clausewitz’s cog

8/8/2019 CLAUSEWITZS COG

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CLAU SEWIT ZS CENTER OF GRAVI TY:

CHANGI NG OUR WARFI GHTI NG

DOCTRINEAGAIN!

Antul io J. Echevarr ia I I

Sept ember 2002


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ISBN 1-58487-099-0

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FOREWORD

Over the last 25 years, the center of gravity concept hasgrown increasingly centra l to the U.S. mi l i tary swarfighting doctrine. It has been hailed by each of theServices and the Joint community as the cornerstone of theoperat ional art ; and i t has come to occupy a common pl ace inthe vocabulary of professional soldiers. It is somewhatsurprising, therefore, that, over the last quarter-centuryespecially, the term has come to have so many differentmeanings.

In this monograph, the author, Lieutenant ColonelAn tu l i o Ec h e v a r r i a I I , c u t s t h ro u g h t h e my r i a dinterpretations surrounding the concept and gets back tothe original idea as conceived by its author, the Prussianmi li tary t heor ist, Carl von Clausewi tz. In going back to theoriginal concept, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria revealsthat Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to functionmuch as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does,that i s, as a focal point . Lieutenant Colonel Echevarr ia thusargues, quit e persuasively, that the Clausewi tzian center ofgravi ty is not a str ength, nor a weakness, nor even a source

of str ength. A center of gravi ty is the one element wi thin acombatants entire structure or system that has thenecessary cent r ipetal force to hold that st ructure together.Thi s is why Clausewi tz wrote that a blow directed against acenter of gravity will have the greatest effect. Themonograph concludes with recommendations for revisingJoint and Service doctrine so that they will reflect a moreaccurate and coherent definition of a center of gravity. Italso offers some considerations for the war planner whenapplying the concept.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Inst it ute

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BI OGRAPHI CAL SKETCH OF TH E AUTHOR

ANTUL IO J. ECHEVARRIA I I , a li eutenant colonel i n theU.S. Army, is cur rent ly assigned as the Di rector of Str ategicResearch at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduatedfrom t he U.S. Mil i tary Academy i n 1981, was commi ssionedas an armor offi cer , and has held a variety of command andstaff assignments in Germany and Continental UnitedStates; he has also served as an assistant professor ofEuropean history at the U.S. Military Academy; Squadron

S3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doct r ine at t heU.S. Army Ar mor Center at Fort Knox; as an act ion offi cerat t he Army Aft er Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe,VA; and as a speechwr iter for t he U.S. Army Chief of Staff.He is a graduate of t he U.S. Armys Command and GeneralStaff Col lege, the U.S. Army War Col lege, and holds M.A.and Ph.D. degrees in History from Pri nceton Universi ty. Hehas published articles in a number of scholarly andprofessional journals to include the Journal of StrategicStudies, Journal of Mi li tary Hi story, War i n H istory, War &Society, Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Mi l i ta ry Review, and Airpower Journal. His book, After Clausewi tz:German Military Thinkers before the Great War, waspubli shed by the Universi ty Press of K ansas in t he spring of2001.

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SUMMARY

The center of gravity has become one of todays mostpopular military concepts despite the fact that its originsextend back to the early industrial-age. Clausewitzsmilitary center of gravity (CoG) and the CoG of themechanical sciences share many of the same properties:neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, butrather a focal point where physical (and psychological)forces come together. The U.S. militarys doctrinal

publicationsespecially Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations, and Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine forCampaign Planningshould be revised to reflect a moreaccurate definition of the CoG.

U.S. Mi l i tar y Doctr in e and th e CoG Concept .

Over the last 2 decades especiall y, the U.S. mil itary hasstr uggled both to understand the CoG concept as developedby Clausewi tz, and to find pract ical ways to apply i t . In t heprocess, however, it has drifted away from Clausewitzsor iginal idea. For example, each of t he servicesshaped bydif ferent roles, histor ies, and t radit ionstended to view t heCoG concept in their respective images. The CoG concepthas, therefore, been f i t ted wi th many guises over the years.The Joint communi ty attemptedthough wit h only limi tedsuccessto pull the various service perspectives togetherinto a single definit ion wi th t he publicat ion of Joint Pub 3-0in 1995. In other words, Joint Pub 3-0 strove to achieve anauthor it ati ve consensus by drawing together many of theservices predilections. However, in so doing, it definedCoGs too broadly and offered no real method fordetermini ng them.

The recently released Joint Pub 5-00.1 (January 2002)buil ds upon Joint Pub 3-0 and att empts to provide a generalmethod for determining CoGs. However, the process that

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Joint Pub 5-00.1 descr ibes for determining a CoG actuall y

leads us not to a CoG, but to a set of critical (physical orpsychological) capabilities. This process appears to haveborrowed from Dr. Joseph Stranges popular CG (cent er ofgrav i ty )CC (cr i t i ca l capab i l i t ies)CR (cr i t i ca lrequirements)CV (critical vulnerabilities) approach. Intheory, Stranges approach linked CoGs (which he definedas dynamic agents of action or influence to CVs in a waythat war planners could put to practical use. However,because any number of dynamic agents of action orinfluence can exist wit hin a given nat ion or wi thin a givenbattlespace, his definition fails to offer a way to focus ones

efforts and other resources on something that will provedecisive. St ranges method only br ings war planners to theenemys centers of critical capability, rather than to anactual CoG.

Clausew i t zs Cent er of Gr avit y.

Clausewitzs original definition follows the physicsanalogy more closely than previous analyses of his workhave appreciated. In fact , it is not a source of str ength or acritical capability, but a focal point that is essentiallyeffects-based, rather than capabilities-based. In modern

elementary physics, which was about the state of themechani cal sciences in Clausewi tzs day, a CoG represent sthe point where the forces of gravity converge within anobject. Striking at the CoG with enough force will usuallycause the object to lose its balance, or equi l ibr ium, and fall .A CoG is, therefore, nota source of strength, but a factor ofbalance.

A closer look at t he German t ext shows that Clausewi tznever used the term source (Quelle). Moreover, theconcept remains valid only where the enemy possesses

suff icient unit y or interdependence (Zusammenhang) toact as a single body. Before applying the concept in warplanning, therefore, we must ask ourselves whether we canconsider the enemy to act as a single ent i ty. I f so, we should

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look for connections among the various parts of an

adversary, or adversari es, in order to determine what holdsthem together. This is the CoG.

Furthermore, Clausewitzs CoG focuses on achieving aspecific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is aneffects-based approach, rather than a capabilities-basedone and it resembles an emerging concept calledEffects-Based Operations (EBO) more than it does thecapabil i t ies-based noti on that underpins todays doctr ine.Another important point is that Clausewitz did notdisti nguish between tact ical, operational, or strategic CoGs.TheCoG is defined by the ent ire system (or st ructure) of t he

enemy, not by a level of war. In addition, Clausewitzemphasized that we should look for CoGs only in warsdesigned to defeat the enemy completely. Only the vastamount of energy and other resources that go into warsaimed at achieving decisive victory can cause CoGs andtheir areas of influence to emerge.

