civil society and the g20: towards a review of regulatory ... · 3/15/2019 · • migration and...

SOCIALCOHESION,GLOBALGOVERNANCE

ANDTHEFUTUREOFPOLITICS

CivilSocietyandtheG20:TowardsaReviewofRegulatoryModelsand

ApproachesHelmutK.Anheier(HertieSchoolofGovernance&

UniversityofHeidelberg)

StefanToepler(GeorgeMasonUniversity)

March15,2019

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SocialCohesion,GlobalGovernanceandtheFutureofPolitics

Abstract

The relationship between many G20 governments and civil societyorganizations(CSOs)hasbecomemorecomplexandoftencontested.Thispolicybrieffirstfocusesonthreekeyproblemsindicativeofthisstrainedrelationship: the shrinking domestic and international space for civilsociety activities; thewidespread policy neglect of civil society; and theemergenceofnewregulatoryvoids.Inessence,governments,internationalagencies and CSOs have to findmore optimal modes of engagement atnationalandinternationallevels. Next,asaninitialsteptoexplorewaysandmeansfor improvingtherelationshipbetweencivilsocietyandG20governments,thebriefproposestheestablishmentofaninternationaltaskforce of independent experts. This task force would be charged withseeking answers to major policy questions, and with a focus oninternationalcivilsocietyactivities:

• WhatarelikelytrajectoriesforCSOsoverthenextfivetotenyears,especiallyinthecontextofchanginggeo-politics?

• What are the main challenges involved, both domestically and interms of cross-border activities, and what opportunities presentthemselves?

• Whatwouldbeadequate regulatorymodelsof state - civil societyrelations, under what conditions, and for international CSOoperationsinparticular?

Key words: civil society, NGOs, nonprofit regulation, cross-borderactivities,internationalrelations,G20JELClassifications:F5,L31,H7,K33

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Challenge

CivilsocietyisahighlydiverseensembleofmanydifferentorganizationsthatrangefromsmalllocalassociationstolargeinternationalNGOslikeGreenpeaceor Amnesty International, and from social service providers and relief anddevelopment agencies to philanthropic foundations commanding billions ofdollars. Located between the state and the market, it is that “set of non-governmentalinstitutions,whichisstrongenoughtocounter-balancethestate,and,whilstnotpreventingthestatefromfulfillingitsroleofkeeperofpeaceand arbitrator betweenmajor interests, can, nevertheless, prevent the statefromdominatingandatomizingtherestofsociety“(Gellner1994:5).ForKeane(1998:6),civilsocietyisan“ensembleoflegallyprotectednon-governmentalinstitutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, andpermanently in tensionwith each other andwith the state institutions that‘frame’,constrictandenabletheiractivities.”Takentogether,CSOsexpressthecapacityofsocietyforself-organizationandthepotentialforpeaceful,thoughoftencontested,settlementofdiverseprivateandpublicinterests.

For several decades, most developed market economies and transitioncountrieshaveseenageneralincreaseintheeconomicimportanceofCSOsasprovidersofhealth,social,educationalandculturalservicesofmanykinds.Assuch, nonprofits have increasingly become part of new public managementapproachesandmixedwelfareeconomieswithquasi-marketsandcompetitivebidding processes (Salamon and Toepler 2015). In addition, CSOs are alsocentraltobuildingandmaintainingsocialcohesionaswellassocialcapitalandeconomic development (Putnam 2001). They do so through strengtheningcommunities, and enhancing civic mindedness and engagement, includingvolunteering and charitable giving. Finally, CSOs are sources of socialinnovation, addressing intractable problems across a broad range of publicpolicyfields(Anheieretal2018).Theirsmallerscaleandgreatercommunity-rootednessandclosenesstoclientsmakesthemcreativeagentsindevelopingnewsolutions.Governmentsareaccordinglyseekingnewformsofpartnershipwith CSOs and their social entrepreneurs aimed at identifying, vetting andscalingsocialinnovations.

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Moregenerally,CSOsperformdifferentfunctionsorrolesthatallowthemtorealizetheircomparativeadvantages:

• Service-provider role: CSOs substitute for or complement servicesoffered by government and businesses, often catering to underservedminorities;

• Vanguardrole:closertothefrontlinesofmanysocialproblems,CSOscantake risks and experiment, thereby increasing the problem-solvingcapacityofsociety;

• Value-Guardian role: CSOs foster and help express diverse values,contributingtoexpressivediversityandpluralismandeasingpotentialtensions;

• Advocacy role: CSOs serve as public watchdogs and advocates, givingvoicetogrievances,reduceconflictsandeffectingpolicychange.

