Civil Procedure 2014Case Digests (Modes of Discovery)

This is a compilation of case digests covering Modes of Discovery, submitted to Atty. Jude Fernandez, Professor of Law, University of San Jose-Recoletos, submitted by Kurt Cajeta, for the course Civil Procedure.

FORTUNE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and INTER-MERCHANTSCORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA

affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. An action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c)such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.

Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify in court. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication on the merits. CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They reasoned that: a) proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory question.

With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.

Issue:Whether or not a party who has resorted to a particular method of

discovery will be barred in subsequently using other discovery devices.

Ruling:Petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of respondent Court of

Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered

ORDERING the court a quo to allow herein petitioner to take the deposition upon oral examination of Juanito S. Teope.

The evident purpose of modes of discovery is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial as long as it touches matters which are not privileged, relevant to the case, done in good faith and in accordance to the rules.

Although limited, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the expeditious and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the Rules are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually exclusive.

It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence. Additional lines of inquiry may come to light after the deposition has been taken, as to which written interrogatories probably would be adequate, and there is no reason why the examining party should not be entitled to obtain all the relevant information he desires if no substantial prejudice is done to the party from whom discovery is sought. On the other hand, interrogatories may well be used as a preliminary to the taking of depositions, in order to ascertain what individuals have the information sought. And, of course, if the answers to interrogatories are evasive or unsatisfactory, the interrogating party should be able to utilize the more effective method of oral examination rather than have to reframe interrogatories. Ordinarily, however, there will be no occasion for a party to use both methods at the same time, at least to obtain the same information. Most of the times, oral interrogatories are resorted than written interrogatories because it is more efficient, effective even when it entails greater expenses.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Private respondents are defendants in a Civil Case of the Sandiganbayan

commenced by the Presidential Commission on Good Government in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

Private respondents filed "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court". They sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of defendants in the case?" The PCGG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer," "weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise."

The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleading dated February 9, 1988. The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate allegations which clearly portray the supposed involvement and/or alleged participation of defendants-movants in the transactions described in detail in said Complaint," and "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper . ." It also opined that "service of interrogatories before joinder of issue and without leave of court is premature absent any special or extraordinary circumstances which would justify the same.”

The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989. On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL. The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date.

On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.

The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents, respectively.

PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration against Resolution of the Sandiganbayn admitting the interrogatories and opposition to the Amended Interrogatories. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying reconsideration and the second,

reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

admitting the motion of the private respondents to avail of the two modes of discovery.

Ruling: The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before

trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.

What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise.

To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party;

contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.

Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention. "As indicated by (the) Rules, limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry. And further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."

The petitioner's objections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with Rule 25 of the Rules of Court cannot be sustained.

It should initially be pointed out — as regards the private respondents "Motion for Leave to File Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 — that it was correct for them to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. In such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon.

The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the PCGG. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invoked as a reason to refuse to answer. As the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered "by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf."

2. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. As already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.

The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the PCGG's other principal contention, of the nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its possession.

The Court finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject of the motion dated August 3, 1989. Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.

The petition was dismissed.

Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:On July 27, 1987, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic, filed a Complaint

with the Sandiganbayan against Marcelo, Fabian Ver (Ver), now deceased, and Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos for recovery of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth which they allegedly acquired in unlawful concert with one another. The complaint, underwent several amendments.

On November 20, 1987, the Republic filed its Second Amended Complaint to rectify its error in making reference to the "Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation", when it should properly be "Philippine Casino Operators Corporation

On May 17, 1989, Marcelo filed his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint attaching thereto a copy of the PN-MFC boat-building contract, the alleged "favored contract" adverted to. The Republic filed its Reply on June 30, 1989, followed later by his Rejoinder.

Subsequently, the Republic served a Request for Admission dated June 5, 1991 on plaintiff. In his August 15, 1991Response to PCGG's Request for Admission, plaintiff included his own counter-request for admission on matters stated in his response.

Following the filing by the Republic of its Pre-Trial Brief,plaintiff submitted his own Pre-Trial Brief With Written Interrogatories, First Set and Request for Admission (to admit the truth of the matters of fact stated in his August 15, 1991 reply to the Republic's June 5, 1991 request for admission). On October 15, 1996, MFC filed its Pre-Trial Brief With Written Interrogatories, First Set and Request for Admission; the other petitioner corporations, as defendants a quo, filed their Pre-Trial Briefs with Written Interrogatories First Set on the same day.

On August 15, 1997, the petitioners filed three separate Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff’s motion was based on two major arguments A.)There is no genuine issue of fact/cause of action against him; and, B.) the Republic did not reply to the request. Thus, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, "each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted". According to the petitioners, "the pleadings of the parties, and the admissions and documentary evidence of the [Republic] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [they] are entitled to a [summary] judgment as a matter of law".

Issue:Whether or not The Republic’s non response to Plaintiff’s (Marcelo) written

interrogatories amounts to an admission

Ruling:

There is really no more genuine issues to be tried in this case, the Republic having failed or refused to answer the requests for admission and the written interrogatories of the petitioners. As it were, the Republic only answered petitioner plaintiff’s request for admission or interrogatories. But then the Republic's answer serves only to highlight and confirm the fact that petitioner plaintiff’s participation in all the transactions subject of this case is as President of MFC. The Republic did not also answer the written interrogatories of the other defendant corporations. In effect, the Republic admitted the non-participation of the other defendant corporations in the contracts in question.

REY LAÑADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.

Facts:

The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up a picket line in front of the company’s Cabuyao, Laguna factory.

NLRC issued a TRO enjoining the UFE to desist from “blocking, barricading and obstructing the points of ingress and egress” from Nestle’s Cabuyao plant. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of the Philippine Constabulary and the fire brigade of Cabuyao. Seeking to transfer its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig during the strike, Nestle hired 6 cargo trucks from brothers Constancio and Jesus Alimagno.

Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of Nestle agreed to constitute a panel to discuss said transfer of products, as the matter was not overed by the TRO. However, in bad faith, Santos instead ordered the PC to disperse the strikers at the barricades in front of the plant gate so that the trucks can get out of the plant. The PC and the fire brigade began hitting the strikers with truncheons and water cannons. With gate cleared, the cargo trucks began leaving the compound.