Toward a Sim ple Meth od.

However, get t ing the defini t ion of a CoG correct is onlyhalf the battle. War planners need a practical method for

determining what a specifi c adversarys CoG is. Such as:Step 1: Determine whether identifying and attacking a

CoG is appropr iate for the type of war we are going to wage.

Step 2: Determine whether the adversarys wholestructure or system is suffi cient ly connected to be tr eated as asingle body.

Step 3: Determine what element has the necessarycentripetal force to hold the system together.

Addi t ional Recommendat ions:

Redefine CoG as fol lows: Centers of Gravit y are focalpointsthat serve to hold a combatants entire system orst ructure together and that draw power from a var iety ofsources and provide it wi th purpose and di rect ion.

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Refrain f rom applying the concept to every k ind of war;

reduce the competition that can occur between CoGs andpoli t ical-mi li tary object ives.

Ident ify where the connect ionsand gapsare in anenemys ent ire str ucture or system before deciding whethera CoG actual ly exists; CoGs only apply where a combatant issuffi cientl y interconnected to act wi th uni ty.

Focus more effort on ident i fying the specific effect(s) tobe achieved by att acking a CoG.

Cont inual ly r eassess CoGs. However , reevaluate theneed to at tack CoGs that are ext remely t ransitory.

Resist salami -sli cing the adversary in to tact ical,operati onal, and str ategic CoGs. The bulk of our effort s andintermediate object ives should focus on dest roying theCoG.

In conclusion, the CoG concept is one of several ofClausewi tzs ideassuch as fr ict ion in war, culmination ofthe at tack, t he roles of chance and uncertaint ythat have aquali ty that t ranscends his day and makes them relevant t oour own. H owever, we must apply i t judiciously, especiallyin todays post-industrial era in which networkedopponents armed with chemical, biological, radiological,

nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons can operate in aglobally decent ralized manner.

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CLAU SEWIT ZS CENTER OF GRAVI TY:

CHANGING OUR WARFI GHTI NGDOCTRINEAGAIN!

The center of gravity has become one of todays mostpopular military concepts despite the fact that its originsextend back t o the earl y industr ial-age. Fir st int roduced bythe Prussian mi li tary theor ist, Car l von Clausewi tz, in t helate 1820s, the idea now appears in t he doct r inal l i teratureof all U.S. military services, and in many European

militaries as well. Despite its popularity, a great deal ofconfusion still surrounds the basic concept. Its definitionhas evolved quite substantively over time; and, even afterdecades of effort , ident i fyi ng an opponent s cent er of gravity(CoG) remains more artand often an arcane one atthatthan science. This state of affairs is rather ironicsince Clausewitz originally borrowed the idea of the CoGfr om the sciences, from mechani cal scienceor physicstobe exact . Why t he great mi l i tary theor ist chose to apply anessentially scientif ic concept to warfare, which heconsidered neither an art nor a science, lies beyond the

scope of this monograph.

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Suffice to say that Clausewitzsmi l i tary CoG and the CoG of t he mechani cal sciences sharemany of the same properties: neither is a strength or asource of strength, per se, but rather a focal point wherephysical (and psychological) forces come together. The U.S.militarys doctrinal publicationsespecially Joint Pub 3-0Doctrine for Joint Operationsand Joint Pub 5-00.1, JointDoctrine for Campaign Planning should be revised toreflect a more accurate definition of the CoG.2

U.S. Mi l i tar y Doctr in e and th e Cent er of Gr avit yConcept.

Over the last 2 decades especiall y, the U.S. mil itary hasstruggled both to understand the center of gravity conceptas developed by Clausewitz, and to find practical ways to

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apply it. In the process, however, it has drifted away from

Clausewi tzs or iginal idea. The concept has evolved from aJominian decisive pointvital geographic features,boundar ies between army groups, and l ines o fcommunicationinto a key source of strength.3 In somecircles, it was used interchangeably wi th the German t ermSchwerpunkt, usually translated as main effort, andbecame synonymous with the location where ones combatforces were most densely concentrated. 4 Some maneuvertheorists, for instance, saw the CoG as a criticalvulnerability that, if neutralized, would paralyze theenemy and achieve a quick decision, l a blitzkrieg.5

Str ivi ng for this goal dist inguished maneuver warfare fromits less attractive counterpart, brute-force attrition-stylewarfare.

In addition, each of the servicesshaped by differentroles, histories, and traditionstended to view the CoGconcept in t heir respect ive images. The U.S. Ar my and U.S.Navy, for example, typically thought in terms of a singleCoG, whi ch usually resided at the core of ones land or navalpower and provided the source of ones physical andpsychological capacity to fight.6 The U.S. Air Force, on t heother hand, pursued the notion of multiple CoGs, each of

which could be targeted from the air to achieve theparalysis of the enemy.7 And, finally, the U.S. Marine Corps(USMC), wi th the d i f f icu l t miss ion of conduct ingamphibious forcible ent ry operati ons, preferred for a time tothink of the CoG as a key weakness, or cr i t ical vul nerabi l it y,the exploitation of which would give it a decisiveadvantage. 8 The CoG concept has, therefore, been fittedwith many guises over the years.

The Joint community attemptedthough with onlylimited successto pull the various service perspectivestogether i nto a single defini t ion wit h the publi cati on of Joint

Pub 3-0 in 1995.9 This publ ication asserted that the essenceof the operational art resided in being able to mass effectsagainst the enemys sources of power, or CoGs, to gain adecisive advantage. It defined CoGs as those charac-

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teristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military

force der ives its fr eedom of act ion, physical st rength, or wi l lto fight.10 Joint Pub 3-0 also stated or implied that CoGsexisted for every level of war, and for all types of war.Presumably, defeating tactical CoGs would facilitate theaccompl ishment of t act ical object ives, whi ch, in t urn, wouldcont r ibute to the defeat of operati onal CoGs, the destruct ionof which then would assist in the accomplishment ofoperational objectives, and so on, until we achieve ournational security objectives. At the strategic level, CoGsmight i nclude a mil it ary force, an all iance, national wi ll orpubli c support , a set of cri t ical capabi l i t ies or funct ions, or

national strategy itself. At the operational and tacticallevels, they would generally consist of t he principal source ofcombat powersuch as modern, mobile, or armored combatforcesthat can assure, or prevent, accompl ishment of t hemission. In other words, Joint Pub 3-0 strove to achieve anauthor it ati ve consensus by drawing together many of theservices predilections. However, in so doing, it definedCoGs too broadly and offered no real method fordetermini ng them.

