civil law cases fulltext compilation

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G.R. No. L-2474 May 30, 1951

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mote! Ma!ia D"e#as as $"a!dia% ad litem, a%d MARIAD&'(A),plaintiffs,vs.

'D&*IGI) MA+ARAIG,defendant.

Reyes and Dy-Liaco for appellants.

Tible, Tena and Borja for appellees.

A&I)A ANG'LO, J.

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardianad litem, brought an

action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the onership and

possession of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of !alacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur.

!he complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of "miliano Andal and Maria Dueas#

that "miliano Andal died on September $%, &'%$# that "miliano Andal as the oner of the parcel

of land in (uestion having ac(uired it from his mother "duvigis Macaraig by virtue of adonationpropter nuptias e)ecuted by the latter in favor of the former# that "miliano Andal had been

in possession of the land from &'*+ up t o &'%$, hen "duvigis Macaraig, taing advantage of the

abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in (uestion.

!he loer court rendered -udgment in favor of the plaintiffs a/ declaring Mariano Andal the

legitimate son of "miliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in (uestion# b/ declaring

Mariano Andal oner of said land# and c/ ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant too the case to this Court upon the plea that only (uestion of la are involved.

It appears undisputed that the land in (uestion as given by "duvigis Macaraig to her son "miliano

Andal by virtue of a donationpropter nuptias she has e)ecuted in his favor on the occasion of hismarriage to Maria Dueas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to

inherit the land in (uestion. If otherise, then the land should revert bac to "duvigis Macaraig as

the ne)t of in entitled to succeed him under the la. !he main issue, therefore, to be determined

hinges on the legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to "miliano Andal is concerned.

!he determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had e)isted beteen

"miliano Andal and his ife during the period of conception of the child up to t he date of his birth in

connection ith the death of the alleged father "miliano Andal.

!he folloing facts appear to have been proven0 "miliano Andal became sic of tuberculosis in

1anuary &'%&. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Feli), ent to live in his house to help him or his

house to help him or his farm. 2is sicness became orse that on or about September &3,&'%$, he became so ea that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. 4n September &3,

&'%$, Maria Duenas, his ife, eloped ith Feli), and both ent to live in the house of Maria5s

father, until the middle of &'%*. Since May, &'%$, Feli) and Maria had se)ual intercourse and

treated each other as husband and ife. 4n 1anuary &, &'%*, "miliano died ithout the presence

of his ife, ho did not ev en attend his funeral. 4n 1une &6, &'%*, Maria Dueas gave birth to a

boy, ho as given the name of Mariano Andal. 7nder these facts, can the child be considered as

the legitimate son of "miliano8

Article &3+ of the Civil Code provides0

Children born after the one hundred and eighty days ne)t folloing that of the

celebration of marriage or ithin the three hundred days ne)t folloing its dissolution or

the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

!his presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it as physically impossible for the

husband to have had access to his ife during the first one hundred and tenty days of

the three hundred ne)t preceding the birth of the child.

Since the boy as born on 1une &6, &'%*, and "miliano Andal died on 1anuary &, &'%*, that boy is

presumed to be the legitimate son of "miliano and his ife, he having been born ithin three

hundred *33/ days folloing the dissolution of the marriage. !his presumption can only berebutted by proof that it as physically impossible for the husband to have had access t o his ife

during the first &$3 days of the *33 ne)t preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to

prove that it as physically impossible for "miliano to have such access8 Is the fact that "miliano

as sic of tuberculosis and as so ea that he could hardly move and get up from his bed

sufficient to overcome this presumption8

Manresa on this point says0

Impossibility of access by husband to ife ould include &/ absence during the initial

period of conception, $/ impotence hich is patent, continuing and incurable, and */

imprisonment, unless it can be shon that cohabitation too place through corruptviolation of prison regulations. Manresa, %'$9:33, ;ol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo !olentino in

his boo ut e)perience shos that this does not prevent

carnal intercourse. !here are cases here persons suffering from this sicness can do the carnal

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act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to se)ual intercourse. As an

author has said,


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G.R. No. 13/493 "%e 15, 2000

'OI)A AI'RA,petitioner,vs.

R')'NA+ION . +AOAL,respondent.

ANGANIAN, J.

A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon ade(uate proof that it is fictitious. !hus, void is a

certificate hich shos that the mother as already fifty9four years old at the time of the child5s

birth and hich as signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. >ecause her

inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the

proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.

Statement of the Case

Submitted for this Court5s consideration is a ?etition for evie onCertiorari&under ule %: of the

ules of Court, seeing reversal of t he March &+, &''' Decision$of the Court of Appeals*CA/ in

CA9B C; o. :@3*&. Affirming the egional !rial Court of anao del orte in Special?roceedings o. *3%@, the CA ruled as follos0

I ;I"= 2""4F, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIM"D. Accordingly, the instant

appeal is DISMISS"D for lac of merit. Costs against the defendant9appellant,

!"4FIS!A >A>I"A, a..a. !eofista Buinto.%

!he dispositive portion of the affirmed !C Decision reads0

=2""F4", in vie of the foregoing findings and pronouncements of the Court,

-udgment is hereby rendered, to itE0

&/ Declaring the Certificate of >irth of respondent !eofista Buinto as null and

void . Catotal hereafter referred to as ?"S"!ACI4/ filed ith the

egional !rial Court of anao del ode, >ranch II, Iligan City, a petition for the

cancellation of the entry of birth of !eofista >abiera herafter referred to as !"4FIS!A/ in

the Civil egistry of Iligan City. !he case as doceted as Special ?roceedings o.

*3%@.

From the petition filed, ?"S"!ACI4 asserted abiera and ithout the

noledge of said spouses, Flora Buinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of

spouses "ugenio and 2ermogena >abiera, caused the registrationHrecording of the facts

of birth of her child, by s imulating that she as the child of t he spouses "ugenio, then @:

years old and 2ermogena, then :% years old, and made 2ermogena >abiera appear as

the mother by forging her signature . . .# that petitioner, then &: years old, sa ith her

on eyes and personally itnessed Flora Buinto give birth to !eofista Buinto, in their

house, assisted by arbiera5s birth certificate is voidab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it

is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child in &':@

because0 a/ 2ermogena Cariosa >abiera, as already :% years old# b/ 2ermogena5s

last child birth as in the year &'%&, the year petitioner as born# c/ "ugenio as

already @: years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate of !eofista Buinto ould

affect the hereditary rights of petitioner ho inherited the estate of cancelled and

declared void and theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing,

-udgment Ebe renderEed declaring . . . the certificate of birth of respondent !eofista

Buinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil

registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City >I!2

C"!IFICA!" recorded as egistry o. &@3*:.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and s ubstance, the trial court issued an order

directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in a nespaper,

the ocal Civil egistrar of Iligan City, the office of the City ?rosecutor of Iligan City and

!"4FIS!A.

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!"4FIS!A filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that abiera

and 2ermogena CarioGa >abiera# that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file t he instant

petition pursuant to Article &6& of the Family Code# and finally that the instant petition is

barred by prescription in accordance ith Article &63 of the Family Code.:

Rulin! of the Court of "ppeals

!he Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved that petitioner as not the

biological child of 2ermogena >abiera. It also ruled that no evidence as presented to sho that

2ermogena became pregnant in &':'. It further observed that she as already :% years old at the

time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred ay bac in &'%&. !he CA noted that the supposed

birth too place at home, notithstanding the advanced age of 2ermogena and its concomitant

medical complications. Moreover, petitioner5s >irth Certificate as not signed by the local civil

registrar, and the signature therein, hich as purported to be that of 2ermogena, as different

from her other signatures.