WhileCSOshaveevolvedintoindispensablepartsofthenewpublicgovernanceintheWestandcrucialconduitsofdevelopmentanddemocratizationpoliciesin the Global South, recent years have also seen growing challenges to civilsociety,withcivicspaces inconsiderable fluxacross theglobe. Inparticular,spaceshavebeengrowingforCSOsintheserviceproviderandvanguardroles,butsharplyconstrictedforCSOsasguardiansofliberalvaluesandadvocates.

Thisinturnraisessignificantquestionsaboutwhattherightpolicyframeworktobalancetherelationofgovernmentsandcivilsocietyoughttobeinviewofkeychallenges.Specifically,weseethreesuchchallenges:

• theshrinking space for civil society activities, especially alsotransnationally;

• thewidespreadpolicyneglectandsubsequentproblemsofgovernanceinactionwithitsunintendedconsequences;and

• theemergenceofnewregulatoryvoids.

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Challenges

ToassessthestateofcivilsocietyacrosstheG20countries,and,inparticular,toprobehowwide-spreadtheshrinkingofcivilsocietyspace,policyneglect,and regulatory dilemmas have become, Anheier et al. (2019) conducted aninitialanalysisusingavailabledataandexpertconsultationsasevidencebase.

Shrinkingspace.Forananalysisofhowacuteandcommontheshrinkingspacefor civil society has become, Anheier et al. (2019) used data from theinternationalsocialsciencesprojectVarietiesofDemocracy(V-Dem).Resultssuggest a general, but mostly gradual erosion of civil society space: valuesmeasuringfreedomfromgovernmentcontrolovertheentryor formationorexitordissolutionofCSOsare,onbalance, lower in2016 than theywere in2008. The same holds for government repression and self-organization andparticipationaswell.Whilethesevaluesarelower,theyarenotlowerinthesensethattheywouldhavedroppedsuddenlyorbymuch.Nonetheless,withvery few exceptions, the overall trend indicates some gradual erosion onbalanceratherthandramaticdecline.OnlylessthanahandfulofG20countriesshow overall improvements within their civic spaces. The great majorityreveals a pattern of either relative stability or gradual decline across thedimensionofcivilsocietyspace.

The shrinking space debate has primarily focused on the growing ranks ofhybridandauthoritarianregimesaroundtheworld,particularlytheimpactofrecentlegislationandattemptstotightenthecontrolofforeignfundinglocalCSOscanreceive(CarothersandBrechenmacher,2014;Rutzen,2015;Dupuy,Ron and Prakash, 2016). Thesemeasures are often accompanied by higheradministrative registration and oversight requirements, including frequentobservations by security forces. Thesemeasures primarily target advocacyCSOs in the fields of human rights, community empowerment andenvironmentalprotection.1

1Theshrinkingspaceproblemhasalsobeenseepingintodemocraticregimes,asexemplifiedbyHungary’seffortstoutilizelegislativemeanstomakeituntenableforsomeCSOstomaintainkeyoperationsinthecountry.TheOpenSocietyFoundationswereaccordinglyforcedtomovetheirinternationaloperationstoGermanyandtheCentralEuropeanUniversityisrelocatingitsmaincampustoVienna.

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PolicyNeglect.OnlyafewG20countrieshavepro-activelysoughttoshrinkcivicspace. At the same time, the more common finding of a gradual erosionsuggeststhatmostG20countriesareatleastnotactivelyseekingtoexpandcivilsocietyspaceanddevelopCSOcapacities.Instead,theymoreorlesspassivelyletcivilsocietyspaceslowlyerodeeitherthroughtheimpactofotherpoliciesorallowcapacitiesdeterioratethroughlackofreform.TheclearestcaseinpointoftheformerareFinancialActionTaskForceeffortstocurbmoney-launderingandterrorismfinancingthathaveeffectivelyhinderedorevencutoffaccessbyNGOstobankingandotherfinancialservices,withsignificantconsequencesforinternationallyactivenonprofitorganizations(Eckert,GuinaneandHall,2017;Daigle,ToeplerandSmock,2016).AnexampleofthelatterisGermany,wherepublic benefit laws designed for the realities of the late 19th and early 20thCenturyarehopelesslyoutdatedandreformeffortstomodernizethecurrentsystem, though on the political agenda for a full two decades now, are stilloutstanding(Strachwitz,2018).

