civrev2 villaroel until millare

8/17/2019 CIVREV2 Villaroel Until Millare

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G.R. No. L-9188 December 4, 1914

GUTIERREZ HERMANOS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ENGRACIO ORENSE, defendant-appellant.

William A. Kincaid, Thos. L. Hartigan, and Ceferino M. Villareal for appellant. Rafael de la Sierra for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

Appeal through bill of exceptions filed by counsel for the appellant from the judgment on April14, 1913, by the onorable !. ". "oir, judge, #herein he sentenced the defendant to ma$eimmediate delivery of the property in %uestion, through a public instrument, by transferring andconveying to the plaintiff all his rights in the property described in the complaint and to pay it thesum of !&'(, as damages, and the costs of the suit.

)n "arch *, 1913, counsel for +utierre ermanos filed a complaint, after#ards amended, inthe ourt of irst /nstance of Albay against 0ngacio )rense, in #hich he set forth that on and

before ebruary 14, 19(&, the defendant )rense had been the o#ner of a parcel of land, #ith the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in the pueblo of +uinobatan, Albay, the location,area and boundaries of #hich #ere specified in the complaint that the said property has up todate been recorded in the ne# property registry in the name of the said )rense, according tocertificate 2o. *, #ith the boundaries therein given that, on ebruary 14, 19(&, ose uran, anephe# of the defendant, #ith the latter5s $no#ledge and consent, executed before a notary a

public instrument #hereby he sold and conveyed to the plaintiff company, for !1,*((, theaforementioned property, the vendor uran reserving to himself the right to repurchase it for thesame price #ithin a period of four years from the date of the said instrument that the plaintiff company had not entered into possession of the purchased property, o#ing to its continuedoccupancy by the defendant and his nephe#, ose uran, by virtue of a contract of leaseexecuted by the plaintiff to uran, #hich contract #as in force up to ebruary 14, 1911 that thesaid instrument of sale of the property, executed by ose uran, #as publicly and freelyconfirmed and ratified by the defendant )rense that, in order to perfect the title to the said

property, but that the defendant )rense refused to do so, #ithout any justifiable cause or reason,

#herefore he should be compelled to execute the said deed by an express order of the court, for ose uran is notoriously insolvent and cannot reimburse the plaintiff company for the price of

the sale #hich he received, nor pay any sum #hatever for the losses and damages occasioned bythe said sale, aside from the fact that the plaintiff had suffered damage by losing the presentvalue of the property, #hich #as #orth !3,((( that, unless such deed of final conveyance #ereexecuted in behalf of the plaintiff company, it #ould be injured by the fraud perpetrated by thevendor, uran, in connivance #ith the defendant that the latter had been occupying the said


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property since ebruary 14, 1911, and refused to pay the rental thereof, not#ithstanding thedemand made upon him for its payment at the rate of !3( per month, the just and reasonablevalue for the occupancy of the said property, the possession of #hich the defendant li$e#iserefused to deliver to the plaintiff company, in spite of the continuous demands made upon him,the defendant, #ith bad faith and to the prejudice of the firm of +utierre ermanos, claiming to

have rights of o#nership and possession in the said property. 6herefore it #as prayed that judgment be rendered by holding that the land and improvements in %uestion belong legitimatelyand exclusively to the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to execute in the plaintiff5s behalf thesaid instrument of transfer and conveyance of the property and of all the right, interest, title andshare #hich the defendant has therein that the defendant be sentenced to pay !3( per month for damages and rental of the property from ebruary 14, 1911, and that, in case these remedies #erenot granted to the plaintiff, the defendant be sentenced to pay to it the sum of !3,((( as damages,together #ith interest thereon since the date of the institution of this suit, and to pay the costs andother legal expenses.

6he demurrer filed to the amended complaint #as overruled, #ith exception on the part of thedefendant, #hose counsel made a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint,excepting those that #ere admitted, and specifically denied paragraph 4 thereof to the effect thaton ebruary 14, 19(&, ose uran executed the deed of sale of the property in favor of the

plaintiff #ith the defendant5s $no#ledge and consent. 1a phil.net

As the first special defense, counsel for the defendant alleged that the facts set forth in thecomplaint #ith respect to the execution of the deed did not constitute a cause of action, nor didthose alleged in the other form of action for the collection of !3,(((, the value of the realty.

As the second special defense, he alleged that the defendant #as the la#ful o#ner of the propertyclaimed in the complaint, as his o#nership #as recorded in the property registry, and that, sincehis title had been registered under the proceedings in rem prescribed by Act 2o. 497, it #asconclusive against the plaintiff and the pretended rights alleged to have been ac%uired by ose

uran prior to such registration could not no# prevail that the defendant had not executed any#ritten po#er of attorney nor given any verbal authority to ose uran in order that the latter might, in his name and representation, sell the said property to the plaintiff company that thedefendant5s $no#ledge of the said sale #as ac%uired long after the execution of the contract of sale bet#een uran and +utierre ermanos, and that prior thereto the defendant did notintentionally and deliberately perform any act such as might have induced the plaintiff to believethat uran #as empo#ered and authori ed by the defendant and #hich #ould #arrant him inacting to his o#n detriment, under the influence of that belief. ounsel therefore prayed that thedefendant be absolved from the complaint and that the plaintiff be sentenced to pay the costs andto hold his peace forever.

After the hearing of the case and an examination of the evidence introduced by both parties, thecourt rendered the judgment aforementioned, to #hich counsel for the defendant excepted andmoved for a ne# trial. 6his motion #as denied, an exception #as ta$en by the defendant and,


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upon presentation of the proper bill of exceptions, the same #as approved, certified andfor#arded to the cler$ of his court.

6his suit involves the validity and efficacy of the sale under right of redemption of a parcel of land and a masonry house #ith the nipa roof erected thereon, effected by ose uran, a nephe#

of the o#ner of the property, 0ngracio )rense, for the sum of !1,*(( by means of a notarialinstrument executed and ratified on ebruary 14, 19(&.

After the lapse of the four years stipulated for the redemption, the defendant refused to deliver the property to the purchaser, the firm of +utierre ermanos, and to pay the rental thereof at therate of !3( per month for its use and occupation since ebruary 14, 1911, #hen the period for itsrepurchase terminated. is refusal #as based on the allegations that he had been and #as thenthe o#ner of the said property, #hich #as registered in his name in the property registry that hehad not executed any #ritten po#er of attorney to ose uran, nor had he given the latter anyverbal authori ation to sell the said property to the plaintiff firm in his name and that, prior to

the execution of the deed of sale, the defendant performed no act such as might have induced the plaintiff to believe that ose uran #as empo#ered and authori ed by the defendant to effect thesaid sale.

6he plaintiff firm, therefore, charged ose uran, in the ourt of irst /nstance of the said province, #ith estafa, for having represented himself in the said deed of sale to be the absoluteo#ner of the aforesaid land and improvements, #hereas in reality they did not belong to him, butto the defendant )rense. o#ever, at the trial of the case 0ngracio )rense, called as a #itness,

being interrogated by the fiscal as to #hether he and consented to uran5s selling the said property under right of redemption to the firm of +utierre ermanos, replied that he had. /nvie# of this statement by the defendant, the court ac%uitted ose uran of the charge of estafa.

As a result of the ac%uittal of ose uran, based on the explicit testimony of his uncle, 0ngacio)rense, the o#ner of the property, to the effect that he had consented to his nephe# uran5sselling the property under right of repurchase to +utierre ermanos, counsel for this firm filed acomplainant praying, among other remedies, that the defendant )rense be compelled to executea deed for the transfer and conveyance to the plaintiff company of all the right, title and interest#ith )rense had in the property sold, and to pay to the same the rental of the property due from

ebruary 14, 1911. itc!alf

2ot#ithstanding the allegations of the defendant, the record in this case sho#s that he did give

his consent in order that his nephe#, ose uran, might sell the property in %uestion to +utierreermanos, and that he did thereafter confirm and ratify the sale by means of a public instrument

executed before a notary.

/t having been proven at the trial that he gave his consent to the said sale, it follo#s that thedefendant conferred verbal, or at least implied, po#er of agency upon his nephe# uran, #hoaccepted it in the same #ay by selling the said property. 6he principal must therefore fulfill all


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the obligations contracted by the agent, #ho acted #ithin the scope of his authority. 8 ivil ode,arts. 1&(9, 1&1( and 1& &.:

0ven should it be held that the said consent #as granted subse%uently to the sale, it isun%uestionable that the defendant, the o#ner of the property, approved the action of his nephe#,

#ho in this case acted as the manager of his uncle5s business, and )rense5r ratification producedthe effect of an express authori ation to ma$e the said sale. 8 ivil ode, arts. 1''' and 1'9 .:

Article 1 *9 of the ivil ode prescribes;


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6he contract of sale of the said property contained in the notarial instrument of ebruary 14,19(&, is alleged to be invalid, null and void under the provisions of paragraph * of section 33* of the ode of ivil !rocedure, because the authority #hich )rense may have given to uran toma$e the said contract of sale is not sho#n to have been in #riting and signed by )rense, but therecord discloses satisfactory and conclusive proof that the defendant )rense gave his consent to

the contract of sale executed in a public instrument by his nephe# ose uran. =uch consent #as proven in a criminal action by the s#orn testimony of the principal and presented in this civil suit by other s#orn testimony of the same principal and by other evidence to #hich the defendantmade no objection. 6herefore the principal is bound to abide by the conse%uences of his agencyas though it had actually been given in #riting 8 onlu "s . Araneta and +uan$o, 1* !hil. >ep.,3'& +allemit "s . 6abiliran, ( !hil. >ep., 41 ?uen le @ =treiff "s . iongco, !hil. >ep.,11(.:

6he repeated and successive statements made by the defendant )rense in t#o actions, #hereinhe affirmed that he had given his consent to the sale of his property, meet the re%uirements of the

la# and legally excuse the lac$ of #ritten authority, and, as they are a full ratification of the actsexecuted by his nephe# ose uran, they produce the effects of an express po#er of agency.

6he judgment appealed from in harmony #ith the la# and the merits of the case, and the errorsassigned thereto have been duly refuted by the foregoing considerations, so it should be affirmed.

6he judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, #ith the costs against the appellant.


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G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988

RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner,vs.T E ONORA!LE COURT O" A##EALS, E$ETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO,DO$INGO ASEJO, JOSE"A ASEJO an% SANTIAGO ASEJO, respondents.

SAR$IENTO, J.:

In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that has led not onlyto protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like strained relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is aquestion that likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural values and institutions, where, as one observer notes,wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and where property is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of hisproperty," says this modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody that threatens his possessions willarouse his most passionate enmity." 1

he task of this !ourt, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values the burden of reconstructing thesocial order is shouldered by the political leadership-and the people themselves.

he parties have come to this !ourt for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the decree of law.

he antecedent facts are quoted from the decision 2 appealed from#

$$$ $$$ $$$

... % &he land in question 'ot ()*+) of !adastral urvey of lbay located in 'egaspi !itywith an area of some ((, /0 sq. m. originally belonged to one 1elisa lzul as her ownprivate property she married twice in her lifetime the first, with one 2ernabe dille, withwhom she had as an only child, herein defendant 3ustico dille in her second marriagewith one 4rocopio sejo, her children were herein plaintiffs, 5 now, sometime in (+ +,said 1elisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain rd persons, period of repurchase being years, but she died in (+)/ without being able to redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he e$ecuted a deed of e$tra-judicial partition representing himself tobe the only heir and child of his mother 1elisa with the consequence that he was able tosecure title in his name alone also, so that 6! . 7o. /(( 8 in the name of his mother wastransferred to his name, that was in (+00 that was why after some efforts of compromisehad failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case for partitionwith accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he


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redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs,9meteria sejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that,5

:ell then, after hearing the evidence, trial ;udge sustained defendant in his position thathe was and became absolute owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed caseand also condemned plaintiff occupant, 9meteria to vacate it is because of this thatplaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court erred in#

I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property

II. ... not ordering the partition of the property and

III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property tovacate the land, p. ( ppellant


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he instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. :e are not convincedthat he had repudiated the co-ownership on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the privaterespondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. ?e cannot therefore besaid to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. =oreover, one of the privaterespondents, 9meteria sejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner hasnot taken pains to eject her therefrom. s a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that portion

9meteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.

It is true that registration under the orrens system is constructive notice of title, 1( but it has likewise beenour holding that the orrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. 11 It is therefore no argument to saythat the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstandingthe long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

1or the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents< claims commenced in (+8) over theestate registered in (+00. :hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years, 12

reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, 1& we, as we said, are not prepared to count theperiod from such a date in this case. :e note the petitioner


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G.R. No. 826'( S)*+) )r 15, 1989

DO$ETILA $. ANDRES, %o n/ u0 n)00 un%)r + ) na ) an% 0+y ) 3IRENE SEARING A##AREL,3 petitioner,

vs.$ANU"ACTURERS ANO ER 7 TRUST COR#ORATION an% COURT O"A##EALS, respondents.

Roque A. Tamayo for petitioner.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

ssailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the judgment of the !ourt of ppeals,which, applying the doctrine of solutio indebiti , reversed the decision of the 3egional

rial !ourt, 2ranch !E, Fuezon !ity by deciding in favor of private respondent.

4etitioner, using the business name "Irene


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purchased. ometime in ugust (+AG, 1 !9 instructed the 1irst 7ational tate 2ankof 7ew ;ersey, 7ewark, 7ew ;ersey, @. . . Bhereinafter referred to as 17 2C totransfer H(G,GGG.GG to petitioner via 4hilippine 7ational 2ank, ta. !ruz 2ranch, =anilaBhereinafter referred to as 472C.

cting on said instruction, 17 2 instructed private respondent =anufacturers ?anover and rust !orporation to effect the above- mentioned transfer through its facilities and tocharge the amount to the account of 17 2 with private respondent. lthough privaterespondent was able to send a tele$ to 472 to pay petitioner H(G,GGG.GG through the4ilipinas 2ank, where petitioner had an account, the payment was not effectedimmediately because the payee designated in the tele$ was only ":earing pparel."@pon query by 472, private respondent sent 472 another tele$ dated ugust /8, (+AGstating that the payment was to be made to "Irene


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:?9391639, the appealed decision is hereby 39E93 9D and 9 ID9 and another one entered in favor of plaintiff-appellant and againstdefendant-appellee Domelita BsicC =. ndres, doing business under thename and style "Irene


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the conflict of rights. It has been accepted by the courts, which have nothesitated to apply it when the e$igencies of right and equity demanded itsassertion. It is a part of that affluent reservoir of justice upon which judicialdiscretion draws whenever the statutory laws are inadequate becausethey do not speak or do so with a confused voice. %at p. * /.&

1or this article to apply the following requisites must concur# "B(C that he who paid wasnot under obligation to do so and, B/C that payment was made by reason of an essentialmistake of fact" %!ity of !ebu v. 4iccio, ((G 4hil. 00A, 0* B(+*GC&.

It is undisputed that private respondent delivered the second H(G,GGG.GG remittance.?owever, petitioner contends that the doctrine of solutio indebiti , does not applybecause its requisites are absent.

1irst, it is argued that petitioner had the right to demand and therefore to retain the

second H(G,GGG.GG remittance. It is alleged that even after the two H(G,GGG.GGremittances are credited to petitioner


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7ational tate 2ank of 7ew ;ersey actually requested the plaintiff-appellant =anufacturers ?anover M rust !orporation to remit to Irene


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4etitioner invokes the equitable principle that when one of two innocent persons mustsuffer by the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whosenegligence was the pro$imate cause of the loss.

he rule is that principles of equity cannot be applied if there is a provision of law

specifically applicable to a case %4hil. 3abbit 2us 'ines, Inc. v. rciaga, K.3. 7o. '-/+8G(, =arch (*, (+A8,()A !3 ) Nabat, ;r. v. !ourt of ppeals, K.3. 7o. ' *+0A,;uly (G, (+A*, ()/ !3 0A8 3ural 2ank of 4aranaque, Inc. v. 3emolado, K.3. 7o.*/G0(, =arch (A, (+A0, ( 0 !3 )G+ !ruz v. 4ahati, +A 4hil. 8AA B(+0*C&. ?ence, the!ourt in the case of De arcia v. 'ourt of Appeals, K.3. 7o. '-/G/*), ;anuary G,(+8(, 8 !3 (/+, citing A!nar v. (apdiangco, K.3. 7o. '-(A0 *, =arch (, (+*0, (

!3 )A*, held#

... he common law principle that where one of two innocent persons mustsuffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon

the party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to becommitted, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an e$pressprovision of the new !ivil !ode, specifically rticle 00+. 2etween acommon law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail inthis jurisdiction. %at p. ( 0.&

?aving shown that rt. /(0) of the !ivil !ode, which embodies the doctrine of solutioindebiti , applies in the case at bar, the !ourt must reject the common law principleinvoked by petitioner.

1inally, in her attempt to defeat private respondent


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Appelle categorically stated that the payment #as not voluntarily made, 8a fact found also by thelo#er court:,but on the erronoues belief, that they #ere due. Gnder this circumstance, the amount

paid, even #ithout protest is recoverable. ingo, 3& ?y. 73*,737 1( =. . , in the follo#ing manner;.


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section is Article CC/, entitled epartment of Assessment and the sections thereunder manifestlysho# that said article and its sections relate to asseessment, collection and recovery of real estatetaxes only. =aid section &7, therefor, is not applicable to the case at bar, #hich relates to therecover of retail dealer taxes..

/n the opinion of the =ecretary of ustice 8)p. 9(,=eries of 19*&, in a %uestion similar to the caseat bar, it #as held that the re%uiredment of protest refers only to the payment of taxes #hich aredirectly imposed by the charter itself, that is, real estate taxes, #hich vie# #as sustained by

judicial and administrative precedents, one of #hich is the case of "edina, et al., v. ity of Faguio, +.>. 2o. D-4 79, Aug. 9, 19* . /n other #ords, protest is not necessary for therecovery of retail dealer5s taxes, li$e the present, because they are not directly imposed by thecharter. /n the "edina case, the harter of Faguio 8 hap. 71, >evised Adm. ode:, provides thatev. Adm.

ode:, a proviso similar to section &7 of the "anila harter. 6he refund of specific taxes paidunder a void ordinance #as ordered, although it did not appear that payment thereof #as made

under protest..

/n a recent case, e said;


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extra-judicial demand x x x< 8Art. 11**, 2 :, and the #ritten demand in the case at bar #asmade on )ctober 3(, 19*7 8=tipulation of acts:. ") / /0 in the sense that only paymentsmade on or after )ctober 3(, 19*( should be refunded, the decision appealed from is affirmed, inall other respects. 2o costs. .

G.R. No. L-1#%%7 A r!" 29, 19%$

&RIMITI3O ANSA', ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs.THE OARD O) DIRECTORS O) THE NATIONAL DE3ELO&MENT COM&AN', ETAL., defendants-appellees.

Celso A. #ernande+ for appellants. $an C. imene+, for appellees.

&ARAS,C. J .5

)n uly *, 19*7, appellants filed against appellees in the ourt of irst /nstance of "anila acomplaint praying for a (L hristmas bonus for the years 19*4 and 19**. 6he court a -$o onappellees5 motion to dismiss, issued the follo#ing order;

onsidering the motion to dismiss filed on 1* August, 19*7, set for this morningconsidering that at the hearing thereof, only respondents appeared thru counsel and there#as no appearance for the plaintiffs although the court #aited for sometime for themconsidering, ho#ever, that petitioners have submitted an opposition #hich the court #illconsider together #ith the arguments presented by respondents and the 0xhibits mar$edand presented, namely, 0xhibits 1 to *, at the hearing of the motion to dismissconsidering that the action in brief is one to compel respondents to declare a hristmas

bonus for petitioners #or$ers in the 2ational evelopment ompany considering thatthe ourt does not see ho# petitioners may have a cause of action to secure such bonus

because;

8a: A bonus is an act of liberality and the court ta$es it that it is not #ithin its judicial po#ers to command respondents to be liberal


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8 : !etitioners admit that respondents are not under legal duty to give such bonus but thatthey had only as$ that such bonus be given to them because it is a moral obligation of respondents to give that but as this ourt understands, it has no po#er to compel a partyto comply #ith a moral obligation 8Art. 14 , 2e# ivil ode.:.

/2 I/0 0>0) , dismissed. 2o pronouncement as to costs.

A motion for reconsideration of the afore-%uoted order #as denied. ence this appeal.

Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their claim restson moral grounds or #hat in brief is defined by la# as a natural obligation.

=ince appellants admit that appellees are not under legal obligation to give such claimed bonusthat the grant arises only from a moral obligation or the natural obligation that they discussed intheir brief, this ourt feels it urgent to reproduce at this point, the definition and meaning of

natural obligation.

Article 14 3 of the 2e# ivil ode classifies obligations into civil or natural. < ivil obligationsare a right of action to compel their performance. 2atural obligations, not being based on

positive la# but on e%uity and natural la#, do not grant a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authori e the retention of #hathas been delivered or rendered by reason thereof


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still the facts in said eacoc$ case are not the same as in the instant one, and hence the rulingapplied in said case cannot be considered in the present action.

!remises considered, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, #ithout pronouncement as tocosts.

G.R. No. L-47#%2 December 19, 194$

6UAN ). 3ILLARROEL, recurrente-apelante,vs.

ERNARDINO ESTRADA, recurrido-apelado.

/. #elipe Agoncillo en representacion del rec$rrente!appelante. /. Crispin 0 en en representacion del rec$rrido!apelado.

A3ANCE A, &re+.:


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0l 9 de mayo de 191 , Alejandro . allao, madre del demandado uan . Iillarroel, obtuvo delos esposos "ariano 0strada y =everina un prestamo de !1,((( pagadero al cabo de siete aNos80xhibito A:. Alejandra fallecio, dejando como unico heredero al demandado. Dos esposos"ariano 0strada y =everina fallecieron tambien, dejando como unico heredero al demandanteFernardino 0strada. 0l 9 de agosto de 193(, el demandado suscribio un documento 80xhibito F:

por el cual declara en deber al demandante la cantidad de !1,(((, con un interes de 1 por cientoal aNo. 0sta accion versa sobre el cobro de esta cantidad.