The recently released Joint Pub 5-00.1 (January 2002)buil ds upon Joint Pub 3-0 and att empts to provide a general

method for determining CoGs. It defines the CoG in amanner simil ar t o Join t Pub 3-0 wi th the excepti on that t hephrase sources of st rength replaces the term locat ions.11

Also, the Execut ive Summary in Joint Pub 5-00.1 providessome much-needed elaboration: CoGs consist of thoseaspects of the adversarys overal l capabi l i ty t ha t ,theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed willlead either to the adversarys inevitable defeat or forceopponent s to abandon aims or change behavi or .12 The CoGthus derives from the collective sum of the enemyscapabilities, and it is, therefore, a capabilities-based

definit ion, despite the presence of terms such ascharacter ist ics or sources of power. Fur thermore, JointPub 5-00.1 stresses the importance of linking CoGs tocri t ical vulnerabil i t ies, so that one can att ack t he enemys

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In theory, Stranges approach linked CoGs to CVs in a

way that war planners could put to pract ical use. However,because any number of dynamic agents of action orinfluence can exist wit hin a given nat ion or wi thin a givenbattlespace, his definition fails to offer a way to focus onesefforts and other resources on something that will provedecisive. What makes one dynamic agent more importantthan another? Stranges fix does not actuall y bui ld upon t heClausewi tzian defini t ionin whi ch the CoG functions as afocal point . Instead, his CoGs amount to centers of criticalcapabilities. In fact , as hi s own approach makes clear, whatmakes his CoGs important are their CCs, making this a

capabilities-based concept. To be sure, Stranges approachcan help war planners make the important linkagesbetween critical strengths or capabilities and criticalvulnerabilities. However, his method will only bring warplanners to the enemys actual CoGas opposed t o merelyone of his centers of critical capabilityby coincidence.

The Joint Pub 5-00.1 definition and its approach todetermining CoGs, therefore, beg the question: Why not justcall centers of cri t ical capabi l i t ies what t hey are?crit icalcenters or cr i t ical point s. Ident i fying the enemys centers ofcritical capabilities can be very useful. Indeed, as we shall

see under Clausewi tzs defini t ion, an adversary might nothave a CoG, or at least not one that we can attack. In t hosesituations, we would do well to focus our efforts ondestroying the enemys critical centers. It stands to reasontha t de fea t ing them wi l l even tua l l y l ead to theaccompl ishment of our object ives.

As the next section will show, Clausewitzs originaldefinition follows the physics analogy more closely thanprevious analyses of his work have appreciated. As such, itdif fers substantively from the prevail ing idea that a CoG isa source of strength or a critical capability. In fact, it is

essentially an effects-based, rather than a capabilities-based concept.

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Clausew i t zs Cent er of Gr avit y.

The quintessential cerebral savage, Clausewitzborrowed a number of intel lectual constr ucts, theor ies, andconcepts from the leading philosophers, scientists, andother thinkers of hi s day in order both to understand and todescribe the various aspects of war that he observed.17

Several of his conceptsfriction, polarity, and center ofgravityare analogies or metaphors drawn from themechanical sciences. In particular, the original Germantext of Vom Kr iege(On War) reveals that Clausewi tz usedthe term CoGexpressed pr imari ly asSchwerpunktmorethan 50 times, though not al l of them refer t o the mi li taryconcept.18 He appears to have derived his idea of the CoGafter being influenced by a series of lectures presented byGerman physicist Paul Erman, a professor at both theUniversi ty of Berl in and the Prussian AllgemeineKriegsschule(War College). Clausewi tz served as director ofthe War College fr om 1818 to 1830, and we know that he andErman had at least a cordial relationship in which theyexchanged ideas related to the mechanical sciences.19

In modern elementary physics, which was about thestate of the mechanical sciences in Clausewitzs day, a CoG

represents the point where the forces of gravity convergewithin an object.20 At that point an objects weight isbalanced in al l direct ions. A physical object can be thoughtof in two ways: as a composite of many smaller particles,each of which i s acted upon by gravity; or as a single object ,which is acted upon by gravity only at a single point (SeeFigure 1). 21 Understandably, physicists prefer the latter,since it makes other calculations concerning the int eract ionof force and matter much easier. However, physicists alsoacknowledge that a CoG amounts to little more than amathematical approximation, since gravity acts upon all

the points in an object simul taneously.

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Calculati ng a CoG for a simple, symmetr ical objectaruler , a rock, a boomerangis not dif fi cul t . The CoG for aruler is in the middle of i t . The CoG for a sphere li es at it sgeometric center. Interestingly, the CoG for a boomerang,though not difficult to calculate, does not lie on the objecti tself, but in the space between t he V (See Figure 2).22 Onthe other hand, calculat ing the CoG for complexobjectssuch as a bolos or a human being with multiplemoving partsis more difficult. Such objects must beartificially frozen in time and space. When a complexobject changes the distribution of its weight, its body

position, or if external weight is added, the CoG requiresrecalculat ion (See Figures 3 and 4).

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Fi gur e 1. Cr oss-sect i on of a Cube Show i ng H owFor ces of Gravi ty Oper ate.

Fi gur e 2. Cent er ofGravi t y of aBoomerang.


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Str ik ing at the CoG wi th enough force wi ll usuall y cause

the object to lose i ts balance, or equi li bri um, and fall . A CoGis, t herefore,nota source of st rength, but a factor of balance.An infantr ymans st rength, for example, might der ive fromhis muscles, his brains, or his weapons, or any combinat ionof t hese, but they relate to hi s CoG only so far as he needs tobe balancedto use them. Also, a CoG is not a weakness. Aninfantryman might be physically weak, intellectuallychallenged, or wanting for weapons, but these conditionshave little to do with his equilibrium. Strictly speaking,then, a CoG is neither a strength nor a weakness, thoughst r iki ng it can compromise a st rength or exploit a weakness.

If one could direct a blow with enough force against theinfant rymans CoG, he could be laid l ow, despite the sum ofhi s st rengths and weaknesses, because his CoG is connectedto those things by means of his physical body.

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F i g u r e 3 . A St a t i o n a r ySold i er s CoG.

Fi gur e 4. A Movi ng Soldi er sCoG.


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Most of the U.S. militarys definitions of CoGs derive

from Sir Michael Howards and Peter Parets Englishtranslation of Clausewitzs On War, especially Book VI(Defense) and Book VI I I (War Plans). Fr om t hese passageswe learn that a CoG is always found where the mass isconcent rated most densely, that i t is the hub of al l powerand movement on which everything depends, and that itemerges from the dominant characteristics of bothbelligerents. 23 Unfortunately, as the passage belowreveals, this t ranslati on, whi le the best available for manyyears, creates the false impression that CoGs are akin tosources of str ength:

The first principle is that the ultimate substance of enemystrength must be traced back to the fewest possible sources,and ideally to one alone. The at tack on thesesourcesmust becompressed into the fewest possible actionsagain, ideally,into one.

