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• Why a new operational concept is needed for the Persian Gulf

• Challenging legacy assumptions for projecting U.S. military power

• Pacing threat: an anti‐access/area‐denial (A2/AD) strategy with Persian characteristics

• Outside‐In objectives and lines of operation

• Recommended supporting initiatives

Click to edit Master title style• The threat has changed: proliferation of precision–guided weapons, maritime

threats, terrorist proxy groups, near‐term potential of a nuclear‐armed Iran

• The Arab awakening “presents both strategic opportunities and challenges”

• Operational planning assumptions developed almost thirty years ago for the Persian Gulf may no longer be valid

• A turning point: With the end of operations in Iraq, DoD has an opportunity to rethink plans, forward posture, and capabilities needed to maintain stable military balance in the Gulf over the next 20 years

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“U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security…to prevent Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies”

bbbbbb Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, January 2012


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“Today’s contingency force is not well‐suited to many of the problems it is likely to face”

‐‐ Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf, 1979

Recommendations:Establish a forward posture that regularly deploys forces into the Persian Gulf and includes a year‐round carrier task group / amphibious ready group presence

Preposition equipment and consumables in the Persian Gulf to support rapid force deployments

Rapidly deploy large forces of bombers and fighters to the region in the event of an Iranian invasion or Soviet adventurism

Upgrade plans and capabilities to support operations against guerilla forces

Harden and defend critical oil facilities and infrastructure against air and terror attacks


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The U.S. military has traditionally assumed:

Although these assumptions served the U.S. military well for the past thirty years, it should not be assumed that they will be suitable for ops against capable A2/AD complexes

Close‐in bases would be available for early‐arriving fighters, ground forces, C2 elements

Naval units could operate within range of their target areas

U.S. would have a near monopoly on PGMs

No real threats to refueling and logistics ops

C4ISR networks would remain secure

As in 1979, we are in a time of transition…another Persian Gulf review may be needed

Major U.S. Gulf OperationsEarnest Will, 1987‐1988

Desert Shield/Storm, 1990‐1991

Southern Watch, 1991‐2003

Desert Strike, 1996

Northern Watch, 1997‐2003

Desert Fox, 1998

Iraqi Freedom, 2003‐2010


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Ballistic Missile Flight Times < 5 minutes

105 nmUSNAVCENT 5th FleetBahrain

149 nmCAOCAl Udeid

“Today’s U.S. air operations usually expect: (1) Secure permanent or deployed bases in or

close to theater; (2) Effective low‐observable (or “stealthy”)

capabilities to penetrate air‐defense systems;

(3) Long force buildups in theater to support maximum sustained operations;

(4) Secure lines of communication for fuel and other logistics;

(5) Effective beyond visual range air‐to‐air missiles; and

(6) Adequate tanker support.”

“Recent and ongoing analyses question whether the USAF can depend on any of these key enablers of air power in the future primarily due to growing challenges

associated with anti‐access and area‐denial strategies”


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Click to edit Master title style• The U.S. will not initiate armed hostilities

• Prior intelligence and warning will be limited

• Neither U.S. nor Iranian territory will be sanctuaries

• All operating domains will be contested

• Close‐in operating locations and forces will be at risk at the beginning of a conflict with Iran

• Cannot assume additional close‐in basing will be immediately available

• Iran will threaten to use WMD

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The U.S. military will need to fight to maintain its freedom of action

Click to edit Master title style• Are designed to create time needed for an enemy to achieve its

campaign objectives, e.g.,

– Prevent the U.S from deploying and employing its forces effectively

– Coerce U.S. partners and allies to deny support to the U.S. military and/or drive them out of the war

– Inflict such damage to U.S. forces and bases that the U.S. would choose to discontinue the fight

– Make the prospect of eventual U.S. victory appear too prolonged or costly

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Iran is developing an A2/AD strategy with “Persian characteristics”


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• Natural channelizing effect of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf

• Short-/medium-range missiles from Iran can reach critical areas across the region

• Global dependence on Gulf energy exports, most of which still transit the Strait

• 80-90% of populations for many Persian Gulf states located in coastal urban areas


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Shahab‐3

C‐802

Fateh‐110

Click to edit Master title style“I advise, recommend and warn them over the

return of this carrier to the Persian Gulf because we are not in the habit of

warning more than once…”


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• Defending forward bases and partner infrastructure against guided rocket, artillery, mortar and missile attacks

• Countering widespread and highly mobile irregular proxy forces armed with guided weapons