0l u gado de primera /nstancia de Daguna, en el cual se interpuso esta accion, condeno aldemandado a pagar al demandante la cantidad reclamada de !1,((( con sus intereses legales de1 por ciento al aNo desde el 9 de agosto de 193( hasta su completo pago. =e apelo de estasentencia.

=e notara %ue las partes en la presente causa son, respectivamente, los unicos herederos de losacreedores y de la deudora originales. 0sta accion se ejercita en virtud de la obligacion %ue el

demandado como unico hijo de la primitiva deudora contrajo en favor del demandante, unicoheredero de loa primitivos acreedores. =e admite %ue la cantidad de !1,((( a %ue se contrae estaobligacion es la misma deuda de la madre del demandado a los padres deldemandante. la phil.net

Aun%ue la accion para recobrar la deuda original ha prescrito ya cuando se interpuso la demandaen esta causa, la cuestion %ue se suscita en esta apelacion es principalmente la de si, no obstantetal prescripcion, es procedente la accion entablada. =in embargo, no se funda la presente accionen la obligacion original contraida por la madre del demandado, %ue ya ha prescrito, sino en la%ue contrajo el demandado el 9 de agosto de 193( 80xhibito F: al asumir el cumplimiento dea%uella obligacion, ya prescrita. =iendo el demandado el unico herdero de la primitiva deudora,con derecho a sucederla en su herencia, a%uella deuda con traida por su madre legalmente,aun%ue perdio su eficacia por prescripcion, ahora es, sin embargo, para el una obligacion moral,%ue es consideracion suficiente a crear y hacer efica y exigible su obligacion voluntariamentecontraida el 9 de agosto de 193( en el 0xhibito F.

Da regla de %ue una promesa nueva de pagar una deuda prrescrita debe ser hecha por la misma persona obligada o por otra legalmente autori ada por ella, no es aplicable al caso presente en%ue no se exige el cumplimiento de la obligacion de la obligada orignalmente, sino del %ue des

pues %uiso voluntariamente asumir esta obligacion.

=e confirma la sentencia apelada, con las costas al apelante. Asi se ordena.


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G.R. No. 179##7 A r!" #$, 2$$8

6OSE&H SALUDAGA, petitioner,vs.)AR EASTERN UNI3ERSIT' *0 EDIL ERTO C. DE 6ESUS !0 !+ c* *c! *+&re+! e0 o/ )EU, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

'NARES-SANTIAGO, J. 5

6his !etition for >evie# on Certiorari 1 under >ule 4* of the >ules of ourt assails the une 9,((& ecision of the ourt of Appeals in A-+.>. I 2o. '&(*(, nullifying and setting aside

the 2ovember 1(, ((4 ecision 3 of the >egional 6rial ourt of "anila, Franch , in ivil ase 2o. 9'-'94'3 and dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner as #ell as its August 3, ((&>esolution 4 denying the "otion for >econsideration. *

6he antecedent facts are as follo#s;

!etitioner oseph =aludaga #as a sophomore la# student of respondent ar 0astern Gniversity

8 0G: #hen he #as shot by Alejandro >osete 8>osete:, one of the security guards on duty at theschool premises on August 1', 1997. !etitioner #as rushed to 0G- r. 2icanor >eyes "edical

oundation 8 0G-2>" : due to the #ound he sustained. 7 "ean#hile, >osete #as brought tothe police station #here he explained that the shooting #as accidental. e #as eventuallyreleased considering that no formal complaint #as filed against him.

!etitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to provide students #ith a safe and secure environment and anatmosphere conducive to learning. >espondents, in turn, filed a 6hird-!arty omplaint & against+alaxy evelopment and "anagement orporation 8+alaxy:, the agency contracted by

respondent 0G to provide security services #ithin its premises and "ariano . /mperial8/mperial:, +alaxy5s !resident, to indemnify them for #hatever #ould be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any and to pay attorney5s fees and cost of the suit. )n the other hand, +alaxy and/mperial filed a ourth-!arty omplaint against A ! +eneral /nsurance. '

)n 2ovember 1(, ((4, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of #hich reads;

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0>0 )>0, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering;

1. 0G and 0dilberto de esus, in his capacity as president of 0G to pay jointlyand severally oseph =aludaga the amount of !3*, 9'. * for actual damages #ith1 L interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid moral

damages of !3((,(((.((, exemplary damages of !*((,(((.((, attorney5s fees of !1((,(((.(( and cost of the suit

. +alaxy "anagement and evelopment orp. and its president, ol. "ariano/mperial to indemnify jointly and severally 3rd party plaintiffs 8 0G and0dilberto de esus in his capacity as !resident of 0G: for the above-mentionedamounts

3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lac$ of cause of action. 2o pronouncement as to costs.

=) )> 0>0 . 9

>espondents appealed to the ourt of Appeals #hich rendered the assailed ecision, the decretal portion of #hich provides, "i+ ;

0>0 )>0, the appeal is hereby +>A260 . 6he ecision dated 2ovember 1(,((4 is hereby >0I0>=0 and =06 A=/ 0. 6he complaint filed by oseph =aludaga

against appellant ar 0astern Gniversity and its !resident in ivil ase 2o. 9'-'94'3 is/="/==0 .

=) )> 0>0 . 1(

!etitioner filed a "otion for >econsideration #hich #as denied hence, the instant petition basedon the follo#ing grounds;

6 0 )G>6 ) A!!0AD= =0>/)G=DO 0>>0 /2 "A220> )26>A>O 6)DA A2 G>/=!>G 02 0 /2 >GD/2+ 6 A6;

*.1. 6 0 = ))6/2+ /2 / 026 /= A )>6G/6)G= 0I026

*. . >0=!)2 026= A>0 2)6 D/AFD0 )> A"A+0= )> 6 0 /2 G>O>0=GD6/2+ >)" A +G2= )6 )G2 =G 0>0 FO 6 0 !06/6/)20> >)" 6 0 A2 = ) 2) D0== 6 A2 6 0/> ) 2 =0 G>/6O +GA> /2

I/)DA6/)2 ) 6 0/> FG/D6-/2 )26>A 6GAD )FD/+A6/)2 6)!06/6/)20>, F0/2+ 6 0/> DA =6G 026 A6 6 A6 6/"0, 6) !>)I/ 0 /"

/6 A =A 0 A2 =0 G>0 0 G A6/)2AD 02I/>)2"026

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that #ould presumably suffice to e%uip him #ith the necessary tools and s$ills to pursuehigher education or a profession. )n the other hand, the student covenants to abide by theschool5s academic re%uirements and observe its rules and regulations.

/nstitutions of learning must also meet the implicit or osete as he #as not their employee 17 and that they complied #ith their obligation to ensure asafe learning environment for their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting thesecurity services of +alaxy.

After a thorough revie# of the records, #e find that respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. 6hey failed to prove that they ensured that the guards assigned in the campus met there%uirements stipulated in the =ecurity =ervice Agreement. /ndeed, certain documents about

+alaxy #ere presented during trial ho#ever, no evidence as to the %ualifications of >osete as asecurity guard for the university #as offered.