The task of reducing the sources of enemy str ength to a singlecenter of gravity will depend on: 1. The distribution of the

enemys poli ti cal power . . . 2. The sit uati on i n t he theater ofwar where the vari ous armies are operati ng.24

In fact, a closer look at the German text shows that

Clausewitz never used the term source (Quelle). Instead,he advised tr acing the ful l weight (Gewicht) of the enemysforce (Macht) to as few CoGs as possible.25 As in t he previousphysics example, the CoG connects the soldiers variousstrengths without being a strength itself. A more literaltranslation of the above passage appears below:

The fir st pr inciple is: To tr ace the ful l w e i g h t (Gewicht) of theenemys force (Macht) to as few centers of gravity aspossible, when feasible, to one; and, at the same time, toreduce the blow against these centers of gravity to as fewmajor acti ons as possible, when feasible, to one.

. . . r educing t he enemysforce(Macht) to one cent er of gravit ydepends, first, upon the [enemys] political connectivity [ oruni ty] i tself . . . and, second, upon the si tuati on in the theater of

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war itself, and which of the various enemy armies appearthere.26

Further examination of Clausewitzs references to theCoG throughout the German text of On Warreveals, fir st ofall, that the concept remains valid only where the enemypossesses suff ic ient unity or interdependence(Zusammenhang) to act as a single body:

Just as the cent er of gravi ty is always found where the mass ismost concentrated, and just as every blow directed against thebodys cent er of gravi ty yields the greatest effect , andmore tothe point the str ongest bl ow is the one del ivered by the centerof gravi ty, the same is tr ue in war . The armed forces of everycombatant , whether an indivi dual stat e or an al li ance of states,have a certain unityand thus a cert ain interdependence[orc o n n e c t i v i t y ] (Z u s a m m e n h a n g ); and w h er e s u c h i nt er depend ence exi sts, one can ap pl y the cent er ofgra vi t y concept. Accordingly, t here exist within these armedforces cer tain centers of gravity which, by their movement anddirection, exert a decisive influence over all other points; andthese centers of gravity exist wherethe forces are mostconcent rated. However , just as in t he worl d of inanimate bodieswhere the effect on a cent er of gravi ty has it s propor ti ons and it sli mi ts determined by the int erdependence of the par ts, the sameis true in war.

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In other words, before applying the concept in warplanning, we must ask ourselves whether we can considerthe enemy to act as a single ent i ty. I f so, we should look forconnections among the various parts of an adversary, oradversaries, in order to determine what holds themtogether. In 1809, for example, Napoleon had to fight on t wofronts, against Anglo-Spanish forces in Spain and againstthe Austrians in central Europe. Although they had acommon enemy, t he Anglo-Spanish and Austr ian forces didl i t t le to coordinate their effort s. Hence, it would have been

correct for Napoleon t o look for two CoGs, one on each f ront .As Clausewi tz stated, the degree of unity formed by mi li taryforces and the geographical spaces in which they have tofight can create more than one CoG. He advocated t racing

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mult iple CoGs back to a single one whenever possible. Yet ,

he allowed for the possibility that one specific CoG mightnot exist . The key quest ion we must ask, then, is whetherthe enemys forces are connectedsuff icientl y so that act ionsagainst him in one area will still have a decisive effect onhim in other areas.

Second, just as in physics, the CoG refers to the thingthat holds the enemys force together, enabling it to act as asingle ent i ty. Indeed, when we reexamine the German t extin one of the popular passages from Book VIII in whichClausewi tz descr ibed the CoG as it applies to war planning,we find the emphasis on the CoG as a focal point becomes

clearer:What t heory can admit to thus far i s the foll owing: Everyt hingdepends upon keeping the dominant characteristics of bothstates in mind. From t hese emerge a cer tain cent er of gravi ty ,a focal poin t (Zentrum) of force and movement, upon which

the larger whole depends; and, it is against t he enemys centerof gravity that the collective blow of all power must bedirected.28

To find the CoG in any particular situation, then, wemust look for the thing that is providing a certain

centripetal, or center-seeking, force (as opposed tocentrifugal, which is outward-seeking) for the enemy.Clausewitz pointed out, for example, that in the February1814 campaign against France, the allies CoG lay morewith Prussias Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht Blcherthan wi th Austr ias Pri nce Karl Phil ip von Schwarzenberg,even though the lat ter had a larger army (140,000) than theformer (100,000). Blcher, Clausewitz explained,although [numerically] weaker than Schwarzenberg, wasnonetheless the more important adversary due to hisenterprising spirit; hence, the center of gravity lay more

with him and i tpull ed the others in h is dir ect ion.29

In theactual campaign, Napoleon (75,000) fir st defeated Blcher sPrussian army, then turned on Schwarzenbergs Austr iansand drove them back. Nonetheless, both Blchers and

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Schwarzenbergs armies recovered and defeated Bonaparte

one month later.

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Clausewitz criticized Napoleonsdecision, arguing that the French Emperor should havecontinued hammering away at Blcherthe all iesCoGuntil the Prussian force was completely defeated.Such a victory, in Clausewitzs view, would have inducedthe Austrians to withdraw as well. As in the mechanicalsciences, therefore, Clausewitzs military CoGs have acent r ipetal quali ty; they r epresent a focal point, a locationwhere forces come together.

Clausewitz gave several examples of such focal points.The CoGs of Alexander the Great, Gustavus Adolphus,

Charles XII of Sweden, and Frederick the Great, forinstance, resided in their respective armies. In differentcircumstances, the personalities of key leaders, a statescapital, or its network of allies and their community ofinterest might serve as CoGs.31 What all of these variouselements have in common is not that they are sources ofpower, but that they perform a cent r ipetal or cent ralizingfunction that holds power systems together and, in somecases, even gives them purpose and direction. Strictlyspeaki ng, an armed force is not a source of power . Rather ,it serves as a focal point that draws and organizes power

from a variety of sources: a population base (recruits); anindustr ial base (weapons and mater iel); and an agr icul turalbase (foodstuffs). The same holds tr ue for the personal it iesof key leaders, state capitals, or alliance networks. Thesethings draw raw power from different sources and refine,organize, and redir ect i t .