Meanwhile, Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez was on his way home from his masteral class at the UP College of Public Health. He arrived at the Nestle factory while the dispersal was ongoing so he stopped his car. At that time, the one of the cargo trucks, driven by Pacifico Galasao, was leaving the Nestle compound at full speed. To avoid stones being thrown at his direction, the truck driver drove in a crouching position. However, he lost control of the truck and bumped the car of Dr. Hemedez. Pinned down by his overturned car, Dr. Hemedez asked someone to inform his parents and pleaded for help from the people. While extricating Dr. Hemedez from the overturned car, his mother and brothers repeatedly asked the help of PC soldiers, specifically to unload the cargo truck to speed up the rescue, but said soldiers refused, saying that the truck might get looted if they did so.

Dr. Hemedez was pulled out from under his car 2 hours later by his family members and was rushed to the hospital, where he died shortly after arrival. Spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of Dr. Hemedez, sued Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and PC/Capt. Rey Lañada for damages. After defendants filed their answers to the complaint, the Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their verified answer to the request for admission.

The Hemedez spouses moved to strike out said answers and to declare the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted, contending that defendants themselves and not their counsel should personally answer the

request for admission. TC denied the spouses’ motion as well as the MR. On certiorari in the SC, the matter was referred to the CA. CA granted the motions to strike out the answers subject of the requests for admission and declared each of the matters requested to be impliedly admitted. It also remanded the case to the court a quo for proper proceedings.

Issue:Should a person to whom a request for admission is addressed personally

answer the request?

Ruling:NO. PSFC Financial Corp. V CA: Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that

“(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure x x x .” Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioners did not authorize their respective counsels to file in their behalf their respective answers to the Hemedez spouses’ written request for admission. As this Court has said, there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase “the party to whom the request is directed” to refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves.Moreover, the subject matters of the request for admission are the same as the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint to which petitioners have already filed their respective answers.

Po v. CA: A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense.”

Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals: The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended “to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.”

ONG vs. MAZO

Facts:Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, such

complaint arose from a vehicular accident whereby a bus owned by petitioner and driven by Caramoan allegedly bumped a jeep owned and driven by respondent Lanuevo, with respondent Tomilloso as her passenger at the time. On November 14, 1996, petitioner served written interrogatories upon respondents and on November 21, 1996, she filed a "Manifestation and Omnibus Motion" seeking, among other things, an order from the trial court directing respondents to answer the interrogatories.

To the motion bearing on the written interrogatories, respondents filed their objection.

By Order of May 6, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to compel respondents to answer the interrogatories upon the ground that it constituted a "fishing expedition" which would be more properly ventilated in a pre-trial conference.

Thus, petitioner filed on with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the above order of the trial court as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying the motion to compel respondents to answer the written interrogatories.

Issues:1. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the motion to compel the

respondents to answer the written interrogatories.

2. Whether or certiorari is the proper recourse for such an error.

Ruling:No doubt, the twin orders denying the written interrogatories were

interlocutory in nature for they leave something more to be done on the merits of the case. And the extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, the proper remedy in such cases being an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment where incorporated in said appeal are the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. Nonetheless, this by no means is an absolute rule. If the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, certiorari may be allowed as a mode of redress.

This Court finds that the orders disallowing petitioner's written interrogatories are patently erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is warranted. In denying petitioner's availment of interrogatories, the trial court was of the view that —

. . . in as much that the written interrogatories is (sic) a sort of fishing expedition, said questions and answer would be properly ventilated in a pre-trial

conference for which this court direct the defendant Elena Ong to file her answer to the amended complaint anent thereto, both parties are required to file their respective pre-trial briefs after which this case will be calendared for pre-trial conference.

This Court has long espoused the policy of encouraging the availment of the various modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, it held:

. . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The thrust of the Rules is to even make the availment of the modes of discovery — depositions, interrogatories and requests for admissions — without much court intervention since leave of court is not necessary to put into motion such modes after an answer to the complaint has been served. The rationale behind the recognition accorded the modes of discovery is that they enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable settlement or expedite the trial of the case.

Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written interrogatories answered by his opponent, as what the trial court did, on the premise that the interrogatories were a "fishing expedition," is to disregard the categorical pronouncement in aforementioned case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party from inquiring into the facts underlying the opposing party's case through the discovery procedures.

The trial court's orders, not being in accordance with law and jurisprudential dictum, are therefore correctible by writ of certiorari.

Landoil vs. Mangudadatu

Facts: Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with

the (RTC) a Complaint for damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI"). The petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed its Answer. The parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner, had led the trial court to declare it in default. Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision. it filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This Motion was deemed submitted for resolution but was eventually denied by the trial court. Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.

Its counsels -- Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate withdrawals of appearance. On the same date, the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. Petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.On the same day, petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice, regarding the public auction sale of its properties. By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. The RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their written comment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing.

Issues:1.Whether petitioner received the Order denying its timely filed Motion for

New Trial.

2.Whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the circumstances.

Ruling:1. Appreciation of Facts

It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising factual issues that this Court does not review. While the rule admits of exceptions, petitioner has not satisfactorily shown any. No compelling reason to disturb the CA’s factual findings. It may therefore not insist, contrary to the finding of the CA, that it did not receive the Order denying its timely filed Motion for New Trial.

Motion for New Trial Improper

The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is unacceptable. It should have also justified its own absence.

Having failed to do so, it had no valid ground to request a new trial. Petitioner also failed to justify the absence of both its counsels. Until their formal withdrawal is granted, lawyers are deemed to be the representatives of their clients. Atty. Fernandez absence from the pretrial was still not excusable. While he could no longer represent petitioner, his presence would have afforded him an opportunity to make a formal withdrawal of appearance. An improvident termination of legal services is not an excuse to justify non-appearance at a pretrial. Otherwise, the rules of procedure would be rendered meaningless, as they would be subject to the counsel’s will.

The Proper Remedy

Under the new Rules, the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not for the petitioner to be considered "as in default," but "to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render judgment on the basis thereof." To the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the defendant’s remedy is a motion for reconsideration. An affidavit of merit is not required to be attached to such motion, because the defense has already been laid down in the answer. In the present case, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration after the trial court had allowed respondents’ ex parte presentation of evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit the filing of a motion for a new trial despite the availability of a motion for reconsideration. But the failure to file the latter motion -- without due cause -- is a factor in determining whether to apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. In its motions and petitions filed with this Court and the lower courts, petitioner did not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration.

The lapse of time it shows the negligence of petitioner and its counsels.

