APPROVED FORRELEASEL DATE:16-Jul-2011

mi,*mad=letzetteis

WE 11—s-5712 March 1957

.03364-&-

C00267693HR70-14

NATIONAL IN T ELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-5-57

Supersildes NIE 11-6-54and its

Supplement NIE 11-12-55

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE

PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMS ibmitted t)y the RELEASE IN FULL

DIRECTOR or CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEThi.• following intellige-ice organhations particpated in thepreparation of thIS ezt:7 !ate.: The Central Hite/IN .:nee AgenCyand the intelligence rganizatioris' 01 the DepertmentsState, the Army, tlic !..":. : y, the Air Forco. eJjnt Staff. and

tire At.•;; ic Ertergi

Cc!ieurred in the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEEo. 12 March 1957. Ci.ncurrtng ii-era the Special Assistant,Intelligence, Depart c t of State: the Assistant Chief ofIntelligence. Depcfbnc - t of the Army ; the Director of NavalIntelligence; the Dirin-: or of Intelligence, USAF; the DeputyDirector for Inteligei,••e, The Joirit Stitt ; and the AtittiliiEnergy Commission Ilciircsentatii-o to the /AC. The Assist-ant Director, Federal bureau of ihreligotion. ab..taihea, the

subject bean; outside cif his jurisdiction. • ;

• -I

..}-effiesleennr°

I

C00267693

CENTRAL INTELIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This estimate was disseminated by "he Central Intelligence Agency. This copyis for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential disseminationmay be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department ofState

b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Armyc. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navyd. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Forcee. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Stafff. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commissiong. Assistant to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigationh. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other De-

partment or Agency

2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-ment with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retainit for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate shouldeither be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be re-quested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC—D-69/2, 22June 1953.

'"VifthsE1.1440049,"'material contain3 information aft ne

the tonal Defense of the • Stateswithin the ng 0 espionage laws,Title 18, 'DSc, d 794. the trans-missio e ation cf whic v manner

unauthorized person is prohibite aW

DISTRIBUTION:White HouseNational Security CouncilDepartment of StateDepartment of DefenseOperations Coordinating BoardAtomic Energy CommissionFederal Bureau of In vestigation

C00267693

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PageTHE PROBLEM 1

FOREWORD 1

CONCLUSIONS 2

DISCUSSION 4

I. SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FORGUIDED MISSTLFS 4

Strategic and Tactical Considerations 4Soviet Requirements for Defensive Missile Systems . 5

Soviet Requirements for Offensive Missile Systems . . 5Soviet Evaluation of Missiles versus other

Weapons Systems 6Priorities within the Soviet Guided Missile Program . 8

II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDED MISSILECAPABILITIES 8

Scientific and Technical Capabilities 8Missile Guidance and Control 9Missile Propulsion 10Aerodynamics and Structure 10Warheads and Fuzes 11

Geodesy and Cartography 11

Soviet Industrial Capability to Produce Guided Missiles. 12

III. SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 12Warhead Selection 13

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems 14

Air-to-Air Missile Systems 16Air-to-Surface Missile Systems 17Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems 17

Ballistic Missiles 17Cruise-type Missiles 19

Earth Satellite 20

Specialized Missiles 20

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont.).

PageANNEXES

A: A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONALAND PRODUCTION PROGRAM 25

I. Possible Program 25

II. Warhead Considerations Affecting Possible Program 32M. Economic Implications of Possible Program . . . 38

B: SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCESFOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDED MISSIT:ES 42

I. Basic Scientific Capabilities 42II. Availability of Technical Knowledge from

Foreign Sources 42III. Organization and Control of the Soviet Guided

Missile Program 43

C: SOVIET GUIDED MISSTLP. TESTING ACTIVITIES(Limited Distribution under Separate Cover)

D: SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEAD CAPABILITIES (LimitedDistribution under Separate Cover)

CO0267693

APPROVED FOR RELEASECIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS

IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs in the field of guided mis-siles, including earth satellites, through 1966.1

FOREWORD

This estimate supersedes NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Pro-grams in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954, and its supplement, NIE 11-12-55,Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs, 20 December 1955. Al-though some new intelligence has strengthened our previous estimate that the USSRhas an extensive guided missile program, intelligence on specific guided missile sys-tems continues to be deficient. In making this estimate in a field where positiveintelligence is minimal, we have employed three interdependent approaches: mili-tary requirements, scientific and technical capabilities, and economic capabilities.Throughout the entire estimative process, the fullest consideration has been takenof the available evidence of Soviet missile activity, US guided missile experience,and known and estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields.

This estimate is based on previous judgments that the USSR does not now in-tend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war asof any particular future date.

Except where noted otherwise, the operational capability dates given in thisestimate are the earliest probable years during which one or more missiles couldhave been serially produced and placed in the hands of trained personnel of oneoperational unit, thus constituting a limited capability for operational employment.These dates are based on our estimate that a concerted and continuous native So-viet research and development program began in 1948.

Although considerable effort has been devoted to estimating a Soviet produc-tion and operational program for guided missile systems through 1966, the productionquantities and time-phasing presented in Annex A represent only a possible Sovietprogram, but one which is considered both feasible and reasonable. 2

'Unguided rockets are not included in this estimate.' See the Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A. paragraph 1.

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CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. We estimate that the Soviet guidedmissile program is extensive and enjoysa very high priority. (Paras. 17, 27, 29-30, 50)

2. We believe that the USSR has the na-tive scientific resources and capabilitiesto develop during this period advancedtypes of guided missile systems, in allcategories for which it has military re-quirements. (Paras. 29-38)

3. We estimate that the USSR has theindustrial base and related industrial ex-perience to series produce the missile sys-tems it will develop during this peri-od. However, in view of competing de-mands, the limited availability of elec-tronic equipment will seriously restrictthe extent and variety of Soviet guid-ed missile production until about 1958.Thereafter, expanding electronics pro-duction will probably make this restric-tion much less severe. (Paras. 45-48)

4. We estimate that the USSR has re-quirements for various sizes of nuclear,high explosive (HE) , and chemical (CW)warheads, and has the capability to de-velop them on time scales consistent withthe missiles in which they would be em-ployed. In view of competing demands,the availability of fissionable materialswill impose limitations on the extent ofSoviet nuclear warhead production dur-ing the period of this estimate. (Paras.39-42, 54, Annex A)

SPECIFIC SOVIET CAPABILITIES ANDPROGRAMS

Surface - to -Air .Missiles

5. We estimate that surface-to-air mis-sile systems have one of the highest pri-orities among current Soviet militaryprograms. At Moscow, an extensive sys-tem of surface-to-air missile sites hasbeen constructed, and all sites are prob-ably now operational. ' This system canprobably direct a very high rate of fireagainst multiple targets at maximum al-titudes of about 60,000 feet and maxi-mum horizontal ranges of about 25 n.m.(Paras. 27-28, 32, 56-60)

6. During the period 1958-1961, surface-to-air systems with increased range andaltitude capabilities for static defense ofcritical areas, and with low and high al-titude capabilities for defense of stat-ic targets, field forces, and naval ves-sels, could probably become available foroperational employment. Sometime be-tween 1963 and 1966, the USSR couldprobably have in operation a surface-to-air system of some capability against theICBM. (Paras. 61-67)

7. We estimate that series production ofsurface-to-air guided missiles is now un-der way in the USSR, and that it willprobably produce such missiles in largequantities. Nuclear warheads could nowbe incorporated into a limited number ofsurface-to-air missiles. We estimate thatsome percentage of surface-to-air mis-

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sues will be so equipped during the pe-riod of this estimate. (Paras. 19, 59-60,Annex A)

ranges: 75 n.m., 175-200 n.m., and 350n.m. These types could be equipped withnuclear warheads. However, the USSRwould probably consider CW warheadsdesirable for certain specific purposes, andmight employ HE in the two shorter-range types. (Paras. 75-79, 81, Annex A)

Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles(700 n.m. and 1,600 n.m. ranges)•

11. Evidence on Soviet development pro-grams leads us to estimate that the USSRcould probably have had a 700 n.m. maxi-mum range ballistic missile available foroperational use in 1956. We have firmevidence that in 1949 the USSR was in-terested in a 1,600 n.m. intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM), and webelieve it is a logical step in the Sovietdevelopment program. We estimate thatthe USSR is developing an IRBM, andthat it could probably have such a mis-sile in operation in 1959. Both these mis-sile types would require nuclear war-heads, although we do not exclude thepossibility of OW use with the 700 n.m.missile for occasional special missions.We believe the USSR would rapidly ac-quire a considerable number of boththe 700 n.m. and the 1,600 n.m. missiles.(Paras. 80, 82, Annex A)

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles(ICBM: 5,500 n.m. range)

12. We have no direct evidence that theUSSR is developing an ICBM, but webelieve its development has probablybeen a high priority goal of the Sovietballistic missile program. We estimatethat the USSR could probably have a5,500 n.m. ICBM ready for operationaluse in 1960-1961. 3 We believe that the

Air-to-Air Missiles

8. Despite a lack of significant intelli-gence, we estimate that the USSR haspursued the development of air-to-airmissiles, and that it could now have inoperational use a 2-3 n.m. range missilecapable of tail-cone attacks in goodweather. It is probable that the USSRcould have a 5 n.m. all-weather missileoperational in 1958 and a 15-20 n.m. all-weather missile, capable of employing anuclear warhead, in 1960. (Paras. 68-70)

Air-to-Surface Missiles

9. In 1955 the USSR could probably havehad a 20 n.m. subsonic air-to-surface mis-sile available for operational use. In1956-1957 a 55 n.m. subsonic missilecould probably be available, and there issome evidence that such a missile hasreached at least final flight test stage.A 55 n.m. supersonic missile could prob-ably be available in 1958. These missiles,designed primarily as antiship weapons,could also be employed against isolatedand well-defined radar targets on land.In 1961, a 100 n.m. supersonic missilecould probably be available for employ-ment by heavy bombers. Each of thesemissile types could employ nuclear war-heads. (Paras. 71-74)

Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles(up to 350 n.m. range)

10. There is considerable evidence of So-viet development of short-range surface-to-surface missiles, and we estimate thatthe USSR could probably have had avail-able for operational use in 1954 ballisticmissiles with the following maximum

' Date predicated on first operational unit beingequipped with prototype missiles.

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USSR will seek to acquire a considerablenumber of ICBM's with nuclear war-heads as rapidly as possible. (Para. 84,Annex A)

Submarine-Launched Surface-to-SurfaceMissiles

13. We believe the USSR would probablyhave developed cruise-type missiles ini-tially, and there is some evidence pointingto the existence of Soviet submarinesequipped to carry such missiles. TheUSSR could probably have had in opera-tion in 1955 a subsonic turbojet missilecapable of a maximum range of 500 n.m.,and a supersonic missile capable of thisrange could probably be in operation in1957. A supersonic cruise-type missilecapable of ranges up to 1,000 n.m. couldprobably be operational in 1962. These

missile types would require nuclear war-heads. With a vigorous program, theUSSR might achieve an operational sub-marine-launched TRBM system sometimeduring the period 1964-1966. (Paras. 83,85-89, Annex A)

Earth Satellite

14. The USSR will probably make a majoreffort to be the first country to orbit anearth satellite. We believe that the USSRhas the capability of orbiting, in 1957, asatellite vehicle which could acquire sci-entific information and data of limitedmilitary value. A satellite vehicle posses-sing substantial reconnaissance capabili-ties of military value could probably beorbited in the period 1963-1965. (Paras.90-91)

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FORGUIDED MISSILES

15. The Soviet guided missile program neces-sarily operates within the framework of cur-rent and future military requirements laiddown by Soviet defense planners. While wehave no direct evidence on the elements ofthis framework as it applies to missiles, webelieve it would logically have been based on:(a) an appreciation of the USSR's present andprobable future strategic and tactical situa-tions; (b) an estimate of the types of attackthat could be launched against the USSR inthe foreseeable future; (c) operational re-quirements for which missile systems could beemployed to replace or augment other weap-ons systems; and, finally, (d) an evaluation ofthe probable effectiveness of missiles versusother weapons systems to perform requiredmissions.

16. The USSR has almost certainly been as-sisted in determining the scope and priorities

of its missile programs by information onWestern, including US, military programs.This information is probably complete enoughto enable the USSR to judge approximatelythe time phases in the develoment, effective-ness, size, and composition of US and Alliedoffensive and defensive forces. Specifically,the Soviet leaders can probably judge suchfactors as the general size of nuclear stock-piles, the weapons systems into which nuclearwarheads have been incorporated, the generalprogress of air defense programs, and the gen-eral characteristics and availability dates ofoffensive and defensive missiles.

Strategic and Tactical Considerations17. Certain considerations which have playeda role in Soviet military thinking in recentyears make it plausible that the U8SR shouldhave given a high priority to the developmentof missiles. The Soviet leaders have heavilyemphasized the development of their nuclearcapability, and probably also believe that mis-

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siles will ultimately become the primarymeans of delivery for nuclear weapons. So-viet concern over US and Allied capabilitiesfor strategic air attack has compelled theUSSR to place high priority on developmentof a modern air defense system, in which mis-siles are now an essential ingredient and willultimately become the primary weapon. Fi-nally, the relative geographic disadvantagesfaced by the USSR for purposes of strategicattack, due to US possession of a forward basestructure on the Soviet periphery, could beoffset to some degree by development of long-range missiles for delivery of nuclear weapons.All these factors probably figured in a Sovietdecision, taken early in the postwar period,to make a major effort in the development ofguided missiles.

Soviet Requirements for DefensiveMissile Systems

18. In preparing their requirements for airdefense guided missile systems, Soviet mili-tary planners would probably have construct-ed a picture of the time-phased threat fromexisting and foreseeable Western offensiveweapons systems about as follows:

—In. 1956: high and low altitude bomb-ing attack by aircraft flying at subsonicspeeds and at altitudes up to 55,000 feet;in peripheral areas, attack by short andmedium range cruise-type missiles; whereground forces would be in contact, at-tack by short range ballistic missiles.

— By 1961: attack by aircraft employingair-to-surface missiles; bombing attackby aircraft capable of supersonic "dash"and altitudes up to 65,000 feet; attackby long range cruise-type missiles capableof high subsonic speeds and altitudes upto 60,000 feet; attack by long range bal-listic missiles.

— By 1966: attack by supersonic aircraftand cruise-type missiles, capable of al-titudes on the order of 80,000 feet; at-tack by long range ballistic missiles.

19. The USSR would have proceeded on theassumption that high-yield nuclear weaponsor warheads could be incorporated into any

of the Western weapons systems describedabove. This assumption would dictate a re-quirement for air defense missile systems witha high kill probability, and therefore the in-clusion of a percentage of nuclear warheadsin Soviet air defense missile systems at anearly date.

20. Soviet defense planners would probablyhave formulated generalized operational re-quirements for both surface-to-air and air-to-air systems capable of countering the threatoutlined above. Surface-to-air requirementswould probably have included static andmobile systems for the defense of criticalgovernmental and industrial centers, impor-tant military centers and bases, major navalforces afloat, and major units of the SovietArmy. Operational requirements for air-to-air missile systems would probably have beenbased on the need to increase the kill capabili-ties of existing and projected Soviet inter-ceptors.

21. Our intelligence on Soviet developmentof surface-to-air missiles to date indicates thattime-phased Soviet operational requirementsprobably began with a point-defense systemcapable of interdicting bomber aircraft at al-titudes up to about 60,000 feet. Our estimateof the Soviet analysis of the foreseeable threatindicates that Soviet requirements for air de-fense missiles over the next few years wouldbecome much more exacting, including longerranges, higher speeds, and more technical-ly advanced guidance systems. Later in theperiod, a high-priority requirement wouldemerge for a system capable of a high killprobability against ballistic missiles.

Soviet Requirements for OffensiveMissile Systems

22. In preparing their requirements for of-fensive missile systems, Soviet military plan-ners probably would have developed general-ized operational requirements for systems inboth the surface-to-surface and air-to-sur-face categories. Available intelligence sup-ports our belief that the USSR has had con-siderable interest in both these categories,especially in a family of surface-to-surfaceballistic missiles.

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23. Soviet requirements for shorter range sur-face-to-surface missiles would probably havebeen derived from the military missions of at-tacking targets in direct tactical support offield forces, and of attacking other targetsof importance in a military campaign. Suchrequirements would probably have been de-rived as follows:

' a. Soviet requirements for surface-to-sur-face missiles for tactical support of field forceswould have been derived in general from themissions of various echelons of the SovietArmy. From current Soviet tactical doctrinewe deduce that operational requirementswould probably have been developed for bal-listic missiles of up to 75 n.m. range for sup-port of division and corps operations, up to200 n.m. range for support of field armies,and up to 350 n.m. range for support of army"fronts." 4

b. Similarly, Soviet requirements for theseshorter range surface-to-surface missiles forthe support of other operations and for theneutralization of certain additional targetsof broad strategic significance would havestemmed from target systems including a va-riety of key installations of both tactical andstrategic significance. A family of 75,200, and350 n.m. missiles would probably have beendeveloped to provide coverage for these targetssystems.

c. In addition, a requirement might havebeen developed for a ballistic or cruise-typemissile capable of a longer range, both forsupport of certain army "front" operationsand for the neutralization of certain addition-al targets.

24. Considering the ranges from possiblelaunching sites within the Bloc to targets onor near the Eurasian land mass, Soviet plan-ners would probably have developed require-ments for longer range surface-to-surface mis-siles: (a) ballistic missiles of 600-900 n.m.maximum range and of longer ranges up to1,600 n.m. for peripheral attack missions, in-cluding the neutralization of US and Alliedbases and attack on strategic targets in non-

' A Soviet army "front" is roughly comparable toa US army group.

Bloc nations on the Eurasian periphery; and(b) a ballistic missile capable of up to 5,500n.m. range, for intercontinental attack. Thepossibility exists that interim Soviet surface-to-surface missile requirements might haveincluded cruise-type missiles in one or moreof the foregoing range categories. Require-ments for specialized naval versions of bothcruise-type and ballistic missiles, suitable forlaunching by submarines or surface vessels,would probably also have been developed.

25. It is reasonable to infer that the USSRwould have developed requirements for air-to-surface missiles to overcome foreseeableimprovements in the capabilities of landand shipborne air defense against bombard-ment aircraft. Genera.117ed operational re-quirements would probably have included amissile of at least 100 n.m. range to augmentthe capabilities of long-range bombers againstheavily-defended land targets and large navalconcentrations, as well as shorter range mis-siles for employment against single ships orother isolated and well-defined radar targets.

26. Soviet military planners may also haveconsidered that a requirement existed to de-velop certain missiles for specific functions inthe field of countermeasures against Westernair defense systems. Such a requirement couldinclude surface-to-surface cruise-type missilesand air-to-surface missiles, equipped withECM gear, to be employed as decoys to satu-rate air defense radar and control systems.In addition, it could include air-to-surface mis-siles capable of homing on and destroyingground radar installations.