>espondents also failed to sho# that they undertoo$ steps to ascertain and confirm that thesecurity guards assigned to them actually possess the %ualifications re%uired in the =ecurity=ervice Agreement. /t #as not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results,

(1 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract #ith +alaxy. 6otal reliance on the

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security agency about these matters or failure to chec$ the papers stating the %ualifications of theguards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allo#ed tocompletely relin%uish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired.6o do so #ould result to contracting a#ay its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learningenvironment for its students.

onse%uently, respondents5 defense of force ma3e$re must fail. /n order for force ma3e$re to beconsidered, respondents must sho# that no negligence or misconduct #as committed that mayhave occasioned the loss. An act of +od cannot be invo$ed to protect a person #ho has failed tota$e steps to forestall the possible adverse conse%uences of such a loss. )ne5s negligence mayhave concurred #ith an act of +od in producing damage and injury to another nonetheless,sho#ing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury #as a fortuitous event#ould not exempt one from liability. hen the effect is found to be partly the result of a person5s

participation - #hether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act - the #hole occurrence ishumani ed and removed from the rules applicable to acts of +od. 1&

Article 11&( of the ivil ode provides that those #ho are negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in

providing a safe learning environment, respondent 0G is liable to petitioner for damages. /t isessential in the a#ard of damages that the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during thetrial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant5sacts. 1'

/n the instant case, it #as established that petitioner spent !3*, 9'. * for his hospitali ation andother medical expenses .19 hile the trial court correctly imposed interest on said amount,ho#ever, the case at bar involves an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan or forbearance of money. As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six percent 87L: per annum of the amount demanded. =uch interest shall continue to run from the filing of the complaint untilthe finality of this ecision. ( After this ecision becomes final and executory, the applicablerate shall be t#elve percent 81 L: per annum until its satisfaction.

6he other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as transportation expenses and thoseincurred in hiring a personal assistant #hile recuperating #ere ho#ever not duly supported byreceipts. 1 /n the absence thereof, no actual damages may be a#arded. 2onetheless, temperatedamages under Art. 4 of the ivil ode may be recovered #here it has been sho#n that theclaimant suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved #ith certainty.

ence, the amount of ! (,(((.(( as temperate damages is a#arded to petitioner.

As regards the a#ard of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of #hat #ould be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its o#n

peculiar circumstances . 6he testimony of petitioner about his physical suffering, mentalanguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shoc$ resulting from the shooting incident 3 justify thea#ard of moral damages. o#ever, moral damages are in the category of an a#ard designed to

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compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the #rongdoer.6he a#ard is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enablethe injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that #ill serve to obviate the moralsuffering he has undergone. /t is aimed at the restoration, #ithin the limits of the possible, of thespiritual status %uo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. 6rial courts must

then guard against the a#ard of exorbitant damages they should exercise balanced restrainedand measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it #as due to passion, prejudice, or corruptionon the part of the trial court. 4 e deem it just and reasonable under the circumstances to a#ard

petitioner moral damages in the amount of !1((,(((.((.

Di$e#ise, attorney5s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of !*(,(((.(( as part of damagesis reasonable in vie# of Article (' of the ivil ode. * o#ever, the a#ard of exemplarydamages is deleted considering the absence of proof that respondents acted in a #anton,fraudulent, rec$less, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

e note that the trial court held respondent e esus solidarily liable #ith respondent 0G. /n o ton Conglomerate, 4nc. ". Agcolicol , 7 #e held that;

JAK corporation is invested by la# #ith a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it, such that, save for certain exceptions, corporate officers #hoentered into contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally liable for theliabilities of the latter. !ersonal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along8although not necessarily: #ith the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only#hen - 81: he assents to a patently unla#ful act of the corporation, or #hen he is guilty of

bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or #hen there is a conflict of interestresulting in damages to the corporation, its stoc$holders or other persons 8 : he consentsto the issuance of #atered do#n stoc$s or #ho, having $no#ledge thereof, does notforth#ith file #ith the corporate secretary his #ritten objection thereto 83: he agrees tohold himself personally and solidarily liable #ith the corporation or 84: he is made by aspecific provision of la# personally ans#erable for his corporate action. &

2one of the foregoing exceptions #as established in the instant case hence, respondent e esusshould not be held solidarily liable #ith respondent 0G.

/ncidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case is the breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the alternative, also holds respondents vicariously liable under

Article 1'( of the ivil ode, #hich provides;

Art. 1'(. 6he obligation imposed by Article 1&7 is demandable not only for one5s o#nacts or omissions, but also for those of persons for #hom one is responsible.

x x x x

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0mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and householdhelpers acting #ithin the scope of their assigned tas$s, even though the former are notengaged in any business or industry.

x x x x

6he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease #hen the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

e agree #ith the findings of the ourt of Appeals that respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 1'( of the ivil ode because respondents are not the employers of >osete.6he latter #as employed by +alaxy. 6he instructions issued by respondents5 =ecurity onsultantto +alaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than re%uests commonly envisaged inthe contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. 6hey cannot beconstrued as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of >osete. '

As held in Merc$r& /r$g Corporation ". Li $nao ; 9

/n Soliman, r. ". T$a+on ,3( #e held that #here the security agency recruits, hires andassigns the #or$s of its #atchmen or security guards to a client, the employer of suchguards or #atchmen is such agency, and not the client, since the latter has no hand inselecting the security guards. 6hus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of afamily cannot be demanded from the said client;

P J/Kt is settled in our jurisdiction that #here the security agency, as here,recruits, hires and assigns the #or$ of its #atchmen or security guards, the agencyis the employer of such guards or #atchmen. Diability for illegal or harmful actscommitted by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to theclients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of asecurity agency has no hand in selecting #ho among the pool of security guardsor #atchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it the duty to observethe diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, inthe ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client #hose premises or

property are protected by the security guards.

x x x x

6he fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guardsassigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of thesecurity guards concerned and liable for their #rongful acts or omissions. 31

e no# come to respondents5 6hird !arty laim against +alaxy. /n #irestone Tire and R$ er Compan& of the hilippines ". Tempeng5o ,3 #e held that;

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6he third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device #hereby a 5third party5 #ho isneither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be broughtinto the case #ith leave of court, by the defendant, #ho acts as third-party plaintiff toenforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogationor any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff5s claim. 6he third-party complaint is actually

independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff5s complaint. ere it not for this provision of the >ules of ourt, it #ould have to be filed independently andseparately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party. Fut the>ules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or so to spea$, to litigate hisseparate cause of action in respect of plaintiff5s claim against a third-party in the originaland principal case #ith the object of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary

proliferation of la# suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation the entiresubject matter arising from one particular set of facts. 33

>espondents and +alaxy #ere able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in the course

of the trial of petitioner5s complaint. 0vidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that+alaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its employees but also in their supervision./ndeed, no administrative sanction #as imposed against >osete despite the shooting incidentmoreover, he #as even allo#ed to go on leave of absence #hich led eventually to hisdisappearance. 34 +alaxy also failed to monitor petitioner5s condition or extend the necessaryassistance, other than the !*,(((.(( initially given to petitioner. +alaxy and /mperial failed toma$e good their pledge to reimburse petitioner5s medical expenses.

or these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent 0G #ith an un%ualifiedsecurity guard, #hich resulted to the latter5s breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold+alaxy liable to respondent 0G for such damages e%uivalent to the above-mentioned amountsa#arded to petitioner.

