climate refugees: flight from nature, man or both?
TRANSCRIPT
CLIMATE REFUGEES: FLIGHT FROM NATURE, MAN OR BOTH? A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON MIGRATION IN CONTEXTS OF FLOODS, SEA-LEVEL RISES AND DROUGHTS
DANIËLLE SPIERINGS
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“We are worth saving!”
- Shishmaref Erosion and Relocation Coalition
(in Marino & Lazrus, 2015, p. 346).
“Human migration, forced or otherwise, will undoubtedly
be one of the most significant consequences of
environmental degradation and climate change in
decades to come” (Steiner, 2008, p. 4).
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Climate Refugees: Flight from nature, man or both? A systematic literature review exploring the effect of climate change on migration in contexts of floods, sea-level rises and droughts.
Daniëlle Spierings
ANR: 821687
Student number: U1233568
Master Thesis: Victimology and Criminal Justice
Supervisor: dr. C.J.J. Rijken
Second reader: Prof. dr. A. Pemberton
MSc. Victimology & Criminal Justice
Tilburg Law School
Tilburg University
VI
Table of Contents Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... VI
I. Foreword & Acknowledgements ....................................................................... VIII
II. Executive Summary ............................................................................................ IX
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Inexistent roads to safety, recognition and justice ............................................. 2
1.2 Inexistent roads to safety, recognition and justice: an issue of causality? ........ 4
1.3 Research aims & questions ............................................................................... 6
1.4 Methods ............................................................................................................. 7
1.4.1 Research design ......................................................................................... 7
1.4.2 Data collection ............................................................................................. 8
1.4.3 Data analysis ............................................................................................. 10
1.4.4 Ethical considerations ............................................................................... 12
1.5 Thesis outline ................................................................................................... 13
2. Key concepts in the climate change and migration Nexus ................................. 14
3. Examining the climate change and migration nexus .......................................... 21
3.1 An overview ..................................................................................................... 21
3.3.1 Climate induced factors for migration ........................................................ 23
3.3.2 Mediating factors in climate-induced migration ......................................... 24
3.4 The effect of climate change on migration ....................................................... 29
3.4.1 Views on the scope of climate-induced migration ..................................... 29
3.4.2 Views on the volition of climate-induced migration ................................... 29
3.5 Conclusions on the climate change and migration nexus debate. ................... 31
4. Floods & Migration ............................................................................................. 32
4.1 An overview ..................................................................................................... 32
4.2 Exploring the relationship between floods and migration ................................ 32
4.3 The effect of floods on migration ..................................................................... 36
5. Sea-level rises & Migration ................................................................................ 39
5.1 An overview ..................................................................................................... 39
5.2 Exploring the relationship between sea-level rises and migration ................... 40
5.2.1 Sea-level rises and migration: a matter of perception? ............................. 41
5.2.2 Pre-existing and alternative factors for migratory decisions ...................... 42
5.3 The effect of sea-level rises on migration ........................................................ 43
6. Droughts & Migration ......................................................................................... 46
6.1 An overview ..................................................................................................... 46
6.2 Exploring the relationship between droughts and migration ........................... 47
VII
6.2.1 Impacts on livelihood & mobility patterns .................................................. 48
6.2.2 Social and demographic mediators for mobility ........................................ 49
6.2.3 Governance and security issues as drivers for migration ......................... 49
6.4 The effect of drought on migration ................................................................... 50
7. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 53
8. Discussion .......................................................................................................... 57
8.1 Making sense of the climate change and migration nexus .............................. 57
8.2 Research limits & knowledge gaps .................................................................. 60
9. Recommendations ............................................................................................. 63
10. Bibliography .................................................................................................... 65
11. Appendices. .................................................................................................... 73
Appendix 1. PRISMA-Protocol ............................................................................. 73
Appendix 2. Systematic literature search ............................................................. 78
Appendix 3. Literature selection ........................................................................... 82
VIII
I. Foreword & Acknowledgements Climate refugees are a highly debated topic within academia, politics and the media, yet little
is known about the vulnerabilities and underlying mechanisms for their flight. Despite their
infamy, there is a tragic and serious lack of protection for climate victims that lose their lives,
livelihoods and homes due to the effects of climate change and those who flee in the face of
those risks. Besides the shortcomings of the legal international framework and states regarding
forced migrants in general, the absence of protection is also partially ascribed to the lack of
consensus on the scope of climate-induced migration and the volition thereof.
It is from this problem statement and the plight of the victims of the climate change and
migration nexus, that this thesis departs. The goal is to examine the effect of climate change
on migration. Not to potentially confirm or disprove their acclaimed status as climate refugees,
but rather to offer tangible knowledge about the vulnerabilities to and induced by climate
change that lead to migration. It is my hope that we can exchange the discourse of the debate
surrounding climate refugees from a discussion about the entitlement of climate refugees as a
legally and scientifically substantive group, to a debate that examines what the vulnerabilities
of people impacted by climate change are and how we can mitigate those to prevent
victimization and forced migration.
It should be emphasized that this thesis would not have been possible without the supervision
of Dr. Conny Rijken for which I owe her great thanks. In this context the second reader of this
thesis Prof. Antony Pemberton should not be forgotten in his efforts in the evaluation process.
Special thanks go out to my colleagues Dr. Liesbeth Hoeven for her moral support and Jolanda
Asmoredjo for her advice on the structure of this thesis. Thanks also go out to Dr. Jan Jans
and Prof. Erik Borgman for showing me the importance of asking the difficult, yet important
questions.
Last but not least, throughout this process I have been immensely supported by my
friends and family. This thesis is dedicated in their honor for their love and support. In
particular, I would like to thank my dear friend Susanne Geboers for her support and my partner
Ruud Schellekens for his unending encouragement.
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II. Executive Summary
“Ofthirtywaystoescapedanger,runningawayisthebest.”
- El-Hinnawi(ascitedinWestra,2009.p.3)
Climate change greatly impacts the environment in which we live (IPCC, 2007b) and severely
threatens the lives and well-being of people and communities all over the globe (Collectif
Argos, 2010; IPCC, 2007a; Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009). As a response to these
vulnerabilities, people and entire communities have been reported to flee their homes in the
search for safety and means of survival (IOM, 2007; Perkiss et al, 2010). Despite the
suggested impact of climate change on the lives and well-being of so-called climate refugees,
there are little to no international mechanisms for the protection of climate refugees (McAdam,
2012; McAdam & Saul, 2010; Bierman & Boas, 2010; Westra, 2009). The root of this problem
can partially be ascribed to the ‘uncertainty’ and disagreement on how climate change affects
(forced) migration (Vlassopoulos, 2010, p. 17; Sriskandarajah, 2008).
As a remedy for this issue, this research performs a systematic literature review to
uncover the effect of climate change on migration and the volition thereof. Herewith, it seeks
to contribute comprehensive and structural knowledge of the scholarly debate surrounding the
climate change and migration nexus and offer a new and expanded framework for the analysis
and evaluation of empirical studies on the effect of climate change on migration.
Four common themes emerged from the literature: Firstly, climate change does not
cause migration, but rather triggers migration in areas with pre-existing vulnerabilities and
herewith the relationship between climate change and migration functions as a nexus.
Secondly, only a relatively small portion of migration induced or triggered by climate change is
considered to be forced. Thirdly, sudden-onset events are more likely to trigger forced
migration than slow-onset events. Lastly, the relationship between climate change and
migration is likely non-linear as the effects of climate change may diminish resources needed
to migrate in response to climate change.
This research concludes that the effect of climate change on migration is very context
specific and should be approached as such in research and policy-making. Neither climate-
induced (forced) migration nor climate refugees (as conceptualized in this thesis) were found
to be have a solid empirical basis given that developmental factors maintained vulnerabilities
to any number of threats besides climate change. Hence, it would be advisable to factor in
climate change as one of the causes for vulnerability and contributing factor to migration for
the development of policies and sustainable aid.
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1. Introduction
“We woke up in terror after the roof of my house was swept away, and moments later we were chest deep in the rising waters,” says Hasan Gharami, 33, of Borguna, who fled to high ground with his family to survive. “We couldn’t return to our land. We lost our boats, we lost our cattle, and our land was flooded with salt water – too saline even to drink, let alone grow crops” (UNDP, 2015, p. 1.).
“He [Jimmy Nayopuk] points vaguely at the sea
and the nearby shore: ‘That’s where it was’, he says ‘My house was 100 feet [30 meters] from here, maybe 150. During the storm of 2000 we couldn’t do anything about my house. It broke apart when it fell, and I lost all my belongings” (Collectif Argos, 2010, p. 22).
“[Mariyam:] The water will rise higher and swallow
everything up, destroying everything. It’s no longer possible to live here. [Abdul:] What will I do if our islands are engulfed? There will be nowhere to go. I’ll take refuge right here on my dhoni! [i.e. a traditional Maldivian fishing boat]” (Collectif Argos, 2010, p. 138).
Climate change greatly impacts the environment in which we live (IPCC, 2007b) and severely
threatens the lives and well-being of people and communities all over the globe (Collectif
Argos, 2010; IPCC, 2007a; Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009). In fact, the Global
Humanitarian Forum (2009) together with former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
determined that annually approximately 300.000 people die from the consequences of climate
change and 325 million are heavily impacted. The effects of climate change do not only result
in direct threats that endanger the very lives of people (e.g., death or injuries due to extreme
weather events), but also prove detrimental for their livelihoods when, for instance, crops or
life-stock are destroyed by floods or when droughts cause water shortages.
As a response to these vulnerabilities, people and entire communities living in regions
affected by climate change have been reported to leave everything behind in the attempt to
flee their homes in the search for safety and means of survival (IOM, 2007; Perkiss et al, 2010).
In some extraordinary cases, the land itself is predicted to completely disintegrate as is the
case for the ‘sinking’ pacific Islands of Tuvalu and Kiribati whose territory is predicted to
become uninhabitable and possibly completely engulfed by water due to sea-level rises
(McAdam, 2010b).
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Those forced to flee their homes in response to the effects of climate change are most
commonly referred to as ‘climate refugees’ and can be defined as people who are: “[d]irectly
or indirectly affected by environmental pressures as a result of climate change. As a
consequence of these pressures, they are no longer able to live in their homeland and
therefore find themselves displaced” (Perkiss et al. 2010, p.4), or as simply stated by Penz
(2010): “those who are forced to move due to the effects of climate change” (p. 152). To be
more specific, several scholars in the field (e.g., Piquet, 2010; Black, 2001; Perch-Nielsen et
al, 2008) have narrowed down floods, extreme weather events, sea-level rises and droughts
as the main effects of climate change which are thought to cause human displacement and
forced migration.
The prospects for climate refugees appear bleak as several scholars (e.g., McAdam,
2012; Westra, 2009) underscore the large scale impact of the effects of climate change on
people and communities and alarmist predictions made by for instance Christian Aid (2007)
who estimates that in 2050 approximately 250 million people will be displaced due to climate
change induced contexts such as droughts, floods and extreme weather events. Moreover,
the UN Under-Secretary General, Achim Steiner, has stated that “Human migration, forced or
otherwise, will undoubtedly be one of the most significant consequences of environmental
degradation and climate change in decades to come” (Steiner, 2008, p. 4).
In particular, people in developmental areas are vulnerable as their capacity to mitigate
the effects of climate change and to effectively migrate is low due to a lack of resources (e.g.,
money and/or social capital) (Warner et al, 2009) and their governments are poorly equipped
to minimize climate-induced harm (Popovski & Mundi, 2011; Smith & Vivekananda, 2012).
Once displaced, people in developing countries run the risk of ending up in even more
precarious situations such as poorly kept refugee camps, conflict areas and various forms of
exploitation such as human trafficking (Martin & Callaway, 2011; Warner et al, 2009) and
sexual exploitation (Warner et al, 2009). In addition, the UN Security Council (2011; 2007) and
various scholars (e.g., Buhaug & Theisen, 2012; Kahl, 2006; Welzer, 2012) have on several
occasions expressed their concerns for the security threat posed by (increased) conflict as a
result of climate-induced migration.
1.1 Inexistent roads to safety, recognition and justice
Despite the impact of climate change on the lives and well-being of climate refugees as
sketched above, there are little to no international mechanisms for the protection of climate
refugees (McAdam, 2012; McAdam & Saul, 2010; Bierman & Boas, 2010; Westra, 2009). In
fact, the legal status of climate refugees remains largely undefined (McNamara, 2007; Penz,
2010). While often referred to as climate refugees in academic literature, they are not included
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in the 1951 Refugee Convention of which Article 1(A)(2) restricts the definition of a refugee to
a person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (p. 14)
As can be derived from Article 1(A)(2), the legal definition of ‘refugee’ does not include the
effects of climate change as a valid factor for refugee status. As domestic RSD (Refugee
Status Determination) systems base state responsibility towards refugees on the convention’s
criteria (Burson, 2010), climate refugees are - in effect - considered ineligible for refugee status
and the rights connected to it (Lister, 2014; McAdam & Saul, 2010; Westra, 2009). Instead,
climate refugees are viewed as ‘economic migrants’ (Foster, 2007) or considered internally
displaced persons (IDPs) (Westra, 2009; Penz 2010). These labels are problematic for two
reasons: Firstly, there is significantly less accountability for states with regards to the rights of
IDPs (Koser, 2011; Westra, 2009) and ‘economic migrants’ than convention refugees
(Kolmannskog, 2008). In contrast to legal status of ‘refugee’ as defined by the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the term ‘IDP’ is descriptive rather than legally binding. This
means states are free to exclude and adapt the criteria of the definition within their own
jurisdiction (Koser, 2011). Secondly, the label of IDP diminishes international responsibility for
climate refugees as states are first and foremost responsible for the care of IDPs (Westra,
2009). More pressingly yet, most climate-induced forced migration tends to occur within
borders (Koser, 2011) and the effects of climate change disproportionally impact developing
countries (Popovski & Mundi, 2011; Smith & Vivekananda, 2012; Reuveny, 2007), meaning
that the countries with the lowest capacity are expected to protect and restore the lives of the
greatest amount of climate refugees. Responsibilities, as argued by Burson (2010), the global
south might be unwilling and unable to fulfill.
In practice, asylum claims and appeals lodged by self-proclaimed climate refugees
remain largely unsuccessful, which arguably can be attributed to the poor embedding and
codification of climate victim rights in (both international and domestic) legal systems (White,
2014; Hall, 2014). In 2014, an infamous asylum claim from New Zealand (i.e. the case of AC
Tuvalu NZIPT 501370-371) managed to attain residency for a family who considers
themselves climate refugees on the basis of exceptional humanitarian grounds (AC Tuvalu,
2014a; AC Tuvalu, 2014b). However, the Tribunal for Immigration and Protection of New
Zealand explicitly denied the claimants asylum under refugee law, stating that factors induced
by climate change were not permissible as valid reasons for granting asylum or residency, and
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did not view this case as a precedent for future rulings.
Besides poor protection in international law, there is also a lack of (transnational)
governance and international policy responses with respect to the environmentally displaced
(Renaud et al, 2007; Burson, 2010; Vlassopoulos, 2010). Arguably, the lack of protection of
climate refugees can also be understood through the weak position of climate change as an
environmental issue in transnational governance (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Westra, 2009).
Currently, most of climate change related issues are either handled by the WTO or by the UN,
neither of which have included climate refugees as a ‘right-bearing’ group, meaning that claims
cannot be lodged by those affected by climate change and preventive measures cannot be
enforced without state representation. In summary, as emphasized by Westra: “[t]here are a
plethora of law and regulatory regimes that support the status quo, permitting, and in fact
encouraging, most of the activities that cause migrations and foster the continuing increases
in the number of dispossessed asylum seekers” (2009, p. xv).
1.2 Inexistent roads to safety, recognition and justice: an issue of causality?
It appears that neither the UN nor its member states have taken steps that indicate a remote
willingness to include climate refugees into the international legal framework or to produce
specific international policy responses. But why? Arguably, there is little incentive for states to
incorporate the effects of climate change as valid factors for recognizing refugee status as the
securitization of irregular migration has left states in fear of being overrun by (climate) migrants
(Bettini, 2013). Although realist and self-interest driven arguments seem appealing in
explaining the lack of (international) protection of climate refugees, the root of this problem
also seems connected to the ‘uncertainty’ and disagreement on how climate change effects
(forced) migration (Vlassopoulos, 2010, p. 17; Sriskandarajah, 2008). On the one hand,
scholars have emphasized the effect of climate change on forced migration (e.g., Bates, 2002;
Meyers, 1993;) and on the basis of these findings several scholars (e.g., McAdam & Saul,
2010; Westra, 2009; Williams, 2008; Biswas & Chowdhury, 2012) endorse the inclusion of
climate refugees in existing international law, such as the refugee convention, human rights
law and humanitarian law. Additionally, pleas have been made in favor of complementary
protection standards by McAdam (2011), and for the inclusion of the protection of refugees
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the creation of an
altogether new convention on climate change that includes climate refugee rights by Bierman
& Boas (2010). On the other hand, there are also several scholars (e.g., Black, 1998, 2001;
Kibreab, 1994; McGregor, 1993) who discommend the inclusion of climate refugees as a
distinct category entitled to refugee status as they argue the term is neither scientifically nor
politically substantive.