Soviet Evaluation of Missiles VersusOther Weapons Systems

27. Soviet military planners, having estab-lished generalized operational requirementsfor which guided missile systems could beemployed, would probably then have evaluatedthe effectiveness of missiles versus other weap-ons systems to perform the missions of airdefense, tactical support, peripheral attack,and intercontinental attack. Based in parton the limited intelligence available on cur-rent Soviet military programs, including the

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missile program, we believe that the Sovietevaluation was as follows:

a. Air defense. The most immediate andgreatest Soviet military concern is the safe-guarding of key Soviet strengths and cen-ters of control. In the face of the gravethreat from Western, especially US, air-nu-clear forces in being and programmed, Sovietair defense kill probabilities must be broughtto a much higher level at a very early date.Conventional antiaircraft artillery is a weap-ons system of negligible value against highperformance, high altitude bombardment air-craft, although this system will continue ef-fective for at least a few years against attackby aircraft at lower altitudes. Fighter air-craft with conventional armament will con-tinue to be effective for a few years againstmany of the likely forms of air attack on theUSSR, but can achieve maximum effective-ness against high-performance, high altitudeattack only if fitted with air-to-air guidedmissiles. As the period advances, improvingcapabilities of both defending and attackingaircraft, and of attacking cruise-type missiles,will dictate more exacting operational require-ments for air-to-air missiles. When super-sonic cruise-type or ballistic missiles consti-tute the major threat, the operational require-ment for air-to-air missiles will tend to phaseout. Guided missile systems offer the bestpromise of raising the effectiveness of Sovietair defenses to an acceptable level.

b. Tactical support. The Soviet Armyground forces have been reorganized and mod-ernized since the end of World War II, andfor the past three years their unit organiza-tion has been undergoing further changes tomeet the requirements of modern warfare,nuclear or non-nuclear. Current Soviet tac-tical doctrine emphasizes allocation of nuclearweapons for use against enemy defensive posi-tions, air facilities, reserves, nuclear capabili-ties, and encircled enemy units. This samedoctrine envisages the use of artillery, guidedmissiles, and tactical aircraft as nuclear de-livery means. Most Soviet requirements fordirect support of line divisions can now bemet satisfactorily with field artillery, un-guided rocket artillery, and aircraft. How-ever, guided missiles offer certain advantages

over tactical aircraft, and should be pro-grammed to augment and to some extentreplace the latter.

c. Peripheral attack. Among the essentialelements in Soviet strategy for the initialphase of a general war are the destructionor neutralization of Western nuclear capabili-ties wherever deployed, destruction of readyNATO forces, prevention of NATO's full mobil-ization, and isolation of the European the-ater by interdicting US reinforcement of over-seas forces. Soviet tactical and naval avia-tion, augmented by units of long-range avia-tion, will be suitable for some time for carry-ing out attacks on the Eurasian periphery.A submarine-launched guided missile couldbe an important weapon system for this mis-sion. Although conventional air attack willremain effective for some time, a substantiallyimproved capability could be attained withair-to-surface missiles. For peripheral attackgenerally, and base neutralization in particu-lar, ballistic missiles carrying nuclear war-heads, by imposing maximum surprise anddifficulty of interception, could ultimatelypresent a greater threat to Western targetsthan any other Soviet weapons system.

d. Intercontinental attack. To deter theUS from initiating general war against theBloc and to fight such a war successfullyshould it occur, the USSR requires a power-ful intercontinental nuclear striking force.This force should be capable of neutralizingUS nuclear delivery capabilities at the outset,and of inflicting damage of a decisive natureon other continental US targets. There willbe a period of years during which the USSRprobably will rely principally on the mannedbomber for adequate coverage of targets inthe continental US, although the Soviet geo-graphic disadvantage, as well as existing USair defenses and foreseeable improvements,will continue to handicap manned aircraftin the execution of the intercontinental at-tack mission. A decrease in the vulnerabilityof attacking aircraft can be effected by equip-ping them with air-to-surface missiles. Sub-marine-launched missiles could be an impor-tant weapon system for attacks against appro-priate targets in the US. Nevertheless, in thelong run, improving US early warning and

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defense capabilities could render even theseattack capabilities insufficient. The intercon-tinental ballistic missile (ICBM), however,could enable the USSR to present an entirelynew type of threat, against which adequatedefense, while scientifically possible, would bemost difficult.

Priorities within the Soviet GuidedMissile Program

28. In determining priorities for its programof missile development and production theUSSR would have taken into account the fol-lowing main factors: (a) priority of missionsto be carried out (i.e., first priority to airdefense, second to peripheral and intercon-tinental attack, third to tactical support);(b) comparative value of missiles versus otherweapons systems, and of one missile typeversus another, in carrying out these missions;(c) feasibility of developing a particular mis-sile or missile system in time to meet-require-ments; (d) availability of resources to developand produce various types of missiles, includ-ing associated equipment and warheads. Tak-ing these factors into consideration, we esti-mate that at some time in the past Sovietmilitary planners established priorities with-in their guided missile program generally asindicated below. While we believe that sucha system of priorities is probably governingthe Soviet guided missile program at the pres-ent time, we recognize that it will be subjectto continuing revision as Soviet program forthe development of missiles and other weap-ons systems advance, and as the USSR re-appraises its military requirements.

High Prioritya. Missiles which can be developed in a

short time:1. Surface-to-air, HE2. Air-to-air, HE

b. Missiles which can be developed in alonger time:1. Surface-to-surface,

tack, nuclear2. Surface-to-air, improved, nuclear/

PEE3. Air-to-surface, land targets, nuclear

c. Missiles which can be developed in avery long time:

1. Surface-to-surface, intercontinentalattack, nuclear

2. Surface-to-air, antimissile missile,nuclear

Lower Priority

a. Missiles which can be developed in ashort time:

1. Surface-to-surface, tactical support,nuclear/TIE/CW

2. Surface-to-surface, submarinelaunched, nuclear

3. Air-to-surface, ship targets, nuclear/HE

b. Missiles which can be developed in alonger time:1. Air-to-air, improved, nuclear2. Air-to-surface, improved, ship tar-

gets, nuclear

In addition, an earth satellite with limitedinstrumentation for scientific purposes hasprobably been assigned a high priority fordevelopment in a short time. A satellite vehi-cle possessing reconnaissance capabilities ofmilitary value has probably been assigned alower priority for development in a very longtime.

II. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET GUIDEDMISSILE CAPABILITIES

Scientific and Technical Capabilities29. On the basis of considerable evidence, weare confident that the Soviet missile researchand development program is extensive andenjoys a very high priority. Although theUSSR had no known guided missile develop-ment program during World War II, it ini-tiated such a program at the close of the warwith a thorough and systematic exploitationof German missile experience. A native So-viet program has advanced rapidly sinceabout 1948, and at present it embraces highquality research institutes, design bureaus,and plants, including some of the best facili-ties and equipment available in the USSR.These resources are adequate to continue andto expand the missile program. We believe

peripheral at-

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that the USSR need not in the future dependto any major extent upon Satellite support,except possibly in certain narrow fields such asprecision optics and electronic instruments.330. The large number of Soviet activities asso-ciated with missile development, as well asresults known to have been achieved to date,provide clear evidence of the intensity of theprogram, but there is relatively little informa-tion on its details. Our assessment of Sovietscientific and technical capabilities to developmissile components (presented in this section)and to develop complete missile systems (pre-sented in Section III) is based wherever pos-sible on the limited intelligence available, in-cluding information obtained from returningGerman missile specialists. However, we havealso relied in large measure on known or esti-mated Soviet capabilities in relevant techni-cal fields, and on US guided missile experience.

Missile Guidance and Control

31. The foundation for current Soviet capa-bilities in missile guidance is largely postwarexploitation of German personnel, facilities,equipment, and documents. The reconstruc-tion, design improvement, and, in some cases,testing of German equipment by German spe-cialits in the USSR covered almost the entirespectrum of guidance concepts in the surface-to-surface missile category, including radartracking-radio control, beam riding, inertial,and celestial guidance systems. In the sur-face-to-air category, the USSR acquiredenough German knowledge and equipment toreconstruct the Rheintochter, Schmetterling,and Wasserfall missiles, each of which in-cluded an optical track-radio command sys-tem. An air-to-air guidance system for theSokol missile, utilizing the same principles,was advocated by the Germans in the USSR.The electronic analogue computer of the Was-serfall system was subjected to further de-tailed studies and design improvements. TheGermans also designed a surface-to-air missilesystem designated the R-113. The guidance

'Detailed information on Soviet scientific andtechnical resources for guided missile develop-ment, including the availability of technical In-formation from foreign sources, is presented InAnnex B.

proposed for this system was a two-radar,ground based, command control type, capableof 360° coverage in azimuth. One radar wasto acquire and track the target, and informa-tion from this radar was to be fed through acomputer to the second radar which was usedto track and position the missile. A semi-active radar homing head, also worked on byGerman scientists, appears to have been de-signed for use in a Wasserf all or R,--113 typemissile. The USSR exploited German WorldWar II infrared developments, including amissile homing head called Juno. In the air-to-surface category, the Germans worked ona guidance system designated Karnet,° whichwas a combination beam rider and semiactivehoming system. Beginning in about 1948, theUSSR apparently reached the point where itcould largely dispense with German assist-ance, except in the missile guidance field.We have no information on German activitiesin the USSR subsequent to 1954.

32. Firm evidence has not been obtained toindicate which of the many guidance systemsare being utilized in Soviet missiles. In thesurface-to-air and air-to-surface categories,however, there are some fragmentary data:

a. The air defense launching sites aroundMoscow employ a unique guidance system ofnative Soviet design. This system apparentlyhas the ability to track multiple targets whilescanning for new targets. It also apparentlyhas an ability simultaneously to control mul-tiple missiles against multiple targets. Recentinformation indicates that a command guid-ance system may be employed. However, thepossibility of a combination command-seekersystem has not been ruled out. Several years'work on a semiactive surface-to-air homingsystem, performed by a German group, might,have been intended to complement the groundguidance system associated with the Moscowsites.

b. In the air-to-surface category, there issome evidence that the USSR continued de-velopment of an antishipping guidance sys-

'For purposes of identification In US intelligence,the designation Komet refers not only to thisguidance system, but also to the complete mis-sile system employing it.

10—P-OP--S--B e-R

CO0267693

tern closely resembling the German Komet.Electronic signals emanating from the BlackSea region were intercepted on many occa-sions in 1955 and again in late 1956. Thesesignals were quite similar in many technicalcharacteristics to the signals a Komet systemmight have radiated.

33. In addition to the fragmentary informa-tion presented above, a strong inferentialmeasure of Soviet success in the guidance andcontrol area is the large-scale ballistic mis-sile test program which has been under wayat Kapustin Yar. 7 Considering the above evi-dence in conjunction with demonstrated So-viet capabilities in other electronics applica-tions, we conclude that the USSR possessesthe necessary scientific knowledge and tech-nical skills to develop advanced guidance andcontrol systems for all categories of guidedmissiles.

Missile Propulsion

34. As in the missile guidance area, the USSRtook energetic measures after World War IIto improve its knowledge of propulsion sys-tems for guided missiles. Only in the fieldof solid propellants, where the USSR hadachieved a position of world leadership duringWorld War II, was its interest in German worklimited. The USSR acquired large quantitiesof pulsejet and rocket engine parts, assem-blies, and production tooling from Germany.Both standard and improved versions of V-1and V-2 engines were produced under Ger-man supervision. Some reports indicate thatas many as 100 to 300 V-2 motors of 25 tonsthrust were completed during the period1947-50. The Germans also developed animproved V-2 engine with a thrust of 35 tons.This motor was placed in production in late1948 and 100 to 250 had reportedly been pro-duced by 1950. At Soviet direction, two groupsOf Germans also worked on designs for twodifferent 100-ton thrust motors, one of whichwas to be gimballed for missile directionalcontrol. Other evidence indicates that a 100-

'For details of Soviet ballistic missile test firingactivities, see Annex C (Limited distributionunder separate cover).

'Metric tons are used throughout this estimate.

ton thrust motor could have been ready forstatic test in 1952; this would represent anoutstanding achievement in advanced tech-nology. In the surface-to-air category, de-sign improvements were made on the Wasser-fall motor to increase its thrust from 17,000pounds to approximately 20,000 pounds. Wehave some evidence of Soviet work in ramjetengines, but we know of no Soviet applicationof such engines to guided missiles.

35. Known Soviet achievements in turbojetsand in both solid and liquid rocket motors in-dicate that the USSR is well advanced inpropulsion systems applicable to guided mis-siles. Evidence indicating the application ofturbojets to missile propulsion is lacking.

Aerodynamics and Structure

36. We have no information on aerodynamicdevelopments in the USSR which can be asso-ciated directly with the missile program since1950. Most of the German work dealt withballistic missiles. Many structural designmodifications of the V-2 were made, includinglight weight structure and pressurized, inte-gral fuel tanks. One structural design (theR-14 ballistic missile) differed radically fromthe V-2. It had a long cone-shaped bodywith no aerodynamic control surfaces; controlwas provided by a gimballed motor. Newbody designs were also provided by the Ger-mans in the surface-to-air category, includ-ing the R-113 missile, which was longer andslimmer than the Wasserf all and had twowings and three tail surfaces instead of acruciform configuration.

37. We do not know that any German de-signs have been developed fully by the USSR.Native Soviet activity in the design field isindicated by a single German report of aSoviet design for a subsonic air-to-surfaceKornet missile.

38. The USSR is known to have a number ofthe world's outstanding aerodynamicists, par-ticularly in the field of theoretical areody-namics, supported by extensive research facil-ities. Despite the dearth of information onnative Soviet missile air-frame design, we esti-mate that the USSR has the knowledge of

CO0267693

—T-O-P-- E 11

basic aerodynamics, as well as the personneland facilities, to support a program for devel-opment of guided missiles of transonic andsupersonic speeds.

Warheads and Fuzes°

39. The USSR did not intensively exploit Ger-man World War II explosives experience, prob-ably because a high level of native compe-tence in explosive and fuze technology hadalready been achieved. To a limited extent,however, the USSR did acquire informationon German fuzing techniques, equipment, anddata, exhibiting interest in the V-2 fuzingsystem and in electromagnetic fuzes for mis-sile warhead application. We have extremelylimited knowledge concerning the native So-viet program of warheads and fuzes. Impact,time-delay, or proximity fuzing techniqueswould not present any insurmountable tech-nical problems to the USSR.

40. Although we have some evidence on thedetails of the Soviet chemical warfare (CW)program, there is no evidence of the applica-tion of CW materials to guided missiles.We estimate, however, that the USSR iscurrently capable of providing CW warheadsfor any missile intended for antipersonnelattacks. Our estimate of Soviet capabili-ties to develop and produce nerve agentsand an examination of the problems involvedin the dissemination of agents in missile war-heads leads us to believe that the USSR couldhave had tabun (GA) warheads in 1954, andsarin (GB) warheads in 1956. We estimatethat the USSR could probably develop and em-ploy "V" agents, more toxic than the "G"series, in guided missiles by 1960. This dateis predicated on Soviet solution of the prob-lem of generating a proper aerosol for dis-persal of the "V" agent.

41. As in the case of CW, we have some evi-dence of a Soviet biological warfare (BW)capability but no evidence of Soviet applica-tion of BW materials to guided missiles. Weestimate, however, that the USSR is capable

• Detalled estimates on Soviet capabilities andrequirements for warheads are presented inAnnexes A and D (the latter in limited distribu-tion under separate cover).

of providing BW agents for antipersonnel,anticrop, or antilivestock use as soon as appro-priate missiles are available.

42. We estimate that the USSR could nowhave nuclear warheads for incorporation intoseveral types of guided missiles.

Geodesy and Cartography

43. The accuracies of Soviet long-rangeguided missiles will depend in part upon theUSSR's capabilities in geodesy and cartogra-phy. The large, modern geodetic and carto-graphic organization created by the USSRsince the days of Lenin is already notablefor its achievements. It has computed a newellipsoid, resurveyed and greatly extended thefirst-order triangulation net, and completelyreadjusted the Soviet survey system to a singledatum. Such achievement is possible only bymaintenance of very high standards of accu-racy. Most of the USSR is now covered bymaps at the scale of 1:100,000 and maps oflarger scales (1:25,000 or larger) are now be-ing emphasized. The new Soviet geodesyspecifications emphasize the pursuit of stillgreater refinement and accuracy.

44. We estimate that the USSR can achievegeodetic location of targets in the US relativeto launching sites in the USSR with errors of300-500 feet, provided, as we believe, a tiehas already been made covertly between So-viet and North American triangulation acrossthe Bering Strait. If this connection has notbeen made, the probable error in target loca-tion would be about 1,060 feet. The locationerror for European targets is estimated at200-300 feet. We estimate that by 1965 theseerrors can be reduced by about half throughextension of the Soviet geodetic and mappingsystem into Satellite areas and through theuse of improved intercontinental ties withEurope and North America. The USSR is alsoworking energetically in the study of geo-detic gravimetry, wherein gravity measuresare used to reduce the error in calculating therelationship of two points on the earth's sur-face. The high competence of Soviet gravim-etrists and their energetic data collectionprogram, especially in the Arctic, may alsoenable the USSR to make early advances in

C00267693

12

the study of the extent to which surfacegravity variations influence a ballistic mis-sile during flight. There is evidence that theUSSR is engaged in the study of the verticalgradient, but information is not available onthe details and extent of such work.

Soviet Industrial Capability to ProduceGuided Missiles

45. We estimate that the USSR has the in-dustrial base and related industrial experienceto adapt and series produce developed proto-type missile systems of all types. However,we believe that in view of competing demands,the limited availability of electronic equip-ment will seriously restrict the extent andvariety of Soviet guided missile productionuntil about 1958. Thereafter, expandingelectronics production will probably make thisrestriction much less severe.

46. We estimate that approximately two-thirds of the current output of Soviet elec-tronics production (in value terms) is allo-cated to military programs, and that theremainder is shared approximately equally byessential domestic telecommunication applica-tion and civilian consumer goods. Both theannounced plans for the Soviet economy andour estimate of over-all Soviet military re-quirements indicate an increasing demand forelectronics production during the next fiveyears.'° The Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan(1956-60) calls for expansion of electronicsproduction by 1960 to three times the valueof 1955 production. This increase is one ofthe largest planned for a major industrialsector, but we estimate that the USSR iscapable of realizing this ambitious goal.47. Other military demands upon electronicsoutput, as well as essential nonmilitary de-mands, will probably restrict the rapid build-up of missile production until new investmentin the electronics industry scheduled underthe Sixth Five-Year Plan makes additionaloutput available. We estimate that signifi-cant portions of the additional electronicsplant capacity will not be available until about

'See also NIE 11-4-56, Soviet Capabilities andProbable Courses of Action Through 1961, 2 Au-gust 1956, Sections III-IV.

1958. In the interim, the USSR could divertelectronics output to missiles from the size-able residual of nonmilitary electronics pro-duction or from other military electronics pro-grams, but it probably would not be willingto accept the adverse consequences of sucha reallocation. However, we estimate thatthe Soviet program for expanding electronicsproduction will create by the later years ofthe Sixth Five-Year Plan an industrial capa-bility to support an extensive and variedguided missile production program as part ofa balanced over-all military program.

