7/27/2019 Classical Weekly -'Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War' by H. G. Robertson, 1944

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Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War

Author(s): H. G. RobertsonSource: The Classical Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 11 (Jan. 10, 1944), p. 130Published by: Classical Association of the Atlantic StatesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4341856 .

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7/27/2019 Classical Weekly -'Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian War' by H. G. Robertson, 1944

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130 CLASSICAL WEEKLYnamely, the 'Golden Mean' or, as the Hellenes haveexpressedt, 'nothing n excess'.'In this present period of world conflict it may beboth interestingand instructiveto review the pro-nouncements f ancientwriterson typesof governmentexisting two and one-halfmillenniaago, when demo-cracy stood embattled,even as today, against whatThucydides called "the lust for power arising fromgreedand ambition."The past is largelya determinantof the presentas well as a richbody of experience, sProfessor Pratt has well observed,3and it is only"through the conjunction of historical analysis andcriticalappraisaln the re-examination f the past thatit is finally possible o achieve the perspective nd in-sight which arerequired or real human advancement."H. L. RUSSELLUNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

2J. Penrose Harland, From Kingship to Democracy. This isone of several stimulating articles in a book of studies honoringWilliam Kelly Prentice, The Greek Political Experience, Prince-ton I941. The present comment is indebted for several indirectquotations and for the elan in general that led up to it tothose articles in that book by Harland, Harper, Meritt, Cole-man-Norton, and MacLaren, as well as that acknowledged innote 3.3Norman T. Pratt, Jr., The People and the Value of TheirExperience, Prentice Studies, see note 2 above.

Commando Raids in the Peloponnesian WarOne night in the earlywinterof 429 B.C. the Athen-ians had a narrow scape.The crewsof a Peloponnesianfleet had marchedoverland o Nisaea, manned fortyships which were lying there, and put to sea undercover of darkness o raid the harborof Piraeus. Noguardshipswere stationed here and the entrancewasnot closed. An attackby sea was the last thing theAtheniansexpected. It was a perfectset-upfor a com-mandoraid.Had the Spartan ommander ersevered, emight have immortalized imselfand made a notable

contribution o the history of combinedoperations.Asit was, he contentedhimself with a smash-and-grabraidon Salamis Thucydides2.93-4).Such enterpriseswere not suited to the cautiousSpartans.The Athenianshoweverwerepeculiarly ittedby temperament nd trainingfor commandoraidsortheir ancient counterparts.Even their enemiesrecog-nizedtheirreckless ourage Thuc. 7.2I). Demosthenesrightly claimed hat they wereexperiencedn makingdescentson hostilecoasts(Thuc.4.IO). Athenianead-ers wereused to commanding ither militaryor navalforces; herewas no problem f dividedcommand o beovercome.Hence Pericles aturally ncluded aidson thePeloponnesiancoast as a part of Athens' strategy(Thuc. I42-3).In the ArchidamianWar Thucydidesmentions sev-eral expeditionsaroundthe Peloponnese Thuc. 2. 17.

23. 25-6, 30, 56, 69;3.7, I6, 91, 94, 105; 4.42-5, IOI).Some of their operationswere merely maraudingde-scentsupon unprotectedands,but otherswere appar-ently commando aidswith limitedobjectivesn whichthey engagedenemy forcesand then withdrewby sea.The seizureof CytheraprovidedAthens with an ad-vancedbasesuperioro Pylos. It was usedfor a num-ber of raidsand arousedgreatalarmat Sparta(Thuc.4.53-7). A rising of helotswas fearedand, insteadofhavingsome of themliquidated y the SpartanGestapo,the government ent severalhundredto help Brasidasin opening a secondfront in the North (Thuc. 4.80).The strategyof the Sicilianexpeditiondid not callforcommando aids,although he Syracusansmay havefeared hem when they built stockadesat the landingplaces (Thuc. 6.75). After war was resumedwithSpartaonly one expeditionwas sent around he Pelo-ponneseand it was content to ravage he countryandbuild a fort, even though Argive hoplites were onboard (Tbuc. 6.20, 26).The Ionian War offersone strikinginstanceof theuseof commandomethodswhenan Atheniansquadronsailedunexpectedly nto the harborof Mytilene andcapturedthe enemy vessels; the crews then disem-barked,defeated he opposing andforces,andcapturedthe city (Thuc. 8.23). Thus an operationwhich mayhavebeenplannedas a mereraiddevelopednto a com-pletevictory. It was followedby some minorsuccessesin amphibiousoperationsagainst the Chians (Thuc.8.24)Commandoraids were among the most effectiveweavonsof the Atheniansand might well have beenused much moreextensively. That they were not sousedmay have beendue to the fact that they were n-consistentwith the defensivestrategyof Pericleswhocontemplated "phonywar."l He may have regardedthemmerelyas a meansof satisfying hosewho wishedmoreaction. The failure o make greateruse of suchraidswasone of the blunders f Athens.H. G. ROBERTSONUNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

lFor a criticism of Pericles' strategy see Henderson, TheGreat War between Athens and Sparta,47-68.

The Guardians, Socrates, and Board"in Prytaneion""The guardianswill live a happier life than that mencount most happy, the life of the victors at Olympia.""How so?""The things for which these are felicitated are a smallpart of what is secured for these. Their victory is fairerand their public supportmore complete."Modern commentators on this passagel give several

lPlato, Rep. 5.13; p. 465 D; trans. Shorey, Loeb Class. Libr.i, ed. of 1937.

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