According to McNamara (2007), Gemenne (2011) and Dun & Gemenne (2008), the
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confusion and strife surrounding climate refugees and their legal rights is largely due to the
plethora of causes due to which people choose to flee from their homes. Here the argument is
that identifying and separating climate change induced factors from other factors (e.g., socio-
political circumstances or economic drivers) driving (forced) migration is difficult to the extent
that some scholars (e.g., Wood, 2001) even render it impossible. For example, the typical
convention refugee fears a clear threat (i.e. the state) and when socio-economically supported
would still be faced with the necessity to flee. In contrast, the climate refugee’s narrative has
no clear and single antagonist and instead may suffer from a myriad of factors induced by
climate change (e.g., lack of safe water supplies and/or the degradation of livelihood) for which
aid, preventive measures and other socio-economic factors may mitigate or excarcebate the
necessity to depart. This multi-causality, as defined by McAdam (2012), is crippling the policy-
making process and the development of legal protective measures for climate refugees
(McAdam, 2012; Zetter, 2010; Vlassapoulos, 2010; Sriskandarajah, 2008). In other words, the
difficulty in distilling climate change as a main factor for forced migration is casting great doubts
amongst several scholars (e.g., Lonergan, 1997; Wood, 2001; Black, 2001; Kibreab, 1997;
Castles, 2002) about the scientific and legal substantiveness of climate refugees as a distinct
category that should be entitled to refugee status. The debate surrounding climate-induced
forced migration, however, does not simply constitute a disagreement on the interpretation of
evidence, but also largely rests on a substantive lack of an empirical framework within
academia (Piquet, 2010) leading to uninformed advice regarding climate refugees (Kibreab,
1997; Dun & Gemenne, 2008). Additionally, within the last ten years, academic studies
integrating and compiling empirical findings on the effect of climate change on migration from
various disciplines appear scarce.
In summary, there is yet a consensus to be formed with regards to existence and prevalence
of climate-induced migration as a phenomenon and in extent climate refugees as a distinct
vulnerable group in need of specific policy address and rights (McNamara, 2007, McAdam,
2012; Bierman & Boas, 2010). One of the main drives for this debate is the disagreement on
the effect of climate change on migratory behavior (Dun & Gemenne, 2008; McNamara, 2007;
Wood, 2001), especially considering the issue of multi-causality (McAdam, 2012; Wood, 2001).
In addition, there’s also a degree of uncertainty and disagreement to what extent these climate-
induced factors lead to forced migration instead of more voluntary forms of migration (Dun &
Gemenne, 2008). This scholarly discord surrounding the climate change and migration nexus
forms a significant obstacle in the protection of a large group of vulnerable people, regardless
of whether or not the effect of climate change on their well-being and migratory behavior is
overestimated or not. In this light, the debate on the effect climate change on forced migration
should perhaps precede the discussion on the effectiveness and legality of establishing climate
6
refugees as a distinct category of refugees entitled to certain rights. Hence, this research aims
to investigate what the effect of climate change is on migration and to what extent it leads to
forced migration. These questions will be answered by cultivating a greater understanding of
the debate surrounding the climate change and forced migration nexus and by critically
appraising studies on the effect of climate change on (forced) migration via the means of a
systematic literature review.
1.3 Research aims & questions
This research seeks to make a meaningful contribution to the field of climate-induced migration
and its victims. It will do so by performing a systematic literature review on the debate on the
effect of climate change on (forced) migration and closely examining three (of the four) effects
of climate change linked to migration, namely: floods, sea-level rises and droughts. This means
that the fourth context of extreme weather events is excluded. Researching the effects of
climate change in these three categories is useful in generating more tangible knowledge and
may aid policy-makers to identify and address context-specific vulnerabilities. Further
justification for the choice of these three distinct categories will be discussed in Section 1.4.1
and Chapter 2. By mapping out the effect(s) of climate change on migration on the basis of a
systematic literature review, this study hopes to fulfill the following aims:
(1) Firstly, this study aims to contribute comprehensive and structural knowledge
of the scholarly debate surrounding the climate change and migration nexus.
(2) Secondly, this study aims to provide a new and expanded framework for the
analysis and evaluation of empirical studies on the effect of climate change on
migration.
It should be noted that this thesis does not offer a legal analysis of the issue area of climate
refugees, but instead focuses on performing an analysis of empirical research in order to
provide insights into effect of climate change on forced migration. Nonetheless, this thesis will
utilize several legal concepts in its terminology (see Chapter 2) as the term ‘refugee’ and the
concept of forced migration are heavily embedded within the legal field, and the social studies
often draw from the legal field for the construction of a common and interdisciplinary
conceptual framework.
In summary, this focus and research aims have raised the following research question:
‘What is the effect of climate change on migration? And to what extent does climate change
lead to forced migration?’
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Consequentially this research will adopt the following subquestions:
SQ1: How can the relationship between climate change and (forced) migration be
conceptualized?
SQ2: What is the effect of floods on migration?
SQ3: To what extent do floods lead to forced migration?
SQ4: What is the effect of sea-level rises on migration?
SQ5: To what extent do sea-level rises lead to forced migration?
SQ6: What is the effect of droughts on migration?
SQ7: To what extent do droughts lead to forced migration?
1.4 Methods
1.4.1 Research design
There is a lack of an empirical framework with regards to climate induced migration (Piquet,
2010; Dun & Gemenne, 2008) and academic studies seeking to compile and integrate
empirical findings appear scarce. Hence, this research has opted for a systematic literature
review method as it allows for the analysis of vast amounts of data (Green, 2005) and enables
the construction of comprehensive and structural knowledge to the relatively new academic
field of climate-induced forced migration. By performing a systematic literature review, this
research aims to better understand and map the effect of climate change on migration and to
what extent it leads to forced migration. It does so by collecting and distilling knowledge and
data from studies on the effect of climate change on (forced) migration and by critically
analyzing and comparing the literature in question.
Based on the collective results, an assessment on the effect of climate change on
migration and the extent to which climate change drives forced migration is made. As further
discussed in Chapter 2, conceptualizing climate change and its link to migration is a highly
complex matter. Nonetheless, several scholars in the field (e.g., Piquet, 2010; Black, 2001;
Perch-Nielsen et al, 2008) have narrowed the main effects of climate change linked to forced
migration into four main contexts, namely: floods, extreme weather events, sea-level rises and
droughts. This research will focus on three of those contexts, namely droughts, sea-level rises,
and floods. Extreme weather events are excluded from the analysis because they are not
always an effect of climate change and could therefore pose a bias to the research results. It
should be noted that Perch-Nielsen et al (2008) (focusing on floods and sea-level risings) and
Black (2001) (focusing on desertification and floods) adopted similar approaches. However,
their methods lack rigor in systematically assessing the empirical evidence and have instead
opted for comprehensive literature reviews, which do not necessarily offer an empirical
8
framework but rather show the weaknesses of the linkages drawn between climate change
and forced migration by other scholars. Their research goals were primarily geared towards
illustrating methodological weaknesses of studies on climate-induced migration as a warning
to policy-makers, rather than testing the causal link itself. Systematic literature reviews offer a
more rigorous analysis of the state of the art of any given field and the empirical basis thereof,
by minimizing biases in the selection process. Hence, this research has opted for this approach
to research the climate change and migration nexus in the hope to uncover common and
divergent themes and threads of empirical studies in the last decade and a half. In
supplementation of the description and explanations given above, the Prisma-Protocol can be
consulted in Appendix 1.
1.4.2 Data collection
The data consists of a wide range of studies such as empirical studies, literature reviews, meta-
analyses, and reports from both national and international organizations. The literature
selection also includes so-called ‘grey literature’ (e.g., NGO reports), which is not uncommon
in systematic literature reviews, but also a necessity due the academic negligence (Piquet,
2010) and overall ‘scarcity’ of academic empirical studies in this field (Dun & Gemenne, 2008,
p.1). Furthermore, since the topic of climate refugees is intrinsically interdisciplinary (Black et
al, 2013, Perch-Nielsen, 2008; Dun & Gemenne, 2008; McAdam, 2010), this study includes
materials from various academic fields. For instance, the issue area of climate change has
traditionally been set in geographical and ecological studies, while migration studies inherently
have been studied through various lenses (e.g., economics, political science and social
sciences). By combining data and knowledge from various disciplines, a more apprehensive
comprehensive and integrative understanding of the relation between climate change and
migration can be constructed.
The literature was obtained via the WorldCat search engine by collecting online sources made
available by the Royal Dutch Library (Koninklijke Bibliotheek van Nederland). Additionally,
extensive use was made of the IBL system (the Dutch Inter-Library Loan System) through
which hardcopies were ordered from libraries throughout the Netherlands, including well-
stocked international institutes such as the Peace Palace Library (Bibliotheek Vredespaleis
Den Haag). In the data-collection phase, search terms such as: ‘climate change’,
‘displacement’, ‘(forced) migration’, ‘climate change migration nexus’, ‘eco-migration’,
‘climigration’, ‘climate refugees’ (and variations of that term), ‘floods’, ‘sea-level rises’,
‘droughts’, were used in various combinations. Moreover, the terms ‘linkages’, ‘(literature)
review’, and ‘meta-analysis’ were also combined with the search terms above. A detailed
overview of the key-words and combinations used in the search can be consulted in Appendix
2. Lastly, as advised by Greenhalgh & Peacock (2005), the snow-ball method is used by also
9
selecting the references found in the literature in order to optimize the effectiveness of the data
collection process. After the search-terms were entered, only Dutch and English sources
selected, after which they were manually screened on the basis on their title and abstract.
Hereafter, the selected sources were evaluated for eligibility by assessing them in terms of
relevance and usefulness according to the following factors (for a detailed overview please
consult Table 1.1): Firstly, the study had to have direct relevance to the issue of climate-
induced migration in general or in relation to one or more of the selected climate change effects
(i.e. floods, sea-level rising, and droughts). Secondly, while sources from a wide spectrum
were collected, all studies required to be based on empirical data. This includes literature
reviews and case studies using secondary data, but excludes normative and legal studies as
they do not offer an empirical assessment of climate-induced migration. Furthermore, only
studies after the year 2000 were eligible to be able to represent the relatively recent state of
affairs concerning climate-induced migration. A schematic representation of the data collection
process can be consulted in Figure 1.
In total 9186 sources were screened and 8427 of those were excluded based on their titles
and abstracts. The predominant reason for exclusion were sources on non-human migration
or studies with no direct relevance whatsoever to the topic of climate-induced migration.
Additionally, articles in languages other than Dutch and English, published before 2000 and
unavailable publications (N=44) were removed from the literature selection. Then, 759 sources
were assessed for eligibility of which 522 were excluded, most of which were legal papers or
focused the effect of extreme weather events on migration (which are excluded reasons
previously explained). Also, a considerable amount of papers in which climate-induced factors
could not be disentangled from environmental factors were excluded. The same goes for
papers in which different effects such as floods and extreme weather events could not be
separately analyzed. After checking for duplicates, 63 sources in total were included in the
qualitative synthesis: 28 studies in the qualitative synthesis on the debate on the effect of
climate change on migration; 12 studies in the qualitative synthesis on the effect of sea-level
rises on migration; 10 studies in the qualitative synthesis on the effect of floods on migration;
and 15 studies in the qualitative synthesis on the effect of droughts on migration. Two studies
were included into more than one category. Approximately half of the sources selected were
obtained through the systematic searches (N=30), while the other half was gathered through
Table 1.1 Major variables for screening and determining the eligibility of the literature during data collection Study Focus of
Climate change
Type of migration Type of study
Methods Language Publication Date
Codename General Migration Conceptual Qualitative English After 2000study Sea-level rises Forced Migration Empirical Quantitative Dutch
Floods Involunatary migration Literature Mixed MethodsDroughts Adaption Critique Review
Displacement Case-studies
10
Iden
tific
atio
n El
igib
ility
Sc
reen
ing
Incl
uded
Records identified through database searching (see Appendix 3. )
Records identified through other
sources (N=80)
the snowball strategy (N=33). A full account of the data selection process can be found in
Appendix 2, whereas Appendix 3 gives an overview of the selected literature for each of the
four syntheses.
Figure 1. Literature selection Prisma Flow Diagram*
*Note. Basic format stems from: Moher et al; The PRISMA Group (2009). Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement. PloS Med 6(6): e10000097.
1.4.3 Data analysis
After the data-selection process, the literature was organized and analyzed in a spreadsheet
format for each of the four syntheses (i.e. the debate on the climate change and migration
Records after duplicates removed (N= 63)
Records screened (N=9186) Records excluded
(N=8427)
Articles assessed for eligibility (N=759)
Articles excluded (N=522)
Studies included in qualitative synthesis
(N=237)
Studies included in qualitative
synthesis on the debate
(N=28)
Studies included in qualitative
synthesis on sea-level rises
(N=12)
Studies included in qualitative
synthesis on floods (N=10)
Studies included in qualitative
synthesis on droughts (N=15)
11
nexus, floods, sea-level risings, and droughts). Hereafter, key terms and statistics were
delineated and climate change and non-climate change-induced factors either mediating or
driving (forced) migration were distilled from the literature. The key data items used for the
qualitative synthesis of the literature can be found in Table 1.2.
The data-analysis of each of the four syntheses (i.e., sea-level rises, droughts, floods and the
debate) takes place within three stages: In the first stage, an overview is made of the
distribution of the selected literature in each section. In the second stage, the relationship
between climate change (i.e. either in general or focused on floods, sea-level rises or droughts)
is explored by distilling climate induced factors for migration from the literature and placed
within a schematic overview. The same process is repeated for mediating factors and non-
climate change induced factors for migration. Based on these results, a synthesis is written on
how the relationship might function. In addition, the third chapter on the climate change and
migration nexus debate will pay special attention to the conceptualization of the nexus, while
each of the three climate-induced contexts (i.e. sea-level rises, floods and droughts) focus
more on the migratory outcome of climate change. In the third stage, the strength and
prevalence of climate-induced migration is evaluated by categorizing the findings of the
literature within the schematic overview found in table 1.3. The qualification of the findings
Table 1.2. Key data items for qualitative synthesis of the literature populationFocus of Climate change
Type of migration
Methods Climate induced Factors for migration
Suggested strength effect climate change on migration
Extent of Forced Migration
General Migration Qualitative x x xSea-level rises
Forced Migration
QuantitativeFloods Voluntary
MigrationMixed Methods
Droughts Adaptation ReviewDisplacement Case-study
Mediating factors for climate induced migration
non-climate induced factors for migration
Suggested strength non-climate change induced factors
Key statistics Objectivity & Strength of the argument/ persuaviness
Peer-reviewed/grey literature
x x x x x x
Table 1.3 Schematic overview for the suggested impact of climate induced factors on
migration
Confirmed In conjunction with other factors Low/insignificant Link cannot be established/disentangled
x x x x
12
categorized within this tool is based on the conclusions drawn by the author(s) of the study.
Then, if indeed migration induced or triggered by climate change is established, the
volition of the migration is classified within a continuum for climate-induced migration. This
implies that studies confirming climate change to be a main factor for migration and studies
arguing that climate change triggers migration in conjunction with other factors are evaluated
within the continuum. Since studies from both categories are evaluated within the continuum,
special attention is given to differentiating research results in the synthesis of each section.
However, studies who found an insignificant relationship or who concluded to be unable to
disentangle the nexus are excluded from the continuum since the migratory behaviors cannot
be linked to climate change. Furthermore, it should be noted that this research uses an
expanded version of the continuum (i.e. table 1.4) than presented in Chapter 2, due to crucial
findings further explained in Chapter 3. Lastly, based on the collective results conclusions will
be drawn on the effect of climate change on migration and the extent to which these
movements constitute forced migration. It should be noted that the goal of this research is not
to test the causality between climate change and (forced) migration, but rather to compile and
distill the results of others who have researched the link in order to construct an empirical
framework.
Table 1.4 Climate change and migration continuum
Volition: Voluntary Migration Compelled
Migration
Forced Migration Forced to
stay
For the evaluation of the quality of the studies the methodology, strength of empirical evidence,
objectivity (e.g., inclusion of contradictory evidence), and overall persuasiveness and value of
the work were taken into account. Other factors thought to be influential to the relation between
climate change and migration was also noted. Furthermore, after the individual assessment of
the selected studies, this research identified common and divergent threads and patterns
within the literature and determined possible knowledge gaps that may have affected the
reliability of the research results.
1.4.4 Ethical considerations
While this research will question the effect of climate change on forced migration, it should be
emphasized that it in no way questions the existence or severity of climate change nor the
impact of humans on the climate. Moreover, this thesis underscores the dire situation of the
many displaced and disowned victims in areas affected by climate change, regardless of
whether or not the causes of their situation can be substantively linked to climate change. As
13
argued in the introduction, suitable legal approaches and political action plans do partially
depend on whether or not their vulnerabilities and (forced) migratory behavior is sufficiently
linked to climate change. Hence, this research aims to provide a conceptual and empirical
framework in order to solve one piece in the greater puzzle on what basis and how these
victims should be helped.
1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis is structured along a total of nine chapters. In the first chapter, the issue area and
problem statements are explored, and on the basis thereof the research questions are formed.
The first chapter also deals with methodology and discusses the research design, data
collection, data analysis and ethical considerations.
Before reporting the results of the systematic literature analysis, the second chapter
frames the key concepts in the climate change and migration nexus in order to broaden the
understanding of the scope and complexity of the climate change and migration nexus and to
find solid ways to think about and research this issue.
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, are concerned with performing systematic literature reviews in
their respective focus areas: The third chapter will pay special attention to an empirically based
conceptualization of the climate change and migration nexus based on the collected studies
and the analysis thereof. Hereby it aims to answer the first research subquestion. The fourth
chapter performs an analysis of the effect of floods on migration and herewith answers
subquestions 2 and 3. The fifth chapter analyses the effect of sea-level rises on migration and
deals with subquestions 4 and 5. The sixth chapter is focused on the analysis of the effect of
droughts on migration and herewith answers subquestions 5 and 6.
Then, Chapter 7 is devoted to comprehensively compare and summarize the results of
Chapters 3 to 6. Hereafter, Chapter 8 attempts to answer the main research question via an
extensive discussion of the results to determine the strength and quality of the research results,
and what the real world implications of these results are. Lastly, this thesis pays special
attention to giving recommendations geared towards future research, governance and policy-
making in Chapter 9.
Overall, this thesis highlights the extremely complex nature of climate-induced
migration, yet strongly emphasizes the vulnerability of people in areas affected by climate
change. Despite certain policy-windows, this thesis advocates the sometimes necessary
dichotomous research aims of voicing concern for victims and accurately reflecting underlying
mechanisms for victimization.
