the Far East (Vladivos-tok), several cities in the Black, Caspian andBarents Sea areas, and other locations in theUSSR. The equipment at these sites appearsto be identical and quite mobile, althoughthose sites identified within the USSR appearof relatively more permanent construction.Basic site equipment includes a central firecontrol system and associated van-type trucksand trailers which probably house radar andcomputing equipment and power generators.Six launchers are normally but not always ar-ranged in a roughly circular pattern of about500 feet in diameter, with the fire control sys-tem in the center. A surveillance type radaris displaced several hundred yards from therest of the equipment. (See Figure 5)

26. The fire control radar (nicknamed "Fruit-set") consists of at least four separate anten-nas located on a single, mobile mount. (See

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FUEL ANDOXIDIZER BOOSTER

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SHOWING CABLE LAYOUT OF SURFACE-TO-AIR

MISSILE SITE AT GLAU, SOVIET ZONE, GERMANY1C426-14-40.

C002 676568

Figure 5) The entire mount and antennasappear capable of rotation about a verticalaxis. At least one of the dishes is capable ofrotation about a horizontal axis as well. Thesurveillance radar (nicknamed "Spoonrest")operates in the VHF range. The launcherscan probably rotate in azimuth through 3600.Each launcher can accommodate one missileon a launching arm which can be elevated tovarious angles. A road network is carefullylaid out at each site to facilitate reloading thelaunchers by missile-carrying truck-trailers.

27. Although the evidence is not conclusive,the missile employed with the SA-2 system isbelieved to be the Guideline, a 35-38 foot mis-sile with a solid propellant booster and prob-ably a liquid propellant sustainer motor. (SeeFigure 3) This missile was displayed at the 7November 1957 Moscow parade on a specialtrailer of a type recently identified at the Glausite. Guideline appears compatible with theequipment and other features of the SA-2system; when used with it, maximum range isestimated to be 25-40 n.m. Maximum missilevelocity is probably about Mach 3. The war-head is estimated to weigh 450-700 poundsand could be either HE or nuclear. Maximumeffective altitude capability is about 60,000feet, with some effectiveness up to about80,000 feet, especially with a nuclear war-head.'

28. Precise estimates of miss distance cannotbe made at this time because the guidancemode has not yet been determined, but webelieve the CEP would approximate the 65-120feet estimated for SA-1. Radio/radar com-mand or beam rider are likely guidanceschemes. A variation of the radar command

'The Guideline missile, although estimated foruse in the SA-2 system, could possibly also beutilized in the SA-1 system as a replacement forthe single stage V-301 missile. If so, the Guide-line version in the SA-1 system would probablynot be identical to its counterpart in the SA-2system. For example, although the basic airframes would be similar, the internal missileguidance equipment could be quite different.The use of such a boosted missile in the SA-1system would increase the system capability, par-ticularly against faster or smaller radar cross-section targets. Maximum intercept range wouldbe 20-30 n.m.

could be a track-while-scan system. Such ascheme, similar in concept to the SA-1 guid-ance, would permit a multiple, simultaneousintercept capability. However, the limitednumber of launchers and the relatively slowreload method at the SA-2 sites seem incom-patible with such a capability. At presentthere is insufficient data and analysis to per-mit firm estimates of radar range capabilitiesor low altitude limits. We do not believe thatthe system is capable of attacking targets atvery low altitude (i.e., as low as 50 feet), butIt is probably effective at altitudes below the3,000 foot lower limit estimated for SA-1.

29. Three sites have been observed under con-struction in the Moscow area (see Figures 1, 6)10-15 miles from the center of the city. Twoof these are about three miles apart; the thirdis in anotlier quadrant. These SA-2 sites areInside the inner ring of SA-1 si.tes. The SA-2sites at Moscow are unique with respect tothose observed in other areas, in that the sixindividual launcher revetments are arrangedin a semicircle (see Figures 1, 6) apparently be-cause their primary sector of fire is away fromthe city, with little consideration for mutualsupport of sites on opposite sides of the de-fended area. It is believed that these SA-2sites are a backup for existing SA-1 defensesand are intended to supplement them.

30. Considering the SA-2 system as a wholein relation to the SA-1, its improvements liepartly in range capabilities and in the shortertime of flight of its boosted missile. The chiefadvantage of the newer system is Its flexibility.It can, at relatively low cost, be deployedwidely for defense of large cities, for smallbut important fixed facilities, and for defenseof forces in the field. This flexibility is ob-tained at the expense of target handling ca-pacity per site relative to the SA-1.

SA-3 System

31. Neither the SA-1 nor SA-2 systems wouldbe effective against very low altitude targets(as low as 50 feet). We therefore estimatethat in order to meet an urgent requirementa very low altitude system (SA-3) probablyis being developed. This system may becapable of engaging both single and closely

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grouped multiple targets at extremely lowaltitudes with a CEP of 20 to 50 feet. Maxi-mum intercept range would be on the orderof 10 miles against low altitude targets and upto 25 miles against medium altitude targets.Altitude coverage could reach from 50 feet to40,000 feet, with limited effectiveness up to60,000 feet. Maximum missile velocity couldbe Mach 2 to 3. The warhead weight may be150 to 250 pounds. HE warheads could beeffectively used with this system; however, nu-clear warheads, which the Soviets could have,would increase the kill probability and maybe required for effective engagement undersome conditions. The system could probablybe deployed at static sites and have mobilitycompatible with that required for use withfield forces. The Soviets will probably havesuch a system available for operational usein abut 1960.

SA-4 System

32. On the basis of a military requirementand the Soviet state of the art, we estimatethat a surface-to-air missile system (SA-4)with increased range, altitude, and kill capa-bilities will probably become available foroperational employment in 1960-1961. It isestimated that this system would employground guidance equipment with 360° cover-age in azimuth. The system could engagetargets effectively at altitudes of 90,000 feetand to a range on the order of 100 n.m. withHE or nuclear warhead of 450 to 700 pounds.We estimate command guidance with activeterminal homing would be employed with thissystem.

SA-5 System33. We have practically no evidence withrespect either to the priority or the technicalapproach which the Soviets are applying tothe problem of an antiballistic missile sys-tem. Considering the ballistic missile threatand the technical problems involved indeveloping an adequate defense system, webelieve that the Soviets have a high priorityresearch program underway. We estimatethat a first operational antiballistic missilecapability (SA-5) could be achieved in the1963-1966 period. The capabilities of the sys-

tern would depend upon tactics and deploy-ment, detection and acquisition rnethods,and the effectiveness of Western counter-measures, among other factors. The net ef-fect of such factors is largely conjectural atthis time. We can therefore conclude onlythat the SA-5 system would have an unde-termined capability against ICBMs, IRBMs,submarine-launched and air-launched ballis-tic missiles. In any case, research and de-ployment in antimissile defenses will un-doubtedly be continuous.

Other Possible Surface-to-Air Systems34. We estimate that the above missile systems•will probably be developed. Nevertheless,these do not meet all of the Soviet surface-to-air missile requirements. Depending uponthe Soviet judgment of their -future require-ments in view of a dynamic threat, the ex-pense of development in terms of value re-ceived and the degree of difficulty involved, webelieve the following three missile systems fallwithin Soviet capabilities but will only pos-sibly be developed:

a. A ground-based missile system to counterreconnaissance satellites; a system with lim-ited capabilities (i.e., interception of satel-lites whose orbits had been established andwhose altitudes did not exceed 200-300miles) might be available in 1963-1965. Weestimate, however, that the SA-5 could havean initial limited capability to counter suchsatellites and a growth potential for higheraltitude capability and intercept with aminimum of preorbital data.

b. A mobile antiaircraft system capable ofdefending field forces against low speed,highly maneuverable aircraft (e.g., recon-naissance types and helicopters) as well ashigh speed drones and tactical aircraft ataltitudes ranging from very low to about10,000 feet; such a system might be avail-able in about 1965.

c. A mobile antimissile system capable ofproviding field forces with at least someactive defense against ballistic missiles withranges of 50 to 1,000 n.m.; such a systemmight be available by 1967.

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AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS

35. Air-to-air missile systems will have utilityas long as interceptor aircraft are importantcomponents of Soviet air defense. New infor-mation is becoming available which indicatesthat air-to-air missiles may now be deployed,but their specific characteristics have not beendetermined. There is little evidence on So-viet development of such missiles, however,with the exception of that reported by Germanreturnees who described early Soviet develop-ment work on the AA-1 (Soviet designationShM) during 1952. The following is an esti-mated Soviet development program based onestimated requirements and on scientific andtechnical capabilities.

36. We estimate that the USSR now has threeair-to-air missile systems available for opera-tional use:

a. AA-1 (ShM) —A 2 2/2 n.m. beam riderlimited to use with some all-weather fighterswith suitably modified radar.

b. AA-2---A short-range infrared homingmissile limited to tail attack and clear airmass 2 conditions. It is usable with mostinterceptors including day fighters. Itsrange varies with the radar capability andaltitude of the launch aircraft, from onen.m. with day fighters to about four n.m.at altitude with an all-weather fighter.

'Clear Air Mass: Absence of clouds and precipita-tion between missile and target. The term isequally applicable to day or night operations.In addition, an infrared system is also degradedby bright background such as white clouds andattack angles close to the sun.

c. AA-3—An all-weather semiactive radarhoming missile of about three to six n.m.range.

37. AA-1 will probably be phased out after thenext few years because of operational limita-tions. In 1960 a longer range missile (AA-4)capable of carrying a nuclear warhead willprobably become available. The necessity forsafeguarding the launching pilot from nu-clear effects will require a missile range ofabout 15-20 n.m. in a head-on attack or fiven.m. in a tail attack. To provide tactical flex-ibility, some AA-4 missiles will probably beequipped with infrared homing and some withsemiactive radar homing. The infrared sys-tem will have greater accuracy but (as inAA-2) will require clear air mass conditions.The semiactive radar system will have all-weather capability with less accuracy; employ-ment will be limited to certain._ all-weatherfighters.

38. In 1963 the Soviets will probably haveavailable a combination infrared/semiactiveradar homing guidance package for the basicAA-4. Such a combination (AA-5) wouldprovide increased resistance to jamming andimproved operational flexibility for all-weatherfighters.

39. In about 1965, increases in fighter andtarget speeds and resulting increases in thelaunching ranges required for safe delivery ofnuclear warheads would require an air-to-airmissile of about 30-40 n.m. range employingan appropriate guidance system. We con-sider the acquisition of such a system to bewithin Soviet capabilities for this time period,but its development is contingent upon trendsIn Soviet fighter and Western bomber forcesand in Soviet surfaCe-to-air missile defenses.

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II. AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

40. By 1947, the USSR had recognized theadvantages of providing bomber aircraft witha stand-off capability against surface targets.First Soviet efforts resulted in an air launchedantiship missile of about 55 n.m. range. Inview of improved Western air defense capa-bilities, we believe the USSR will provide itsbombers with an extended stand-off capabilitywith an air launched missile of at least 350n.m. Considering probable Soviet develop-ment plans for other types of missiles as wellas bombers, we believe these two missiles willsubstantially satisfy the USSR's need for airlaunched missile systems in the foreseeablefuture.

AS-1 System

41. The USSR has had operationally avail-able since 1956-1957 a subsonic antiship sys-tem (AS-1) with a maximum range ofabout 55 n.m. It achieves a speed of Mach0.8 and can carry a nuclear or possibly HEwarhead of about 3,000 pounds, with a CEPof about 150 feet against well-defined radartargets. It uses a guidance system known asKomet (a beam rider with semiactive hom-ing—see Figure 7), the characteristics ofwhich limit its employment almost exclusivelyto ships at sea.

42. Although originally designed to be carriedby a BULL (TU-4), the AS-1 is compatiblewith the BADGER (TU-16). (See Figure 8)Because it is carried externally and its launchaltitude is only about 15,000 feet, it limits theBADGER'S radius capability to about 1,250n.m. when carrying one missile or about1,000 n.m. when carrying two. (See Figures9, 10)

43.C

On the basis of this and theearly development date, we estimate that ithas already been assigned to several BADGERunits of Long Range Aviation and Naval Avia-tion in the Western USSR and in the Far East.

AS-2 System

44. Recognizing improved Western air de-fense capabilities and comparing these withthe obvious limitations in the AS-1 in rangeand type of target, we believe the USSRhas already commenced development of animproved air-to-surface missile system. Im-provements would be primarily directedtoward extension of range, speed and launchaltitude and improvement of operationalcharacteristics to permit employment againsta wider variety of targets.

45. We estimate that in about 1961 the USSRwill have operationally available an,improved,supersonic cruise type system (AS-2) of atleast 350 n.m. range, capable of carrying a2,000-3,000 pound nuclear warhead. We esti-mate a cruise altitude of 45,000-55,000 feet,representing a significant improvement overAS-1. A missile speed of Mach 1.5-2 could beachieved with either a turbojet or solid rocketboosted ramjet propulsion system; we believethe former to be probable.

46. We are not confident as to whether thissystem will be used against land targets, shipsat sea, or both. Different types of guidancewould be required for these purposes. • Utiliz-ing all-inertial guidance, the CEP against landtargets would probably be about two n.m. Iffitted with terminal homing suitable for useagainst ships at sea, the CEP would probablybe about 150 feet. For use against ships, thelaunching range would have to be reduced orother aircraft or ships would be required toaid in detection, acquisition, and identificationof the target. We estimate that AS-2 will beadaptable for use against land targets or shipsat sea with accuracies as indicated above.

47. Effective delivery of this missile could beaccomplished by the BADGER, BEAR, andBISON, and presumably by future medium orheavy bombers. We estimate that AS-2would probably weigh about 9,000-10,000pounds. BEAR and BISON could carry two,

11

A TYPICAL GUIDANCE/FLIGHT PROFILE FOR THE KOMET (AS-I)

SWITCHING ZONE:Exact point of switchingis dependent on strengthof target returns.

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20

10

Aerial Refueling:

A single pre-strike aerial refueling will increase radiuscapability approximately 35%. This is on a Buddy missionusing a converted Badger as tanker.

SO 100 150 20-0/\/ 1200 12.50 1300 13501 100 1 150Distance (n.m.)

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Altitude TYPICAL MISSION PROFILE - BADGER/TWO KOMETS (AS-I)1.(ft./1000)

AO "\IMission Legs:

I Climb to 30,000 ft.2 Cruise-out at 30,000 ft.3 Descend to 15,000 ft.4 Run-in 12 min. at 250 knots5 Release first KS missile6 Perform 180° turn and run-out 12 min.7 Perform 180° turn and again run-in 12 min.

at 250 knots8 Release second KS missile9 Continue on course 3 min. at 250 knots

10 Perform 180° turn and climb-out to 30,000 ft.11 Cruise-home at 30,000 ft. constant altitude:12 30 min. fuel reserve over home base

Aerial Refueling:A single pre-strike aerial refueling will increase radius

capability approximately 35Z. This is on a Buddy missionusing a converted Badger as tanker.

1050 1100

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and BADGER one or possibly two on opera-tional missions. We calculate a range degra-dation of about 8-10 percent for these aircraftwhen carrying one such missile, and 15-20percent when carrying two.

Special Applications and Decoys

48. The Soviets are capable of developing guid-ance systems for AS-1 or AS-2 designed tohome on air defense or other radar trans-mitters. There is no evidence of present So-viet interest in such modification, and we donot consider them probable development pro-grams.

49. Although we have no evidence, we esti-mate, on the basis of operational desirabilityand technical feasibility, that the USSR isprobably developing and may now have opera-tional an air launched decoy to simulate me-dium or heavy bombers. We estimate thatfour can be carried in a BISON or BEAR andtwo in a BADGER in addition to a bomb lead.The decoy would probably be powered by aturbojet engine which would permit the decoyto simulate aircraft performance. Improve-ments to this system would be required tomaintain its compatibility with advancedbomber developments.

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III. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

50. The USSR has developed a family of sur-face-to-surface ballistic missiles through anintensive and well conceived program con-ducted at high priority since shortly afterWorld War II. Missiles known to have beendeveloped or to be under development at pres-ent include those with maximum ranges ofabout 75 n.m., 200 n.m., 350 n.m., 700 n.m.,1,100 n.m., and intercontinental ballistic mis-siles (ICBMs) . 3 We have more extensive in-formation on the ballistic missile programthan on any other Soviet missile program.We therefore estimate this program with con-siderable assurance, although our confidencein the details varies.

51. German scientists, technicians, missiles,and missile facilities gave the Soviets majorassistance in ballistic missiles during the earlypostwar years. At Soviet direction, Germandesign studies were made on missiles of rangesas great as 1,600 n.m., and there is good evi-dence that Soviet research paralleled some ofthe German projects. German assistance wasno longer an important factor in surface-to-surface ballistic missiles by about 1949.

52. A substantial body of evidence supportsour belief that the Soviet ballistic missile de-velopment program has for a number ofyears been well coordinated, extensively sup-ported, and condUcted by qualified personnelwith access to excellent facilities. It has re-sulted in the development of operational mis-siles whose reliability, accuracy and other per-formance characteristics meet high standards.

53. We believe that in the development oflonger range systems, maximum use has beenmade of proven components. On the basis ofindirect evidence and the logic of a coordi-nated development program, we consider it

'As a rule of thumb, a ballistic missile can befired to about one-third of maximum operationalrange without serious degradation in accuracy.and to even shorter ranges with degraded ac-curacy. The CEPs estimated herein are formaximum missile range.

reasonable to conclude that the two activeSoviet ballistic missile test ranges (KapustinYar for missiles up to 1,100 n.m. range, TyuraTam for ICBMs and space vehicles) have beenmutually supporting with respect to compo-nent testing and shared experience.

54. The type of warhead employed with Sovietballistic missiles will vary with the specificmission of the missile. In general, however,we believe that for missiles with maximumranges of 350 n.m. or less, HE, nuclear, orchemical warfare (CW) warheads will be em-ployed in accordance with Soviet militarydoctrine, depending, upon nuclear stockpiles,missile accuracy, character of the target, andresults desired. We estimate that for missileswith ranges of 700 n.m. and over, only nuclearwarheads will be employed, although we donot exclude the possibility of CW use in 700n.m. missiles for certain limited purposes.We believe that the USSR is capable of devel-oping techniques for missile dissemination ofbiological warfare (BW) agents, although wehave no specific evidence relating 13W andmissile research and development. In viewof operational considerations we consider BWuse in ballistic missiles unlikely, although pos-sible for certain special purposes.

55. Mobility appears to be a basic considera-tion in Soviet ballistic missile design and wehave good evidence of road mobility on somesystems with ranges of 700 n.m. and less. Thesize and weight of the 1,100 n.m. missile maybe such as to limit its road mobility to selectedfirst class road nets; in view of this limitation,we believe it may be road and/or rail mobile.In the case of road mobile systems, it is prob-able that missile carriers and support vehiclesare readily adaptable for rail transport. Mo-bility as it applies to an ICBM system is dis-cussed in paragraphs 81 through 83.

SS-1: 75 n.m. Ballistic Missile System56. At the '7 November 1957 Moscow parade amissile 33 feet long and 2.7 feet in diameter,

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nicknamed SCUD, was displayed mounted ona self-propelled, tracked vehicle. (See Figure11) Photo analysis of the launching struc-ture, coupled with the mobility inherent inthe tracked carrier, indicates this missile istransportable in a fueled condition. The typeof propellant cannot be ascertained with cer-tainty; some details suggest solid propellantwhile others indicate the use of a storableliquid propellant. Analysis of the photo-graphs also indicates a range capability ofup to 75 n.m. with a 1,500 pound warhead.We estimate the SS-1 became operational dur-ing 1954-1957, employing a radio-inertial guid-ance system. An all-inertial system probablybecame available in 1958-1959, with eithersystem giving a CEP of about 1,200 feet.

SS-2: 200 n.m. Ballistic Missile System

57. After World War II, the Soviets seizedlarge numbers of German V-2 missiles whichbecame the basis for their ballistic missile pro-gram. Test firings of this missile are re-ported to have occurred at Kapustin Yar asearly as 1947. There is evidence that develop-ment and prototype production of a short-range, modified V-2 type missile took placeat Plant No. 456, Khimki, in the late 1940s,and that serial production of this missile mayhave begun as early as 1951 at the Dnepro-petrovsk Automobile Plant (DAZ) No. 186.We believe it unlikely that production of thismissile continued for more than a few yearsand we do not consider it to be an operationalsystem today.

58. Due to the operational limitations in-herent in the V-2 system, we believe theUSSR paralleled the above program with asecond generation missile of the same rangeand payload characteristics. We estimatethat such a missile (SS-2) became operationalin 1954, with a maximum range of about 200n.m. and a CEP of 1/, to % n.m. Guidancecould be radio/inertial or (by 1958-1960) all-inertial, but there is no evidence on this point.In light of the probability that the secondgeneration missile was developed primarily toobtain better operational and handling char-acteristics, we estimate continued use of a2,000 pound warhead as in the V-2.


59. We believe this missile is an outgrowth ofthe V-2, improved in range and accuracy bySoviet and German efforts in the years follow-ing World War II. SS-3 is probably based onthe German-designed R-10 and Soviet-devel-oped Korolov missiles, both of which incorpo-rated a 75,000 pound thrust engine. Thiswould give it a maximum range capability ofat least 350 n.m. with a 2,000 to 3,000 poundwarhead. The first two Korolov missile fir-ings in 1949 were reported to be unsuccessful.

The SS-3 missile system is estimated to havebecome operational in 1954 with radio/inertialguidance and to be now equipped with an all-inertial guidance system, giving an accuracyof about 1/2 to 1 n.m.


60. There is considerable evidence cD that a missile

which would meet the Soviet requirement fora 700 n.m. range weapon has been under testat Kapustin Yar for many years. We believethat test firings began in about 1953; an aver-age of about two per month have occurredsince mid-1955. We estimate that this systemhas been available for operational use sinceabout 1956, although no operational sites orunits have been identified.

