cia - iraq's wmd: addenda

8/14/2019 CIA - Iraq's WMD: Addenda

1/84

Comprehensive ReportAddendums to the

of the Special Advisor to the DCI onIraqs WMD

March 2005


2/84

Prewar Movement of WMD

Material Out of Iraq


3/84


4/84

1

Prewar Movement of WMDMaterial Out of Iraq

ISG formed a working group to investigate the pos-

sibility of the evacuation of WMD-related material

from Iraq prior to the 2003 war. This group spentseveral months examining documents, interviewingformer Iraqi officials, examining previous intelligence

reports, and conducting some site investigations. Thedeclining security situation limited and finally haltedthis investigation. The results remain inconclusive,

but further investigation may be undertaken whencircumstances on the ground improve.

The investigation centered on the possibility thatWMD materials were moved to Syria. As is obvious

from other sections of the Comprehensive Report,Syria was involved in transactions and shipments of

military and other material to Iraq in contraventionof the UN sanctions. This indicated a flexibility withrespect to international law and a strong willingness

to work with Iraqat least when there was consider-able profit for those involved. Whether Syria received

military items from Iraq for safekeeping or otherreasons has yet to be determined. There was evidence

of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initi-ated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG receivedinformation about movement of material out of Iraq,

including the possibility that WMD was involved. Inthe judgment of the working group, these reports were

sufficiently credible to merit further investigation.

ISG was unable to complete its investigation andis unable to rule out the possibility that WMD wasevacuated to Syria before the war. It should be

noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqisin custody supports this possibility. ISG found no

senior policy, program, or intelligence officials whoadmitted any direct knowledge of such movement of

WMD. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledgeof residual WMD that could have been secreted toSyria.

Nevertheless, given the insular and compartmentednature of the Regime, ISG analysts believed there

was enough evidence to merit further investigation.It is worth noting that even if ISG had been able to

fully examine all the leads it possessed, it is unlikelythat conclusive information would have been found.

At best, barring discovery of original documentaryevidence of the transfer, reports or sources may havebeen substantiated or negated, but firm conclusions on

actual WMD movements may not be possible.

Based on the evidence available at present, ISG

judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer ofWMD material from Iraq to Syria took place. How-

ever, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movementof limited WMD-related materials.


5/84

Iraqi Detainees: Value to Investigation of

Iraq WMD and Current Status


6/84


7/84

1

Iraqi Detainees: Value toInvestigation of Iraq WMDand Current Status

The Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to

the DCI on Iraq WMD relied upon multiple sourcesfor the collection of information regarding Iraqsweapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. TheComprehensive Reportmade extensive use of theinformation provided by numerous detainees, includ-ing Saddam Husayn. The unprecedented access tothis type of regime information provided a uniqueperspective on the intentions, policies, programs, andmechanisms of the former Regimes WMD programsand international policy.

Unique Access to Key Individuals

Immediate access to the detainees allowed ISG tointerview knowledgeable Iraqis on a broad rangeof issues. ISG analysts were able to compare theaccounts of multiple high-ranking or well-placeddetainees with information from captured docu-ments and other (nondetained) Iraqis. These multiplesources provided rich detail and allowed ISG to gaugethe consistency and reliability of the informationprovided.

These interviews provide an in-depth understanding

of the former regimes strategic intent, its militaryindustrial complex and its security organizations.They also provided ISG with comprehension of IraqsWMD programs, including management, funding,and use as seen from within the regime. For example,detainee debriefs allowed ISG to confirm the use ofthe chemical agent VX during the Iran-Iraq war andthe use of nerve agent in Karbala during the Shiauprising following the 1991 war.

The opening chapter of the report, Regime Strate-gic Intent, particularly benefited from access to thedetainees who embodied the top leadership of the

Regimeincluding Saddam. Much of the chapter isbased upon information from detainee interviews. Thedepth of knowledge on the regimes structure, opera-tions, programs, and functional WMD infrastructurewould not have been nearly as detailed or crediblewithout this direct access.

Nevertheless, it is essential to bear in mind that theseinterviews were custodial interviews and statementsmade by detainees would have been affected by theseconditions. Moreover, once detainees are freed or facetrial they may make statements at variance with whatthey told the ISG.

Identification and Detention

The blacklist of individuals targeted for arrest anddetention was drawn up prior to the 2003 war, and itwas shaped by various organizations with a range ofconsiderations and objectives.

CENTCOM and intelligence agencies initiallyengaged in compiling lists based on their own criteriaand for their own purposes. WMD as a criterionexisted because of the projected existence of WMDand concern that such materials be located quickly forforce protection reasons in the first instance and othernonproliferation concerns secondly. Individuals werealso included on the list if they were judged centralto maintaining the regime in power, able to influenceevents on the battlefield, or had responsibility for theregimes past actions.

While the top 55 names on the list were well pub-licized (due in part to their circulation as faces ondecks of cards), the blacklist contained over 300names and the full list was not publicly known. Thiscreated sizeable uncertainty among Iraqis concerningwhether they were wanted or not. Moreover, in theperiod following the war, many Iraqis, whether listedor not, were captured and detained for a wide rangeof causes. It was also announced after the war thatWMD participants could be subject to arrest and pros-ecution. These factors combined to cause Iraqi WMDparticipants at virtually all levels to attempt to remain

undetected by coalition forces. Many were successful,but almost all the top WMD personalities were eithercaptured or turned themselves inmany with theexpectation that their detention would be short.


8/84

2

Prewar intelligence was the basis for constructing theblacklist and hence it was subject to some of the sameinaccuracies and also, by the nature of constructinga list, was the product of a certain amount of capri-ciousness. Some very despicable individuals who

should have been listed were not, while many techno-crats and even opponents of the Saddam regime madethe list and hence found themselves either in jail or onthe run. Up to the publication of this report 105 of theblacklisters were detained. Some of the WMD figuresand other detainees were assessed to have been erro-neously detained and were released in the first fewmonths after the war.

Debriefing

The Iraqis of interest to ISG were mostly senior levelscientists, engineers, or program managers knownfrom UN inspection activities. Other detainees ofrelevance to the WMD investigation were seniormilitary, security, or regime leaders. Many individu-als who were key to, or very knowledgeable about,WMD programs were not listed and thus not detainedbut some were located and submitted voluntarily todebriefing. All these individuals proved to be valuablesources of information.

In general terms, technocrats tended to be quite coop-erative with the ISG. Those who may have perceived

a risk of prosecution for one reason or another mayhave been less forthcoming. In some cases ISG sub-

ject matter experts (SMEs), often former UN inspec-tors, had been dealing with these individuals for manyyears. This provided an unusually strong base fromwhich to debrief in detail. Moreover, the detaineeswere more inclined to be forthcoming with counter-parts for whom they had a level of respect. Severaldetainees made a considerable effort to help facilitateunderstanding of the former regime and the WMDprograms.

The debriefing process was not without difficulties.

Control of the detainees and the ultimate responsibil-ity for debriefing belonged to the military. Standardmilitary procedures are designed more to collect intel-ligence of tactical importance with an immediate goalof collecting information either for force protection

purposes or to guide offensive military actions. Thestandard doctrine for debriefing detainees was thusnot well suited to the accumulation of understand-ing of previous activities of the regime. The standardprocess requires the creation of a source directed

requirement (SDR) from a SME (usually not locatedin theater) to a collector in the field, which proved tobe a cumbersome approach. While in Iraq the debrief-ers (collectors) and SMEs were often collocated andcould talk face-to-face on a daily basis, the processquickly abbreviated and SMEs generally participateddirectly in debriefings. This modification of procedurefor the purposes of developing understanding of IraqsWMD programs was essential. It should be empha-sized that these debriefings were not hostile.

It should be noted that the DCIs Special Advisor metwith many of the senior detainees directly. He had

known them quite well from his previous position asDeputy Chairman of UNSCOM during the 1990s.There was significant candor on the part of theseformer ministers during these discussions.

An area of difficulty emerged in recording the infor-mation. The accepted method of creating a perma-nent record was by writing Intelligence InformationReports (IIRs). However, IIRs were not written in atimely fashion, sources were not specifically iden-tified and the reports tended to be short, addressa specific topic and thus do not provided context.Connective tissue does not exist among these reports.

An example of absent contextual information is seenin an IIR developed from a debrief describing onedetainees favorable remarks about a second detainee.However, the fact that these two detainees were mar-ried was never reflected in the report.

Another shortcoming concerning dependence uponIIRs as a method of record is that the information insome reports was later either confirmed or provenincorrect, but earlier incorrect IIRs remain part of therecord. Thus, incorrect information was recorded inthe form of an IIR, classified, and never amended toreveal a more accurate update.

The constant rotation of ISG personnel had negativeconsequences. Many detainees had as many as fourdifferent debriefers and were debriefed dozens oftimes, often by new, inexperienced, and uninformed


9/84

3

debriefers. This was also the case with the SMEswho also rotated regularly. These individuals usuallyhad even shorter terms in Baghdadsometimes onlya month or two. Not knowing the details of previ-ous debriefs, new debriefers and SMEs often asked

detainees to retrace ground already covered. This hadtwo unfortunate results. First, the detainees becamequite familiar with the type of information we wantedand as a result, developed a party line (e.g., blam-ing everything on Husayn Kamil or Qusay Husayn).Second, they failed to develop, or lost, respect for thedebriefers.