14
2. Key concepts in the climate change and migration Nexus
This chapter delineates and defines several concepts in the climate change and migration
nexus key in examining climate-induced migration, namely: ‘Climate Change’, ‘Climate
Change induced Migration’, ‘Forced Migration’, ‘Voluntary Migration’ and ‘Climate Refugees’.
• Climate Change
Climate change is commonly referred to as ‘global warming’ or in more scientific terms, refers
to: “both to the ‘natural variability’ in the climate system, which has fluctuated between warm
and cold periods during the Holocene since the end of the glacial periods 12,000 years ago,
and the anthropogenic global warming during the ‘Anthropocene’; (Crutzen, 2002, 2006,
2011)” (Brauch & Scheffran, 2012, p. 3). In other words, climate change is the increase in the
earth’s temperature caused both by natural cycles and human activity. Despite political
controversy, there is very little doubt amongst scientists about the impact of human activity on
climate change (Collectif Argos, 2013). In fact, the IPCC has stated that anthropogenic forcing
(i.e. the human impact on climate change) is very likely to be the main cause for the changes
in the climate since the 1950s (IPCC, 2014b, p. 17). While the effect of human activity on
climate change carries various moral and possibly even legal considerations (e.g.,
accountability for GHG emissions), this thesis will not differentiate between anthropogenic
forcing (i.e. climate change caused by human activity) and natural variability. Making a division
between the two is nonsensical in examining migratory behavior (McAdam, 2012) as the real-
world impact of climate change on well-being and migratory patterns is in fact the result of both
components (Wood, 2001). The key impacts of climate change can be consulted in the IPCC’s
(2007a) 2007 report: ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’.
• Climate-induced Migration
The term ‘climate-induced migration’ refers to migration caused by climate change. However,
the exact definition of the phenomenon of climate-induced migration, also referred to as
‘climigration’, lacks scholarly consensus (White, 2011). Nonetheless, the sections below
attempt to offer a comprehensive and functional conceptualization of the term.
Conceptualizing ‘climate change’ in the term ‘climate-induced migration’
Climate change in itself (i.e. the warming of the globe) generally does not lead to migration.
Instead, “climate change produces environmental effects which may make it difficult or even
impossible for people to survive where they are” (Kälin, 2010, p. 135). The main effects of
climate change considered possible drivers for migration have been roughly agreed upon by
various scholars (e.g., Piquet, 2010; Bierman & Boas, 2010; Perch-Nielsen et al 2008; Black,
2001; Westra, 2009) and include sea-level rises, extreme weather events, droughts and floods.
15
Moreover, the IPCC (2007a) has identified these effects of climate change (i.e. floods,
hurricanes and torrential rain; drought and desertification; and rising sea levels) as most
strongly linked to forced migration. This research uses this categorization to test the link
between climate change and migration, not only by means of scholarly convention, but also
because the concept of climate change is simply too large and complex to operationalize and
because (while the effects may overlap in case-studies) it seems logical to assume that
contexts of floods may induce quite different factors for forced migration than, for instance,
sea-level rises.
Purposely or not, the various definitions referring to migration caused by environmental
factors are often used almost interchangeably in literature. However, there is an important
distinction to be made between environmental migration and climate change induced
migration. Whereas environmental migration can be caused by a whole array of environmental
factors, such as volcanic activity or corporate pollution, climate change induced migration is
specifically caused by the effects of climate change (e.g., sea-level rises). In other words, as
can be viewed in Figure 2.3, environmental change encompasses all changes related to our
living environment of which the effects of climate change are a subcategory.
Environmental change Both man-made (e.g., corporate pollution, deforestation) and natural (e.g .Volcanic eruption, tsunami) Climate change Both Anthropogenic forcing & natural variability resulting into climate change (i.e. higher temperatures and in extent sea-level rises etc.)
Figure 2.1 The effects of climate change within the larger framework of environmental change Conceptualizing migration in the term ‘climate-induced migration’
The literature mainly differentiates between voluntary and forced climate migration (Burson,
2010; Bates, 2002) and is usually divided into: climate migrants, for whom climate-induced
factors influencing migration are conceptualized as ‘push’ (e.g., poverty) and ‘pull’ factors (e.g.,
economic wealth); and ‘climate refugees’, who are forced to leave (Burson, 2010).
• Forced Migration
“[F]orced migrants are defined as persons who flee or are obliged to leave their homes or
places of habitual residence because of events threatening to their lives or safety” (Martin,
2000, p. 4). While the popular discourse tends to refer to all those who are forced to migrate
16
as ‘refugees’, only a small section of forced migrants are considered refugees under
international refugee law (Castles, 2006). In fact, Castles (2006) compiled as many as ten
different types of forced migrants. Taken the previous into consideration, a more elaborate
definition is offered by the IOM (2011) who defines forced migration as:
A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life
and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g., movements of
refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or
environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development
projects. (p. 1)
The forced migrant category most closely related to climate change induced forced migration
is that of the ‘environmentally displaced’, which refers to those forced to migrate due to
environmental change (e.g., deforestation or desertification), natural disasters (e.g., volcano
eruptions or earthquakes), and/or man-made natural disasters (e.g., oil-leaks) (Castles, 2006).
This category also includes the effects of climate change linked to forced migration, namely
floods and extreme weather events (as natural disasters), and sea-level rises and droughts
(as environmental degradation). Hence, one can conclude that the conceptualization of forced
migration far outstretches the legal definition of refugees as long as the movement can be
described a coercive or ‘involuntary’ and can indeed be caused by the effects of climate
change.
• Voluntary Migration
In contrast to forced migration, voluntary migration refers to a type of migration in which the
choice to migrate was freely taken. Voluntary migration is also referred to as ‘economic
migration’, as the main drivers for this type of migration are often economic factors (e.g., better
working opportunities). The economic migrant is defined as follows by the IOM (2011):
A person leaving his or her habitual place of residence to settle outside his or her
country of origin in order to improve his or her quality of life. This term is often loosely
used to distinguish from refugees fleeing persecution, and is also similarly used to refer
to persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using
asylum procedures without bona fide cause. It may equally be applied to persons
leaving their country of origin for the purpose of employment. (p. 1)
Voluntary migration, however, is not only conceptualized as the decision to migrate based on
economic drivers. Instead, voluntary migration is most often studied in terms of ‘push’ and ‘pull’
factors between two areas. These factors do often include economic considerations, but socio-
political factors such as preferences for more liberal or conservative communities or personal
preferences for certain living areas (e.g., rural-urban migration) may also play a role in
voluntary migratory decisions. Adaptation can be considered a form of voluntary migration as
17
well. The IPCC (2001) defines (climate change) adaptation as:
adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or
expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. It refers to changes in processes,
practices, and structures to moderate potential damages or to benefit from
opportunities associated with climate change. (p. 881)
Usually, adaptation refers to three different classes of actions (ICHRP, 2008): Firstly, actions
taken by individuals themselves (e.g., a farmer changing his livelihood from farming crops to
working as a construction worker). Secondly, governmental actions such as building dams to
prevent floods or installing water reservoirs in drought stricken areas. Thirdly, international
policies aimed at providing adaption in the form of financial contributions to areas impacted by
climate change. Increasingly more often scholars (e.g McLeman & Smit, 2006) have also come
to consider migration as a “voluntary coping strategy that allows people time to weigh
alternatives and use migration as a way to reduce household risk” (Martin, 2009, p. 357). For
example, populations deciding to migrate from areas that no longer support (or are anticipated
to no longer support) agriculture and therefore their livelihoods.
A continuum for climate-induced migration
As noted by Castles (2006), the concept and legal categories of ‘forced’ migration are products
of decades of negotiations by international organizations and states and should not be
considered as static categories in scientific research. Philosophically speaking, one could
argue that involuntarily or forced migration can only truly occur if one is expelled or facing life-
threatening situations and, as ironically stated by Reuveny (2007): “even people facing such
threats can choose not to leave, hoping to survive” (p. 658). Some scholars even argued that
no distinction can be made between climate refugees and economic migrants as
environmental factors are often interlinked with the livelihoods of potential climate migrants
(Kolmannskog, 2008). For example, as argued by Kolmannskog (2008):
The small-scale farmer, who finally abandons his land due to gradual soil degradation,
leaves because there is an increasing lack of opportunities of livelihood. In this aspect
he or she is like the so-called economic migrant. Gradual environmental degradation
can cause significantly more far-reaching and permanent migration than sudden
disasters. The question of choice is linked to the degree of severity. When is the soil
so degraded that the farmer is forced [sic] leave? At what stage in this gradual process
are we dealing with forced migration rather than voluntary migration? (p. 25)
A solution to this issue is offered by Hugo (1996) and Bates (2002) who suggest the use of a
continuum stretching between ‘forced’ to ‘voluntary’ migration in order to conceptualize and
evaluate the nature of the decision to migrate. Table 2.3 represents such a continuum in which
the left side represent migrants with full agency over their migratory behavior and on the right
18
hand side are those who have no other decision but to migrate. In between exists the category
of ‘compelled’ climate-induced migrants, referring to forms of migration that are ambivalent in
nature. This category is included for two reasons: Firstly, as argued by Castles (2006), while
governments prefer static categories, often the drivers for migration are mixed (e.g., people
may flee from warzones but also aspire to build more prosperous lives for their families).
Secondly, the choice to flee might to a degree only be anticipatory, as is often the case in slow-
onset climate change-induced events such as sea-level rises (e.g., how many meters does the
ocean need to be away from your house before you are forced to migrate?). With this
approach, migration flows can be assessed along a continuum with the necessary nuances.
Additionally, as asserted by Bates (2002): “a continuum overcomes the debate over legalistic
definitions of refugees” (p. 468). Hence, this research uses a spectrum between forced
migration and voluntary to evaluate the impact of climate change on migration.
Table 2.3 Continuum for climate-induced migration* Volition Voluntary Compelled Forced Category Climate change
motivated migrant Climate change compelled migrant
Climate refugee
* Note. Table based on following sources: White (2011). Climate-Induced Migration: An essentially Contested Concept. In White (Ed.), Climate Change and Migration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. And, Bates, D. C. (2002). Environmental refugees? Classifying human migrations caused by environmental change. Population and environment, 23(5). Page 468.
• Climate Refugees
Academia has fashioned various names such as ‘environmentally displaced persons’ (EDPs)
(e.g., UNHCR), ‘ecological refugees’ (e.g., Westra, 2009), and ‘environmental migrants’ (e.g.,
IOM & RPG, 1992) to describe human mobility in response to the environment. This thesis,
however, uses the term ‘climate refugees’ to refer to migrants whose type of migration can be
categorized as forced/involuntarily and is directly or indirectly caused by climate change.
The term ‘climate’ in ‘climate refugees’
As explained in the section on climate-induced migration, a difference is to be made between
environmentally induced migration and climate-induced migration. The same principle applies
to the differentiation between the term ‘climate refugees’ and ‘environmental refugees’. While
environmental refugees encounter forced migration caused by environmental factors (e.g.,
toxic corporate waste), climate refugees are considered persons forced to migrate due to the
effects of climate change. With the previous in mind, a practical and concise definition comes
from Bierman & Boas (2010), who define climate refugees as:
[P]eople who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because
of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of
three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and drought
and water scarcity. (p. 67)
19
The term ‘refugee’ in ‘climate refugees’
The use of the term ‘refugee’ to describe persons forced to migrate due to the effects of climate
change is highly debatable. As explained in the introduction, the legal definition of ‘refugee’ is
restricted to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
political and social membership, or political opinion by Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol and thus does not include the effects of climate change as
a valid factor for refugee status. In addition, those forced to migrate due to the effects of climate
change do not necessarily cross borders - in fact most of climate change induced migration
occurs within borders (McAdam, 2012) - which is also an exclusionary factor for refugee status.
Instead, the UNHCR and the IOM prefer to define persons who were forced to migration due
to climate-induced circumstances as ‘environmentally displaced persons’ (EDPs) or use the
working definition of ‘environmental migrants’ instead (see IOM, 2007, pp. 1-2). The UNHCR’s
and IOM’s preference for the term EDPs also strongly relates to their desire not to weaken the
legal definition of the term ‘refugee’ as defined in Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention (Castles, 2002; Gromilova & Jägers, 2010). This sentiment is shared by various
other scholars such as Black (2001) and Kibreab (1997) who argue that the legal
conceptualization of climate refugees might actually lead to more restrictive protection
standards and domestic refugee policies.
Even though some scholars argue that the use of the term “climate refugee implies
mono-causality” (Brown, 2008, p. 12), and most climate-induced forced migration occurs within
borders (Koser, 2011), this research will for practical purposes continue to use the term
‘climate refugees’ to refer to persons for whom the effects of climate change is the main factor
for forced migration. Bierman and Boas (2010) make two excellent points for the continued
use for the term ‘climate refugees’: Firstly, differentiating between cross-border migration and
internal displacement as a benchmark for refugee status is senseless when in both cases
victims are in need of the assistance linked to this status (and should therefore not depend on
whether or not a border was crossed). Secondly, there appears to be “[n]o convincing reason
to reserve the stronger term ‘refugee’ for a category of people that stood at the center of
attention after 1945, and to invent less appropriate terms - such as ‘climate-related
environmentally displaced persons’ - for new categories of people who are forced to leave
their homes now, with similar grim consequences” (Bierman & Boas, 2010, p. 67).
The term ‘climate refugees’ here functions as a social concept, not a legal one (Burson,
2010; Suhkre, 1994) (see Figure 2.4), and in accordance with most ecological and sociological
literature (e.g., McNamara, 2007), the term ‘refugee’ denotes a context of forced migration,
rather than a push factor or simply voluntary migration. Thus accurately reflecting the dire
20
situation of those forced to migrate due to the effects of climate change within this social
concept seems appropriate.
Figure 2.2 Legal and social conception of climate refugees*
* Note. Image based on Burson (2010). Environmentally induced displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to recognition. In Afifi & Jäger (Eds.) Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability. Berlin: Spierings. Page 5.
Figure 2.3. Legal and social conception of climate refugee Source: Burson, B. (2010). Environmentally induced displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to recognition. n Afifi, T., & Jäger, J. (Eds). Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability (pp. 235-246). Berlin: Springer. Page 5.
Socialconception
Climaterefugee
ConventionRefugee
Legalconception
21
3. Examining the climate change and migration nexus
3.1 An overview
This chapter constructs a conceptual overview of the climate change and migration nexus and
coinciding contemporary scholarly debate by analyzing 28 studies and distilling common
themes and arguments, identifying mediating factors for climate-induced migration and other
drivers for migration within these sources. All studies were written in English and most sources
were peer-reviewed (N=23). Furthermore, most papers (N=19) concerned themselves with the
relationship between climate change and migration in general, while others (N=9) used
context-specific cases to illustrate their view on the climate change and migration nexus and
focused on: Asia and the Pacific (N=3); Tuvalu (N=1); the developing world (N=2); the Sahelian
and Sub-Saharan (N=1) regions; Mozambique and Vietnam (N=1); and one that used a wide
variety of geographical areas. Most sources were literature studies (N=12) or conceptual
papers (N=10), though also some empirical studies (N=5) and a critique paper (N=1) were
included. In these studies, the following methods were implored: qualitative methods (N=1);
quantitative methods (N=2); mixed methods (N=2); literature review (N=21); and case study
(N=2). An overview of the general information of the literature for the synthesis of this chapter
can be viewed in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 An overview of the literature for the synthesis on the debate on the climate change and migration nexus.
3.2 Variations of impact as indicators for multi-causality?
Two schools have emerged in the field of environmental migration, namely those who
conceptualize the relationship between climate change as linear using a ‘common sense
approach’ (an example of which can viewed in figure 3.2) and those who view the relationship
GEOGRAPH I CA L FO CU S
General
AsiaandthePacific
Developingworld
GRE Y & P E E R - R E V I EWED L I T E RATURE
Greyliterature
Peer-reviewedliterature
T Y P E O F S TUDY
Literature
Conceptual
Empirical
Critique
METHODSQualitative
Quantitative
MixedMethods
Literaturereview
Casestudy
22
as a nexus. That said, the great majority of the literature (N=24) (to various degrees) agrees
that the relationship between climate change and migration cannot be understood via a
‘common sense approach’. There were, however, three papers with no explicit view and the
report by Christian Aid (2007) was the only paper who subscribed to a common sense
approach in its understanding of the relationship. Coincidently, this paper is heavily criticized
for its wild estimations on the scope of climate-induced migration and its liberal projects of
future climate-induced mobility patterns. Overall, the relationship between climate change and
migration is thought to be complex and mediated by various factors. As stated by the Asian
Development Bank (2012): “Climate-induced migration is a highly complex issue which needs
to be understood as part of global migration dynamics” (p. VIII).