61. Until recently we were unable to deter-mine whether the largest missile in the 7 No-vember 1957 Moscow parade (nicknamedSHYSTER for recognition purposes—see Fig-ure 12) was the 700 n.m. missile or the 350 n.m.missile.

,together with state-ments and photographs released by the USSR,has provided sufficient data to permit the de-termination that SHYSTER is probably the700 n.m. missile. Analysis of this evidencehas caused us to change our previous esti-mate of maximum warhead weight from5,000-6,000 pounds to approximately 3,000pounds.

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62. We continue to estimate that prior to 1958this missile utilized radio/inertial guidanceand that commencing in 1958-1960 an all-inertial system would become available.There are some indications c

3 that inertial components werebeing tested in late 1958. Missiles alreadyproduced and equipped with the radio/inertialsystem will not necessarily undergo retrofit tothe all-inertial system.

63.0

We do not believe a secondgeneration missile of this range is yet beingdeveloped. There are indications that the 700n.r.a. missile has contributed to the develop-ment of other missiles, but the exact natureof this contribution cannot be determined.

64. We estimate that this missile system is op-erational and in production in the USSR, andthat it probably has the following charac-teristics: 4

US Designation SHYSTER—SS-4IOC Date' 1956Maximum Range 700 n.m.Length 68 feetDiameter Approximately 5 feetPropulsion Single thrust chamber, jet

vane controlled (no ver-niers), approximately90,000 pounds thrust, liquidoxygen/kerosene, two stepthrust cutoff

Configuration/Struc- Single stage ballistic, inte-ture gral tankage

Guidance 1956-1958 radio/Inertial; 1958-1960, all-inertial (retrofitoptional)

Accuracy 1-2 n.m. CEP at 700 n.m.under average operationalconditions

Maximum Warhead Approximately 3,009 pounds,Weight in a separating nosecone

GroundEnvironment Road mobile

'For estimates of reliability and reaction timesunder various conditions for this and other sys-tems discussed herein, see Sections V and VI.

'Date at which one or more missiles could havebeen placed In the hands of trained personnel inone operational unit.

SS-5: 1,100 n.m. Ballistic Missile System

65. We have good evidence L.3, that a missile of about

1,100 n.m. maximum range has been undertest at Kapustin Yar for over two years; sincemid-1957 about 50 such missiles have beentest fired. There have been periods of highfiring rate as well as periods of inactivity, thelatter including one as long as nine months.

C.

the 1,100 n.m.missile could have become operational in late1958 or early 1959, although no operationalsites or units have been identified.

66.0

There are in-dications of inertial components, of engineburning time, and of four combustion cham-bers in the engine. Like the V.-2 and the 700n.m. missile, this engine shuts down in twosteps. Jet vanes are probably used for mis-sile stabilization and control. We no longerbelieve that the 1,100 n.m. missile is essentiallya modified 700 n.m. missile, although it wouldbe in keeping with Soviet practice for thissystem to make maximum usage of provencomponents and designs from other programs.

67. On the basis of all available evidence, weestimate that the 1,100 n.m. system is opera-tional and in production in the USSR, andthat it probably has the following charac-teristics:

US Designation SS-5IOC Date Late 1958 or early 1959Maximum Range 1,100 n.m.

Four combustion chambers,Propulsion liquid oxygen/kerosene, twostep thrust cutoff, Jet vanestabilization and control

Configuration Single stage ballistic Radio/Inertial or all-InertialGuidance

Accuracy 2 n.m. CEP at 1,100 n.m.under average operationalconditions

Maximum Warhead ApproxLmately 3,000 pounds,in a separating nosecone

GrWoue nigdhEtnvironment. Road and/or rail mobile

TOP 3

16

Iniermediate Missile Systems of Longer Range

68. Assuming deployment within Soviet terri-tory, 700 n.m. and 1,100 n.m. missiles are capa-ble of reaching a large majority of critical tar-gets in Eurasia and its periphery. It is pos-sible that the USSR intends at a later dateto develop a ballistic missile system with maxi-mum range of about 1,500 to 2,500 n.m. tosupplement existing target coverage and topermit deployment in more secure areas. In1949, fairly early in the USSR's ballistic mis-sile program, the Soviets instructed Germanmissile specialists to make design studies onmissiles with ranges as * great as 1,600 n.m.We know of no further developmental work onsuch missiles, and we do not believe therehave been any test firings or preparations forfirings to intermediate ranges of greater than1,100 n.m. We conclude that an intermediatemissile of longer range has had a fairly lowpriority. In any case, the initiation of testfirings would probably precede first opera-tional capability by 18 months to two years.

SS-6: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System

69. In our most recent estimate on Sovietdevelopment of ICBMs (NIE 11-4-58, para-graphs 125 and 126), we considered it probablethat the USSR would achieve an initialoperational capability with 10 prototypeICBMs at some time during the year 1959.We also held it to be possible, although un-likely, that a limited capability with compara-tively unproven ICBMs might have been estab-lished in 1958. These conclusions rested on avariety of factors, including the estimatedvery high priority the USSR placed on achiev-ing an ICBM capability for both political andmiltary purposes, the estimated willingness ofSoviet planners to accept considerable risks ininitiating ICBM production and deployment,and the available evidence on Soviet test fir-ings and capabilities in ballistic missile de-velopment.

70. We now have considerable additionalknowledge of the ICBM test firing program,

/ This evidence shows thatduring 1959 the test program has proceededin an orderly manner which we believe is effec-

tively testing a complete ICBM system.There is good evidence that from the begin-ning of the test firing program in 1957 untilthe present there have been about 20 ICBMtest firings, a high percentage of which havebeen successful in traveling from the TyuraTarn rangehead over a distance of approxi-mately 3,500 n.m. to the terminal end of therange in the Kamchatka Peninsula area. Inthe test program, since its inception in August1957 we have observed periods of launchingactivity and inactivity, but the evidence is notsufficient to determine whether this was dueto a setback in the program. Reanalysis oftest firing patterns for both ICBM and shorterrange missile systems leads us to believe thatthis periodicity of test firing activity is theSoviet method of conducting an orderly pro-gram. In any event, both the rate and num-ber of ICBM test firings are lower, than wehad expected by this time.

71. Operational Capability Date—Consider-ing all the evidence, we believe it is now wellestablished that the USSR is not engaged in a"crash" program for ICBM development. Wetherefore believe it extremely unlikely that aninitial operational capability (IOC) was estab-lished early in the program with prototypemissiles or with missiles of very doubtful per-formance characteristics.

72. On the other hand, we still consider it alogical course of action for the USSR to ac-quire a substantial ICBM capability at theearliest reasonable date. (The IOC for theICBM marks the beginning of the plannedbuildup in operational capabilities and repre-sents the date when the weapon system couldbe counted on to accomplish limited tasks inthe event of war.) The hard evidence at handdoes not establish whether or not series pro-duction of ICBMs has actually begun, nordoes it confirm the existence of operationallaunching facilities. However, Khrushchev'sstatements of the winter of 1958-1959 regard-ing the establishment of ICBM series produc-tion have been considered in relation to allother evidence and in light of variations inthe meaning of "serial production," other offi-cial Soviet statements, and cold war tactics.These statements are not inconsistent with a

Revised paragraph ,78to be attached to backof page 16.

78. We estimate ICBM guidance at IOC date as a combination ofradar track/radio command/inertial which is called "radio-inertial,"although an all inertial system is possible. Soviet state of the art inprecision radars, gyroscopes and accelerometers leads us to estimatea theoretical CEP at IOC of 2 n.m. at 5,500 n.m. range for the radio-inertial system. We believe the Soviets probably will incorporate the all-inertial guidance system into their ICBM sometime during the 1960-1962period (see paragraph 79) and could in 1960 achieve with this systema theoretical CEP of about 3 n.m. The data available for estimatingboth the above theoretical CEPs are far from precise. Further, underoperational conditions the theoretical CEPs will be degraded by severalfactors, such as (a) re-entry errors induced by undeterminable winds andair density over the impact area; (b) geophysical errors;' and (c) humanand experience factors. The amount of degradation which would beintroduced by such nonguidance system errors cannot be firmly fixed,but we estimate that the operational CEP at IOC date for the radio-inertial system would be about 3 n.m. Should the all-inertial systembe introduced in 1960, it could have an operational CEP of about 5 n.m.2

' Geophysical errors include gravitational anomalies, geoidal uncertainties,and uncertainties of target location relative to launch point and local verticals.

'See the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army,footnote to paragraph 6.

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-E-C 17

logical decision to tool-up for series productionand to begin preparation of operational unitsand facilities before all technical aspects ofthe system had been fully demonstrated.Considering that production lead times areprobably on the order of 12-18 months, we be-lieve the USSR has had sufficient time to beginturning out series produced missiles.

73. Evidence derived from Soviet ICBM flighttests is considered adequate to gauge the gen-eral progress of the program. We cannotstate with certainty the precise timing of theIOC of a few—say, 10—series produced ICBMs.In light of all the evidence we believe that forplanning purposes it should be consideredthat the IOC will have occurred by 1 January1960.

74. The rate of operational buildup subse-quent to IOC date would depend not only onthe priority assigned, but also to a great de-gree on the planned force level. This will bediscussed in the forthcoming NIE 11-8-59,"Soviet Capabilities for Strategic AttackThrough Mid-1964."

75. ICBM Performance Characteristics—There is no direct information on the configu-ration of the Soviet ICBM and no conclusive in-telligence regarding ICBM component testing,although Soviet statements indicate a positiverelationship between the ICBM, space vehicles,and proven military hardware. Analysis ofpossible vehicles used in Sputnik C.

indicates that the ICBM couldbe a one and one-half or parallel stage con-figuration but is probably not tandem. Atthis time we do not believe there is sufficientevidence to permit selection of a single mostprobable ICBM configuration.