Non-Receipt of the Order

Petitioner fails to convince us that it has not received the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial. There is a disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. On this basis, we have ruled that the postmaster’s certification prevails over the mere denial of a lawyer. This rule is applicable here. Petitioner has failed to establish its non-receipt of the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial.

2. The Taking of Depositions

The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

The RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other evidence -- that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.

Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Ley Construction

Facts:

Respondent LCDC filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner Hyatt claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of its share of a real property despite respondent’s full payment of the purchase price and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC's payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. Respondent filed an amended complaint impleading Princeton as additional defendant claiming that Hyatt sold the property in fraud of defendant. LCDC filed a second amended complaint adding as defendant Yu He Ching, alleging that LCDC paid to Hyatt through Yu.

Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take depositions. During the scheduled depositions, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case. RTC agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place. LCDC moved for reconsideration, RTC denied.

While pre-trial proceeded with the refusal of LCDC to enter in pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited, which the RTC granted. Defendant filed an appeal, which the CA granted. Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which the CA denied, which leads to this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and

order the deposition-taking to proceed.

Ruling:No. A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it

would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists. The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. Trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of

interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

Sales v. Sabino G.R. No. 133154, December 9, 2005

Facts:Respondent Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages

against Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death of respondent's son, Elbert. Before any responsive pleading could be filed, plaintiff notified the defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral. The deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Roldan Villacorta, who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent. In the course of trial, respondent had the deposition of Buaneres Corral. Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, respondent made a Formal Offer of Exhibits. Petitioner opposed the admission of exhibits and even asked that they be expunged from the records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court were not complied with. The trial court admitted the exhibits. Petitioner went on certiorari to the CA when the trial court denied his motion for reconsideration, which CA denied explaining that petitioner's active participation, through counsel, during the taking of subject deposition and adopting it as his own exhibits, has thereby estopped him from assailing the admissibility thereof as part of respondent's evidence.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent satisfied the requirements of Section 3,

Rule 24 of the Rules of Court, when it presented a certification attesting to the fact that deponent has left the country but silent as to whether or not at the time his deposition was offered in evidence is in the Philippines.

Ruling:While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are

generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Among the exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition is when the witness is out of the country.

Trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his deposition was made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves respect, having been adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by the Bureau of Immigration provides that evidentiary support. Accordingly, the attribution of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court must be struck down. It has been said to be customary for courts to accept statements of parties as to the unavailability of a witness as a predicate to the use of depositions. Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent to his departure, petitioner could

have presented evidence to show that such was the case. As it is, however, the petitioner does not even assert the return as a fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary proof had been adduced.

Cariaga vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:Luis Miguel Aboitiz, then employed at DLPC, initiated a covert operation

with the objectives to ascertain how DLPC material were being stolen, the frequency of thefts, who were perpetrating such and to catch at least one DLPC employee that may be involved. He sought the assistance of Sgt. Villasis, Chief of the Theft & Robbery Section of the San Pedro Patrol Station, Davao METRODISCOM. He also hired one Florencio Siton, a welder by occupation and a Civilian Home Defense Forces member, as his undercover agent under the pseudonym ‘Canuto Duran’, an ‘electrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.’

Canuto struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a private electrician at the Miguel Store. He told Ricardo that his boss ordered him to buy electrical materials. Ricardo offered to supply Canuto with electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the same. Canuto purchased small electrical wires, which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga. Ricardo introduced Canuto to Jonathan at Miguel Store. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of DLPC Service Truck 'S-143' assigned to Work Gang 'Venus'. It turned out that the supplies were being pilfered from the truck, and properties of DLPC.

The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not certain.

RTC rendered judgment based on prosecution’s evidence, with the statements in the extrajudicial confessions of Ricardo Cariaga implicative of the accused as the source of the stolen articles formidable compared to the mere puny denial of the accused. CA affirmed the decision on appeal by Jonathan Cariaga, hence the instant petition.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn

statement of Ricardo Cariaga.

Ruling:Yes. Court emphasized that "the preconditions set forth in Section 47, Rule

130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115, for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right of an accused person "to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face." In Tan vs. CA, it was ruled that "'unable to testify' or for that matter 'unavailability', does not cover the case of witnesses who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not refer to tampering of witnesses." The threshold question then is the admissibility of the

sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga which was attached to DLPC's position paper in the labor case filed by Jonathan Cariaga against it for illegal dismissal. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner. Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat, and previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against this backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence, unavailable or unable to testify.

It must be emphasized that Sec. 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence, "mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest." In the instant case, no efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested, which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this rule.

The trial judge who sees and hears witnesses testify has exceptional opportunities to form a correct conclusion as to the degree of credit which should be accorded their testimonies. The rule has also always been that the contradictions between the contents of an affiant's affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not always militate against the witness' credibility because we have long taken judicial notice that affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate. Indeed, a sworn statement taken ex parte is generally considered to be inferior to a testimony given in open court as the latter is subject to the test of cross-examination.

There is no rule of evidence to the effect that omission of certain particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial.

Dulay vs. Dulay

Facts:In a complaint for recovery of his bank deposit with prayer for a writ of

attachment and damages, Rodrigo S. Dulay, a naturalized American citizen, alleged that upon his petition his brother Godofredo Sr. and nephew Pfeger immigrated to the United States of America. The two stayed with him in his house at Claremont, Massachusetts. Godofredo, however, decided to return to the Philippines because he could not endure the weather. Pfeger stayed behind to take care of Rodrigo.

Having nurtured affection, love and trust for his nephew Pfeger, Rodrigo opened a trust account with the Bank of Boston naming Pfeger as trustee thereof. Five months later, Pfeger left Rodrigo's house allegedly to join his girlfriend in California. Rodrigo learned only later that Pfeger actually went back to the Philippines. Pfeger returned to the United States, but after a brief stay returned again to the Philippines where he went on a spending binge. Upon knowing this, Rodrigo verified the status of his account with the Bank of Boston, and to his shock and dismay discovered that Pfeger had already emptied the account.

