Fall 1994

Publicly ExposingDiscrimination: The1945 FEPCHearings inCincinnati, Ohio

Publicly Exposing Discrimination

Andrew E. Kersten

During World War II, in cities across thenation, racial conflicts broke out because of job dis-crimination and changing patterns of employment.These changes stemmed from several factors. Onewas President Franklin D. Roosevelt 's FairEmployment Practice Committee (FEPC) which brokedown some traditional barriers to equality, the verybreaking of which led to racial conflicts. In addition,massive migrations of black and white workers tomany northern cities not only strained housing, tran-sit, and recreational facilities, but also intensifiedcompetition for jobs and employment advancement.In some places such as Detroit, these tensions led torace riots. In others such as Cincinnati, they producedstrikes by white workers incensed by the prospect ofhaving to work side by side with blacks.1

Nonetheless, the Roosevelt administra-tion maintained its commitment to fair employmentpractices, a commitment that led the FEPC to holdhearings in Cincinnati in 1945 which intended toexpose and break down the racial barriers to employ-ment at Cincinnati war production plants. The hear-ings failed to break down these barriers. But in expos-ing widespread unfair employment practices, the hear-ings lent impetus to the broader and more effectivefair employment movement that took shape in thepost-war period.2

Unfair employment practices againstblacks in Cincinnati first became a municipal issue in1925. In that year, the Cinc innat i Chamber ofCommerce made an industrial survey of the citywhich stated that the demand for workers was out-stripping the labor supply that local employers werewilling to use. The authors of the survey suggested

that Cincinnati industrialists utilize the largelyuntapped supply of black labor. However, this meantthat the unfair employment practices that kept blacksfrom jobs at "an unfortunately large number of localindustries" had to change. The city government tookno action on this recommendation, but in 1930 theChamber of Commerce and the Department of PublicWelfare commissioned Theodore M. Berry3 to do aspecial survey concerning the economic status andoccupational opportunities of blacks in Cincinnati.The guiding assumption in Berry's survey which dealtalmost exclusively with industry was that as theblack population in Cincinnati increased, the num-bers of blacks working in Cincinnati factories shouldalso increase. Berry reported that this had not hap-pened. The number of blacks living in Cincinnati hadgone up, but increasingly they were underrepresentedin the industrial work force.4

Andrew E. Kersten, a doctoralstudent in history at theUniversity of Cincinnati,received his Bachelor of Artsdegree from the University ofWisconsin.

The return of prosperity inthe early 1940s benefitedmainly white workers andblack civil rights leadersbegan to demand their fairshare of the war jobs. (CHSFelix Koch PhotographCollection)

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Berry based his findings on the 1910 and1920 censuses which showed a marked rise in theblack population of Cincinnati. In 1910, 19,639blacks lived in the city. By 1920 that number hadgrown to 30,079, a fifty-three percent increase. Berryestimated that in 1930, 48,000 lived in Cincinnati, afifty-nine percent increase. This meant that by 1930blacks accounted for roughly ten percent of the entirepopulation of Cincinnati.5

The percentage of blacks working inindustry, especially in skilled occupations, had failedto rise accordingly. Berry drew this conclusion fromthe results of 475 questionnaires that he sent toCincinnati employers "concerning the occupationsengaged in by Negroes, their work performance, theopportunities available, the attitudes of employersand white employees, [and] the factors inhibiting theadvance of Negro workers."6 Berry received answersfrom 234 establishments. One hundred and sevenbusinesses (46%) openly refused to hire black work-ers. Some of these employers explained in their ques-tionnaires that they had no desire to mix black andwhite workers. Others claimed that union restric-tions or lack of separate facilities kept blacks fromtheir employ. Berry also found that the fear of vio-lence and of bad public relations were frequent ratio-nales for not hiring.7

Queen City Heritage

The other 127 Cincinnati businesses uti-lized some black labor. The statistics compiled fromthe questionnaires "seemed to provide evidence of alow occupational status for Negro workers."8 Overeighty percent of black women were engaged indomestic service and had "very little opportunity" towork in industry. Roughly seventy percent of blackmen worked as unskilled laborers, many of them asporters or janitors. A few found a place in somebranch of industrial production, but these jobs wererarely skilled in nature.9

A majority of those employers who hiredblacks indicated that they were good workersalthough some employers felt that the work perfor-mance of blacks was poor.10 In either case, Berrylearned that almost all employers refused to upgradeblacks to skilled positions, because they believed thatblacks lacked the proper training. Moreover, employ-ers confined blacks to certain types of servile work,because they believed that this ensured a cooperativeand congenial working relationship between whitesand blacks. From this Berry concluded that the "evi-dence of a Negro achieving equality as worker andwage-earner, and not his presence alone seemed to bethe cause for objections and animosity."11

Aside from detailing the low economicstatus of black Cincinnatians, Berry's survey allowed

The great majority of blackmen worked as unskilledlaborers. (CHS Felix KochPhotograph Collection)

The 1930 study by Berryrevealed that over eightypercent of black women wereengaged in domestic serviceand had very little opportuni-ty to work in industry. (CHSFelix Koch PhotographCollection)

Fall 1944 Publicly Exposing Discrimination 1 1

DEFENSE AND NON-DEFENSE JOBSTO REQUIRE 2,000 NEGRO WORKERS

These workers must be intelligent and able to pass a common test. 75 of every100 Negroes who have recently applied for defense jobs were not hired because:

They could not read or write, orThey had less than a common school education.