76. C

Variations inthe performance of Soviet ICBMs and spacevehicles could be accounted for by modifica-tions of one basic type of vehicle to accom-plish specific purposes. It is also possiblethat some or all of the space vehicles do notspecifically represent the basic ICBM, butwere special purpose vehicles. While we can-

not firmly relate any of these vehicles to theICBM, the energy they required can be corre-lated to alternative ICBM warhead weights.An ICBM of a size sufficient to orbit SputniksI and II would have gross takeoff weight ofabout 350,000 pounds and could carry a war-head of 2,000-3,000 pounds in a heat-sink nose-cone. An ICBM of a size sufficient to propelSputnik III or Lunik would have a gross take-off weight of about 500,000 pounds and couldcarry a warhead of 5,000-6,000 pounds. C

77. While the evidence is not conclusive andwe cannot eliminate the possibility of a lighterwarhead, we believe the current Soviet ICBMis probably capable of delivering a warheadof about 6,000 pounds to a range of about 5,500n.m. with a heat-sink nosecone configuration.A reduction in warhead weight from that usedto 5,500 n.m. would permit an increase inrange. For example, a range of about 7,500n.m. could be achieved with a warhead ofabout 3,000 pounds with the same noseconeconfiguration. Since there is no firm evi-dence on whether the Soviet ICBM employs aheat-sink or ablative type nosecone, it mustbe noted that the ablative type would permitan even heavier warhead or extended range.Although we believe them to be within Sovietcapabilities, neither radar camouflage of nose-cone nor decoys have been detected in ICBMtest firings to date.Xevised v- 4. 7 - a.c.1 e ,0 &Ay

We estimate ICBM guidance at`710C dato s a combination of radar track/radio •m-

ertial, although an all-inertia ystem(see paragraph 79). viet state

recision radars, ros, and ac-us to est • ate a theoretical

t IOC at 5,500 n.m.ta available for esti-

CEP i o far from ade-figure migh be somewhat

gher. Under operat al condi-theoretical CEP will be deg ded by

rous factors, such as geodetic error in-fficiently known weather and wind con

manis possibof the art incelerometers leaCEP of about threerange. However, thmating theoreticquate that tlower ortions tnu

Revised paragraph 79 79. We further believe that the Soviets will be able to improve theto be attached to back accuracy of their ICBM following IOC, and that over the next few years,of page 17. and probably not later than during 1963, the operational CEP for

and all-inertial system could be reduced to about 2 n.m., and the opera-tional CEP of the radio-inertial system would be somewhat better.*

—rP-OP—&E-G-R-E-T— Units already equipped with radio-inertial guidance probably would notbe retrofitted with all-inertial system.

• See the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army,footnote to paragraph 6.

the target area, the inability of equ' -remain at peaked effectiven for

-rinds, variations in th erances• nexperienced • sonnel (espe-• new s) and the pres-

on the personnel.data.. which would be

ch factors i nknown, butat CEP under oper onal con-

uld be no greater than five atand may be better, say betwee

ti-o is inmenprolongeof componencially at IOC ansure of combat conThe amount of deintroduced bywe estimateditions10 ate

d 5 n.m.

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T

eratio1963 and twohave no knowledgeretrofit inertial sys •prior to oper.. 'nal adoption of ansyste ich could probably occur in • -

od 1960-1962.

89. Available evidence does not support thetesting of more than one basic type of ICBMat Tyura Tam—the possible variations inrange and warhead weight discussed in para-graph 77 could be accomplished with one basicmissile. G Likewise, there is no evidence to

•The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAFbelieves that the ICBM currently undergoingtests at Tyura Tam is a follow-on weapon. Apossible correlation of 700/1,100 n.m. missile testsat the Kapustin Yar missile test center andICBM/space vehicle firings at Tyura Tarn canbc made. Chronologically the 700 n.m. missilefirings, the early Soviet space launchings (Sput-nik I and II), and the successful ICBM firingsfrom August 1957 to May 1958, could be relatedto the objective of developing an ICBM with agross weight of approximately 350,000 pounds,carrying a 2,000 pound warhead to a range of5,500 n.m. A similar chronological correlationemerges from analysis of the test firings of the1,100 n.m. missile, the later Soviet space ventures(Sputnik III and Lunik) and the most recentrun of successful ICBM test firings (January1959 to date). If the initial success of the ICBMwere derived from extensive 700 n.m. subsystemtesting and experience gained from Sputniks Iand II, the similar pattern of activity with re-spect to Kapustin Yar test firings of the 1,100n.m. missile, Sputnik III, Lunik, and the mostrecent successful run of ICBM firings would sug-gest a follow-on R&D program of a missiledesigned for greater warhead weight and ac-curacy.

18

indicate development of a second generationICBM to replace that now being tested, Ifdeveloped and tested in the future, such amissile would probably be designed to over-come certain operational difficulties and topermit simplified logistics. It might there-fore be considerably smaller than the cur-rent System, taking advantage of improve-ments in the technology of construction, com-ponent design, warhead efficiency, fuels, andguidance.

81. ICBM Ground Environment—There is nofirm evidence to indicate the Soviet concept ofICBM deployment or the nature of operationallaunching sites. From other ballistic missilesystems it appears that mobility is a basicSoviet design consideration. The size, weight,complexity, and mission of the ICBM, how-ever, bring new factors to bear on launchingsystem and site parameters.

82. As opposed to the advantages of hard orsoft fixed site systems, a mobile system canreduce vulnerability by making site locationand identification more difficult. Eliminatingroad mobile systems as being infeasible forthe Soviet ICBM, we believe a rail mobile sys-tem, using special railroad rolling stock andpresurveyed and preconstructed sites, to havecertain advantages and disadvantages. Solong as a multiplicity of sites existed, a railmobile system would increase flexibility, de-crease vulnerability and reduce the oppor-tunity for enemy knowledge of occupied sites.On the other hand, missile system reliabilitymight be reduced and sizable special trainswould be required. The number and type ofcars would depend on the size and configura-tion of the missile and the amount of fixedequipment installed at each of the preparedsites. The permanent installation at thelaunching site in such a rail system could beno more than a concrete slab on a special spur,but might include other facilities such as asmall liquid oxygen facility, missile checkoutbuilding, missile erecting equipment, etc.

83. The available evidence suggests that theSoviet ICBM could be rail mobile; it is insuffi-cient to establish whether the system as awhole will consist of rail mobile units, fixed

In any event, we estimate that underconditions a CEP of three

. in 1966 will b

s in

n. insible. We

viet intentions toMs fabricated

-inertial

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TOP SECflFP- 19

installations, or a combination of the two.Whatever ground environment is selected,however, the Soviet rail network will play acentral role in the operational deployment andlogistic support of the ICBM system.

84. ICBM System Summary—In summary,the probable characteristics of the SovietICBM system are estimated as follows:

US Designation SS-6IOC Date See paragraph 73Maximum Range .. 5,500 n.m. with 6,000 pound

warheadPropulsion Liquid oxygen/kerosene, sin -

gle-step final stage shutoff,and large verniers

Configuration One and one-half or parallel• staging

Guidance Probably radar track/radiocommand/inertial. All-inertial could probably beavailable in 1960-1962

Accuracy See paragraphs 78 and 79Nosecone Separating; heat-sink or ab-

lative (see paragraph 77)Maximum Warhead Probably 6,000 pounds at 5,500

Weight n.m. range

Ground Environment Rail mobile and/or fixed in-stallations

Close Support Missiles

85. Considering general Soviet progress in themissile field, we believe that for several yearsthe USSR has had the capability of makingclose support missiles available to groundforce units. Such missiles could include: (a)a single stage missile with a range of about5,000 to 6,000 yards, capable of delivering a20-40 pound shaped HE charge against tanksor other hard targets with a CEP of about twofeet, possibly employing wire link commandguidance; (b) a missile capable of deliveringa 500 pound payload to ranges on the order of10,000 to 30,000 yards which could, with a for-ward observer/controller, obtain accuracy of15-30 feet employing radio command guid-ance. Despite the lack of evidence, we esti-mate that the first of these missiles probablyhas been developed and is now operational.Soviet development of the second missile sys-tem is only a possibility, not a probability.

Tor ODORET

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IV. NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS

86. Evidence indicates that first steps werebeing taken to modernize the Soviet Navy in1952-1953. There is an increasing amountof evidence subsequent to 1955 that indicatesan intent to equip ships with guided missiles.

87. There is little evidence of research and de-velopment associated with specific missile sys-tems for Soviet naval application, althoughthere have been sporadic reports of possiblelaunchings of missiles or rockets in the vari-ous Soviet fleet areas.

SS--7: 150 - 200 n.m. Submarine Missile System

88. Since 1955 there have been sightings of"W" class and smaller submarines with cap-sules and/or launcher-like structures on theirdecks. These included an excellent sightingin Leningrad in 1956 of a submarine with acapsule and launching ramp. It is probablethat a few "W" class submarines have beenconverted to carry subsonic cruise type mis-siles. Some smaller submarines have pos-sibly been converted as well. It is estimatedthat two such missiles can be carried in adeck capsule and launched from a ramp.Characteristics of the system are approxi-mately as follows:

US Designation SS--7IOC Date 1955-1956Type Subsonic cruiseMaximum Range of 150-200 n.m.

MissilesNumber per Sub- 2

marineLaunching Condition Surfaced

Guidance Programmed with dopplerassist, permitting low alti-tude flight. profile

Accuracy 2-4 n.m. CEP under opera-tional conditions

Maximum Warhead 2000, poundsWeight

SS-9: 500-1,000 n.m. Submarine Missile System

89. Since 1956 there have been a few sightingsand photographs of "Z" class submarines withgreatly enlarged sails. Since 1958, three suchsubmarines with two dome-shaped covers inthe after portion of the enlarged sail havebeen observed in the North; we believe at leastone such submarine is in the Far East. (SeeFigure 13) These submarines may have beenmodified for carrying and launching ballisticmissiles. If so, an initial operational capa-bility with at least three submarines has ex-isted since mid-1958.

90. Such submarines could carry two missileseach, but could probably launch them onlyv,, hile fully surfaced. The missile might havea range of about 200 n.m., a warhead weigh-ing about 1,000 pounds, and a CEP under aver-age operational conditions of 2-4 n.m. at max-imum range. Although we estimate thesesubmarines may have been modified to carryand launch ballistic missiles, we are not suffi-ciently confident to include them as a "prob-able program."

91. There is inconclusive evidence that the So-viets are developing an advanced submarine/ballistic missile system. None of the smallamount of evidence available concerns devel-opment of an associated missile itself. Basedmainly on estimated Soviet requirements andtechnical capabilities we believe the USSR willprobably develop a submarine/ballistic missilesystem having the following characteristics:

US Designation SS-9IOC Date 1961-1963Type BallisticMaximum Range of 500-1,000 n.m.

MissilesLaunching Condition Submerged or surfacedPropellant Solid or storable liquid

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21

Guidance All-inertialAccuracy 2-4 n.m. CEP under opera

-tional conditionsMaximum Warhead About 1,000 pounds

WeightNumber per Sub- 6-12

marine

SS-8: 30-40 n.m. Shipborne Surface-to-Sur-face Missile System

92. Some Kotlin class destroyers have beencompleted with armament and electronics in-stallations significantly different from thestandard Kotlin (see Figure 14). These ships,now designated Kildin class, have neither theconventional main battery armament nor tor-pedo tubes. They have a large _ missile.launcher in place of the after main batterygun mount and a missile-handling deck housejust forward of the launcher. Although thesewere not seen until 1958, there is some evi-dence that they were being worked on aS earlyas 1955 in both the Black Sea and Far Eastareas. More recently we have seen a newguided missile destroyer, tentatively desig-nated Krupnyy class, which has two missileinstallations similar to the Kildin, one forwardand one aft. In 1955-1956 construction workwas stopped on four to six uncompleted Sverd-lov class cruisers and several were partiallydismantled. It is still not known whetherthese ships will be scrapped or completed. ItIs logical to suppose that guided missiles willbe included in the armament of these and anyother cruisers modified or constructed in thefuture. The surface-to-surface missile forarmament of destroyers and cruisers is esti-mated to have the following characteristics:

US Designation SS-8Type of Missile Subsonic cruiseMaximum Range 30-40 n.m.Guidance Programmed or radar track/

radio command with ter-minal homing

Maximum Warhead 2,000 poundsWeight

Shipborne Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

93. Surface-to-air armament could include theSA-2, SA-3 and/or SA-4 adapted for navaluse. Installation of these systems would re-quire extensive alterations to existing ships.