48. Another potential bottleneck in the pro-duction of guided missiles is the amount oftime necessary to train production personneland to adapt prototype mechanisms to seriesproduction. This problem is particularlyacute in the production of precision mecha-nisms for missile system components, such asgyros, stable platforms, mechanical comput-ers, and certain valves. However, we estimatethat the USSR has the engineering ability toovercome this potential bottleneck, and thatit should be able to produce precision mecha-nisms in sufficient quantity to support an ex-tensive missile production program.

III. SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENTPROGRAMil

49. Current intelligence on the specific guidedmissiles actually under development in theUSSR is almost nonexistent, except in a veryfew instances. In the succeeding paragraphs,therefore, we assess Soviet technical capabili-ties to develop specific missiles types which,among the vast number of types the USSRcould develop, seem to us most likely to satisfythe general requirements outlined in SectionI above. There is intelligence to indicatethat certain missiles are under development

11 While we consider the development program asa whole to be probable, the detailed character-istics represent a logical growth or developmentalpattern within a particular family of missilesystems. We have high confidence in our esti-mates on certain missiles currently in variousstages of development, test, or operational em-ployment. However, in the light of inadequateevidence pertaining to other missile systems,our estimates of detailed characteristics for suchsystems are less certain.

CO0267693

or in operation. In most instances, however,and especially for those types estimated forlate in the period, our chief guide is our esti-mate of Soviet requirements and developmentpriorities. Within each broad category of mis-siles (e.g., surface-to-air), we have presentedwhat we believe is a logical, step-by-step de-velopment program toward the more advancedtypes.

50. This assessment of Soviet capabilities todevelop specific missile types is predicated up-on our estimate that concerted and continu-ing native Soviet research and developmentin the guided missile field began in 1948.The date given as the estimated Soviet opera-tional capability for each missile type is theearliest probable time at which one or moreseries produced missiles could have beenplaced in the hands of trained personnel 12in one operational unit, thus constituting alimited capability for operational employment.We estimate that the time interval betweenthe Soviet decision to produce in series andthe attainment of fu-st operational capabilityis probably between six and 18 months,under average conditions. For convenience,in the succeeding paragraphs we assume thatin general a Soviet decision to produce a par-ticular missile in series has preceded the esti-mated operational date by an average time ofone year. However, in instances of very highpriority, the USSR could probably reduce thistime interval to zero if the first operationalunit were equipped with prototype weaponsand if personnel training were begun earlyenough. These instances are specifically notedin the case of the surface-to-air missile (para.60) and the ICBM (para. 84).

51. Based on our current knowledge of thestate of the guided missile art and our esti-mate of Soviet capabilities in parallel fields,we estimate that when a particular naissilesystem first becomes operational its systemreliability will be 40-60 percent. 13

52. Despite the obvious difficulties of estimat-ing individual weapons types to be developedover a period reaching 10 years into thefuture, we have sufficient confidence in theestimates made in this section of the paperto characterize the development program in

the aggregate as "probable." There are sev-eral factors which contribute to this confid-dence, including: (a) sufficient intelligenceto indicate at least the general nature ofsome current Soviet missile programs, notablythe surface-to-surface and surface-to-air pro-grams; (b) foreseeable developments in USoffensive and defensive capabilities which theUSSR can ascertain and must attempt tocounter; (c) the probability that the ultimategoal of the Soviet development program inthe surface-to-surface category is an ICBM,and in the surface-to-air category an anti-ICBM; and (d) the probability that any de-velopment program will be limited by foresee-able states of the art and will advance throughlogical steps. In addition, sufficient technicaldifferences exist between the specific missilesin this development program so that cancel-lation of one or several of the projects prob-ably would not appreciably advance the opera-tional dates of others.

53. Nevertheless, we recognize that Soviet re-quirements and priorities could change thedevelopment program significantly as the peri-od advances, and new goals, either more am-bitious or more restricted, may be set. Thiswould be particularly likely in the event of anunforeseen technological breakthrough.

Warhead Selection 14

54. As a critical portion of our estimate ofthe Soviet guided missile development pro-gram, we have considered Soviet capabilitiesto develop warheads for specific missile types.We estimate that the USSR has requirementsfor various sizes of nuclear, HE, and CW war-heads, and has the capability to develop themon time scales consistent with the missiles inwhich they would be employed. Our selec-tion of appropriate warheads for various mis-

"Military personnel or civilian scientists andtechnicians.

""System reliability" In this context means thepercentage of missiles which function accordingto specifications from missile takeoff to detona-tion In the target area. Malfunctions prior tolaunching are not Included in this definition ofsystem reliability.

"For details, see Annexes A and D (the latter inlimited distribution under separate cover).

TOP 3

14

C00267693

sue types, presented in Table I following Sec-tion III, is based on estimated Soviet warheaddesign technology and on consideration of theCEP's, payload weights and probable employ-ment of the various missiles. In general, webelieve nuclear warheads would be preferablein most missile types and mandatory in some.The USSR would probably consider CW war-heads desirable in some missiles for certainspecific missions. HE warheads would be sat-isfactory in some missiles with relatively smallCEP's. We do not believe the USSR woulddevelop and produce BW warheads for guidedmissiles, since BW could be disseminated moreeffectively by a wide variety of other means,including clandestine delivery.

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

55. In 1945-46, the USSR exploited in Ger-many all the important German surface-to-air missiles under development, includingWasserf all, Schmetterling, and Rheintochter,and caused a new design Fluse, to be under-taken. After their transfer to the USSR, theGermans continued work on these missiles,with the exception of the Fluse. Some workwas probably done into 1951 to design a semi-active homing head for the Wasserfall, andfour models are believed to have been con-structed and taken over by the USSR in late1950. Considerable interest was also evi-denced by the USSR in improving the capabil-ity of the Wasserfall computer. In 1950,a group of Germans were ordered to preparea study on an advanced surface-to-air missile,designated the R.-113. Some of the Wasser-fall features, such as the propulsion system,were to be retained and improved, while othercomponents, notably the airframe, were to beredesigned. Operationally, the R-113 was tobe effective at altitudes of from 15,000 to 100,-000 feet with a 32 n.m. slant range and a burn-out velocity of more than Mach 3. The So-viet specifications for the R-113 were rigorousand more closely supervised than were thoseof other German design projects. The Ger-man design study for this missile was sub-mitted to the Russians in 1951, but its dis-position is not known.

56. The most significant current intelligencein the surface-to-air category deals withguided missile installations around Moscow.Sightings of these installations have beenmade since mid-1953; there have also beena few reports of similar sites being constructedaround Leningrad in 1955 and 1956-

57. In the Moscow area, 24 sites have beenlocated with sufficient accuracy to indicatetheir arrangement in two concentric ringswith radii of approximately 25 and 45 n-m.from the center of the city. The circum-ferential distance between the sites is about8 n.m. on the outer ring and about 7 n.m.on the inner ring. Observation in all sec-tors around Moscow has not been possible,but we calculate that the inner ring contains23 sites and the Outer ring 34 sites, for atotal of 57 sites. A typical site measures ap-proximately one mile by one-half mile, withthree longitudinal and about 11 transverseconcrete roads and approximately 60 launch-ing positions. Associated building complexesare of sufficient size to house from 200 to 400personnel at each site. The dimensions, con-figuration, disposition, and quality of con-struction of these installations indicate thatthey comprise a static guided missile air de-fense system. 15

58. Certain unique equipment, designated inUS intelligence as "YOYO," is located approxi-mately one mile from each operational site,on the Moscow side, and is generally alignedwith the center longitudinal road. YOYO isa radar for use in the surface-to-air missileguidance system. A recent report indicatesthat in tests in 1952, this radar was employedto track 5-6 targets simultaneously, and thatit may be intended to track as many as 25targets simultaneously. Based on this intel-ligence, and on the fact that provision hasapparently been made for the simultaneouslaunching of an undetermined number ofmissiles from each site, we estimate that thissystem has a high traffic-handling capability.

59. Missile-like objects were observed in sub-stantial numbers at one Moscow site in 1955.They are estimated to be about 21/2 to 3 feetin diameter and 25 to 35 feet in length.

"See map and diagrams on following pages.

eR

CO 0267693

-5-EGRET

Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow Areav.e.-•

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CO 0267693

15

60. We believe that some sites in the surface-to-air missile defense system around Moscowhave been operational since mid-1955, andthat all sites are probably now operational.Based on the size and configuration of themissile-like objects observed, and on technicalassessment of the capabilities of the YOYO,we estimate that at present this system prob-ably employs missiles capable of carrying a600-700 pound payload '° to a maximum al-titude of 60,000 feet, and a maximum horizon-tal range of 25 n.m. 17 Its guidance system isprobably of the command type, with a CEP atmaximum range of about 190 feet, or possiblya command and semiactive seeker with a CEPof about 50 feet. We believe that in this in-stance, the high priority requirement for im-proved air defense capabilities probably dic-tated the equipping of the first operationalunit with prototype missiles simultaneouslywith the decision to begin series production.

61. The USSR has an excellent capability forthe development of more advanced surface-to-air systems, and a high priority will almostcertainly continue to be given to this program.It is probable that the currently operationalsurface-to-air missile system can and will beimproved. We estimate that in 1957 a com-mand-type guidance system capable of 360°traverse could be available for employmentwith Moscow-type missiles, but that such asystem would have a lower traffic-handlingcapability than the current Moscow system.

62. The current Moscow system will probablycontinue to have only limited effectiveness atvery low altitudes. To overcome this defi-ciency, it is probable that the USSR will de-velop and could have in operation in 1958a surface-to-air system for low altitude cover-age, effective to a maximum of 40,000 feet al-titude and 15 n.m. range. This system could

i• Payload includes the explosive device and itsassociated fuzing and firing mechanism. For theestimated yields of nuclear payloads which couldbe employed in these and other missiles see An-nex D (Limited distribution under separatecover).

" This range represents our estimate of Sovietcapabilities to extend the maximum horizontalrange of the system. It probably had a maximumhorizontal range of 20 n.m. when it first becameoperational in 1955.

probably employ missiles carrying 150 poundpayloads, and achieve a CEP of about 50 feetwith semiactive homing guidance. 38

63. It is also probable that the USSR will de-velop and could have in operation in 1959 asurface-to-air system capable of carrying a500-800 pound payload to a maximum of80,000 feet altitude and 50 n.m. range. Itsguidance would probably be of the commandtype or a command-seeker combination. Theformer could probably achieve a CEP of about500 feet, the latter about 100 feet.

64. Although we have no firm evidence of So-viet interest in surface-to-air missiles for ship-borne defense, we believe a requirement forsuch missiles exists. We estimate that theUSSR could probably have a 40,000 ft/15 n.m.missile system in operation in 1958, and an80,000 ft/50 n.m. missile system in operationin 1960. We also estimate that the USSRcould modify either or both of these missilesso as to make them suitable for dual purposeuse as surface-to-surface missiles in appro-priate naval roles. Recognizing that a highdegree of accuracy would be dependent uponthe ability of the launching ship to acquiretargets by radar, we estimate that the maxi-mum effective range of the 80,000 ft/50 n.m.system against surface targets would beroughly 30-50 n.m.65. For improved range capabilities in defenseof critical areas, it is probable that the USSRwill develop and could have in operation in1961 one of two missile systems: (a) a ram-jet propelled missile capable of carrying a500-pound payload to a maximum altitudeof 60-80,000 feet and a maximum of 100 n.m.Such a missile would have a speed of aboutMach 2.5 and a CEP of 100 feet with terminalhoming or 500 feet with command guidance;(b) a rocket-propelled missile capable of the

It is the view of the Director of Intelligence,USAF, that the USSR would be unlikely to havean effective all-weather land based low altitudesurface-to-air missile system in operational useprior to 1960-61. There is no evidence of So-viet interest in, or development programs forsuch a system. Further, the advanced radartechniques required for an operational guidanceand homing system for such a missile are prob-ably beyond the capability of Soviet electronictechnology prior to 1960-61.

S E C 1213 T

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16

same payload capacity, accuracy, and range,but with an altitude up to 90,000 feet and aspeed of about Mach 4. We estimate that thelatter would probably be the USSR's selection,although the development of such a systemwould present more complex problems thanthe development of a ramjet missile system.

66. The required performance characteristicsof a surface-to-air missile system which couldeffectively engage both supersonic cruise-typemissiles and ICBMs are not fully known. Re-quired engagement characteristics are esti-mated as 75 n.m. horizontal range and 300,000feet altitude to oppose the ICBM, and 300 n.m.horizontal range and 90,000 feet altitude tooppose cruise-type missiles. We do not be-lieve a single system effective against boththese targets at maximum range and maxi-mum altitudes could be developed by theUSSR during the period of this estimate.

67. We estimate that anti-ICBM defense wouldreceive the higher priority, and that the USSRcould probably develop a missile system ofsome capability against the ICBM for firstoperational use during the period 1963-66.We are unable to estimate with confidence thecharacteristics of such a system. It mightcarry a 1,000-pound payload to a horizontaldistance of about 40 n.m. and an altitude ofabout 200,000 feet. An extension of theserange and altitude capabilities would requireadvances in radar design which we believeare not within Soviet capabilities during thisperiod. Such an anti-ICBM system might bemodified for use against aircraft and cruise-type missiles up to altitudes of about 100,000feet and to ranges of about 150 n.m. Devel-opment of antimissile defense systems will un-doubtedly be continued beyond the period ofthis estimate.

Air-to-Air Missile Systems'°68. In late 1945 and 1946 the USSR acquiredseveral German air-to-air missiles and designs.Although during this period German scientistsin the USSR successfully applied Soviet solidPropellants to German unguided rockets, we

"Unguided rockets are not Included in this esti-mate.

know of only one instance in which the Ger-mans worked on a guided missile employingthese propellants. This design was the Ger-man Falke, later given the Soviet designationSokol. The Sokol was designed to have asolid-propellant rocket motor of 2,800 poundsthrust, an optical track-radio command guid-ance system, and an HE warhead of 106pounds, to be detonated by either radio oracoustic proximity fuzing. The design study,excluding guidance, was completed by theGermans in 1948. We have no evidence thatthe USSR pursued any of the German workto completion, but there is a small amountof evidence to indicate that the USSR nowhas an air-to-air missile development program.

69. Despite the lack of significant intelligencein this field, we believe that Soviet air defenserequirements would have dictated that thedevelopment of air-to-air missiles be given aninitial high priority. This estimate is sup-ported by some indirect evidence, includingSoviet interest in infrared homing devices andthe fact that the airborne intercept radarwhich has been developed for the FLASH-LIGHT fighter could be used in conjunctionwith air-to-air missiles. We therefore believethat the USSR continued development workafter 1948, and that by 1955 it could probablyhave had in operation a solid-propellant air-to-air missile capable of carrying a 25-poundpayload to a range of 2-3 n.m., with a CEPof 30 feet. However, the pa_c.sive infraredhoming system probably employed in this mis-sile would limit its use to tail-cone attacksunder conditions of good weather at the en-gagement altitude.

70. The probable limitations of the above mis-sile would have dictated high-priority effortsto develop an all-weather air-to-air missile,and we believe that in 1958 the USSR couldprobably have such a missile in operationaluse, employing a semiactive homing systemand capable of carrying a 50-pound payloadto a range of 5 n.m., with a CEP of 40 feet.In addition, the USSR will probably developa longer range all-weather missile, and couldprobably have in operation in 1960 a missilecapable of carrying a 150-pound payload toa range of 15-20 n.m., if launched at 60,000/altitude. This missile could probably achieve

C00267693

17

a CEP of 50 feet, employing semiactive horn-ing guidance, or infrared homing for tail-coneattacks.

Air-to-Surface Missile Systems

71. Complete design data on all German air-to-surface missiles were acquired by theUSSR, as were many completed German mis-siles. The USSR also obtained informationon German air launchings of the V-1. OneGerman group at Design Bureau 2, Moscow,engaged in research and development workfrom 1947 to 1951 on a guidance system fora Soviet-designed antiship missile designatedKonzet. Details are not available on the de-sign of its warhead, airframe, and propulsionsystem, although from information providedby the Germans who worked on the guidancesystem we have deducec general informationconcerning the over-all system performance.The TU-4 (BULL) was designated as thelaunching platform, and release of the mis-sile was to be accomplished at about 10,000feet altitude at a maximum range of 55 n.m.from the target. The missile speed was esti-mated to be about 485 knots. A radar in thelaunching aircraft was to provide for beam-riding during the first two-thirds of the mis-sile's flight, and to illuminate the target forradar homing during the remainder of theflight. We believe that a missile system ofthe Kcrrnet type, or other air-to-surface sys-tem with similar performance characteristics,has reached at least final flight test stage."72. We therefore estimate that a subsonic air-to-surface missile, capable of delivering a3,000-pound payload to a range of 55 n.m. fromthe launching aircraft, could probably be inoperational use in the USSR in 1956-57. Thismissile, possibly employing beam-riding withsemiactive terminal homing guidance, couldachieve a CEP of 150 feet against ships orother isolated and well-defined radar targets.A supersonic missile to fulfill this require-ment could probably be operational in 1958.73. Although we have no evidence on otherSoviet activities in the air-to-surface field,our estimate of Soviet military requirements

"See Annex C (Limited distribution under sepa-rate cover).

leads us to believe that the USSR has prob-ably also developed a shorter-range missilefor employment against ships. It probablycould have had in operation in 1955 a sub-sonic air-to-surface missile capable of deliver-ing a 3,000-pound payload to a range of 20n.m. A guidance system using television witha radio command link could probably achievea CEP of 300 feet, but such a system could beemployed only in good weather.

74. It is also probable that, in order to im-prove its long-range bomber attack capabili-ties against heavily defended land targets andlarge naval concentrations, the USSR will de-velop and could have in operation in 1961 asupersonic air-to-surface missile capable ofcarrying a 3,000-pound payload to a range of100 n.m. The CEP of such a missile wouldvary with the type of guidance employed,ranging from about 0.5 n.m. with homing ona clandestine beacon to 1-2 n.m. with inertialguidance (assuming in the latter case thatthe launching aircraft could determine itsown position within 0.25 n.m.).

Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems

Ballistic Missiles

75. After World War II, the USSR acquiredfrom Germany a number of complete V-2ballistic missiles, as well as component partsand production facilities. V-2's were test-fired at Kapustin Yar as early as the fall of1947. During the period up until about 1950,several different groups of German missilespecialists and engineers in the USSR devotedconsiderable effort to improve the V-2 sys-tem, increasing the thrust of its motor from25 to 35 tons, and improving its accuracy.At the same time, a Soviet team attempted toincrease its maximum range of about 200 n.m.to about 350 min.

76. German experts under Soviet directionalso performed preliminary design studies forother ballistic missiles. In December 1948they completed a design study for a missiledesignated R-10, to employ a 32-ton thrustmotor and designed to carry a 2,150-poundpayload to a range of 430 n.m.; this studyactually represented the consolidation of anumber of proposals for further improvement

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18

of the V-2. Beginning in the spring of 1949,they worked on detailed designs for a missiledesignated R-14, which was to be a single-stage missile, to employ a 100-ton thrust mo-tor and to carry a 6,600-pound warhead toabout 1,600 n.m. A series of feasibility studieswas made for an R-12 missile, to be a stagedmissile carrying a 2,200-pound warhead toabout 1,300 miles. The Soviet utilization ofthese studies is not known.