The main argument made in favor of the multi-causal relationship between climate change and
migration is the variation of the impact of climate change between different areas. One could
argue that various Western nations are also affected by climate change. For example, the
German Halligen Islands are impacted by floods and sea-level rises, and several communities
in Alaska (e.g., the Kigiqtamiut and the inhabitants of Newtok) are severely impacted by
changes in their ecosystem and sea-level rises, which threaten both their livelihoods and very
homes (Collectif Argos, 2010). However, the scale and severity of the impact of climate change
is much higher in developing countries compared to the Global North (Beine & Parsons, 2015;
Castles & Rajah, 2010; Webersik, 2012; Barnett & Webber, 2010). This can be partially
explained by the higher prevalence of so-called climate change ‘hot-spots’ - areas in which
the effects of climate change manifest most severely - in the Global South. However, one
paper by Detraz & Windsor (2014) which entertained the argument that high-income states in
close proximity to climate change hot-spots had also encountered displacement due to the
direct effects (i.e. droughts, shrinking coastlines, and floods) and indirect effects (i.e., impact
on food and livelihood security) of climate change. Nonetheless, the verdict amongst the
literature is clear: climate change does not affect countries equally due to differences in their
Table 3.1 Distribution of common sense and nexus proponents in climate-induced migration
Nexus Perspective (N=24) Common Sense Approach (N=1)
Undecided/unclear (N=3)
Asian Development Bank (2012); Barnett & Webber (2010); Bardsley & Hugo (2010); Beine & Parsons (2015); Black (2001); Brown (2012); Brown (2008); Demola (2013); Castles & Rajah (2010); Hugo (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); McLeman, & Brown (2011); Gemenne (2011); Piguet (2010); Piguet, Pécoud, & Guchterneire (2011); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Jäger et al (2009); Reuveny (2007); Webersik (2012); Tacoli (2009); White (2011); Warner et al (2009); Warner, Dun & Stal (2008); Black et al (2011)
Christian Aid (2007) Detraz & Windsor (2014); Farbotko & Lazrus (2012); Marchiori & Schumacher (2009)
23
ability to prevent and cope with the effects of climate change. This implies that several factors
mediate people’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change, and in extent the strength of
climate change as a migratory push factor. Countries such as Bangladesh (suffering from great
floods), several pacific islands (threatened by rises in sea-level), and Nepal (threatened by
melting ice cascading down from the Himalayas), are more severely affected than first world
countries as their capacity to mitigate or compensate climate-induced harm is lower due to
differences in available resources and installment of effective policy action plans (Asian
Development Bank, 2012; Brown, 2011; Demola, 2014). Recognizing these mediating factors
is highly important (for policy-making especially), because by placing political and economic
factors in the background in defining environmental refugees, one negates the reason as to
why these groups are so vulnerable in the first place (Hartmann, 2009). Hence, taking the
overwhelming support of the nexus perspective in consideration, the relationship between
climate change and migration is most accurately conceptualized as a nexus.
Figure 3.2. Common sense approach to Climate Change induced (Forced) Migration.
3.3 Considering the climate change and migration nexus
3.3.1 Climate induced factors for migration
The following climate-induced factors driving migration were distilled from the literature: Impact
on livelihood (N=19); security (N=13); conflict (N=3), and the anticipation of the risks of climate
change (N=3).
Livelihood was found to be the most prevalent way in which climate change affects
migration. When livelihoods tied to ecosystem services (e.g., cultivation of crops, fishing,
herding etc.) are affected by climate change to the point that they no longer provide income
and resources, well-being decreases and migration tends to occur in response (Black et al,
2011). For instance, rural areas in South-East Asia are considered socio-economically
vulnerable to climate change as they heavily depend on agriculture for their livelihoods (Asian
Development Bank, 2012). Similar results were found by Warner, Dun & Stal (2008) in
Mozambique and Vietnam. Interestingly, Jäger et al (2009) also found a trickle-down effect in
which people with occupations in other sectors (e.g., commerce, food industry and transport)
showed migratory behavior in response to environmental degradation as well, suggesting that
Climate Change
Floods, Sea-level risings,
droughts.
Immediate Danger & Loss of Livelihoods
(Forced) Migration
24
climate change can indirectly impact the overall health of the local economy and thereby drive
people to find employment in other areas. In addition, resource scarcities due to the decline of
ecosystem services have the potential to cause conflict, which in turn drives migration
(Reuveny, 2007; Black, 2001). As argued by Beine & Parsons (2015), conflict is a very strong
push factor for migration. However, it is debatable to what extent climate change causes
conflict, rather than trigger conflict areas that are politically instable to begin with.
Climate change also raises other security concerns that may drive migration. Events
such as floods form a direct security threat that propels ad-hoc migration and causes
(temporary) displacement (Christian Aid, 2007; Piguet, 2010). However, the effects of climate
change - slow-onset events included - also negatively impact health (Brown, 2008; Reuveny,
2007; Piguet, 2010; Piguet et al 2011; Reuveny, 2007; McLeman, & Brown, 2011; Detraz &
Windsor, 2014), food security (Detraz & Windsor, 2014; Christian Aid, 2007; Reuveny, 2007),
and habitat (Hugo & Bardsley, 2013; Christian Aid, 2007; Piguet, 2010). These additional
security threats drive migrants to search for areas with better facilities and the chance to create
a more secure life.
Lastly, Bardsley & Hugo (2010), Hugo & Bardsley (2013) and Piguet et al 2011),
consider the perception of the risks of climate change as a driving factor for migration. The
main example brought forward in this context are the ‘sinking islands’ whose territory is
projected to be degraded by sea-level rises to the point that they are unfit for human
inhabitation. Even though these effects are not reality yet, the anticipated risks of climate
change in such cases drives the inhabitants of these Islands to plan for migration and their
governments to develop relocation strategies and multi-lateral resettlement plans.
3.3.2 Mediating factors in climate-induced migration
The analysis of the literature shows that the following factors mediate the relationship between
climate change and migration: poverty (N=13), dependency on ecosystem services and
income diversification (N=12), remittances (N=7), circular migration/seasonal labor (N=2),
Table 3.2 Climate-induced factors for migration
Impact on livelihoods (N=19) Security (N=13) Conflict (N=3)
Anticipation of risks(N=3)
Asian Development Bank (2012); Barnett & Webber (2010); Black (2001); Black et al (2011); Brown (2012); Brown (2008); Demola (2013); Detraz & Windsor (2014); Christian Aid (2007); Castles & Rajah (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Gemenne (2011); Piguet (2010); Piguet, Pécoud, & Guchterneire (2011); Jäger et al (2009); Tacoli (2009); Reuveny (2007); Webersik (2012); Warner et al (2008)
Black (2001); Brown (2012); Brown (2008); Demola (2013); Detraz & Windsor (2014) Christian Aid (2007); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); McLeman, & Brown (2011); Gemenne (2011) ; Piguet (2010); Piguet et al (2011); Reuveny (2007); Warner, et al (2008)
Black (2001); Black et al (2011); Reuveny (2007)
Bardsley & Hugo (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Piguet, et al (2011).
25
economic opportunity (N=8), social and family networks (N=11), historical mobility patterns
(N=4), perceptions of climate change and migration (N=7), education (N=3), governance (N-
9), sense of oppression/freedom (N=3), and conflict and political instability (N=9).
Table 3.3 Mediating factors in the climate change and migration nexus Economic factors Social & cultural factors Political factors Poverty (N=13) Asian Development Bank (2012); Poverty & Webber (2010); Beine & Parsons (2015); Brown (2012); Demola (2013); Detraz & Windsor (2014); Castles & Rajah (2010); Hugo (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Piguet et al (2011); Raleigh & Joran (2010); White (2011); Webersik (2012)
Social and family migratory networks (N=11) Bardsley & Hugo (2010); Beine & Parsons (2015); Black et al (2011); Brown (2012); Brown (2008); Demola (2014); Hugo (2010); McLeman & Brown (2011); White (2011); Warner et al (2009); Webersik (2012)
Governance (prevention and assistance) (N=9) Asian Development Bank (2012); Brown (2012); Demola (2014); Christian Aid (2007); Hugo & Bardsley (2013) ; Raleigh & Joran (2010); Jäger et al (2009): Tacoli (2009); Warner et al (2009)
Dependency on eco-system services & income diversification (N=12) Black et al (2011); Detraz & Windsor (2014); Christian Aid (2007); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Gemenne (2011); Piguet (2010); Piguet,et al (2011); Raleigh & Joran (2010); Jäger, et al (2009); Tacoli (2009); Reuveny (2007); Warner, Dun & Stal (2008)
Historical mobility patterns (N=4) Black et al (2011); Brown (2008); Hugo (2010); Gemenne (2011)
Sense of oppression/freedom (N=3) Asian Development Bank (2012); Barnett & Webber (2010); Hugo (2010);
Remittances (N=7) Asian Development Bank (2012); Black et al (2011); Barnett & Webber (2010); Hugo (2010); Brown (2008); McLeman & Brown (2011); Tacoli (2009);
Perceptions of climate change and migration (N=7) Brown (2012); Farbotko & Lazrus (2012); Hugo (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Piguet, Pécoud, & Guchterneire (2011) ; Jäger et al (2009): Webersik (2012)
Conflict & political instability (N=9) Asian Development Bank (2012); Beine & Parsons (2015); Brown (2012); Brown (2008); Christian Aid (2007); McLeman & Brown (2011); Piguet (2010); White (2011); Webersik (2012)
Circular migration/seasonal labor (N=2) Tacoli (2009); Black et al (2013)
Education (N=3) Brown (2012); Webersik (2012); Warner et al (2009)
Economic opportunity (N=8) Beine & Parsons (2015); Black et al (2011); Brown (2012); Demola (2013); Hugo (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Jäger et al (2009): Warner et al (2008)
3.3.2.1 Economic factors
A total of 13 studies considered poverty to be a mediating factor for climate-induced migration.
Poverty increases vulnerability to climate change (e.g., inability to protect homes) and climate
change increases existing poverty (e.g., water stress increases drinking water prices and crop
destruction increases food insecurity), driving populations to seek more secure and prosperous
lives elsewhere (Detraz & Windsor, 2014; Castles & Rajah, 2010). A striking example of how
26
this poverty plays a role in adaptive strategies to climate change comes from Barnett & Webber
(2010):
[F]armers in Australia, who experience climatic variability comparable to farmers in
Northern Ethiopia, do not suffer hunger and do not resort to migration as a coping
strategy in the same way as Northern Ethiopian farmers. Thus it could be argued that
migrations triggered by drought in Northern Ethiopia are primarily driven by poverty and
institutional failures, rather than by climatic variability. (p. 38)
As previously discussed, many people in climate change hot-spots are dependent on the
environment and the ecosystem services it provides (Jäger et al, 2009), and when these are
impacted by climate change, migration tends to occur as a response (Black et al, 2011). It is
exactly this dependency on ecosystem services that many studies (N=12) have come to regard
as a mediating factor as it heightens people’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change. For
instance, both the Asian Development Bank (2012) and Warner et al (2008) argue that climate-
induced migration occurs in the rural developmental areas they studied because people there
are heavily reliant on agriculture for their livelihood. Moreover, several authors (e.g., Gemenne,
2011; Black et al, 2011) argue that households that have diversified their income do not share
this dependency and are therefore less likely to migrate in response to the effects of climate
change. In addition, ownership of these ecosystem services (e.g., land-ownership or livestock)
also factors into migratory decisions, as exemplified by Jäger et al (2009): “As long as the
farmers are hired on the land, they are very mobile and flexible in response to environmental
changes. Owners of the land would not leave unless there is no other way or they are officially
displaced by the government” (p. 71).
A few studies (N=3) also found that education had a mitigating effect on the effects of
climate change. One explanation is that education likely mitigates the effect by being better
informed on how to deal with disasters (Brown, 2011). However, as found by Webersik (2012)
educational attainment mitigates the impact of climate change on household risk as there is
an increased likelihood for female employment (thus multiple incomes) and skilled labor is less
likely tied to occupations heavily impacted by climate change such as farming.
Furthermore, the literature indicates that remittances mediate the relationship between
climate change and migration by either increasing migration when one member of the
household is compelled to generate income elsewhere to mitigate the loss of income due to
the effects of climate change (Asian Development Bank 2012; Barnett & Webber, 2010) or in
reverse by preventing migration when there is a pre-existing context, which decreases the
dependency of the household on the environment for income and therefore the need for
migration. In this context, often circular migration occurs (Tacoli, 2009; Black et al, 2013). For
example, Black et al (2013) found that seasonal migration heightened resilience to the effects
27
of climate change by generating income through temporary employment elsewhere. These
types of migratory patterns are generally short-distanced, as households often cannot finance
long-distanced travels (McLeman & Brown, 2011). Furthermore, even though the amount of
money sent back to relatives tends to be small (migrants often do uneducated work and are
taken advantage of) (Barnett & Webber, 2010), it does considerably add to the ability of the
household to adapt to climate change (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Asian Development Bank,
2012). Additionally, remittances also generate capital that can be invested into the
development of alternative sources of income within the stay-at-home community (Hugo,
2010).
Notwithstanding the above, six studies considered economic opportunity to be an alternative -
and often stronger - driver for migration. For instance, Beine & Parsons (2015) found an
insignificant relationship between climate change and migration both long and short term, but
found increased out-migration to places with more economic opportunity in terms of wage
differentials. Nonetheless, to conclude that economic opportunity simply drives migration from
poor to rich areas is oversimplified (Tacoli, 2009). Instead, migration driven by economic
opportunity takes place to areas that are only relatively better off (Black et al, 2011) and are
deemed accessible by migrants in terms of financial and social capital. In the context of
climate-induced migration, migration may be triggered in areas that are socio-economically
vulnerable to climate change and economic opportunity elsewhere influences migrant
destinations.
3.3.2.2 Political factors
Governance plays a highly significant role in mediating the relationship between climate
change and migration in two ways: Firstly, prevention strategies, such as water management,
warning systems and resilience plans, are strong determinants for the impact of climate
change (McLeman & Brown, 2011; Asian Development Bank, 2012). For instance, the Asian
Development Bank (2012) concludes that poor city planning greatly increases the vulnerability
to the effects of climate change in Southeast Asia. More interestingly, governmental action
need not to be specifically aimed at the prevention of climate change, in fact, Jäger et al (2009)
found that areas neglected by the central government became impoverished and therefore
less resilient to the effects of climate change. Secondly, the policy responses and aid after
climate induced disasters are suggested to be even more influential for migratory decisions
than the initial climate change induced event itself (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010; Tacoli, 2009). In
addition, mobility might also increase when governments accommodate migration as an
adaptive strategy through relocation and resettlement plans (Tacoli, 2009).
Then, conflict is argued to be a considerable factor for out-migration (Asian
Development Bank, 2012; Black et al 2011; Beine & Parsons, 2015) as the combination of
28
climate change leading to resource scarcity and a state of disarray in politically instable areas
creates a ‘perfect storm’ for conflict and migration as a response to it (White, 2011). Only
McLeman & Brown (2012) conceptualized conflict as a mediating factor, rather as an
alternative or major driver for migration.
Furthermore, three studies (i.e., Asian Development Bank, 2012; Barnett & Webber,
2010; Hugo, 2010) indicated that political factors such as freedom and discrimination shape
migratory decisions as push and pull factors. For example, Barnett & Webber (2010) assert
that social marginalization (together with poverty) are the strongest predictors for migration in
areas affected by climate change.
3.3.2.3 Social and cultural factors
Migrant networks are indicated to be essential in predicting and understanding climate-induced
migration as they shape migratory responses to climate change (Hugo, 2010; Brown, 2011,
McLeman & Brown, 2011; White, 2011). Here migrant networks function both as a resource
that facilitates migration (Brown, 2011; Hugo, 2010; Black, et al, 2011), and as a determining
factor for migrant destinations (White, 2011; Black et al, 2011). Social and family networks tied
in with these established migrant networks have an even more profound effect on migratory
patterns as they provide the social capital needed to migrate by “providing trusted information
about opportunities in that destination, assistance in the moving process and an assurance of
support upon arrival” (Hugo, 2010, p. 37). In addition, it was found that especially international
migration is heavily dependent on family networks (Brown, 2011).
Then, a good portion of the studies (N=7) argued that migratory decisions are
influenced by subjective perceptions of climate change, the migrant’s vulnerability to it, and
migration. As argued by Farbotko & Lazrus (2012, p. 1), climate change is as much a ‘narrative’
as it is a ‘material phenomenon’, implying that perceptions of the effects of climate change and
the migratory decisions based on those perceptions are embedded in social, cultural and
historical understandings of the process and can thus not be viewed separately. For instance,
Jäger, et al (2009) note how circular migration as a response to climate stressors is ingrained
into the lifestyle and culture of herding nomadic populations. Another example comes from a
case-study by Farbotko & Lazrus (2012) on Tuvalu, whose inhabitants are often typecast as
an oversimplified representation of climate refugees, while the Tuvaluan identity as a migrating
people is completely overlooked. That is not to say that in these cases climate change is not
the main factor in migratory decisions, yet existing migratory patterns - especially those in
response to environmental stresses (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010) - are likely to accelerate and
smooth out the migratory decision process (Brown, 2011). In other words: “mobility is likely to
be seen more as an option in communities with a history of movement and active migration
networks” (Hugo, 2010, p. 21).
29
3.4 The effect of climate change on migration
3.4.1 Views on the scope of climate-induced migration
Scholars are often divided into so-called ‘minimalists’, claiming that the impact of climate
change on migration is only a (small) contributing factor to migratory behavior, and
‘maximalists’, who argue that climate change causes migration on a large scale. While opinions
do vary on the scale to which climate change triggers migration, most studies (N=24) agree
that the relationship between climate change and migration should be conceptualized as a
nexus. In summary, only two papers confirmed the relationship between climate change and
migration, while the plurality (N=11) argued that only in conjunction with other factors climate
change drives migration. Moreover, several studies (N=6) did not find climate change to be a
significant factor in migratory behavior, and some papers (N=3) concluded that the link
between climate change and migration could not be disentangled. The remaining studies not
included in Table 3.4 remained undecided or only offered suggestions on what the conceptual
model of climate induced migration could look like.
Table 3.4 Suggested impact of climate induced factors on migration
Confirmed (N=2)
In conjunction with other factors (N=11)
Low/insignificant (N=6)
Link cannot be established/disentangled (N=3)
Christian Aid (2007); Marchiori & Schumacher (2009)
Asian Development Bank (2012); Black et al (2011); Brown (2012); Detraz & Windsor (2014); Castles & Rajah (2010); Hugo & Bardsley (2013); Jäger et al (2009); McLeman & Brown (2011); Reuveny (2007); Warner at al (2009); Warner et al (2008)
Barnett & Webber (2010); Bardsley & Hugo (2010); Piguet (2010); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Webersik (2012); Beine & Parsons (2015)
Black (2001); Hugo (2010); Gemenne (2011)
3.4.2 Views on the volition of climate-induced migration
As stated by Dun & Gemenne (2008), the dispute on the climate change and migration nexus
also touches on whether or not climate induced migration also constitutes forced migration
rather than voluntary migration. Overall, studies concluded that the link between forced
migration and climate change is heavily mediated and only a relatively small portion should be
viewed as forced. There were also seven studies which did not qualify the nature of the climate-
induced migratory behavior and five studies (i.e. Black, 2001; Barnett & Webber, 2010;
Bardsley & Hugo, 2010; Beine & Parsons, 2015) which deemed the movements not to be
substantially linked to climate change in the first place. Within the latter group serious issues
are raised concerning the lack of empirical evidence for climate-induced forced migration.