Rodrigo additionally claimed that Pfeger used the money from said account to buy several vehicles, loan money to several people, open bank accounts for his siblings, and buy a house and lot and jewelry for his wife. Whatever was left of the account was allegedly transferred to Pfeger's father, Godofredo. Denying the accusations, respondent claimed that the money deposited in the name of Pfeger was his own money and not Rodrigo's. They assailed the admissibility of the statement of account and the supporting affidavit attached to the complaint. For his part, Pfeger asserted that he spent his own money. Rodrigo filed a petition for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get the depositions of several witnesses residing abroad. Petitioners, on the other hand, moved to be allowed to file cross-examination questions to respondent's written interrogatories, which the trial court granted.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which was denied, which instead Rodrigo to complete his depositions. As it turned out, however, the depositions could not be taken before the Clerk of Court of Massachusetts, but were taken instead before a notary public in New York. The trial court directed respondent to have the written and cross interrogatories taken by the notary public authenticated by the consulate. Thus, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the answers so that he could have them authenticated by a Philippine consul in the United States.

Issue:Whether or not the documents submitted by respondent were violaitve of

Sections 11, 12, and 14 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:No. In our jurisdiction, depositions in foreign countries may be taken: (a)

on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice

consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines; (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or (c) before any person authorized to administer oaths as stipulated in writing by the parties. While letters rogatory are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of the issuing jurisdiction.

Generally, a commission is an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, directed to a magistrate by his official designation or to an individual by name, authorizing him to take the depositions of the witnesses named therein, while a letter rogatory is a request to a foreign court to give its aid, backed by its power, to secure desired information. Commissions are taken in accordance with the rules laid down by the court issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory, the methods of procedure are under the control of the foreign tribunal.

Leave of court is not required when the deposition is to be taken before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines and the defendant's answer has already been served. However, if the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent, it may be taken only before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

In the instant case, the authentication made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the notary public who took the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through a commission, and no longer through letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move was even sanctioned by the trial court by virtue of its order. With the ratification of the depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.

Besides, the allowance of the deposition cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the adverse party. They were given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through their cross-interrogatories, which were in turn answered by the deponents. Save for the complaint of delay in the proceedings, petitioners were unable to point out any injury they suffered as a result of the trial court's action.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, respondents.

Facts:Private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila

conjunction tickets from Singapore Airlines for nine cities in different countries with New York as the final destination. In Geneva, private respondent bought from petitioner a ticket in exchange for the unused conjunction ticket for a one-way ticket from Geneva to New York. However, because of the embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered in Geneva when he was prevented by petitioner's security officer from boarding the plane, detained for about an hour and allowed to board the plane only after all the other passengers have boarded, private respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner in Cebu.

Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and that the ticket issued by petitioner in Geneva was a separate and distinct contract of carriage from that entered into by the private respondent with Singapore Airlines in Manila. When its motion was denied, petitioner presented a deposition of its security officer taken in Geneva. The trial court ruled that under the pool partnership agreement among the IATA members, including Singapore Airlines and American Airlines, the members act as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets. This decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals.

In SP no. 30946, the petitioner assails the trial court's order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private respondent for lack of jurisdiction under Section 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention; and in SP No. 31452 the petitioner challenges the validity of the trial court's order striking off the record the deposition of the petitioner's security officer taken in Geneva, Switzerland for failure of the said security officer to answer the cross interrogatories propounded by the private respondent. Hence, this petition. Meanwhile, the security officer of petitioner subsequently appeared before the Philippine consul and answered the cross-interrogatories of private respondent.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in

ordering the deposition of the petitioner's security officer taken in Geneva to be stricken off the record for failure of the said security officer to appear before the Philippine consul in Geneva to answer the cross-interrogatories filed by the private respondent.

Ruling:

The subsequent appearance of the said security officer before the Philippine consul in Geneva on September 19, 1994 and the answer to the cross-interrogatories propounded by the private respondent was transmitted to the trial court by the Philippine consul in Geneva on September 23, 1994 should be deemed as full compliance with the requisites of the right of the private respondent to cross-examine the petitioner's witness. The deposition filed by the

petitioner should be reinstated as part of the evidence and considered together with the answer to the cross-interrogatories.

Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Sps. Parocha

Facts:Petitioners filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and

Titles, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and Damages filed by against respondents. Petitioners alleged a share over three properties owned by respondents, which formed part of the estate of petitioners' deceased grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag. They averred that their grandparents died intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their eight children — Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata. However, Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of self-adjudication that he is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir. Consequently, he was able to appropriate to himself the properties. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over the said properties in favor of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover, petitioners alleged that Severino used the same affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free patent over an agricultural land that had long been under the possession of Benito and Florentina Pasag.

In denying the material allegations in the Complaint, respondents averred in their Answer that the properties left behind by the spouses Pasag had already been partitioned among their eight surviving children. They claimed that the parcels of land are Bonifacio's share of which he later on renounced in a Quitclaim Deed in favor of his brother, Severino. As regards another parcel of land covered by respondents asserted that the held that petitioners failed to prove their claim by a preponderance of evidence. said land had been in Severino's possession and occupation since 1940, thus, giving him the right to apply for and be granted a free patent over it. Having complied with the requirements of law, Severino's title had now become indefeasible.

The trial of the case commenced, petitioners rested their case and was granted ten days within which to submit their formal offer of documentary exhibits. However they failed to submit the said pleading within the required period. Petitioners asked for extension to submit their offer of evidence but failed to submit and moved for another extension but still failed to submit. Consequently, trial court deemed waived petitioners’ right to make their formal offer of evidence. Petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence but the trial court denied. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, which held that petitioners failed to prove their claim by a preponderance of evidence.

Issue:Whether or not CA erred in ruling that petitioners waived their right to

offer of documentary evidence.

Ruling:The Rules of Court provides that the court shall consider no evidence which

has not been formally offered. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial

judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility.

The Court ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. Court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."

The trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice. Under the Rule on guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and case of deposition and discovery measures, it is provided that: on the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter the judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing.

On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence." It requires that "such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the Court to be done in writing."

The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the very day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may consider the party's documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court may allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object evidence or documents are large in number — say from 100 and above, and only where there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer. HTDcCE

Both parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list all their respective pieces of evidence — whether testimonial, documentary, or object — even prior to the preliminary conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictly adhere to the principle of "laying one's cards on the table." In the light of these issuances and in order to obviate interminable delay in case processing, the parties and lawyers should closely conform to the

requirement that the offer of evidence must be done orally on the day scheduled for the presentation of the last witness.

Trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that the party must formally offer any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.

SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-

ISA, respondents.

Facts:Petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages,

preliminary injunction against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners (of) a parcel of land Among the improvements on this parcel of land is plaintiff's residential house where his wife and children used to stay until they migrated to the United States.