77. We believe that exploitation of the Ger-mans, together with parallel and subsequentnative efforts, enabled the USSR to make sig-nificant progress in the development of bal-listic missiles of short and medium rangesafter 1948. In addition to the 25- and 35-tonthrust rocket motors which were available atthat time, we believe that a 100-ton thrust mo-tor was succ?ssfully developed by 1953. Asindicated in Section II, we also believe theUSSR has high capabilities for development ofguidance systems, warheads, and probably air-frames for ballistic missiles. These estimatesare supported by the extensive Soviet ballis-tic missile testing program which has beenunder way at Kapustin Yar.2,

78. Based on the evidence cited above and inAnnex C, we believe that the USSR has pur-sued the development of several surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems. A missileof 175-200 n.m. maximum range has beendeveloped and could probably have been oper-ational in 1954. It is probable that this mis-sile employs a 25-ton thrust motor and couldcarry a 2,000-pound payload. 22 Using a com-bination of radar track-radio command andinertial guidance, a CEP of 1-2 n.m. couldprobably be achieved, and this could probablybe improved to about 2,000 feet by 1955-57.A CEP of 1-2 n.m. could probably be achieved

"For further details, see Annex C (Limited dis-tribution under separate cover).

" The 2,000-pound payload weights given for the75 , 175-200, and 350 n.m. ballistic missiles de-scribed in paragraphs 78, 79, and 81 represent ourbasic estimates. However, we believe that if theUSSR Incorporated certain technically feasiblerefinement in structural design, these missilescould carry to their maximum ranges payloadsweighing 1.5 to 2 times as much as those esti-mated. We have no evidence of such Sovietdevelopments.

with a pure inertial guidance system by1958-59.

79. In addition, a missile of about 350 n.m.maximum range has been developed and prob-ably could also have been operational in 1954.It is probable that this missile employs a35-ton thrust motor and could carry a 2,000-pound payload. 22 Using a guidance systemsimilar to that of the 175-200 n.m. missile,this missile could probably achieve a CEP of1-2 n.m., which could be improved to 3,000feet by 1955-57. A CEP of 1-2 n.m. couldprobably be achieved with a pure inertialguidance system by 1958-59.

80. Development work has also been in prog-ress on a missile of about 700 n.m. maximumrange, which could probably have been oper-ational in 1956. It is probable that this mis-sile employs a 100-ton thrust motor and couldcarry a 6,000-pound payload. A guidance sys-tem similar to those of the first two ballisticmissiles described could probably achieve aCEP of 3 n.m., improvable to 1-2 n.m. by1957-59. A CEP of 1-2 n.m. could probablybe achieved with a pure inertial system by1958-62.

81. We have no firm evidence of Soviet devel-opment of any ballistic missile of shorterrange than 175 n.m. We believe that a re-quirement exists for a missile with 75 n.m.maximum range for tactical support of groundforces, and for neutralizing certain additionaltargets, and that its relative ease of develop-ment would probably have led Soviet plan-ners to include it in their program. We esti-mate that such a missile could probably havebeen in operation in 1954. Employing a 10-ton thrust motor, it could probably carry a2,000-pound payload 22 and achieve a CEP of1,200 feet, using a combination of radar track-radio command and inertial guidance. ThisCEP could probably be achieved with a pureinertial system by 1958-59.

82. Estimated Soviet requirements for im-proved attack capabilities against peripheralEurasian targets and against the continentalUS lead us to believe that intermediate rangeand intercontinental ballistic missiles areprobably under high priority development.

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19

These missiles are the logical goals of thestep-by-step Soviet ballistic missile develop-ment program which was clearly under wayby 1948. The R-14 studies ordered by theUSSR in early 1949, as well as the R-12 stud-ies, confirm an early Soviet interest in atleast the IRBM. The significance of the R-14studies is further increased by recent US ex-perience, which indicates the feasibility ofachieving ranges up to 1,600 n.m. with a single100-ton thrust rocket motor. In view of prob-able Soviet requirements and the progress ofthe Soviet program to date, we estimate thatthe .USSR is probably developing and couldprobably have in operation in 1959 a single-stage IRBM, capable of carrying a 1,650-pound payload to a maximum range of 1,600n.m. A CEP of 3-4 n.m. could probably beachieved with a combination of radar track-radio command and inertial guidance, improv-able to 1-2 n.m. in an additional one to twoyears, or in an additional three years with apure inertial system.

83. In view of the potential capabilities of anIRBM against the continental US as well asoverseas targets, if launched from a subma-rine, we believe the USSR may attempt todevelop an IRBM for submarine employment.However, the formidable problems involved(including the development of pure inertialguidance, precise navigational equipment, andspecially configured submarines with the nec-essary handling, fueling, and launching equip-ment) lead us to estimate that with a vigor-ous program the USSR might achieve an oper-ational submarine-launched 1RBM systemsome time during the period 1964-66.

84. There is no direct evidence that the USSRis developing an ICBM, but its developmenthas probably been a high priority goal of theSoviet ballistic missile program. We estimatethat the USSR now possesses, or is rapidlyacquiring, the necessary data for attackingthe aerodynamic, structural, and guidanceproblems of an ICBM. The solution of manyproblems, including the re-entry problem, hasalready been aided to some extent by the 700n.m. ballistic missile development program,and should be further advanced by work onIRBM and earth satellite programs. It is

therefore probable that the USSR could haveready for operational use in 1960-61 a proto-type ICBM capable of carrying a 1,500-pound payload to a maximum range of 5,500n.m. The high priority requirement for anoperational ICBM would probably dictate theequipping of the first operational unit withprototype ICBMs. Such a missile would prob-ably employ two 100-ton thrust motors forfirst-stage propulsion and one 35-ton motorfor second-stage propulsion. With a combina-tion of radar track-radio command and iner-tial guidance, a CEP of about 5 n.m. couldprobably be achieved, but an additional twoyears would probably be required to achievethis CEP with a pure inertial system.

Cruise-Type Missiles

85. Many German V-1 component parts andconsiderable manufacturing equipment wereshipped to the USSR after World War II. Es-timates on the number of V-1 missiles assem-bled in the USSR range from 50 to severalhundred. German V-1 experts were exploiteduntil about 1950; their work included proj-ects to improve the V-1's guidance system andits pulsejet engine. The Germans reportedthat Soviet scientists experimented with twin-pulsejet V-1 type missiles in 1948 and 1949.Also, a German group prepared a preliminarydesign study for a ramjet cruise-type missiledesignated R-15, which was to be a 1,600 n.m.missile boosted to operating altitude and speedby a jettisonable V-2. However, no Germanramjet experts were involved and there wasno evidence of any Soviet interest in this proj-ect after the completion of the design studyin December 1949.

86. The postwar work on pulsejet missiles,while far less extensive than work in otherguided missile fields, could have permittedthe USSR to have improved V-1 type missilesin operational use by 1950. However, becauseof the apparent lack of Soviet interest andthe limited speed and altitude capabilities andhigh fuel consumption of pulsejet motors, webelieve that the USSR. probably did not carrydevelopment of such missiles to completion.

87. The potential military value of subma-rine-launched surface-to-surface missiles, to-

T O P SECT/ET.

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20

gether with the difficulty of employing ballis-tic missiles with submarines, would probablyhave led the USSR to develop cruise-type mis-siles initially. There is some evidence, as yetinconclusive, of the existence of Soviet subma-rines equipped to carry such missiles. Basedon estimated Soviet requirements and capa-bilities, we believe that the USSR has probablydeveloped and probably could have had inoperation in 1955 a submarine-launched tur-bojet missile capable of carrying a 3,000-poundpayload at high subsonic speeds to a maxi-mum range of 500 n.m. The accuracy of thismissile would probably vary from 0.5 to 10n.m., depending upon the guidance systememployed and the accuracy with which theguidance submarine could fix its position.

88. A supersonic missile to fulfill this require-ment could probably be in operation in 1957.Guidance could probably be improved to ob-tain a CEP of 1-.2 n.m. at maximum missilerange in 1960, using an inertial guidance sys-tem monitored by radar map-matching.

89. The requirement for submarine-launchedmissiles will probably lead the USSR to de-velop a longer range cruise-type system. Asupersonic missile capable of carrying a 3,000-pound payload to a maximum range of 1,000n.m. could probably be operational in 1962.As with the 500 n.m. missile, CEP's wouldvary considerably with the type of guidanceemployed.

Earth Satellite

90. In April 1955, the USSR announced theformation of the Permanent Interagency Com-mission for Interplanetary Communications.There is other evidence indicating the exist--ence of this commission at least as early asthe fall of 1954. The public announcementwas the first official indication that the USSRwas actively engaged on problems associatedwith the launching and orbiting of earth sat-ellite vehicles. The six commission membersnamed are among the leading Soviet scien-tists; their competence in such fields as astro-physics and nuclear research is internationallyrecognized. One of the first tasks of this coin-

mission was stated to be the organization ofwork for the creation of an "automatic" lab-oratory for scientific research of outer space.Since late 1955, numerous unofficial state-ments have been attributed to Soviet scien-tists concerning Soviet intentions to launchsatellites during the International Geophys-ical Year (1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958).In September 1956, the Soviet IGY Committeeannounced its intention to participate in theIGY rocket and earth satellite programs. Nodetailed program was submitted, however.

91. The USSR will probably make a majoreffort to be the first country to orbit an earthsatellite. On the basis of estimated Sovietguided missile capabilities, we believe thatthe USSR possesses the basic technical ca-pabilities, skills, and other resources requiredto develop, build, and orbit an unmannedsatellite vehicle. The successful orbiting ofa satellik vehicle requires solutions for manyof the scientific and technical problemsencountered in the development of long-range ballistic missiles, except for the re-entryproblem, and with the added requirement fora small, long-life power supply. We believethat the USSR has the capability of orbiting,in 1957, a satellite vehicle which could acquirescientific information and data of limited mili-tary value. A satellite vehicle possessing sub-stantial reconnaissance capabilities of militaryvalue could probably be orbited in the period1963-65.

Specialized Missiles

92. We consider that, during the period ofthis estimate, it will be within Soviet capa-bilities to develop specialized missiles for em-ployment as decoys and antiradar weapons.We have not estimated specific Soviet pro-grams among the wide range of possibilitiesin these fields. However, we believe that someof the air-to-surface missiles described in thepreceding paragraphs could be modified tohome on ground radars, and that a portion ofthe air-to-surface missile production estimatedin Annex A might comprise these antiradarweapons.

Remarks

First operational capabilitysimultaneous with decisionto series produce. Charac-teristics are those estimatedfor early 1957.For low altitude defense.

Alternate system also possi-ble. See paragraph 65.

(Characteristics estimated are(subject to considerable error.

(Could be modified for dual-(purpose use as surface-to-(surface missiles in appropri-(ate naval roles.

-CD iN)

o")

FirstOpera-tionalCapa- Maximum

TABLE I

SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1968

MaximumHorizontal

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS

Accuracy Payload

Maxi-mumSpeed

Designa- bility Altitude Range (CEP (lbs. and (Mach Para.tion Date' (ft.) (n.m.) in ft.) type) No.) Guidance Refer.

Ground-Launched

SA-1 • mid-1955 60,000 20 (1955) 50 or 190 600-700 2.0- Command type (190' CEP); 56-25 (1957) nuclear

or HE2.5 mid-course command with

terminal homing, probablysemiactive (50' CEP).

60

SA-2 1958' 40,000 15 50 150 HE 2.0 Semiactive homing 62SA-3 1959 80,000 50 100 or 500 500-800

nuclearor HE

3.0 Command type (500' CEP);command with homing (100'CEP).

63

SA-4 1961 90,000 100 100 or 500 500nuclearor HE

3.5 Command type (500' CEP);command with homing (100'CEP).

65

(Anti-ICBM System .SA-5 1963-66 ( 200,000 40

(1,200 1,000

nuclear8.0 Command type 67

(Modification for use against aircraft and cruise-type( missiles((

100,000 150 . 500 1,000nuclear

7.0 Command with homing

Ship-borne

SA-6

SA-7

1958

1960

40,000

80 ,000

15

50

50

100 or 500

150 HE

500-800nuclearor HE

2.0

3.0

Beam riding and/or semi-active homing.

Command type (500' CEP);command with homing (100'CEP). .

64

64

We evaluate this program as "probable," with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. See footnote to title of SectionThose missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current intelligence are indicated by an asterisk following the missile designa-tion.

' These are arbitrary designations for convenience of reference. The same designations are used in Table II following Section I of Annex A.'For definition, see paragraph 50.'Payload includes the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism. Warhead capabilities and requirements are discussed in AnnexesA and D (the latter in limited distribution under separate cover).

▪ See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to paragraph 62.

21

TABLE I (Cont'd)

SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1968

AIR-TO-Am MISSILE SYSTEMS

FirstOpera-tional Maximum Approx.Capa- Maximum Payload Speed Gross

Designa- bility Range Accuracy (lbs. and (Mach Weight Para.Mon ' Date' (n.m.) (CEP) type) No.) (lbs.) Guidance Refer. Remarks

AA-1 1955 2-3 30 ft. 25 HE 2.0 175 Passive infrared homing. 69 Tail-cone attack in good weather.AA-2 1958 5 40 ft. 50 HE 2.0 300-450 Semiactive homing. 70 A11-weather.AA-3 1980 15-20 if 50 ft.

launchedat 60,000'

150 nuclear 2.0or HE

800 Serniactive homing or in-frared homing.

70 All-weather or tail-cone attack.

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

Para.Guidance Refer. Remarks

FirstOpera-tional Cruise Approx.Capa- Maximum Payload' Speed Gross

Designa- bility Range Accuracy (/bs. and (Mach WeightUm ' Date' (n.m.) (CEP) type) No.) (lbs.)

300 ft. 3,000 0.8-0.9 6,000-8,000nuclearor HE

150 ft. 3,000 0.9 8,000-nuclear 10,000or HE

150 ft. 3,000 1.5 8,000-nuclear 10,000or HE

0.5-2.0 3,000 2.5 11,000n.m. nuclear IIIIIX.

73 For use in good weather.TV with radio commandlink.

Beam riding with semi-active terminal homing.

72 For use against ships or other well-defined radar targets.

72 Ditto.Beam riding with semi-active terminal homing.

Command type, radar map-matching, or homing onclandestine beacon (CEPsof 0.5 n.m.); with inertialguidance, 1-2 n.m. CEP as-suming launching aircraftcan fix own position with0.25 n.m.

AS-1 1955 20

AS-2' 1956-57 55

AS-3 1958 55

AS-4 1961 100 '74 For use against heavily-defendedland targets or large naval concen-trations.

114 See footnotes on page 21.'Does not include speed of launching aircraft.

22

Desig-nation'

BallisticMissiles

SS-1

SS-2

SS-3'

SS-4'

SS-5 (IRBM)

FirstOpera-tionalCapa-bilityDate'

MaximumRange Accuracy(n.m.) (CEP)

Payload'(lbs. andtype)

Thrustof

Motor(metrictons)

Approx.Gross

Weight(lbs.) Guidance

Para.Refer. Remarks

100 110,000

100 150,000(singlestage)

TABLE I (Cont'd)

SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966'

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

SS-6 (ICBM)

1954 75

1954 175-200

1954 350

1956 700

1959 1,600

1960-61 5,500

1,200 ft. 2,000nuclear,HE, orCW

1-2 run. 2,000(1954) nuclear2,000 ft. or CW,(by 1955-- possibly57) HE1-2 n.m. 2,000'(1954) nuclear3,000 ft. or CW(by 1955-57)3 n.m. 6,000(1956) nuclear1-2 n.m.(by 1957-59)3-4 n.rn. 1,650(1959) nuclear1-2 n.m.(by 1960-61)about5 n.m.

10 12,000 Radar track-radio command/ 81 For tactical support of groundinertial. Same CEP attain- forces, and for neutralizing certainable with pure inertial sys- other targets.tern by 1958-59.

25 28,000 Radar track-radio command/ 78 Ditto.inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at-tainable with pure inertialsystem by 1958-59.

35 42,000 Radar track-radio command/ 79 Ditto.Inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at-tainable with pure inertialsystem by 1958-59.

Radar track-radio command/ 80 For peripheral attack; see paras. 23inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at- and 27c.tamable with pure inertialsystem by 1958-62.

Radar track-radio command/ 82 For peripheral attack.inertial. CEP of 1-2 n.m. at-tainable with pure inertialsystem by 1982.

Radar track-radio command/ 84 First operational capability slmul-inertial; same CEP attain- taneous with decision to series pro-able with pure inertial sys- duce. For intercontinental attack.tern by 1962-63.

1,500 First stage, 300,000nu- two 100-tonclear motors; second

stage, one 35-ton motor.

SS-7 (IRBM) 1964-66 A submarine-launched IRBM system, with characteristics similar to those of the 1959ground-launched system, might be available for operational employment some timeduring the period 1964-66.

83

"" See footnotes on page 21.' These payload weights represent our basic estimates. However, if the USSR incorporated certain technically feasible refinements in structural design,these missiles could carry to their maximum ranges payloads weighing 1.5 to 2 times as much as those estimated. We have no evidence of such Sovietdevelopments.

23

TABLE I (Cont'd)SOVIET GUIDED MISSTIE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH 1966

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS (Cont'd)

Para.Guidance Refer. Remarks

Radar track-radio command (CEP of 0.5 n.m. 87 Designed for sub-with forward guidance station within 100 n.m. of marine launching.target; 1.0 n.m. with forward station within 200n.m. of target); hyperbolic radio (CEP of 1-10n.m.); combination of inertial guidance andhoming on clandestine beacon (CEP of 1-2n.m.); inertial system monitored by radar map-matching (CEP of 1-2 n.m. by 1960); pure iner-tial (CEP of 10 n.m. in 1955, with 2.5 n.m. atmaximum range attainable by 1964, assumingsubmarine can fix own position within 0.5 n.m.).

SS-9 1957 500 0.5-10.0 3,000 1.5-2.0 12,000 Same as 1955 subsonic missile. 88 Ditto.n.m. nuclear

SS-10 1962 1,000 1-10 3,000 1.5-2.0 25,000 Hyperbolic radio (CEP of 1-10 n.m.); inertial 89 Ditto.n.m. nuclear system monitored by radar map-matching (CEP

of 1-2 n.m.). CEP of 5 n.m. at maximum rangeattainable with pure inertial system by 1964, as-suming submarine can fix own position within0.5 n.m.

FirstOpera-tional Cruise Approx.Capa- Maximum Payload' Speed Gross

Desig- biLity Range Accuracy (lbs. and (Mach Weightnation' Date' (n.m.) (CEP) type) No.) (lbs.)

Cruise-TypeMissiles

SS-8 1955 500 0.5-10.0n.m.

3,000nuclear

0.9 12,000

" " See footnotes on page 21.