The Krupnyy and Kildin, previously noted ashaving surface-to-surface missiles, do not havea surface-to-air missile capability. We esti-mate that adaptations of the SA-2 and SA-3would be put on destroyer and cruiser types,whereas the size of the SA-4 would limit in-stallation to cruiser types.

SS-10: Antisubmarine Missile Systems

94. An antisubmarine missile system could beunder development in the USSR without ourknowledge. The USSR has the basic scien-tific and technical capabilities to develop ASWmissile systems as well as the required detec-tion and tracking equipment. We believe that.the U$S.R will probably develop an 'ANT mis-. . .iile for operational use. The alternate linesof development available plus a complete lackof evidence on Soviet development of such amissile system preclude a firm estimate ofspecific missile characteristics. Based on re-quirements and the state of the art we esti-mate the following system. The specific char-acteristics of the actual weapon may vary con-siderably from listed characteristics:

US Designation SS-10IOC Date Surface ship-launched

1962-1964Submarine-launched

1963-1965Maximum Range 20 n.m.CEP 400 yards at water re-entryConfigurations (a) Ballistic launched depth

charge. with 400 poundnuclear warhead

(b) Ballistic launched hom-ing torpedo with 150 poundHE warhead

Guidance Inertial—in addition, the tor -pedo to employ self-con-tained acoustic homing

Remarks May possibly be used againstsurface ship targets

Coast Defense Missile Systems

95. In carrying out its responsibility for de-fending the sea approaches to the USSR, theSoviet Navy maintains and operates land-based coast defense weapons in addition to itsaircraft and forces afloat. It is possible thatguided missiles or rockets have been or arebeing incorporated into this coast defensesystem.

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Information on changeto TABLE I to be at-tached to back of page21.

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A similar review of the evidence relating to ICBM reliabilityhas led to the conclusion that Table I (page 22) of the subjectestimate should also be revised. We have concluded that theinflight reliability, that is, the missile's reliability after leavingthe pad, lies in the range between 55 percent and '75 percent atIOC as opposed to the 60 percent now appearing in the Table.We further conclude that inflight reliability at IOC plus threeyears lies in the range between 70 percent and 85 percent asopposed to 75 percent now in the Table. Within these rangesthe Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of theArmy and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelli-gence, Department of the Navy believe the reliabilities in ques-tion lie at the lower ends; the Assistant Chief of Staff, In-telligence, USAF estimates that the reliabilities lie at the upperends Sand herewith withdraws his footnote on page 23 of thesubject estimate. Note that figures in the Table regarding "incommission rate" and "on launcher reliability" are unchanged.

CT 0 2 6 7 6 5 6

V. ESTIMATED RELIABILITIES OF SOVIET MISSILES

TABLE 1

We have little information on which to base an estimate of theoperational reliability of Soviet missiles. The following are consid-ered as possible rellabilities. For several years after an IOC, the reli-ability of a missile system will probably improve, and then level off.Except where noted the following reliabllities are for the period sub-sequent to 1963.

US DESIGNATION

IN-COM-MISSIONRATE • RELIABILITY

(percent) (percent)On Launcher b In Flight'

Air-to-Surface Systems"AS-1 NA 90 80AS-2 NA 80 65

Surface-to-Surface (Ground-Launched) Systems

SS-1 NA 90 80SS-2 NA 90 80SS-3 NA 90 80SS-4 85 90 80SS-5 at IOC 75 85 75

IOC plus 3 years 85 95 80SS-6 (ICBM) at IOC 70 80 60'

IOC plus 3 years 80 90 75'Surface-to-Surface d (Naval-Launched)

SystemsSS-7/8 NA 80 75SS-9 at IOC NA 80 60

IOC plus 3 years NA 90 75SS-10 (ASW) at IOC NA 80 75

(w/subsequentimprovement)

Surface-to-Air SystemsSA-1 NA 90 90SA-2 NA 90 90SA-3 NA 90 85SA-4 NA 85 80SA-5 at IOC NA 80 75


Surface-to-Air (Naval) Systems aSA-2 (Naval) NA 90 90SA-3 (Naval) NA 90 90SA-4 (Naval) NA 85 85

Air-to-Air Systems a •AA-1 NA 85 80AA-2 NA 85 80AA-3 NA 90 85AA-4 NA 90 80AA-5 NA 85 75


See footnotes on next page.

22

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• Percentage of national operational inventory considered "good enoughto try" to launch at any given time (considered meaningful in only afew cases). With prior preparation in-commission rate would be higher.

b Percentage of those missiles in operational units considered "goodenough to try" to launch that will actually get off the launcher whenfired.

• Percentage of those missile.s that get off the launcher that will actuallyreach the vicinity of the target, i.e., perform within the designed speci-fications of the missile system.

• In these categories, only those missiles considered "good enough totry" to launch will be loaded on ships and aircraft.

• The assumptions made for air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles do notinclude losses due to aircraft aborts which are caused by nonmissilerelated items.The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates that the inflightreliability of Soviet ICBM's will be 80 percent at IOC (1 January 1980)and 90 percent three years later. This estimate is based upon the veryhigh and well recognised reliability of Soviet short and medium rangemissiles, the vast Soviet experience in surface-to-surface missile launchoperations, the high proportion of recent ICBM launches which havetravelled the full ICBM test range distance, and comparable USAF ICBMprograms.

NOTE: It is pointed out that a larger number of missiles than in nationaloperational inventory will have been produced, the extras going totraining, test, etc. The number of "extras" will vary with the typemissile.

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VI. REACTION TIMES FOR SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEMS

96. The reaction times of Soviet missile unitswould vary according to the type of missile,the location (on or off site) and degree ofalert. In the absence of information we con-sider the following are reasonable estimates:

a. SS-1: This 75 n.m. missile, which istransported in a fueled state by a track-laying vehicle, could be fired about five min-utes after reaching a presurveyed position.

b. SS-3 through SS-6: Each of these sys-tems is estimated to have varying degreesof mobility. For units in transit at the timeof alert, the following times are .estimatedfor the launching of the first missile afterthe unit has arrived at the site, which wouldrequire at least presurvey and in some casescertain fixed facilities:

(1) SS-2 through SS-5: 2-4 hours afterarrival at site

(2) SS-6: 4-12 hours after arrival at site

97. The following reaction times are estimatedfor the SS-2 through SS-6 when the missileunit is in place at a launching site and underthe alert condition indicated:

a. Case I—Crews on routine standby, elec-trical equipment cold, missiles not fueledbut could have been checked out recently.Reaction time 2-4 hours.

b. Case II—Crews on alert, electrical equip-ment warmed up, missiles not fueled. Re-action time 15-30 minutes.

c. Case III—Crews on alert, electrical equip-ment warmed up, missiles fueled and oc-casionally topped. This ready-to-fire con-dition probably could not be maintained formore than 10-15 hours. Reaction time5-15 minutes.

98. Air-to-Air and Air-to-Surface Missiles—The AAMs and ASMs have a short enough re-action and reload time so that they are notthe delaying factor in the takeoff of the air-craft.

99. Surface-to-Air Missiles—All SAMs willhave a reaction time of less than a minutewhen alerted. The reload time will vary withthe type missile system, but would be such asto provide relatively .continuous fire until allmissiles at the site are expended.

100. Naval Missile Systems—The reactiontimes for naval systems are estimated asfollows:

ALERT STANDBY(minutes) (minutes)

REMARKS

SS-7 10 15 Surface launchSS-8 .... 1 5-10 30-40 n.m. cruise

missileSS-9 10 15 Submerged or sur-

face launchedSS-10 1 5-10 ASWSAMs . 1 2 Reload time, 20

seconds

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VII. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL

101. As in the case of other priority programsof great magnitude, basic policy decisions ofthe Council of Ministers guide and control re-search, development, and production of Sovietmissile systems and the construction of oper-ational facilities. The military, economic,scientific, and industrial organizations par-ticipating in the program receive instructionsfrom and submit recommendations to theCouncil of Ministers. Within the Council it-self there is evidence to indicate that a DeputyChairman, Dmitrij Ustinov, plays a leadingrole in the missile production program. It islikely that Ustinov and his colleagues are ad-vised by a Scienti fic Technical Council com-posed of scientists, industrialists and militaryofficers who are experts in this field.

102. The Ministry of Defense controls all mili-tary aspects of the guided missile programs:e.g., the conception of military requirements;the military participation in design, testing,procurement, and production; the inspection,acceptance, storage, and maintenance of com-pleted systems and operational facilities; thetraining of military personnel to operate thesystems; and the formulation of strategic andtactical doctrine for their use. Within theMinistry the organization designated to carryout these responsibilities, as they apply to theequipment itself, is the Chief Artillery Direc-torate, which performs a similar function formany other weapons systems. The activitiesof the Chief Artillery Directorate and the otherministerial organizations participating in themissile program are believed to be directedand coordinated by Chief Marshal of ArtilleryM. I. Nedelin, who has had wide experiencein the weapons field and is a former head ofthe Chief Artillery Directorate. Unlike otherDeputy Ministers, the nature of Nedelin's as-signment has been kept secret since his ap-

'This discussion of the basic organization andcontrol of the Soviet guided missile program isbased in part upon direct evidence and in parton analogy with the way the Soviets are knownto handle other high priority programs of mili-tary significance.

pointment as a Deputy Minister of Defensein 1952; in light of his background there islittle doubt that he plays an exceedingly im-portant role in the missile program.

103. Once the decision is made by the Councilof Ministers to create a missile system to meetthe requirements of the Ministry of Defense,a number of scientific-industrial organizationsbecome major participants in carrying out theprogram. The research and developmentphase is centered in various research insti-tutes, design bureaus, and experimental fac-tories subordinate either to the Ministry ofDefense itself or to facilities belonging to thestate committees which handle various facetsof defense production. These facilities havethe capability for experimental production ofmajor missile system components and handlethe bulk of the developmental missile produc-tion. Assuming a successful developmentprogram and a decision to proceed with pilot-line production and testing preparatory toquantity production, the USSR Gosplan andthe USSR Ministry of Finance have the re-sponsibility for integrating the productionand construction plans with the over-all So-viet economic program.

104.The state committees established for suchcritical industries as defense, electronics, avi-ation, and chemicals have prime responsibil-ity for the participation of these industries andtheir plants in the over-all missile program.However, individual plants engaged in serialproduction appear to be subordinate to theregional Councils of the National Economy,which exercise executive authority over theirday-to-day operations.