Shortcomings in the management of staffing ISG con-tributed to debriefing difficulties as well because ofdeployment of many debriefers and SMEs who wereinexperienced and lacking in knowledge and expertiseon Iraq. Short tours exacerbated this problem, as indi-

viduals often left just as they were gaining expertiseand knowledge useful to the ISG investigation.

A consequence of the way detainees were incarcer-ated also affected the debriefing results. High-leveldetainees were all kept at Camp Cropper and wereallowed contact with one another. Some detaineesassumed the rank and presence of their status in theformer regime. One made it a habit to debrief thedetainees following their sessions. This may haveallowed for some rigging of stories and intimidation.

Finally, there were some discrepancies between thetechniques of the debriefers and the mission of theISG analysts, who for the most part were civilian

intelligence officers or scientists. For example, if thedetainees discussion wandered into topics of stra-tegic or political nature, many debriefers would cutthe digression short and redirect the detainee back tothe more specific tactical focus of the written SDR,

potentially losing significant information about thenature and operations of the regime. In addition, someof the information of political value was not publishedin an IIR if it was not requested in an SDR.

While results obtained when debriefing individuals incustody may differ from those received when they arespeaking on their own volition, we believe detaineesstill provided a vital primary source of informationon Iraqs WMD programs and regime strategic intent.The result was the emergence of a fairly detailed pic-ture that was tested against data from other individu-als, physical evidence gained from site exploitation

and captured documentation.

Conclusion of the WMD Debriefing

As matters now stand, the WMD investigation hasgone as far as feasible. After more than 18 months,the WMD investigation and debriefing of the WMD-related detainees has been exhausted. As far as theWMD investigation is concerned, there is no furtherpurpose in holding many of these detainees. Theseindividuals have shown no reluctance to engage in

further discussions should the need for questioningabout past WMD programs emerge.


10/84

Residual Proliferation

Risks: People


11/84


12/84

1

Residual ProliferationRisks: People

Saddams WMD programs created a pool of scien-tific experts, experienced in the disciplines necessaryto research, develop and produce these weapons.Although the infrastructures built to support theWMD program created employment for many thou-sands, the core of experts with unique WMD-associ-ated skills was a subset. For example, while manyengineers and technicians worked on the nuclearprogram, the designers of critical components wereless numerous.

The enforced hiatus in research, development andproduction of WMD, post 1991, probably deterioratedtheir skills, and many found alternative employment.Nevertheless some Iraqis with knowledge of prolif-

eration concern remain.

Such individuals may not be attractive to countries ofconcern because of a possible reluctance to rely onforeigners of questionable loyalty or reliability. How-ever, there is also some risk such expertise may attractthe attention of terrorists or insurgents who desire anyWMD capability.

Key Judgments

The precise population of participants in IraqsWMD programs is impossible to quantify. A seniorIraqi official associated with the pre-1991 programstated that the numbers of WMD-associated scien-tists reported in Iraqs declarations to the UN weregrossly inflated to confuse inspectors. He also statedthat there probably were no more than approximately1,100 scientists and possibly as few as 600 with coreexpertise specific to WMD research, developmentand production requirements. However none of thesefigures can be verified.

In the 12 years under sanctions since the end of thefirst Gulf war, many members of Iraqs scientific andtechnical communities have increasingly struggled tofind any job let alone employment that would pre-serve WMD skills. Because skills specific to WMD

development undergo a natural decay, it is likely thatthe subset of former regime scientists who still pos-

sess potentially dangerous expertise is shrinking.

So far there is very little evidence that either foreignjihadists operating in Iraq or Iraqi insurgent groupsare attracting experts from the former regimes WMDprograms.

Introduction

This section looks at the potential proliferation risk ofIraqs former WMD-associated personnel working for

countries of concern, terrorists, or insurgent groups.It characterizes the scale of the problem, examinesmotivations that may influence personal decisionsmade by members of this community, and describesthe options we believe they currently face.

Scoping the problem

While the number of individuals involved in the IraqWMD programs throughout the past thirty years is inthe thousands, there is a fairly small subset who may

remain of concern today. Precision is impossible, butit is worth noting that one or two individuals with theright skills could make a significant impact in a WMDeffort.

UN sanctions and intrusive UNSCOM inspectionsdampened the Regimes ability to retain its WMDexpertise. During the course of the 1990s, staffswere directed to civilian enterprises. Concomitantly,attrition through emigration, retirement and naturalprocesses occurred.

UN inspectors identified approximately 3,500former WMD-associated individuals in Iraq prior

to OIF based on Iraqi declarations of WMD-associ-ated personnel. However, according to an NMDofficial interviewed after the war, this list includedmany non-WMD personnel to confuse the inspec-tors.


13/84

2

By way of reference, in 2002, the IntelligenceCommunity identified approximately 1,000 person-nel believed associated with the Regimes WMD-related activities.

The Regime made efforts through the 1990s and upto 2003 to maintain the expertise of former WMDscientists and engineers. Saddam instituted the lawof scientific patronage in the early 1990s as a legalmechanism to minimize the risk of losing his scien-tific community and to maintain their skills. The lawenabled Iraqi scientists to augment their meager sala-ries through government payments. At the same timehe also encouraged scientists to form close fraternities(as in the case of the nuclear scientists).

The law for the patronage of scientists providedcash grants twice yearly up to OIF to a list of

key scientists under the guise of academic grantschemes.

An Iraqi document recovered by ISG identified136 scientists from many scientific disciplines aswould be beneficiaries of the law of scientificpatronage. ISG identified 48 of the 136 scientiststhat reporting indicates were involved in Iraqs pre-1991 WMD programs.

Current Environment: Limited Employment

Opportunities

Unemployed WMD experts may have economic rea-sons to seek markets for their talents, and if civilianoccupations are unavailable, they may seek to workin WMD capacities. For some, there may also be apolitical motivation as a consequence of the removalof Sunni Baathist power, Coalition and IIG policies,and the current security environment in Iraq. As aresult of the ongoing shift in the Iraqi social order,many have lost their positions, both within societyand in their places of employment.

Academic Institutions

Currently, Iraqs university system may have thepotential to absorb some of the WMD-associatedcommunity; however, de-Baathification policies

and the rise of violence at Iraqi universities sinceOIF deter their employment. Before OIF, Iraq had anextensive university system, with at least one univer-sity in every province. Key national universities, suchas University of Baghdad and Saddam University,provided employment in the 1990s to personnel previ-ously associated with Iraqs WMD programs. UnderSaddam, WMD scientific personnel were shuffledin and out of universities in an attempt to maintaintheir core skills and ensure their employment. A reli-able senior former National Monitoring Directorate(NMD) official now working for the Iraqi Govern-ment supported the following claims made in Iraqinewspapers:

Today, universities are not Baathist friendly andoften display violence against the perceived wealthy(for example, ex-WMD-associated scientists).

The largely secular WMD experts may be uncom-fortable with the emerging religious direction ofIraqi academic life.

Interim Iraq Government

Interim Iraqi Government institutions, such as NMDand the Ministry of Higher Education employ someof the former WMD experts. We believe the numbersare small and at NMD, according to an NMD offi-cial interviewed after the war, former WMD expertsare relegated to lesser positions because of de-Bathification policies.

Risk of Migration to Countries of Concern

Migration of some WMD-associated programpersonnel to countries like Iran or Syria is possible.Previous contact, financial inducements, academic orprofessional opportunities and possibly the prospectof frustrating coalition countries, may be motivators.


14/84

3

Although the potential recruitment of WMD scientistsby hostile states is an obvious threat, there is onlyvery limited reporting suggesting that this is actuallytaking place and no reports that indicate scientistswere recruited to work in a WMD program.

Unidentified members of the Supreme Council forIslamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) allegedly smug-gled an Iraqi rocket scientist into Iran at the requestof Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

Recruitment by Terrorists or Insurgents

Since OIF, the ISG is aware of only one scientistassociated with Iraqs pre-1991 WMD programassisting terrorists or insurgents. However, there are

multiple reports of Iraqis with general chemical orbiological expertise helping insurgents to producechemical and biological agents.

An Iraqi scientist (no known affiliation with theformer regimes WMD program) was involved withthe production of chemical mortar munitions.

Iraqi entities (no known affiliation with the formerregimes WMD program) aligned with Sunniextremists established chemical laboratories for thefabrication of chemical weapons at various loca-tions in and around Baghdad (the Al Abud net-

work).

Emigration From Iraq

There are many reports of Iraqi professionals whohave left Iraq because of the lack of security, rampantcrime and kidnapping in Iraqi cities, especially Bagh-dad. Kidnapping for ransom and death threats alleg-edly have forced doctors, scientists and many fromthe wealthier sector of the population to migrate tosafer countries. However, professionals leaving Iraq

probably have also done so for a variety of benignreasons.

Reporting indicates that unidentified groups con-ducted both kidnapping and assassination of Iraqiprofessionals and have threatened violence, someof which was carried out, against the scientific andmedical communities to pressure these individuals

to leave the country.

An Iraq gang, aided by Iraqi police, reportedly haskidnapped wealthy Iraqis for ransom. The moneygenerated allegedly funds anti-coalition attacks.

One prominent Iraqi doctor allegedly paid a$30,000 ransom and was forced to leave Iraq onthreat of death. A prominent nephrologist allegedlypaid a $1 million ransom with the prospect of asimilar fate if he stayed in country.