!he CA also deemed inapplicable Articles &63 and &6& of the Family Code, hich stated that only

the father could impugn the child5s legitimacy, and that the same as not sub-ect to a collateral

attac. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation herein the husband or his heirs

asserted that the child of the ife as not his. In this case, the action involved the c ancellation of

the child5s >irth Certificate for being voidab initioon the ground that the child did not belong to

either the father or the mother.

2ence, this appeal.@

#ssues

?etitioner presents the folloing assignment of errors0

&/ espondent plaintiff in the loer courta $uo/ does not have the legal capacity t o file

the special proceeding of appeal under CA B o. C;9:@3*& sub-ect matter of this

revie on certiorari#

$/ !he special proceeding on appeal under CA B o. C;9:@3*& is improper and is

barred by Ethe statute of limitation prescription/# Eand

*/ !he 2onorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly failed to hold, that the

ancient public record of petitioner5s birth is superior to the self9serving oral t estimony of

respondent.6

The Court5s Rulin!

!he ?etition is not meritorious.

irst #ssue0Subject of

the %resent "ction

?etitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article &6&+of the Family

Code states that the child5s filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special

circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not sub-ect to a collateral attac.

!his argument is incorrect. espondent has the re(uisite standing to initiate the present action.

Section $, ule * of the ules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one


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In Benite&-Badua .Court of "ppeals, &&the Court ruled thus0

?etitioner5s insistence on the applicability of Articles &@%, &@@, &63 and &6& of the Family

Code to the case at bench c annot be sustained. !hese articles provide0

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

A careful reading of the above articles ill sho that they do not contemplate a situation,

lie in the instant case, here a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological

child of a certain couple. ather, these articles govern a situation here a husband or

his heirs/ denies as his on a child of his ife. !hus, under Article &@@, it is t he husband

ho can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving0 &/ it as physically impossible

for him to have se)ual intercourse, ith his ife ithin the first &$3 days of the *33 days

hich immediately preceded the birth of the child# $/ that for biological or other scientific

reasons, the child could not have been his child# */ that in case of children conceived

insemination, the ritten authoriGation or ratification by either parent as obtained

through mistae, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles &63 and &6&

reinforce this reading as they spea of t he prescriptive period ithin hich the husband

or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless

then, the appellate court did not err hen it refused to apply these articles to t he case at

bench. For the case at bench is not one here the heirs of the late ;icente are

contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. ather, their clear submission is that

petitioner as not horn to ;icente and Isabel. 4ur ruling in Cabatbat9im vs.

Intermediate Appellate Court, &@@ SCA %:&, %:6 cited in the impugned decision is

apropos, i&0


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( =ho are your children8

a ?resentation and Florentino >abiera.

( o, this !eofista >abiera claims that she is your legitimate child ith your husband

"ugenio >abiera, hat can you say about that8

a She is not our child.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

( Do you recall here she as born8

a In our house because her mother as our house helper.

( Could you recall for ho long if ever this !eofista >abiera lived ith you in your

residence8

a Maybe in &'6+ but she Eould alays go ouEt from time to time.

( o, during this time, do you recall if y ou ever assertEed her as your daughter ith

your husband8

a o, sir. &:

elying merely on the assumption of validity of the >irth Certificate, petitioner has presented no

other evidence other than the said document to sho that she is really 2ermogena5s child# either

has she provided any reason hy her supposed mother ould mae a deposition stating that the

former as not the latter5s child at all.

All in all, e find no reason t o reverse or modify the factual finding of the trial and the appellate

courts that petitioner as not the child of respondent5s parents.

=2""F4", the ?etition is hereby D"I"D and the assailed Decision AFFIM"D. Costs

against petitioner.

S4 4D""D.

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G.R. No. 10525 a%"a!y 24, 1994

MARI))A 'NI'-AD&A, petitioner,vs.

+O&R O A'AL), *I+ORIA 'NI' LIRIO AND 'ODOR 'NI'AG&ILAR, respondents.

Reynaldo *. "lcantara for petitioner.

"u!ustus Cesar +. "&ura for priate respondents.

&NO, J.:

!his is a petition for revie of the Decision of the &$th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA9B..

o. C; o. *3+@$ dated May $', &''$.1

!he facts sho that t he spouses ;icente >eniteG and Isabel Chipongian oned various propertiesespecially in aguna. Isabel died on April $:, &'+$. ;icente folloed her in the grave on ovember

&*, &'+'. 2e died intestate.

!he fight for administration of ;icente5s estate ensued. 4n September $%, &''3, private

respondents ;ictoria >eniteG9irio and Feodor >eniteG Aguilar ;icente5s sister and nephe,

respectively/ instituted Sp. ?roc. o. 6'6 '3/ before the !C of San ?ablo City, %th 1udicial

egion, >r. *3. !hey prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of ;icente5s estate in favor

of private respondent Aguilar. !hey alleged,inter alia, i&.0

))) ))) )))

%. !he decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants

or descendants, hether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted# despite

claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can ell and truly

establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel

Chipongian ho pre9deceased him, and hose estate had earlier been settled

e)tra9-udicial, ere ithout issue andHor ithout descendants hatsoever, and

that one Marissa >eniteG9>adua ho as raised and cared by them since

childhood is, in fact, not related t o them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is

therefore not a legal heir# . . .

4n ovember $, &''3, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of thedeceased ;icente >eniteG and capable of administering his estate. !he parties further e)changed

reply and re-oinder to buttress their legal postures.

!he trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner5s heirship to the estate of the

deceased. ?etitioner tried to prove that she is t he only legitimate child of the spouses ;icente

>eniteG and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence, among others0 &/ her

Certificate of ive >irth ")h. */# $/ >aptismal Certificate ")h. %/# */ Income !a) eturns and

Information Sheet for Membership ith the BSIS of the late ;icente naming her as his daughter

")hs. &3 to $&/# and %/ School ecords ")hs. : @/. She also testified that the said spouses

reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. 4n the other hand, private

respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a

child during their marriage# that the late Isabel, then thirty si) *@/ years of age, as ev en referredto Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted obstetrician9gynecologist, for treatment. !heir primary

itness, ;ictoria >eniteG9irio, elder sister of the late ;icente, then 66 years of age,2categorically

declared that petitioner as not the biological child of the said spouses ho ere unable to

physically procreate.

4n December &6, &''3, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It dismissed the private

respondents petition for letters and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate

daughter and sole heir of the spouses ;icente 4. >eniteG and Isabel Chipongian. !he trial court

relied on Articles &@@ and &63 of the Family Code.

4n appeal, hoever, the Decision of the trial court as reversed on May $', &''$ by the &6th

Division of the Court of Appeals. !he dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court

states0

=2""F4", the decision appealed from herein is ";"S"D and another

one entered declaring that appellee Marissa >eniteG is not the biological

daughter or child by nature of the spouse ;icente 4. >eniteG and I sabel

Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased ;icente 4.

>eniteG. 2er opposition to the petition for the appointment of an administrator

of the intestate of the deceased ;icente 4. >eniteG is, conse(uently, D"I"D#

said petition and the proceedings already conducted therein reinstated# and

the loer court is directed to proceed ith t he hearing of Special proceeding

o. S?96'6 '3/ in accordance ith la and the ules.

Costs against appellee.

S4 4D""D.

In -u)taposition, the appellate court held that the trial c ourt erred in applying Articles &@@ and &63 of

the Family Code.