105. The completed missiles and their associ-ated equipment are transferred directly fromthe plants to organizations of the Ministry ofDefense. The Chief Artillery Directorate, inits role as principal weapons procurementagency for the Ministry, maintains plantrepresentatives who carry out technical checksand inspections to insure that specifications

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•

are being met and accept items on behalf ofthe Ministry of Defense.

i106. Soviet space research is directed by theInteragency Commission for InterplanetaryCommunications (ICIC) of the Astronomical,Council, Academy of Sciences, USSR, themembership of which includes leading Soviet

--49-11-ErcP- 26

specialists in numerous fields of technology.Among the known members of this commis-sion, personnel of the Academy of Sciencespredominate. The Ministry of Defense is rep-resented on the commission (but does notcontrol it), and the facilities of the Ministryof Defense are utilized for launchings of spacevehicles and other space research rockets.

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VIII. THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

Soviet Objectives

107. The USSR has announced that the objec-tive of its space program is the attainment ofmanned interplanetary travel. At present,the program appears to be directed towardthe acquisition of scientific and technologicaldata which would be applicable to Soviet spaceactivities, their ICBM program, and basic sci-entific research. While the space programwas undoubtedly initiated to serve scientificpurposes, one of the primary underlying mo-tivations which continues to give it impetus isthe promise of substantial worldwide politicaland psychological gains for the USSR. Mili-tary considerations may have little bearing onthe decision to develop certain types of spacevehicles, although the successful developmentof these vehicles could result in military appli-cations. Thus we conclude that the Sovietspace program has four major objectives,which will have varying priorities as the pro-gram itself progresses and as new politicaland military requirements develop:

a. manned space travel;b. scientific research;c. propaganda;d. military applications.

Of the above, it appears now that the flighttest priority has been on the scientific andpropaganda objectives rather than on man-in-space or military applications.

108. The importance the Soviets attach to theirspace program is illustrated by the assign-ment of leading scientists to its direction sinceat least 1955, by the broad range of facilitiesand specialists engaged in its implementation,and by the wealth of theoretical and appliedresearch being conducted in its support.Judging by the number and type of spacevehicles launched over the past two years,however, the Soviets have not devoted as mucheffort to the flight test phase of the programas we had previously expected. The actualfiring program has (like the ICBM test firingprogram) proceeded at a fairly deliberate

pace. The acquisition of data and experienceleading to future accomplishments has beenlimited by the absence of Soviet attempts toorbit additional satellites for such importantpurposes as recovery of capsules or determin-ing the extent and nature of radiation beltsaround the earth.

109. We have no direct evidence on the priorityof the over-all Soviet space program relative tothat of the military missile program. We findno evidence that it has interfered with themilitary program and we do not believe it willbe permitted to interfere in the future.

Recent Launching Activities

110. The lunar probes, or Lunilcs, launched in1959 were major feats of theory and technol-ogy. Their general nature and complexity, to-gether with their announced payload weights,represent an advance over the Sputniks, whichthemselves had exhibited progressively in-creasing payload capability and technicalsophistication. The launching vehicles for allthree Luniks were probably essentially thesame. They used one stage more than theSputnik or ICBM vehicles. Since the missionsof Luniks I and II were probably to hit themoon, their instrumentation was probablyabout the same. The first failed to accom-plish the mission and the second was success-ful. The mission of the third was primarilyto acquire pictures. of the previously un-observed portion of the moon's surface. So-viet released data indicates that this was suc-cessful, although the actual quality of thedata cannot now be assessed. During thetransit of the Lunik beneath and beyond themoon—not around the moon—there was achange in the modulation on 183.6 mc/s thatcould indicate the transmission of photo-graphic data to the Soviets. Lunik M be-came an earth satellite with an approximate16-day orbit. The Soviets have triggered theprimary data link only when the informationcan best be received in the USSR, therebypreventing the West from intercepting an ap-

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preciable amount of data or locating thevehicle.

111. In addition to satellite and space vehiclelaunchings, the USSR has conducted an ex-tensive series of high altitude research firings.In February 1959, the Soviets displayed nosesections recovered from rockets fired verticallyto altitudes of 60 n.m., 120 n.m., and 250 n.m.Live dogs have been carried in some suchrockets and successfully recovered from eventhe highest of these altitudes, according toSoviet announcements.

112. The Sputniks and Luniks have probablyall been launched from the Tyura Tam range-head. Many but not all of the vertical rocketshave been launched from Kapustin Yar.Some characteristics of the Sputniks andLuniks are given in Table 2.

113. The launching of such significant instru-mented payloads is largely attributable to theavailability of high thrust propulsion systems,which have more than compensated for higherstructural weights and nonuse or nonavail-ability of miniaturized components. To date,conventional liquid rocket propellants haveprobably been used exclusively. Within thenext few years the Soviets will probably beable to employ high energy propellants in theupper stages of their space vehicles. We be-lieve the Soviets are interested in and areprobably working on nuclear rocket enginesfor this purpose. However, nuclear propul-sion will probably not be used for the firststage. Nuclear rocket engines may be fol-lowed by ion and photon type engines, if thesecan be proved practical.

114. The estimated mobility and inherenttransportability of Soviet missiles which webelieve comprise major elements of their spacevehicles supports the feasibility of launchingan earth satellite from areas other than theestablished Soviet test ranges. There may besome technical reasons why this would be de-sirable. Further, political or propagandabenefits might dictate such an attempt. Forexample, based on the prestige and propa-ganda benefits and the existing Soviet tech-nical and logistical capability, we believe thatthe USSR could launch an ostensible "Chinese

satellite" from the territory of CommunistChina. We would not expect this to be anative Chinese launching vehicle althoughthey may design and build the instrumentpackage.

Major Supporting Capabilities

115. For tracking space vehicles, the Sovietscan employ their extensive system of opticalobservatories, radio telescopes, interferome-ters, radars, and radio direction finders. Theaccuracy and response time of their optical sys-tems are adequate for determining relativelystable earth satellite orbits; the speeds of re-sponse of the interferometer, radar and theradio direction finding stations are adequatefor observing their nonrepetitive trajectories.Soviet observation facilities and data handlingcapabilities will be adequate to carry out mostof the individual space missions--consideredherein. However, some will have to be com-plemented by self-contained guidance; e.g., toeffect rendezvous with a space station, or toland a man on the moon. Such missions willbe handicapped to some extent by the USSR'spresent lack of access to land-based locationsfor worldwide tracking stations. Shipborneinstallations could alleviate but not eliminatethis problem.

116. The accomplishment of more advancedspace projects requires contributions frommany fields of science and engineering. Inthe basic sciences, the Soviets have demon-strated high capabilities in related fields suchas physics, mathematics, and the geophysicalsciences, stemming from an extensive theo-retical background, large and effective edu-cational and research programs, and inten-sive efforts to keep informed about Westernscientific advances. The Soviets are compe-tent in celestial mechanics and astrobiology,they are making rapid strides to overcomelimitations in astronomical instruments, andtheir capability in computers is adequate forspace research purposes.

Capabilities to Accomplish Specific Objectives

117. The dates given for Soviet space activ-ities estimated in this section represent theearliest passible time periods in which we

TABLE 2

SOVIET EARTH SATELLITES AND SPACE PROBES

Ncrrn: Most of these data are based on Soviet announcements or displaysi

SPUTNIK I(1957 ALPHA-2)

SPUTNIK II(1957 arrs)

SPUTNIK III(1958 DELTA-2)

turris 1 b Lux= 11 b LUNIE III b

(1959 Turrs) •

Scientific or Measuring Equip- 184 (includes the 1,120 (including 2,130 (plus about 797 858 959.ment Weight (lbs.). structural batteries). 800 lbs. of struc- A portion of the experimentation weight was affixed to the

weight). tural weight, last stage rocket bodies, and a portion in special con-i.e., total weight tainers—a 2.7 foot diameter ejectable sphere in the case of2,925 lbs.). Luniks I and II and a cylinder-truncated cone in the case

of Lunik III, which was probably also separated.Shape Spherical Conical • Conical • The last stage of all three Luniks was probably essentiallyDiameter (ft.) of Satellite 1.9 3.3' 5.7 • the same as that displayed at New York and other ex-Length (ft.) of Satellite 6.5* 11.7 • positions. Shape: A cone or cylinder, 173-6 feet long,

feet in diameter. Weight of empty last stage including in-

Date Launched 4 October 1957.... 3 November 1957. 15 May 1958 strumentation: Varying

2 January 1959....slightly, about

12 September 1959.3,250-3,400 pound.s.4 October 1959.

Orbit Period 96 minutes 104 minutes 106 minutes 450 days (aroundthe sun).

Impacted on moon. Approx. 16 days(around the earth).

Perigee (St mi) 142 140 140 Approx. 30,000.Apogee (st 588 1,038 1,168 Approx. 290,000.Inclination to Equator (degs). 65 65 65 Approx. 75.Contents Internal tempera-

ture, pressureinstruments,transmitters,chemical batter-ies.

Dog; cosmic, ul-traviolet, X-ray, tempera-ture, pressureinstruments,transmitters,chemical batter-ies.

Large variety ofresearch instru-ments, transmit-ters, chemicaland solar bat-teries.

Large variety ofresearch instru-ments, chemicalbatteries, trans-mitters.

Instruments formeasuring mag-netic field ofearth and moon,cosmic rays, me-teorites, densityof matter inspace, radiationaround earth andmoon.

Equipment for tem-perature, gravi-tation, radiationand moon pho-tography experi-ments.

Radio Frequencies Used 20 mc/s 20 mc/s 20 mc/s 183.6 mc/s 183.6 mc/s 183.6 me/s.40 me/s. 40 mc/s. 60 me/s. 19.993 me/s. 19.993 me/a. 39.986 me/s.

70 mc/s. 70 mc/s. 19.995 ma/s. 19.997 me/s.19.997 me/s. 20.003 mc/s.

39.986 me/s.

Bee footnotes on next page.

Table 2 (Continued)

SPUTNIK I

(1957 ALPHA-2)SPUTNIK II

(1957 BETA)SPUTNIK III

(1958 DrtTA-2)LUNIK 1b LUNIK II b Lorna tub

(1959 THETA) •

Date of Last Signal Intercept

Date of Satellite Demise

25 Oct. 1957

4 June 1958

10 Nov. 1957

14 Apr. 1958

Still transmittingon 20 mc/s, 3Nov. 1959. Themain .batterywent dead 5 June1958.

Estimated Mar.-Apr. 1960.

Soviets reported62 hrs. recep-tion.

Indefinite aroundsun.

Soviet: 38 hrs., 22min., 42 sec.

Western: 38 hrs.,22 min., 38 sec.

2102:24Z-13 Sept.1959.

US: Possibly 18Oct. 1959.

Soviet: Unknown.

Unknown.

• Not including the last stage which did not separate in the case of Sputnik II.t. The West's capability to intercept transmissions from a Soviet lunar probe, especially in the lower frequencies, is very limited. Additionally, the Soviets

probably trigger the transmitters while over Soviet territory, and pass only limited position data to the West.• The earth satellite designation assigned Lunik III.

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believe each specific event could be accom-plished. We recognize that the various facetsof the space flight program are in competitionnot only among themselves but with manyother priority programs, and that the USSRprobably cannot undertake all of the spaceflight activities described below at the priorityrequired to meet the time periods specified.In addition, some of these missions dependupon successful prior accomplishments ofother ventures.