By March 2004, according to press reports, insur-gents assassinated more than 1,000 Iraqi profes-sionals and intellectuals, including Muhammadal-Rawi, the President of Baghdad University.Whether such reports are accurate or not theyreflect a widespread concern among the technicalelite.

Many (especially older) scientists and engineershave links with Europe and the United States; manyhave language and cultural familiarity with theWest so that their integration into those professionalnetworks should still be sufficiently robust enough

to help them find work in the West.

Many of the western academic institutions are com-petitive in the way they attract lecturers and mostwould probably be open to accepting members ofthe Iraqi scientific community.

Marriage and family links to the West give anumber of former WMD scientists and engineersdual citizenship or permanent residence in the West.

Many members of the scientific population wouldprobably prefer to migrate to the West, although

this is not necessarily indicative of their politicalallegiances.


15/84

4

Some former WMD participants had academic andprofessional links to countries within the formerSoviet Union. However, former Soviet countries havelittle to gain from Iraqi WMD expertise. The emigra-tion of scientists to other Arab states, where the civil

and commercial infrastructures could benefit fromtheir expertise, has been occurring for years and willcontinue.

Conclusion

Brain drain is an ongoing phenomenon in Iraqtoday. Former WMD scientists led privileged livesbefore Iraqs invasion of Kuwait. For over ten yearsthey have endured, much like the rest of the Iraqi

population, a steady decline in their living condi-tions. Post-OIF Iraq for them is worse still. However,despite the obvious risk factors, former WMD pro-gram participants are most likely to seek employmentin the benign civil sector, either in Iraq or elsewhere.

While the danger remains that hostile foreign govern-ments, terrorists or insurgents may seek Iraqi exper-tise, the subset of individuals who possess the uniqueWMD skills of proliferation concern is numericallysmall. However, because a single individual canadvance certain WMD activities, it remains an impor-tant concern.


16/84

Residual Pre-1991

CBW Stocks in Iraq


17/84


18/84

1

Residual Pre-1991 CBW Stocksin Iraq

ISG assesses that Iraq and Coalition Forces will

continue to discover small numbers of degraded

chemical weapons, which the former Regime mislaidor improperly destroyed prior to 1991. ISG believesthe bulk of these weapons were likely abandoned,forgotten and lost during the Iran-Iraq war becausetens of thousands of CW munitions were forwarddeployed along frequently and rapidly shifting battle-fronts.

All but two of the chemical weapons discoveredsince OIF were found in southern Iraq where themajority of CW munitions were used against Iran inthe Iran-Iraq war.

As the Coalition destroys the thousands of conven-tional munitions at depots around the country thepossibility exists that pre-1991 vintage chemicalrounds could be found mixed in with conventionalmunitions at these locations.

ISG identified 43 bunkers and depots where theCoalition is in the process of destroying conven-tional munitions and that were suspected of beingassociated with the pre-1991 WMD programs.

However, ISG believes that any remaining chemical

munitions in Iraq do not pose a militarily significantthreat to Coalition Forces because the agent andmunitions are degraded and there are not enough

extant weapons to cause mass casualties. However,if placed in the hands of insurgents, the use of a singleeven ineffectual chemical weapon would likely causemore terror than deadlier conventional explosives.

Since May 2004, ISG has recovered 41 Sakr-18CW rocketsand eight Buraq CW rockets. Coali-tion military explosive experts doubted the rocketscould be effectively launched because the physicalstate of the munitions was degraded from years ofimproper storage.

Since 2003, insurgents have attacked CoalitionForces with two CW rounds (not including attackswith riot control agents) that ISG judges were pro-duced by Iraq prior to 1991. Neither attack caused

casualties and ISG believes the perpetrators did notknow the rounds contained CW agent because therounds were not marked to indicate they containedCW agent and they were used no differently thaninsurgents had employed conventional munition

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

The mustard round used by insurgents as an IEDnear Abu Ghurayb Barracks on 2 May 2004 con-tained agent degraded to such an extent to be inef-fective.

Sakr 18 Rockets

Buraq warheads


19/84

2

There continues to be reporting that indicates ter-rorists and insurgents possess chemical or bio-logical weapons, although there is no evidenceindicating that they have obtained functionalCBW weapons or agents from the former Regimesprograms. An insurgent captured in Fallujah stated,If we had chemical weapons, we would have usedthem.

Iraqis seeking rewards have added toxic chemicals tounfilled pre-1991 chemical munitions to fool Coali-tion Forces into believing that they had found CWmunitions.

Polish Forces recovered 41 Sakr-18 rockets in Juneand July 2004. Of the rockets tested one containedresidual sarin, five contained petroleum and a pesti-cide, and the remainders were empty. ISG believesthat the Iraqis who provided the rockets added thepesticide because we have no previous reportingindicating that Iraq weaponized pesticides.

ISG has not found evidence to indicate that Iraq

did not destroy its BW weapons or bulk agents.However, even if biological agents from the formerprogram do remain they probably have significantly

decreased pathogenicity because Iraq never success-fully formulated its biological agents for long-term

storage.

According to a former Iraqi BW researcher, Iraqwas not able to acquire drying technology becauseof sanctions.

Sarin IED

Mustard IED


20/84

Residual Proliferation Risk:

Equipment and Materials


21/84


22/84

1

Residual Proliferation Risk:Equipment and Materials

In autumn 2004,ISG systematically reviewed avail-able information on facilities suspected to be associ-

ated with Iraqs chemical, biological, or nuclearprograms to develop a snapshot of the remaininginfrastructure in Iraq and its potential for diver-

sion to WMD useeither by Iraq or others. Themission to look for dual-use or residual capabilitieswas started late in the ISG process and the declin-

ing security situation halted our site visits; therefore,the judgments in this paper reflect only a small and

incomplete sampling of Iraqs infrastructure.

Chemical and Biological Facilities

ISG judges that Iraqs remaining chemical and

biological physical infrastructure does not pose aproliferation concern. The effects of sanctions, war,and looting have destroyed, displaced, or severely

degraded much of Iraqs dual-use equipment.However, the missing equipment could contribute

to insurgent or terrorist production of chemical orbiological agents.

Muthanna and Fallujah chemical production facili-

tiessites formerly associated with Iraqs CWProgramwere completely razed and looted. Many

buildings were removed piece by piece.

ISG found no stockpiles of precursor chemicalsnecessary for synthesis of militarily significant

quantities of agent.

Officials from NMD stated that souks (market

areas) are selling small- and large-scale (pilot plantsize) laboratory equipment. The officials suspect

that the equipment was looted from Iraqi industrialfacilities.

Nuclear-Related Facilities

ISG judges that Iraqs current industrial and technicalinfrastructure, with its dual-use equipment and mate-rials, probably does not pose a nuclear proliferation

concern as long as the Iraqi Government maintainscontrol over the equipment and materialsa difficult

task for the new government. This judgment alsoincludes an assumption that Iraq will not restart its

WMD programs.

From September to November 2004, ISG surveyed16 of 45 sites that reporting indicated had potential

nuclear-related dual-use equipment and/or materialsprior to OIF. ISG found about two-thirds destroyed

or nonoperational and the remaining sites securedand operating. (See table 1.)

ISG found potential nuclear-related dual-use equip-ment at 10 of the 16 sites visited. However, only

six sites had equipment that appeared operableand all sites were fenced or walled and protected

by the Iraqi Facility Protection Service (FPS).ISG identified machines as potentially dual-use

based on IAEAs general description of dual-usemachine categories, such as multi-axis CNC milling

machines.1 (U)

ISG observed IAEA- or UNSCOM-tagged equip-

ment at seven of the 16 sites, five of which were atleast partially operating and protected by the Iraqi

Facility Protection Service.

1 A true determination of dual-use status requires an

understanding of an individual machines capabilities and

specifications, such as camming and runout tolerances,

positioning (rotary and linear) accuracies, and axes

coordination, as well as its software capabilities, such as

the capability to control multiple axes simultaneously for

contouring and flexibility to provide real-time processing

by means of multiple detection techniques. Due to the limitednature of the survey, the ISG did not determine the actual

dual-use status of potential dual-use equipment; such a

determination requires a detailed investigation into the actual

capabilities and specifications of individual machines, a task

beyond the nature of the survey.


23/84

2

An Iraqi court recently acquitted an Iraqi officialwho allegedly negotiated, but did not complete, the

sale of machine tools from the Al Karama Companyto Iran. The Iraqi Government has successfully

appealed the decision in a higher court. The highercourt has sent the case back to the lower court,

where a new judge will retry the case.