In this petition for revie, petitioner contends0

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&. !he 2onorable Court of Appeals committed error of la and

misapprehension of facts hen it failed to apply the provisions, more

particularly, Arts. &@%, &@@, &63 and &6& of the Family Code in this case and in

adopting and upholding private respondent5s theory that the instant case does

not involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child#

$. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can (uestion or impugn

directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa5s birth, still the respondent

appellate Court committed grave abuse of discretion hen it gave more

eight to the testimonial evidence of itnesses of private respondents hose

credibility and demeanor have not convinced the trial court of t he truth and

sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial evidence of t he no

petitioner Marissa >eniteG9>adua#

*. !he 2onorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a ay not in

accord ith la or ith applicable decisions of t he supreme Court, more

particularly, on prescription or laches.

=e find no merit to the petition.

?etitioner5s insistence on the applicability of Articles &@%, &@@, &63 and &6& of the Family Code to

the case at bench cannot be sustained. !hese articles provide0

Art. &@%. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are

legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the ife ith sperm

of the husband or that of a donor or both are lieise legitimate children of the

husband and his ife, provided, that both of them authoriGed or ratified such

insemination in a ritten instrument e)ecuted and signed by them before t hebirth of the child. !he instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together

ith the birth certificate of the child.

Art. &@@. egitimacy of child may be impugned only on the folloing grounds0

&/ !hat it as physically impossible for t he husband to have se)ual

intercourse ith his ife ithin the first &$3 days of the *33 days hich

immediately preceded the birth of the child because of0

a/ the physical incapacity of the husband to have se)ual

intercourse ith his ife#

b/ the fact that the husband and ife ere living

separately in such a ay that se)ual intercourse as not

possible# or

c/ serious illness of the husband, hich absolutely

prevented se)ual intercourse.

$/ !hat it is proved that f or biological or other scientific reasons, the child

could not have been that of the husband e)cept in the instance provided in the

second paragraph of Article &@%# or

*/ !hat in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the

ritten authoriGation or ratification of either parent as obtained through

mistae, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

Art. &63. !he action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought

ithin one year from the noledge of the birth or its recording in the civil

register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in

the city or municipality here the birth t oo place or as recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of

birth as defined in the first paragraph or here it as recorded, the period

shall be to years if they s hould reside in the ?hilippines# and three years if

abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or as unnon to

the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or

noledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth,

hich ever is earlier.

Art. &6&. !he heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child ithin

the period prescribed in the preceding Article only in the folloing case0

&/ If the husband should die before the e)piration of the period fi)ed for

bringing his action#

$/ If he should die after the filing of the complaint, ithout having desisted

therefrom# or

*/ If the child as born aft er the death of the husband.

A careful reading of the above articles ill sho that they do not contemplate a situation, lie in the

instant case, here a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certaincouple. ather, these articles govern a situation here a husband or his heirs/ denies as his on

a child of his ife. !hus, under Article &@@, it is thehusbandho can impugn the legitimacy of said

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child by proving0 &/ it as physically impossible for him to have se)ual intercourse, ith his ife

ithin the first &$3 days of the *33 days hich immediately preceded the birth of the child# $/ that

for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child# */ that in cas e of

children conceived through artificial insemination, the ritten authoriGation or ratification by either

parent as obtained through mistae, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles &63

and &6& reinforce this reading as they spea of t he prescriptive period ithin hich thehusband or

any of his heirsshould file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the

appellate court did not err hen it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case

at bench is not one here the heirs of the late ;icente are contending that petitioner is not his childby Isabel. ather, their clear submission is that petitioner as not born to ;icente and Isabel. 4ur

ruling in Cabatbat-Lim s.#ntermediate "ppellate Court,&@@ SCA %:&, %:6 cited in the impugned

decision is apropos, i&.0

?etitioners5 recourse to Article $@* of the e Civil Code Eno Article &63 of

the Family Code is not ell9taen. !his legal provision refers to an action to

impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action

to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to

claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. !hey do

not claim that petitioner ;ioleta Cabatbat im is an illegitimate c hild of the

deceased, but that she is not the decedent5s child at all. >eing neither legallyadopted child, nor an acnoledged natural child, nor a child by legal fict ion of

"speranGa Cabatbat, ;ioleta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

=e no come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner as not the biological child

or child of nature of the spouses ;icente >eniteG and Isabel Chipongian. !he appellate court

e)haustively dissected the evidence of the parties as follos0

. . . And on this issue, e are constrained to say that appellee5s evidence is

utterly insufficient to establish her biological and blood inship ith the

aforesaid spouses, hile the evidence on record is strong and convincing that

she is not, but that said couple being childless and desirous as they ere of

having a child, the late ;icente 4. >eniteG too Marissa from somehere

hile still a baby, and ithout he and his ife5s legally adopting her treated,

cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their on true child, giving her

the status as not so, such that she herself had believed that she as really

their daughter and entitled to inherit from them as such.

!he strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the folloing0

irst, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel Chipongian never

became pregnant and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel5s on only

brother and sibling, Dr. ino Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already

been married for ten years and as already about *@ years old and still she

has not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even had t o refer her

to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a ell9non and eminent obstetrician9

gynecologist and the 4> of his mother and ife, ho treated his sister for a

number of years. !here is lieise the testimony of the elder sister of the

deceased ;icente 4. >eniteG, ;ictoria >eniteG irio, ho then, being a

teacher, helped him he being the only boy and the youngest of the children of

their idoed mother/ through la school, and hom ;icente and his ife

highly respected and consulted on family matters, that her brother ;icente and

his ife Isabel being childless, they anted to adopt her youngest daughter

and hen she refused, they looed for a baby t o adopt elsehere, that;icente found to baby boys but Isabel anted a baby girl as she feared a

boy might gro up unruly and uncontrollable, and that ;icente finally brought

home a baby girl and told his elder sister ;ictoria he ould register the baby

as his and his ife5s child. ;ictoria >eniteG irio as already 66 years old and

too ea to travel and come to court in San ?ablo City, so that the taing of

her testimony by the presiding -udge of the loer c ourt had to be held at her

residence in ?araa(ue, MM. Considering, her advanced age and ea

physical condition at the time she testified in this case, ;ictoria >eniteG irio5s

testimony is highly trustorthy and credible, for as one ho may be called by

her Creator at any time, she ould hardly be i nterested in material things

anymore and can be e)pected not to lie, especially under her oath as aitness. !here ere also several disinterested neighbors of the couple

;icente 4. >eniteG and Isabel Chipongian in agcarlan, aguna Sergio Fule,

Cecilia Coronado, and >en-amin C. Asendido/ ho testified in this case and

declared that they used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as she had

drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but they never sa her to have

been pregnant, in &':% the year appellee Marissa >eniteG as allegedly

born, according to her birth certificate ")h.


10/113

Second, appellee5s birth certificate ")h. eniteG

appearing as the informant, is highly (uestionable and suspicious. For if

;icente5s ife Isabel, ho ads already *@ years old at the time of the child5s

supposed birth, as truly the mother of that child, as reported by ;icente in

her birth certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital under

the e)perienced, sillful and caring hands of Isabel5s obstetrician9gynecologist

Dr. Constantino Manahan, since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel

ould have been difficult and (uite risy to her health and even life8 2o

come, then, that as appearing in appellee5s birth certificate, Marissa assupposedly born at the >eniteG home in Avenida iGal, agcarlan, aguna,

ith no physician or even a midife attending8

At this -uncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become a practice in

recent times for people ho ant to avoid the e)pense and trouble of a

-udicial adoption to simply register the child as their supposed child in the civil

registry. ?erhaps Atty. >eniteG, though a layer himself, thought t hat he could

avoid the trouble if not the e)pense of adopting the child Marissa through

court proceedings by merely putting himself and his ife as the parents of the

child in her birth certificate. 4r perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the

child hen she gre a little older but did not come around doing so eitherbecause he as too busy or for some other reason. >ut definitely, the mere

registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of t he supposed

parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an

adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of

simulation of the child5s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, hich

is a public document.