C00267693

"14-8-12—S-E-G-13. E T 25

ANNEX A

A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND

PRODUCTION PROGRAM

1. The program outlined in this Annex can-not be taken as the most likely or the prob-able Soviet program. We present it as onlya possible program, but one which is bothfeasible and reasonable.'

I. POSSIBLE PROGRAM

2. We have direct evidence of the series pro-duction and operational deployment of onlyone of the 24 missile types discussed in Sec-

'It is the view of the Director of Intelligence,USAF, that the number of certain shorter rangesurface-to-surface and shorter range air-to-sur-face missiles projected in this estimate is in ex-cess of any reasonable production in light of thelimited availability of nuclear warheads and thelimited requirement for HE and CW warheads.The number of missiles in these categories asshown in Annex A has been predicated mainlyon the assumption that, although the Sovietsrecognize the desirability of having a high pro-portion of nuclear warheads (e.g., paragraphs35 and 37 of Annex A) they would:

(a) Produce far more of these missiles thanthe number for which they could provide anysignificant percentage of nuclear warheads(paragraph 40 of Annex A and Table II,Annex A)

(b) Produce and use HE or CW warheadsfor the bulk of this large number of missiles(e.g., paragraphs 37 and 40 of Annex A)

(c) Plan for and be willing to accept thehigh cost and relative ineffectiveness of usinga missile to deliver HE or CW on many mili-tary missions for which a nuclear warhead ishighly desirable, if missiles are to producethe effects desired.

The Director of Intelligence, USAF, agrees thatthe USSR would indeed satisfy Its requirementsfor missiles with HE and CW warheads, includ-ing reserve stocks, but believes that a shortageof nuclear materials would then limit the fur-ther production of missiles in these categoriesto the number for which nuclear warheads couldbe provided.

tion III of the DISCUSSION. We have noknowledge of the actual Soviet program forproduction and employment of missiles duringthe next 10 years, and we could reasonably ex-pect little direct evidence bearing on the prob-lem. The range of possibilities is wide. In at-tempting to narrow this range, and to arriveat a better-defined judgment of the dimen-sions of the Soviet missile threat which willconfront the US during the decade, we pro-ceeded as follows: First, we estimated Sovietmilitary requirements for numbers of missilesby type, making this estimate consistent withthe date at which we believe each type couldbe available. These numbers were then modi-fied in the light of: (a) the estimated avail-ability of nuclear materials for warheads;(b) the estimated limitations of the Sovieteconomy, e.g., of the electronics and con-struction industries; and (c) an assumed So-viet desire to plan a reasonably economicalprogram involving efficient production and anexpenditure curve which would not move toosharply or irregularly and thus severely affectexpenditures for other military programs.

3. In considering the numbers of missiles tobe stockpiled, we have been unable to makedefinitive estimates of the Soviet view as tothe effectiveness of missiles versus other weap-ons systems. We have, however, exercisedjudgment along the general lines indicatedin Section I of the DISCUSSION as to the rel-ative weight Soviet planners would give to par-ticular missile types versus other availableweapons to perform various missions. We donot believe that Soviet planners would at pres-ent be capable of realistically evaluating theeffectiveness of their own as-yet undevelopedweapons systems. When such evaluations canbe made, various aspects of any currentlyvisualized Soviet program will be modified.

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26

4. This analysis is predicated upon our basicestimate that, barring unpredictable techno-logical or political changes, there will be nospecific war readiness target-date in Sovietmilitary programs through this period. Wehave therefore not attempted to postulatewhat Soviet military planners would judgenecessary to meet their full requirements forwar readiness. We assume that the USSRwill develop a missile force in-being consistentwith Soviet judgments as to the effectivenessof missiles versus other weapons systems, thatit will apportion its efforts according to thepriorities of the various missions, and that itwill stress the development and maintenanceof production skills, experience, and facilitiesthat can be expanded rapidly if necessary.We have not attempted to define the force in-being as optimum, maximum, or minimum,nor have we attempted to arrive at precisepercentage requirements for air defense ef-fectiveness or precise numbers of targets tobe attacked by missiles.

5. Clearly the following paragraphs cannotbe regarded as defining the most probableSoviet accomplishment over 10 years. Thereare far too many doubtful factors enteringinto the calculations; moreover, it is certainthat any 10-year program of missile produc-tion envisaged now, whether by the USSR orby ourselves, will be subject to extensivechange as the years go by. We believe, how-ever, that these paragraphs set forth a pro-gram which, in the light of our uncertainknowledge at the present time, is not onlypossible but is also feasible and reasonable.

Warheads'

6. We have not attempted to estimate pre-cisely what proportion of the stockpiles ofvarious missiles would be provided with nu-clear, HE, or CW warheads where such achoice would be feasible. We recognize, how-ever, that the availability of nuclear materialswill impose limitations on the extent of Sovietnuclear warhead production during the periodof this estimate. In those cases where CEP's

'See Section II of this Annex, and Annex D (thelatter In limited distribution under separatecover).

and payloads make HE or CW warheads feasi-ble, we believe the USSR would produce suchwarheads in sufficient quantity to meet itsrequirements for certain specific missions,without regard to the availability of nuclearmaterials. However, we are unable to deter-mine whether shortages of nuclear materialswould in fact result in the production of fewermissiles of certain types than estimated here-in, or in the production of additional HE orCW warheads, or both.

Surface-to-Air Program

Ground-Launched

7. We estimate that the high priority almostcertainly assigned to air defenses generally,together with the necessity for air defenseweapons compatible with the requirements fordefense against high-performance aircraftand missiles, probably gives surface-to-air mis-sile defenses one of the highest prioritiesamong current Soviet military programs. Ob-servance of construction of the first of anestimated 57 launching sites around Moscowin 1953, some five years after the initiationof a native missile program, tends to confirmthis estimate. Construction of the Moscowlaunching sites represented a major effortduring the years 1953-56. On the basis ofan estimated 60 launchers per site, and onallocation of four missiles per launcher, themissile stockpile requirement for the entireMoscow system would be about 14,000 mis-siles. Our estimate that large-scale produc-tion of these missiles is under way is sup-ported by observations in 1955 and 1956 offour and possibly as many as six factory-typefacilities near the city. These unique andalmost identical facilities, at present in dif-ferent stages of completion, appear to be par-tial fabrication and final assembly plants forsurface-to-air missiles. At one of them, morethan 450 missile-like objects were observed inSeptember 1955.

8. Aside from the information presentedabove, plus some evidence that launching sitesmay be under construction near Leningrad,we have no intelligence on Soviet programsfor the operational employment or produc-tion of surface-to-air missiles. We believe,

—T-O-P—S-E-e-

C00267693

27

however, that the surface-to-air program willcontinue to enjoy high priority. We believethat each surface-to-air system developed bythe USSR will, with relatively minor improve-ments, possess combat utility for some fiveto seven years following the introduction ofthe succeeding system. In this manner, new-er systems can either supplement older sys-tems or permit their allocation to less criti-cal static targets or to mobile units for de-fense of field forces.

9. Soviet military planners undoubtedly viewthe defense of Moscow as being of very highpriority and of critical importance. Theyprobably recognize that the current Moscowsurface-to-air system will satisfy their require-ments for only a few years. Available intelli-gence indicates that although the Moscowsystem has the advantage of a very high rateof fire, it imposes limitations on the sectorcovered by individual sites to about 60°,and a large number of sites are required toprovide adequate all-around coverage. Be-cause of these limitations and the great ex-pense of the current installation in fixed facil-ities, we believe the surface-to-air missile de-fense as observed around Moscow to be a spe-cial case dictated by the special importanceof Moscow to the USSR. We believe that theMoscow-type surface-to-air defenses as nowconstituted and in terms of the level of defenseeffort would not be deployed in any additionalSoviet areas, except possibly Leningrad.10. To provide surface-to-air missile defensesfor other critical areas, several alternativesare open to Soviet planners. For example, asingle ring of sites, comparable to the innerMoscow ring of 23 sites, could provide a rela-tively high level of defense at most defendedareas. With the present YOYO guidance sys-tem, we believe that 12 sites would be requiredto give 360° coverage with acceptable overlap.On the other hand, we estimate that in 1957the current system could probably be modi-fied to incorporate a guidance system capableof 360° traverse. Such a system would havea lower traffic-handling capability, but itwould have the advantage of permitting sub-division of the large fire-units of 60 launchersinto smaller units, each with its own guidanceSystem.

11. We have no intelligence to indicate wheth-er the USSR will elect to defend a few criticalareas at a high level of defense or, alternative-ly, a larger number of areas at a lower levelof defense. In any case, we estimate that alogical program for the 60,000 1t./25 n.m. mis-sile might involve the activation of 150 unitsby 1959. This would require a stockpile ofabout 36,000 missiles, to be produced in theperiod 1955-58.3

12. The low altitude capability estimated forthe 40,000 ft./15 n.m. system which couldprobably become available in 1958 4 wouldmake it a valuable weapon for augmentingthe defenses of both critical areas and fieldforces. This low-altitude coverage would prob-ably be required to supplement the later, moreadvanced high-altitude systems as well as thecurrent 60,000 ft./25 n.m. system. The USSRmight thus produce a stockpile of about 22,400of these missiles in the period 1958-66, andactivate about 350 units for their employ-ment.3 A portion would probably be assignedto critical static target areas and the remain-der, employing mobile launchers, to fieldforces.

13. It is probable that the USSR would desireto defend a relatively large number of criticalmilitary installations and industrial areaswith surface-to-air systems of the 80,000 ft./50 n.m. and 90,000 ft./100 n.m. types. Theimproved characteristics of these systemswould permit a reduction in the number ofunits assigned to the defense of any givencritical area. We estimate that a total stock-pile of about 60,000 missiles of these two typesmight be produced between 1959 and 1963,and that a total of about 250 units might beactivated.° Beginning in about 1959, missilesof the 60,000 ft./25 n.m. type would probably

'Calculation based on 60 launchers per unit, fourmissiles per launcher.

'See Director of Intelligence. USAF, footnote toparagraph 62 of the DISCUSSION.

'Calculation based on 16 launchers per unit,four missiles per launcher, with an allocationof 150 units to static defense and 200 units tofield forces.

"Calculation based on GO launchers per unit, fourmissiles per launcher.

C00267693

28

be phased out of the defenses of critical areasand be redeployed to less critical areas andfield force units.

14. The numbers of interim anti-ICBM mis-siles and units which the USSR might haveby 1966 is conjectural. The USSR might electto stockpile several thousand as an ultimateobjective, the exact number depending upon:(a) its estimate of the number of US ICBMsto be countered; (b) its estimate as to the neteffectiveness of the system against ICBM's;(c) the number of nuclear warheads avail-able for use in the anti-ICBM role; and (d) itsestimate of the effectiveness of this system,as modified, against high performance bomb-ers and cruise-type missiles. The uncertain-ties as to when such a weapon might bebrought to first operational use (1963-66)precludes confident numerical estimates. Ona tentative basis, we estimate that a reason-able number of missiles produced through1966 might be 1,000 for use in the anti-ICBMrole, and the number of units about 15.

Shipborne

15. While the defense of naval surface unitswould probably have a lower priority than thedefense of key land targets, Soviet plannerswould almost certainly recognize that ship-borne surface-to-air missiles could providevaluable protection for the Soviet surface fleetand decrease its dependence on shore-basedaircraft. Considering these factors togetherwith the economic cost of such a program,we believe the USSR might seek during theperiod of this estimate to equip about two-thirds of its cruisers and about one-sixth ofits destroyer types with surface-to-air missiles.On the basis of estimated Soviet navalstrength for 1961, and assuming a relativelyconstant force after that date, about 24 cruis-ers and 48 destroyer types might thus beequipped with surface-to-air missiles by 1966.A logical program might be as follows:(a) equip six cruisers and eight destroyertypes with 40,000 ft./15 n.m. shipborne mis-

'All calculations based on four launchers percruiser and two launchers per destroyer type,with an allowance of 30 missiles per launcherand a small allowance for reserve.

siles, producing a stockpile of 1,500 such mis-siles between 1958 and 1961; I (b) later, equip24 cruisers, including the six above, with80,000 ft./50 n.m. shipborne missiles, pro-ducing a stockpile of 3,000 such missiles be-tween 1960 and 1966; (c) equip an additional40 destroyers with the 40,000 ft./15 n.m. mis-siles (including those withdrawn from theoriginal six cruisers), the conversion of thesedestroyers and production of an additional2,500 missiles to be accomplished by 1966.16. Warheads. Nuclear warheads could beemployed in any of the surface-to-air missiletypes estimated for the period except the40,000 ft./15 n.m. types. While the smallCEP's of most surface-to-air missile typeswould make HE warheads satisfactory, weestimate that the USSR would include nuclearwarheads in some of these missiles. Such war-heads would be mandatory for anti-ICBMs.17. Cost. The ground-launched surface-to-air programs, involving the activation ofabout 750 static and mobile units and produc-tion of a stockpile of some 120,000 missiles,would cost an estimated 36 billion 1955 dollarsin investment and operating expendituresthrough 1966. This represents about one-halfof the dollar cost of the over-all missile pro-gram set forth in this Annex, and its dollarallocation is more than three times that ofany other single category of missiles. Theshipborne surface-to-air programs would en-tail investment and operating costs amount-ing to seven billion dollars, or about 10 per-cent of the over-all missile program.8

Air-to-Air Program18. We have no evidence of any Soviet pro-gram for the operational employment or pro-duction of air-to-air missiles, but we believethat such a program has probably enjoyed ahigh initial priority as part of the over-allSoviet air defense effort. The Soviet air-to-air missiles which we estimate will probablybe available during the first half of the periodhave several advantages which tend to coun-teract their guidance and payload limitations.

'For details of the estimated costs of the entiremissile program, see Section III of this Annex.All dollar costs presented In this estimate areIn 1955 dollars.

CO0267693

TOP CECRET 29

These include: (a) their relatively cheap unitcost; (b) the availability of large numbers offighter aircraft as carriers; and (c) their abil-ity to improve fighter kill capabilities. Con-current surface-to-air and air-to-air programsare justified during much of the period be-cause of their complementary relationships.We believe, however, that late in the periodthe contribution of air-to-air missiles to theover-all Soviet air defense effort will probablydecrease as the nature of the threat evolves.

19. We estimate that the USSR will continueto maintain about 9,300 fighter aircraft inoperational units through at least 1961. As-suming an initial program to equip about one-fourth of these fighters with the currentlyavailable 2-3 n.m./good-weather air-to-airmissile, a stockpile of about 20,000 missilesmight be produced by 1958. 9 Soviet plannerswould probably consider this air-to-air sys-tem as an interim measure only, to be sup-plemented by the 5 n.m./all-weather air-to-airsystem which we estimate could probably beavailable in 1958. A Soviet program for thismissile might involve full equipment of the4,800 Soviet all-weather fighters estimated for1961. Thus a stockpile of about 55,000 suchmissiles might be produced between 1958 and1961.1°

20. Soviet production of the 15-20 n.m. air-to-air missile, which could probably first beavailable in 1960, would probably be limitedby the actual or impending threat of attackby cruise-type and ballistic missiles. How-ever, since the 15-20 n.m. missile could carrya 150-pound payload, three times that of the5 n.m. air-to-air missile and capable of em-ploying nuclear as well as HE warheads, webelieve some production would probably beundertaken. As a tentative figure only, weestimate that some 7,000 such missiles mightbe produced between 1960 and 1963.

21. Cost. The air-to-air programs describedwould entail an investment and operating costamounting to about seven billion dollars, or 10

''°Calculations based on four missiles per aircraftper sortie, with sufficient 2-3 n.m. missiles avail-able for two sorties per aircraft and sufficient5 n.m. missiles for three sorties per aircraft.

percent of the total cost. The entire air de-fense missile program, including surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles of all types, com-prises approximately 70 percent of the dollarcost of the over-all Soviet missile program setforth in this Annex.

Air-to-Surface Program22. While there is considerable evidence to in-dicate Soviet interest in air-to-surface missilesand we believe that one type has reached atleast final flight test stage, there is no evi-dence of Soviet series production in this mis-sile category. Our belief that such a programwould probably be undertaken rests -primarilyon two factors: (a) Soviet planners probablyestimate that they face a serious threat fromUS and Allied carrier task forces and that thecapabilities of these task forces to defendthemselves against close-in attacks by air-craft are already high and will continue toimprove; and (b) they probably estimate thatas the period advances, the capabilities oftheir own bombers to penetrate the defensesof key Western land targets will materiallydecrease.

23. Until 1961, the air-to-surface missilesavailable to the USSR will probably be thosedesigned primarily as antiship weapons. ASoviet program for these missiles might beas follows: (a) on an interim basis, produceby 1958 a stockpile of about 1,000 " subsonicair-to-surface missiles, of which the majoritymight be 55 n.m. missiles of 8-10,000 poundsgross weight, and a portion might be 20 n.m.missiles of 6-8,000 pounds gross weight;(b) replace this stockpile with the supersonic55 n.m. missiles which could probably beavailable in 1958, producing a stockpile of1,000" by 1960. Such a program could pro-vide air-to-surface missiles for employment by300 or more aircraft," most of which wouldbe of medium bomber or larger types. Some55 n.m. missiles could be employed against

"The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes thatthe numbers of shorter range air-to-surfacemissiles shown here are excessive. See his foot-note to paragraph 1 of this Annex.

'Calculation based on one missile per aircraftper sortie, with sufficient missiles for threesorties per aircraft.

CO 0267693

T-0 P--S-E-G-R-E-T- 30

land targets, although the guidance systemestimated for these missiles would limit theiremployment to isolated and well-defined radartargets and the short range would also limittheir utilization. BM warheads would prob-ably be satisfactory for employment againstsingle ships, but nuclear warheads would beemployed against land targets and ship con-centrations.24. The supersonic 100 n.m. missile of 11,000pounds gross weight, which could probablybe available in 1961, would increase the capa-bilities of manned heavy bombers to attackwell-defended land targets, and could decreasethe vulnerability of these aircraft. A Sovietprogram for these missiles might involve pro-duction of a stockpile of about 1,000 by 1966.Because of their CEP's payloads and prob-able employment, these missiles would requirenuclear warheads.

Surface-to-Surface ProgramGround-Launched25. Information from returned German per-sonnel, as well as the large-scale testing ofballistic missiles in the USSR, indicate thatat least experimental or pilot-line productionhas been under way for six to eight years,and that there must be at least one majorassembly facility committed to such produc-tion." Other than this circumstantial evi-dence, we have no knowledge of any Sovietprogram for the production or operationalemployment of ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles.

26. In estimating possible Soviet stockpilesfor ground-launched surface-to-surface mis-siles, we have considered the different priori-ties the USSR would probably assign to mis-siles for augmenting or replacing other weap-ons systems in the tactical support, peripheralattack, and intercontinental attack roles, 14and weighed these priorities against the re-quirement for economy in expenditure andin utilization of nuclear materials. While wehave generally equated the stockpiles of cer-tain missiles to numbers of operational units

" See Annex C (Limited distribution under sepa-rate cover).