Only in a few instances did ISG site surveys look fornuclear-related dual-use materials. The Al Qaqaamissile propellant and high explosives production

facility was surveyed for the presence of dual-useexplosives, while the Rashid State Companys Dhu

al-Fiqar Factory was investigated to verify the pres-ence of high-strength aluminum tubes. The ISG did

Table 1. Findings for Sites Surveyed in September to November 2004 Time Frame

Facility Facility Status

17 Nissan State Company Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; remnants of somemachinery/equipment found; deserted and no security

Al Zawra State Company Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Al Hamath Intact; nonoperating; no machinery/equipment; deserted exceptfor armed security

Al Salaam State Company Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; remnants of 2presses found; deserted except for unarmed security

Ash Shaykhili Warehouses Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; no machinery/ equipment; occupied by squatters and no security

Ibn Yunis Center Structurally intact and occupied by US forces; nonoperating; nomachinery/equipment

Specialized Institute for EngineeringIndustries (SIEI)

Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Al Nasr State Company Intact; operating; armed Facility Protection Service guardsRashid State Companys Dhu al-FiqarFactory


Al Nasr Al Azim State Company (formerlyState Establishment for Heavy EquipmentEngineering (SEHEE))


Al Raya State Company Totally destroyed and razed; nonoperating; remnants of somemachinery/equipment found; deserted except for South TajiIndustrial Complex armed security

Al Zahf Al Kabir State Company Intact with minor looting/vandalism; nonoperating; somemachinery/equipment found; deserted except for possible localsecurity guard and South Taji Industrial Complex armed security

Tarmiya Technical School Heavily damaged and looted; nonoperating; no machinery/ equipment; deserted and no security

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center Damaged and looted; partially operating; neutron generatorfound; armed Facility Protection Service guards

Baghdad (Tuwaitha) Nuclear ResearchCenter Tools Workshop

Heavily damaged and looted; remnants of some machinery/equipment found; deserted except for armed Facility ProtectionService guards in the vicinity

Al Qaqaa State Company ExplosivesBunkers

All surveyed bunkers empty or destroyed


24/84

3

Table 2. UNSCOM- or IAEA-Tagged orMonitored Equipment Identified by ISG

Facility Machine Type IAEA/UNSCOM

Specialized Institute for Engineering

Industries (SIEI)

C.E. Johansson CMMe IAEA Tag # 157128

Al Nasr State Company DEA CU/01 CMMa IAEA Tag # 148953

Hauser S50L Milling Machinea IAEA Tag # 149419

Bridgeport Milling Machinea IAEA Tag # 157045

DEA QCM1 CMMa IAEA Tag # 146789

Rashid State Companys

Dhu al-Fiqar Factory

Rexroth Flow Forming Machineb IAEA Tag # 3344290

H&H Flow Forming Machineb UNSCOM Tag # ME05045

Flow Forming Machineb UNSCOM Tag # ME05170

Al Raya State Company Arcardini CMMe IAEA Camera Monitored

Al Zahf Al Kabir State Company Gloveboxc UNSCOM Tag # B002486

Gloveboxc

UNSCOM Tag # B002487Unidentified Itemd UNSCOM Tag# B002488

Unidentified Itemd UNSCOM Tag# B002489

Al Nasr Al Azim State Company

(formerly State Establishment for

Heavy Equipment Engineering

(SEHEE))

Boldrini 2500/4500 Dual Column Pressa IAEA Camera Monitored

Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center Neutron Generatorf

a Operationalb Dismantledc Repairabled Condition unknowne

Inoperablef Partially dismantled, and needs reconditioning

not specifically look for maraging steel but officialsat the secured and operational sites said that none waspresent at these facilities.

In October 2004, ISG surveyed all 56 bunkers inthe southern complex at Al QaQaa, which include

the 10 bunkers previously sealed and monitored bythe IAEA. ISG found the facility unoccupied and

the explosives storage bunkers empty (see pictures).

Approximately 70,000 high-strength aluminum

81-mm tubes are located in two padlocked ware-houses (see pictures) at Dhu al-Fiqar Factory,

which is within a secure facility protected by armed

Facility Protection Service personnel. Accordingto a current NMD official, Dhu al-Fiqar Factoryemployees were cutting the tubes into pieces for

use in the private sector.

Missing Equipment

ISG found that some potential nuclear-relateddual-use equipment was missing from heavily dam-

aged and looted sites, but ISG did not determine theultimate disposition of the missing equipment. Someof it probably has been sold for its scrap value. Other


25/84

4

81-mm aluminum tubes in a Dhu al-Fiqar Factorywarehouse.

81-mm aluminum tubes in a second Dhu al-Fiqar Factorywarehouse.

pieces might have been disassembled for valuable

subassemblies such as motors and condensers. Stillothers could have been taken intact to preserve their

function.

National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) officials

stated that employees and facility management hadremoved some equipment at former suspect facili-

ties in an effort to prevent equipment loss to lootingor bombing. This technique was consistent with

prior Iraqi war practices.

An example of possible removal of equipment to

preserve its function was seen at the Iraqi Atomic

Energy Commissions Tuwaitha Tools Workshop.During the IAEC modernization Iraq purchased fivenew CNC machines (see main report). Two new

Chen Ho multi-axis machines reportedly purchasedfor Tuwaitha and some older machines were not

found. The absence of any components of these

machines may suggest they were removed in theirentirety.

The Ash Shaykili storage site located near theTuwaitha Nuclear Research Center contained

(prior to OIF) a variety of equipment and materials

associated with Iraqs pre-1991 nuclear weaponsprogram. While judged insufficient to reconstitutea nuclear weapons program, some of these items

could be exploited to obtain information of poten-tial use to a proliferant.


26/84

5

Intact, empty former HMX bunker at Al Qaqaa. Destroyed former HMX bunker at Al Qaqaa.

Destroyed Al Qaqaa bunker that, according to IAEA,contained RDX/PETN prior to OIF.

Destroyed Al Raya State Company.


27/84

6

Al Raya State Companydamaged and looted ArcardiniCMM camera-monitored by IAEA.

Destruction of Tuwaitha Tools Workshop Site.

Tuwaitha Tools Workshopstripped Chen HoMachine Tools.

Tuwaitha Tools Workshopstripped Kao FongMachine Tool.


28/84

7

Annex 1Nuclear-Related Dual-Use

Equipment and Materials

Dual-use equipment and materials as defined by

the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA)Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,

Material and Related Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 2 and Annex, are equipment or materials

that could make a major contribution to a nuclearexplosive activity.

Examples include:

Computer-Numerically-Controlled (CNC)

Multi-Axis Machine Tools (turning, milling,

grinding, or combination)capable of producinghigh precision parts, such as for enrichment centri-

fuges or even nuclear weapons parts.

Computer or Numerically Controlled Multi-

Axis Coordinate or Dimensional Measuring

Machinescapable of providing quality controlfor high-precision parts, such as for enrichmentcentrifuges or even nuclear weapons parts.

Computer or Numerically Controlled Multi-Axis

Spin-Forming or Flow-Forming Machines and

precision Rotor Forming Mandrelscapable of

producing high-precision cylindrical rotors, such asfor enrichment centrifuges.

Computer-Controlled Vacuum and Controlled

Atmosphere Metallurgical Melting and CastingFurnacescapable of producing weapons parts.

Coordinated Multi-Axis Electrical Discharge

Machines (EDM)capable of producing con-

toured high-precision parts, such as for enrichmentcentrifuges.

Special Softwaresoftware specifically designed

to support and enhance the capabilities of the abovemachines.

Maraging Steelspecial steel alloy for high-strength parts, such as enrichment centrifuges.

High-Strength Aluminumspecial aluminum for

high-strength parts, such as enrichment centrifuges.

Specialty High Explosiveshigh explosives, such

as HMX, RDX, TATB, and HNS, HS, which maybe useful to a nuclear weapons program.


29/84

8


30/84

9

Annex 2Sites Suspected Prior to OIF toContain Potential NuclearDual-Use Equipment and

Materials

The following sites were identified from reviews ofintelligence as well as collaborative discussions with

the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate. These sitesare related to the pre-1991 nuclear program and/or are

sites suspected of possessing dual-use equipment.

ISG acknowledges that potentially sites are not listed

here that a more comprehensive study would haveidentify.

ISG visited sites in bold during the September toNovember 2004 time frame.

1. 17 Nissan Factory

2. Former Al Athir site belonging to Rashid StateCompany

3. Al Badr State Company

4. Milad State Company (Al Furat site)

5. Al Hadr high-explosive testing site

6. Al Hamath, Tuwaitha

7. Al Kindi State Company

8. Al Jazira plant site (Al Kindi State Company)

9. Al Karama State Company Waziriyah Plant

10. Al Nida State Company

11. Al Qaqaa State Company

12. Al Qaqaa State Company Explosives

Bunkers

13. Al Qaim Superphosphate Fertilizer Plant

14. Al Radwan State Company

15. Al Rashid State Company

16. Al Rashidiya (site of the Al Faw State Com-

pany headquarters)

17. Al Raya State Company

18. Al Razi State Company

19. Al Salaam State Company

20. Al Samud State Company

21. Al Shahid State Company

22. Al Shuhada Mechanical Workshop, Saddam

State Company

23. Al Ubur State Company

24. Al Zahf Al Kabir State Company

25. Al Zawra State Company

26. Amin Factory, Rashid State Company

27. Amir Factory, Saddam State Company

28. Ash Sharqat (former EMIS enrichment site)

29. Ash Shaykhili Warehouses, Tuwaitha30. Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center

31. Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center

Tools Workshop (IAEC Training Center,

Tuwaitha Training Institute)

32. Dhu-al-Fiqar Factory Rashid State Com-

pany

33. Factory for the Repair of Jet Engines (FRJE),

Taji

34. Hittin State Company

35. Ibn al-Haitham Factory, Saddam State Com-

pany

36. Ibn-Firnas State Company

37. Ibn-Yunis Center, Sad State Company

38. Al Nasr State Company

39. Saddam State Company

40. Salah-al-Din State Company

41. Specialized Institute for Engineering Indus-

tries (SIEI)

42. Al Nasr Al Azim State Company (formerly

known as State Establishment for Heavy

Equipment Engineering (SEHEE))

43. Ibn Sina State Company, Tarmiya

44. Tarmiya Technical School

45. Umm-al-Maarik State Company


31/84

Iraqs Military Industrial

CapabilityEvolution of the Military

Industrialization Commission


32/84


33/84

1

Iraqs Military IndustrialCapabilityEvolution of theMilitary IndustrializationCommission

Introduction

Iraqs Military Industrialization Commission operatedall of Iraqs military-industrial complexes, includ-ing industries and activities supporting the research,development, and production of chemical weaponsand missile delivery systems. Iraqs nuclear andbiological weapons programs were separate from thecommissions institutional framework throughoutmost of its history, though like MIC, these programs

reported to Husayn Kamil Hasan Al-Majid, Saddamsson-in-law. The creation and evolution of Iraqsmilitary industrial capability, and Saddam Husaynsassociation with it, provides an important case studyof how Saddam handled one of the Iraqi states mostvaluable assets.