Third, if appellee Marissa >eniteG is truly the real, biological daughter of the

late ;icente 4. >eniteG and his ife Isabel Chipongian, hy did he and

Isabel5s only brother and sibling Dr. ilo Chipongian, after Isabel5s death on

April $:, &'+$, state in the e)tra-udicial settlement")h.


11/113

=e sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on record. !he eight of

these findings as not negated by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most

notable of hich is her Certificate of ive >irth ")h. eniteG, and

Dr. ilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notariGed document, they st ated that irth of petitioner here it appeared that he as petitioner5s father. !he repudiation as made

tenty9eight years after he signed petitioner5s Certificate of ive >irth.

I ;I"= =2""4F, the petition for revie is dismissed for lac of merit. Costs against petitioner.

S4 4D""D.

11 | P a g e


12/113

G.R. No. L-4912 "y 2/, 19/7

ANI+' MARI' AO, !e6!ese%ted by e! mote! a%d $"a!dia% ad item, ARL'N' ).)ALGADO,petitioner,vs.

' ONORAL' +O&R O A'AL) a%d 'RI+O *. AO,respondents.

ADILLA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decisionKof the Court of Appeals in CA9B.. o. :&36+9, dated $'

August &'6+, hich dismissed petitionerureau of Investigation >I/ upon order of the trial court. !he result of the blood grouping test,

held $& 1anuary &'@', indicated that 1anice could not have been the possible offspring of ?erico ;.

1ao and Arlene S. Salgado.&

!he trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiffoulevard.

!hese conflicting versions of the parties emphasiGe, in resolving the paternity of

1AIC", the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the >I and hich resulted in

the negative finding that in a union ith A"", 1A4 could not be the father of

1AIC".

=e cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the >I is not in a position to

determine ith mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,

considering the rulings of this Court ... here the blood grouping tests of the >I ere

admitted# especially here, in the latter case, it as Dr. orenGo Sunico ho conducted

the test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the

findings and report. ... In Co !ao vs. Court of Appeals, &3& ?hil. &++, the Supreme Court

had given eight to the findings of t he >I in its blood grouping test. !hus, it cannot be

gainsaid that the competency of the >I t o conduct blood grouping tests has been

recogniGed as early as the &':3ut group blood testing

cannot sho that a man is t he father of a particular child, but at least can

sho only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in

others, have recogniGed the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of

12 | P a g e
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49162_1987.html#fnthttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49162_1987.html#fnthttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49162_1987.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49162_1987.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49162_1987.html#fnthttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1987/jul1987/gr_l-49162_1987.html#fnt1


13/113

the decisions have recogniGed the conclusive presumption of non9paternity

here the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, sho the

impossibility of the alleged paternity. !his is one of the fe cases in hich the

-udgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and

intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred here the finding is

alloed to turn on oral testimony conflicting ith the results of the test.

!he findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of

paternity as they sho only a possibility that the alleged father or any one ofmany others ith the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

>ut the 7niform Act recogniGes that the tests may have some probative value

to establish paternity here the blood type and the combination in the child is

shon to be rare, in hich case the -udge is given discretion to let it in I

1ones on "vidence, :th "d., pp. &'*9&'%/.

In one specific biological trait, viG,blood !roups, scientific opinion is no in

accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation beteen the trait

of the progenitor and the trait of t he progeny. In other ords, the blood

composition of a child may be some evidence as to the childut

thus far this trait in the present state of scientific discovery as generallyaccepted/ can be used onlyne!atielyi.e. to evidence that a particular man F

is not the father of a particular child C. I =igmore on "vidence *rd "d., pp.

@&39@&&/.

In a last ditch effort t o bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test, 1AIC"

claims that probative value as given to blood tests only in cases here they tended to

establish paternity# and that there has been no case here the blood test as invoed to

establish non9paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only hen

the result is a possible affirmative and not hen in the negative. !his contention is

fallacious and must be re-ected. !o sustain her contention, in effect, ould be

recogniGing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself forif the result ere negative, the t est is regarded orthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As

an admitted test, it is admissible in subse(uent similar proceedings hether the result be

in the negative or in the affirmative. .. .

!he Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner


14/113

!he petitioner no brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and conclusiveness of the

result of blood grouping tests to prove non9paternity.

In this -urisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to,affirm paternityas dealt

ith in Co Tao . Court of "ppeals,$an action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In

said case, the >I e)pert


15/113

G.R. No. 10437 eb!"a!y 23, 1994

AR'MIO G. ILANO, petitioner,vs.

' +O&R O A'AL) a%d M'R+'DIA) 8si: ). ILANO, !e6!ese%ted by e! mote!,L'ON+IA D' LO) )ANO), respondent.

+rnesto %. %an!alan!an for petitioner.

+duardo S. Rodri!ue& for priate respondent.

NO+ON, J.:

After the great flood, man as commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill t he earth. 4thers

did not heed the se(uence of this command because they multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is

no commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for recognition and

support.

!he antecedent facts are narrated in the trial c ourt5s decision, as follos0

eoncia first met petitioner Artemio B. Ilano hile she as oring as secretary to Atty. Mariano C.

;irata. ?etitioner as one of the clients of

Atty. ;irata. 4n several occasions, she and petitioner too lunch together. In less that a year5s time,

she resigned from her or.

Sometime in &':6, eoncia, then managing a business of her on as amarco distributor, met

petitioner again ho as engaged in the same business and they reneed ac(uaintances. Since

then, he ould give her his unsold allocation of goods. ater, he courted her more than four years.!heir relationship became intimate and ith his promise of marriage, they eloped to Buagua,

?ampanga in April, &'@$. !hey stayed at a Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas

!elephone Company branch office, of hich he is t he president and general manager. 2e came

home to her three or four times a ee.

!he apartment as procured by Melencio eyes, 4fficer9in9Charge of the F ilipinas !elephone

Company branch office. 2e also too care of the mareting and paid rentals, lights and ater

bills.17nable to spea the local dialect, eoncia as provided also by Melencio ith a maid by thename of ena. ?etitioner used to give her ?633.33 a month for their e)penses at home.

In 1une, &'@$, eoncia, ho as conceiving at that time, as fetched by petitioner and theytransferred to San 1uan St., ?asay City. In 4ctober, &'@$, she delivered a still9born female child at

the Manila Sanitarium. !he death certificate as signed by petitioner.2!hereafter, hile they ere

living at 2ighay :%, Maati, private respondent Merceditas S. I lano as born on December *3,

&'@* also at the Manila Sanitarium. 2er birth as recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,

child of eoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio BeluG Ilano.3eoncia submitted receiptsissued by the Manila Sanitarium to sho that she as confined there from December *3, &'@* until

1anuary $, &'@% under the name of Mrs. eoncia Ilano.4

!he support by petitioner for eoncia and Merceditas as sometimes in the form of cash

personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru "lynia niece of eoncia/5or thru Merceditas

herself#and sometimes in the form of a chec lie Manila >aning Corporation Chec o.+&:*$,7the signature appearing thereon having been identified by eoncia as that of petitionerbecause he often gives her checs hich he iss ues at home and sa him sign t he checs./>othpetitioner and his daughter admitted that the chec and the signature are those of the former.9

During the time that petitioner and eoncia ere living as husband and ife, he shoed concern as

the father of Merceditas. =hen Merceditas as in Brade I at the St. 1oseph ?arochial School, he

signed her eport Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods10as her parent. !hose signaturesere both identified by eoncia and Merceditas because he signed them in their residence in their

presence and of "lynia.11Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he as already t he onehom she recogniGed as her Daddy.122e treated her as a father ould t o his child. 2e ould bring

home candies, toys, and anything a child en-oys. 2e ould tae her for a drive, eat at restaurants,and even cuddle her to sleep.13

=hen petitioner ran as a candidate in the ?rovincial >oard of Cavite, he gave eoncia his picture

ith the folloing dedication0

In May, &'@*, uth "lynia Mabanglo, niece of eoncia, lived ith eoncia and petitioner. She

accompanied her aunt hen she started having labor pains in the morning of December *3, &'@*.