Ballots of more than 4,000 Negro voters were thrown out in the Election be-cause they were spoiled.

PREPARE FOR A BETTER JOBATTEND THE STOWE EVENING SCHOOL

Corner of Seventh and Cutter Sts.ALL CLASSES FREE

New Enrollment Begins January 5, 1942Classes Offered

Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, History, Geography, Science, Hygiene,Civics, Sewing, Cooking and Power Machine Sewing.

For Further Information Call CHerry 6021

him to make a "discouraging" — and accurate — fore-cast about the future occupational opportunities forblack workers in the city. Eight-five percent of thesurveyed Cincinnati employers responded negativelywhen asked if they would hire more blacks in thefuture. Furthermore only ten percent of the employerscould suggest jobs for blacks. These businessmen indi-cated that blacks could find work as common labor-ers, janitors, and farm hands. Berry concluded thatCincinnati employers were "first, not interested inemployment problems of the Negro; and second, thatthere was not much desire to have Negro workersadvance above a certain low level of occupations."12

Still Berry hoped that Cincinnati employers wouldoffer more jobs, especially skilled ones, to blacks, andhe called on the government, employers, and socialorganizations to band together and eradicate theunfair practices.

The end of employment discriminationdid not happen during the Great Depression of the1930s. Moreover, the return of prosperity in the early

1940s benefited mainly white workers. As a result,black civil rights leaders such as A. Philip Randolph,president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters(BSCP),13 began to organize blacks to demand their fairshare of the war jobs. In January 1941, Randolphformed a new organization, the March on WashingtonMovement (MOWM) which called for 10,000 blacksto march on Washington, D.C. to protest discrimina-tion in the defense industries and the military.Randolph set the march for July 1, 1941, whichallowed time for negotiation with the Rooseveltadministration. Although FDR sympathized with theMOWM's goals, President Roosevelt sought to avoidthe demonstration because he was not willing to takethe political risks. In addition, he feared that theprotest could spark violence in the capital whichcould be used, like the march itself, as Axis propagan-da. Meetings between federal officials and otherMOWM leaders ended without a compromise. Finallyon June 24, 1941, FDR informed Randolph that hewould issue an executive order banning discrimina-

Although black workers wereurged to get training toprepare for better jobs,Cincinnati manufacturersrefused to hire blacks. (CHSManuscript Collection)

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tion in the defense industries but not in the military ifRandolph would call off the march.14

Randolph agreed to this, and on June 25,1941, FDR issued Executive Order 8802 whichdeclared "that there shall be no discrimination in theemployment of workers in defense industries orGovernment because of race, creed, color or nationalorigin." Executive Order 8802 also established theFair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) in theOffice of Production Management to "receive andinvestigate complaints of discrimination in violationof the provision of [the] order and . . . take appropriatesteps to redress grievances which it finds valid."15 Bylate 1942, FDR had appointed the members of thecommittee: Mark Ethridge, a Southern liberal (chair-man); Earl Dickerson, a black alderman from Chicago;William Green, president of the American Federationof Labor (AFL); Philip Murray, president of theCongress of Industrial Organizations (CIO); DavidSarnoff of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA);and Milton P. Webster, the black trade unionist fromRandolph's own union.

From 1941 to 1946 when the FEPC dis-banded, the committee went through many changesin organization and personnel, but two thingsremained constant during its life. First, the FEPCcould only investigate complaints of discriminationagainst a defense contractor or a nonmilitary federalagency. Second, the FEPC could not issue subpoenas,use federal courts, or fine offending parties.16 Insteadthe committee carried out its function by holdingpublic hearings and using moral suasion to convinceemployers to stop their discrimination. Public hear-ings could also place community peer pressure uponviolators and send a message to other war industriesnot directly involved with the FEPC.

In July 1942, conservative elements inthe federal government pressured President Rooseveltto curtail the FEPC's anti- discrimination activitieswhich he did by transferring the FEPC to the WarManpower Commission (WMC) headed by Paul V.McNutt17. The uncooperative McNutt blocked theFEPC's hearings and activities and in late 1942, somecommittee members, including chairman Ethridge,resigned in disgust.

Queen City Heritage

Seeking to avoid political damage fromthe end of the FEPC, Roosevelt issued ExecutiveOrder 9346 on May 27, 1943, which created the sec-ond Fair Employment Practice Committee. This newexecutive order resembled the first with two signifi-cant changes: (1) Executive Order 9346 codified thepractice of conducting hearings and making fact-find-ing missions; (2) it allowed the chairman to "makeprovision for such supplies, facilities, and services asmay be necessary to carry out" the mandate againstdiscrimination in the war industries.18 Soon after FDRappointed a new committee consisting of chairmanMonsignor Francis J. Haas (who was replaced byMalcolm Ross in September 1943); Sara E. Southall ofthe International Harvester Company; Charles L.Horn, president of the Federal Cartridge Company;John Brophy of the CIO; Boris Shishkin, an AFL econ-omist; the preeminent African American civil rightslawyer, Charles H. Houston; and Milton P. Webster.Armed with this slate of committee members, Haasexercised his power as chairman, divided the nationinto twelve regions, and created FEPC .facilities, ineach area. Ohio, which was in Region V, had its officein Cleveland.