The abovementioned parcel of land was acquired and the residential house was constructed through plaintiff's hard-earned salaries and benefits from his employment abroad. Plaintiff was surprised to learn that his wife Nonita A. Briboneria sold to defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale never authorized or empowered Nonita A. Briboneria or anybody for or on his behalf, stead or representation to enter into any transaction regarding the sale Plaintiff had all along been expecting that the house and lot shall be for his family, particularly his children. Plaintiff was denied the use and enjoyment of his properties since defendant Gertrudis B. Mag-isa had even leased the premises to another who in turn had prohibited plaintiff from entering the premises. Plaintiff suffered serious anxiety, fright, mental anguish and wounded feelings and further subjected him to social humiliation and embarrassment,

In due time, private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer alleging as follows:

Defendants admit their circumstances as alleged in paragraph 1, the age of plaintiff but deny the rest of the allegations therein for lack of knowledge and/or information sufficient to form a judgment as to the truths thereof. petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-isa a request for admission

On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request for Admission, 5 alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that the other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.

On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 December 1988, the trial court issued an order denying the petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration, which the court granted in its order, dated 20 July 1989, setting aside the order of 28 December 1988. The private respondents, in turn, filed a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, to which the petitioner filed an opposition.

The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order dated 1 February 1989 of the court a quo, alleging that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On 13 August 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, 14 dismissing the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, he is now before us in the present petition.

Issue:Petitioner assails the respondent appellate court in holding that the

matters of fact and the documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or reproductions of those alleged in the complaint. He claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of action. He further argues that the private respondents have impliedly admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission on account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath.

Ruling:The petition cannot be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of

merit.

To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly shows, as found by respondent appellate court, that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer." 16 The respondent court therefore correctly held that this case falls under the rule laid down in Po vs. Court of Appeals. 17 wherein this Court held:

A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. . . .

Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, 18 the request for admission must be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of

any relevant document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for admission.

In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.

Facts:Spouses Hemedez filed an action for damages against several persons for

the death of Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia Hemedez which happened in a dispersal operation during a strike staged by the Union of Filipino Employees on account of alleged unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc.

The Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their respective counsel, defendants filed their verified answer to the request for admission.

The Supreme Court held that there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase "the party to whom the request is directed" to refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves. Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the subject matters of the request for admission are the same as the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which the private respondents have filed their respective answers. Private respondents desired the petitioners to admit once again the very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers.

Issue:May the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is

addressed under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer such request for his client?

Ruling:Yes. THE PHRASE "THE PARTY TO WHOM THE REQUEST IS DIRECTED"

DOES NOT REFER PERSONALLY TO PETITIONERS IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not authorize their respective counsel to file in0020their behalf the respective answers requested of them by private respondents in the latter's written request for admission.

As this Court has said, there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase "the party to whom the request is directed" to refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves. Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the subject matters of the request for admission are the same as the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which private respondents have filed their respective answers. Private respondents thus desired the petitioners to admit once again the very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers.

The application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court. In the same vein, the determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion. It is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious

administration of justice. It need not be emphasized that upon the court's shoulders likewise rests the burden of determining whether the response of the requested party is a specific denial of the matters requested for admission.

FORTUNATA N. DUQUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ENRICO BONIFACIO and DRA. EDNA BONIFACIO, respondents.

Facts:Petitioner Duque filed a complaint before the RTC of Valenzuela alleging

that: respondents spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with her certain checks in exchange for cash in the total amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00); respondents represented themselves to be holders in due course and for value and claimed that the checks were sufficiently funded; upon presentation of the checks on their respective dates of maturity, the same were dishonored; petitioner Duque gave notice of dishonor to the respondents; and this notwithstanding and despite repeated demands, respondents refused and continued to refuse to honor said checks or replace it with cash.

Petitioner Valenzuela alleged the same circumstances in her complaint, except that with her, the total amount involved is Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432, 000.00).

In their Answers, the respondents spouses denied: having personally negotiated with the plaintiffs any of the checks annexed to the complaints; representing to both plaintiffs that they were holders in due course and for value of said checks; representing that the same had sufficient funds; having drawn or issued all the checks alluded to by plaintiffs; and refusing to honor the checks or replace it with cash after being informed of the dishonor thereof.

Further, respondents contend that upon learning that the checks were returned to the petitioners, they made arrangements for settlement but only for the checks duly issued by them. Finally, respondents dispute the true amount of their total liability to the respective petitioners as alleged in their separate complaints, claiming that “they do not owe that much” to either of them.

On June 28, 1988, the RTC issued a pre-trial order defining the principal issues, thus: "whether or not the defendants owe the plaintiffs the amount of money as claimed in the complaint, and whether or not defendants can be permitted to adduce evidence which would contradict the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents attached to the complaint”; and setting the cases for trial on the merits.

On November 22, 1988, petitioners filed a Request for Admission and furnished to counsel for private respondents, specifically requesting that they admit that:

1. They negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed to the respective complaints;

2. Defendant Edna M. Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes dated November 23, 1987, acknowledging that she is indebted to plaintiff Duque in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Valenzuela Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00), respectively; and

3. The plaintiffs in the two cases sent letters of demand to the defendants both dated November 28, 1987 which the latter received on December 5, 1987.

For failure of the respondents spouses to respond to the aforementioned request, the RTC, citing Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, issued an Order on December 27, 1988, which reads in part: “Defendants’ failure to deny under oath the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reason why he cannot truthfully admit/deny those matters in accordance with the cited provisions of the Rules of Court is an implied admission of the matters of which admission is requested.” In the same Order, the RTC deemed the cases submitted for decision. On February 1, 1989, the RTC of Valenzuela rendered a decision against the private respondents.

Issues:1. Whether or not the failure of the private respondents to respond to the

request for admission by the petitioners is tantamount to an implied admission under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.

2. Whether or not there was personal service of the request on private respondents.

Ruling:We find the petition devoid of merit.

This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admissions to enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse side thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of the case or expediting the trial of the same. However, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceeding by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

The defendants, conspiring, confederating, aiding and helping each other, negotiated with the plaintiff certain checks in exchange for cash. Clearly there from, to require an admission on this point even though it was already denied in the Answer would be superfluous.

As expounded by this Court in Po vs. Court of Appeals “A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d, 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, ‘pointless, useless’ and ‘a mere redundancy.’