• Defending surface vessels against missile, submarine, and swarming boat attacks

• Penetrating contested airspace to conduct offensive operations

• Securing safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf

• Setting conditions for other campaign operations (e.g., counter‐WMD, unconventional warfare missions)


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Prevent the U.S from deploying and employing its forces effectivelyCoerce U.S. partners to deny support to the U.S. military Inflict such damage that the U.S. would choose to discontinue the fight Make the prospect of an eventual U.S. victory appear too prolonged or costly

Freedom of action in all domains – air, land, sea, space & cyberspaceCreate advantages over a capable opponentGain the initiativeDeny a quick victorySet the conditions for effective follow-on operations

• Outside‐In encompasses all elements of the joint force• Outside‐In proposes an enabling concept, not a theater warplan• AirSea Battle‐like concepts are not all about WESTPAC

Important Caveats:


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• ISR and C2 networks are the "Achilles’ heel" of A2/AD strategies • U.S. ability to sustain operations over extended distances is a key advantage• At the outset of hostilities, U.S. could use this advantage to:

Footage reportedly filmed by an Iranian UAV

• Degrade/deny enemy’s ability to effectively target its missiles

Regain U.S. naval maneuver and ability to deploy air forces close to an enemy, thereby increasing sortie generation

• Deny enemy’s ability to form an accurate picture of the battlespace or assess effects of its strikes

Force the enemy to waste its missile assets against targets of little value


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Conduct long‐range operations from outside the reach of Iran’s anti‐access threats to gain the advantage:

DISPERSE AND DEPLOY TO SECURE STAGING BASES avoid a trap by deploying and operating from bases located outside the reach of Iran’s missile threats

BLIND THE ENEMY, SHRINK THE A2/AD THREAT RING fight from range to dominate the battlespace ‐‐ kill the archer, not the arrows

CREATE ENABLING POCKETS OF AIR & MARITIME SUPERIORITY includes air, EW & undersea warfare, special ops, and joint theater entry ops to create lodgments near Strait

Counter weapons of mass destruction

Counter proxy groups armed with G‐RAMM

Other Possible Theater Campaign Lines of Operation:Impose costs

UW to bring about regime change from within


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Deploy to operate from bases located outside the reach of Iran’s missile threats

• Disperse steady-state theater presence forces

• Deploy initial response forces to locations outside of Iran’s threat ring

– Undersea warfare for strike & maritime dominance ops

• Fight from a posture of advantage to complicate Iran’s planning and reduce its A2/AD threat


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Fight from range to dominate the battlespace

• Prevent the enemy from developing an accurate picture of the battlespace

• Attack from multiple axes to complicate and overwhelm Iran’s defenses

• Force Iran to its culminating point, regain the initiative for the U.S.

• Enable forces to deploy closer to the area of operations, increasing aircraft sortie rates / tempo of operations

Click to edit Master title styleIncludes air, electronic warfare and undersea

warfare, special operations…

…and potentially joint theater entry ops to create lodgments to

help secure the Strait

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• Counter weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons

• Counter proxy groups armed with guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles

• Impose costs on Iran, degrade its ability to conduct offensive and defensive military operations

• Unconventional warfare operations that could lead to a regime change from within

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Click to edit Master title styleA more balanced mix of short‐range and long‐range capabilities for surveillance & strike

Land‐ and sea‐based manned and unmanned penetrating, persistent ISR to support operations in high threat areas

Robust surface warfare defenses against ASCMs, swarming attack craft, UAVs

Undersea warfare payload, UUVs with long endurance

Land‐based missile defenses with low theater footprints

Land‐based counter‐fires

Offensive & defensive cyber, electronic warfare, directed energy capabilities

New capabilities to support SOF ops in non‐permissive areas

Forces to building partner capacity21


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• Work with regional partners to diversify posture, harden shelters and support facilities

• Improve ability to rapidly disperse forces across the Arabian Peninsula

• Hundreds of candidates for bases located outside the Persian Gulf, including facilities across Europe’s southern tier

• Does a networked force with “reach-back” need to maintain major C2 facilities on the western coastline of the Gulf?

Potential Airbases

Click to edit Master title style• Operational concepts such as AirSea Battle and

Outside-In are not all about preserving the defense budget and buying major new weapon systems

• New, innovative concepts are needed that will help:

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– Provide the vital links between the DefenseStrategy and future defense spending;

– Increase synergy across operating domains and the Services;

– Identify priority capabilities; and

– Identify areas for reduced investment as DoD rebalances to support its new strategy


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