In September 1943, soon after thereassembling of the committee, William T. McKnight,head of the Cleveland office, sent FEPC investigatorErnest G. Trimble to Cincinnati on a fact-finding mis-sion. During his interviews with Cincinnati business-men and workers Trimble was struck by the racialtension within the city. He heard rumors that"Negroes had organized what were called 'pusher'clubs." Supposedly, the members of these clubs setaside one evening a week to push whites off the trol-leys and buses. These rumors had contributed to asense of uneasiness in the city. After meeting withboth the Cincinnati police department and black lead-ers, he concluded that the rumors were unfounded.Still, many of the employers with whom Trimbletalked felt that "a race riot might easily develop."19

Aside from the tense racial situation,Trimble's investigation of Cincinnati businesses in1943 also revealed patterns of employment discrimi-nation similar to those Berry reported in 1930.Trimble, like Berry, focused on industry and found

The Crosley RadioCorporation had a companypolicy that kept blacks out.(CHS Photograph Collection)

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that many war plants refused to hire any black work-ers. For example, the Crosley Radio Corporation hada company policy that kept blacks out. The U.SPlaying Card Company also employed no blacks.Trimble met with U.S. Playing Card supervisors,Robert K. Matlack and Charles J. Calahan, who toldhim that because their company recruited largelywhite Southerners from Kentucky and other southernstates, they felt that the white workers would notaccept black employees. Furthermore, Trimble report-ed that the plant was all white because it was not"equipped with separate toilet facilities, which [thesupervisors] thought would be necessary." Regardlessof worker composition and facilities, Matlack andCalahan told Trimble that no blacks had applied attheir plant. In fact, Trimble knew that at least oneblack machine operator had been referred to the busi-ness, but he was not hired.20

Trimble, like Berry before him, recordedthe view of some Cincinnati employers that blackswere less fit for skilled occupations. During Trimble'svisit to the Formica Insulation Company which madevarious types of airplane parts, E. G. William, vice-

Publicly Exposing Discrimination 13

president, and Walter T. Beinhardt, employmentmanager, explained to him that "the companydesired applicants with mechanical aptitude" andthat they had not hired blacks "because qualifiedones had not applied." Likewise, Joseph A. Andersonof the American Can Company which producedmachine gun shells said that "the company'smechanical aptitude test barred Negro workmen."Such requirements though did allow blacks to runthe plant's elevator. Thus, American Can whichemployed 1,200 workers had one black worker, awoman who operated the plant elevator.21

Trimble found more complex racial dis-crimination at the Lodge and Shipley Company.Lodge and Shipley made automatic lathes for thenavy. It had 1,074 employees in two plants. The com-pany's vice-president Fred Albrecht told Trimble thatthey hired blacks for jobs in Plant 2. Supposedly,many white Southerners worked in Plant 1, and theywere not willing to work with blacks. Trimble toldAlbrecht that this employment practice was not inline with the Executive Order 9346, a statement that"led to a rather lengthy discussion of the race ques-

Queen City Heritage

tion" in which Albrecht "exhibited considerable prej-udice against Negroes . . . and emphasized that col-ored men are not reliable workers."22

Such patterns of discrimination gaveTrimble reason to conclude that "on the whole, itseems clear that the defense industries in theCincinnati area have rather generally refused toemploy colored people equally with whites." Trimblesuggested that the FEPC take "vigorous action" inCincinnati to secure war jobs for the city's blacks"not only because of the prevalence of discriminationbut also for the sake of the prestige of the [newlyresuscitated] committee." He recommended that thecommittee "single out a few of the larger companiesagainst whom good cases could be obtained." Oncethe FEPC brought these local industrial leaders intocompliance with Executive Order 9346, he "believedthe smaller companies would then fall into line."Without this "vigorous action/7 Trimble predictedthat at the very least black leaders in Cincinnatiwould lose confidence in the FEPC.23

Soon after receiving the report onCincinnati, Trimble's boss, William T. McKnight,director of FEPC's Cleveland-based Region V, visited

Cincinnati. He met with many businessmen engagedin war production but was unable to convince them togive up their discriminatory practices. Following thismeeting, in March 1944, a group of local businessmenmet on their own to discuss "the matter of employingNegroes and reportedly agreed on at least two reasonswhy they could not." The reasons were "that employ-ees of the companies involved had an understandingwith their former employees now in the armed forcesnot to alter the employment pattern of the plants"and "that to introduce Negro employees would bringother Negroes into the area and thereby up set [sic]the present social ratio and produce a 'race problem'for the community."24

Having failed twice to alter employmentpatterns in Cincinnati, McKnight wrote to the FEPCofficials in Washington, D.C. explaining that the com-mittee must take strong action in the city to changeits employment practices. Chairman Malcolm Rossagreed and estblished a Cincinnati FEPC suboffice andauthorized it to hold hearings against the most promi-nent violators of Executive Order 9346.