This paper will trace the history of military industryin Iraq with special emphasis on its structures andfunctions primarily through the eyes of three formersenior officials: Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sadi, AmirMuhammad Rashid Al-Ubaydi, and Abd al-TawabAbdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh. Taken together, their

relevant experience spans the entire period of Iraqimilitary industry after the Bathist Revolution. It issectioned chronologically starting with Initial Steps(1930-1968) and FOLEXSOTI (1968-1987), fol-lowed by The Husayn Kamil Era (1987-1995) andTransition (1995-1997) covering Kamils mercu-rial management of military industry and then hisdefection. Finally, The Huwaysh Years (1997-2003)describes the operating environment of MIC duringthe tenure of Abd al-Tawab Abdallah Al-MullahHuwaysh.

Following the main text are four annexes: Annex Aoutlines the influential people in the history of Iraqsmilitary industrialization; Annex B expounds greatdetail on the growth of the military industrial complexand the entities it absorbed; Annex C provides insightto Saddam Husayns role in Iraqs military-industrialprojects; and Annex D is a reference for the variousestablishments, companies, and centers of the Mili-

tary Industrialization Commission.

Editorial Note: This paper is based primarily oncustodial interviews of Dr. Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sadi, Dr. Amir Muhammad Rashid Al-Ubaydi, andAbd al-Tawab Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh; theseinterviews are supplemented by a handwritten docu-ment drafted in English by Dr. Al-Sadi and a hand-written document drafted in Arabic by Huwaysh. As isoften the case with participants of the former Regime,a certain degree of embellishment is presented bydetainees to disassociate themselves from the Regime.Huwaysh had difficulty remembering exact dates and

on some occasions provided a date that contradictedhis previous statement. Alternate sources, both humanand documentary, were used for corroboration when-ever possible, yet some details of the account differfrom Iraqi declarations.


34/84

2

History of Military Industryin Iraq

Initial Steps (1930s-1968)

In the years before the Bath Party came to powerin 1968, the Iraqi Government took several steps todevelop a domestic arms industry. In the 1930s underthe monarchy, Iraq entered into an agreement withthe British to gradually develop the capability tomanufacture small arms, small-arms ammunitions,and artillery ammunition. Manufacture of small-armsammunition for rifles (.303 Lee Enfield) and machine-guns (Bren and Vickers) began in the 1930s in thebasement of the Ministry of Defense but World War II

interrupted progress on the project. Several years afterthe war, Iraq moved production to a location knownas Karantina while a modern new plant was built atAbu Ghurayb. The new plant, which later becameYarmuk State Company, contained new lines for .303cartridge production with a single-shift capacity of5 million rounds per year and for 9-mm Parabellumpistol and submachinegun cartridges with a capacityof 3 million rounds per year. The coup that overthrewthe monarchy in 1958 delayed completion of the plantuntil the early 1960s.

Iraq and the British also built a facility at theMusayyib military camp for overhauling and recon-ditioning British-made small arms. The facility wasequipped with machines to produce the various metalcomponents for the Lee Enfield service rifle. Work onthis facility was also interrupted by World War II andalso delayed by the 1958 coup.

In 1939, Iraq signed a contract with the British tosupply equipment for manufacturing artillery ammu-nition for the British-built guns in service with theIraqi Army.As with the other plants, work wasinterrupted by World War II. The machines weredelivered after the war and stored in a shed adjacentto the Musayyib small-arms facility. According to Dr.Amir al-Sadi, these crates were opened once a year

for inspection and regreasing of the machines, but theplant was never built because Iraq changed from Brit-ish to Soviet weapons after the 1958 coup.

After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, theQassim government invited the USSR to conducta survey and initial studies for the development ofIraqs civilian and military industrial capabilities.These were carried out in 1959 and 1960. Iraq thenrequested the establishment of four projects:

The Waziriyah electrical equipment plant

The Samarra pharmaceutical production plant

The Ramadi glass production facility, and

The Iskandariyah Mechanical Complex, whichincluded two facilities:

Project #1 for the production of agriculturalequipment

Project #2 for heavy ammunition production

Project design reports were made and submitted for

approval in 1962 and 1963. The Iraqi Governmentwas considering the voluminous project reports whenthe Bath Party and their allies ousted and killedQassim in 1963. Although the Bathist faction wassoon ousted, the new government continued to studythe proposed projects. With credit facilities and verylow prices for the supplies and technical assistance,Iraq had only to provide funds for the construction ofthe buildings, as well as lodging and local expensesfor the Russian experts. All of the projects wereapproved, with the exception of the heavy ammu-nition plant, which was turned down on politicalgrounds. All of the other projects were completedduring the 1960s.


35/84

3

FOLEXSOTI (1968-1987)

Iraqs program to develop its indigenous military-industrial capability gained momentum after the Bathparty returned to power in 1968. In the years after

1968 but before 1972, the new Iraqi Governmentplanned to convert the Musayyib refurbishment fac-tory for the production of Russian-designed weap-onsinitially the SKS rifle and later the KalashnikovAK-series weapons. Similarly, Iraq planned to convertthe Abu Ghurayb ammunition plant to produce the7.62 x 39-mm and 7.62 x 54-mm cartridges fired bythe Russian weapons. With Egyptian technical assis-tance, the Musayyib plant was converted to producethe Egyptian version of the Russian Simonov SKSrifle. Egypt also assisted with the Abu Ghurayb plantconversion effort.

The Follow-up and Executive Committee

In 1972, Dr. Amir Hamudi Hasan Al-Sadi formedand chaired a committee to plan, negotiate, and

implement a program to develop self-sufficient Iraqimilitary industries, named the Military Industry

Follow-up and Executive Committee (FOLEX). TahaYasin Ramadan Al Jizrawi, who was both Ministerof Industry at the time and a member of the Revolu-tionary Command Council (RCC), oversaw FOLEXthroughout its existence. In addition to Amir Al-Sadi, the committee included a munitions expert, asmall-arms manufacturing expert, an engineer whohad been the Director General of the IskandariyahState Establishment for Agricultural Implements,and a civil engineer who previously headed the StateCompany for Construction. Taha Yasin Ramadan AlJizrawi, then Minister of Industry and member ofthe RCC, supervised FOLEX and kept Saddam wellinformed about its activities. FOLEX committeemembers later became directors general of newly con-structed facilities specializing in ammunition produc-tion of all types and calibers that became the heart of

Iraqi military industry.To accomplish this task, FOLEX revived andexpanded Iskandariyah Project # 2, a mechanicalcomplex for producing finished heavy ammunition,including production of metal components, explosive

and propellant filling, integration, and test facili-ties. With the revival came expanded product lines

and larger capacity than the original project that hadbeen abandoned in the 1960s. FOLEX took over theartillery ammunition equipmentpurchased from theBritish and moved it to Iskandariyah, where the newplant had been constructed. With Russian technicalassistance, the machines were incorporated into theHittin complex for heavy ammunition production.

FOLEX also constructeda chemical complex forproducing explosives, propellants, and pyrotechiccompositions from indigenous raw materials. Thecomplex, later known as Al QaQaa, included testfacilities and laboratories. FOLEX also constructed an

industrial facility for producing specialized tools anddies for use in the ammunition and weapons factories,and training centers to prepare the local workforce tooperate the factories without foreign assistance.

Saddams Role in Iraqs Weapons Programs

Saddams interest in controlling Iraqs weapons

programs dates back to his days as Vice President of

Iraq. In the early 1970s, he became the head of the

all-important Committee for Planning and Follow-

up of Development Projects. Development Proj-

ects in this context encompassed everything from

agriculture to industry, infrastructure to health and

education, as well as the armed forces. Each gov-

ernment organization drew-up five-year plans that

required approval by the Committee. Saddams invest-

ments in high technology, research and development,

and indigenous weapons production yielded results

that varied widely in their success. Saddam wanted

immediate results and did not have an appreciation

of the long leadtime of most large industrial projects.

As a general rule, Saddams personal involvement in

one project or another was not a strong predictor of

its rapid progress or eventual success (for additional

information, see Annex C: Saddam Husayn and Mili-

tary Industrialization).


36/84

4

Amir Al-Sadis Sabbatical in Yugoslavia

Amir Al-Sadi left his job as Vice President of SOTIin November 1981, during the tenure of Lt. Gen.Abd al- Jawad, and moved to Belgrade as the headof a group of Iraqi engineers working to develop amultiple launch rocket system (MLRS). This projectwas a joint development program with Yugoslaviathat started in 1980 and was to take seven years tocomplete two functional prototypes.