Furthermore, Clausewitzs CoG focuses on achieving aspecific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is aneffects-based approach, rather than a capabilities-basedone. To be sure, the two approaches are linked. Attackingspecific capabilities produces certain effects. Achieving

certain effects oft en requir es att acki ng specific capabil it ies.Indeed, one could say that these approaches represent theproverb ia l two s ides o f the same co in . In thecapabil i t ies-based approach, the fir st step is to ident i fy t he

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key enemy st rength or capabil it y that could prevent us from

achieving our objective. In the effects-based approach, thefi rst step is to ident i fy t he effect we want t o achieve and thento determine what actions we should take to achieve it.Frequently those actions might go well beyond merelyneut rali zing or dest roying specific capabil i t ies. In a mannerof speaking, the capabilities-based approach seeks anegative aim, destruction of a certain capability. Theeffects-based approach, on the other hand, pursues aposit ive aim because i t seeks to create a defini te effect . TheU.S. mi li tary has got ten i nto the habit of nar rowly focusingon t he former. I t could well benefi t fr om a broader approach

of the lat ter .In one sense, Clausewi tzs effects-based CoG resembles

an emerging concept called Effects-Based Operations(EBO) more than it does the current capabilities-basednot ion, wi th the excepti on that only one part icular effect issoughttotal collapse of the enemy.32 For Clausewitzseffects-based approach, the effect and the objectivetotalcol lapse of t he enemywere always the same. EBO has thebenefit, as retired General Anthony Zinni remarked, offorcing poli t ical and mili tary leaders to focus on t he specificeffects that they want mi li tary (and non-mil it ary) act ion to

achieve.33

When asked to descr ibe effects-based operat ions,one senior offi cial r epli ed that they were aki n t o dissolvingthe glue that holds a table together, rather than str ik ingat i ts individual l egs.34 Thus, whi le the offi cer s analogy i sfl awed in t hat it uses a stati c object to descr ibe somethi ngthat has a dynamic nature, the similarities in the twoapproaches are clear.

Like EBO, Clausewitzs CoG requires the ability topredict , wi th some reasonable probabil i ty, how to achieve atleast fi rst and second-order effects, and possibly more. Thatsaid, it is important to poin t out that Clausewi tz eschewed

prescriptive formulae and considered the calculation of aCoG a matt er of st rategic judgment (str ategische Ur tei l) atthe highest levels.35 I t is a matter of judgment and, givenClausewitzs distaste for prescriptive formulae, it is

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doubt ful t hat he would have approved of some of the cur rent

efforts to develop them by means of new kinds ofinformation technology and software. Educating seniorleaders to develop their st rategic judgment in order to makesuch determinat ions, on t he other hand, was somethi ng hecertainly would have supported. This theme runsconsistentl y throughout On War.

Another important point is that Clausewitz did notdisti nguish between tact ical, operational, or strategic CoGs.TheCoG is defined by the ent ire system (or st ructure) of t heenemy, not by a level of war. Consider the example of thesoldier (Figures 3 and 4); he can have only one CoG at a t ime.

According to Clausewitz, a local commander mightdetermine a center of gravit y for t he por t ion of t he enemysforces that lay before him, providing those forcesdemonstrated sufficient independence from the remainderof the enemys forces. However, this separate CoG wouldonly amount to a localrather t han a tact ical or operationalCoG. For us to speak of a tact ical CoG, the tact ical level ofwar would have to exist independent of t he operati onal andstrategic levels of war. Similarly, for CoGs to exist at theoperational and strategic levels of war, those levels of warwould have to have an existence separate from the rest of

warfare. This notion defies the principle of unityorinterconnectednessthat German mi li tary thinkers fromClausewitz to Heinz Guderian had ascribed to warfare.36

For bet ter or worse, the German way of war did not formall yrecognize the operati onal level of war unt i l after 1945, whenit was heavil y infl uenced by U.S. doct r ine. Thi s is not to saythat understanding how t o link engagements together in toa campaign is not important ; only that a campaign shouldnot become an end in itself, or a justification for elevatingthe operati onal art above strategy.

Clausewitzs own references to strategy throughout OnWarrarely r ise above contemporary campaign str ategy. Henever addressed the integration of the nonmilitaryelements of nati onal power i nt o a grand strategy of sor ts.He appears to have thought mainly in terms of the

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employment of the military element of power; hence, his

focus is primarily on military strategy (and that almostexclusively from a l and perspect ive). Even hi s discussions ofoperations within single or multiple theaters take place atthe level of mi li tary str ategy, that i s, from t he standpoint ofpurely military ends, ways, and means. Accordingly, weshould consider hi s CoG to be a st rategic concept , a way. I t isclear from his discussions in On War that he would havesupported t he idea of individual CoGs based on geographi ccir cumstances. At the same t ime, it is highly unl ik ely thathe would have supported assigning CoGs by horizontallyslicing war in to tact ical, operati onal, and str ategic levels.

In addit ion, Clausewi tz emphasized that we should lookfor CoGs only in wars designed to defeat the enemycompletely. Only the vast amount of energy and otherresources that go into wars aimed at achieving decisivevictory can cause CoGs and their areas of influence toemerge.37 Perhaps more important, in such wars militaryand political objectivesthe total political and militarydefeat of the enemyessentially complement one another.In such wars we want to achieve the total collapse of theenemy and so we want to st r ik e at his CoG. In l imi ted wars,on t he other hand, CoGswhich focus on t he total col lapse

of the enemytend to compete with the typically morerestricted political objective(s). For example, during theGulf War the ground component planning staff of U.S.Central Command (CENTCOM) spent more hoursatt empt ing to ident ify the I raqi CoG than planning how todefeat it. 38 Ironically, under Clausewitzs concept,determining the Iraqi CoG would have been unnecessarysince the Gulf War was not a war of annihilation. Simplytranslating the wars strategic objectivesexpulsion ofIraqi forces from Kuwait and reduction of Iraqi offensivecapabil i tyint o operati onal and tact ical object ives should

have given coali t ion forces all the operational gui dance theywould have needed to succeed.39 Thi s is not t o say that t heCoG concept can only apply in wars of annihi lat ion, but to

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poin t out that it is neit her appropr iate nor necessary in all

cases.To sum up, Clausewitzs CoG is a focal point, not a

strength nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength.Second, CoGs are found only where sufficient connectivityexists among the various parts of the enemy to form anoverarching system (or structure) that acts with a certainuni ty, l ik e a physical body. Unless the enemys part s havesuffi cient connect ivi ty, he may not necessarily have a CoG.Third, CoGs possess a certain centripetal force that acts tohold an entire system or structure together. A blow at theenemys CoG would throw him off balance or, put

differently, cause his entire system (or structure) tocollapse. Fourth, the concept necessitates viewing theenemy hol ist ically, as a system. Fi nall y, identi fying CoGs isnot appropriat e for all types of wars.

As we have seen, Joint doctrines definition of CoGsdeparts from Clausewitzs original concept. By equatingCoGs to critical capabilities, strengths, or sources ofstrength, the Joint definition refers more to centers ofcritical capability than centers of gravity. Moreover, asFigure 5 (modified from Figure II-2, extracted from JointPub 5-00.1) reveals, the flawed definition leads to somemischaracter izat ions regarding an adversarys (or our own)CoG that could det r imentally affect war planning.

Towar d a Sim ple Meth od.

However, get t ing the defini t ion of a CoG correct is onlyhalf the battle. War planners need a practical method fordetermining a specific adversarys CoG.40 The methodshould be simple, in keeping wit h Clausewi tzs dictum t hatin war even t he simplest thing is dif ficul t , and yet it shouldmake use of the best in te l l igence avai lable and

accommodate revision as the resul t of r igorous analysis.Step 1: Determine whether identifying and attacking a

CoG is appropriate for the type of war we are going to wage.