Immediately after the office opened onFebruary 1, 1945, McKnight sent its chief, Harold

Cincinnati employers saidthey had not hired blacksbecause they need applicantswith mechanical aptitude andskills. (CHS PhotographCollection)

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James, a list of offending companies: the BaldwinCompany, the Cambridge Tile Company, the CrosleyRadio Corporation, the Kirk and Blum ManufacturingCompany, the F.H. Lawson Company, the SchaibleCompany, the Strietmann Biscuit Company, and theVictor Electronic Products Company. McKnight whohad accumulated sixty-two cases charging discrimina-tion sent James the files concerning the alleged viola-tors and the names of the complainants. James orga-nized these materials for the hearings and, with thehelp of Theodore M. Berry, persuaded the com-plainants to give new depositions against the eightcompanies. In late February, James contacted the busi-nesses requesting their presence at the CincinnatiFEPC hearings which were to be held in the city coun-cil chambers on March 15-17, 1945. Committee mem-bers Malcolm Ross, Sara Southall, Milton Webster,John Brophy, and Boris Shishkin would preside overthe hearings while FEPC trial attorneys Emanuel H.Bloch and Frank D. Reeves would present evidenceand direct most of the FEPC's questions.

Even though the cases of discriminationagainst these eight large war plants were well-docu-mented, James knew that something more was neededto convince Queen City employers to "fall into line"with Executive Order 9346. The hearings, in a court-room-like setting, had two goals: to expose discrimi-nation publicly and to show how unfair employmentpractices hur t war production. If the hearingsachieved these two goals, a change in employmentpatterns might take place. To give the hearings anadded sense of patriotic urgency, James asked the WarManpower Commission to make a report onCincinnati's war-time economy stressing the plight ofblacks and its negative effect on the war effort.

On the morning of March 15, FEPCChairman Malcolm Ross called the Cincinnati hear-ings to order. The first witness whom FEPC attorneyEmanuel Bloch called was Willard J. Schilling fromthe War Manpower Commission. Reading his reportverbatim, Schilling laid out the basic war t imeemployment statistics for Cincinnati. In 1940 blacksmade up 12.2 percent of the city's population, 12.4percent of the labor force (i.e. persons with jobs aswell as those seeking work), and 29.2 percent of the

Publicly Exposing Discrimination 15

unemployed. Schilling estimated that since 1940more blacks than whites had settled in Cincinnati.25

In 1940 one out of every twenty industri-al workers in Cincinnati was black. By 1945 with thegrowth in the production of war materials, this ratiohad improved to one out of every nine. But thisprogress did not include black women who made up"only 3 percent of the female employees of war manu-facturing establishments." Furthermore, in general,black labor was underrepresented in the Cincinnatiwar industries. Schilling reported that eighty-five warplants in the Queen City employed 98,941 people,10,734 of whom (10.8%) were black. Moreover, onlyone plant hired any substantial number of them: theWright Aeronautical Company, which employedabout 6,000 blacks. The remaining 5,000 worked ineighty-four plants. "The largest percentage," Schillingadded, worked in "unskilled and service positions." Infact, many companies only hired blacks "for jobs ofshort duration, [that is] spot labor."26

After testifying to the low economicposition of black Cincinnatians, Schilling concludedthat at the beginning of the war "the Cincinnati labormarket [had] been a Group III area, i.e. one in whichthe supply of labor and demand for labor [was] sub-stantially in balance." Yet because more men weregoing off to war, "it [had] become increasingly diffi-cult to meet labor demands in the area." Schillingsuggested that Cincinnati was becoming a Group IIarea, "one in which labor shortages exist, that mayendanger essential production." He stated that thethreat to war production could be mitigated "throughbetter utilization of the labor force including minoritygroups."27

Following Schilling's statement, theFEPC proceeded with the cases against Cincinnaticompanies beginning with Kirk and BlumManufacturing and Cambridge Tile. Examiner Blochtold Chairman Ross that both companies had agreedto settle with the committee by signing documentsstating that they would conform to Executive Order9346. The companies promised to recruit and hirenew workers regardless of race, creed, color, or nation-al origin. They also agreed to give preference to theworkers they had previously discriminated against

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and to notify the United States Employment Service(USES) of their new employment practices and theFEPC of their progress.28

Next the committee proceeded with thecase against the Crosley Radio Corporation. Blochcalled Hubert J. Shank, the manager of the Cincinnatioffice of the U.S.Employment Service, to the stand.Shank knew intimately the employment policies ofthe local war plants to which he referred workers. Hehad been in contact with Crosley about its unfairemployment practices since 1943. The USES oftensent black applicants to Crosley which would returnthem jobless. Before contacting the FEPC Shank hadtried to determine the position of both Crosley's man-agement and union. Industrial relations director CarlT. Nearing told the USES that Crosley did not hireblacks because it feared that its union would strike.To corroborate this testimony, Fred Ross, president ofthe International Brotherhood of Electrical WorkersLocal #1061 at Crosley, testified next. He confirmedthe union's threat to walk out if blacks wereemployed and added that the purpose of the war was"to preserve the American way of life," which to Rossmeant keeping "negroes [sic] in their place."29

Then Bloch called six more witnesses,five black women and one black man, to tell their sto-ries about Crosley. The first four women — LucilleCharity Cooper, Louise Comer, Hazel Anderson, andWillie Webb — reported that Crosley refused to hirethem because of their color. Cooper's testimony repre-sented a typical experience.

Bloch: "And now will you tell theCommittee what happened when you got out to theCrosley employment office at the plant out there?"