Gnli$e respondent e esus, #e deem /mperial to be solidarily liable #ith +alaxy for beinggrossly negligent in directing the affairs of the security agency. /t #as /mperial #ho assured

petitioner that his medical expenses #ill be shouldered by +alaxy but said representations #erenot fulfilled because they presumed that petitioner and his family #ere no longer interested infiling a formal complaint against them. 3*

HERE)ORE , the petition is GRANTED. 6he une 9, ((& ecision of the ourt of Appeals in A-+.>. I 2o. '&(*( nullifying the ecision of the trial court and dismissing the

complaint as #ell as the August 3, ((& >esolution denying the "otion for >econsideration areRE3ERSED *0 SET ASIDE. 6he ecision of the >egional 6rial ourt of "anila, Franch ,in ivil ase 2o. 9'-'94'3 finding respondent 0G liable for damages for breach of itsobligation to provide students #ith a safe and secure learning atmosphere, is A))IRMED #iththe follo#ing MODI)ICATIONS ;

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a. respondent ar 0astern Gniversity 8 0G: is ORDERED to pay petitioner actual damages inthe amount of !3*, 9'. *, plus 7L interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until thefinality of this ecision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the applicable rate shall

be t#elve percent 81 L: per annum until its satisfaction

b. respondent 0G is also ORDERED to pay petitioner temperate damages in the amount of ! (,(((.(( moral damages in the amount of !1((,(((.(( and attorney5s fees and litigationexpenses in the amount of !*(,(((.((

c. the a#ard of exemplary damages is DELETED.

6he omplaint against respondent 0dilberto . e esus is DISMISSED. 6he counterclaims of respondents are li$e#ise DISMISSED.

+alaxy evelopment and "anagement orporation 8+alaxy: and its president, "ariano .

/mperial areORDERED

to jointly and severally pay respondent 0G damages e%uivalent to theabove-mentioned amounts a#arded to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-#7:% 6 0e #$, 19:2

SAGRADA ORDEN DE &REDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO DE )ILI&INAS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.NATIONAL COCONUT COR&ORATION, defendant-appellant.


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oconut orporation reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises. 80xhibit A-1.:

6he present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August, 1947, the date #hen thedefendant began to occupy the premises, to the date it vacated it. 6he defendant does not contest

its liability for the rentals at the rate of !3,((( per month from ebruary ', 1949 8the datespecified in the judgment in civil case 2o. *((&:, but resists the claim therefor prior to this date./t interposes the defense that it occupied the property in good faith, under no obligation#hatsoever to pay rentals for the use and occupation of the #arehouse. udgment #as renderedfor the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of !3,((( a month, as reasonable rentals,from August, 1947, to the date the defendant vacates the premises. 6he judgment declares that

plaintiff has al#ays been the o#ner, as the sale of apanese purchaser #as void a initio that theAlien !roperty Administration never ac%uired any right to the property, but that it held the samein trust until the determination as to #hether or not the o#ner is an enemy citi en. 6he trial courtfurther declares that defendant can not claim any better rights than its predecessor, the Alien

!roperty Administration, and that as defendant has used the property and had subleased portionthereof, it must pay reasonable rentals for its occupation.

Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed, the follo#ing assignment of error having been made on defendant-appellant5s behalf;

6he trial court erred in holding the defendant liable for rentals or compensation for theuse and occupation of the property from the middle of August, 1947, to ecember 14,194'.

1. ant to


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that as defendant has used it for commercial purposes and has leased portion of it, it should beresponsible therefore to the o#ner, #ho had been deprived of the possession for so many years.8Appellee5s brief, pp. (, 3.:

e can not understand ho# the trial court, from the mere fact that plaintiff-appellee #as the

o#ner of the property and the defendant-appellant the occupant, #hich used for its o#n benefit but by the express permission of the Alien !roperty ustodian of the Gnited =tates, so easily jumped to the conclusion that the occupant is liable for the value of such use and occupation. /f defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namley, la#, contract or %uasi-contract, crime, or negligence. 8Article 1('9, =panish

ivil ode.: efendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and occupied it #ith the permission of the entity #hich had the legal control andadministration thereof, the Allien !roperty Administration. 2either #as there any negligence onits part. 6here #as also no privity 8of contract or obligation: bet#een the Alien !roperty

ustodian and the 6ai#an 6e$$osho, #hich had secured the possession of the property from the

plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien !roperty ustodian or its permittee8defendant-appellant: may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said 6ai#an 6e$$osho. 6he Allien !roperty Administration had the control andadministration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title,the 6ai#an 6e$$osho, but by express provision of la# 86rading #ith the 0nemy Act of theGnited =tates, 4( =tat., 411 *( G.=. .A., 1'9:. 2either is it a trustee of the former o#ner, the

plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of then +overnment of the Gnited =tates 83 )p. Atty.+en. 49 *( G.=. .A. '3:, in its o#n right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of,the enemy o#ner. 8Ooughioheny @ )hio oal o. vs. Dasevich J19 (K, 1&9 2. ., 3** 1&1 is.,34& G.=. .A., ' - '3.: rom August, 1947, #hen defendant-appellant too$ possession, to thelate of judgment on ebruary ', 194', Allien !roperty Administration had the absolute controlof the property as trustee of the +overnment of the Gnited =tates, #ith po#er to dispose of it bysale or other#ise, as though it #ere the absolute o#ner. 8G.= vs. hemical oundation J . .A.

el. 19 *K, * . J dK, 191 *( G.=. .A., '3.: 6herefore, even if defendant-appellant #ere liableto the Allien !roperty Administration for rentals, these #ould not accrue to the benefit of the

plaintiff-appellee, the o#ner, but to the Gnited =tates +overnment.

Fut there is another ground #hy the claim or rentals can not be made against defendant-appellant. 6here #as no agreement bet#een the Alien !roperty ustodian and the defendant-appellant for the latter to pay rentals on the property. 6he existence of an implied agreement tothat effect is contrary to the circumstances. 6he copra 0xport "anagement ompany, #hich

preceded the defendant-appellant, in the possession and use of the property, does not appear tohave paid rentals therefor, as it occupied it by #hat the parties denominated a


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also free from payment of rentals, especially as it #as +overnment corporation, and steps #herethen being ta$en by the !hilippine +overnment to secure the property for the 2ational oconut

orporation. =o that the circumstances do not justify the finding that there #as an impliedagreement that the defendant-appellant #as to pay for the use and occupation of the premises atall.

6he above considerations sho# that plaintiff-appellee5s claim for rentals before it obtained the judgment annulling the sale of the 6ai#an 6e$$osho may not be predicated on any negligence or offense of the defendant-appellant, or any contract, express or implied, because the Allien!roperty Administration #as neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee, nor a privy to the obligationsof the 6ai#an 6e$$osho, its title being based by legal provision of the sei ure of enemy property.

e have also tried in vain to find a la# or provision thereof, or any principle in %uasi contractsor e%uity, upon #hich the claim can be supported. )n the contrary, as defendant-appellantentered into possession #ithout any expectation of liability for such use and occupation, it is onlyfair and just that it may not be held liable therefor. And as to the rents it collected from its lessee,

the same should accrue to it as a possessor in good faith, as this ourt has already expressly held.8>esolution, 2ational oconut orporation vs. +eronimo, '3 !hil. 47&.:

Dastly, the reservation of this action may not be considered as vesting a ne# right if no right toclaim for rentals existed at the time of the reservation, no rights can arise or accrue from suchreservation alone.

herefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, #hich sentences defendant-appellant to payrentals from August, 1947, to ebruary ', 1949, is hereby reversed. /n all other respects the

judgment is affirmed. osts of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee.

G.R. No. L-&684( $ay 22, 19'&


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#EO#LE S CAR INC., plaintiff-appellant,vs.CO$$ANDO SECURIT SER ICE AGENC , defendant-appellee.