118.Unmanned Earth Satellites—The USSRwill continue to place into orbit satellitesgrowing progressively in size and weight. Onthe basis of information from previous spaceflight operations, we believe that the USSRcould now orbit scientific payloads weighingon the order of 5,000-10,000 pounds in a mini-mum (100-150 n.m.) orbit. As additional sci-entific information is obtained, the USSR willrefine and develop new scientific instrumen-tation to be placed into satellites, and willexplore fully those critical regions surround-ing the earth to assess accurately the biologi-cal effects of radiation and. other hazardswhich may be present. Objectives will prob-ably include continued measurements of thegaseous compositions of the upper atmosphereand space, micrometeorites, primary andsecondary radiations of all types, aurora andIonospheric characteristics and electric, mag-netic, and gravitational fields. Within thenext several years the Soviets can be expectedto undertake relativity checks and the acqui-sition of astronomical data.

119. Specific military support functions whichmay be served by unmanned satellites in-clude surveillance, communications relays,navigational aid to shipping and aircraft,geodesy and mapping, and early warning.Techniques to accomplish the above includephotography, infrared, radio, and televi-sion. Within the general classification ofsurveillance satellites, there are several typeswhich have potential usefulness to theUSSR. These are a weather satellite, a satel-lite for warning against ballistic missileattack, an electronic surveillance satellite, asatellite for mapping, a force deploymentsatellite, an electronic countermeasures satel-

lite, and a satellite for the detection of highaltitude nuclear tests. Any of these missionscould be undertaken to demonstrate feasibil-ity beginning in the 1959-1960 period. How-ever, they could probably not contribute sig-nificantly to Soviet military capabilities forseveral years after first feasibility demonstra-tion.

120. There are three nonsurveillance typesof military satellites which we believe will beIncluded as Soviet military requirements.These are navigation satellites used by air-craft and surface craft to aid in position deter-mination, communications satellites of thesimple and delayed repeater types, and non-radiating satellites so positioned as to permita complete and accurate description of thegeoidal shape of the earth.

121. Currently, the USSR could place intoorbit and probably recover biological speci-mens from satellites for the purpose of pro-viding essential knowledge of recovery tech-niques and the effects of the space environ-ment of such specimens. Several such testswould be highly desirable, if not necessary,prior to manned capsule recovery from orbit.

122.Unmanned Lunar Rockets—The Sovietshave announced the total inflight weight ofLuniks I and II to be 3,245 and 3,324 pounds,respectively, which includes the final stageempty rocket weight and 797 and 858 pounds,respectively, of scientific instruments, con-tainers, and batteries. Given such payloadcapacities and the demonstrated ability toImpact on the moon, we believe the USSRcould orbit the moon with an instrumentedsatellite at any time. A soft impact on themoon requires the use of a retrorocket, moreaccurate guidance and a method of attitudeorientation. An instrumented lunar softlanding could probably be accomplished bylate 1960. We also believe that the capabilitydemonstrated by the Luniks implies a currentcapability to carry out a biomedical experi-ment to the vicinity of the moon. As a pre-lude to a manned lunar landing, we believethat an unmanned experimental landing onthe moon and return to earth could occur dur-ing the period 1963-1964.

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123. Planetary Probes—Planetary probe ve-hicles could utilize existing propulsion unitsand presently available guidance components.We believe the USSR could launch probestoward Mars and Venus with a good chancefor success, with the communications linkprobably presenting the most formidable prob-lem. The first launchings toward Mars couldoccur about October 1960, when Mars will beIn the most favorable position relative to theearth. More sophisticated probes could belaunched about November 1962, when Marswill again be in a favorable position. On thesame basis, the first launchings toward Venuscould occur about January 1961, and moresophisticated probes could be launched aboutAugust 1962. The months given are those inwhich energy requirements are at a minimumand the guidance accuracy requirements arethe least stringent. An approximate threemonth period on either side of those specifiedis practical but as one departs from theseminima, penalties in payload weight andguidance accuracy are imposed.

124. Manned Earth Satellites—We believethat the Soviets will achieve their first man-in-space success using a capsule-type recoveryincorporating a minimum of refinements. The present Soviet payload capacity is ade-

quate to meet initial requirements. However,prior to attempting even the most elementaryman-in-space ventures, the Soviets must solvevarious problems, many of which require aprogression of space experiments. We antic-ipate that many of these experiments wouldprecede even a high risk attempt.

125. Most important among problems still re-quiring solution are: (a) the development andtesting of a suitable and a reliable rocketvehicle, and (b) development and testing of re-covery techniques which will necessarily in-clude provision for safe re-entry into theearth's atmosphere as well as the ability tocontrol ejection and re-entry in relation to apreselected geographic area.

126. Certain biomedical experimentation is anabsolute requirement for passenger survival:e.g., stabilization, temperature control, andother physiological and psychological en-vironmental controls must be provided. It is

possible that harmful radiations associatedwith large solar eruptions will inhibit mannedspace flight, but until additional knowledgeof the degree and effect is acquired, no mean-ingful assessment can be made. Based on thelimited data presently available on the VanAllen belts, it is possible that unshieldedmanned sustained orbital flight will be limitedto altitudes under 500 miles or above 25,000miles.

127. Intensive testing within the next six toeight months could provide sufficient scien-tific background to support a high risk man-in-space attempt or more normal testing forthe next 18 months would provide back-ground for a less risky attempt. An earlyeffort resulting in failure would not neces-sarily risk adverse publicity because of theUSSR's strict security measures. We there-fore estimate that, in consideration of propa-ganda advantages that would ' accrue, theUSSR could attempt to recover a manned cap-sule from orbit at any time by the acceptanceof very great risks of failure. However, weestimate that by mid-1960 to mid-1961 theUSSR could acquire sufficient experience andscientific data to recover a man from orbitalflight with a fair chance of success. Glidetype re-entry vehicles could make their ap-pearance one or two years later.

128. We believe that the USSR now has thecapability for manned vertical launchings andthat downrange manned recovery tests couldbegin at any time.

129. Manned Maneuverable Space Vehicles—Achievement of a maneuverable manned earthsatellite could follow closely upon the attain-ment of a minimum man-In-space capability.It is believed that in 1963 the Soviets coulddevelop a minimum ability to change the pathof a manned space vehicle. Longer lived andmore maneuverable space vehicles allowingrepeated path changes could be developedusing conventional propellants. When a sig-nificant capability for maneuver of a mannedspace vehicle had been achieved, it would bepossible to effect rendezvous with an orbitingvehicle. Once contact had been made anditems of equipment constructed or modifiedin space, the Soviets could claim they had

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established a manned space station. Depend-ing on the successful prior development of themaneuverable vehicle, it is believed theycould establish such a station by 1965.

130. Once the long-lived maneuverablemanned vehicle using conventional propel-lants and large boosters becomes practicable,it would permit the construction, operation,and maintenance of initial space stations.These stations would incorporate a capabilityfor position keeping and for making minoradjustments in position as desired. Advancedspace stations suitable for sustaining life andfor performing scientific or military functionsfor extended periods of time (several monthsor more) would probably use unconventionalpropulsion systems and closed cycle ecologicalsystems and could be established about 1970.

131. Manned Lunar Flights—Contingentupon successes with manned earth satellites,the development of a new, large booster en-gine, and concurrent advances in scientificexperimentation with lunar rockets, propul-sion staging techniques and attitude orientingdevices, the Soviets are believed capable of

manned circumlunar flight with reasonablechance of success in the period 1964-1965; ofrecoverable manned lunar satellites in the1965-1966 period; and of lunar landings andreturn to earth about 1970. None of theabove estimated missions would, initially, re-quire unconventional propulsion systems.

Probable Next Steps

132. Judging by the USSR's known and esti-mated technical capabilities, and consideringthe Soviet desire to achieve major worldwidepropaganda and psychological impact, we be-lieve that during the next 12 months or sothe Soviet space program will include one ormore of the following:

a. vertical or downrange flight and re-covery of a manned capsule;

b. unmanned lunar satellite or soft land-ing on the moon;

c. a probe to the vicinity of Mars orVenus;

d. orbiting and recovery of capsules con-taining instruments, an animal, andthereafter perhaps a man.

TOP S-EORT4T,

1965About 1970

1964-19651965-1966About 1970

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TABLE 3

POSSIBLE SOVIET SPACE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

FIRST POSSIBLESPACE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

CAPABILITY DATE

These dates represent the earliest possible time period in whicheach specific event could be successfully accomplished. However,competition between the space program and the military missileprogram as well as within the space program itself makes it un-likely that all of these objectives will be achieved within the speci-fied time periods.

Unmanned Earth Satellites 5,000-10,000 pounds, low orbit satellites 1959Recoverable (including biological) satellites 1959Military Satellites:—The dates shown are the earliest in which

feasibility dembnstrations could begin. After feasibility demon-stration, militarily useful systems could generally become avail-able in two to three years.

Surveillance: weather, mapping, and force deployment 1959-1960Navigation, Geodesy, and Communications 1959-1960Early Warning 1959-1960ECM and Elint 1959-1960

Unmanned Lunar Rockets Biological Probe 1959Satellite of the Moon 1959Soft Landings 1960Lunar Landing, Return, and Earth Recovery 1963-1964

Planetary Probes Mars About October 1960Venus About January 1961

Manned Vertical or Downrange Flight 1959

Manned Earth Satellites—The specified time periods for mannedaccomplishments are predicated on the Soviets having previouslysuccessfully accomplished a number of similar unmanned ven-tures.

Capsule-type Vehicles b

Glide-type Vehicles b

Maneuverable (minimum; conventional propulsion)Maneuverable (nuclear propulsion) Space Platform (minimum, nonecological, feasibility demonstra-

tion) Space Platform (long-lived)

Manned Lunar Flights Circumlunar Satellites (temporary) Landings

'See Table 2 for accomplishments to date.'Recovery would probably be attempted after the first few orbits but life could probably be sustainedfor about a week.

TOP CEORA-T-

Mid-1960 to mid-19611 to 2 years after above 1963

About 1970

C00267656

IX. SUMMARY TABLES

PROBABLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILEDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

SUMMARY TABLE

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS •

(GROUND AND NAVAL LAUNCHED) b

MAXIMUMMAXIMUM MAXIMUMA RD ITR A II Y INITIAL OPERA- HORIZONTAL ACCURACY •EFFECTIVE WARHEADREFERENCE TIONAL CAPA- RANGE (NM) d (CEP IN GUIDANCE REMARKSALTITUDE d (LBS. AND

MAXIMUMDESIGNATION BILITY DATE •(IN FEET)

FEET)TYPE)

SPEED (MACH)

SA-1 1954 60,000 20-30 65-120 .. Track-while-scan 450-700 B-200 guidance system with the single stage(minimum

about 3,000)2.5 radar; radio

command.HE or

NuclearV-301 missile deployed only around Moscowat fixed sites. Boosted Guideline possibly alsoutilized in SA-1 system as a replacement forsingle stage V-301.