The second issue involves the question of sufficiency of service on a party of a request for admission. The petitioner’s claim that respondents were personally served requests for admission as required by the Rules; and that granting that they were not, service on the counsel would be sufficient. Records show that only the counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G. Domingo, Jr. was furnished copies of the requests.

Consequently, the requests for admission made by the petitioners were not validly served and therefore, private respondents cannot be deemed to have admitted the truth of the matters upon which admissions were requested. Thus, the summary judgment rendered by the RTC has no legal basis to support it.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSALINDA CANADALLA-GO, represented by her Attorney-in-

fact BENITO A. CANADALLA

Facts:The controversy stemmed in January 1977 when Irene Canadalla obtained

a loan of P100, 000 from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for purposes of financing her piggery business. As security, Canadalla executed on 19 January 1977 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-7609 and OCT No. P-4226 of the Registry of Deeds of Infanta, Quezon. On 10 August 1979, Canadalla procured another loan in the amount of P150, 000, which was secured by a mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel covered by OCT No. P-6679 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Quezon.

Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses, compounded by devastating typhoons, the prevalence of diseases, and destruction of her store by fire, Canadalla failed to comply with her obligations to the DBP. Subsequently, the DBP extra judicially foreclosed the mortgages. On 5 September 1989, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the DBP, which emerged as the only bidder. The sale was evidenced by a Certificate of Sale and registered on 17 January 1990.

Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property covered by TCT No. T-7609 within the redemption period of one year from 17 January 1990. As to the properties covered by OCT Nos. P-4226 and P-6679, she had six years from 17 January 1990 to redeem the same, they being free patent titles. On 5 October 1995, she offered to redeem the properties for a redemption price of P1.5 million. But the DBP countered that the redemption price under its 1986 Revised Chapter must be based on its total claim, which was P1, 927,729.50 as of 30 September 1995. Subsequently, she allegedly assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter, herein private respondent Rosalinda A. Canadalla-Go.

In January 1996, Go offered to redeem the properties for P526, 882.40. In response, the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price was P1, 814,700.58 representing its total claim as of 17 January 1996. When Go failed to redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its titles over the subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in its name.

On 8 July 1996, Go filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a Supplemental Complaint for the “Exercise of Right of Redemption and Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation, Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.” The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-483 in Branch 148 of said court. After the DBP filed its Answer, but before the parties could proceed to trial, Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse Party. Thereafter, the DBP filed its Comment.

During the hearing on 20 May 1997, Go objected to the Comment reasoning that it was not under oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and that it failed to state the reasons for the admission or denial of matters for which an admission was requested. For its part, the DBP manifested that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents contained in the Request for Admission are substantially the same as those in the Supplemental Complaint; second, they had already been either specifically denied or admitted by the DBP in its Answer; and third, the reasons for the denial or admission had already been specifically stated therein.

On 9 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of Go to consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for Admission and all those denied by the DBP in its Comment.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the DBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62142, attributing to the court a quo grave abuse of discretion in granting the Request for Admission despite the fact that (1) some of the matters assigned in the Request for Admission had already been specifically denied in its Answer to the Supplemental Complaint; (2) the sworn statement of Atty. Caraan had sufficiently cured the alleged defect of the Comment; and (3) some of the matters in the Request for Admission involved questions of law, conclusions of facts, and matters of opinion which are improper subjects of such a request.

On 6 August 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that since DBP’s answer was not under oath, it could not be considered as having substantially complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The affidavit of Atty. Caraan, one of the legal counsels of the DBP, failed to cure the defect because it was submitted after the motion for the declaration of implied admission had been made and the hearing of the same had been terminated.

The DBP’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 16 April 2002. Hence, the DBP is now before this Court by way of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether matters requested to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of

Court – which are mere reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in the answer – may be deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the response thereto is not under oath.

Ruling:We find for petitioner DBP.

Indeed, as pointed out by the DBP, the matters stated in Go’s Request for Admission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint.

Besides, they had already been either specifically denied or admitted in DBP’s Answer to the Supplemental Complaint. To require the DBP to admit these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and superfluous.

We have held in Po v. Court of Appeal that “[a] party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and … to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint.”

The Po doctrine was brought a step further in Concrete Aggregates Co. v. Court of Appeals, where we ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied or otherwise dealt with in the answer, a response to the request is no longer required. It becomes, therefore, unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an unsworn response to the request for admission. The reason is obvious. A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.

Hence, the DBP did not even have to file its Comment on Go’s Request for Admission, which merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. DBP’s Answer itself controverts the averments in the complaint and those recopied in the request for admission.

Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the scope of matters that a party may request the adversary to admit are (1) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; and (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. The rule authorizing a party to call on the other party to make an admission implies the making of demands for admission of relevant and material matters of facts– and not for admission of matters of law, conclusions, or opinions.

BAY VIEW HOTEL., INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. KER & CO., LTD., and PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., defendant-appellees.

Facts:In January, 1958, plaintiff-appellant Bay View Hotel, secured a fidelity

guarantee bond from defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., for its accountable employees, against acts of fraud and dishonesty. Said defendant-appellees the Philippine general agent of Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. When one employee, a cashier, was discovered by the plaintiff-appellant with a cash shortage and unremitted collection totalling P42,490.95, it filed claims for payments on said fidelity guarantee bond. Said claim was denied by the defendant-appellee, prompting plaintiff-appellant to institute a civil case in the CFI to enforce it. Defendant-appellee denied the claims contending that since it was a mere agent, it was not liable under the policy. On June 22,1966, counsel for appellee filed a request for admission of certain facts which appellant failed to answer.

Upon said failure to answer, defendant-appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that appellant was deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters enumerated in the request for admission and claimed that the proper party-in-interest against whom appellant has a claim was Phoenix, who is the principal. Plaintiff-appellant amended the complaint to include Phoenix. On August 1, 1966, defendants-appellees filed their joint answer to the amended complaint. Phoenix argued, in said joint answer, that appellant was deemed to have abandoned its claim as it did not seek arbitration thereof pursuant to Condition No. 8 of the policy. On August 24, 1966, defendants-appellees filed a motion for summary judgment and on November 4, 1966, CFI granted said motion and dismissed the complaint.

Issue:Did the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in extending the

effects of the request for admission to Phoenix who never filed a similar request; in giving legal effects to a request for admission under the original and not the amended complaint; in holding that the controversy requires arbitration; and in finally dismissing the complaint?