TEE AN EE, J.:

In this appeal from the adverse judgment of the Davao court of first instance limiting plaintiff-appellant


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he parties thus likewise stipulated on this sole issue submitted by them for adjudication, as follows#

Interpretation of the contract, as to the e$tent of the liability of the defendant to theplaintiff by reason of the acts of the employees of the defendant is the only issue to beresolved.

he defendant relies on 4ar. ) of the contract to support its contention while the plaintiff relies on 4ar. 0 of the same contract in support of its claims against the defendant. 1or ready reference they are quoted hereunder#


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Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus incurred, sinceunder paragraph 0 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the proper performance by theguards employed of their duties and Bcontracted toC be solely responsible for the acts done during their watch hours" and "specifically released BplaintiffC from any and all liabilities ... to the third parties arisingfrom the acts or omissions done by the guards during their tour of duty." s plaintiff had duly dischargedits liability to the third party, its customer, ;oseph 'uy, for the undisputed damages of 4A,)A+.(G caused

said customer, due to the wanton and unlawful act of defendant


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G.R. No. L-12191 Oc ober 14, 1918

6OSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,vs.MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.

Ramon Sotelo for appellant. Kincaid % Hartigan for appellee.

)ISHER, J.:

At the time of the occurrence #hich gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, ose angco, #as inthe employment of "anila >ailroad ompany in the capacity of cler$, #ith a monthly #age of ! *. e lived in the pueblo of =an "ateo, in the province of >i al, #hich is located upon the lineof the defendant railroad company and in coming daily by train to the company5s office in thecity of "anila #here he #or$ed, he used a pass, supplied by the company, #hich entitled him toride upon the company5s trains free of charge. Gpon the occasion in %uestion, anuary (, 191*,the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car #here he #as riding and, ma$ing, his exitthrough the door, too$ his position upon the steps of the coach, sei ing the upright guardrail #ithhis right hand for support.

)n the side of the train #here passengers alight at the =an "ateo station there is a cement platform #hich begins to rise #ith a moderate gradient some distance a#ay from the company5soffice and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slo#ed do#n another passenger, named 0milio HuNiga, also anemployee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point #here the

platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. hen the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff ose angco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact #ith a sac$ of #atermelons #ith the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the

platform. is body at once rolled from the platform and #as dra#n under the moving car, #herehis right arm #as badly crushed and lacerated. /t appears that after the plaintiff alighted from thetrain the car moved for#ard possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.

6he accident occurred bet#een & and ' o5cloc$ on a dar$ night, and as the railroad station #as

lighted dimly by a single light located some distance a#ay, objects on the platform #here theaccident occurred #ere difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

6he explanation of the presence of a sac$ of melons on the platform #here the plaintiff alightedis found in the fact that it #as the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lothad been brought to the station for the shipment to the mar$et. 6hey #ere contained in numeroussac$s #hich has been piled on the platform in a ro# one upon another. 6he testimony sho#s thatthis ro# of sac$s #as so placed of melons and the edge of platform and it is clear that the fall of


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"anresa 8vol. ', p. 7&: in his commentaries upon articles 11(3 and 11(4 of the ivil ode,clearly points out this distinction, #hich #as also recogni ed by this ourt in its decision in thecase of >a$es "s. Atlantic, +ulf and !acific o. 8& !hil. rep., 3*9:. /n commenting upon article1(93 "anresa clearly points out the difference bet#een < c$lpa , substantive and independent,#hich of itself constitutes the source of an obligation bet#een persons not formerly connected by

any legal tie< and c$lpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation alreadyexisting . . . .<

/n the >a$es case 8 s$pra : the decision of this court #as made to rest s%uarely upon the proposition that article 19(3 of the ivil ode is not applicable to acts of negligence #hichconstitute the breach of a contract.

Gpon this point the ourt said;

6he acts to #hich these articles J19( and 19(3 of the ivil odeK are applicable are

understood to be those not gro#ing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to oneanother. Fut #here relations already formed give rise to duties, #hether springing fromcontract or %uasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 11(1, 11(3,and 11(4 of the same code. 8>a$es "s. Atlantic, +ulf and !acific o., & !hil. >ep., 3*9 at37*.:

6his distinction is of the utmost importance. 6he liability, #hich, under the =panish la#, is, incertain cases imposed upon employers #ith respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to #hom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the0nglish ommon Da#, upon the principle of respondeat s$perior 6 if it #ere, the master #ould

be liable in every case and unconditionally M but upon the principle announced in article 19(of the ivil ode, #hich imposes upon all persons #ho by their fault or negligence, do injury toanother, the obligation of ma$ing good the damage caused. )ne #ho places a po#erfulautomobile in the hands of a servant #hom he $no#s to be ignorant of the method of managingsuch a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence #hich ma$es him liable for all theconse%uences of his imprudence. 6he obligation to ma$e good the damage arises at the veryinstant that the uns$illful servant, #hile acting #ithin the scope of his employment causes theinjury. 6he liability of the master is personal and direct. Fut, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence #hatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the actsof the latter, #hatever done #ithin the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by theservant does not amount to a breach of the contract bet#een the master and the person injured.

/t is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servantrelieves the master from liability for the latter5s acts M on the contrary, that proof sho#s that theresponsibility has never existed. As "anresa says 8vol. ', p. 7': the liability arising from extra-contractual c$lpa is al#ays based upon a voluntary act or omission #hich, #ithout #illful intent,

but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master #ho exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, ta$ing into consideration the %ualifications they


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control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve themaster of his liability for the breach of his contract.

0very legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. 0xtra-contractualobligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties #hich civili ed society

imposes upon it members, or #hich arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certainmembers of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of stat$s . 6he legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negativein character, #hich the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. 6he

breach of these general duties #hether due to #illful intent or to mere inattention, if productiveof injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. 6he fundamental distinction

bet#een obligations of this character and those #hich arise from contract, rests upon the fact thatin cases of non-contractual obligation it is the #rongful or negligent act or omission itself #hichcreates the "inc$l$m 3$ris , #hereas in contractual relations the "inc$l$m exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties #hen entering into the contractual

relation.

ith respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, #hether of act or omission,it is competent for the legislature to elect M and our Degislature has so elected M #hom such anobligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, toextend that liability, #ithout regard to the lac$ of moral culpability, so as to include responsibilityfor the negligence of those person #ho acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others#ho are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. 6he legislature #hichadopted our ivil ode has elected to limit extra-contractual liability M #ith certain #ell-defined exceptions M to cases in #hich moral culpability can be directly imputed to the personsto be charged. 6his moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in theselection and control of one5s agents or servants, or in the control of persons #ho, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency #ith respect to the person made liable for their conduct.

6he position of a natural or juridical person #ho has underta$en by contract to render service toanother, is #holly different from that to #hich article 19(3 relates. hen the sources of theobligation upon #hich plaintiff5s cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the

burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence M if he does not his action fails. Fut#hen the facts averred sho# a contractual underta$ing by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff,and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for

plaintiff to specify in his pleadings #hether the breach of the contract is due to #illful fault or tonegligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. !roof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to #arrant a recovery.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon #hich his actionis based #hile on the contrary, in a case of negligence #hich presupposes the existence


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of a contractual obligation, if the creditor sho#s that it exists and that it has been bro$en,it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. 8"anresa, vol. ', p. &1 J19(& ed., p. &7K:.