Black (2001), for instance, argues that while environmental degradation may play a
(subordinate) role in the decision-making process of migrants, no evidence-based links
30
indicated forced migration. Others, including Hugo & Bardsley (2010), Gemenne (2011) and
Asian Development Bank (2012), emphasize that the scope is difficult to predict since it has
not been accurately established in current methodologies. In addition, several scholars, such
as Hugo (2010), express their concern for the tendency to almost automatically consider
climate-induced migration as forced migration. As a result, "[m]uch of the discussion on climate
change migration has exaggerated the likely extent of direct impacts of future climate on
displacement” (Bardsley & Hugo, 2010, p. 254).
In general, there are four main themes: Firstly, the relationship between climate change and
forced migration is heavily mediated (even more so than climate-induced migration in general)
and certain preconditions need to be present in order for climate change to trigger forced
migration (McLeman & Brown, 2011; Hugo & Bardsley, 2013; Piguet, 2010). It appears that in
order for forced migration to occur in response to the effects of climate change, there needs to
be a degree of vulnerability (e.g., poverty, poor governance) to the extent that the places
impacted by climate change can no longer support human survival and no option remains other
than to migrate (Brown, 2011; Gemenne, 2011). A very comprehensive and overarching
description of how climate change may trigger forced migration in conjunction with other factors
that drive migration is offered by Demola (2013):
It may be reasonable to conclude that climate change is unlikely to trigger migration in
developed states which have adequate information and the resources needed to
forestall its impact. For the states in the global south, however, climate change
principally acts as a threat multiplier to their existing socio-economic and political woes.
In other words, the combined changes to the climate and, most importantly, their
interaction with pre-existing stressors will determine if and when people move
(p. 818)
Secondly, forced migration is regarded as being only a small portion of the overall migration
triggered by climate change (e.g., Asian Development Bank, 2012; McLeman & Brown, 2011;
Jäger et al, 2009). For instance, the synthesis report of the EACH-FOR project concluded that
forced migration did occur and is tied to many grave consequences, however adaptive forms
of migration were considered to occur more frequently in their case-studies.
Thirdly, authors such as McLeman & Brown (2011) and Black et al (2011) assert that
slow-onset events (e.g., sea-level rises) are less likely to induce forced migration than sudden-
onset climate change induced events (e.g., floods). The argument here is that slow-onset
events offer people the opportunity to plan for migration, characterizing the migratory behavior
as an adaptive strategy, while in contrast sudden-onset events pose an immediate threat that
drives ad-hoc ‘flee-like’ migratory responses.
Fourthly, climate change is thought to decrease migration by exacerbating poverty and
31
diminishing resources needed for successful relocation (Piguet et al, 2011; Barnett & Webber,
2010; Beine & Parsons, 2015; Gemenne, 2011; Piguet, 2010; White, 2011, Jäger et al, 2009).
Instead of suffering forced migration, people – often referred to as ‘the poorest of the poor’ -
wanting to migrate are forced to stay due to their immobility. Additionally, as emphasized by
Tacoli (2009), people at risk due to the effects of climate change are not automatically also
people likely to migrate. This fourth theme suggest that an additional category should be added
to the climate change induced migration continuum, namely those ‘forced to stay’ (see table
3.5.).
Table 3.5 Climate-induced migration continuum
Volition: Voluntary Migration Compelled
Migration
Forced Migration Forced to
stay
3.5 Conclusions on the climate change and migration nexus debate.
Climate change can have a serious impact on people’s livelihood and security. Together with
the anticipated risks of climate change, they form factors that drive migration. However, the
relationship between climate change and migration is (heavily) mediated and hence, should
be thought of as a nexus. More specifically, the effect of climate change on migration is thought
to be mediated by poverty, dependency on ecosystem services, income diversification,
remittances, circular migration, economic opportunity, social and family networks, historical
mobility patterns, perceptions of climate change and migration, education, governance, sense
of oppression/freedom, and political instability.
32
4. Floods & Migration
4.1 An overview
Climate change induces floods through increased rainfall (Perch-Nielsen et al, 2008) and
through heightened temperatures that cause glacial retreat and permafrost degradation (IPCC,
2012). Herewith, floods have some overlap with extreme weather events as increased
temperatures increases the amount of water vapor which in turn leads to more rainfall. This
chapter reviews the effect of floods on migration and determines to what extent these
movements are considered forced migration.
Figure 4.1 An overview of the literature for the synthesis of the effect of floods on migration.
In total 10 studies were analyzed, all of which were written in English and peer-reviewed.
Furthermore, only one paper concerned itself with the relationship between floods and
migration in general, while most (N=9) used context-specific cases to investigate the
relationship between floods and migration and focused on: Southeast Asia (N=6), Mozambique
(N=2), and Pakistan & Colombia (N=1) Most sources were empirical studies (N=5), while other
studies were either literature based (N=2), conceptual (N=2) or functioned as critiques (N=1).
These studies made use of the following research methods: qualitative methods (N=4),
quantitative methods (N=1), literature review (N=3), and case study (N=2). An overview of the
general information of the literature for the synthesis of this chapter can be viewed in figure
4.1.
4.2 Exploring the relationship between floods and migration
The most common flood-induced factors for migration found in the literature are related to
security (N=9). The impact on livelihood is almost as often mentioned (N=8), though not equally
GEOGRAPH I CA L FO CU S
General
South-EastAsia
Mozambique
Other
GRE Y & P E E R R E V I EWED L I T E RATURE
Greyliterature
Peer-reviewedliterature
T Y P E O F S TUDY
Literature
Conceptual
Empirical
Critique
METHODS
Qualitative
Quantitative
MixedMethods
Literaturereview
33
emphasized as security issues. Other factors for flood-induced migration are destruction of
(public) facilities (N=2) and the anticipated risks of flood (N=1). Factors indicated to mediate
the effect of floods on migration are: poverty (N=9), dependency on eco-system services &
income diversification (N=4), remittances (N=3), circular migration/seasonal labor (N=3),
economic opportunity (N=4), social and family migratory networks (N=4), historical mobility
patterns (N=2), sense of belonging (N=3), demographic factors (N=3), education (N=2),
governance (prevention and assistance) (N=5), and conflict & political instability (N=2).
Table 4.2 Flood-induced factors for migration
Impact on Livelihoods (N=8)
Security (N=9) Public facilities (N=2)
Anticipation of the risks (N=1)
Black et al (2013); Uddin (2013); Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree et al (2014); Poncelet et al (2010); Thomas (2014); Dun (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
Black et al (2013); Uddin (2013); Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree et al (2014); Poncelet et al (2010); Thomas (2014); Dun (2011); Stal (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
Findlay & Geddes (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
Arnall (2014)
Table 4.3 Mediating factors for flood-induced migration
Economic factors Social & cultural factors Political factors
Poverty (N=9) Black et al (2013); Uddin (2013); Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree et al (2014); Poncelet et al (2010); Thomas (2014); Dun (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Arnall (2014)
Social and family migratory networks (N=4) Black et al (2013); Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree et al (2014); Poncelet et al (2010)
Governance (prevention and assistance) (N=5) Black et al (2013); Thomas (2014); Dun (2011) ; Stal (2011); Arnall (2014)
Dependency on eco-system services & income diversification (N=4) Black et al (2013); Banjeree et al (2014); Dun (2011) ; Stal (2011)
Historical mobility patterns (N=2) Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree et al (2014):
Conflict & political instability (N=2) Black et al (2013); Banjeree et al (2014)
Remittances (N=3) Black et al (2013); Banjeree et al (2014): Poncelet et al (2010)
Demographic factors (N=3) Banjeree et al (2014); Poncelet et al (2010): Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
Circular migration/seasonal labor (N=3) Black et al (2013); Banjeree et al (2014); Dun (2011)
Belonging (N=3) Poncelet et al (2010); Dun (2011); Stal (2011)
Economic opportunity (N=4) Black et al (2013); Banjeree et al (2014); Dun (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
Education (N=2) Uddin (2013); Banjeree et al (2014):
4.2.1 Floods, immediate and long-term security concerns and governmental intervention
Security concerns were consistently voiced as a consequence of floods, which can be divided
into short-term security issues (i.e. immediate danger), as a sudden-onset event, and long
term security concerns. In the first category are the direct and immediate effects of floods that
drive migration (Poncelet et al, 2010) such as sustained injuries (Perch-Nielsen et al, 2008),
loss of home and shelter (Uddin, 2013, Black et al, 2013) and the overall unsafety of one’s
34
surroundings after a flood (Banjeree et al, 2014). One of Stal’s (2011) respondents illustrates
such a scenario: “I moved from my area because of the floods in 2000 ⁄ 2001. We could not
sleep inside the house because there was water everywhere and our beds were all wet, so I
decided to take my family and rent a place in Maputo city” (p. 134). The security issues in the
second category are of a less immediate nature and relate to the impact floods have on well-
being that drives people to move (Uddin, 2013). Floods in particular increase health risks as
they create unsanitary conditions (Findlay & Geddes) by contaminating (drinking) water and
promoting the spread of diseases such as dysentery, malaria (through stagnant water), yellow
fever and cholera (Perch-Nielsen et al, 2008). Also, public facilities (e.g., hospital and roads)
designed to provide relief are at times destroyed by floods providing an additional migratory
push factor.
The impact of floods on security is mediated by the extent to which the government
took preventive measures and provides assistance post-flood, especially “[w]here aid has
effectively distributed food and food market supported, out-migration has been minimal” (Black
et al, 2013, p. 45). For example, Thomas (2014) concluded that the governments of Colombia
and Pakistan failed to successfully coordinate disaster-relief and implement disaster risk
reduction measures on a provincial level, leading up to large-scale flood-induced
displacement. In the case of Pakistan, the government did not even relocate citizens in risk
areas previously stricken by floods, leaving these populations vulnerable to future (repeat)
displacement. In the cases examined by Stal (2011), Banjeree, et al (2014) and Dun (2011),
governments did attempt to mitigate the effects of floods by assisted migration through
resettlement programs. However, most of these programs were unsuccessful as the
resettlement locations were poorly facilitated and offered no employment opportunities. In
Stal’s (2011) case, return migration was ironically caused by droughts and water scarcity at
the appointed resettlement center. Moreover, such resettlement plans are often socio-
culturally insensitive and people are left longing for their homes with which they have strong
cultural and spiritual connections, eventually leading to return migration or an unwillingness to
relocate in the first place (Dun, 2011). In some cases, as found by Poncelet et al (2010),
governments are a cause for (repeat) displacement by removing slums housing migrants who
fled in response to floods, whilst not offering resettlement options or restorative programs.
According to Arnall (2014), such derogative practices are enforced via the political discourse,
which serves the political and economic elite and masks the pre-existing crippling socio-
economic vulnerabilities. Furthermore, governments failing to properly mitigate the effects of
climate change generally also govern politically instable countries (Black et al, 2013). It is the
understanding of Black et al. (2013) and Banjeree et al. (2014) that political insecurity (e.g.,
minority discrimination) and violent conflict are usually the strongest factors for displacement,
the latter of which may be exacerbated by climate-induced resource scarcity.
35
4.2.2 The attempt at making a living: destruction of livelihoods, networks and resources
Besides inducing unsafe and unhealthy environments, floods can also have a negative impact
on people’s livelihoods (Banjeree et al, 2014). In response to the impact of floods on their
livelihood - in conjunction with other non-climate-induced socio-economic push and pull factors
- people move in search of better opportunities (Dun, 2011; Poncelet, 2010). For instance,
Poncelet et al (2010) found that all of the respondents interviewed in the slums of Dhaka
indicated to have moved due to the impact of a sudden-onset climate-induced event on their
livelihoods. It should be noted that Uddin’s (2013) results were somewhat ambiguous in this
regard and showed impact on community/village level rather than on household level, even
though initial results showed a significant correlation on all levels. In any case, the severity of
the narratives of flood-induced displacement are striking; for example, Thomas (2014) shares
an anecdote of “[a] few hundred of the very poorest individuals remained squatting near closed
camps, either because they were indebted to their landlords or had nothing to return to” (p.
67). Especially agricultural sectors, dependent on the environment, are severely struck by
floods (Findlay & Geddes, 2011; Dun, 2011; Stal, 2011). For example, one of Dun’s (2011)
respondents stated:
Flooding occurs every year at my former living place. I could not grow and harvest
crops. Life therefore was very miserable. Besides my family did not know what else we
could do other than growing rice and fishing. Flooding sometimes threatened our lives.
So we came here to find another livelihood. (p. 211)
The effect of floods on migration via its impact on livelihoods is mediated by five factors: Firstly,
the dependency on ecosystem services heightens the impact of floods on livelihood (Findlay
& Geddes, 2011; Dun, 2011; Stal, 2011). This dependency is decreased through income
diversification (Black et al, 2013) and employment in sectors non-dependent on eco-system
services (Dun, 2011). Income diversification can also promote migration by imploring
remittances (Black et al, 2013; Poncelet et al 2010) and/or seasonal labor (Dun, 2011; Black
et al, 2013; Poncelet et al 2010) as adaptive strategies. For example, Poncelet et al (2010)
found that after floods, fathers temporarily left their families to provide income through
employment in neighboring cities.
Secondly, having access to resources decreases the need for migration in response to
the long-term effects of floods (Uddin, 2013). However, both Findlay & Geddes (2011) and
Dun (2011) found that the availability of resources through loans in fact exacerbated poverty,
providing another push factor to either ‘run away’ from the incurred debt or to pay off the loan
via employment elsewhere.
Thirdly, economic opportunity in itself can be a strong motivator for migration as found
by Black et al (2013) and Banjeree et al (2014). A less obvious effect, however, is the
36
motivation to stay within the flood-stricken area for its economic potential. Despite the risks
that their environment poses, people have been reported to stay put as their livelihoods are
dependent on the flood-prone environment (Dun, 2011) or they believe circumstances to
improve (Poncelet et al, 2010). For example, the ‘char people’ (i.e. people living on small river
islands cause by floods) persevere in the belief that the land they inhabit will shortly improve
for agricultural purposes (Poncelet et al, 2010). In the latter case, it is not so much a case of
wishful thinking, but coping with a situation with no other alternatives, seeing as ‘char people’
often do not have resources to migrate and are unlikely to find alternative livelihoods (Poncelet
et al, 2010).
Fourthly, as is the case for the ‘char people’, mobility in the context of floods is heavily
dictated by financial resources (Findlay & Geddes, 2011; Banjeree et al, 2014; Poncelet et al,
2010). In that regard, social networks were found to increase mobility by facilitating migration
(Findlay & Geddes, 2011), family networks especially (Black et al, 2013). In addition, together
with historical mobility patterns, social networks to a large extent determine migratory
destinations (Findlay & Geddes, 2011; Banjeree et al 2014).
The literature analysis also indicates that demographic factors - age, household
consistency and gender - are correlated with mobility (i.e. Poncelet et al, 2010; Banjeree, et al
, 2014; Perch-Nielse et al, 2008). It appears these factors contribute to mobility as it was found
that in particular the young (physically capable), male (culturally preferred) and the childless
(less restrictions) moved in response to floods. Additionally, Uddin (2013) found that female
education mitigated the impact of floods on migration, which was explained in terms access to
better employment options non-dependent on the environment. In contrast, Banjeree et al
(2014) found that education increased the likelihood of migration, which in turn was explained
by arguing that those having received education were more driven and capable to look for
better opportunities elsewhere.
4.3 The effect of floods on migration
None of the studies confirms a direct link between floods and migration, rather studies (N=9)
affirm the effect of floods on migration in conjunction with the other factors previously
mentioned, affirming the multi-causal nature of the relationship. There are, however, some
nuanced differences: For instance, Black et al (2013), Poncelet et al (2010) and Banjeree et
al (2014) concluded that the impact of floods on migration was quite significant, though other
factors (e.g., poor government planning) are needed to surpass a certain threshold upon which
floods impact people to such a degree that migration occurs. Others, such as Findlay & Geddes
(2011), Perch-Nielsen et al (2008), Dun (2011) and Stal (2011), consider floods one of the
many drives for migration rather than the main factor for migration.
37
Table 4.4 Suggested impact of floods on migration
Confirmed (N=0)
In conjunction with other factors (N=9)
Low/insignificant (N=)
Link cannot be established/disentangled (N=1)
x Black et al (2013); Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree, Knivetone, Black & Kollmair (2014); Poncelet et al (2010); Thomas (2014); Dun (2011); Stal (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Arnall (2014)
x Uddin (2013)
Furthermore, several authors (e.g., Farbotko & Lazrus, 2007; Black, 2001) argue that over time
populations learn to adapt to change either through circular migration or local coping
strategies. However, within the framework of floods it becomes clear that even though
populations may have a long history with floods they do not necessarily simply ‘live with floods’.
In fact, Findlay & Geddes (2011) emphasize that floods have caused large-scale deaths and
that the acceptance of suffering is not the same as a community applying historically endorsed
adaptive strategies. Hence, it should be unsurprising that the type of movements resulting from
floods were in most cases (N=8) categorized as displacement (i.e. forced migration). Two
authors also found compelled migration, though this was due to findings also indicating
compelled migration next to forced migration (in the case of Poncelet et al, 2010) or floods
themselves were not pointed out to be the main factor that caused the forced migration in
question, but rather forced relocation by the government in response to floods (Dun, 2011). In
general flood-induced displacements were characterized as ad-hoc, large-scale, temporary,
internal and highly disruptive of the lives of affected people.