Toprobedeeperintotheseissues,Anheieretal(2019)consultedagroupofcivilsocietyexpertsandfoundthat

• few countries have open, proactive dialogues in place to review civilsociety–governmentrelations;themostcommonpatternistheabsenceofapolicyengagementratherthansomeformofcontestation,letaloneconsultation;

• fewer countries still have reform efforts under way, even though ageneralsenseofreformneedsprevailsamongexpertopinions;

• mostcountriesseemtodolittletostemthegradualerosion,perhapsoutof unawareness, lack of civil society activism and organizational acapacitytofindacommonvoice,ortheabsenceofpoliticalwillonbehalfofgovernments.

RegulatoryVoids.Institutionsarethebackboneonwhichmodernsocietiesinalltheircomplexityandsophisticationfunction(Northetal.,2009:13-29;251-263).Theyarethe“rulesofthegame,”anddosobyprotecting,policingandenforcingrightsandobligationsinordertoenablecooperation.However,theway globalization progressed in recent decades challenges the institutional

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capacities to provide and act upon such rules. National governments andinternational organizations increasingly lack the very institutional capacityneeded to legislate, control and enforce regulations (Zürn et al 2012).Regulatory voids open up. Such voids denote the systemic under-institutionalizationofpolicydomainswhere institutions lack the capacity todealadequatelywiththechallengesathand.Globalfinance,migration,cyberspace or climate change are examples of domains lacking appropriateinstitutional capture to fill regulatory voids, as are international taxationregimes.

The role of CSOs becomes important: they can mobilize opinion, bringgovernments to impose better rules and play a crucial part in ensuringcompliance and implementation by monitoring the behaviour of states andeconomicactors(Malenaetal.2004;BrinkerhoffandWetterberg2016).Yetinseveral policy fields, CSOs encounter dilemmas that need to be addressedbeforeregulatoryvoidscanbemanaged.Examplesinclude:

• Migration and refugee rescue operations, e.g., the conflict betweenhumanitariandemands andEUpolicies blocking Italianports forNGOrescueshipsintheMediterraneanandtransferringresponsibilityforsearescuestotheLibyancoastguard.WhileCSOsfeartheperpetuationofhumanrightsviolationsthroughthearrangementwithLibya,Europeanpolicy makers accuse CSO rescue operations of aiding and abettinghumantraffickers(Stone2018),leadingtoacallforacodeofconductforCSOs to stem the flowof illegalmigration to theEU. In a similar vein,humanitarianactionforillegalmigrantsalongthesouthernborderoftheUS has recently been subjected to Border Patrol harassment andcriminalization(Tomassoni,2019).

• Financeandtaxation,e.g.,theroleofCSOinexposingtaxavoidancebyinternational corporations through tax shaming (Barford and Holt,2013),pointingtothemarketdangersofquasimonopoliesbyFANGs,orbringingcorruptprocurementpracticesofinternationalorganisationstothe open. ATTAC, the Association for the Taxation of FinancialTransactions and Citizen's Action, for example, is a global networkworking in this space has been facing challenges to its public benefitstatusbyGermantaxauthorities.Morebroadly,humanrightsdefenders

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are increasingly threatened by states protecting business interests orbusinesscorporationsthemselves(UNWorkingGroup,2017).

• Cyber space, e.g., theproliferationof fake-newsandpolitical influenceseekingthroughbotsandsocialmediamanipulationsandCSOeffortstopromote free online expression and ensure the safety, openness andtrustworthinessofcyberspace.

Inthesefieldsandothers,actorsoperatewithoutadequateregulatorycapacityand hence guidance, which leaves the influence of dominating interests onnational and international regulation within a policy domain largelyuncontested.Asaresult,thenegativesofinstitutionalvoids(e.g.moralhazard,regulatory capture, profiteering, rent-seeking) continue unabated. What ismore, institutional voids canwiden through contagion effects or deepen byweakeningwhateverinstitutionsandorganizationmightexistinthefielditself.