?etitioner arrived after five o5cloc in the afternoon. =hen the nurse c ame to in(uire about the

child, eoncia as still unconscious so it as from petitioner that the nurse sought the information.

Inasmuch as it as already past seven o5cloc in the evening, the nurse promised to return the

folloing morning for his signature. 2oever, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to

eoncia for her signature, as he as leaving early the folloing morning.

?rior to the birth of Merceditas, "lynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes ith petitioner

in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal

chec9up. At times, she used to go to his office at @&: Sales St., Sta. CruG, Manila, upon his

instructions to get money as support and sometimes he ould send notes of e)planation if he

cannot come hich she in turn gave to her aunt.15!hey stayed at &&$ Arellano St., then Sta. CruG,Manila in &'@@ before they finally transferred to Bagalangin in &'@6. ?etitioner lived ith them up

to 1une, &'6& hen he stopped coming home.

?etitioner5s defense as a total and complete denial of any relationship ith eoncia and

Merceditas. 2e disoned the handritten ansers and signatures opposite column &@ of the death

certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in column &* thereof opposite father5s name

15 | P a g e


16/113

the typeritten name, Artemio B. Ilano, appears. 2e also denied the folloing0 all t he notes alleged

to have been received from him by "lynia f or delivery to eoncia# the signatures appearing in

Merceditas5 eport Card# and being the source of a photo of himself ith a handritten dedication.

2e admitted that Manila >aning Corporation Chec o. +&:*$ including the signature is his. 2e

as sic on December *3, &'@* and as hospitaliGed on 1anuary 6, &'@%.12e does notunderstand hy this case as filed against him.17

Melencio admitted that he as the one ho procured the apartment for eoncia, leased it in his

name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. 2e and eoncia lived together andshared the same bed. !hey later transferred to San 1uan St., ?asay City and to 2ighay :%,

Maati. 2e stopped visiting her in March or April, &'@* because he planned to get married ith

another hich he eventually did in September, &'@*.

Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by Melencio hich

ere received by eoncia.

ilda Ilano amos, daughter of petitioner, does not no eoncia# neither has she been brought to

their family home in Imus, Cavite. 4n December *3, &'@*, her father as at their home because

he got sic on December $:, &'@* and as advised to have a complete bed rest. 2er father as

hospitaliGed on 1anuary 6, &'@%. She denied that her father as at the Manila Sanitarium on

December *3, &'@*# that he fetched a certain oman on 1anuary $, &'@%, at the Manila Sanitarium

because he as at their home at that time# and that her father lived ith a certain oman in &'@*

up to 1une, &'6& because all this t ime he as living ith them in I mus, Cavite. 2e as oring and

reporting to the office everyday and hen he goes to Buagua or Manila on business, her mother or

brother goes ith him.

;ictoria 1. Ilano, petitioner5s ife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about petitioner5s

sicness on December *3, &'@* and hospitaliGation on 1anuary 6, &'@%. I t could not be true that

her husband, during the years &'@* to &'@+, lived three */ times a ee ith a certain eoncia de

los Santos because her husband never slept out of t heir house and that in his capacity as

?resident and Chairman of the >oard of the Filipinas !elephone Company he does not go to

Buagua even once a year because they have a branch manager, Melencio eyes.

After eighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court as not fully

satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of t he folloing0

&/ petitioner and eoncia ere not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas5 conception#

$/ testimony of Melencio that he fre(uented the apartment here eoncia as living, too care of

all the bills and shared the same bed ith her#

*/ the birth certificate of Merceditas as not signed by petitioner#

%/ petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas# and

:/ there is no clear and sufficient shoing that s upport as given by petitioner to Merceditas.

!hus it rendered -udgment on April $%, &'+& dismissing the complaint.1/

Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the same vie as

the trial court. A revie of the testimonial and documentary evidenced adduced by private

respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to

support. !he dispositive portion of its decision dated December &6, &''& reads0

=2""F4", the Decision appealed from is ";"S"D and -udgment is

hereby rendered declaring plaintiff M"C"DI!AS S. IA4 as the duly

acnoledged and recogniGed illegitimate child of defendant A!"MI4 B.

IA4 ith all the right appurtenant to such status.

Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of

"IB2! 27D"D ?+33.33/ ?"S4S a month from the date of the filing of

the complaint on August &@, &'6$ up to August &:, &'6:# 4" !247SAD

?&,333.33/ ?"S4S a month from August &@, &'6: to August &:, &'6+# 4"

!247SAD !2"" 27D"D ?&,*33.33/ ?"S4S a month from August

&@, &'6+ to August &:, &'+ and 4" !247SAD FI;" 27D"D

?&,:33.33/ a month from August &@, &'+& up to the time she reached the age

of ma-ority on December *3, &'+%.

Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of ?&3,333.33 as

attorney5s fees plus the costs.

S4 4D""D.19

!he motion for reconsideration as denied in the resolution dated February $@, &''$.20

2ence, the present petition.

=e shall resolve the folloing pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent court0

&/ in aarding


17/113

?etitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court,

therefore as absolutely no obligation on his part to give s upport to Merceditas. It ould have been

only from the date of the - udgment of the trial court that support should have commenced, if so

granted. 7nder the la in force hen the complaint as filed, an adulterous child cannot maintain

an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary

recognition, it must be signed by the father. "(uivocal act, such as signing under the caption


18/113

supplies and services needed in the apartment for hich procurement

Melencio gives to eoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for

li(uidation of cash advances Artemio or the Buagua !elephone System or

eoncia herself, gives to Melencio ")hs. A, A9& to &%# !S, p. *$, +H&*H6*#

!S, pp. 6, &$ and &%, &H$:H6%/.

At the Buagua apartment, Artemio ould visit eoncia three of four times a

ee and sleeps there !S, p. %6, +H&*H6*/. Artemio as giving eoncia an

alloance of ?633.33 a month !S, p. *+, 6H&+H6*/.

eoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute beteen Cavite

and Buagua so that in 1une &'@$, Artemio transferred eoncia to Calle San

1uan, ?asay City !S, pp. &'9$3, 6H&+H6*/ here t hey ere non as

husband and ife id. p. %&/. In leaving Buagua for San 1uan, ?asay City,

eoncia as fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. pp. '9&&,

Appellant5s >rief/

"ven as Artemio and eoncia lived and transferred to several places

heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of

Artemio ho ould deliver notes ")hs.


19/113

2aving discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then applied

paragraph $/ of Article $+*0

!he court a $uodid not lieise consider the evidences as sufficient to

establish that plaintiff as in continuous possession of s tatus of a child in vie

of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient

evidence that the support as really given to plaintiff5s mother. !he belated

denial of paternity after the action has been f iled against the putative father is

not the denial that ould destroy the paternity of the child hich had alreadybeen recogniGed by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that

he is plaintiff5s f ather. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot

be ithdran. A mere change of mind ould be incompatible ith the stability

of the civil status of person, the permanence of hich affects public interest.

"ven hen the act in hich it is made should be revocable, the revocation of

such act ill not revoe t he recognition itself & !olentino, pp. :6'9:+3, &'+*

"d./.