Ruling:The Supreme Court held that the legal effects of the request for admission

may not be altered by the mere amendment of a pleading; that the consequences of the admission should favor respondent Phoenix as the same was secured by its agent within the scope of and during the existence of the agency; that Condition No. 8 which requires arbitration applies only in disputes regarding the amount of the insurer's liability, but not as to any dispute as in the existence or nonexistence thereof; that Ker & Co., Ltd., having acted merely as the agent of its principal, Phoenix, only the case against it should rightfully be dismissed and the case should be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and determination on the merits.

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, NOW KNOWN AS METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. GATEWAY ELECTRONICS CORPORATION,

JAIME M. HIDALGO AND ISRAEL MADUCDOC, respondents.

Facts:In May and June 1997, Gateway Electronics Corporation (Gateway)

obtained from Solid bank Corporation (Solid bank) four (4) foreign currency denominated loans to be used as working capital for its manufacturing operations. The loans were covered by promissory notes (PNs) which provided an interest of eight and 75/100 percent (8.75%), but was allegedly increased to ten percent (10%) per annum, and a penalty of two percent (2%) per month based on the total amount due computed from the date of default until full payment of the total amount due. To secure the loans covered by PN 97-375 and PN 97-408, Gateway assigned to Solid bank the proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement7 dated June 25, 2000 with Alliance Semiconductor Corporation (Alliance). The following stipulations are common in both PNs:

3. This Note or Loan shall be paid from the foreign exchange proceeds of Our/My Letter(s) of Credit, Purchase Order or Sales Contract described as follows: *** Back-end Services Agreement dated 06-25-96 by and between Gateway Electronics Corporation and Alliance Semiconductor Corporation.

4. We/I assign, transfer and convey to Solid bank all title and interest to the proceeds of the foregoing Letter(s) of Credit to the extent necessary to satisfy all amounts and obligations due or which may arise under this Note or Loan and to any extension, renewal, or amendments of this Note or Loan. We/I agree that in case the proceeds of the foregoing Letter(s) of Credit prove insufficient to pay Our/My outstanding liabilities under this Note or Loan, We/I shall continue to be liable for the deficiency.

5. We/I irrevocably undertake to course the foreign exchange proceeds of the Letter(s) of Credit directly with Solid bank. Our/My failure to comply with the above would render us or me in default of the loan or credit facility without need of demand.

Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations. By January 31, 2000, Gateway’s outstanding debt amounted to US$1,975,835.58. Solid bank’s numerous demands to pay were not heeded by Gateway. Thus, on February 21, 2000, Solid bank filed a Complaint9 for collection of sum of money against Gateway.

On June 16, 2002, Solid bank filed an Amended Complaint to implead the officers/stockholders of Gateway, namely, Nand K. Prasad, Andrew S. Delos Reyes, Israel F. Maducdoc, Jaime M. Hidalgo and Alejandro S. Calderon – who signed in their personal capacity a Continuing Guarantyto become sureties for any and all existing indebtedness of Gateway to Solidbank. On June 20, 2002, the trial court admitted the amended complaint and impleaded the additional defendants.

Earlier, on October 11, 2000, Solid bank filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents on the basis of an information received from Mr. David Eichler, Chief Financial Officer of Alliance that Gateway has already received from Alliance the proceeds/payment of the Back-end Services Agreement. Gateway filed a motion to reset the production and inspection of documents to March 29, 2001 in order to give them enough time to gather and collate the documents in their possession. The trial court granted the motion.

On April 30, 2001, Solid bank filed a motion for issuance of a show cause order for Gateway’s failure to comply with the January 30, 2001 Order of the trial court. In response, Gateway filed a manifestation that they appeared before the trial court on March 29, 2001 to present the documents in their possession, however, Solid bank’s counsel failed to appear on the said date. In the manifestation, Gateway also expressed their willingness to make available for inspection at Gateway’s offices any requested document.

Solid bank was not satisfied with the documents produced by Gateway. Thus, on December 13, 2001, Solid bank filed a motion to cite Gateway and its responsible officers in contempt for their refusal to produce the documents subject of the January 30, 2001 Order. On April 15, 2002, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to cite Gateway for contempt. However, the trial court chastised Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to produce the documents evidencing the payments received by Gateway from Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement. Gateway filed a partial motion for reconsideration of the April 15, 2002 Order. However, the same was denied in an Order dated August 27, 2002.

On November 5, 2002, Gateway filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) seeking to nullify the Orders of the trial court. On June 2, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision nullifying the Orders of the trial court dated April 15, 2002 and August 27, 2002.

Issues:I. Whether Solid bank’s motion for production and inspection of documents

and the Order of the trial court dated January 30, 2001 failed to comply with Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court; and

II. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the matters subject of the documents sought to be produced but which were not produced by Gateway shall be deemed established in accordance with Solid bank’s claim.

Ruling:We resolve to deny the petition.

The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them

and that they are material to any matter involved in the action.33 The lament against a fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.

In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the requisites in order that a party may compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of documents or things, viz.:

(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause therefore;

(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of the case;

(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected;

(d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;

(e) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action, and

(f) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.

A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce.

The trial court held that as a consequence of Gateway’s failure to exert diligent effort in producing the documents subject of the Order dated January 30, 2001, in accordance with Section 3(a), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, the matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be produced but which were not produced by Gateway, shall be considered as having been established in accordance with Solid bank’s claim.

We hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the aforesaid Order. It is not fair to penalize Gateway for not complying with the request of Solid bank for the production and inspection of documents, considering that the documents sought were not particularly described. Gateway and its officers can only be held liable for unjust refusal to comply with the modes of discovery if it is shown that the documents sought to be produced were specifically described, material to the action and in the possession, custody or control of Gateway.

SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES AGUSTIN P. UY and PACITA TANG * SIOC TEN, DOMINGO UY, and Hon. PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO JR. in his capacity as presiding judge of the

Quezon City RTC (Branch 220), respondents.

Facts:Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten filed a petition for

injunction and damages with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Security Bank Corporation (SBC), Domingo Uy and the Sheriff of Quezon City. They sought to enjoin the extra-judicial foreclosure of the Uy's property located in Quezon City. Both SBC and Domindo P. Uy separately filed their answers with compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims. SBC filed its answer to Domingo's cross-claim. Before filing his answer to SBC's cross-claim, Domingo filed an Omnibus Motion for the Production of Documents and Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-claim.