What is interesting is the temporary nature of the displacement induced by floods. Many
authors (i.e. Findlay & Geddes; Banjeree, Kniveton, Black & Kollmair, 2014; Poncelet et al,
2010; Thomas, 2014; Stal, 2014; Perch-Nielse et al, 2008) argued that floods tend to cause
temporary displacements. For instance, Thomas (2014) noted that of the millions displaced in
the 2010-2011 floods in Pakistan, most returned within twelve months. Most likely, this can be
explained by the few alternatives people affected by floods have. Tied in with the characteristic
Table 4.5 Distribution of the literature within the climate-induced migration continuum
Voluntary
(N= 0)
Compelled
(N=2)
Forced (N=8) Forced to
stay (N=0 )
No evidence
(N=1)
x Poncelet et al (2010); Dun (2011)
Black et al (2013); Findlay & Geddes (2011); Banjeree et al (2014); Poncelet et al (2010); Thomas (2014); Stal (2011); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Arnall (2014)
x Uddin (2013)
38
of temporality is the short distance travelled by those displaced by floods (Findlay & Geddes,
2011; Black et al, 2013), which can be explained through the lack of resources, political barriers
preventing out-migration (Perch-Nielsen et al, 2008) and the preference for temporary
relocation areas by government (Dun, 2011; Stal, 2011). Furthermore, throughout the literature
it was found that international migration only occurred among relatively wealthy households
(Black et al, 2013; Banjeree et al, 2014) and through social and family networks (Findlay &
Geddes, 2011).
Other mechanisms that drive temporary migration are seasonal employment (Black et
al, 2013) that migrants often consider after already being displaced, in order to provide for their
families (Poncelet et al, 2010). These findings also have great implications for the vulnerability
of populations affected by floods as the analysis shows that the capacity to mitigate climate
change is very low in the reviewed cases. Migration did not offer a permanent solution and
instead the process of displacement in response to floods is repeated. For example, Poncelet
et al (2010) paints the following re-occurring situation:
Most of Bangladesh sits astride the deltas of a series of large rivers flowing from the
Himalayas and about a third of the country is flooded every year during the monsoon.
Many people live and farm on flood-prone land. Floods kill hundreds and make
thousands homeless every year. (p. 211)
Despite the anticipated risks of floods and past experiences, people remain living in high-risk
areas, only to temporarily relieve immediate and extreme climate stressors through temporary
displacement whilst being unable to escape the danger through permanent and sustainable
forms of migration and/or resettlement.
39
5. Sea-level rises & Migration 5.1 An overview
Climate change induces sea-level rises through increased temperatures that cause thermal
expansion (i.e., the volume of the water increases due to higher temperatures) and the melting
of land ice (e.g., glaciers) (IPPC, 2007b). This chapter reviews the relationship between sea-
level rises and migration and determines to what extent the migratory outcomes of that
relationship can be considered forced migration. While sea-level rises are considered the most
clear-cut driver for forced migration in the political discourse – after all, one simply cannot live
underwater – the field is riddled with poor predictions, inaccurate statements supposedly based
on meteorological science, and mediatization. Hence, this chapter pays special attention to
the differentiation of results based on migratory responses to occurring sea-level rises and
movements driven by the anticipated risks of sea-level rises.
In total 12 studies were analyzed, all of which were written in English and peer-reviewed
(N=12). One paper (N=1) reviewed the effect of sea-level rises on migration in general, while
most (N=11) used context-specific cases and focused on: the SIDS (N=1); the developing
world (N=1), Bangladesh (N=1), the Pacific Islands (N=6) and two papers used a cross-
continental variety of case-studies (N=2). Most sources were either literature based papers
(N=5) or empirical studies (N=5), though also two conceptual studies (N=2) were included. In
these studies, the following methods were implored: qualitative methods (N=4), quantitative
methods (N=1), literature review (N=2), and case study (N=5). An overview of the literature
population can be viewed in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 An overview of the literature for the synthesis of the effect of sea-level rises on
migration
GEOGRAPH I CA L FOCUS
General
PacificIslands
Cross-continental
Other
GR E Y AND P E E R - R E V I EWED L I T E R A TUR E
Greyliterature
peer-reviewedliterature
T Y P E O F S T UDY
Literature
Conceptual
Empirical
ME T HODS
Qualitative
Quantitative
Literaturereview
Casestudy
40
5.2 Exploring the relationship between sea-level rises and migration
The literature analysis shows that the anticipation of the risks of sea-level rises (N=9), security
issues (N=8), impact on livelihoods (N=7) and the deterioration of public facilities (N=3) are
considered potential sea-level rise-induced factors for migration. Factors mediating the
relationship between sea-level rises and migration are thought to be: governance (N=6),
economic opportunity (N=4), belonging (N=4), perception of migration and climate change
(N=4), public and social services (N=2), historical mobility patterns (N=2), dependency on
eco-system services and income diversification (N=1), conflict and political stability (N=1),
political boundaries (N=1), and poverty (N=1).
Table 5.3 Mediating factors for sea-level rise-induced migration
Economic factors Social & cultural factors Political factors
Poverty (N=1) Kelman (2014)
Social and family migratory networks (N=2) Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Mortreux & Barnett (2009)
Governance (prevention and assistance) (N=6) Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Campbell (2010); Campbell & Bedford (2014) Nun (2013); Kelman (2014)
Dependency on eco-system services & income diversification (N=1) Shen & Gemenne (2011)
Historical mobility patterns (N=2) Shen & Gemenne (2011); Kelman (2014)
Conflict & political instability (N=1) Kelman (2014):
Remittances (N=1) Birk & Rasmussen (2014)
Belonging (N=4) Campbell (2010); Marino & Lazrus (2015); Campbell & Bedford (2014); Mortreux & Barnett (2009)
Political boundaries (N=1) Shen & Gemenne (2011)
Economic opportunity (N=4) Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Campbell (2010); Marino & Lazrus (2015); Mortreux & Barnett (2009)
Public & Social Services (N=2) Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Saroar & Routray (2010).
Perception of Migration and Climate change (N=4) Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Nunn (2013); Marino & Lazrus (2015); Kelman (2014)
Table 5.2 Sea-level rise-induced factors for migration
Impact on Livelihoods (N=7)
Security (N=8) Public facilities (N=3)
Anticipation of the risks (N=9)
Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Campbell (2010); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Locke (2009); Saroar & Routray (2010); Nun (2013); Kelman (2014)
Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Campbell (2010); Campbell & Bedford (2014); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Saroar & Routray (2010); Shen & Gemenne (2011); Marino & Lazrus (2015); Kelman (2014)
Perch-Nielsen, Bättig, & Imboden (2008); Saroar & Routray (2010); Marino & Lazrus (2015)
Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Campbell & Bedford (2014); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Locke (2009); Saroar & Routray (2010). Shen & Gemenne (2011) Marino & Lazrus (2015); Mortreux & Barnett (2009)
41
5.2.1 Sea-level rises and migration: a matter of perception?
Despite being cast as the poster child for climate-induced forced migration, the empirical
evidence for sea-level rise-induced migration is questionable from various angles. First of all,
it seems there is a fierce disagreement among scholars - and arguably poor application of geo-
meteorological findings within the social sciences - regarding the predication of sea-level rises
and its possible impact on human life. The IPCC (2007b), for instance, has warned for
increasing sea-level rises of 30 to 80 cms, which could be disastrous for many populations
living near Delta areas (e.g., the Mekong) and low-lying islands such as Tuvalu. Based on
these findings, scholars predict millions of climate refugees, yet forget to read the fine-print
that these changes are roughly estimated to occur within a period of 300 years. Campbell &
Bedford (2014) also touch upon this issue in their case study and while they acknowledge that
sea-level rises could be a very significant problem in the future, “[t]here are as yet no clear
cases of climate change forced sea-level rise causing atolls to become uninhabitable”
(Campbell & Bedford. 2014, p. 197).
Regardless of the actual (future) impacts of sea-level rises, this chapter has frequently
found evidence of the impact of the anticipated risks and perception of sea-level rises on
migration. In other words, the need for migration in most cases is based on future projections
of vulnerability to sea-level rises and the anticipated risks tied to it. In these cases, climate
change has not (fully) physically manifested to the extent that an ‘actual threat’ is posed and
rather the perception of the risks of sea-level rises appears to motivate migration (Perch-
Nielsen et al, 2008; Locke, 2008), especially if these are based on past-events (Birk &
Rasmussen, 2014). Of course, this relationship also works vice versa with people not aware
of the potential risks or the existence of climate change at all. For example, Kelman (2014)
found that some Tuvaluan communities reject the idea that they could be flooded by sea-level
rises due to Biblical references (i.e. Noah was ensured by God no flood would ever occur
again) and therefore do not take anticipatory action to sea-level rises. Different world-views
such as these also pose methodological issues. For instance, Saroar & Routray (2010)
received little to no response when asking respondents about the impacts of sea-level rises,
yet when asked about the direct impacts of sea-level rises on their daily lives, such as the
salinization of their farmlands, the recorded impacts of sea-level rises were very consistent
and prevalent.
With the previous considerations in mind, the relationship between sea-level rises and
migration can be explored: First of all, the literature has reported sea-level rises to create
unfavorable situations that are prone to climate-induced migration. For one, livelihoods are
impacted by sea-level rises through the degradation of marine life (impacting commercial
fishing) (Campbell, 2010; Soraor & Routray, 2010), deterioration of agricultural land (Soroar &
42
Routray, 2010) and property loss (Perch-Nielsen et al, 2008) such as one’s house and food
supplies (Saroar & Routray, 2010). While in the studies of Sorar & Routray (2010) and
Campbell (2010), the recorded impact of sea-level rises on livelihoods were extensive, Shen
& Gemenne (2011) found that the impact on livelihood was insignificant in their case-study on
Tuvaluan migration to New-Zealand as this population is not dependent on agriculture. What
did, however, drive migration in this case were the psychological effects such as fear incurred
by the increasing sea-levels and anticipated future risks tied to it.
The literature also indicated security issues caused by sea-level rises (Birk &
Rasmussen, 2014), such as loss and damage to homes (Campbell, 2010; Campbell & Bedford,
2014; Perch-Nielsen et al 2008; Shen & Gemenne, 2011), shortages of safe water (Campbell,
2010; Soroar & Routray, 2010; Kelman, 2014), dangerous deterioration of infrastructure
(Kelman, 2014), and decreased natural barriers (e.g., coral reefs) to storms (Lazrus & Marino,
2015). While these examples for a large part speak for themselves as potential drivers for
migration, Soroar & Routray (2010) argue that the awareness of climate change also helps
populations adapt to climate change as an alternative to migration. Of course political factors
can play a large role in creating awareness of climate change and mitigating its impacts
(Campbell, 2010). Though in practice, governmental assistance in the context of sea-level
rises is largely unsuccessful due to unsatisfactory resettlement plans (Birk & Rasmussen,
2014) (e.g., poor quality of land, no attention to culture, lack of opportunities), which makes
people very reluctant to migrate (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010).
To make matters even more complicated, the perception of the potential risks of sea-
level rises in itself can also produce situations generating additional motives for migration. For
instance, Marino & Lazrus (2015) found that communities aware of the risk of sea-level rises
were no longer willing to invest in facilities (e.g. infrastructure and sanitation). This does not
only heighten the community’s vulnerability to climate change, but is also an additional push
factor for migration, as inhabitants wish to search for greener pastures and educated
youngsters experience little incentive to move back to their birthplace. In support of this theory,
Raleigh & Jordan (2010) note that the deterioration of public and community services has
previously been recorded to cause high levels migration and Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
observed that the small number of those who do stay behind are unable to retain these services
and facilities.
5.2.2 Pre-existing and alternative factors for migratory decisions
The literature indicates economic factors to be strong drivers for migration (Mortreux & Barnett,
2009). For instance, Marino & Lazrus (2015) found labor opportunities to be the strongest
driver for migration. Moreover, Kelman (2014) even emphasizes that in his case study on
Kiribati, the portrayal of climate change only distracted from the actual issue of poverty
43
determining vulnerability and possible displacement. In line with this argument, Campbell
(2010), found that environmental and economic factors both influence migration equally, yet
only climate change is propelled as the cause for displacement. Additionally, while remittances
often function as a mediating factor for migration in contexts of floods and droughts, in the
context of sea-level rises no other drivers than economic opportunity was found for initiating
remittances by Birk & Rasmussen (2014).
The literature also shows that mobility tends to be mediated by family and historical
networks. For instance, Mortreaux and Barnett (2009) found that family networks are central
in facilitating legal, financial and organizational support for migration and often determines the
migratory destination for the purpose of family reunification. Historical networks, in turn,
mediate migratory behavior by offering specific know-how for migration and increasing mobility
through cultural consciousness and lifestyles (Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Kelman 2014).
However, as argued by Kelman (2014), one needs to be careful about equating nomadic
behavior and circular migration between islands as predictors for intercontinental mobility
patterns and tools for community relocation plans. For example, the cultural understanding of
‘belonging to the land’ for island communities threatened by sea-level rises may include
neighboring islands, but not international relocation destinations. Campbell (2010) gives the
example of the Maori inhibiting the pacific islands surrounding New-Zealand, who view their
lands as literally their place of birth or ‘Whenua’ (i.e. placenta) and would have a hard time to
leave the land they view as the mother of their tribe. Moreover, even though island communities
such as Tuvalu and Sarichef (Alaska) are threatened and affected by sea-level rises, people
have been reported refuse to move from the land they are spiritually and culturally tied to
(Campbell & Bedford, 2014; Mortreux & Barret, 2008; Campbell, 2010) and would rather make
a last attempt at saving their homes (Marino & Lazrus, 2015).
5.3 The effect of sea-level rises on migration
Only the study by Nunn (2013) (N=1) found a direct relationship between sea-level rises and
migration. Based on historical data, Nunn (2013) concludes that sea-level rises affect the
habitability of pacific islands leading to direct threats (i.e. flooding/ destruction infrastructure)
and prevent socio-economic development, which make future relocations inevitable.
Interestingly, current empirical data of sea-level rise-induced migration was not offered.
Most studies by far (N=6) assert that the migratory outcomes in the context of sea-level
rises were determined by a myriad of factors. For instance, Campbell (2010) found that even
though environmental reasons are propelled as the reason for relocation, economic
circumstances are equally important factors for migration. Then, the perception of the risks of
sea-level rises is a strong factor for migration. Most strikingly, Shen & Gemenne (2011) found
that the psychological effect of the perceived risks of sea-level rises weigh stronger than any
44
economic impact in the case of the Tuvaluans. This can, however, also be partially attributed
to the fact few Tuvaluan households depend on the environment for their livelihoods.
Furthermore, various studies argued that migration in response to sea-level rises was only to
occur if the authorities provided insufficient prevention and assistance. For instance, Kelman
(2014) strongly emphasizes that ‘hazards’ such as sea-level rises are not the root cause for
vulnerability but rather overall public mismanagement resulting in to marginalisation, lack of
access to resources, exploitation, inequity, and injustice. In other words:
The challenge is not so much addressing the hazard of climate change per se
(although climate change mitigation activities are certainly essential), but is addressing
why SIDS peoples often do not have the resources to resolve climate change and other
development challenges themselves, on their own terms. That is, the fundamental
challenge is vulnerability to all hazards. (Kelman, 2014, p. 126)
Two studies (N=2) found that the link between sea-level rises and migration could not be
established and/or disentangled at all; Campbell & Bedford (2014) concluded that even though
future impacts could be great, the predictions of the impacts of sea-level rises were so flawed
they deemed them impossible to use. Similarly, Perch-Nielsen et al (2008) drew the conclusion
that even though the population at risk for climate-induced migration is great, actual data and
empirical evidence on these movements are lacking and are thus scientifically unfounded.
Lastly, there were also three studies in which the effect of sea-level rises on migration
was found to be insignificant. For one, despite the need for future relocation in Bangladesh in
response to sea-level rises Raleigh & Jordan (2010) found that no migration actually took
place. Furthermore, in Mortreux & Barnett (2008) climate change was not found to be a factor
in current and future migratory decisions. Not even in the case of Birk & Rasmussen (2014) -
who explicitly asked respondents about possible environmental factors for migration - a
considerable link could be established.
Table 5.4 Suggested impact of sea-level rises on migration
Confirmed (N=1)
In conjunction with other factors (N=6)
Low/insignificant (N=3)
Link cannot be established/disentangled (N=2)
Nunn (2013)
Campbell (2010); Locke (2009): Saroar & Routray (2010); Shen & Gemenne (2011); Marino & Lazrus (2015); Kelman (2014)
Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Mortreux & Barnett (2008)
Campbell & Bedford (2014); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008)
Even though predicted future impacts of sea-level rises are a very serious threat (Mortreux &
Barnett, 2009; Marino & Lazrus, 2010) and is likely to require out-migration in many cases
(Locke, 2009), actual migration patterns in areas threatened by sea-level rises are
characterized as internal (Birk & Rasmussen, 2014; Campbell, 2014; Soraor & Routray, 2010)
and are often temporal (Marino & Lazrus, 2015) Birk & Rasmussen, 2014). Moreover, when
45
out-migration does occur it is often facilitated and driven by social networks (Shen & Gemenne,
2011). These results are not to say that out-migration is not a desirable option. Rather, one
would argue that international migration takes considerable funds and is blocked by various
geo-political barriers and strict migration requirements, which are hard to surpass even with
social and family networks.
As for the volition of the migratory behaviour, three case studies concluded most
migration could be viewed as voluntary migration (N=3) and two argued that the movements
could be considered compelled migration (N=2). Strikingly, no authors concluded to find cases
of forced migration. In addition, four studies did not qualify the volition of the movements (i.e.