!o be sure, to establish oth Artemio and ilda admitted that the chec and s ignature

ere those of Artemio !S, p. :*, &3H&6H66#

!S, p. &', &3H'H6+/.

During the time that Artemio and eoncia ere living as husband and ife,Artemio has shon concern as the father of Merceditas sic/. =hen

Merceditas sic/ as in Brade & at the St . 1oseph ?arochial School, Artemio

signed the eport Card of Merceditas sic/ ")h.


20/113

defendant, ho claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, as the

father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter5s signatures and

handriting.2/

Branting e2 !ratia ar!umentthat private respondent5s evidence is not sufficient proof of continuos

possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied ne)t paragraph %/ of Article $+*0

. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . is/ t oo replete ith

details that are coherent, logical and natural hich cannot be categoriGed asmere fabrications of an inventive and malicious mind of hich eoncia de los

Santos as not shon to possess.

!he natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the

relationship beteen eoncia and appellee, their living together as

circumstances of plaintiff5s birth, the acts of appellee in recogniGing and

supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary

evidence hich leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity hich may

not be infirmed by his belated denials.

otably, the courta $uodid not consider plaintiff5s evidence as lacing in

credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that defendant is the father

since the Certificate of ive >irth as not signed by appellee and since the

monthly report card is not sufficient to establish recognition, considering the

denial of the defendant of his signature appearing thereon.

=hile defendant5s signature does not appear in the Certificate of ive >irth,

the evidence indubitably discloses/ that eoncia gave birth on December *3,

&'@* to Merceditas sic/ at %0$6 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived

at about :033 !S, p. $:, :H&6H6%/. At about 6033 p.m., a nurse came id. p.

$@/ ho made in(uiries about the biodata of the born child. !he in(uiries ere

directed to Artemio in the presence of "lynia ho heard the ansers of

Artemio hich the nurse too don in a s heet of paper id. p. $+/. !he

in(uiries ere about the name of the father, mother and child. After the

intervie the nurse told them that the information has to be recorded in the

formal form and has to be signed by Artemio id. p. *3/ but because there is

no office, as it as past 6033 p.m., the nurse ould -ust return in the morning

for Artemio5s signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the

biodata to eoncia for her signature as he as leaving very early the folloing

morning as in fact Artemio left at :033 a.m. of December *&, &'@* id. p. **/.

Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December *3, &'@* id. p. $@/.

As pointed out in Castro s.Court of "ppeals, &6* SCA @:@0

!he ruling in Roces s.Local Ciil Re!istrar of

*anila&3$ ?hil. &3:3 E&':+ andBerciles

./oernment Serice #nsurance System&$+ SCA :*

E&'+% that if the father did not sign in the birth certificate,

the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, register, or

other person is incompetent evidence of paternity does

not apply to this case because it as "usta(uio himself

ho ent to the municipal building and gave all the data

about his daughter5s birth. . . .

. . . the t otality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient toestablish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff

Merceditas sic/ Ilano.

As elucidated in *endo&a s.Court of "ppeals, Supra0

))) ))) )))

. . . although !eopista has failed to sho that she as in open and continuous

possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, e find that she

has nevertheless established that status by another method.

=hat both the trial court and the respondent did not tae into account is that

an illegitimate child is alloed to establish his claimed affiliation by ible in hich his name has been entered, common

reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of

itnesses, and other inds of proof admissible under ule &*3 of the ules of

Court.29

!he last paragraph of Article $+* contains a blanet provision that practically covers all t he other

cases in the preceding paragraphs.


21/113

be paid e)cept from the date of -udicial or e)tra-udicial demand. Article $3*,

Family Code of the ?hilippines./

!he complaint in this case as f iled on August &%, &'6$. ?laintiff, having been

born on December *3, &'@*, as about nine '/ years old at the time and as

already of school age spending about ?%33.33 to ?:33.33 a month for her

school e)penses alone, hile defendant as earning about ?&3,333.33 a

month. She attained the age of ma-ority on December *3, &'+% Article

$*%, Supra/. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period oftelve &$/ years, four %/ months and fourteen &%/ days, hich is hereby

fi)ed at ?+33.33 a month for the first three */ years# and considering the

declining value of the peso as ell as her needs as she gros older, at a

graduated increase of ?&,333.33 a month for the ne)t t hree */ years#

?&,*33.33 a month for the succeeding three */ years# and ?&,:33.33 a month

for the last three */ years, four %/ months and fourteen &%/ days until she

attained the age of ma-ority.

!his being an action for legal support, the aard of attorney5s fees is

appropriate under Article $$3+ @/ of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court

deems it -ust and e(uitable under the given facts and circumstances thatattorney5s fees and e)penses of litigation should be recovered.32

=e concur ith the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it as arrived at arbitrarily.

!he other allegation of petitioner that the appeal as prosecuted almost t en years after the

decision of the trial court as rendered does not deserve any consideration because it appears

that it is being raised for t he first time in this petition.33

=2""F4", the petition is hereby D"I"D. !he decision of

the Court of Appeals dated December &6, &''& and its resolution dated February $@, &''$ are

AFFIM"D.

S4 4D""D.

21 | P a g e


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G.R. No. 95229 "%e 9, 1992

+ORIO O+AMO A;AG, petitioner,vs.

ON. +O&R O A'AL) a%d 'MILI' DA;RI +&;&GAN, respondent.

R'GALADO, J.

!he instant petition sees to reverse and s et aside the decision1of respondent Court of Appeals in

CA9B.. S? o. $3$$$, entitled


23/113

'. ?laintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of

friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is

urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be e)tended financial support

from the estate of his putative father, Atty. icardo 4campo#

&3. Several demands, verbal and ritten, have been made for defendant to

grant Chad5s laful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed

and refused and still fails and refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the

claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. 4campo#3

))) ))) )))

?laintiff thereafter prays, among others, that -udgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an

inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. icardo 4campo# to

determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in t he estate of the deceased# and to give

him supportpendente lite.

?etitioner, as defendant therein, filed her anser ith counterclaim on 1une *, &'+6, disputing the

material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by ay of affirmative defenses,inter alia, that

the complaint states no cause of action# that the action is premature# that the suit as barred by

prescription# that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and -udicial personality to bring the suit# that

the loer court as no -urisdiction over the nature of the action# and that there is improper -oinder

of causes of action.4

After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial

court issued the folloing order on 4ctober $3, &'+60

))) ))) )))

!he Court is of the considered opinion that t here is a need of further

proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to

hear their respective sides

=2""F4", resolution on the preliminary hearing hich partaes of the

nature of a motion to dismiss re(uiring additional evidence is in the meantime

held in abeyance. !he Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set

for pre9trial . . . 5

=ith the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on ovember &', &'+6,petitioner

filed on December &3, &'+6 a petition forcertiorariand prohibition before the Court of Appeals,

doceted therein as CA9B.. S? o. &*%@%, hich as granted by the Si)th Division of respondentcourt on August $, &'+' and en-oined respondent -udge to resolve petitioner5s motion praying for

the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses ithin ten &3/ days from notice

thereof. 7

In compliance ith said decision of respondent court, the t rial court acted on and thereafter denied

the motion to dismiss, hich had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case o. 6'*+,

in an order dated 4ctober $%, &'+', resolving the said motion in t he folloing manner0

))) ))) )))

!he Court no resolves0

o. &. !he complaint sufficiently shos that a cause of action e)ists in f avor of

the plaintiff. A cause of action being the


24/113

From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient5 in form

and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until

after trial on the merits in hich it should be shon that the allegations of t he

complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action e)ists.

