Submitted by: SALTING, JESSICA J.ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL.,petitionersFERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE,respondentG.R. No. L-12471 April 13, 1959

Topic: Restrictions on Capacity to Act: MinorityIssue: WON the minorityof the petitionersabsolve them oftheir civil liabilityfrom the contractthey made.Held: Although the promissory note cannot be enforced, due to the minors incapacity of binding themselves, they still hold monetary responsibility. In accordance with the provisions ofCC, even if theirwritten contract is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they received (Art. 1340).G.R. No. L-23002 July 31, 1967CONCEPCION FELIX VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ,plaintiff-appellant,vs.GERONIMO RODRIGUEZ., ET AL.,defendants-appellees.Topic: Defect of Consent; No Consideration PaidHeld: Duress being merely a vice or defect of consent, an action based upon it must be brought within four years after it has ceased; and the present action was instituted only in 1962, 28 years after the intimidation is claimed to have occurred and no less than 9 years after the supposed culprit died. On top of it, appellant entered into a series of subsequent transaction with appellees that confirmed the contracts that she now tries to set aside. Therefore the cause of action is clearly barred.That the prices were not paid does not make the sales inexistent for want of causa. The consideration need not pass from one to the other at the time the contract is entered into. The consideration need not be paid at the time of the promise. The one promise is a consideration for another.Appellants inaction to enforce her right, for 28 years, cannot be justified by the lame excuse that she assumed that the transfer was valid. Knowledge of the effect of that transaction would have been obtained by the exercise of diligence. Ignorance which is the effect of inexcusable negligence, it has been said, is no excuse for laches.

G.R. No. 114950 December 19, 1995RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, substituted by his heirs, namely: ROSARIO, RAFAEL, JR., APOLINARIO, RAYMUND, MARIA VICTORIA, MARIA ROSARIO and MARIA LOURDES, all surnamed SUNTAY,petitioners,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FEDERICO C. SUNTAY,respondents.Topic: Intention of parties as primary consideration in a contractHeld:Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.the deed of sale executed by Federico in favor of his now deceased nephew, Rafael, is absolutely simulated and fictitious and, hence, null and void, said parties having entered into a sale transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound.