class 14 outline the economics of business harvard extension school fall 2011 instructor: bob...
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TRANSCRIPT
CLASS 14 OUTLINE
The Economics of Business
Harvard Extension SchoolFall 2011Instructor: Bob WaylandTeaching Assistant: Natasha Wambebe
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George Akerlof
Won 2001 Economic Nobel Prize for 1970 QJE article: “The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”
Not accepted immediately nor adopted widely for several years: “ a struggling attempt…”
Now a mainstay of understanding how asymmetric information may distort or damage markets
A structure for analysis of “economic costs of dishonesty”
Another case of divergence of social and private costsConcept is useful in exploring opportunities for
information-producing or sharing products
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Akerlof’s Used Car Market
Buyer has a notion that he has q probability of buying a good quality car; and (1-q) probability of a “lemon.”
Buyer cannot discern individual quality but has an idea of q
Buyer must assume all used cars are average quality and is only willing to pay that price
As a consequence, sellers of above-average vehicles tend to withhold them, sellers of below average vehicles tend to offer them
A destructive dynamic ensues in which q declines, expected average quality drops, even fewer good quality vehicles are offered….
Eventually the lemons may drive out the cream puffs
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Trader Types 1 and 2
Akerlof defined the demand, Qd, for used cars as function of price, p, and average quality of cars, μ
• Qd = D(p, μ)
Average quality, μ, is a function of price, p• μ = μ(p)
Supply, S, is a function of price, p• S = S(p)
Equilibrium: supply equals demand• D(p, μ) = S(p)
Begin by defining traders’ utility functions
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Symmetric Information Case
With symmetric information, the constraints due to ignorance and uncertainty are removed
Table shows demand curves for two price ranges and the total (last column)
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Supply Curve for the Symmetric Information Case
Supply, S, in the symmetrical information case is a 2
part function depending upon whether p>1 or p<1
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Examples of Lemon Principle
Medical Insurance Geezers find it difficult to buy medical insurance Government mandate to sell to pre-existing conditions creates
a moral hazard (geezer has the asymmetric information advantage)
Remedy is to require all to buy May be constitutional issues
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Examples of Lemon Principle, continued
Minority qualifications and hiring Minority status may be a fairly accurate indicator of
educational quality in U.S. School policies of social promotion and grade inflation
erode value of high school degree Employers cannot easily distinguish among top,
middle and bottom of high school graduates Special efforts to improve quality of minority
education and reestablish standards may raise the perceived average quality
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Examples of Lemon Principle, continued
Dishonesty Some merchants may exploit asymmetric
information to lie about the quality of their goods Even if some merchants are honest, the buyers
may not be able to distinguish the honest from the liars and so shun the market
In this case, the loss is not only lost sales by the crooks but loss of businesses by the honest merchants
In some cases, the government or an industry group may need to vouch for quality, particularly in underdeveloped countries
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Credit Markets in Undeveloped Countries
Commercial banks in undeveloped countries may not be able to distinguish credit worthiness Local moneylenders exploit the banks’ ignorance and
charge very high rates Similar things happen in poorer neighborhoods in the
U.S. (paycheck loans from Legbreaker, Kneecapper, and Knuckles Bank)
Micro credit has filled part of the void, risk management by group responsibility
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Counteracting the Lemon Principle
Independent information sources, e.g. VEHIX, Carfax, Emily’s List
Awards, e.g. Nobel PrizesGovernment standards, e.g. Appellation
d’Origine Controlées (AOC) and Vin de Pays (VDP)
Warranties and guarantees, e.g. Hyundai