=2""F4", the Motion to Dismiss is hereby D"I"D./

?etitioner5s motion for reconsideration of said order as denied by the trial court on 1anuary *3,

&''3. 9As a conse(uence, another petition forcertiorariand prohibition ith preliminary in-unctionas filed by petitioner on March &$, &''3 ith respondent court, doceted as CA9B.. S? o.

$3$$$, praying that the orders dated 4ctober $%, &'+' and 1anuary *3, &''3 of the trial court be

annulled and set aside for having been issued ith grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac or

e)cess of -urisdiction.

4n May &3, &''3, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the

petition, and lieise denied petitioner5s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated

September :, &''3, hence the present petition for revie oncertiorari.

In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds0

a. !he 2onorable espondent Court of Appeals dismissed ?etitioner5s ?etition

for Certiorariand ?rohibition in 7!!" DIS"BAD 4F A??ICA>"

D"CISI4S 4F !2IS 244A>" C47! providing clear e)ceptions to

the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by ay of the

special civil action ofcertiorari#

b. espondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by ?etitioner

before the egional !rial Court and before espondent Court of Appeals

involving N7"S!I4S 4F S7>S!AC" not theretofore determined by t his

2onorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. $+& of the

Civil Code re(uiring -udicial approval hen the recognition of an illegitimate

minor child does not tae place in a record of birth or in a ill0 of Art. &6:, ?ar.

$, in relation to Art. &6$, ?ar. $ of the Family Code, providing for the

prescriptive period ith respect to the action t o establish illegitimate filiation#

and of Art. $+: of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period ith

respect to the action for recognition of a natural child# and

c. espondent Court has sanctioned a D"?A!7" by the egional !rial

Court from the accepted and usual course of -udicial proceedings.10

?etitioner contends that the action to claim f or inheritance filed by herein private respondent in

behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action,

she submits that the recognition of t he minor child, either voluntarily or by -udicial action, by the

alleged putative father must first be established before the f ormer can invoe his right to succeed

and participate in the estate of the latter. ?etitioner asseverates that s ince there is no allegation of

such recognition in the complaint denominated as


25/113

necessity re(uiring that the action to compel acnoledgment should have

been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in

hich that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir.

Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acnoledgment

as to re(uire that a rule should be here applied different from that generally

applicable in other cases. . .

!he conclusion above stated, though not heretofore e)plicitly formulated by

this court, is undoubtedly to some e)tent supported by our prior decisions.!hus, e have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered

ell settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acnoledgment, but

ho has not been in fact legally acnoledged, may maintain partition

proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co9heirs . . .# and the

same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of

his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it

been thought necessary for the plaintiff to sho a prior decree compelling

acnoledgment. !he obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution

proceedings the other persons ho might tae by inheritance are before the

court# and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

!he ne)t (uestion to be resolved is hether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.

?etitioner argues that assumingar!uendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private

respondent5s cause of action has prescribed for the reason that s ince filiation is sought to be

proved by means of a private handritten instrument signed by t he parent concerned, then under

paragraph $, Article &6: of the Family Code, the action to establish f iliation of the illegitimate minor

child must be brought during the lifetime of t he alleged putative father. In the case at bar,

considering that the complaint as filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has

prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. ?etitioner theoriGes that

Article $+: of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph $, Article

&6: of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. !he theory is premised on thesupposition that the latter provision of la being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are

created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively.

Article $+: of the Civil Code provides0

Art. $+:. !he action for the recognition of natural c hildren may be brought only

during the lifetime of the presumed parents, e)cept in the folloing cases0

&/ If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in hich cas e

the latter may file the action before the e)piration of four years from the

attainment of his ma-ority#

))) ))) )))

4n the other hand, Article &6: of the Family Code reads0

Art. &6:. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the

same ay and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

!he action must be brought ithin the same period specified in Article &6*,

e)cept hen the action is based on t he second paragraph of Article &6$, in

hich case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

7nder the last9(uoted provision of la, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the

child, a final -udgment, or an admission by the parent of the child5s filiation in a public document or

in a private handritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the

child. 2oever, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the

status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence alloed by the ules of Court and special las,

the vie has been e)pressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged

parent. 13

?etitioner submits that Article &6: of the Family Code applies in hich case the complaint should

have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing hich the same must be dismissed

on the ground of prescription. ?rivate respondent, hoever, insists that Article $+: of the Civil Code

is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for

filiation may be filed ithin four years from the attainment of ma-ority of the minor child.

Article $:@ of the Family Code states that


26/113

especially here vested rights may be pre-udiced. Accordingly, Article &6: of the Family Code finds

no proper application to the instant case since it ill ineluctably affect adversely a right of private

respondent and, conse(uentially, of the mind child s he represents, both of hich have been vested

ith the filing of the complaint in court. !he trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions

of Article $+: of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent5s cause of action has not yet

prescribed.

Finally, e conform ith the holding of the Court of Appeals that the (uestioned order of the court

belo denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and c annot be the sub-ect of a petitionfor certiorari. !he e)ceptions to this rule invoed by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at

bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.

=2""F4", the petition at bar is D"I"D and the assailed decision and resolution of

respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIM"Din toto.

S4 4D""D.

26 | P a g e


27/113

G.R. No. 10/3 eb!"a!y 1, 1994

ON A&L '. 'RNAND', ' AL., petitioners,vs.

' +O&R O A'AL) a%d +ARLIO ). 'RNAND', respondents.

+rlinda B. +spejo for petitioners.

C.B. Carbon 3 "ssociates for priate respondent.

&NO, J.:

!he legal dispute beteen the parties began hen the petitioners filed Civil Case o. N9%::@6 for

support against the private respondent before the !C of NueGon City. !he complaint as

dismissed on December ', &'+@ by 1udge Antonio ?. Solano,1ho found that ranch +6. !he case as doceted as Civil Case o. N9:3&&&.

!he evidence shos that ;I4"!A ?. "SB7"A, single, is the mother and guardianad litem of

the to petitioners, CA4 A!4I4 F"AD"O and 142 ?A7 F"AD"O, met

sometime in &'+*, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis

enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his ee9ends regularly at said courts, here ;ioleta5s father

served as tennis instructor.

;ioleta pointed to Carlito as the father of her t o sons. She claimed that they started their illicit

se)ual relationship si) @/ months after their first meeting. !he tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner

Claro Antonio on March &, &'+%, and of petitioner 1ohn ?aul on not no that Carlito as married

until the birth of her to c hildren. She averred they ere married in civil rites in 4ctober, &'+*. In

March, &'+:, hoever, she discovered that the marriage license hich they used as spurious.

!o bolster their case, petitioners presented the folloing documentary evidence0 their certificates of

live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as their father# the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro

hich also states that his father is respondent Carlito# photographs of Carlito taen during the

baptism of petitioner Claro# and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taen at the home of;ioleta "sguerra.

?etitioners lieise presented as itnesses, osario Cantoria,3Dr. Milagros ;illanueva,4ubyChua Cu,5and Fr. iberato FernandeG.!he first three itnesses told the t rial court that ;ioleta"sguerra had, at different times,7introduced the private respondent to them as her


28/113

credence to the self9serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito FernandeG# and @/

holding that the principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.

=e find no merit in the petition.

!he rule is ell9settled that findings of f acts of the Court of Appeals may be revieed by t his court

only under e)ceptional circumstances. 4ne such situation is hen t he findings of the appellate

court clash ith those of t he trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to e)ercise

our e)traordinary poer, and settle the issue of hether the ruling of the appellate court that privaterespondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.

=e shall first e)amine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners hich the respondent

court re-ected as insufficient to prove their filiation. F irstly, e hold that petitioners cannot rely on

the photographs shoing the presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro

")h. 9+


29/113

N ?lease point to the court8

A !here itness pointing to the defendant, Carlito

FernandeG/.