Cooper: "Well, I went to the employ-ment office and I was interviewed by a lady and shesaid she wasn't hiring any colored girls at the presentand that they hadn't hired any colored girls."30

Similarly, Comer's interviewer told herthat Crosley was not "taking any colored girls." HazelAnderson told the committee that she had asked herinterviewer if "there were any available opening forcolored and [the company official] said 'No, not at pre-sent'." Willie Webb, a victim of the same employ-ment discrimination, was a definite loss for the pro-

Queen City Heritage

duction capabilities of Crosley, which made electron-ic equipment, because Webb had amassed 536 hoursof training as a welder.31

The last two witnesses called againstCrosley also detailed the company's unfair employ-ment practices. Moreover their testimonies added aclear, patriotic message. Henry Harris had beenrecently discharged from the Army and went toCrosley for a molding job. He arrived at the plant withmany others seeking war-related work. During theinterview process, Crosley officials separated thewhite and black applicants. In a separate room, aninterviewer talked with Harris for "two minutes" andtold him that "he would keep [his] application on fileand call" him if needed. A year later, Crosley had yetto call the war veteran. A patriotic theme also ranthrough the testimony of Ruby Chapman, who wasrefused a job at Crosley. She explained to the commit-tee that she wanted a war job "because my husband isoverseas and I figured I would be helping him."32

After Chapman's testimony, the com-mittee let Crosley's attorney, Walter M. Shohl of theCincinnati law firm Dinsmore, Shohl, Sawyer, andDinsmore, present testimony. Gerald F. Gamber,Crosley's director of industrial relations, testified anddefended employment discrimination because hebelieved that hiring blacks would disrupt productionof war materials.

Shohl: "Did you reach conclusions as towhat the situation [at Crosley] was?"

Gamber: "I reached the conclusion . . .that in my honest opinion, a work stoppage wouldsurely result if we hired a single colored person."

Gamber maintained that such a strikewould throw Crosley's production capabilities "into atailspin," which would adversely affect the wareffort.33

Following Shohl's questioning ofGamber, the FEPC cross-examined. Bloch askedGamber if he had ever talked with the white employ-ees about allowing blacks to work at Crosley. Gambersaid that he had talked to some workers, all of whomsaid that they would strike if blacks were hired.

Bloch: "Now, when you talked to thesesixty or seventy people, did you point out to them

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that it is unpatriotic, that it is a stab in the back toour soldiers overseas if anybody would walk out andpull a strike?"

Gamber: "It isn't very good policy topoint out to anybody today that they are unpatriotic."

Bloch: "I wanted to know whether youdid?"

Gamber: "I didn't go out and do a nega-tive sales job. I have other things to do. . . ,"34

Committee member John Brophy alsoquestioned Crosley's dedication to the war effort. Heasked, "Doesn't it seem contradictory that a materialthat serves an armed force composed of whites andblacks . . . can only be made by whites?" Gamberchose not to answer that question but instead statedthat "I may not personally feel that we are goingabout the thing in this instance in the right way.Personally, I have a feeling that education is one ofthe biggest things, not force or directives."Committee member Milton P. Webster responded tothis with a small lecture.

Publicly Exposing Discrimination 17

/ judge you meant the processes theCommittee uses, that is by directives and so forthwas not the proper method, but probably an educa-tional process would be a much better method. Don'tyou agree that the fact that Hitler and Hirohito start-ed this war, that we have got to accentuate our edu-cational facilities to meet the crisis much more thanin normal times* In other words, we can't wait forthe long drawn out process, by reading books, butsome other drastic method of education has to takeplace in order to change these conditions.^

Gamber remained on the stand for sometime after Webster's statement. The committee mem-bers' questions and comments directed to Gambernever strayed far from Webster's lecture. They madeclear the FEPC's position that in this crisis fairemployment was needed to fight Hitler and Hirohitoand that gradual methods to achieve this threatenedthe war effort. The members continued to attack theidea that discrimination could be patriotic or aid thewar effort. The end of Gamber's testimony markedthe end of the first day of hearings.

The following morning ChairmanMalcolm Ross reconvened the hearings to examinecompanies which hired blacks but refused to givethem permanent or skilled jobs. All the same playerswere present, including Shohl, who now representedthe F. H. Lawson Company, which refused to hireskilled black labor. Frank Reeves prosecuted this casewhich, like Crosley's, began with Hubert Shank, whohad contacted both union and management aboutunfair employment practices. Shank told the commit-tee that in conversations with union officials, he hadlearned that if blacks were hired on a permanent basisthe union would strike. Shank also stated thatLawson's president, John A. Buhr, had supported thecompany's policy of employment discrimination butinsisted "that the company's position was one causedsolely by the union's stand and the fact that [the com-pany was] situated so close to Kentucky, where manyof our employees reside."36

Although the union contributed toLawson's unfair employment policy, the company'streatment of black applicants was particularly dishon-est. One applicant, Gertrude Barney, testified that the

Cambridge Tile was one oftwo Cincinnati companiesthat agreed to hire new work-ers regardless of race, creed,color, or national origin incompliance with ExecutiveOrder 9346. (CHS MarshPhotograph Collection)

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USES sent her and her sister to Lawson. Once theyarrived, their interviewer told them that "he wassorry, [and that] he had called up [the USES] and saidthey didn't need anymore help." The Lawson officialexplained to the women that he would fill out theirreferral cards and return them to the USES office.Reeves entered into evidence the cards on which theLawson official had written "Did Not Report."37

In rebuttal, attorney Walter Shohl askedcompany president Buhr why he discriminated inemployment. Buhr blamed the unfair practices on theunion employees who, he claimed, lived in the "hillsback of Covington." Buhr had asked union representa-tives if its members would work with blacks on theproduction line. The union officials responded "thatour men would walk out if such a thing happened."38

As far as the position of management,Buhr told the FEPC that Lawson could only hireblacks as "spot labor from time to time . . . unloadingcars and things of that kind, on the outside" of theplant. Buhr stated that to do more would harm thewar effort.