State Organization for Technical Industries

FOLEX became the State Organization for Techni-cal Industries (SOTI) in April 1974. A Bath partymember and artillery officer, Maj. Gen. Sabbar Sirhan

Al-Ani became the first president of SOTI, with AmirAl-Sadi as vice president. In 1978 or 1979, Sabbarwas suddenly pensioned off, leaving Amir Al-Sadias Acting President for about three weeks. Lt. Gen.Abd al-Jawad Majid Amin Lawand, an officer fromthe Electrical and Mechanical Corps, was appointedby Saddam to replace Sabbar. Abd al-Jawad ledSOTI for the following five or six years. The SOTIPresident reported directly to Taha Yasin Ramadanwho, in turn, reported directly to Saddam Husayn,at first when Saddam served as Vice President andChairman of the Committee for Planning and Devel-opment, and laterafter 1978when Saddam servedas President and Prime Minister. Just as with FOLEX,Ramadan also oversaw military industries as theMushrif(Supervisor) of SOTI, with a direct line toSaddam. Ramadan became the Minister of Housingand Construction in 1976 and Deputy Prime Ministerin 1979, but he remained Supervisor of SOTI untilthe mid-1980s, when Saddam appointed a new, morepowerful board of directors for SOTI.

This new SOTI board of directors was appointed inFebruary 1985 as the Iran-Iraq war dragged on andSOTI struggled to meet the ammunition and supplyneeds of the Iraqi military. Saddam designated Lt.

Gen. Muhammad Jisam Hanash, the former com-mander of the Air Force, President of SOTI, withAmir Al-Sadi, again, appointed as the Vice Presidentof SOTI. Saddam recalled Al-Sadi from the MLRSproject in Yugoslavia in an effort to get productionback on track. Muhammad Jisam served as Presidentof SOTI until the arrival of Husayn Kamil HasanAl-Majid, Saddams son-in-law, in February 1987.Even before Kamil assumed a formal leadership role,however, he exerted powerful, although informal,influence on SOTI affairs beginning in 1985 or early1986.

Taha Yasin Ramadans supervision of SOTI ended atthat time when Saddam placed his personal secretary,Hamid Yusif Hammadi, on the SOTI board of direc-tors. In the early years, Taha Yasin Ramadan oversawmilitary industry for Saddam, but the presidentialsecretarys position on the board of directors created adirect link between the Presidential Office and SOTI,

eliminating the need for Ramadans position. Neitherwas an industrial specialist by training. Their primaryqualification was loyalty to Saddam.

Upon his return, Amir Al-Sadi found that SOTIwas having problems fulfilling the Armys munitionsrequirements, particularly for heavy artillery roundsand mortar shells. The outnumbered Iraqi Armywas locked in a trench-warfare stalemate with Iran,

which forced the Iraqis to rely heavily on artillery andmortar munitions. Al-Sadi took over Al QaQaa StateEstablishment, the principal propellant and explosivesmanufacturing facility, for a month and a half to solveproduction problems at its munitions factories, afterwhich he returned to the management of SOTI.

SOTI Board of Directors, February 1985

Muhammad JisamHanash

President of SOTI

Amir Hamudi HasanAl-Sadi

Vice President of SOTI

Hamid Yusif Hammadi Secretary of thePresident

Director, Procurementand Supplies

Ministry of Defense

Adnan Abd al-MajidAl- Ani,Director, State Org. ofIndustrial Design andConstruction.

Ministry of Industry

Amir MuhammadRashid Al-Ubaydi,

Director, Research andDevelopment Institute

Ministry of Defense


37/84

5

The Husayn Kamil Era(1987-1995)

Creation of the Military IndustrializationCommission

SOTI was renamed the Military IndustrializationCommission (MIC)1 in late 1987. The starting pointfor this change was in early 1985 or early 1986 whenHusayn Kamil, with Saddams blessing, inserted him-self informally in SOTI affairs, and then in February1987 ousted its head Muhammad Jisam Hanash, andseized an active role in managing SOTI. Amir Al-Sadi became SOTI President under Kamils supervi-sion. Kamil never assumed a formal title in SOTI. Atthe time, he was the Director of the Special SecurityOrganization (SSO) and Supervisor of the RepublicanGuard (RG), including the Special Republican Guard(SRG). To ensure that Al-Sadi understood that hewas subordinate to Kamil, Kamil appointed Al-Sadias Deputy Director of the SSO for Military Produc-tion for a brief period, but Al-Sadi contends he neverhad any SSO or security-related responsibilities.

SOTI and MIC Acquisition of WMD Programs

and Key Industrial Facilities

Between 1986 and 1988, SOTI and then MIC werevery successful, enjoying public admiration andprestige, and attracting talented personnel to its ranks.This organization, particularly under Husayn Kamilsinfluence, became a predator gobbling up variousorganizations and projects, such as the Petrochemi-cal Project No. 2 (PC-2) and the Dawrah Factory(an industrial workshop)2 from the Ministry of Oil

(MoO); the General Establishment for Iron and Steelin Basrah and Nasr State Establishment from the Min-istry of Industry; the State Establishment for PesticideProduction (SEPP), which was a chemical weaponsprogram, and the Military Research and DevelopmentInstitute from the Ministry of Defense (MoD); andthe Technical Research Center, which included theRegimes nascent biological warfare program. MIC

also took over the Petrochemical Project No. 3 (PC-3), Iraqs nuclear weapons development project, in1988 (for additional details see Annex B: SOTIMICAcquisitions, Mergers, and Expansion and Annex C:Saddam Husayn and Military Industrialization).

Development of Extended Range Scud missiles

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran acquired Scud mis-siles and launchers from Libya. Baghdad was withinrange of the newly acquired Scuds from firing posi-tions well inside Iranian territory, and missiles beganhitting Baghdad every few days. Iraq possessed Scudmissiles with one-ton high-explosive warheads butcould not retaliate because the Iranian capital waswell beyond the missiles 300-km range. This sparkedfrantic Iraqi efforts to obtain missiles with a mini-mum 600-km rangeat any pricebut overtures toRussia, China, and Brazil failed. Iraq embarked on a$2 billion joint project with Egypt for the developmentand production of the Badr 2000, a 750- to 1,000-kmrange missile with a 560-kg payload, but this projectwas not expected to produce such a missile for four tofive years.

1987 was the turning point both in SOTIs versatilityand the fortunes of the Army at the battlefront. SOTIextended the range of Iraqs Scuds to deliver a 300-kghigh-explosive warhead 650 km. Every Scud missilehitting Baghdad was answered with 10 Al Husaynmissiles (Iraqi modified Scuds) fired at Tehran. SeniorRegime figures believed this turnabout contributed toIrans acceptance of Iraqs offer of a reciprocal haltto missile attacks on the capitals.

1 In its original Arabic form, hiat al-tasnia al-askarri canbe translated various ways. Hiat is organization, corps,corporation, association, society, and a number of othermeanings. Al-tasnia al-askarri is military industrialization.

Therefore, Military Industrialization Commission, MilitaryIndustrialization Organization, and Organization of MilitaryIndustrialization are synonymous translations. The Iraqis refer to theentity in English as the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC).

2 In 1990, MIC commissioned the State Establishment for HeavyEngineering Equipment (SEHEE), a new, much bigger facility builtnext to the Ministry of Oils former Dawrah Factory, according to Al-Sadi.


38/84

6

Creation of the Ministry of Industry and Military

Industrialization

Husayn Kamil wanted Iraqs entire industrial appa-ratus under his control, including the Ministry of

Industry. Saddam divided the Ministry of Industryand Minerals (MIM) in 1982 to create a Ministry ofIndustry (sometimes referred to as heavy industry)and a Ministry of Light Industry. The Ministry ofIndustry controlled the heavy industries, includingsulfur and phosphate mining and processing theseminerals into fertilizers; the chemical industry forproducing petrochemicals, plastics, and rayon; papermills; and electrical power generation and distribu-tion; and the State Organization for Engineering(Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic) Industry. TheMinistry of Light Industry controlled dairy and foodproduction, textiles, and other consumer products.

In July 1987, Husayn Kamil stepped in as ActingMinister of Industry for about one month, replacingKasim Al-Urabi (who was undergoing medical treat-ment in Germany), and attempted to rearrange keyfacilities in the ministry. Eight months later, a majorconsolidation occurred under Husayn Kamil.

In March 1988, Kamil combined MIC with the Min-

istry of Industry and the Ministry of Light Indus-try to form the Ministry of Industry and Military

Industrialization (MIMI). Saddam appointed HusaynKamil as the Minister of Industry and Military

Industrialization. Abd al-Tawab Abdallah Al-MullahHuwaysh, the Minister of Industry at the time, feltthat this was a direct result of Kamils successfulcampaign to undermine his position. Huwaysh, whoearlier served Kamil loyally, nevertheless consideredhim unqualified and did not hide his disdain. Saddamwould not tolerate Huwayshs open humiliation ofKamil (and by extension Saddams family). Huwayshand the Minister of Light Industry both lost their jobsto Kamil, according to Huwaysh.