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For example, the campaign against Al Qaeda, though part ofthe larger global war on t er ror ism, is essent ial ly a war t hat,for the United States at least, cannot end without theneut rali zat ion or dest ruct ion of that t er ror ist group; hence,it is the kind of war in which the ident ifi cation and pursuit of

a CoG serves a constructive purpose.Step 2: Determine whether the adversarys whole

structure or system is suffi cient ly connected to be tr eated as asingle body. Al Qaeda has numerous cells operatingglobally, most of which do not know of the existence of theothers. At least some of these cel lsor cer tain indivi dualswithin themappear to have been linked to the groupsleadership by networked electronic communications.Messages and commands were thus passed via the internet,cellular phones, and other electronic devices. It is alsopossible that a fair number of cells already haveordersand have had them for some timethat they willattempt to execute at a certain time and place, if theyreceive no other orders to the contrary. Thus, the physical

17

Fi gur e 5. Char act er isti cs of th e Adver sar ys Cent er sof Gr avi t y .


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l inks are somewhat tenuous. Successful operat ions against

Al Qaeda cells in Europe will not likely cause those inSingapore to col lapse, part icular ly as a new breed of supercells appears to be emerging that can act even moreindependently.41 However, the groups psychologicalorideologicall inks appear st rong. I f they are notpart icularl y well -li nked physicall y, the cel ls do appear t o befairly united ideologically. It might be best, therefore, toseek an ideological CoG.

Step 3: Determine what element has the necessarycent r ipetal force to hold the system together. One ideologicalelement does appear to have sufficient centrifugal force to

hold Al Qaeda together, that is its avowed hatred ofapostasy.42 It is probably that hatred, rooted in a radicalbranch of I slamrather than Osama bin L aden or anotherindividual leaderthat serves as the groups CoG. Whilebin Laden appears to have done much of the ground work t oestablish Al Qaeda, i t does not appear t hat hi s removal wi l lcause his organization to collapse. Most analysts andintel l igence sources claim that i f bin L aden were capturedor ki ll ed, another leader would simply take his place.43 Thatleader can only turn out t o be either more or less as effect iveas bin Laden. Thus, Al Qaedas leadership reall y amounts to

a center of critical capability, something we want toneutralize but not something that will end the war. Thehatred of apostasy is what draws raw powerrecruits,money, and the support of other statesand serves tomotivate the groups members to wage their part icular styl eof asymmetric warfare. For this group, apostasy seems toserve as the root cause of t he poverty, corrupt ion, t he spreadof Western influences, and the social and political violencethat plague many Muslim societies. It wi ll li kely cont inue toserve in such a capacity after bin Laden is removed.Decisively defeating Al Qaeda, therefore, will require

neutralizing that CoG. However, accomplishing that willmean employing the diplomat ic and informat ional elementsof nat ional power in a deli berate campaign to discredit thenotion that apostasy is the root cause of injustice against

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Musli ms. I t is a campaign that wil l, t o be sure, require the

support of moderate branches of Islam. Yet, it will alsorequire deli berate mil it ary act ion against t error ist cell s inthe field so that this brand of Muslim extremism becomesassociated wi th fai lure to achieve it s ends.

Addi t ional Recommendat ions:

To put its doctrinal definitions of CoG more in line withClausewi tzs idea and thereby bring the concept back undercont rol, U.S. mil i tary doct r ine in general, and Joint Pub 3-0and Joint Pub 5-00.1 in part icular , should redefine the CoGas follows:

Centers of Gravit y are focal pointsthat serve to hold acombatants entire system or structure together and thatdraw power from a variety of sources and provide it withpurpose and direction.

War planners should refrain from applying the conceptto every kind of war (or operation) so as to eliminate orreduce the competition that can occur between CoGs andpolitical-military objectives. We must ask ourselveswhether the total military collapse of the enemy iscommensurate wi th our pol i t ical object ives and end state.

I f so, then war planners should ident ify where theconnectionsand gapsare in an enemys ent ire st ructureor system before deciding whether a CoG actually exists.The CoG concept does notapply in a sit uation in which t heenemy isnotconnected enough to act wi th uni ty. Also, giventhe anticipated proliferation of chemical, biological,radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive (CBRNE) weaponsover the next decade or so, some situations are likely inwhich it is dangerous to assume that the individualsegments of t he enemy can be defeated by a single knock-outblow. I f several of Al Qaedas cel ls were armed wit h CBRNE,

for instance, striking against one cell could trigger amassive retaliation event. The continued proliferation ofCBRNE and informat ion technologies could very well makethe CoG concept academic in the fut ure.

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Employing Clausewi tzs CoG concept means that we

wi l l have to t rain ourselves to think more about the specif iceffect(s) we want to achieve and less about the capabilitieswe want to destroy, though without denigrating theimportance of those capabilities.

CoGs can, of course, change in the course of a confl ict i f,for example, all ies enter or leave the fi ght , or other changesoccur within the combatants respective power structures.We must, therefore, reassess any previous determinat ion ofa CoG. However, we should reevaluate whether we need toatt ack CoGs that are so tr ansit ory t hat once one is destroyedanother quickly takes i ts place. I f t hat occurs, perhaps we

have only found a center of cr i t ical capabil i ty rather than aCoG.

We should resist salami-sli cing t he adversary i ntotactical, operational, and strategic CoGs. The bulk of ourefforts and intermediate objectives should focus ondestroying theCoG. Creat ing sub-CoGs is ar t i fi cial, unlessour opponent is too dispersed or decent rali zed to have oneCoG. Yet , even in such cases, we may f ind i t possible to tr acethose individual CoGs back to a central one.

In conclusion, the U.S. mil i tary has come to a doct r inal

fork in the road. On the one hand, it can modify the CoGconcept, changing the term into a center of cri t icali ty so thati t more accurately reflects what the defini t ion actuall y says.If it chooses this path, the U.S. military should drop theterm center of gravi ty from i ts lexicon ent irely. On the otherhand, if it wishes to retain the CoG concept so that it cancontinue to focus its efforts against something that wouldforce an adversary to collapse, then it should redefine theCoG concept as a focal point . I f i t chooses this path, t he U.S.military would have a concept that behaves more like anactual CoG. It would also find itself in a better position to

incorporate and apply information-age concepts likeEffects-Based Operat ions.

To be sure, the U.S. military is under no obligation toaccept a concept developed nearly two centuries ago by a

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military theorist who was influenced by a distant culture

and who had different conceptual tools available to him.Yet, each of the services believes its CoG derives fromClausewitzs. Presumably, the original concept hadsomething of value that att racted mili tary art ists to it in thefirst place. Indeed, that original fascination was notmisplaced. The concept does have value. However, we needto get back to the original idea to understand and benefitfrom that value. Many of Clausewitzs ideasfriction inwar, culmination of the attack, the roles of chance anduncertaintyhave a quality that transcends his day andmakes them relevant to our own. The CoG concept is one of

them. However, we must apply it judiciously. The risks ofmisapplying it, especially in todays post-industrial era inwhich networked opponents armed with CBRNE canoperate in a globally decentralized manner, are too great.

ENDNOTES

1. In Book I, Chapter 2 of On War, Clausewitz concluded thatwarfare is neither a science nor an art. Its outcomes are toounpr edictable to consider i t a science, and i t involves forces that reactwhen acted upon, so it can not be an art, like painting. Carl vonClausewitz, On War, I ndexed ed., Michael Howard and Peter Par et , eds.and t rans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Hereafter cit ed

as On War.

2. Department of Defense, Doctr ine for J oint Operat ions:Joint Pub3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995;Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning:JointPub 5-00.1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January2002.

3. Depar tment of the Army, Operations:FM 100-5, Washington, DC:U.S. Depart ment of the Army, 1986, pp. 179-180, Appendix B, identi fiedkey command posts, key ter rain, uni t boundar ies, logisti cs bases, andlines of communication as CoGs. Jomini defined a decisive point asanything whose attack or capture would imperil or seriously weaken

the enemy. John Shy, Jomini, in The Makers of Modern Strategy:From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed., Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 152-154. For example, USMCdoctrine, like most U.S. doctrine, currently defines CoGs as keyorimportant sour ces of str ength. Depar tment of the Navy, Warfighting:

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Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Washington, DC: U.S.Depart ment of t he Navy, 1997, p. 46; and Strategy: MCDP 1-1, p. 86; andCampaigning: MCDP 1-2, p. 41.

4. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder:Westview, 1985, pp. 107-110.

5. Robert R. Leonard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver WarfareTheory and Air land Batt le, Novato, CA: Presidio, 1991, esp. pp. 20-24.

6. FM 100-5, 1993, p. 6-13; Department of t he Navy,Naval Warfare:NDP 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of t he Navy, Mar ch 1994, p.72.

7. See John A. Warden I I I ,The Ai r Campaign: Planning for Combat,

Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1988, pp. 9-10; and John A. Warden I I I ,The Enemy as a System, Ai rpower J ournal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995,pp. 40-55; and Department of the Air Force, Air Force DoctrineDocument 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Air Force,September 1997, p. 79.

8. Depart ment of the Navy, Warfighting:FMFM 1, Washington, DC:U.S. Depart ment of t he Navy, 1989, p. 85.

9. Department of the Navy, Warfighting:MCDP 1, Washington, DC:U.S. Depart ment of t he Navy, June 20, 1997, pp. 44-45; and Depart mentof the Army, Operations:FM 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Depart mentof the Army, 2001, pp. 5-7, general ly follow the Join t Pub 3-0 defini t ion.

10. Joint Pub 3-0, p. GL-4.

11. Join t Pub 5-00.1, p. II -6.

12. Join t Pub 5-00.1, p. ix. Emphasis added.

13. For exampl es of th is approach, see: Warfighting:MCDP 1, 1997,p. 46; and Strategy: MCDP 1-1, 1997, p. 86; and Campaigning: MCDP1-2, 1997, p. 41.

14. Bri gadier General (reti red) Huba Wass de Czege, Clausewi tz:Historical Theories Remain Sound Compass References: The Catch IsStaying on Course, ARMY, Vol. 38, N o. 9, September 1988, p. 42.

15. Joseph Str ange,Centers of Gravity and Cri ti cal Vulnerabil it ies:Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak

the Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting Series No. 4, 2d Ed.,Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1996.

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16. Strange, Centers of Gravity, pp. 47-48 and 143. Emphasisoriginal.

17. For example, Clausewitz borrowed from German philosophersImmanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schiller, and Germanysfamous literary figure, Wilhelm Goethe. Peter Paret, Clausewitz andthe State, New York: Oxford Un iversit y Press, 1976.

18. Schwerpunktis the term used most frequently; it appears atleast 53 times, though some uses do not reflect the sense of a CoG.Clausewitz also used the terms Centra gravitatis, Kernor core, andZentrumor cent er , at t imes.

19. Paret , Clausewitz, pp. 310-311.

20. Geoff Jones, Mar y Jones, and Phi l li p Marchington, CambridgeCoordi nat ed Science: Physics, Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversi ty Press,1993, pp. 52-55.

21. In an environment where gravity does not exist, a CoG isreplaced by a cent er of mass, CoM, meaning where an object s mass ismost heavily concentrated.

22. Jones, et al., Physics, p. 53.

23. On War, pp. 485-486, 595-596. Emphasis added.

24. On War, p. 617. Emphasis added. In fairness to Howard andParet, they admit that at t imes their tr anslat ion was more interpr eti vethan l it eral . They could not have foreseen t he extent to which the U.S.military would embrace the CoG concept and adhere to theirinterpretation literally.

25. See Carl von Clausewi tz,Vom Kriege, 19th Ed., Int r. by WernerHahlweg, Regensburg: Pustet, 1991. Hereafter, Vom K ri ege.

26. Der erste ist : das Gewicht der feindl ichen Macht auf so wenigSchwerpunkte als mglich zurckzufhren, wenn es sein kann, aufeinen; wiederum den Sto gegen diese Schwerpunkte auf so wenigHaupthandlungen als mgli ch zurckzufhr en, wenn es sein k ann, aufeine; endlich alle untergeordnete Handlungen so untergeordnet alsmglich zu halten. Mit einem Wort, der erste Grundsatz ist: so

konzentriert als mglich zu handeln. Der zweite Grundsatz: so schnellals mglich zu handeln, also keinen Aufenthalt und keinen Umwegohne hinr eichenden Grund. Das Reduzieren der feindl ichen Macht aufeinen Schwerpunkt hngt ab: Erstens von dem poli t ischenZusammenhang derselben . . . Zweitens von der Lage des

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Kriegstheaters, auf welchem die verschiedenen feindlichen Heereerschienen. Vom Kr iege, pp. 1009-1010. Emphasis added.

27. So wie sich der Schwerpunkt immer da findet, wo die meisteMasse beisammen ist, und wie jeder Sto gegen den Schwerpunkt derLast am wirksamsten ist, wie ferner der strkste Sto mit demSchwerpunkt der Kraft erhalten wird, so ist es auch im Kriege. DieStreit kr fte jedes Kr iegfhrenden, sei es ein einzelner Staat oder einBndnis von Staaten, haben eine gewisse Einheit und durch dieseZusammenhang; wo aber Zusammenhang ist, da treten die Analogiendes Schwerpunktes ein. Es gibt also in diesen Streitkrften gewisseSchwerpunkte, deren Bewegung und Richtung ber die anderenPunkte entscheidet, und diese Schwerpunkte finden sich da, wo diemeisten Streitkrfte beisammen sind. So wie aber in der totenKr pe r we l t d ie W i r kung gegen den Schwer punk t i n dem

Zusammenhang der Teil e ihr Ma und i hr e Grenze hat , so ist es auch imKr iege. Emphasis added. Vom Kriege, pp. 810-811.

28. Was sich die Theor ie hier sagen kann, ist folgendes: Es kommtdarauf an, die vorherrschenden Verhlt nisse beider Staaten im Auge zuhaben. Aus ihnen wird sich ein gewisser Schwerpunkt , ein Zent rum derKraft und Bewegung bilden, von welchem das Ganze abhngt, und aufdiesen Schwerpunkt des Gegners mu der gesammelt e Sto all er Krftegeri cht et sein . Vom Kr iege, p. 976. Emphasis added.

Compare: What the theor ist has to say here is this: one must k eepthe dominant characterist ics of both bell igerent s in mi nd. Out of thesecharacter istics a cer tain cent er of gravi ty develops, the hub of al l power

and movement, on wh ich everything depends. That i s the point againstwhich all our energies should be directed.On War, pp. 595-596.

29. Weil Blcher, obgleich schwcher als Schwarzenberg, dochwegen seines Unt ernehmungsgeistes der Bedeut endere war , da in ihmalso mehr der Schwerpunk t l ag, der das bri ge in seiner Richtung mi tfort reit . Emphasis added. Vom Kriege, p. 324.

30. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, New York:MacMi l lan, 1966, pp. 960-976.

31. Alexander, Gustav Adolf, K arl XI I , Fr iedrich der Groe hatt enihren Schwerpunkt in ihrem Heer, wre dies zertrmmert worden, sowr den sie ihr e Rolle schlecht ausgespielt haben; bei Staaten, die durch

innere Parteiungen zerri ssen sind, li egt er meistens in der Hauptstadt ;bei kl einen Staaten, die sich an mcht ige sttzen, l iegt er i m H eer dieserBundesgenossen; bei Bndnissen l iegt er in der Einheit des In teresses;bei Volksbewaffnung in der Person der Hauptfhrer und in der

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ffentlichen Meinung. Gegen diese Dinge mu der Sto gerichtet sein.Hat der Gegner dadurch das Gleichgewicht verloren, so mu ihm keineZeit gelassen werden, es wieder zu gewinnen; der Sto mu immer indieser Richtung fortgesetzt werden, oder mit anderen Worten, derSieger mu ihn immer ganz und das Ganze nicht gegen einen Tei l desGegners ri cht en. Vom Kriege, pp. 976-977.

32. Join t Forces Command, J9 Joint Fut ur es Lab, Rapid DecisiveOperations White Paper, Coordinating Draft dated August 9, 2001,Nor folk , VA: U .S. Joint Forces Command, 2001. It defines EBO as Aprocess for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on theenemy, through the application of the full range of military andnon-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategiclevels. An effect is the physical, functional, or psychological outcome,event, or consequence that results from a specific action or actions. p.

A-2. However, the USAF curr ent ly has a vision of EBO that dif fers fromthat of t he J9. Br uce Rolf sen, Ef fects-Based Operat ions Is New Way ToFight, Ai r Force Ti mes, May 7, 2001, p. 27.

33. Christ ian Lowe, In Exercise, U.S. Military PracticesUnconvent ional Warfare, Defense Week, May 21, 2001, p. 2.

34. Lowe, Unconvent ional War fare, p. 2.

35. Diese Centra gravitatis in der feindlichen Kriegsmacht zuunt erscheiden, ihr e Wirkungskr eise zu erkennen, ist also ein H auptaktdes strategischen Urteils. Man wird sich nmlich jedesmal fragenmssen, welche Wirkungen das Vorgehen und Zurckgehen des einen

Teiles der gegenseitigen Streitkrfte auf die brigen hervorbringenwird. Vom Kriege, pp. 810-811.

36. Based on the authors research for a forthcoming manuscriptentitled, The German Way of War.

37. Denn nur durch diese Ent scheidung werden die Schwerpunk teder gegenseit igen Macht und di e von ihnen ausgehenden Kr iegstheaterwi rksame Di nge. Vom Kr iege, p. 813.

38. Cited from Seow Hiang Lee, Center of Gravity or Center ofConfusion: Understanding the Mystique, Wright Flyer Paper No. 10,Maxwell Ai r Force Base, AL : Air Command and Staff College, 1999, pp.18-19.

39. These st rategic object ives are condensed. The object ives for theGulf War as outlined by President Bush were: (1) withdrawal of Iraqiforces fr om Kuwai t , (2) restorati on of legit imate government i n Kuwai t ,

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(3) assuring security and stability of the Persian Gulf region, and (4)protecting American lives. Eliot Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air PowerSurvey, 5 Vols., Vol. I: Planning and Command and Control,Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 83-84.

40. Numerous methods, too many t o li st here, have been devisedover the years. The Strategic Helix method, for example, involvesattacking all potent ial CoGs unt il the real one is hit . Put simply, thi smethod amounts to a recon by destruction approach and assumesunlimited resources. Discussed in detail in Lee, Center of Gravity orCenter of Confusion, pp. 27-28. Sim il arl y, the Onion method amount sto li t tl e more than eating ones way th rough the mult ipl e layers of theenemys nat ional power to get at the CoG. Colin Agee,Peel ing the Oni on:The Ir aqis Center of Gravit y, Ft . Leavenwort h, KS: School of AdvancedMil i tar y Studies, 1992, pp. 26-27. Both of t hese methods assume that

the enemys CoG l ies withinthe Heli x or t he Onion.

41. Mike Boettcher, Al Qaeda forming new cells worldwide,CNN.com, Ju ly 31, 2002; accessed August 1, 2002. The ar t icle repor tedthat t he new super cel ls operate on their own wi thout gui dance fr omthe men who once t rained and di rected them.

42. Al-Qaida, the Base, available from http:/ / www.ict.org.il /inter_ter, In ternet, accessed Apr i l 3, 2002.

43. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said as much in a pr essin terview, Secretary Rumsfeld Intervi ew,Washington Times, July 19,2002; and in a quest ion and answer peri od that foll owed his test imony t o

the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 31, 2002.

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U.S. ARM Y WAR COLL EGE

Major General Rober t R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGI C STUDI ES I NSTI TUTE

DirectorPr ofessor Dougl as C. L ovelace, J r .

Di r ector of Resear ch

Dr . St even M et z

Author

Li eut enant Colonel Antul io J. Echevarr ia I I

Dir ector of Publ icat i onsM s. M ari anne P. Cow li ng

Publ icati ons Assi stant

M s. Ri t a A. Rum mel

*****

Composition

Ms. Ki mberl y A. Rockw ell

clausewitz’s cog

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