Shohl: "What has been your primary con-sideration in connection with all of these questions ofemployment of personnel?"

Queen City Heritage

Buhr: "Well, we have felt that our actionshould be such that every order that we had on ourbooks should be gotten out on time, and according tothe delivery schedules that have been given us. That'sbeen our prime idea and, of course, we have beenexpedited with very much high pressure by the armedservices right from the first, and we didn't think thatwe should interfere with that effort in any way."

Shohl: "Is it your belief that if you wereto have employed non-white persons, your productionwould be disrupted?"

Buhr: "I am firmly of that belief, fromeverything that has been said to us, even as late asyesterday and today."39

Keeping blacks in low-skilled jobs wasthe main charge in the case against the BaldwinCompany. Forty blacks worked at the war plantwhich made airplane wings, but none were in skilledpositions. Instead they operated elevators and workedas porters and maintenance men. Baldwin's personnelmanager James M.E. Mixter said that the companywanted to hire blacks, but "the sudden influx [ofblacks into skilled positions] . . . might cause consid-erable troubles in our plant, so that we have gone onthe slow, sure method of doing it gradually, gettingthe other employees used to seeing them around."40

Thus, Baldwin refrained from employing blacks onthe production line.

Philip J. Kennedy, attorney for Baldwin'sunion, presented the official position of the workers.He argued that the "wholesale introduction of negroes[sic] into the production classifications" would causea strike which would impede the war effort. LikeBuhr, Kennedy blamed this stance on white workerswho "had come more or less recently from southernKentucky and Tennessee."41

Following Kennedy's testimony, blackwitnesses recounted their experiences at the plant.What happened to Louise E. Stallworth was typical. InMay 1944, she went to Baldwin and filled out anapplication for a production job. As was the customshe completed the blank on the form titled "race"with the word "Negro."

Bloch: "Now tell us what happened?"Stallworth: "Well, after I filled out the

The F.H. Lawson Companyexplained that the company'sposition of employmentdiscrimination was caused bythe Union's stand and thefact that so many of its work-ers came from Kentucky.

(CHS F. H. LawsonPhotograph Collection)

Fall 1994 Publicly Exposing Discrimination

application blank, the young man came to the door ofthe office and asked me what I wanted, so I told himthat I was sent there by the United StatesEmployment Center [sic] for the job of inspector train-ing. I asked him if he had such a job and he said yes.So then he asked me to come into the office. I handedhim my application blank that was filled out. So hetold me that the job would require two weeks trainingperiod and I said, 'That is quite all right.' In speakinghe glanced down at my application blank and he said,'Oh, you are a negro.' I said, 'Yes.'"

At this point, the interview stopped, andthe Baldwin official told Stallworth that "in about acouple weeks we will let you know if we have any-thing." She was never called.41

The case against the Strietmann BiscuitCompany shared the same premise as the case againstBaldwin. Strietmann employed over 600 workers whopacked food for the military. Only about twentyblacks (mostly women) worked there, and all werejanitors. W.H. Armstrong, Strietmann's lawyer,defended this discrimination by arguing that: "Wecannot employ 'non-white' women on productionwork because of the fact that such employment wouldcause most of our white help to resign." Testimonyfrom Evans Douglas, a union member, supportedArmstrong's statement. Douglas told the committeethat if blacks were hired on the production line, "mymachine goes down."43

On March 17 in the hearing against theVictor Electronic Products Company, the FEPC clear-ly showed that Cincinnati war industries treatedblacks unfairly. Victor Electronic Products Companyflatly refused to employ blacks. FEPC attorney FrankReeves explained that Victor's management claimedit could not hire blacks because its "present workerswere Kentuckians who would quit rather than workwith non-whites and be obliged to share washroomand locker room facilities with them." Reeves addedthat Charles L. Harrison, president of Victor, "ques-tioned the ability of negroes to perform the intricatepattern of [the company's] work."44

Victor's union shared its management'sviews. This stance became apparent when WalterShohl, the company's attorney questioned Norbert

Auer, president of International Brotherhood ofElectrical Workers (AFL), Local #1264. Victor's attor-ney asked Auer what would happen if "a substantialnumber of negro workmen" were hired. Aueranswered that he "couldn't say, but [he was] almostpositive that [the white workers] would walk out."45

Esther Lupariello, a worker at Victor, reenforced thisstatement.

Reeves: "Do you know the attitude ofthe workers at the Victor Electronic Products?"

Lupariello: "I certainly do. I am no offi-cial of the union. I am just a member, but I have madeit my business to go around and ask some of them andthey are all against it [that is, the hiring of blacks]."

Reeves: "Is it your judgement, at least,on what you have learned and heard, that the employ-ment of negroes [sic] would lead the employees towalk out?"