N For instance, -ust give us more specifically hat

(uestion do you remember having ased him8

A Les, lie for e)ample, do you renounce Satan and hisors8

N =hat as the anser of FernandeG8

A Les, I do.

N I -ust ant to be sure, Father, ill you please loo at

the defendant again. I ant to be s ure if he is the person

ho appeared before you on that occasion8

A I am sure.

!S, May $*, &'+@, pp. &%9&@/

2oever, on cross e)amination, Father FernandeG admitted that he has to be shon a picture of

the private respondent by ;ioleta "sguerra to recogniGe the private respondent,i&4

N =hen as the, appro)imately, hen you ere first

shon this picture by ;ioleta "sguerra8

A I cannot recall.

N At least the month and the year8

A It must be in &'+@.

N =hat month in &'+@.

A It is difficult. . .

N =hen as the first time you no you are going to

testify here8

A et us see, you came there to times and first one as

you ant to get a baptismal certificate and then the

second time as I ased you f or hat is this8 And you

said it is for the court.

N 4n the second time that Ms. ;ioleta "sguerra ent to

your place, you ere already informed that you ill test ify

here before this 2onorable Court8

A Les.

N And you ere informed by this Ms. ;ioleta "sguerra

that this man earing the blue !9shirt is the father8

A Les, sir.

N So, it as ;ioleta "sguerra ho. . .

A Les.

!S, May $*, &'+@, pp. &+ to $$/

Indeed, there is no proof that Father FernandeG is a close friend of ;ioleta "sguerra and the

private respondent hich should render un(uestionable his identification of the private respondent

during petitioner Claro5s baptism. In the absence of this proof, e are not prepared to concede that

Father FernandeG ho officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can

remember the parents of the children he has baptiGed.

=e cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility of ;ioleta "sguerra.

2er testimony is highly suspect as it is self9serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternityof the petitioners.

=e shall not pass upon the correctness of t he ruling of the respondent appellate court applying the

doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and

support. It is unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate

their cause of action.

I ;I"= =2""4F, the petition is DI SMISS"Dand the Decision of the respondent court in CA9

B.. C; o. $'&+$ is AFFIM"D. Costs against petitioners.

S4 4D""D.

29 | P a g e


30/113

G.R. No. 124/14 Otobe! 21, 2004

+AM'LO +AAANIA, petitioner,vs.

+O&R O A'AL) a%d +AM'LO R'GODO), respondents.

D " C I S I 4

+ORONA, J.

>efore us is a petition for revie on certiorari under ule %: of the ules of Court assailing the

March &:, &''@ decision&of the Court of Appeals in CA9B.. *@63+ hich in t urn affirmed the

decision of the egional !rial Court of CadiG City, >ranch @3 in Spec. ?roc. o. ++9C hich

compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acnoledge private respondent Camelo egodos as

his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of ?:33 per month.

!his controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia egodos in

behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo egodos.

During the trial, Florencia testified that she as the mother of private respondent ho as born on

September ', &'+$ and that she as the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her

husband left her in the early part of &'+&, she ent to "scalante, egros 4ccidental to loo for

or and as eventually hired as petitionerPs household help. It as hile oring there as a maid

that, on 1anuary $, &'+$, petitioner brought her to >acolod City here they checed in at the

;isayan Motel and had se)ual intercourse. ?etitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she as carrying petitionerPs child $6 days after their se)ual

encounter. !he se)ual intercourse as repeated in March &'+$ in San Carlos City. ater, on

suspicion that Florencia as pregnant, petitionerPs ife sent her home. >ut petitioner instead

brought her to Singcang, >acolod City here he rented a house for her. 4n September ', &'+$,

assisted by ahilotin her auntPs house in !iglaigan, CadiG City, she gave birth to her child, private

respondent Camelo egodos.

?etitioner Camelo CabataniaPs version as different. 2e testified that he as a sugar planter and a

businessman. Sometime in December, &'+&, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the

course of her employment, she ould often go home t o her husband in the afternoon and return to

or the folloing morning. !his displeased petitionerPs ife, hence she as told to loo for

another -ob.

In the meantime, Florencia ased permission from petitioner to go home and spend e LearPs

"ve in CadiG City. ?etitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited

her to dinner. =hile they ere eating, she confided that she as hard up and petitioner offered to

lend her save money. ater, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had se)ual intercourse.

=hile doing it, he felt something -ering and hen he ased her about it, she told him she as

pregnant ith the child of her husband. !hey ent home the f olloing day.

In March &'+$, Florencia, then already oring in another household, ent to petitionerPs house

hoping to be re9employed as a servant there. Since petitionerPs ife as in need of one, she as

re9hired. 2oever petitionerPs ife noticed that her stomach as bulging and in(uired about the

father of the unborn child. She told petitionerPs ife that the baby as by her husband. >ecause of

her condition, she as again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.

?etitioner as therefore surprised hen summons as served on him by FlorenciaPs counsel. She

as demanding support for private respondent Camelo egodos. ?etitioner refused, denying the

alleged paternity. 2e insisted she as already pregnant hen they had se). 2e denied going to

>acolod City ith her and checing in at t he ;isayan Motel. 2e vehemently denied having se) ith

her on 1anuary $, &'+$ and renting a house for her in Singcang, >acolod City.

After trial, the courta $uogave more probative eight to the testimony of Florencia despite its

discovery that she misrepresented herself as a ido hen, in reality, her husband as alive.

Deciding in favor of private respondent, the trial court declared0

!he child as presented before the Court, and if t he Court is to decide this c ase, basedon the personal appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the

plaintiff9minor is the child of the defendant ith plaintiff9minorPs mother, Florencia

egodos.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

In vie of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of t he

plaintiff in support of the claim to


31/113

appellant occurred on 1anuary $, &'+$ and nine '/ months later or on September ',

&'+$, she gave birth to appellee !S, 2earing of 1une &3, &''& and ")hibit . !2" C47! 4F A??"AS ""D I I!S D"CISI4 >AS"D 4 !2" ";ID"C"

ADD7C"D >L "S?4D"! CAM"4 "B4D4S >"F4" !2" !IA C47!.%

Clearly, this petition calls for a revie of the fact ual findings of the to loer courts. As a general

rule, factual issues are not ithin t he province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, hen

adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be

revieed on appeal e)cept &/ hen the inference made is manifestly mistaen, absurd or

impossible# $/ hen there is a grave abuse of discretion# */ hen the finding is grounded entirely

on speculation, surmises or con-ectures# %/ hen the -udgment of t he Court of Appeals is based

on misapprehension of facts# :/ hen the findings of fact are conflicting# @/ hen the Court of

Appeals, in maing its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the

admissions of both appellant and appellee# 6/ hen the findings of the Court of Appeals are

contrary to those of the t rial court# +/ hen the findings of fact are conclusions ithout citation of

specific evidence on hich they are based# '/ hen the Court of Appeals manifestly overloos

certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and hich, if properly considered, -ustifies a

different conclusion, and &3/ hen the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the

absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. !he Court is convinced that

this case falls ithin one of the e)ceptions.:

!he trial courtPs finding of a paternal relationship beteen petitioner and private respondent as

based on the testimony of the childPs mother and


32/113

is based on the broad principles of natural -ustice and t he supposed virtue of the mother. !he

presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from t he odium of illegitimacy.&$

In this age of genetic profiling and deo)yribonucleic acid DA/ analysis, t he e)tremely sub-ective

test of physical resemblance or similarity of features ill not suffice as evidence to prove paternity

and filiation before the courts of la.


33/113

G.R. Nos. /9224-25 a%"a!y 23, 1992

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