Campbell, 2010; Saroar & Routray, 2010; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Kelman, 2014) and three
studies argued there wasn’t sufficient evidence for the link between sea-level rises and
migration in the first place. Reasons for characterizing sea-level rise-induced migration as
voluntary included: migratory decisions being made as an - be it last resort - adaption strategy
(Brik & Rasmussen, 2014) or ‘managed retreat’ (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010), and the planned
anticipatory nature of the movements in reaction to the slow-onset event of sea-level rises
(Nunn, 2013). In contrast, Locke (2009) and Marino & Lazrus (2015) adopted descriptions
fitting the compelled category in admitting the grey area between necessity of migration in the
face of future disaster-like threats and migratory decisions based on current economic
pressures.
The results based on actual migratory movements in sea-level rise-induced contexts is
clear; no significant evidence for forced migration was found. Nonetheless, these results feel
unsatisfactory as quite a few studies grappled with insufficient data and the uncertainty of
predictions with regards to the future impact of sea-level rises. Moreover, because migratory
behavior appears to be so heavily dependent on the perception of the risks of sea-level rises,
determining the volition of the movements becomes extremely difficult. As argued by Marino
& Lazrus (2015): “In the lived experiences of residents, forced displacements and voluntary
migrations are not so easily separated, but are complex decisions made by individuals, families
and communities in response to discourses of risk, deteriorating infrastructure and other
economic and social pressures” (p. 341). Perhaps, the ecological tipping point for forced
migration in the context of sea-level rises has not yet been reached and within the decades to
come entirely new findings on this relationship will arise.
Table 5.5 Distribution of literature in the climate-induced migration continuum
Voluntary (N=3) Compelled (N=2) Forced
(N=0)
Forced to
stay (N=0 )
No evidence link (N=3)
Birk & Rasmussen (2014); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Nunn (2013)
Locke (2009); Marino & Lazrus (2015)
x x Campbell & Bedford (2014); Perch-Nielsen et al (2008); Mortreux & Barnett (2009)
46
6. Droughts & Migration
6.1 An overview
Climate change induces and worsens droughts through high temperatures and little or
infrequent rainfall (IPPC, 2007b). In practical terms, droughts result into the (often strong)
decrease of streaming water, loss of vegetation, and desertification of the soil (Leighton, 2011).
The manifestation of droughts as a climate-induced phenomenon has been well established
and documented (Cohen et al, 2013). Within this chapter, the effect of droughts – as a climate-
induced phenomenon – on migration is explored, and to what extent these movements can be
described as forced migration.
Figure 6.1 An overview of the literature for the synthesis of the effect of droughts on migration. In total 15 studies were analyzed, all of which are written in English and peer-reviewed.
Furthermore, one paper (N=1) concerned itself with the relationship between drought and
migration in general, while all others (N=14) used context-specific cases to investigate the
relationship between droughts and migration, and focused on: the developing world (N=1),
Canada (N=1), Africa (N=8), and South-America (N=4). Most sources were empirical studies
(N=8) or literature based studies (N=6), though also one conceptual paper was included. In
these studies, the following methods were implored: qualitative methods (N=2), quantitative
methods (N=5), mixed methods (N=1), literature review (N=3), and case study (N=4). An
overview of the general information of the literature for the synthesis of this chapter can be
viewed in figure 6.1.
GEOGRAPH I CAL FOCUS
General
Africa
South-America
Other
GR E Y & P E E R - R E V I EWED L I T E R A TUR E
Greyliterature
Peer-reviewedliterature
T Y P E O F S T UDY
Literature
Conceptual
Empirical
Critique
ME THODS
QualitativeQuantitativeMixedMethodsLiteraturereviewCasestudy
47
6.2 Exploring the relationship between droughts and migration
The analysis of the literature shows that droughts may lead to migration by impacting
livelihoods (N=10), security (N=4) and inducing conflict (N=3). One paper also viewed the
destruction of public facilities by droughts (i.e. power-shortages) to be a potential migratory
push-factor. Factors believed to mediate the effect of droughts on migration are: poverty (N=7),
dependency on eco-system services & income diversification (N=7), remittances (N=4),
circular migration/seasonal labor (N=2), economic opportunity (N=3), social and family
migratory networks (N=5), historical mobility patterns (N=3), demographic factors (N=2), social
capital (N=1), governance (N=5), and conflict & political instability (N=3).
Table 6.2 Mediating factors for drought-induced migration
Economic factors Social & cultural factors Political factors
Poverty (N=7) Andersen et al (2010); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); White (2011); Leighton (2011); Abu et al (2013); McLeman & Ploeger (2011); Nawrotzki et al (2013)
Social and family migratory networks (N=5) Andersen et al (2010); Leighton (2011); Nawrotzki et al (2013); Black et al (2013); Leighton (2011).
Governance (prevention and assistance) (N=5) Cohen et al (2013); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Leighton (2011); McLeman & Ploeger (2011); Bleibaum (2010).
Dependency on eco-system services & income diversification (N=7) Black et al (2013); Cohen et al (2013) ; Leighton (2011); Marchiori et al (2012); McLeman & Ploeger (2011); Meze-Hausken, E. (2000); Bleibaum (2010):
Historical mobility patterns (N=3) Andersen et al (2010); Gila et al (2011); McLeman & Ploeger (2011)
Conflict & political instability (N=3) Leighton (2011); Gila Et Al (2011); Naude (2010)
Remittances (N=4) Andersen et al (2010); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Cohen et al (2013); Leighton (2011);
Demographic factors (N=2) Abu et al (2013); Nawrotzki et al (2013)
Circular migration/seasonal labor (N=2) White (2011); Leighton (2011)
Social capital N=1) McLeman & Ploeger (2011)
Economic opportunity (N=3) Andersen et al (2010); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Naude (2010)
Table 6.1 Drought-induced factors for migration
Impact on Livelihoods (N=10) Security (N=4) Conflict (N=3) Public facilities (N=1)
Black et al (2013); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Cohen et al (2013); Leighton (2011); Morrisey (2014); Abu et al (2013); Marchiori et al (2012); Gila et al (2011); Meze-Hausken, (2000); Bleibaum (2010).
Cohen et al (2013); Morrisey (2014); Marchiori et al (2012); Gila et al (2011)
Black, et al (2013); White (2011); Naude (2010)
Black et al(2013).
48
6.2.1 Impacts on livelihood & mobility patterns
Droughts have a significant impact on the livelihoods of people (Black et al, 2013; Cohen et al,
2013; Morrisey, 2014), which places stressors on household risk (Leighton, 2011; Abu et al,
2013). For example, Machiori et al (2012) found that weather anomalies (i.e., infrequent rain)
leading to droughts decreased GDP per capita. This effect is even more significant for
livelihoods dependent on the environment, agriculture especially (Leighton, 2011; Meze-
Hausken, 2000; Machioi et al , 2012; Black et al, 2013). As explained in Chapter 3, not all
areas are equally impacted by climate change; in this context Nawrotzki et al (2013) found that
a tipping point exists in which climate change exacerbates pre-existing geo- and
meteorological conditions in that dry-lands did experience the disastrous impacts that
surpasses the threshold for migratory behaviour, while this did not occur in ‘wet-lands’.
In order to mitigate the impact of droughts on their livelihood and drawn by economic
opportunity elsewhere, households decide to migrate or send one or more members elsewhere
to provide remittances (Andersen et al, 2010; Leighton, 2011; Raleigh & Jordan, 2010). It
should, however, be well understood that in most cases economic opportunity functions as the
strongest incentive for migration, while pre-existing poverty in conjunction with the stressors of
droughts act as additional push-factors. In fact, Naude (2010), Andersen et al (2010), and
Raleigh & Jordan (2010) all argue that non-environmental economic factors play a far greater
role in migration than environmental factors.
Nonetheless, the relationship between poverty (and access to resources) and droughts
does appear to act as a determinant for mobility, resulting in a non-linear relationship (see
Figure 6.2). The likelihood of migration increases when climate change impacts a person’s
livelihood and/or increases household risk. More strikingly, migration is regarded as a common
adaptation strategy in areas stricken by droughts over longer periods of time (Gila et al, 2011;
McLeman & Ploeger, 2011; Andersen et al, 2010). However, when climate change
exacerbates the impact of droughts on the livelihoods of households and communities at large,
the number of migrants declines as there is a lack of resources needed to enable mobility
(Morrisey, 2014; Leighton, 2011; White, 2011). Interestingly, this paradoxical relationship
appears to be far more explicit in contexts of drought as in these regions populations tend to
already have embedded adaptive strategies to mitigate the effects of droughts through
remittances, seasonal work and/or circular migration. In these contexts, it is the inability to
migrate that appears to be the most harmful for the population’s well-being.
Black (2001) illustrates this relationship well by exemplifying the traditional migrations
in the Sahel; he argues that the population in this region is accustomed to migrate in order to
mitigate the impact of droughts, yet during the drought in the Senegal River Valley in the 1980s
migration actually dropped as the extreme drought strongly diminished resources needed for
(successful) migration and many people were forced to stay behind. In conclusion, “It is those
49
with access to some financial resources who face the loss of livelihood that are more likely to
migrate than those with either no resources or than those who are relatively well off” (Leighton,
2011, p.333).
Figure 6.2 Non-linear
relationship between the
impact of droughts,
access to resources and
migration
6.2.2 Social and demographic mediators for mobility
Besides the financial resources needed for migration, the importance of social capital is also
emphasized throughout the literature. Migrant networks in particular appear to be strong
determinants for mobility (Andersen et al, 2010; Leighton, 2011; Nawrotzki et al, 2013;
McLeman & Ploeger, 2011) in two ways: Firstly, social and family networks help people to
migrate in response to droughts by providing help at the destination (Andersen et al, 2010;
White, 2011; McLeman & Ploeger, 2011) and valuable information about the migration process
(Nawrotzki et al, 2013). At the same time, Black et al (2013) and Leighton (2011) argued that
these social networks indeed heighten mobility, but more for the purpose of family reunification,
marriage, etc. Secondly, migrant networks are based on historical mobility patterns which offer
a pre-established route for people confronted with droughts (Andersen et al, 2010; Gila et al,
2010). For instance, Gila et al (2011) argued that in the case of the Sahrawi, a long history of
dealing with droughts through migration existed, leading them to become nomadic people.
It should be noted that certain demographic household characteristics also weigh in on a
household’s capacity to move, as primarily young households migrate (Abu et al, 2013),
especially those without the additional burden of children (Nawrotszki et al, 2013).
6.2.3 Governance and security issues as drivers for migration
Droughts can cause several security issues, namely: health-risks caused by unsanitary water
and prevalence of diseases such as malaria (Machoiri et al, 2012; Morrisey, 2014; Gila et al,
2010), food insecurity (Morrisey, 2014), and conflict (White, 2011; Black et al, 2013). Conflict,
50
in particular, is an ambiguous result of climate change. Fortunately, White (2011) explains this
mechanism well:
[C]limate change will aggravate the already acute water stress that parts of Africa
experience. Fresh water runs off into rivers systems and reservoir basins are
threatened not only by climate change but also by low levels of development and fast
growing populations. (p. 43)
In other words, poor governance and climate change will create water scarcity, which, as
argued by Black et al (2013), could lead to conflict over scarce resources and migration as a
response to conflict. This implies that the initial phase of droughts influencing the availability
of resources could have been prevented and mitigated (i.e. mediated) by good governance. In
fact, Leighton (2011), Raleigh & Jordan (2010) and Bleibaum (2010) argued that governments
should have installed better agricultural policies to prevent resource scarcity in the first place.
For example, Cohen et al (2013) found that the Mexican government initiated local
development projects that increase resilience to climate change and decrease political
instability within drought-stricken areas by providing livelihood alternatives and strengthening
the community’s facilities (e.g., better roads, health centers).
6.4 The effect of drought on migration
In summary, none of the studies examined confirmed finding a direct relationship between
droughts and migration. Instead, the vast majority of studies (N=13) found droughts to one of
the factors driving migration in conjunction with others. Also, two studies concluded the
relationship to be statistically insignificant (i.e. Abu et al, 2013; Naude, 2011). As for the volition
of the movements, most studies qualified the migratory behaviour as voluntary (N=6) or
compelled (N=3). Only one study considered forced migration to be a likely response to
droughts and a fair number of studies (N=5) either did not qualify the movement or were
ambiguous about its nature.
Table 6.4 Suggested impact of droughts on migration
Confirmed (N=0)
In conjunction with other factors (N=12)
Low/insignificant (N=2)
Link cannot be established/disentangled (N=)
X Andersen et al (2010); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); White (2011); Black et al (2013); Cohen et al (2013); Leighton (2011); Marchiori et al (2012); Gila et al (2011); McLeman & Ploeger (2011); Nawrotzki et al (2013): Meze-Hausken (2000); Bleibaum (2010); Morrisey (2014)
Abu, Codjoe & Sward (2013); Naude (2011);
x
51
The relationship between droughts and migration is likely to be non-linear (Andersen et al,
2010; Leighton, 2011; Morrisey, 2014) and highly mediated by other factors (Cohen et al,
2013). For instance, Mezke-Hausen (2000) argued that coping strategies such as relying on
available resources (e.g. animal stock) or alternative employment strongly mediated the need
for migration. In any case, the effect of droughts on migration is also highly context-specific
(Raleigh & Jordan, 2010; Machiori et al, 2012; McLeman & Ploeger, 2011) and should be
viewed from a vulnerability perspective based on “endemic poverty, limited access to capital,
and significant population pressures” (White, 2011, p.43). For example, Bleibaum (2010)
presents the case of the Senegalese farmers who, besides dealing with droughts, are
confronted with bad agricultural policies and poor organization that also lead to the further
degradation of their crops and, in extension, their livelihoods. Moreover, due to the intertwined
effect of both environmental and non-environmental factors in a case such as this,
disentangling the various factors becomes undoable (Bleibaum, 2010). As a result, authors
have concluded that droughts may trigger migration, rather than function as a cause for
migratory behaviour (Meze-Hausken, 2000).
The migratory patterns in drought-stricken areas can be characterized as temporal, internal
and mostly occurring from rural to urban areas. Because international migration is so
expensive most migratory movements happen within borders. In cases in which out-migration
was found (i.e. Nawrotzki et al, 2013; Marchiori et al, 2012) the populations investigated, such
as those in Mexico, are relatively better off than the cases investigated in Africa in the rest of
the literature. Another compelling explanation is the use of seasonal labor, circular migration
and remittances as coping strategies which usually take place within borders (see for instance
Leighton, 2011 or Andersen et al, 2010).
Migration tended to occur from rural to urban areas (Marchiori et al, 2012; Bleibaum,
2010; Andersen et al, 2010). Bleibaum (2010) even called it the ‘rural exodus’. The fact that
the relationship between droughts and migration is stronger in rural areas is most likely to be
explained by the higher dependency on agriculture and other ecosystem services for livelihood
in these areas (Marchiori et al, 2012; Bleibaum, 2010). The big cities, in contrast, offer
employment opportunities that are not dependent on the environment. This might also explain
why migrants - as found by Anderson et al (2010) - do not necessarily take the extent to which
the effects of climate change have manifested at the migratory destination into account, but
are instead pulled by economic opportunities.
52
Voluntary migration was found to be the most prevalent volition of migration triggered by
drought as authors (i.e. Andersen et al, 2010; Black et al, 2013; Raleigh & Jordan, 2010;
Morrisey, 2014; Leighton, 2011; McLeman & Ploeger, 2011) considered the migratory
response to droughts to be adaptive, rather than forced. Even though voluntary migration was
the most common migratory response to the effects of climate change (in conjunction with the
factors mentioned in the previous section), that does not imply that forced migration is not
triggered at all. In fact, various authors (i.e. Black et al, 2013; Gila et al, 2011) found that while
forced migration is unusual, it does occur in cases in which conflict is caused or exacerbated
by droughts (e.g., through resource scarcity). For instance, in her case study Bleibaum (2010)
found evidence for forced migration, but concluded that droughts compelled farmers to move
and that only the added factors of poor governance and insecurity led her to describe the
movements as forced.
Lastly, as discussed in the previous section, droughts can decrease the resources
needed to migrate, resulting in a group of people forced to stay. Proof of this effect was found
by Andersen et al (2010), Raleigh & Jordan (2010), Morrisey (2014) and Leighton (2011).
Finally, as argued by Morrisey (2014): “It is also clear that migration is more than the outcome
of poverty or intolerable vulnerability. Instead, mobility manifest as a highly strategic response
to which significant barriers operate” (p. 105).
Table 6.5 Distribution of the literature within the climate-induced migration continuum
Voluntary (N=6) Compelled (N=3) Forced (N=1) Forced to stay (N=3)
Black et al (2013); Andersen et al (2010); Raleigh & Joran (2010); Leighton (2011); Morrisey (2014); McLeman & Ploeger (2011)
Gila et al (2011); Meze-Hausken (2000);Bleibaum (2010)
Cohen et al (2013)
Andersen et al (2010); Raleigh & Jordan (2010); Morrisey (2014)
53
7. Conclusions Within this section the results of chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are summarized in accordance with
each of the seven research subquestions.
- SQ1: How can the relationship between climate change and (forced) migration be
conceptualized?
There are three major ways in which climate change is conceptualized to effect migration,
namely through a) its impact on livelihoods, b) security issues and conflict and c) the
anticipation of the risks connected to climate change. That said, the great majority of the
literature in Chapter 3 (N=24) agree that the relationship between climate change and
migration is best conceptualized as a nexus, due to the multi-causality at hand in climate-
induced migration and the differential impact of climate change in different areas. In fairness,
these differences can be partially explained by the prevalence of climate change hot-spots in
the Global South in which migration “occurs when ecological tipping points are exceeded –
points in time when environmental pressures mount and so threaten human security that
people begin to factor environmental conditions into their migration decisions” (Warner et al,
2008, p. 14). However, the nexus consists of several mediating factors that influence the
degree of vulnerability to climate change and, in extension, migratory decisions. More
specifically, the effect of climate change on migration is thought to be mediated by poverty,
dependency on ecosystem services, income diversification, remittances, circular migration,
economic opportunity, social and family networks, historical mobility patterns, perceptions of
climate change and migration, education, governance, sense of oppression/freedom, and
political instability. As a result of this multi-causality, climate change tends to only cause
migration in conjunction with non-climate-induced factors and rather triggers migration in areas
with pre-existing vulnerabilities.