Lupariello: "They certainly would.Anybody that thinks they won't, they should justsend one out there and the whole place will be emptyin five minutes. No union, no guards, no managementwill hold them."46

Workers like Lupariello gave Victor anexcuse not to hire black Cincinnatians, even qualifiedones. In December 1944, Victor placed an advertise-ment in a local newspaper calling for drill and punchpress operators. Joseph Todd, a black complainant,had experience with these machines at the CincinnatiTool Company, and applied at Victor. His interviewertold him that the "company did not hire colored peo-ple in the shop." The official did offer Todd "a job cut-ting the lawn and washing the President's car." Toddtold the FEPC that "Naturally I refused the job. Thatended the interview."47

After the proceedings against Victor, thecommittee took up the case against the SchaibleCompany which demonstrated that changes inemployment policies were possible. Schaible settledwith the FEPC as Kirk and Blum and Cambridge Tilehad done. Schaible's agreement mirrored those thatthe other consenting firms signed. Less than a monthlater in April, 1945, Chairman Ross told Schaible'smanagement via telegram that all counts of discrimi-nation against it were dropped.48

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Overall, the hearings could not be con-sidered a success. Only three of the firms settled withthe FEPC, not enough to alter employment practicesin Cincinnati significantly. The hearings ended onMarch 17, 1945, with little evidence that the intransi-gence of companies like Victor was not the only posi-tion held in Cincinnati.49

The FEPC had planned to return toCincinnati to try to convince Crosley, Baldwin, F.H.Lawson, Strietmann, and Victor to comply withExecutive Order 9346, but in July 1945, Congress cutits budget. As a result, the FEPC closed many of itsregional offices, including the one in Cincinnati. In itsFinal Report (1946), the committee acknowledgedthat some Cincinnati businesses had initiated newemployment programs and hired more blacks.However the five recalcitrant firms that had attendedthe hearings "were [either] unwilling to initiate suchprograms or capitulated to the bias of their workers."50

Although the FEPC failed in its overallmission of opening the gates of most Cincinnati warplants to blacks, it had some accomplishments. Inaddition to opening up a few firms, the FEPC succeed-ed in exposing the prevalent employment discrimina-tion against African Americans in Cincinnati. At thesame time, the committee sent a clear message thatrefusing blacks jobs and failing to upgrade them wereunfair employment practices and were not to be ratio-nalized on the basis of the alleged bigotry of whiteworkers or on the claim of aiding the war effort.

The FEPC's actions also gave some peo-ple confidence in this method of attacking unfairemployment practices. Civil rights leaders, such asTheodore M. Berry, saw the FEPC as an efficient vehi-cle to advance fair employment. When the federalcommittee disbanded in 1946, he joined others inOhio in pushing for a state FEPC. In 1947 StateSenator Howard Metzenbaum introduced a bill in theOhio General Assembly "to prohibit discriminatoryemployment practices based upon race, color, reli-gious creed, national origin, or ancestry, and to createan Ohio Fair Employment Practices Commission."51

For twelve years, Ohio civil rights leaders fought forthis type of bill which mirrored Roosevelt's executiveorders. On April 29, 1959, Ohio Governor Michael

DiSalle signed an Ohio FEPC bill into law.52 Thus,while President Roosevelt's FEPC failed to eradicateemployment discrimination in Cincinnati, the com-mittee's action gave a focus to the post-war fairemployment movement.

1. See Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States,1941-1945 (New York, 1972) and Dominic J. Capeci, LayeredViolence: The Detroit Rioters of 1943 (Mississippi, 1992). InCincinnati, on June 5, 1944, the day before D-Day, 9,000 whiteworkers at Wright Aeronautical went out on a four day strike toprotest the upgrading of seven trained black workers to operateidle machines in the cylinder department. On April 18, 1945,197 white workers at the Continental Can Company went onstrike, because the company had hired two black porters. Athird racially motivated strike happened at General Motor'sDelco Products Plant on April 18, 1945, when 273 white work-ers walked out for five days, because Delco had hired a blackwelder, Cletus Moster, to work an idle machine.2. For more information on the FEPC and fair employment dur-ing World War II, see Merl E. Reed, Seedtime for the ModernCivil Rights Movement: The President's Committee on FairEmployment Practice, 1941-1946 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana,1991).3.Theodore M. Berry (b. 1906) was the president of theCincinnati NAACP branch in the 1930s. During the war, hespent time in Washington, D.C. working with the Office ofFacts and Figures. In the 1960s, Berry lobbied for fair employ-ment and housing laws in Ohio and from 1972-1975 he wasmayor of Cincinnati.4. See Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce, CincinnatiIndustrial Survey, 192s (New York, 1925), pp.27-35. See alsoTheodore M. Berry, "Survey Abstract: The Status of the Negroin Industry and Occupational Opportunities in Cincinnati"(Cincinnati, 1930). In December 1930, Berry published the sur-vey in the National Urban League's Opportunity magazine.Berry's survey which he presented to the city government andthe article in Opportunity contain virtually the same statisticaldata. The main difference between the two is that theOpportunity article is in a more readable form.5. See Theodore M. Berry, "Survey Abstract: The Status of theNegro in Industry and Occupational Opportunities inCincinnati," pp.1-2. Berry did not use the 1930 census becauseit was not available to him at the time he made his study.6. Theodore M. Berry, "The Negro in Cincinnati Industries: ASurvey Summary," Opportunity (December, 1930), p.361. Seealso Theodore M. Berry, .Survey Abstract: The Status of theNegro in Industry and Occupational Opportunities inCincinnati,, p.4.7. Berry, "The Negro in Cincinnati Industries," p.362. See alsoBerry, "Survey Abstract," p.7.8. Berry, "The Negro in Cincinnati Industries," p.361. See alsoBerry, "Survey Abstract," p.3.9. Ibid.