Amir Al-Sadi and Amir Rashid, whose Researchand Development Institute was earlier folded into

MIC, were given tremendous authority, as long asthey honored and respected Husayn Kamil. Al-Sadistitle changed to Senior Deputy Minister of MIMI forMilitary Production, other deputy ministers includedAmir Rashid, responsible for military R&D; AdnanAl Ani, responsible for civilian industries; and

Ahmad Al Dulaymi, responsible for electrical powerproduction and distribution, as well as head of thetrade unions. Dr. Jafar Diya Jafar Hashim becamethe fifth deputy minister of MIMI, when HusaynKamil took control of the Iraqi nuclear weapons pro-

gram later in 1988.

Saddams creation of an industrial super ministryunder Husayn Kamils supervision was designed tolead Iraq technologically into the 21st century, accord-ing to one Iraqi official. MICs strength, as the center-piece of MIMI, lay in its sound planning philosophy,including particular attention to workforce trainingprior to project initiation, and its in-house design andconstruction capability for buildings and other largestructures.

Post-Desert Storm Changes to MIMI

In the turmoil following the 1991 Gulf war, Saddaminitiated a major shake-up of the Council of Ministers,appointing Sadun Hammadia veteran Bath Partymember and Shiaas Prime Minister, and HusaynKamil as the Minister of Defense. As a result, AmirAl-Sadi became the Minister of Industry and MilitaryIndustrialization for a period of about five months;Al-Sadi also served briefly as the Acting Minister ofOil following the shake-up.During the summer of1991, MIMI dissolved, leaving MIC and the former

Ministries of Industry and Light Industry as individ-ual components. MIC became independent, whereasthe two remaining entities, once again, merged into

the single Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM),identical to its pre-1982 state.

In September 1991, after the restoration of refiner-ies and power stations destroyed in the war, HusaynKamil called Al-Sadi and told him that he (Al-Sadi)was only the MIM Ministerthat is, that MICreverted to the control of the Presidency. HusaynKamil got into a dispute with Minister of AgricultureMahmud Dhiyab Ahmad over the reconstruction of

theJumhuriyah (Republic) Bridge in Baghdad, andKamil resigned as Minister of Defense the first weekof November 1991. Ali Hasan Al-Majid replacedKamil as the Minister of Defense, which left HusaynKamil without a ministry.


39/84

7

Jafar Diya Jafar, who had become the Deputy atMIC in April 1991, became the Acting Director ofMIC in November 1991 and continued in the post forabout a month. In late November or early Decem-ber, either Minister of Defense Ali Hasan Al-Majid

or Secretary of the President Abd Hamid MahmudAl Khatab Al Nasiri called Jafar and told him hewas being transferred from MIC to the MIM. AmirRashid, as the only remaining former MIMI DeputyMinister, then succeeded Jafar at MIC with thetitle Senior Deputy Director, which he retained untilFebruary 1992, when Husayn Kamil returned to MIC.Jafar became head of the electrical power genera-tion and distribution enterprise within MIM underAl-Sadi.

By the summer of 1994, Rashid began to attendCouncil of Ministers meetings in Husayn Kamils

absence and at his urging. Kamil was receiving medi-cal treatment at the time in Jordan for a brain tumor.Amir Rashid remained MIC Director until July 1995when he became the Minister of Oil, though he wasrecalled to MIC for several months following HusaynKamils defection to Jordan the following month.

Husayn Kamil returns to MIC

In February 1992, Saddam reinstated Husayn Kamilas Supervising Minister overseeing MIC, MIM, MoO,

and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC),and as head of the minister-level Economics Commit-tee. Amir Rashid acted as Kamils deputy, though hisformal title was Director of MIC, which he retaineduntil July 1995. Amir Al-Sadi, now Minister ofIndustry and Minerals, sought the return of severalenterprises poached from MIM in the 1980s, includ-ing Nasr State Establishment, General Establishmentfor Iron and Steel in Basrah, and a plant in Waziriyah,Baghdad. Husayn Kamil, however, refused to returnthese companies to MIM.

When Husayn Kamil returned as the Supervising

Minister, he directed the reconstruction of MICfacilities destroyed during the 1991 war and tried toexpand MIC into civilian production. MIC and theformer nuclear weapons program (PC-3) personneland resources played an important role in restoringIraqi infrastructure, including refineries, power sta-tions, and bridges.

During this period, however, UN sanctions andinspections imposed huge restrictions on MIC. Alot of equipment that was used or purchased for theWMD program was at risk of destruction by the UN.Iraq was required to prove to the UN Special Com-

mittee (UNSCOM) that a machine had not been usedin proscribed programs to save the machine fromdestruction.

MIC was also strapped for resources. All of the min-istries fought for resources, including hard currency,within the ministerial Economics Committee. SOTIand MIC received a substantial percentage of moneyfrom oil revenues during the 1980s, but this went tozero after 1991. While it did not help its financial situ-ation, MIC became involved in printing Iraqi currencyduring this period. 3 After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraqswitched the printing of its currency from the United

Kingdom to MIC. (Serial numbers were added to thebills by the Central Bank, however.)

Amir Al-Sadi Ousted From MIM

On 4 September 1993, the Presidential Diwaninstructed Amir Al-Sadi to turn over MIM to HusaynKamil, who told Al-Sadi the change was being madefor administrative reasons. Al-Sadi has statedthat he expected this removal, as reconstruction wasmostly finished, he was not a member of the Bath

Party, and Saddam had taken Ahmad Husayn Khu-dayr Al-Samarrais place as Prime Minister, 4 whichprovided Kamil additional leverage to influenceAl-Sadis removal. According to an acquaintance ofAl-Sadi, Kamil took Al-Sadis ministerial positionbecause Kamil wanted to become a minister againand because there was money to be made throughcontrol of MIM. Husayn Kamil remained the Min-ister of Industry and Minerals and the SupervisorofMilitary Industrialization until he fled to Jordan inAugust 1995.

3

According to Dr. Amir Al-Sadi, the British company De La Rueprinted Iraqi currency, and a shipment of Iraqi currency was onits way to Iraq in 1991 but was stopped in Malta because of theimposition of UN economic sanctions. Consequently, Iraq began toprint its own currency.

4Dr Saqdun Hammadi, who was appointed Prime Minister in April

1991, was ousted 18 months later. Muhammad Hamza Al-Zubaydireplaced him. Al-Zubaydi lasted about nine months and was replacedas Prime Minister by Ahmad Husayn Khudayr Al-Samarrai who hadserved as Finance Minster since April 1991.


40/84

8

Husayn Kamils Demise

By 1995, UN sanctions had caused serious disruptionof the Iraqi economy. Kamils capricious and self-serving oversight of MIC, his lack of accountability,

and the intrusive nature of UN inspections combinedto erode Iraqs military industrial capability. HusaynKamil, his brother Saddam Kamil, their wives andchildren (Saddam Husayns grandchildren), and ahandful of others sought political asylum in Jordan on9 August 1995. According to Huwaysh, Kamil tookwith him several million dollars that he had with-drawn from MIC bank accounts.

Various reasons may explain why Husayn Kamilleft Iraq. The most important reason may have beenthe growing tension between him and his bitterfamily rival Uday Saddam Husayn. According to

King Hussein of Jordan, as far as we know, it was afamily feud on the personal level which went on fora rather long period of time. A further explanationrevolves around the terrible state of the Iraqi economyunder sanctions and the possibility that he wanted toescape Iraq before a popular or tribal revolt unseatedSaddam and his family. For his part, Husayn Kamilsaid Saddams rule had lost its creditability on theinternational and Arab level, and that his defec-tion shows to what extent the situation in Iraq hasdeteriorated. The Iraqi media and leadership first

accused him of financial improprieties, and then saidhe was no more than an employee in this state andhis responsibilities were limited. Finally, they madehim the ultimate fall guy for all Iraqs problemsfrom the Regimes decision to invade Kuwait to Iraqs

duplicitous relations with UNSCOM.

Husayn Kamil, Saddam Kamil, and their familiesdecided to return to Iraq in February 1996, suppos-edly with the promise of a pardon from Saddam.Upon their return from Jordan, he and his brotherwere detained, separated from their families, andplaced under house arrest. Within days, Saddamsdaughters divorced their husbands. While under housearrest Husayn Kamil and his brother were confrontedby Ali Hasan Al-Majid and members of their family,come to reclaim tribal honor. Husayn Kamil, hisbrother Saddam, their father, their sister and her

children were killed in the ensuing shoot-out. SaddamHusayn explicitly endorsed the killings, which, as hesaw them, purified and healed the family by ampu-tating from the hand an ailing finger. Trying atthe same time to distance himself, Saddam assuredhis listeners that, had he been notified about it aheadof time, he would have prevented the assault, becausewhen I pardon, I mean it.


41/84

9

Transition (1995-1997)

Amir Rashid Returns as MIC Caretaker

In June 1995 Saddam advised Amir Rashid thathe intended to appoint him Minister of Oil, whichoccurred the following month. Shortly after Kamilsflight to Jordan in August, Saddam called AmirRashid and told him to take care of MIC until a newminister could be found. He remained in this dualcapacity as Acting Director of MIC and Minister ofOil until January or February 1996, when Saddamappointed Dayf Abd al-Majid Ahmad as the newMIC Director.