"As set forth In Section I of the DISCUSSION.

and targets to be attacked, the stockpilesthemselves were not derived by any precisecalculation of these factors. The stockpilesrepresent a time-phased program designedto achieve a reasonable degree of readinessand an expandable production capability.This we have done in the belief that Sovietplanners must make contingent decisionswhen technology and doctrine are changingrapidly and comparative evaluation of com-peting weapons systems is not clear-cut.

27. Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (up to 350n.m. range)

a. Because of its relatively low prioritywithin the missile program, a production pro-gram for 75 n.m. ballistic missiles would prob-ably be phased over a fairly long period. Astockpile of about 9,000 15 such missiles mightbe produced between 1954 and 1960, withstress on maintaining an expandable produc-tion capability. This stockpile could equipabout 90 missiles units." The estimated1,200-foot CEP of this missile would permituse of nuclear, HE, or CW warheads againstappropriate targets.

b. On the same basis, a stockpile of about3,000" ballistic missiles of 175-200 n.m. rangemight be produced between 1954 and 1960.This stockpile could support about 30 units.A basic requirement exists for nuclear war-heads. The estimated 1954 CEP of 1-2 n.m.would probably preclude the use of HE butnot CW warheads, and would limit employ-ment of these missiles to static targets. Witha CEP improved to 2,000 feet by 1955-57,the use of HE would be feasible for someoperations.

c. To provide an improved capability forattack against NATO or other forces, theUSSR might have produced a stockpile ofabout 700 "ballistic missiles of 350 n.m. rangebetween 1954 and 1956. This stockpile couldsupport about 14 units. " The same warhead

"The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes thatthe numbers of short range surface-to-surfacemissiles shown here are excessive. See his foot-note to paragraph 1 of this Annex.

"Calculation based on 100 missiles per unit. Unitsassumed to have four launchers each.

"Calculation based on 50 missiles per unit. Unitsassumed to have two launchers each.

E-C-R-E-T-

C00267693

T 0 P—S-E-C-R-E-T- 31

and target limitations would apply as in the175-200 n.m. missile, except that the use ofHE would not be practicable.

28. Ballistic Missiles of 700 n.m. and 1,600n.m.- Ranges. Ballistic missiles of 700 n.m.range could reach much of the Eurasian landmass, Japan, Alaska, and a portion of theUK from launching sites within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. IRBMs of 1,600 n.m. range couldcover these same targets from more securelaunching sites and could extend the coverageto include more distant target areas. Whilewe have not fully assessed the number of tar-gets the USSR might elect to attack by thismeans rather than by other weapons systems,we estimate that the USSR might stockpileabout 900 of these missiles. We have as-sumed that the advantages the USSR couldgain by acquiring a missile capability hi-beingfor attack on Western Europe would probablylead it to produce the stockpile fairly rapidly.We have thus allocated the larger portion ofthe stockpile to the 700 n.m. missile becauseof its earlier availability, and on this basiswe have assumed a stockpile of 700 ballisticmissiles of 700 n.m. range produced between1956 and 1960 and a stockpile of 200 IRBMsproduced between 1959 and 1962. We recog-nize, however, that the earlier program mightbe cut back to allow some increased produc-tion of IRBMs. The CEP's, payload weights,and probable employment of both the 700 n.m.missile and the IRBM would require nuclearwarheads, although we do not exclude thepossibility of CW use with the 700 p.m. mis-sile for occasional special missions.

29. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (5,500n.m. range). We believe that the USSR willseek to acquire a considerable number ofICBMs with nuclear warheads as rapidly aspossible. In reaching this conclusion we haveconsidered: (a) the great potential militaryvalue of the ICBM as compared to competingSoviet weapons systems, particularly for sur-prise attack; (b) the military advantage theUSSR could gain if it could acquire a substan-tial ICBM capability before the US had de-veloped adequate countermeasures or similarforces in-being; (c) the potential economyof the ICBM system as compared to compet-ing weapons systems; and (d) the probable

low initial system reliability and accuracy ofthe ICBM. On these grounds, a Soviet ICBMprogram might include production of a stock-pile of about 1,000 missiles between 1960 and1965. " To provide security and permit rapidrates of fire, but at the same time to conserveInvestment in facilities, the USSR might em-ploy about 100 widely dispersed ICBM launch-ing sites, each with 10 missiles and twolaunching pads, although many other methodsof deployment would be possible.

Shipborne30. Any of the present Soviet submarine typescould be equipped to carry one or two cruise-type missiles in topside stowage, and conven-tional-powered or nuclear-powered boats aboutthe size of the "Z" class could be converted orconstructed to accommodate four missileseach in internal stowage. While there is noevidence to indicate how many guided missilesubmarines the USSR intends to convert orconstruct, we estimate that it could now haveabout 10 submarines equipped to carry mis-siles in topside stowage. Its future programmight call for the construction or conversionof about 50 submarines with internal stowageby about 1966.

31. We estimate that production of surface-to-surface cruise-type missiles is probably un-der way, and that a Soviet production pro-.gram might be as follows: (a) to acquire aninitial capability rapidly, produce a stockpileof 100 missiles with 500 n.m./subsonic capa-bilities between 1955 and mid-1957; (b) pro-duce a stockpile of 150 missiles with 500 n.m./supersonic capabilities in the period 1957-60; (c) produce a stockpile of 300 missileswith 1,000 n.m./supersonic capabilities in theperiod 1962-64, in part to replace the sub-sonic missiles and in part to equip submarinesconverted or constructed after 1960. TheCEP's, payload weights, and probable employ-ment of these missiles would require nuclearwarheads.

U These dates assume first operational capabilityof the ICBM at the earliest probable date (i.e.,the beginning of 1960). Within range of ourestimate, however, a Soviet ICBM might not beoperationally available until the end of 1961.

32PEE

CO0267693

32. The USSR might also adapt 80,000 ft/50n.m. shipborne surface-to-air missiles to per-mit their alternative use against surface tar-gets in appropriate naval roles. The basicnumerical requirement for such missiles is in-cluded in the shipbome surface-to-air pro-gram (paragraph 15 of this Annex).

33. Cost. The estimated investment and oper-ational cost of the entire surface-to-surfaceprogram is about 20 billion dollars, or approxi-mately 27 percent of the dollar cost of theover-all missile program. The included ICBMprogram represents about eight percent of theover-all program.

Table II, summarizing Section I of this An-nex, begins on page 33.

II. WARHEAD CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTINGPOSSIBLE PROGRAM

Nuclear Warheads34. The production and operational programfor guided missiles described in Section I ofthis Annex has been assessed in the light ofthe estimated availability of nuclear materialsto the USSR during the period. ,° The accu-racy of the assessment is necessarily limitedby the element of uncertainty in our estimatesof past and future Soviet production of fission-able materials." It is further limited by ourinability to determine with any validity theplanned Soviet allocation of fissionable mate-rials available for weapons.

35. From the standpoint of destructive effectalone, a probable Soviet objective would be toallocate nuclear warheads to a large percent-age of all those missiles for which it is tech-nically possible to design such warheads. Itis highly unlikely that sufficient nuclear mate-

'See NEE 11-2-56, The Soviet Atomic Energy Pro-gram, 8 June 1956 (Limited distribution). Thisestimate will be superseded by the forthcomingNIE 11-2-57.The uncertainty In our estimate of cumulativeSoviet production of U-235 up to the presentprobably does not exceed plus or minus 50 per-cent of the estimated value and plutonium plusor minus 25 percent. The error In our estimatesof future production is less predictable.

rials will be available during the period ofthis estimate to permit such an allocation.

36. We have not made an estimate of theamount of fissionable material which theUSSR would allocate to guided missile use.Nor have we estimated the percentage alloca-tion of nuclear warheads to all the variousmissiles. However, in order to assess the lim-itation imposed by the availability of nuclearmaterials, we have selected those missileswhich, because of their probable employmentand/or CEP's, we believe would be equippedalmost entirely with nuclear warheads, andhave assumed that they would be 100 percentso equipped:

a. all submarine-launched surface-to-sur-face missiles (total: 550);

b. all 700 n.m ballistic missiles, IRBMs,and ICBMs (total: 1,900);

c. all surface-to-air missiles employed asanti-ICBMs (total: 1,000);

d. all 100 n.m. air-to-surface missiles (total:1,000).

Calculations based on Soviet weapons capa-bilities show that the USSR could equip allof these missiles with nuclear warheads, byallocating to the missile program about 55 per-cent of t6-e U-235 and about 30 percent of theplutonium which has been estimated in NIE11-2-56 to be available for weapons on acumulative basis through 1966.

37. It is clear that 1.f during this period theUSSR equipped with nuclear warheads thelong-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles,submarine-launched missiles, anti-ICBMs, andlong-range air-to-surface missiles postulatedin this Annex, it would have to equip the large

'The Director of Naval Intelligence did not con-cur with the figures in NIE 11-2-56 for the esti-mated production of U-235, and for the esti-mated production of plutonium after 1959, whichwere used as a basis for the calculations In thisestimate. The Director of Naval Intelligencebelieves the figures to be too high, and that forplanning purposes a more practical magnitudeof cumulative quantities of U-235 would be Ina range below that of the minus 50 percent lowerlimit of the estimates In NTE 11-2-56.

"For further details, see Annex D (Limited dis-tribution under separate cover).

21 22

TABLE II

A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1986

The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program.We present it as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.'

OperationalUnits Remarks

150 units acti-vated 1955-59.

Static defense ofcritical areas.

350 units acti-vated 1958-86,150 for staticdefense and 200for defense offield forces.

250 units acti-vated 1959-63.

For low altitudedefense.

15 units.

Replaces 60,000125 nia. system incritical areas anddefends addition-al such areas.Earlier systemtransferred to lesscritical areas andfield forces.

Stockpile a ten-tative figure only.Production mightbegin as late as1988.

FirstOpera-tional Identi-Capa- lying Stock-

. Desig- billty Charac- pilenation' Date' teristics' Goal 1954 1955 1958

Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)'

1957 1958 1959 1960 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988

SURFACE-TO-AIR, GROUND-LAUNCHED

1,000 10,000 23,000 36,000

3,800

5,000

6,800

17,000

9,900

35,000

12,900

47,000

—

15,900

60 000

18,900

100

22 000

1 000

SA-1 mid-1955 60,000'/ 36,000 —25 n.m.(1957charac-teristics)

SA-2 1958' 40,000'/ 22,00015 n.m.

SA-3 1959 80,0001 (50 n.m. ( 60,000 —

SA-4 1981 90,0001 (100 n.m.(

SA-5 1963-66 Interim 1,000anti-ICBM

1,000

400—

'See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1.'These are arbitrary designations for convenience of reference. The same designations were used in Table I following Section III of the DISCUSSION.'For definition, see paragraph 50 of the DISCUSSION.'For further details, see Section III of the DISCUSSION.'These figures do not include missiles produced for testing and training. Stockpile goal, once reached, is in general maintained throughout the period.'See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to paragraph 82 of the DISCUSSION.

33

TABLE II (Cont'd)

A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1988

The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program.We present it as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.'

OperationalUnits Remarks

8 cruisersequipped by1980,8 destroyertypes equippedby 1961, 40 addi-tional destroyertypes equipped1982-88.

24 cruisers, in-cluding 6 above,equipped by1988.

Replaces 40,000'/15 n.m. system on8 cruisers origi-nally equipped,and equips 18 ad-ditional cruisers.Earlier systemtransferred todestroyer types.

One - fourth ofSoviet fighterforce of 9,300aircraftequipped1955-58.

4,800 all-weath-er fi ghters fullyequipped by1981.

Interim system.

Supplements 2-3n.m./good weath-er system.

Allfighters.

Stockpile a ten-tative figure only.

FirstOpera-tional Identi-Capa- fying Stock-

Desig- bility Charac- pileStatus of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)'

nation' Date' teristics Goal 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1988

SURFACE-TO-AIR, SHIPBORNE

SA-8 1958 40,0001 4,000 — — — 100 300 700 1,400 2,100 2,800 3,500 4Q015 n.m.

BA-7 1980 80,0001 3.000 — — — — — — 100 300 700 1,400 2,100 2,800 3 00050 n.m.

AIR-TO-AIR

AA-1 1955 2-3 20,000n.m./goodweather

— 500 8,000 18,000 20 000

AA-2 1058 5 n.m./ 55,000allweather

— 2,000 18,000 44,000 55 000

AA-3 1980 15-20 7,000n.m.

— — — — — — 300 2,400 5,800 7,000

See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1.Footnotes 2-5 on page 33.

34

TABLE II (Cont'd)

A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1968

The program outlined in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program.We present It as only a possible program, but one which is both feasible and reasonable.'

OperationalUnits Remarks

FirstOpera-tional Identl-Capa- lying Stock- Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)'Willy Charac- pileDate' teristics Goal 1954 1955 1958 1957 1958 1959 1980 1981 1962 1963 1984 1985 1968

Desig-nation'

AIR-TO-SURFACE

AS-2 1958-57 55 ia.m./ 1,000'subsonic

300 mediumbomber or anti-shipping recon-naissance air-craft.

AS-3 1958 55 n_m./ 1,000 —super-sonic

Production mightnot begin until1957. Portion ofstockpile mightbe 20 run. missiles(AS-1) whichcould have beenavailable in 1955.Replaces subson-ic version.

100 1 000

150 600 1,000 300 mediumbomber or anti-shipping recon-naissance air-craft not inaddition tothose above.

150 300 500 700 900 1 000 Heavy bombers.AS-4 1981 100 n.m. 1,000 —

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE, GROUND-LAUNCFIED (BALLISTIC)

For strategic at-tack againstwell-defendedtargets. -

90 missile units. For tactical sup-port of groundforces, • and forneutralizing cer-tain other tar-gets. -Ditto.30 missile units.

83-1 1954 75 n.m. 9,000' 800 1,800 3200, 4,700 8,100 7,800 9 000

55-2 1954 175-200 3,000' 200 600 1,100 1,600 2,000 2,500 3 000n.m.

'See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1.Footnotes 2-5 on page 33.

'The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the numbers of AS-2, AS-3, SS-1, SS-2, and SS-3 missiles shown in this table are excessive.Annex A, paragraph 1.

See his footnote to

35

,N.)

' (51

4IT) CZ.°

TABLE II (Cont'd)

A POSSIBLE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE OPERATIONAL AND PRODUCTION PROGRAM THROUGH 1968

The program outllned in this table cannot be taken as the most likely or the probable Soviet program.We present it as only a possible program, but one which Is both feasible and reasonable.'

OperationalRemarksUnits

14 missile units.

Not estimated.

Ditto.

For peripheralattack; see pares.23 and 27c of theDiscussion.

Not estimated. . Peripheral at-tack.

100 launchingsites, 2 launch-ing pads each.

Intercontinentalattack. Produc-tion might notbegin until theend of 1981.

) 10 submarines)with topside) stowage plus) 20 submarines) with internal)stowage by) about 1980. 30) additional sub-)marines with)Internal stow-/ age by about) 1988.

FirstOpera-tional Identl-Capa- fying Stock- Status of Stockpile at End of Year (Cumulative)'

Desig- billty Charac- pilenation' Date' terLstics Goal 1954 1955 1958 1957 1958 1959 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1965 1988

88-3 1954 350 n.m. 700' 200 500 700

83-4 1958 700 n.rn. 700 50 150 250

83-5 1959 1,800 n.m. 200(BM) (IRBM)

83-8 1980-81 5,500 n.m. 1,000 —(ICBM) (ICBM)

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED (CRUISE-TYPE)

500

30

100

700

100

100

150

170

300

200

500

40

700

120

900

200

1 OM

300280

861-8 1955 500 n.m./ 100 5 60 100subsonic

88-9 1957 500 nan./ 150 5 50supersonic

88-10 1982 1,000 n.m./ 300supersonic

To acquire initialcapability.

Replaces subson-ic missiles andequips additionalsubmarines.

See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Annex A, paragraph 1.Footnotes 2-6 on page 33.See Director of Intelligence, USAF, footnote to page 35.

36

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37

majority of its other missiles with non-nuclearwarheads. However, it would be highly desir-able and most probable that some percentageof other missiles, particularly surface-to-airand shorter range air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missiles, would be provided with nu-clear warheads. We are unable to postulatevalid percentage allocations, and present thefollowing only for illustration: if an addi-tional 10 percent of the fissionable material ac-cumulated through 1966 were allocated tothese other missiles categories, about 700 sur-face-to-air and 500 air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile warheads could be provided.The desirability of providing larger numbersof these missiles with nuclear warheads isequally apparent, but their competing de-mands could not be met without reducing theamount of fissionable materials allocated tosome other part of the program. For example,the scale of the surface-to-air missile programpostulated in this Annex is such that theUSSR could not equip a major portion of thesemissiles with nuclear warheads, even by utiliz-ing all the fissionable material available forweapons.38. There are certain factors, however, whichtend to offset the stringency of nuclear mate-rials:

a. The USSR could gain some flexibility ofutilization by developing interchangeable nu-clear components for certain weapons systemsemploying these components.

b. Through technical advances after 1960it will probably increase the explosive yieldattainable from a given weight of nuclearmaterials and the economy of use of thesematerials in individual weapons.

C. Some missile types could be effective withother than nuclear warheads. Moreover, cer-tain missiles for which we have assumed 100percent nuclear warheads might for certainspecific missions achieve acceptable effectswith other types of warheads, or could employnuclear warheads of lower yields than thosewe have assumed for the assessment in thisAnnex.

d. Finally, the possibility cannot be ex-cluded that the USSR would deliberately planto restrict its wartime employment of nuclear

weapons under certain circumstances and incertain areas which it planned to occupy orexploit, in order to cause the minimumamount of physical damage.

39. Nevertheless, the USSR would face manydifficulties in the allocation of fissionable ma-terials to its various weapons systems duringthis period. It could mitigate these difficul-ties by phasing the equipping of certain mis-siles with nuclear warheads over a longerperiod of time, by producing smaller quanti-ties of certain missiles during the period ofthe estimate, or by deliberately planning onthe extensive use of non-nuclear warheads.We cannot estimate with confidence what theUSSR will do in this respect, but we believeit might adopt some combination of thesethree courses of action.

40. We have not undertaken to estimate theprobable basic Soviet allocation of nuclearmaterials as between the guided missile pro-gram and other uses. However, we believethat within a plausible basic allocation — as-sumed in this estimate as about 50 percentfor the missile program — the USSR would beable to equip with nuclear warheads: (a) avery high proportion of the postulated produc-tion of missiles for which nuclear warheadswould be regarded as essential (i.e., those typesnamed in paragraph 36 of this Annex); and(b) a much smaller proportion of the postu-lated production of selected other missiletypes.

Chemical Warheads41. There is no evidence of Soviet develop-ment of CW warheads for guided missiles.However, our estimate of Soviet capabilitiesto develop and produce agents and to solvethe problems of dissemination by guided mis-siles leads us to believe that the USSR couldhave had tabun (GA) warheads by 1954 andcould have had sarin (GB) warheads by 1956.Active Soviet military interest in CW is shownby the extent of their CW organization, thewidespread issue of chemical defensive equip-ment, the extent of their training pro-gram for CW defense, and the statements ofSoviet leaders. The USSR would probablyconsider CW warheads desirable for certain

'r orP 3 B-e-R-B-LP-

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38

specific purposes: for attack on personnel inthe open; for employment against personnelin areas where the USSR would wish to holdphysical destruction to a minimum; and pos-sibly for psychological effect.