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10. Berry, "The Negro in Cincinnati Industries," p.362. See alsoBerry, "Survey Abstract," p.6.11. Berry, "The Negro in Cincinnati Industries," p.363.12. Berry, "The Negro in Cincinnati Industries," p.363. See alsoBerry, "Survey Abstract," p. 12-13.13. Asa Philip Randolph (1889-1979) was the co-founder of theMessenger, a militant Socialist monthly in 1917. He foundedand served as the first president of the Brotherhood of SleepingCar Porters (BSCP) in 1925. In 1935 he served as a member ofMayor Fiorello La Guardia's New York City Commission onRace. Six years later, he organized the March on WashingtonMovement which led to the FEPC. He became co-chairman ofthe National Council for a Permanent FEPC in 1943. After thewar he was elected a vice- president of the AFL-CIO. He wasone of the leaders in the 1963 march on Washington.14. See Merl E. Reed, Seedtime for the Modern Civil RightsMovement, pp.1-17.15. "Executive Order 8802," The Public Papers of FranklinDelano Roosevelt: Compiled with Special Material andExplanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, 1950)vol. 1941, p.234. Hereinafter: FDR Papers.16. An executive order and agencies created by it are examplesof administrative law, not statute law.17. Paul Vories McNutt (1891-1955) was the governor ofIndiana 1933-1937. In 1937 he was appointed high commission-er to the Philippines. In 1939 he became the head of the newlycreated Federal Security Agency. McNutt had hopes of captur-ing the 1940 presidential nomination of the Democratic Party,but his campaign lost momentum as rumors of corruption dur-

ing his term as governor surfaced and as German victoriesadded to the growing sentiment for a Roosevelt third term.Along with his duties in the WMC, McNutt remained the headof the Federal Security Agency until 1945.18. Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, vol. 1943, p.230.19. Ernest G. Trimble, "Investigationof Discrimination againstNegroes in War Industries in Cincinnati, Ohio," pp. 1-2, Papersof the United States Committee on Fair Employment Practice -Cincinnati Office General Files, 1943-1946, Box 2, File 10.Cincinnati Historical Society Library.20. Ibid., pp.3-4.21. Ibid., pp. 4-7.22. Ibid., p.7.23. Ibid., p.13.24. "Cincy Industrialists Flaunt FEPC According to Report,"The Ohio State News, May 20, 1944, p.8. It is not clear fromthe article what report the author is referring to.25. Willard J. Schilling, "Statement of the War ManpowerCommission, March 14, 1945," Cincinnati Urban LeaguePapers, box 11, file 8.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. This agreement was the same one that with Schaible signedtwo days later on March 17.29. Transcript of the 2 p.m. session of the March 15, 1945,FEPC Hearing in Cincinnati, Ohio, Papers of the President'sCommittee on Fair Employment Practice, Legal Division,Records Relating to the Hearings, Case No. 72, box 1, file 72.2,p. 61. Hereinafter: Cincinnati FEPC Hearings.

Streitmann BiscuitCompany's lawyers arguedthat the company could notemploy non-white women onproduction work because"such employment wouldcause most of our help to

resign." (CHS PhotographCollection)

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30. Ibid., p. 102.31. Ibid., p.106,109.32. Ibid., pp. 120-121.33. Ibid., pp. 129-131.34. Ibid., pp.136-137.35-Ibid., pp.154-155.36. Cincinnati FEPC Hearings, Case No. 73, box 1, file 73.1,p.49.37. Ibid., pp.58-60.38. Ibid., p.74.39. Ibid., pp.76-77-40. Cincinnati FEPC Hearings, Case No. 74, box 1, file 74.1,p.69.41. Ibid., pp.101-102.42. Ibid., pp.57-59-43. Cincinnati FEPC Hearings, Case No. 78, box 1, file 78.2.p.38.44. Cincinnati FEPC Hearings, Case No. 75, box 1, file 75.1. p.8.

45. Ibid., p.63.46. Ibid., p.87.47. Ibid., p. 5 9.48. Cincinnati FEPC Hearings, Case No. 79, box 1, file 79.1 andCincinnati FEPC Office Files, box 1, file 7.49. There was not much newspaper coverage by the mainCincinnati papers. The three main Cincinnati papers, theTimes-Star, the Enquirer, and the Post, ran stories about thehearings but offered neither commentary not editorials. See theEnquirer March 15, 1945, p.8, March 16, p.15, and March 17,p.2; the Times-Star March 15, 1945, p.2 and March 16, p.32; andthe Post March 16, 1945, p. 24 and March 17, p. 2.50. FEPC, Final Report (Washington, 1946), p. 19.51. Ohio State Journal, vol. 122, January 14, 1947, p.66.52. See Cincinnati Enquirer, May 17, 1959, p.6A.

Company supervisors testi-fied that since their companyrecruited largely Southernersfrom Kentucky and othersouthern states, they felt thatthe white workers would notaccept black employees.(CHS Photograph Collection)