SA-2 .. 1957 60,000(minimum

25-40 Guidance system as yet unde-termined. Believe CEP would

450-700HE or

System being widely deployed In Soviet Bloc,typified by Glau site and estimated to em-3

—7) approximate the 85-120 ft. Nuclear ploy Guideline missiles. May be used forestimated for SA-1. static or mobile defense.

SA-2 (Naval) •

Designated SA-2 (Naval) if adapted as surfaceship armament.

SA-3 About 1980 40,000 25—med alt.. 20-50.... Semiactive radar 150-250 Static or mobile system primarily for low altitude(minimum 10—low alt. homing all the HE or defense.

SA-3 (Naval) •

50) 2-3 way. Nuclear Designated SA-3 (Naval) if adapted as surfaceship armament.

SA-4 1960-1961 90,000 On the orderof 100

100 Command withactive terminal

450-700HE or

Static or transportable system to provide in-creased range and altitude capability.

SA-4 (Naval) b

3.5 homing. Nuclear Designated SA-4 (Naval) if adapted as surfaceship armament.

•SA-5 1963-1986 Static antiballistic missile s ystem with undetermined capabil 'ty against IC Ms, IRBMs, submarine-launched and air-launchedballistic missiles.

Other It is possible th at the USSR will develop and place in operation a ground-base d missile system with limited capabilities againstreconnaissan cc satellites (1963-1985); a mobile system for defense against reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters, etc. (about1965):a mob 987). See paragraph 34.nse against ballistic missiles (by 1lie system for field force defe

• We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably gothrough various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. We estimate that considerable energy will be expended in secondgeneration longer range missiles.

e Adaptations of SA-2 and SA-3 would be suitable for cruisers and destroyers. The size of the SA-4 iyould limit it to cruisers.• Date at which one or more missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.• Maximum altitude is not necessarily achieved at maximum range. A limited capability will exist above the indicated altitude.• Accuracy varies with target size, speed, altitude and range.I Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

SUMMARY TABLE

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS•

ARBI-TRARYREFER-ENCEnxsio-NATION

INITIAL OP-ERATIONALCAPABILITY

DATE sGUIDANCE

ACCU-RACY(CEPIN

FEET)

MAXIMUMWARHEAD,tLBS. ANDTYPE) •

APPROXI-MATE GROSS

WEIGHT(LBS.)

COMPATIBLE AIRCRAFT

REISARXS •AircraftAttack

Clitapabi y Range (NM) 4

AA-1...

AA-2....

AA-3....

1955-1956

1955-1956

1958

Radar beam rider..

Infrared homing...

Semiactive radarhoming.

20

10

15

40 HE

25 HE

25 HE

200

175

.

200

Flashlight andmodified Flash-light.

Fresco D, E

Farmer B Fagot Fresco A,B,CFarmer AFaceplateFitter

Fresco DFarmer BFlashlight

Modified Flash-light.

FishpotFresco D Farmer BFlashlight and

modified Flash-light.

Rear quarter360°.

Day Fighter....

Limited all-weather

All-weather

Rear

2 (Tail only)

2 (Tail only)

234 (Tail)5 (Head-on)

.

Limited by ra-dar range toapproximately1 nm

23,5 Sea Level

4-Alt

6 (Head-on)*i--3 (Tail)

All-weather. Sovietdesignation

Limited to clear airmass' and tailcone attack.

MI-weather.


SUMMARY TABLE (Continued)

ARBI•TRARYREFER-ENCEDEW,.NATION

INITIAL 01.•ERATIONALCAPABILITY

DATE'.

GUIDANCE

ACCU-RACY

(CEP114

'Err)

MAXIMUMWARHEAD%fLBS. AND

TYPE) •

APPROXI.MATE GROSS

WEIGHT(Las.)

COMPATIBLE AIRCRAFT

REMARKS •Aircraft

AttackCapability Range (Nu) 4

AA-4....

AA-5....

1960

1960

1963

Semiactive radarhoming.

Infrared homing...

Combined Semi-active radar andinfrared homing.

50

10

10-50

150 HE orNuclear.

150 HE orNuclear.

800

800

Modified Flash-light.

Fishpot

1963 Fighter All angle cape-bility.

15-20 (Head-on)5 (Tail)

5 (Tail only)

15-20 (Head-on)5 (Tail)

All-weather.

Limited to clear airmass.'

All-weather. Ac-curacy varieswith guidanceemployed.Countermeasureresistant—(SeeAA-4).

Other.... It is possib e that the USSR vii develop and place in operation a 30-40 nm range missile for all-weather employment with HE ornuclear warhead by advanced interceptor types (1965). See paragraph 39.

• We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably gothrough various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table.

• The date at which one or more missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

• Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

• Range is here defined as the distance between launching aircraft and target at the instant of missile launch.

• Speed for these missiles has not been indicated on the chart. Mach 2 plus the speed of the launching aircraft is considered reasonable speed for all themissiles estimated except for AA-1 which probably has a speed of Mach 1.7.Clear Air Mass is here defined as absence of clouds and precipitation between missile and target. The term is equally applicable to day or night op-erations. In addition, an infrared system is also degraded by bright background such as white clouds and attack angles close to the sun.

SUMMARY TABLE

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS •

ARBITRARYREFERENCE

DES10-NATION

INITIAL OPERA-TIONAL CAPA-may DATE b

MAXIMUM RANGE(NM)

ACCURACY(CEP)

MAXIMUM WARHEAD(LBS. AND TYPE) •

CRUISESPEED

(.f4.on no.)GUIDANCE REMARKS

AS-1

AS-2

1958-1957

About 1981

55

At least 350

150 feet...against ships2 nm againstand targets,

150 feetagainst ships

3,000 HE or Nuclear...

3,000 HE or Nuclear...

0.8

1.5 to 2.0

Beam riding with semi-active radar homing.

Adaptable for use againstguidance, or ships at seaship use would require reductionof other aircraft or ships.

'Antiship missile. "Komet.".

land targets with all-inertialwith terminal homing. Anti-

in range or assistance

Decoys.... The USSR is probably developing and may now have operational an air launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bomber.


• The date at which one or more missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.• Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

wAXIMUlf WARHEAD(LBS. AND TYPE) •

CONFIGU-RATION

REMARKS

SCUD—Launched fromself-propelled trackedvehicle. Road mobile.

Second generation mis-sile—outgrowth ofV-2. Road mobile.

Outgrowth of V-2.Probably based onGerman designed R-10 and Soviet devel-oped Korolov missiles.Road mobile.

SHYSTER—Road mo-bile.

Road and/or rail mo-bile.

Could be rail mobilewith rail mobile units,fixed installations ora combination of thetwo.

Ballistic..

Ballistic..

20-40 HE-shapedcharge.

1,500 HE, Nu-clear, CW.

2,000 HE, Nu-clear, C W.

2,000 HE, Nu-clear, CW.

3,000 Nuclear,possibly CW.

3,000 Nuclear

6,000 Nuclear

Ballistic..

Ballistic..

Ballistic..

Ballistic..

SUMMARY TABLE

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR GROUND- T ,A TINCHF.D SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS •

ARBITRARYREFERENCE

DEsIONATION

INITIAL. OPERATIONALCAPABILITY DATE b

MAXIIIUOtOPERATIONAL

RANGE(NM).

GUIDANCE

SS-Antitank ....

SS-1

SS-2

SS-3

SS-9

SS-5

SS-6 (ICBM)

Prior to 1958

1954-1957

1954

1954

1958

Late 1958 or early1959.

For planning pur-poses it should beconsidered that itwill have oc-curred by 1 Jan-uary 1960.

About5,000-6,000

yards75

200

350

700

1,100

(5,500

Command wire link....

Radar track-radio com-mand/inertial withterminal correction o.all-Inertial.

1954: Radar track-radiocommand/inertial.

1958-1980: All-inertial.1954: Radar track-radio

command/inertial.1958-1960: All-inertial.

1956-1958: Radar track.radio command/iner-tial.

1958-1960: All-inertial(retrofit optional).

Radar track-radio corn-mand/inertial or all-inertial.

Radar track-radio com-mand/inertial.

1960-1962: All inertial(retrofit undetermin-able).


• We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably gothrough various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. We estimate that considerable energy will be expended in secondgeneration longer range missiles, particularly on an ICBM of greatly improved operational characteristics. •

• Date at which one or more missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit. In the case of the ICBM, it isthe date on which a few—say 10—series produced missiles are in the hands of trained personnel at a completed launching facility.

Generally a ballistic missile can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-third the maximum operational range without serious incrense in CEPand to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

• CEP is the radius of a circle within which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better that theaccuracies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors.

• The type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission of the missile. In general, however, we believe that formissiles with maximum ranges of 350 nm or less, high explosive (HE), nuclear, or chemical warfare (CW) warheads will be employed in accordancewith Soviet military doctrine, depending upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. We estimate that formissiles with ranges of 700 nm and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use in 700 ammissiles for certain limited purposes. We believe that the USSR is capable of developing techniques for missile dissemination of biological warfare(BW) agents, although we have no specific evidence relating BW and missile research and development. In view of operational considerations we con-sider BW use in ballistic missiles unlikely, although possible for certain special purposes.The current missile should be capable of delivering a warhead of 6,000 pounds to a range of about 5,500 nm if employing a heat-sink nosecone, or witha warhead reduced to the order of 3,000 pounds could achieve 7,500 nm range. Use of an ablative nosecone would permit a heavier warhead or ex-tended range.

SUMMARY TABLE

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR NAVAL-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE GUIDED MISSILE SYSTEMS •

ARBITRARYREFERENCE

DESIGNATION

INITIAL OPERA-TIONAL CAPABILITY

DATE b

MAXIMUMOPERATIONALRANGE (NM)

ACCURACY (CEP) •MAXIMUM

WARHEAD (LBS.AND TYPE) d

GUIDANCE CONFIGURATION REMARES

SS-7 . 1955-1956 150-200 2-4 am 2,000 Nuclear.. Programmed withdoppler.

Cruise type Subsonic, low alti-tude. For launchfrom surfaced sub-marine.

SS-8 1958 30-40 150 feet 2,000 HE, Nu-clear.

Programmed or ra-dar track-radiocommand, withterminal homing.

Cruise type For use in destroy-ers and cruisers.

SS-9 1961-1963 500-1,000 2-4 am 1,000 Nuclear. All-inertial Ballistic For launch fromsurfaced or sub-merged submarine.

SS-10 (ASW).. Surface ship-launched—1962-1964.

20 400 yards at waterre-entry.

450 Nuclear. . . Inertial Ballistic launched...,

Primarily for useagainst submarines.May possibly beused against sur-

SubmarineI aunched—1963-1965.

150 HE Inertial with self-contained acoustichoming.

Ballistic launched,homing torpedo.

face ship targets.Both configurationsavailable.

Other The USSR may now have in operation a few long-range conventionally-powered submarines modified to launch, winksurfaced, ballistic missiles of about 200 am range and 2-4 am CEP. See paragraphs 89, 90.


▪ Date at which one or more missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.• CEP is the radius of a circle in which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the ac-

curacies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors.• Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism. The weight of the structure and the heat protection of the nose.

cone are not included in "payload."

PA.

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