42. On the basis of our estimates of SovietCW agents available, missile warhead weights,and Soviet capability to develop the necessarymunitions, we believe the USSR could achievewith GB agents a 50 percent casualty effectagainst unprotected personnel in the openover the following areas: 23

Warhead Class

Area Radius of Effects

2,000 lb. 1.3 sq. mi. 3,300 ft.4,000 lb. 3.0 sq. mi. 5,100 ft.6,000 lb. 8.0 sq. mi. 8,400 ft.

43. We estimate that the USSR could prob-ably develop and employ "V" agents in guidedmissiles by 1960. This date is predicated onSoviet solution of the problem of generatinga proper aerosol for dispersal of the "V" agent.Recent intelligence indicates that the Sovietshave made substantial progress in aerosolgeneration, although no evidence is availableto indicate its application to the dissemina-tion of CW agents by guided missiles. Use of"V" agents, far more toxic than the "G" series,would enable the USSR to obtain area cover-ages approximately three times as great asthose shown for the "G" series.

Biological Warheads

44. We estimate that antipersonnel BW agentswhich could now be available to the USSR arebrucella, tularense, anthracis, and pestis. Themeans employed for CW dispersal by guidedmissiles could also be used for BW.

45. The use of antipersonnel BW agents wouldbe profitable only in situations where delayedcasualties are acceptable. Other than this,the advantages of using these agents inguided missile warheads would be generallysimilar to those of CW. However, greater

" In determining area coverage, favorable con-ditions for agent dissemination are assumed.Soviet GA would be slightly less effective thanGB.

quantities of BW agents could be dissemi-nated over even wider areas by clandestinedelivery and other means than by guidedmissiles.

46. We estimate that the USSR could alsohave certain anticrop and antilivestock agentswhich could be used in guided missiles.

III. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OFPOSSIBLE PROGRAM

Costing Methods and Limitations

47. The problem of estimating the costs of aSoviet guided missile program for a periodextending 10 years into the future has manylimitations. Because neither the US nor theUSSR has had sufficient experience in theproduction of these new weapons systems,costs calculated at present cannot be con-sidered as accurate estimates of the actualfuture costs of producing and operating theguided missile systems postulated. They are,however, adequate for distinguishing theeconomic differences between one missile sys-tem proposal and another. They are thetype of estimates used by the US in plan-ning its future missile programs and are sim-ilar in nature and reliability to those whichmight be used by Soviet planners in makingdecisions about their own future programs.

48. In the absence of firm data on Soviet rnig-sile characteristics, production methods, andcost of component parts, the program hasbeen costed in dollars, using known or esti-mated production costs for the nearest UScounterparts of the missile systems under con-sideration. Almost all the data employed re-flect planning costs supplied by the US mili-tary services responsible for the various UScounterpart missiles. These data have beenapplied to the stockpile levels and time sched-ules stipulated in Section I of this Annex,using analytical procedures consistent withstandard weapons systems cost analyses.Ruble costs have been derived by applyingknown or estimated ruble-dollar ratios. 24

"For purposes of analytical convenience, all dol-lar costs used in this estimate are calculatedin 1955 dollars; all ruble costs are in 1951 rubles.

CO 0267693

39

49. Because it is necessary to know the direc-tion of any bias in the estimated costs of theprogram, it was decided that where there wasa choice of militarily acceptable approacheswith differing costs, the one with the lowercost would be used. This type of choice wasmade on economic grounds, without furtherconsideration of the relative military effective-ness or vulnerability of the costed system asopposed to others. Other decisions also madethe estimated costs somewhat lower than theymight actually be. Certain items necessaryto the operation of the various guided missilesystems have not been included in the costcalculations because they were not consid-ered exclusively guided missile items. Amongthese exclusions are the costs of early warn-ing and ground control intercept systems andthe costs of aircraft and naval vessels whichcarry missiles. The costs of nuclear warheadswere not included. Also specifically excludedfrom the estimated totals are investment inplants and industrial equipment to producemissiles, and expenditures on research anddevelopment. All these factors tend to givethe over-all estimate of the cost of the postu-lated missile program a severe downward bias,and it should be considered as a minimum fig-ure. Our best judgment of the degree ofdownward bias for the items which were in-cluded in the costs is that it is not greaterthan 20 percent and more likely falls betweenfive and 15 percent.

Cost of Program

50. The program for the production and op-erational employment of guided missiles, asdescribed in this Annex, would be a large andcostly one. We estimate, however, that sucha program is within the economic capabili-ties of the USSR, although it would necessi-tate an increasingly heavy economic alloca-tion through at least 1961. The programwould incur an aggregate cost of about 73billion (1955) dollars, or about 400 billion(1951) rubles, during the 14-year period from1953 through 1966. The aggregate dollar out-lay for this program is apportioned amongbroad categories of missiles approximately asfollows: total air defense program (includingall surface-to-air and air-to-air systems), 70

percent; total ground-launched surface-to-sur-face program, 25 percent; air-to-surface pro-gram, 2 percent; submarine-launched surface-to-surface program, 3 percent. The ground-launched surface-to-air program would incurby far the largest dollar outlay of any singlecategory, comprising about 50 percent of thetotal. The ICBM program would compriseabout eight percent of the total dollar outlay.(See Figure 1.)

51. For purposes of analysis, the aggregatecosts of the program have been broken downinto broad areas termed "initial investmentcosts" and "annual operating costs." 23 In dol-lars, investment costs through the period rep-resent about 44 percent of the aggregate costof the program, with operating costs repre-senting about 56 percent. (See Figure 2.)

52. The postulated program results in a fair-ly smooth but rapidly rising cost curve. An-nual outlays in dollars rise from 0.5 billionin 1954 to 5.2 billion in 1959, and then risesharply to about 8 billion in 1960, withannual expenditures ranging between 7.4 and9.4 billion for the remainder of the period.Considering the entire period, about 20 per-cent of the total dollar outlay would be in-curred through 1959 and about 80 percentbetween 1960 and 1966. The nature of theeconomic burden also shifts drastically frominvestment to operating costs as the periodprogresses. By 1966, nearly seven billion dol-lars per year are required to operate and main-tain the missile systems which have been de-veloped and produced during the period. (SeeFigure 3.)

*"Initial Investment costs" are those one-timecosts incurred in producing and activating aparticular missile system, including missiles, in-stallations, guidance and special equipment, or-ganizational equipment, Initial personnel train-ing, and transportation. "Annual operatingcosts" are those additional recurring expensesincurred In the operation and maintenance ofthe equipment and personnel, including main-tenance of installations and equipment, missilesfired for proficiency and tests, personnel pay,allowances and subsistence, and support com-mand. Neither "Initial investment costs" nor"annual operating costs" take into account thoseexcluded costs factors described In paragraph49 of this Annex.

CO0267693•

‘11-&-P—

53. The cost of the missiles themselves isonly a partial measure of the economic mag-nitude of the missile program. Missiles andspare parts would account for only 25-30 per-cent of the dollar outlay for each missile sys-tem, while the major part of the outlay wouldbe for associated equipment, facilities, andpersonnel. Therefore, changes in the organi-zational structure and method of deploymentdescribed in Section I of this Annex wouldhave a proportionally greater effect on thetotal cost of the program than would changesin the size of the missile stockpiles to be pro-duced. The ICBM program provides a strik-ing example of this phenomenon. We havepostulated a stockpile of 1,000 ICBMs de-ployed on 100 sites (10 per site). However, ifthe same stockpile were deployed on the basisof one ICBM per site, the presently estimatedcost would be increased by a factor ofabout 10.

54. In conjunction with earlier estimates ofSoviet military expenditures through 1961,presented in Appendix B of NIE 11-4-56, theeffects of the possible missile program ontotal Soviet defense spending can be roughlydetermined. Assuming that the total mili-tary expenditures estimated in NEE 11-4-56would not change, the missile program's sharewould rise from some two percent in 1954 toabout 24 percent in 1961, and would requiresome reduction in the nonmissile expendi-tures. If, however, the nonmissile expendi-tures remained as estimated, the addition ofthis missile program would require increasesin over-all military expenditures, reaching asmuch as 17 percent in 1961.

Impact on Electronics Industry

55. While the demands of the missile programon the Soviet electronics industry would bequite heavy, we estimate that the program is

40

within the growing capabilities of that in-dustry. As indicated in the DISCUSSION,the estimated capacity of the Soviet electron-ics industry will probably limit its ability tosupport a varied and extensive missile pro-.gram and also meet the competing demandsof other Soviet military and essential non-military programs until about 1958. The mis-sile program described in this Annex placesits heaviest demands upon the electronicsindustry in the years after 1959. For ex-ample, roughly 20-25 percent of the estimateddollar value of Soviet electronics output wouldhave had to be allocated to the missile pro-gram in 1955 and in 1956. This allocationwould rise to roughly 30-35 percent in 1960.These percentages take into account the largeincrease in the total value of electronics out-put called for in the Sixth Five-Year Plan.Assuming that approximately two-thirds ofthe dollar value of annual electronics outputcontinues to be allocated to military pro-grams, the missile program would requiresomewhat over half the military electronicsallocation for 1960.

Research and Development Costs

56. Limited data, based on US experience, pro-vides some measure of the research and de-velopment costs which would be incurred ina national missile program of the magnitudeestimated in Section III of the DISCUSSION.We have not included such costs in our aggre-gate figures for the period because we haveno basis for determining R and D costs charge-able to the development of those missile sys-tems which would not materialize until after1966. As an indication of probable R and Dcosts in the early years, we estimate that suchcosts would have climbed from about onebillion dollars in 1953 to a peak of about 1.7billion in 1957.

E C -R E—T-

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TOP SE 41

FIGURE 1

Total Cost of Possible Missile Program, 1953-1988By Category of Missile

Billions Billionsof 1955 Per- of 1951 Per-Dollars cent Rubles cent

Surface-to-Air,-

Ground-Launched 35.8 49.4 198.1 49.3Surface-to-Air,

Shipbome 7.4 10.2 42.8 10.8Air-to-Air 7.3 10.1 44.2 11.1Air-to-Surface 2.4 3.3 14.1 3.5Surface-to-Surface,

Ground-Launched(up to and includ-ing 700 n.m.) 10.0 13.8 49.9 12.5

Surface-to-Surface,Submarine-Launched 2.2 3.0 11.1 2.8

IRJ3M 1.3 1.8 8.9 1.7ICBM 8.1 8.4 33.8 8.5

72.5 100.0 398.9 100.0

FIGURE 2

Total Investment and Operating Costsof Possible Missile Program

1953-1988By Category of Missiles

InitialInvest- Oper-ment atingCosts Costs Total(Billions of 1955 Dollars)

Surface-to-Air,Ground-Launched 15.5 203 35.8

Surface-to-Air,Shipborne 3.8 3.8 7.4

Air-to-Air 3.2 4.1 7.3Air-to-Surface 1.4 1.0 2.4Surface-to-Surface,

Ground-Launched(up to and includ-ing 700 run.) 3.2 8.8 10.0

Surface-to-Surface,

Submarine-Launched 1.0 1.2 2.2LRBM 0.4 0.9 1.3ICBM 3.2 2.9 8.1

31.7 40.8 '72.5

10.0

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

Figure 3

Annual Costs of Possible Missile Program

1953-66

.....

...***

..••••..•

......•••

0.0

Total annual costs(billions of 1955 dollars)

- Investment costs

....... Operating costs

Total annual costs(billions of 1951 rubles)

--24461 3 57

I...............

.•••

••■,.

1953 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

.5 1.2 2.2 2.5 3.3 5.2 8.3 9.4 8.5 8.7 7.6 7.5 7.4

.5 1.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 3.3 5.6 5.5 3.6 3.2 1.5 1.0 .5./ .3 .7 1.4 1.9 2.7 3.9 4.9 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.9

3.1 8.0 13.8 15.3 19.0 31.1 50.4 55.6 46.7 46.7 37.6 36.4 35.3

C00267693

T P--S-E G-R E T 42

ANNEX B

SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES

FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDED MISSILES

I. BASIC SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES

Scientific and Technical Personnel'

1. The rising general level of Soviet technicalability and the rapidly increasing number ofSoviet scientists and engineers provide themanpower potential necessary to staff a veryextensive guided missile program. Althoughtotal Soviet scientific resources remain smallerthan those of the US, and assets of the Sino-Soviet Bloc far smaller than those of theWest, the USSR has been able to achieve nearparity with the US in areas of critical militaryand industrial significance. We estimate thatthe USSR as of mid-1956 had about 1,690,000university graduates in scientific and techni-cal fields, of which about 765,000 were actual-ly employed in the physical sciences and en-gineering. If present trends continue, by1961 the USSR could have 1,240,000 graduatesemployed in the physical sciences and engi-neering. While we know that in general theSoviet scientific effort has been focus.sed pre-ponderantly on the building of a strong in-dustrial base and the development of modernweapons, to the relative neglect of other fields,we have no firm evidence of the number ofSoviet scientists and technicians working inthe guided missile program.

2. The quality of Soviet scientific and tech-nical personnel can be measured in fieldsother than guided missiles by evidence indi-cating striking progress over the past fewyears in such important fields as nuclear phys-ics, geophysics, high-speed digital computers,high-temperature alloys, and the theory ofautomation. In basic research in mathe-matics and in many fields of physics andchemistry, the quality of the Soviet work isjudged to be about equal to that of the US.

'See NEE 11-6-56, Capabilities and Trends of So-viet Science and Technology, 9 October 1956.

In the missile field itself, the quality of Sovietpersonnel is revealed not only by known Sovietsuccesses in developing surface-to-surface andsurface-to-air missiles, but also by indicationsthat by 1948 they were beginning to proceedwith native development of missile compo-nents, independent of German missile experts.

3. Research Equipment. Although complexresearch instruments throughout the Sovietscientific program are probably in shorter sup-ply thai in the US, research and developmentprograms of major importance, such as guidedmissiles, will probably be hampered onlyslightly by shortages or nonavailability of sci-entific instruments and equipment. Predict-ed Soviet advances by 1961 in electronics,which is basic to instrumentation, will prob-ably permit the USSR to achieve near equalitywith the US in research instruments at thattime.

4. Materials. We know of no shortage of basicmaterials required by the missile developmentprogram described in this estimate. Eventhough our information is practically non-existent regarding specific application of ma-terials to the guided missile program, theability demonstrated by the USSR in develop-ing unique materials for special application inother programs of complex nature leads usto conclude that materials for missiles will al-most certainly not be unduly restrictive.

II. AVAILABILITY OF TECHNICAL KNOWL-EDGE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES

5. Exploitation of the German Missile Pro-gram. At the close of World War II the USSRinitiated a thorough and systematic exploita-tion of German guided missile personnel, fa-cilities, and equipment. They obtained fourgeneral results: (a) the acquisition of opera-tional and prototype missiles, research andproduction facilities and equipment, and ap-

43S-E C-R-E-T-

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proximately 400 German missile specialists;(b) completed studies of German achieve-ments prior to 1946; (c) the familiarization ofSoviet personnel with German techniques ofresearch, development, testing, and produc-tion of missiles and components; and (d) fur-ther technical studies and limited hardwaredevelopment performed by German scientists.We believe that the Soviet exploitation pro-gram was an effort to acquire equipment andtechniques in which the USSR had little orno experience. As a result of the foregoingexploitation, the Soviet personnel apparentlyacquired a thorough and valuable familiaritywith the German program, and we believethat by 1948 the USSR had raised the levelof its guided missile knowledge to that whichhad existed in Germany at the close of WorldWar II. The repatriation of the German mis-sile specialists began in 1950 and continuedthrough 1953, with the exception of about100 guidance and control specialists, some ofwhom have recently been repatriated. Webelieve, because of the deliberate separationof the Germans from the Soviet native mis-sile program, that the German exploitationwas utilized primarily for training, familiari-zation, comparison, and supplementary ex-ploration.

6. Availability of US Data. A significantamount of potentially valuable knowledge onguided missiles and earth satellites has been,and is continuing to be, made available to theUSSR in the form of unclassified Westernpublications. A definitive assessment of itsvalue to the Soviet research and developmentprogram cannot be made. We do know, how-ever, that enough unclassified information isavailable to provide the USSR with a rela-tively clear and accurate picture of the natureand extent of the US guided missile program,including relative priorities of systems andcategories, developmental status, certain per-formance characteristics, and time schedules.While we cannot determine the degree of So-viet success in covert collection of informa-tion on foreign guided missile developments,we know of numerous instances during . thepast two years where the USSR has indicatedthrough covert activities an interest in ac-quiring data on US missiles, particularly on

air-to-air missiles, and missile electronics.There are no known instances of Soviet tech-nical collection systems being specifically di-rected at, or developed for use against, USguided missile installations or facilities, al-though we believe that such surveillance iswell within Soviet capabilities. Soviet interestin foreign missile programs is further attestedby the fact that, in addition to their normalscientific translation and dissemination serv-ices, the USSR in 1950 began publication ofthe journal, "Problems of Rocket Techniques."This journal, publication of which has con-tinued at least to mid-1956, contains transla-tions of non-Soviet articles on guided missiles,earth satellites, and related subjects.

III. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THESOVIET GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM

Over-All Coordination and Control7. The Soviet missile research and develop-ment program is conducted within the exist-ing framework of ministerial functions andresponsibilities. In 1947, over-all supervisionand administration of the program was re-liably reported to have been vested in a Spe-cial Committee of the Council of Ministers,which made policy and planning decisions.There is insufficient evidence to determinewhether this Special Committee has beencontinued to the present. In addition, aScientific and Technical Council (NTS) wasdescribed by a returned German scientist asthe highest technical authority on guided mis-siles, with power to review Soviet-initiatedGerman missile design proposals and to deter-mine whether they should be continued intothe development stage. The membership ofthe NTS was composed of military personnel,civilian research and development personnel,and scientific personnel from the Academy ofSciences, and was chaired by the Director ofNII 88, the principal known guided missileinstallation under the Ministry of DefenseIndustry. Whether the NTS was set up sole-ly to direct the German activity or whetherit also had an active part in the native pro-gram is not known. Information on the ac-tivities of the NTS does not exist later than1949.

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44

8. Despite the lack of current intelligenceIdentifying a top authority for the entire So-viet missile program, we believe a program ofsuch magnitude and complexity would requirehigh-level centralized control. Soviet de-fectors have speculated that any high-levelSoviet missile authority would include repre-sentatives of the military, the government,and the Party. Thus, such an authority mightinclude representatives of the Ministry of De-fense, the Council of Ministers (including itsAcademy of Sciences), and the military direc-torate of the Party's Central Committee. Al-though this speculation appears reasonable,we have no direct evidence of the existence ofsuch an authority.