Proposal

CreatinganInternationalTaskForce

Weproposetheestablishmentofaninternationaltaskforcetoaddressthreekeyquestionsinthecontextofashrinkingspace,regulatoryneglectandvoids:

• What are likely trajectories for CSOs over the next five to ten years,especially with changing geo-politics and in transnational policydomains?

• Whatarethemainchallengesinvolved,bothdomesticallyandintermsofcross-borderactivities,andwhatopportunitiespresentthemselves?

• WhatwouldbeadequatespaceorregulatorymodelsforCSOoperations?What areworkablemodels of state - civil society relations, andunderwhatconditions?

The Task Force does not beginwith the assumption that onlyminimal CSOregulations would be needed; nor does it advocate regulations that couldintentionallyorunintentionallystiflethepotentialsCSOsharbornationallyas

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wellas internationally.Rather, theTaskForce, inaddressing the threemainquestionsabove,willreviewavailableevidenceandsuggeststate-civilsocietypoliciesthatenablecivilsocietytorealizeitspotentialwithoutimpedingstatesandinternationalorganizationsinfulfillingtheirfunctions.

Proposal.TheTaskForcewillproducethreescopingpapers,oneforeachofthethreemainquestionsabove.Thesewillbethebasesofpolicybriefs,drawingonthe discussion among Task Force members and wider consultations withpolicymakersandcivilsocietyexperts.Oneofthebriefs,asasolutionproposal,willbeofanagenda-settingnatureandinviewofcarryingtheworkoftheTaskForceforward.Specifically,itwilladdress

• ThefeasibilityofdevelopingacodeofconductforinternationalCSOs;

• Appropriate regulatory models of state-civil society cooperation,includingfundingarrangements;and

• modelsforthefutureroleofCSOsinmultilateralandinter-governmentalsystems.

If warranted, the solution proposal may make the case for a high-levelcommissionofG20representativestoreviewandrevisetheseproposalswithaviewofengagingthepolicyprocessatnationalandinternationallevels.

SuggestedMembersofTaskForce.Thetaskforcewillhaveachairandthreeco-chairs (representing past, present and future G20 presidenciesrespectively).Ideally,eachG20countryshouldbepresentedamongtaskforcemembers. To ensure effective coordination and full engagement, task forcemembershipwillbecappedat20,excludingthechairs.However,aminimumnumber of 15 members seems appropriate to ensure a sufficient diversityamongG20countriesandtheirrespectivepolicyviews.Membersserveintheirindividualcapacityandnotasofficialrepresentativesoftheirgovernments.

Dialogue with Policymakers. Task Force member are expected to contactrelevantpolicymakersandexpertsforinputandadvice.G20groups,too,willbeconsulted,includingtheThink-20,Business-20andCivilSociety-20.Otherorganizationsof interestare the InternationalCenter forNonprofitLaw, theJapan InternationalCooperationAgency,The Japan Instituteof International

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Affairs, theCarnegieEndowment for InternationalPeace, theUSFoundationCenter,theEuropeanFoundationCentre,theUNNGOCommittee,theEuropeanCommissionand theEuropeanParliament, theCouncilofEurope, theWorldBank and regional development banks (e.g., Inter-American, Asian, Africa),relevantthink-tanksinAfrica,LatinAmericanandtheMiddleEastaswellasuniversity-basedresearchcentersandexpertsfromG20countries.

NextSteps

Whilesomespaceshavebeenexpanding(Alscheretal.,2017),especiallywithregardtoinvolvingnonprofitserviceprovidersintopublicserviceprovision,civilsocietyspacesaremostlyshrinkingandCSOsarecurrentlyexperiencingsignificant challenges on a global scale that threaten to fundamentallyundercut,ifnotreverse,theprogressmadesince1989(Anheier,2017).Thesechallengesaresevereenoughtojustifyanextensivereviewandassessmentbyaninternationaltaskforce.

Toestablishsuchataskforce,weforeseethreemajorsteps:(1)presentingtheproposalattheupcomingGlobalSolutionsSummitinBerlin,Germany,inMarch2019andattheT20SummitinOsaka,Japan,inMay;(2)refiningthechargeforthetaskforce,includingdevelopingatimeline;and(3)enlistingmembersforthe task force,establishing leadershipandsecuring financial resources. TheworkoftheTaskForcewouldbepresentedattheT20meetingsin2020.

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