As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to sho# that the breach #as due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in

fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that thenegligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract #ould notconstitute a defense to the action. /f the negligence of servants or agents could be invo$ed as ameans of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result #ould be that

person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts,#ould be in a better position than those acting in person. /f one delivers a valuable #atch to#atchma$er #ho contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes itsdestruction, he is un%uestionably liable. ould it be logical to free him from his liability for the

breach of his contract, #hich involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the#atch, if he sho#s that it #as his servant #hose negligence caused the injuryQ /f such a theory

could be accepted, juridical persons #ould enjoy practically complete immunity from damagesarising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons canof necessity only act through agents or servants, and it #ould no doubt be true in most instancesthat reasonable care had been ta$en in selection and direction of such servants. /f one deliverssecurities to a ban$ing corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some cler$ employed by the ban$, #ould it be just and reasonable to permit the ban$ to relieveitself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of thedebt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the cler$Q

6his distinction bet#een c$lpa a-$iliana , as the so$rce of an obligation, and c$lpa contract$al as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has fre%uently been recogni ed by thesupreme court of =pain. 8 Sentencias of une &, 1'94 2ovember (, 1'97 and ecember 13,1'97.: /n the decisions of 2ovember (, 1'97, it appeared that plaintiff5s action arose e7contract$ , but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 19( of the ivil

ode as a defense. 6he =panish =upreme ourt rejected defendant5s contention, saying;

6hese are not cases of injury caused, itho$t an& pre!e7isting o ligation , by fault or negligence, such as those to hich article 189: of the Ci"il Code relates , but of damagescaused by the defendant5s failure to carry out the underta$ings imposed by thecontracts . . . .

A brief revie# of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damagedone by the negligent acts of their servants #ill sho# that in no case has the court ever decidedthat the negligence of the defendant5s servants has been held to constitute a defense to an actionfor damages for breach of contract.

/n the case of ohnson "s. avid 8* !hil. >ep., 773:, the court held that the o#ner of a carriage#as not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. /n that case the court


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commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendanthad been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any $no#ledge of his lac$ of s$ill or carefulness.

/n the case of Faer =enior @ o5s =uccessors "s. ompania "aritima 87 !hil. >ep., 1*:, the

plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff #hich #as allo#ed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant5s servants in the course of the

performance of a contract of to#age. 6he court held, citing "anresa 8vol. ', pp. 9, 79: that if the


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source of an extra-contractual underta$ing obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.6here is al#ays an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the

part of the defendant. onse%uently, #hen the court holds that a defendant is liable in damagesfor having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in theselection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case. 6herefore, it

follo#s that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Oamada case that defendant #asliable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to #hom it #as bound bycontract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant #as negligent in the selection andcontrol of its servants, that in such a case the court #ould have held that it #ould have been agood defense to the action, if presented s%uarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract,for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of theservant.

6he true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheresof contractual and extra-contractual obligations. 6he field of non- contractual obligation is much

more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the #hole extent of juridical human relations. 6hese t#o fields, figuratively spea$ing, concentric that is to say, themere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. hen such a contractual relation exists the obligor may

brea$ the contract under such conditions that the same act #hich constitutes the source of anextra-contractual obligation had no contract existed bet#een the parties.

6he contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried #ith it, by implication, the duty to carryhim in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains 8civil code, article1 *':. 6hat duty, being contractual, #as direct and immediate, and its non-performance couldnot be excused by proof that the fault #as morally imputable to defendant5s servants.

6he railroad company5s defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligentconduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform #as a breach of its contractualobligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximatecause of the injury suffered by plaintiff #as his o#n contributory negligence in failing to #aituntil the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Gnder the doctrine of comparativenegligence announced in the >a$es case 8 s$pra :, if the accident #as caused by plaintiff5s o#nnegligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant5s negligence and plaintiff5s negligence merelycontributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. /t is, therefore, important toascertain if defendant #as in fact guilty of negligence.

/t may be admitted that had plaintiff #aited until the train had come to a full stop beforealighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. efendant contends, andcites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger toalight from a moving train. e are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form.

e are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance #ith theexperience of every-day life. /n this particular instance, that the train #as barely moving #hen


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plaintiff alighted is sho#n conclusively by the fact that it came to stop #ithin six meters from the place #here he stepped from it. 6housands of person alight from trains under these conditionsevery day of the year, and sustain no injury #here the company has $ept its platform free fromdangerous obstructions. 6here is no reason to believe that plaintiff #ould have suffered anyinjury #hatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant5s negligent failure to perform

its duty to provide a safe alighting place.

e are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in6hompson5s #or$ on 2egligence 8vol. 3, sec. 3(1(: as follo#s;

6he test by #hich to determine #hether the passenger has been guilty of negligence inattempting to alight from a moving rail#ay train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. /tis to be considered #hether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, #ould have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed

by the evidence. 6his care has been defined to be, not the care #hich may or should be

used by the prudent man generally, but the care #hich a man of ordinary prudence #oulduse under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.< 86hompson, ommentaries on 2egligence, vol. 3, sec. 3(1(.:

)r, it #e prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in !icart "s. =mith 83& !hil.rep., '(9:, #e may say that the test is this as there anything in the circumstances surroundingthe plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train #hich #ould have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing #as dangerousQ /f so,the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting and his failure so to desist #as contributorynegligence. 1a ph;l.net

As the case no# before us presents itself, the only fact from #hich a conclusion can be dra#n tothe effect that plaintiff #as guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car #ithout

being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and #hile the train #as yet slo#lymoving. /n considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overloo$ed that the plaintiff #as, as #e find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction #hich #as caused by the sac$s of melons piled on the platform existed and as the defendant #as bound by reason of its duty as a

public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff hada right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to #arn him to the contrary, that the

platform #as clear. 6he place, as #e have already stated, #as dar$, or dimly lighted, and this alsois proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty o#ing by it to the

plaintiff for if it #ere by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sac$s in the pathof alighting passengers, the placing of them ade%uately so that their presence #ould be revealed.

As pertinent to the %uestion of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case thefollo#ing circumstances are to be noted; 6he company5s platform #as constructed upon a levelhigher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. 6he distance from the steps of thecar to the spot #here the alighting passenger #ould place his feet on the platform #as thus


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reduced, thereby decreasing the ris$ incident to stepping off. 6he nature of the platform,constructed as it #as of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surfaceon #hich to alight. urthermore, the plaintiff #as possessed of the vigor and agility of youngmanhood, and it #as by no means so ris$y for him to get off #hile the train #as yet moving asthe same act #ould have been in an aged or feeble person. /n determining the %uestion of

contributory negligence in performing such act M that is to say, #hether the passenger acted prudently or rec$lessly M the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger arecircumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.

omen, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting #ith safetyunder such conditions, as the nature of their #earing apparel obstructs the free movement of thelimbs. Again, it may be noted that the place #as perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it #as hisdaily custom to get on and of the train at this station. 6here could, therefore, be no uncertainty inhis mind #ith regard either to the length of the step #hich he #as re%uired to ta$e or thecharacter of the platform #here he #as alighting. )ur conclusion is that the conduct of the

plaintiff in underta$ing to alight #hile the train #as yet slightly under #ay #as not characteri ed

by imprudence and that therefore he #as not guilty of contributory negligence.

6he evidence sho#s that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, #as earning ! * a month as acopyist cler$, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him fromcontinuing that employment. efendant has not sho#n that any other gainful occupation is opento plaintiff. is expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximatelythirty-three years. e are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by himfor his permanent disability is the sum of ! ,*((, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of !&9(. * for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected #ith the treatment of his injuries.

6he

civrev2 villaroel until millare

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