He wanted SBC to produce the documents, which was used in the evaluation, processing and approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc., the real estate mortgages and the special power of attorney. These documents, according to Domingo, must first be produced before he could prepare and file the answer to SBC's cross-claim. Later, the spouses Uy also filed a similar motion against SBC. SBC opposed both motions. The trial court, however, granted the production and inspection of the documents. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court.

Issue:Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the grant of the two motions

for production and inspection of documents.

Ruling:The Supreme Court found the arguments of petitioner as not persuasive.

Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the documents sought must be material to any matter involved in the action. Respondents herein had shown that the subject documents were indeed material to the action involved. Petition was denied and the assailed decision was affirmed.

Motion for production or inspection aims to enable the parties to inform themselves of all relevant facts to the action. The Court discussed exhaustively the significance of the various modes of discovery, an example of which is Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In sum, the Court held that the said Rule aims to enable the parties to inform themselves, even before the trial, of all the facts relevant to the action, including those known only to the other litigants.

Through this procedure, "civil trials should not be carried on in the dark." As quoted: ". . . Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules

of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplishes one of the most necessary ends of modern procedure; it not only eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . . ..'

"As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings. "

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark." It is clear that courts are given wide latitude in granting motions for discovery in order to enable parties to prepare for trial or otherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto.

Thus, in the same case, the Court further held: "What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, 'the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise. . . . .'"

Indeed, the rule is that courts, in passing upon a motion for discovery, should be liberal in determining whether the documents in question are relevant to the subject matter of the action. To repeat, the rule on discovery "requires the parties to play the game with cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased."

ROGER MANZANO, petitioner, vs. LUZ DESPABILADERAS, respondent.

Facts:In 1989, during the months of August and September, respondent Luz

Despabiladeras obtained on credit from petitioner Roger Manzano various construction materials which she used in her construction project at the Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges (CSPC). By petitioner’s claim, he delivered to respondent during above-said period a total of P307, 140.50 worth of construction materials payable upon respondent’s initial collection from CSPC, to bear 8% monthly interest until fully paid.

Respondent having paid the amount of only P130,000.00 exclusive of interest, despite receipt of payments from CSPC, petitioner filed on April 6, 1990 a complaint against her for sum of money with damages a) P201,711.74 plus 8% monthly interest thereon from September 20, 1989 until payment in full;

In her Answer with Counterclaim, respondent alleged that petitioner had substantially altered the prices of the construction materials delivered to her; and that in addition to the P130, 000.00 she had paid petitioner; she had made additional payments to petitioner via two checks (one in the amount of P43, 069.00 and the other in the amount of P14, 000.00).

Petitioner filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the two checks represented payment for past obligations other than that subject of the case.

As required by the trial court, petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P50, 000.00 to answer for any damages arising from the grant and enforcement of supplier’s lien. Issues having been joined, the case was set for pre-trial.

Instead of submitting "an offer to stipulate," petitioner filed on October 24, 1990 a "Request for Admission" asking respondent to admit within 15 days. No response to the Request for Admission was proffered by respondent until in the course of the trial of the case or on April 8, 1991, respondent filed a list of items admitted to have been delivered and those not admitted, noting therein that "Deliveries admitted do not bear the actual price agreed [upon] or the specifications requested," which filing the trial court noted in its order of even date.

Opposing the Motion for Partial Judgment and Execution, respondent alleged: That the motion appears to have been based on the list of items on file with the court which defendant admitted to have been delivered to her by plaintiff but which, will still be litigated in order to determine the actual cost or value as the delivery receipts did not contain or reflect the true agreement between the parties or the cost does not appear on the receipt at the time of the delivery of the items; Petitioner, by counsel, also admitted having received P25,000.00 upon the expiration of respondent’s counter bond which was posted for the dissolution of petitioner’s bond.

At the reception of evidence for the defense, respondent offered documentary evidence including two cleared checks payable to petitioner, one dated August 10, 1989 in the amount of P43, 069.00, and another dated August 12, 1989 in the amount of P14, 200.00. As reflected in petitioner’s Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, the receipt of the checks was admitted but it was claimed that they represented payment for previous accounts, not for respondent’s account subject of the present case.

By Decision of July 7, 1997, the trial court found for petitioner.

x x x Despite receipt of said request for admission, defendant did not answer the same, under oath, consequently, defendant is deemed to have admitted that plaintiff delivered to her and she received the goods delivered with the total value of P314,610.50 and that of the said total amount, she has paid only P130,000.00.

There is no more need for the Court to examine and discuss the evidence submitted by the plaintiff to prove the account of defendant because what has been admitted need not be proved. Admission made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake (Yu v. Magpayo, 44 SCRA 163). All proofs submitted by him contrary thereto and inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether or not objection is interposed (Elayda v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 349).

Plaintiff insists that there was an agreement between him and the defendant for the latter to pay 8% monthly interests on the purchase on credit. Defendant denied that there was such an agreement. According to the counsel for plaintiff in his memorandum, it [is] just "a matter of one’s word against the others." Plaintiff did not present any written agreement as to payment of interests. In the light of the defendant’s admission herein before explained, her contention that her remaining balance is lesser than the amount being claimed by plaintiff, is without merit. Defendant’s claim that she is not liable to pay the 8% monthly interests is correct, but she should have rendered payment of the amount being claimed by the plaintiff minus the 8% monthly interest and if plaintiff refuses to accept, consign the amount in Court.

Issue:What is the legal consequence when a request for admission of material

and relevant facts pursuant to Rule 26 is not answered under oath within the period stated in the Rules by a party litigant served therefore?

Ruling:Petitioner contends that when respondent failed to deny under oath the

truth of the material facts subject of petitioner’s Request for Admission, she is deemed to have admitted them that he delivered to her, and she received various construction materials costing a total of P314, 610.50, P130, 000.00 of which had been partially paid.

Petitioner’s arguments are impressed with merit.

The agreement of the parties during the pre-trial conference of October 2, 1990, as reflected in the pre-trial order of even date, was that "the [petitioner] shall submit an offer to stipulate showing an itemized list of construction materials delivered to the [respondent] together with the cost claimed by the [petitioner] within fifteen (15) days[,] furnishing copy thereof to the [respondent] who will state her objections if any, or comment there[o]n within the same period of time." In substantial compliance with said agreement, petitioner chose to instead file a request for admission, a remedy afforded by a party under Rule 26.

The above-quoted Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 should not be disregarded, as in fact the trial court did not, when it ordered respondent to file comment thereon, just because the parties mutually agreed that petitioner submit "an offer to stipulate."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.