9. We believe that within those ministries en-gaged in the missile program, coordinatingand control groups probably exist at variouslevels. For example, it was reliably reportedthat at least until about 1950 a Seventh ChiefDirectorate existed in the Ministry of DefenseIndustry, with over-all responsibility for sur-face-to-surface and surface-to-air missile de-velopment.

Organizations, Installations, andFacilities

10. The following summary includes impor-tant organizations, installations, and facili-ties known or estimated to be involved in theSoviet guided missile research and develop-ment program, together with brief discussionsof their known or estimated contributions tothe program:

Council of Ministers

11. Special Committee for Guided Missile Ac-tivities: A knowledgeable Soviet defector hasreported on such a committee as it existed in1946. A high-level German returnee has alsoreported the existence of such a committee.No information concerning its activities be-yond 1949 is available.

Ministry of Defense Industry

12. Chief Directorate for Guided Missile Ac-tivities: A high-level German returnee has re-ported that a Chief Directorate existed whichwas concerned with research and development

of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air mis-siles. No information exists beyond 1950, butthe continued existence of such a Chief Di-rectorate within the Ministry of Defense In-dustry to control its missile research, devel-opment, and production activity is consideredmost likely. .

13. Scientific Technical Council (NTS) forGuided Missile Research and Development:The existence during 1947-49 of an NTS con-cerned with missile design projects worked onat Scientific Research Institute (NII) 88 hasbeen reported by German returnees. Theknown Soviet practice of employing similartechnical councils at various levels (Minis-terial, Directorate, Plant, Institute) for de-velopments in other military fields strength-ens the belief that a missile NTS for the Min-istry of Defense Industry probably still exists.14. The "88 Complex," Kaliningrad: This in-stallation, comprising a plant and a researchinstitute, is believed to be a major center forsurface-to-surface ballistic missile researchand development, an activity in which it wasengaged from 1946 to at least 1954. Surface-to-air missile research and development wasalso conducted at this installation from 1946to at least 1950.15. Branch 1 of Scientific Research Institute(NII) 88, Ostashkcrv: This large, well-equippedinstallation was the major center for exploi-tation of some German guided missile special-ists who were repatriated in 1952-53. Ger-man efforts were concerned with design stud-ies of surface-to-surface and surface-to-airmissiles. Certain key facilities, especially forliquid rocket propulsion research, are believedto be still engaged in the guided missile re-search and development program.16. Plant 456, Khimlci: Center for researchand development of large, liquid-fuel rocketengines, staffed in part by Germans until1950. Design work on a 100-metric-ton thrustengine was conducted here, as well as workon 25- and 35-metric-ton thrust engines. Thisinstallation is still active in the research anddevelopment program.

17. Central Artillery Design Bureau, Kalinin-grad: This installation is probably the lead-ing Soviet design bureau for new artillery

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weapons. In addition to its role in design-ing conventional artillery, it is believed toplay a central role in the design of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.

18. Naval Artillery Central Design Bureau,Leningrad: Personnel of this organizationwere active in the reconstruction of Germansurface-to-air missiles in Germany during1945-46. We believe this bureau would bethe focal point of any Soviet naval work inmissile developments.

19. Design Bureau (KB) 2, Moscow: Germantechnicians were involved in the developmentof an air-to-surface missile guidance systemfrom 1946 to mid-1950. Soviet continuationof this project at KB-2 is indicated to atleast mid-1953. Beginning in 1951, one groupof German specialists worked on a high-pri-ority Soviet project to develop a new triaxialstabilizing system, probably for a surface-to-surface missile, and this system was flighttested between 1952-53. By 1954 approxi-mately 40 complete systems were manufac-tured. In February 1951, another Germangroup was assigned to a surface-to-air missileguidance project. Information on the Ger-man work on this project correlates with thecharacteristics of the Moscow surface-to-airmissile system. German work on this and allclassified projects was terminated by the endof 1953. While working at KB-2, the Ger-mans assisted Soviet work on an air-to-airmissile project, and reportedly discussed withSoviet scientists a surface-to-surface (shore-to-ship) missile project.

20. KB-3, Putilovo: Research and develop-ment of an air-to-air guided missile (Sokol)was conducted here by German specialistsfrom 1946-48. Unguided solid rocket air-to-air and surface-to-air research and develop-ment has also been reported. This installa-tion, believed still to be active in the guidedmissile program, is closely associated with theSofrino test range which adjoins it.

21. "Dyatlov's" Institute — NII 24, Moscow:This installation is reported to have conductednative Soviet development of air-to-air missiledesigns parallel to the German activity atKB-3. Dyatlov's Institute is possibly identi-cal with Nil 24.

22. Plant 393, Krasnogorsk: Research anddevelopment activities here have includedwork on the German infrared missile homingsystem, Juno. This installation has also in-dicated a capability for the repair of eine-theodolites, essential to test range instrumen-tation.23. "Konoplev's Institute," Leningrad: A fa-cility in Leningrad, associated with a scientistnamed Konoplev, has reportedly conducteddevelopment work on ballistic missile guid-ance systems. Konoplev attended NTS meet-ings at the 88 Complex, Kaliningrad, during1947-48, when the R-10 design proposals werereviewed. Konoplev was concerned with R-10guidance matters.24. Nil 6, Moscow: Numerous awards to mem-bers of the staff of this institute indicate acapability for research and development inthe field of solid propellants for rockets and/or guided missiles. A Soviet scientist fromNil 6 was a member of a Commission of theAcademy of Artillery Sciences which was es-tablished to evolve better colloidal gunpowdersfor rocket artillery.25. Plant 604, Moscow: In 1947, Germans re-constructed V-2 fuzes at this plant. Theequipment used was then shipped to "Pishch-ik's Institute," Leningrad, but a capability forcontinued missile fuze development is believedstill to exist at Plant 604.

26. "Pishchik's Institute," Leningrad: In 1947,V-2 fuze assembly equipment was shippedfrom Plant 604 to an installation in Lenin-grad associated with an engineer namedPishchik. Supplementary information sug-gests that this installation may be eitherPlant 521 or a Branch of Central Design Bu-reau 22 (possibly Nil 22). Central Design Bu-reau 22 and Plant 521 were active in fuze re-search and development during World War II.

27. NII 13, Leningrad: Numerous awards toand publications by members of the staff ofthis institute indicate a capability for researchand development in metallurgy applicable toheat transfer problems in combustion cham-bers, or to warhead re-entry problems. Thisinstitute is specifically concerned with metal-lurgical research, notably in the fields of heattreatment of metals and nonferrous alloys.

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Ministry of Defense

28. Chief Artillery Directorate, Moscow: Thisorganization is responsible for the over-allsupervision and coordination of research, de-velopment, and manufacture of artillery andantiaircraft weapons systems for the Sovietarmed forces. In its role as point-of-contactbetween the industrial ministries and the Min-istry of Defense, the directorate probablyserves as the key organization coordinatingmilitary requirements and acceptance testingwith guided missile research and development.29. Academy of Artillery Sciences, Moscow:The academy was established in 1946 to im-prove and promote artillery and ordnance re-search and development. Its organization issimilar to that of the Academy of Sciences,USSR, and it has an unknown number ofassociated research institutes. We believe theacademy has an advisory role in the formula-tion of military requirements for guided mis-siles.30. Artillery Institute, Bolshevo: This insti-tute, possibly subordinate to the Academyof Artillery Sciences, is known to have beenconcerned with missile guidance and controlresearch and development in the 1949-51period. During that period, the institute wasassociated with both NII 88 and NII 885.31. NII of the Air Forces, Shchelkovo: Thisinstitute is responsible for acceptance testingof all new aircraft. A high-level defectorhas described a directorate of this institutewhich was responsible for air-to-air rocketsand, presumably, missiles. In addition, thereare indications that the institute has conduct-ed developmental work on various airborneweapons systems.32. Aviation Technical C0771.171iSSi071 of the AirForces, Moscow: This commission directs allscientific matters of concern to Soviet airforces research establishments under the ChiefEngineer of the air forces. In its role as sci-entific adviser to the air forces, it examinesall new projects and indicates lines of researchon outstanding aeronautical problems. Webelieve, therefore, that this commission par-ticipates in the planning of research and de-velopment for those guided missiles to be usedby the air forces.

33. Air Forces Engineering Academy im. Zhu-kcruskiy, Moscow: This academy is the mostimportant center for the training of aeronau-tical engineers in the USSR. Several mem-bers of the staff have been definitely associatedwith guided missile research and development,although not necessarily in their role as pro-fessors at the academy.

Academy of Sciences

34. Interagency Commission for Interplane-tary Communications: This commission is be-lieved to be the focal point for research anddevelopment pertinent to the Soviet earthsatellite program. Key members of the staffare world-recognized authorities in scientificfields essential to such an activity.

35. Institute of Automatics and Telemechan-ics, Moscow: This institute is the Soviet cen-ter for fundamental and applied research inthe fields of automatic regulation, remote con-trol, telemetry, and nonlinear mechanics, andfor the development of pneumatic, hydraulic,and electrical servo systems. It has beendirectly associated with missile guidance re-search and development activity at Branch 1of NTI 88.

36. Institute of Precision Mechanics and Com-puter Engineering, Moscow: This institute isa center for theoretical investigation and de-velopment of electronic digital and analoguecomputers, and has performed research anddevelopment on electrical and mechanical in-tegrators, and network and differential ana-lyzers. In addition, the institute is responsi-ble for general theoretical problems of preci-sion mechanical and electrical systems.

37. Institute of Chemical Physics, Moscow:This institute, the center for combustion re-search in the USSR, has conducted muchbasic research directly applicable to the devel-opment of both liquid and solid rocket en-gines. Other work, as indicated by open lit-erature publications, could have been in thetheory and development of techniques ofshock-tube (hypersonic) experimentation.

38. Institute of General and Inorganic Chem-istry, Moscow: This institute has conductedresearch in metallurgy, specifically in heat-resistant alloys, applicable to both rocket en-

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gine components and warhead materials.Other research has been on oxidants and fuels,particularly on nitrogen-containing com-pounds.

39. Institute of Mathematics urn. Steklov, Mos-cow: This institute is responsible for funda-mental research in mathematics. It has stud-ied problems in the statistical theory of tur-bulent flow, which is directly applicable to thedevelopment of hypersonic configurations.

40. Institute of Physics urn. Lebedev, Moscow:This institute, in addition to its work in acous-tics and dielectrics, has given particular atten-tion to the study of the diffusion of electro-magnetic radiation.

Ministry of Aviation Industry

41. Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute(TsAGI), Ramenskoye: This is the primarySoviet center for aerodynamic research. Thisinstitute is a known participant in the Sovietguided missile research and development pro-gram. Specifically, it has conducted windtunnel experiments for Nil 88.

42. NII 1, Moscow: Numerous scientists andengineers who were on the staff of this insti-tute in 1945 have since appeared in key posi-tions in guided missile research and develop-ment centers. Research and development inthe field of gas dynamics is believed to be themajor activity of the institute.

43. Flight Test Institute, Ramenskoye: Thisinstallation is responsible for all Ministry ofAviation Industry research and developmentwhich requires flight testing. It is believedthat the institute conducts tests of all air-borne guided missile weapons systems priorto their submission to the Ministry of Defensefor acceptance testing.

44. Experimental Plant 1, Podberezhe: Thiswas a German exploitation center from 1946to 1952. Research and development on V-1's,air-to-surface, and possibly surface-to-air mis-siles was conducted. In addition, this planthas supplied Nil 88 with cigar-shaped fuse-lages, wings, accelerometers, altimeters, andother equipment.

45. Special Design Bureau 3 of Plant 2, Kuy-byshev: Germans at this installation conduct-ed research and development on automaticpilots, triaxial gyroscopes, and V-1 steeringmechanisms. During 1948, about 100 stand-ard V-1 control systems were reportedly over-hauled.

46. Central Scientific Research Institute ofAviation Engines (TsIAM), Moscow: This in-stallation is concerned with research and de-velopment of aircraft engines. Reported fa-cilities include four rocket engine test standsand sections dealing with new engine de-signs. Support could be provided in the re-search and development of ramjet and pulse-jet engines.

47. Central Scientific Research Institute ofAviation Fuels and Lubricants (TsIATIM),Moscow: We believe this institute would con-tribute to the development of special fuels forcruise-type missiles and also to the develop-ment of special lubricants and hydraulic flu-ids for all types of missiles.

Ministry of Radio-Technical Industry

48. NII 885, Novaya: At this installation, Ger-mans worked on the reconstruction and de-velopment of a ground guidance system, adoppler-velocity measuring system and tele-metering equipment for the V-2. A specialbranch at Monino worked until 1950 on aradar-homing head project for a surface-to-air missile. Both Soviet and German spe-cialists from Nil 885 were at Kapustin Yarin 1947.

49. NII 20, Moscow: German specialists whovisited this installation in the 1946-48 periodhave reported that the Tonne television mis-sile guidance system was under investigation.A defector report covering the period 1948to June 1949 indicates that the installationmay have been moved to Kuntsevo, southwestof Moscow, and transferred to the Ministry ofDefense Industry.

50. NII 380, Leningrad: This was a Germanexploitation center from 1948 to 1952. Theinstallation is the primary Soviet televisiondevelopment center. A secret department atLesnoy reportedly devoted considerable effort

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to the development of the Tonne televisionguidance system for air-to-surface missiles.

51. Unidentified Installation, Odessa: Militarypersonnel from an unidentified installation inOdessa frequently visited the Secret Depart-ment of NLI 38. The Odessa installation re-portedly had received one set of the Tonneequipment. Subordination of this installa-tion to the Ministry of Radio Technical In-dustry is conjectural.

52. NII 108, Moscow: This installation is be-lieved to be the major Soviet center for theresearch and development of radar equip-ment. On this basis alone, we believe it ispossibly involved in the development of radarfor missile guidance systems. The subordi-nation of this installation has not been veri-fied.

53. NII 160, Fryazine: This installation is be-lieved to be the major Soviet electron tubedesign center. As such, it is probably involvedin the development of missile electronic guid-ance equipment.

Ministry of Chemical Industry

54. State Institute of Applied Chemistry(GIPKh), Leningrad: This installation hasconducted research on propellants, with em-phasis on amine compounds for use in hyper-golic fuels. Research on ignition propertiesof liquid propellants has also been reported.The activities of this installation have paral-leled those of the Karpov Institute.

55. Physico-Chemical Institute im. Karperv,Moscow: Germans at this installation from1946 to 1948 worked on hypergolic rocketfuels and hydrogen peroxide oxidizers. Thisinstallation is believed to be part of a com-plex including the State Institute of AppliedChemistry, Plant 94, and the OKA ChemicalPlant, all of which have conducted rocket fuelresearch.

56. OKA Chemical Plant, Dzerzhinsk: Ger-mans from the Karpov Institute were trans-ferred to this installation in 1948 to continuetheir propellant research. A pilot plant forhypergolic fuels, developed at the Karpov In-stitute, was sent to OKA. Certain specialists

employed here were reportedly subordinate toPlant 94.

57. Plant 94, Moscow: Hypergolic fuels devel-oped at the Karpov Institute were sent herefor testing. In addition, certain amines de-veloped at the Karpov Institute were report-edly put into pilot production here.

Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building

58. "Kompressor" Plant, Moscow: Germanswho were at this installation in 1947 havereported the development of V-2 type groundhandling equipment.

Ministry of Heavy Machine Building

59. "Pod'emnik" Plant, Moscow: It has beenreported that V-2 transporters were under de-velopment here. This installation is wellequipped to develop such transporters.

Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry

60. NH 49, Leningrad: This installation hasbeen engaged in the design and limited pro-duction of control devices, computers, gyro-scopes, electronic test equipment, radar, andhigh-frequency apparatus. German special-ists working here developed computers forsurface-to-air missiles and worked on gyro-stabilized platforms for inertial guidance sys-tems. Wasserfall computers developed herewere tested, possibly at Kapustin Yar, in 1949.This installation may have become one of thelargest Soviet design institutes when it wasenlarged in 1952.

61. Kuznetsov's Gyroscope Institute, Moscow:This installation appears to be a central agen-cy for gyroscope research and development.The director, Kuznetsov, was in Germany in1945-46 and at Kapustin Yar in 1947. Therewas close liaison between this installation andNII 885.

Ministry of Higher Education

62. Certain installations subordinate to thisministry, although properly educational insti-tutions, are believed to conduct limited guidedmissile research at the graduate level. Sev-eral important guided missile specialists iden-tified at key installations in the program have

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also been identified with the staffs of certainof these educational institutions.

63. Higher Technical School im. Bauman.,Moscow: This institution is believed to be the"MIT" of the Soviet Union. A turbine assem-bly for the 100-metric-ton thrust engine de-veloped at Plant 456 was reportedly sent herefor testing in 1950.

64. Power Engineering Institute mi. Molotov,Moscow: Another large engineering school,this institution possesses several faculties forsubjects pertinent to guided missile researchand development. At a 1950 conference, pa-pers presented to the Instrument BuildingSection of the school were all of possible mis-sile interest. Particularly, the paper present-ed by L. I. Tkachev appeared to be a classifiedversion of his 1949 publication on an inertialsystem for missile guidance based on the 84-minute pendulum principle.

65. State University im. Lcrrnanosov, Moscow:Although there is no direct evidence of guidedmissile activity at this institution, several keyscientists and engineers of the guided missileprogram have been identified on the faculty.

Known Test Facilities 2

66. Kapustin Yar Guided Missile Test Range:Established in 1947, as a missile test range,Kapustin Yar is the only identified surface-to-surface missile test range in the USSR. Itis now known to be actively engaged in thetesting of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.The scale of effort involved indicates that Ka-pustin Yar is a most important facility in theSoviet program.

Suspect Test Facilities 2

67. Sofrino Test Range (SNIP): This range,located adjacent to Design Bureau 3, is known

to have actively supported the bureau in thepast. On the basis of its limited size andgeneral location, we believe the range may beconcerned with the developmental testing ofsurface-to-air guided missiles only.

68. Barents Sea: There is some inconclusiveevidence to indicate missile firings in thisarea. The location of a range in this areawould be suitable for the shipboard testing ofall types of guided missiles assigned to theSoviet Navy and for both environmental andoperational testing of other missile types.

69. Riga: A facility at Riga is known to havereceived specimens of German naval air-to-surface missiles following World War II. Oth-er than 1956 reports of a restricted coastalarea in the Riga vicinity, there is no indicationof present missile testing.

70. Zagorsk: German engineers at NIt 88 de-signed a static test facility for large liquidrocket engines and surveyed a site in thisarea for its construction. No confirmation ofits existence is available.

71. Crimea (Black Sea): Signals interceptedfrom the Crimea (Black Sea) area betweenMay 1955 and September 1955 and in October1956 are similar to guidance signals of an air-to-surface missile guidance system (Komet)designed at Design Bureau 2, Moscow. Thiscomparison appears valid when consideredwith the report that Germans from KB-2 at-tended tests of this system in the Crimea atthe end of 1951. Testing of surface-to-airmissiles in the Crimea has also been indicatedby the recent report that the surface-to-airmissile project worked on at KB-2 was takento the Crimea for tests beginning in November1952.

'For further information, see Annex C (Limiteddistribution under separate cover).

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