Clarence Ayres's Instrumental Value Theory: A Rejoinder to RutherfordAuthor(s): Ivan WeinelSource: Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1983), pp. 753-755Published by: Association for Evolutionary EconomicsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4225345 .

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Notes and Communications 753

References

Boland, Lawrence A. 1982. The Foundations of Economic Method. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Rutherford, Malcolm. 1981. "Clarence Ayres and the Instrumental Theory of Value." Journal of Economic Issues 15 (September): 657-73.

Weinel, Ivan. 1982. "Comment on Rutherford: An Alternative Interpretation of the Instrumental Theory of Value." Journal of Economic Issues 16 (De- cember): 1116-20.

Clarence Ayres's Instrumental Value Theory: A Rejoinder to Rutherford

An important epistemological conception lies behind my designation of Malcolm Rutherford as a "dogmatic falsificationist." The issues raised by this conception are also the basis for my dissatisfaction with Rutherford's treatment of the Dewey/Ayres theory of knowledge. I object particularly to Rutherford's use of "knowledge for its own sake" as a point of depar- ture [Rutherford 1983, p. 3]. I will attempt to elucidate the principles un- derlying my objections taking Rutherford's major points in order.

Imre Lakatos's definition of "dogmatic falsificationism" (which is the definition to which I assume Rutherford is referring) runs as follows: "The hallmark of dogmatic falsificationism is then the recognition that all theories are equally conjectural. Science cannot prove any theory. But al- though science cannot prove, it can disprove" [Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, p. 96]. Compare the above with Rutherford's statement: "If scien- tific progress is seen as the gradual elimination of falsity, then instrumen- talism is inadequate for the task" [Rutherford 1981, p. 668, emphasis added]. Lakatos also gives a cogent argument for the abandonment of dogmatic falsificationism (see especially [Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, pp. 97-103 and passim]), which, unfortunately, would lead us far from the main point. If there is some nice distinction to be made between La- katos's definition of dogmatic falsificationism and Rutherford's position (and Rutherford's reference to Karl Popper is evidence against the exis- tence of such a distinction [Rutherford 1981, p. 668]), Rutherford has ad- duced no evidence of his own to support it. The implications of this Popperian approach for Rutherford's critique will be developed below.

Regarding the Dewey/Ayres theory of knowledge and the status of "truth" in inquiry, Professor Rutherford is overly generous in referring to "Weinel's arguments" as the challenge to his position [Rutherford 1983,

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754 Notes and Communications

p. 2]. The reproof of Rutherford's arguments can be found, as I have con- sistently maintained, in the words of John Dewey and Clarence Ayres.

The force of Dewey's philosophy lies in his rejection of dualism in all its forms. The dualism that Dewey's The Quest for Certainty is primarily di- rected toward eliminating is the very dualism that Rutherford reintroduces in his critique of the instrumental (not pragmatic; see below) approach to inquiry. This is the dualism of theory and practice. Rutherford's separa- tion of "instrumental success" and "truth," based as it is on Popperian falsificationism, assumes a "world of ideas, . . . Plato's and Popper's 'third world,' . . . the world of articulated knowledge which is independent of knowing subjects" [Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, p. 180]. In this view, "truth" is certain or "probable" in that every "truth" has a preexistent ontological referent "independent of knowing subjects." From this basis, Professor Rutherford's notion regarding "knowledge for its own sake" emerges, as it were, as a natural consequent [Rutherford 1983, p. 3]. If, as I contend, Ayres's ceremonial/instrumental dichotomy is complementary to (or represents a particular expansion of) Dewey's philosophy of action [Ayres 1978, p. 99, pp. 155-56], the two must be accepted or rejected as a whole. Accordingly, we must either accept Rutherford's assertions of the existence of essences and hold our learned convocations in the "Islands of the Blessed" [Deane 1962, p. 150], or we can reject the "isolation of knowledge from overt action" [Dewey 1960, p. 48], which finds the mean- ing of statements and actions in metaphysical essences. "Knowledge for its own sake" thus fails to signify anything meaningful with regard to the Dewey/Ayres theory of inquiry, since, as Dewey put it: "Meaning as- signed to any phase or aspect of my position which puts what is said in an ontological context instead of that of inquiry is sure to go amiss in respect to understanding" [Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 316].

Parenthetically, it must be remarked that the repeated use of the noun "pragmatism" and the modifier "pragmatic" in Professor Rutherford's dis- cussions of Dewey and Ayres tends to perpetuate an unfortunate confu- sion. The instrumental philosophy of Dewey and Ayres should be dis- tinguished from the "pragmatism" of William James and from the more sharply delineated "pragmaticism" of C. S. Peirce. Many of Professor Rutherford's criticisms may carry some force against James, but are less valid in the case of Peirce.

Ivan Weinel The aihtlior is Instructor of Economics, University of Nebraska.

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Notes and Communications 755

References

Ayres, C. E. 1978. The Theory of Economic Progress. Kalamazoo: New Issues Press.

Deane, S. N. (translator). 1962. St. Anselm. LaSalle: Open Court. Dewey, John. 1960. The Quest for Certainty. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

--_ , and Arthur F. Bentley. 1949. Knowing and the Known. Boston: Beacon Press.

James, William. 1917. "What Pragmatism Means." In Selected Papers on Philosophy, edited by Ernest Rhys. New York: E. P. Dutton.

Lakatos, I. 1970. "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peirce, J. S. 1878. "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Popular Science Monthly, January.

Rutherford, Malcolm. 1981. "Clarence Ayres and the Instrumental Theory of Value." Journal of Economiiic Issues 15 (September): 657-74.

. 1983. "Avres's Instrumrntalism: A Reply to Weinel." Journal of Economic Issues 17 (September): 750-53.

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