While Amir Rashid headed MIC he returned a

number of companies poached by Husayn Kamilto their original ministries, including the Nasr StateEstablishment, the General Establishment for Ironand Steel in Basrah, and the State Establishment forHeavy Engineering Equipment (renamed Al NasrAl Azim in 1997). Certain companies were laterreclaimed by MIC when Abd al-Tawab Al-MullahHuwaysh became Minister of Military Industrializa-tion. Amir Rashid abolished the MIC Follow-upDirectorate,5 an instrument that Husayn Kamil usedin his capacity as Supervising Minister to track pro-duction in the ministries he oversaw. Amir Rashidfelt there was no longer any need for such a director-

ate within MIC because the Supervising Ministerposition no longer existed.

Dayf Abd al-Majid Ahmads Tenure at MIC

Dayf replaced Amir Rashid as MIC Director in 1996.Dayf had been Deputy Director to Amir Rashidsince 1994 and his appointment as MIC Directorfreed Amir Rashid to focus on MoO. Years earlier,Dayf was working at the State Establishment for

Vegetable Oil when Al-Sadi sent him to Yugoslavia

with 60 others to be trained to operate the Al Qaqaamunitions complex. When this group returned fromYugoslavia, Zuhayr Al Ani became Director Generalof Al Qaqaa State Establishment and Dayf becamethe number-two official. When Zuhayr died, FaizAbdallah Shahin became Director General of AlQaqaa. When the Director General of Al MuthannaState Establishment (MSE) was dismissed in 1987,Shahin was moved to MSE to replace him, and Dayfbecame Director General of Al Qaqaa.

According to Amir Rashid, Dayf was an honestand clean manager, though perhaps not very clever.

Saddam wanted things from him that Dayf could notdeliver. Dayf, on the other hand, believed that Saddamdid not favor MIC during this time. During his tenureof just over a year, Dayfs main concern was how tooperate MICs production plants without funds, spareparts, or raw materials. He lamented that his budgetwas only $5 million a year, although carrying outtraditional MIC tasks, such as producing ammunitionand arms, required a minimum of $50 million annu-ally. MIC needed much more, if it was to continuespecial missile projects.

Huwaysh, however, contends that these figures are

not correct and that Dayf did not even use whathard currency the government had allocated to him.Huwaysh wrote that when he took over MIC in March1997 there was still hard currency available in MICaccounts from the previous year. Amir Al-Sadi ismore supportive of Dayf, arguing that MICs mainproblem was the lack of support and funds.

On 9 March 1997, Saddam summoned Dayf andsome of his subordinates to a meeting. The topics ofdiscussion were MICs ongoing munitions produc-tion problems at Al Qaqaa and the lack of progresson the Al Samud missile. Saddam also invited Abd

al-Tawab Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh, the formerMinister5 According to Dr. Amir Al-Sadi, all the directors at MIC and atthe state entities under MIMI hated the MIC Follow-up Directoratebecause is was staffed by personnel whose qualification wasarrogance and loyalty to the boss. They were perceived as the whip inthe hand of the coach driverHusayn Kamil.


42/84

10

of Industry, to attend the meeting as an observer.6After listening to Dayfs complaints, Saddam askedfor Huwayshs evaluation. Huwaysh was criticalof MICs failure to adopt and implement standardindustrial management practices, which he felt were

instrumental to solving its problems. Saddam thenasked to see Huwaysh alone and inquired what hethought of Dayf. Huwaysh told Saddam that Dayf wasa weak man unsuited to run MIC. Saddam agreed andsaid that was why he wanted Huwaysh to take the job.

The Latter Years (1997-2003)

After Husayn Kamils departure, many of the com-panies and enterprises he had incorporated into MICwere returned to other ministries. MIC was rudder-

less under Dayf Abd al-Majid Ahmad. According toAmir Al-Sadi, MICs personnel were in a state ofshock after Husayn Kamils flight. Many were calledfor questioning and all were afraid of the ramifica-tions of what was described publicly as Kamilstreachery and treason. By the time Saddam dismissedDayf, MIC headquarters was already in chaos.

MICs primary customer, MoD, had lost confidencein MICs capability to meet military productionrequirements, and MIC was seriously stressed.

According to Huwaysh, large segments of industrial

capacity were either out of service or underutilized,raw materials were in short supply, quality controlwas weak, MIC employees were dispirited, wageswere below subsistence levels, corruption was ram-pant, managers and workers lacked technical skills,and there was no fiscal accountability and no adher-ence to accepted standards of industrial practice.

Amir Al-Sadi contends that lack of resource cancripple any enterpriseno matter how healthy itisand that this lack of resources was really whatwas responsible for the dire state of MIC. Sadi alsodisputed the assertion that MIC technical skills haddeteriorated, and he stated that there was no corrup-tion under Husayn Kamil, while under Dayf therewere was hardly any money available to be squan-dered or embezzled.

Abd al-Tawab Abdallah Al-Mullah Huwaysh

Huwaysh was appointed to direct MIC on 9 March1997. Concurrent with Huwayshs appointment,Saddam chose Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sab Hasan

Muhammad Al Nasiri as MIC Senior Deputy Directorand Lt. Gen. Hazim Abd al-Razzaq Shihab Al-Ayyubi as Deputy Director. Both men were experi-enced military officers: Muzahim had commanded the

6 According to Amir Al-Sadi, this was one of Saddams time honoredpractices. When problems appeared at any ministry, Saddam wouldsend one of the many previously ousted ministers or commanders whohad been kept as a presidential advisor without specific duties, waiting

in the wings. The adviser would visit the problem sites, talk to peopletherepreferably the disgruntled oneand write a report directly toSaddam. Saddam would then call a meeting to discuss the matter in thepresence of the observer. If the observer showed eagerness and anappetite for the job, he would often be appointed to the position. Forexample, that was how Lt. General Muhammad Jisam got the job asPresident of SOTI.


43/84

11

Iraqi Air Force and the Fedayeen Saddam and servedas a bodyguard for Saddam; Hazim was a missileofficer who had commanded the Iraqi surface-to-sur-face missile forces during the 1991 Gulf war. Neitherhad any experience in managing military industry, but

both had Saddams confidence.

Over the course of time, Huwayshs deputies took onadditional roles, or left MIC altogether. For example,Muzahim Sab was appointed by Saddam to the AirDefense Command for six months in 2001, but heretained his position of Senior Deputy Director ofMIC. Hazim remained a deputy director until he wasreplaced by Muyassir Raja Shalah Hassun Al-Tikritiin 2000, who subsequently was appointed Minister ofMIM a year later. Daghir Muhammad Mahmud wasMIC Deputy Director from 2001 to 2003.

An unlikely choice to head MIC, Saddam broughtback Huwaysh, who had been languishing as apresidential advisor for nine years. Reflecting on hisreemergence, Huwaysh admitted he actually relishedthe opportunity to have Saddam invite him backinto government. He felt that Saddams summonswas an implicit admission he had been wrong to fireHuwaysh nine years earlier.

Saddam promoted Huwaysh to Minister of MilitaryIndustrialization in late 1997 and in July 2001 madehim a Deputy Prime Minister. Huwaysh substantiallyrestructured MIC by 1999, and his new frameworkcontinued virtually unchanged, except by expan-sion, until 2003. MICs reemergence provided theresearch, technological, and industrial foundationon which Saddam hoped to rebuild and modernizeIraqs military-industrial capabilities. Drawing onthese capabilities, Saddam was determined that ifthe Security Council could not enforce a WMD-freezone in the Middle East (as prescribed in UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 687, paragraph 14), Iraqs abilityto defend itself against regional threats should be notbe constrained, according to Huwaysh.

To revitalize MIC, Huwaysh instituted strictorganizational and financial reforms centered onmandatory planning, and required institutional andpersonal accountability. MIC immediately raisedsalaries across the board. Externally, MIC re-engaged with its customers, especially MoD.

Reforms centered on one-year, five-year, and 10-year planning cycles, meticulously administeredfrom MIC headquarters. While MICs directorsgeneral were given broad authority to conductbusiness and implement these plans, Huwaysh held

them directly accountable for plan performance.

Embedded in each plan was a range of requirementscovering education and training, technical research,safety, quality control, and industrial efficiency, inaddition to clearly defined production goals. Theplan linked these performance factors to explicitfinancial and promotion incentives, including a newMIC-wide bonus system approved by Saddam.

In 1998, Huwaysh created a program to involveuniversity academics and graduate students directlyin MIC research and development efforts. Thenext year, he introduced incentives to encourageoutsourcing of specific production projects to theprivate sector. Both programs flourished.

According to Amir Al-Sadi, these measures werecommon practices in government establishments,and many of these practices were required by lawor by instructions from the Presidential Diwan.

In the years after coming to MIC, Huwaysh becamethe most powerful Iraqi industrial official sinceHusayn Kamil, rising to Deputy Prime Minister,

Minister of Military Industrialization, and head of theIndustrial Committee.

The Special Office and the IIS Procurement

Connection

In November 1997, Saddam Husayn approved a MICproposal to enlist the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)to develop new procurement, technology transfer, andtechnical assistance channels to supplement existingMIC Commercial Directorate channels. Huwaysh

formed the MIC-IIS relationship to support Iraqsmissile program after Saddam instructed him toimprove Iraqs missile capabilities.


44/84

12

MICs end of this second procurement channel oper-ated through a MIC staff section called the SpecialOffice, headed by Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun Muham-mad Al-Abuddi, Director General of MICs ResearchDirectorate. Hadis office handled the entire secret,

special contracting process with Russia, Belarus,Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria.

Th

cia - iraq's wmd: addenda

Documents