The volition of climate-induced migration is best conceptualized as a continuum
stretching from ‘forced’ to ‘voluntary’ migration (see table 3.5), in which the left-hand side
represents migrants with full agency over their migratory behavior and the right-hand side
represents those who have no other decision but to migrate. In between exists the category of
‘compelled’ climate-induced migrants, referring to forms of migration that are ambivalent in
nature. This thesis has also opted to add an additional group of those ‘forced to stay’, to
represent those unable to migrate in response to the effects of climate change, due the impact
of climate change and/or pre-existing vulnerabilities on their mobility. In light of this
mechanism, the relationship between climate change and migration is not only considered
multi-causal, but also non-linear (see figure 6.2).
54
- SQ2: What is the effect of floods on migration?
Floods were found to mainly impact people’s security (N=9) by posing instant security threats
(e.g., fear of injury) and long-term security concerns such as unsanitary conditions. If not
protected by successful preventive measures or aided with disaster relief, floods were reported
to trigger large-scale and ad-hoc movements. Due to a lack of resources and/or unsustainable
governmental resettlement programs, these movements are often only temporary as returning
to the stricken areas appears to be the only viable option. In some cases, as found with the
‘char people’, the only option is to clutch to the belief that one day their lands will once again
be viable for inhabitation and agriculture. Furthermore, the impact of floods on livelihoods
(N=8) - in conjunction with existing poverty (N=8) and economic opportunity (N=4) elsewhere
- was also found to be a considerable factor for migration (N=8). This relationship, however,
is mediated by demographic factors (N=3), education (N=2), and historical (N=2) and social
networks (N=4).
It should be noted that none of the studies confirm a direct link between floods and
migration, rather studies (N=9) affirm the effect of floods on migration in conjunction with the
other factors previously mentioned.
- SQ3: To what extent do floods lead to forced migration?
Overall, movements in the context of floods can be characterized as large-scale, ad-hoc,
temporary and forced. The latter either through ‘flee-like’ movements or forced resettlement.
In any case, it is very clear that even though populations may have a long history with floods,
they are not coping or adapting to these re-occurring disasters and instead risk life, home and
livelihood during each sudden-onset event. Hence, it should be unsurprising that in general
movements were categorized as displacement (N=8) (i.e. forced migration), two studies
viewed movements as compelled migration and none mentioned voluntary mobility patterns.
The disaster-like circumstances, the temporality of the threat (i.e. sudden) and movement (i.e.
ad-hoc), and the lack of alternatives leads to the conclusion that floods tend to trigger forced
migration.
- SQ4: What is the effect of by sea-level rises on migration?
Despite being cast as the poster child for climate-induced forced migration, the empirical
evidence for sea-level rise-induced migration is questionable due to uncertainty of the impact
of predictions for the future, the use thereof by scholars, and migratory behavior based on
these predictions. That said, the literature has reported sea-level rises to create unfavorable
situations that are prone to climate-induced migration, namely the impact on livelihoods (N=7)
via for instance salinization of agricultural land and security concerns (N=8) such as loss of
55
home. The most prominent potential factor in the context of sea-level rises for migration,
however, was the perception of the anticipated risk of sea-level rises (N=9).
Overall, the tone of the studies concerning sea-level rise-induced migration was highly
skeptical. Most studies by far (N=6) assert that the migratory outcomes in the context of sea-
level rises were determined by a myriad of factors, such as governance (N=6), public services
(N=2), social (N=2) and historical networks (N=2), and economic opportunity (N=4). In addition,
three studies concluded not to find a significant effect at all.
Even though predicted future impacts of sea-level rises are a very serious threat
(Mortreux & Barnett, 2009; Marino & Lazrus, 2010) and are likely to require out-migration in
many cases (Locke, 2009), actual migration patterns in areas threatened by sea-level rises
are characterized as internal (Birk & Rasmussen, 2014; Campbell, 2014; Soraor & Routray,
2010) and are often temporal (Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Birk & Rasmussen, 2014). The lack of
out-migration can be explained by either the reported strong belonging to the land in islands
communities threatened by sea-levels rises (N=4) or geo-political obstacles. Moreover, one
could argue that the ecological tipping point for forced migration in the context of sea-level
rises has not yet been reached and within the decades to come entirely new findings on this
relationship will arise.
- SQ5: To what extent do sea-level rises lead to forced migration?
In summary, three case studies concluded that most migration could be viewed as voluntary
migration (N=3) and two studies argued that the movements could be considered compelled
migration (N=2). Reasons for characterizing sea-level rise-induced migration as voluntary
included: migratory decisions being made as an - be it last resort - adaption strategy (Brik &
Rasmussen, 2014) or ‘managed retreat’ (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010), and the planned
anticipatory nature of the movements in reaction to the slow-onset event of sea-level rises
(Nunn, 2013). In contrast, Locke (2009) and Marino & Lazrus (2015) adopted descriptions
fitting the compelled category in admitting the grey area between necessity of migration in the
face of future disaster-like threats and migratory decisions based on current economic
pressures.
- SQ6: What is the effect of droughts on migration?
Droughts have a significant impact on the livelihoods (N=10) of people (Black et al, 2013;
Cohen et al, 2013; Morrisey, 2014), which places stressors on household risk (Leighton, 2011;
Abu et al, 2013). In order to mitigate the impact of droughts on their livelihood and drawn by
economic opportunity elsewhere, households tend to decide to migrate or send one or more
members elsewhere to provide remittances (Andersen et al, 2010; Leighton, 2011; Raleigh &
Jordan, 2010). Interestingly, the relationship between poverty (and access to resources) and
56
droughts acts as a determinant for mobility when droughts deplete resources needed for
migration, resulting in a non-linear relationship between droughts and migration (see Figure
6.2). Besides the financial resources needed for migration, the importance of migrant networks
is also emphasized as mediating factors for mobility in terms of financial and advisory support.
Droughts can cause several security issues, namely: health-risks caused by unsanitary water
and prevalence of diseases such as malaria (Machoiri et al, 2012; Morrisey, 2014; Gila et al,
2010), food insecurity (Morrisey, 2014), and conflict (White, 2011; Black et al, 2013). Results
on this particular effect, however, were ambiguous. Overall, the vast majority of studies (N=12)
found droughts to be one of the factors driving migration, in conjunction with factors such as
poverty (N=7), dependency on ecosystem services (N=7), economic opportunity (N=3) and
political instability (N=3). As a result, authors have concluded that droughts triggers migration,
which then generally results into migratory patterns characterized as temporal, internal and
mostly occurring from rural to urban areas.
SQ7: To what extent do droughts lead to forced migration?
Voluntary migration was found to be the most prevalent volition of migration triggered by
drought as authors (i.e., Andersen et al, 2010; Black et al, 2013; Raleigh & Jordan, 2010;
Morrisey, 2014; Leighton, 2011; McLeman & Ploeger, 2011) considered the migratory
response to droughts to be adaptive, rather than forced. This does not imply that forced
migration is not triggered at all. In fact, various authors (i.e. Black et al, 2013; Gila et al, 2011)
found that while forced migration is unusual, it does occur in cases in which conflict is caused
or exacerbated by droughts (e.g., through resource scarcity). Interestingly, droughts were also
reported to decrease the resources needed to migrate, resulting in a group of people forced to
stay by Andersen et al (2010), Raleigh & Jordan (2010), Morrisey (2014) and Leighton (2011).
Tragically, it is the inability of those ‘forced to stay’ to migrate that appears to be the most
harmful for the population’s well-being.
57
8. Discussion
8.1 Making sense of the climate change and migration nexus
In short, four common themes emerged from the literature: Firstly, climate change does not
cause migration, but rather triggers migration in areas with pre-existing vulnerabilities and
hereby the interaction between climate change and migration functions as a nexus. Secondly,
only a relatively small portion of climate-induced migration is considered to be forced. Thirdly,
sudden-onset events are more likely to trigger forced migration than slow-onset events. Lastly,
the relationship between climate change and migration is likely non-linear as the effects of
climate change may diminish resources needed to migrate in response to climate change. Now
the question becomes how exactly these findings relate to the research question: What is the
effect of climate change on migration? And to what extent does climate change lead to forced
migration?’
Relating to the first theme, climate change was found to have a serious impact on livelihood
and security. Together with the anticipated risks of climate change, they form potential factors
for climate-induced migration. However, the relationship between climate change and
migration was also found to be (heavily) mediated by (mainly) economic factors (i.e. poverty,
income diversification, remittances and economic opportunity), political factors (i.e.
governance, sense of freedom, and political instability) and social factors (i.e. social and family
networks, historical mobility patterns, perceptions of climate change and migration, education).
The variation in the impact of climate change on different areas and communities due to these
factors is regarded as proof for multi-causality, since some areas are simply better equipped
(e.g., through sources of income, state governance etc.) to cope with climate change.
Naturally, it is logical to assume that migratory behavior would look different if the people in
the climate change ‘hot-spots’ did have access to alternative coping-strategies next to
migration. As a result, climate change is concluded to affect migration, but rarely as the main
driver and instead triggers migration in areas with pre-existing vulnerabilities (e.g., poverty),
when ecological tipping points are exceeded. In fact, the plurality of the studies in Chapters 3,
4, 5, and 6 all concluded that climate change only drives migration in conjunction with other
factors. The support of the conceptualization of climate-induced migration in a nexus and its
multi-causal (and arguably non-linear) relationship throughout this research presents a strong
argument for a paradigm shift from the ‘common sense approach’ to approaching climate-
induced migration as a nexus.
In addition, because the effect of climate change is so heavily mediated, research
concerning the climate migration nexus should be context specific (Hugo and Bardsley 2010;
58
Black, 2001; Castles, 2002), so that depending on factors such as dependency on ecosystem
services, policies can be drafted based on the specific needs of those affected by climate
change. More interestingly, the impact of climate change is not only based on the extent to
which those impacted by it can cope with it, but also the geographical and meteorological
circumstances in which climate change manifests itself. For example, areas close to the
equator are more greatly impacted by climate change (Beine & Parsons, 2015), which for a
large part can be explained by meteorological factors inherent to those areas interacting with
climate change, resulting into droughts and extreme weather events. Furthermore, in some
countries like Siberia and New-Zealand, higher temperatures might actually lead to positive
outcomes such as the possibility to cultivate new crops and extended growing seasons
(Castles & Rajah, 2010).
Then, one could also raise the question whether climate-induced migration and climate
refugees still hold up as theoretical concepts when the findings indicate that certain pre-
existing vulnerabilities in most cases explain the capacity of climate change to trigger
migration. In other words, does vulnerability to climate change constitute climate-induced
migration and, by extension, climate refugees? Firstly, since there is no commonly agreed
upon definition of either the concept of climate-induced migration or climate refugees and
different organizations uphold different requirements, offering a definitive answer is extremely
difficult. However, in Chapter 2 of this research, it was determined that both concepts required
climate change to be the main driver for migration. Considering that in only a small portion of
the studies climate change was found to be an equal or predominant driver for migration, one
would have to conclude that either the conceptualization for climate-induced migration is too
narrow or preferably that - as of yet - the terms are scientifically unsubstantiated and therefore
unhelpful. More, importantly, even though it is easy to sympathize with the compelling
normative argument made in favor of demanding protection and aid based on the concept
climate refuges, these efforts overlook the developmental issues that maintain vulnerabilities
to any number of threats besides climate change. Hence, it would be better to factor in climate
change as a vulnerability and contributing factor to migration for the development of policies
and sustainable aid.
The second theme concluded that - with the exception in the context of floods - only a relatively
small portion of migration triggered by climate change is considered to be forced and that
sudden-onset events are more likely to cause forced migration than slow-onset events. To a
great extent one does indeed agree and conclude that climate change in itself is not the main
factor for forced migration and rather factors such as poverty, conflict and governance appear
to predominantly determine vulnerability to climate change and in effect the type of migratory
behavior. It is noticeable, however, that a large portion of the studies (e.g., Barnett & Webber,
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2010) retain a somewhat limited conception of forced migration. For one, movements were
more easily considered forced migration in the case of the sudden-onset events of floods than
the case of slow-onset events such as droughts and sea-level rises. As discussed in Chapter
2, migratory decisions are considered adaptive if the migrant in question has ample time to
consider his decision or has alternative options are available. In the first instance it makes
sense that slow-onset events tend to be less prone to trigger forced migration, however, the
degree to which alternatives are available easily ventures into a grey area. The
conceptualization of forced migration by the IOM (2011) clearly states:
A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life
and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g., movements of
refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or
environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development
projects). (p. 1)
Here the categorization made by the authors becomes questionable. After all, political refugees
might also be given considerable time to plan their movements, yet due to the reasonable
likelihood of being persecuted are considered forced migrants. The most significant distinction
between the convention refugees and climate refugees is the presence of a clear and single
threat (i.e. the state) in the case of convention refugees, whereas climate refugees were found
to be threatened by a myriad of factors, including some non-climate change related. In other
words, it is possible that due to the historical and institutional narrative of forced migrants as
convention refugees, a blind spot is generated amongst academics in recognizing other forms
of forced migration that do not necessarily fit the master narrative. It is uncertain how and to
what extent this issue may have affected the results of this research, though it raises interesting
questions with regards to the discourse and normativity of forced migration.
What is also quite disconcerting is the argument propelled by several authors (e.g.
Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Black, 2001) who confirm the relationship by examining historical
migratory patterns in response to the environment, yet also conclude that climate-induced
migration is simply part of a communities lifestyle and cultural identity. But does that mean
these movements should be seen as a historically endorsed adaptation strategy? On the one
hand, as argued by Hugo (2010): “mobility is likely to be seen more as an option in communities
with a history of movement and active migration networks” (p. 21). On the other hand, one fails
recognize as to why a historical legacy of migration in response to environmental change -
such as the human mobility patterns of the ice-age period 13,000 years ago (see Piguet 2010)
or the migratory behavior of nomadic pastoralists a thousand years ago in imperial China (see
McLeman and Brown, 2011) - should necessarily be informative of the nature of migratory
behavior of modern people today. Simply because migration has been part of human survival
strategies throughout our existence, does not imply they are still applicable to modern ways of
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living or that migration in response climate change is ‘a part of life’ and therefore should be
seen as a voluntary adaptive strategy. Admittedly, communities such as the Tuvaluans in the
Pacific area threatened by sea-level rises, have a long-standing history with short-term
migration between Islands and have retained their identity as a migratory people throughout
history (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). At the same time most communities living on the pacific
islands also have a very strong connection with their land and as a result are reluctant to leave
their homes behind to pursue out-migration (Raleigh & Jordan, 2010). More strikingly, in the
section on floods, it was explicitly found that even though populations may have a long history
with floods, they do not simply ‘live’ or ‘cope’ with floods, instead they have been reported to
suffer great losses and even deaths due to floods (Findlay & Geddes, 2011).
Lastly, this research found that climate change may actually decrease migration by
diminishing the resources needed for migration. This was most prominently found in droughts,
but is also supported by the results in the context of floods, in which people are either left
behind or return to the flood-stricken areas due to a lack of better alternatives. Throughout the
literature and within the political discourse, the problem is generally represented to be the
migratory movements themselves responding to climate change. Tragically, the ‘poorest of the
poor’ are the groups of people that are already the most vulnerable and it is their immobility –
not the perils of migration – that heightens their vulnerability in contexts of climate change.
This group has been abhorrently underrepresented in the climate change and migration nexus,
which is why this research has sought to expand the continuum for climate-induced migration
with the category of those ‘forced to stay’. Herewith, this research hopes to promote their
inclusion into research and policy-making.
8.2 Research limits & knowledge gaps
The results of this research have also been influenced by various research limits. The first and
foremost limitation with regards to this research is that it does not generate new knowledge
and is therefore dependent on the research of others. This can be highly problematic as the
field of climate-induced migration is often accused of lacking a common language (White,
2011), conceptualization (Piguet et al, 2011), theoretical models and methodologies (White,
2011). This is not only an obstacle for the purpose of combining data and research outcomes,
but also plagues the overall reliability of the results based on the selected literature.
Fortunately, these issues are not lost on most authors, who underline the issues that plague
the field of climate-induced migration and how this effects their own work.
The following are issues that may have affected the reliability of the collected studies:
Firstly, authors seem to experience great trouble with consistently separating climate-induced
factors for migration and environmental drivers for migration in general. For instance, this
research excluded the report on environmental migration by Renaud et al (2007) from its data
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analysis as the climate-driven factors (extreme weather events excluded) for migration - in
one’s opinion - could not be sufficiently disentangled from the environmentally driven causes.
Nonetheless, this research appears in some papers (mostly in theoretical frameworks) as a
source confirming the relationship between climate change and (international) migration, whilst
the analysis includes non-climate change induced factors (i.e., environmental factors) such as
natural disasters (e.g., earthquake, tsunami, volcanic eruptions). In most cases,
conceptualizations are simply vague; for example, Andersen et al (2010) in some of their
graphs do not specify what types of natural disasters are included in their analysis, which
makes it challenging to distinguish climate induced factors from environmentally driven
migratory outcomes.
Secondly, the lack of established methodologies to measure climate-induced migration
proves very challenging, for quantitative research especially, to determine the strength and
validity of the relationship. For example, Uddin (2013) uses ‘calorie intake’ to determine well-
being as the independent variable to measure the effect of climate change on well-being. On
would argue that calorie intake is a rather weak indicator for well-being as it opens the door for
a great number of mediating factors and spurious relationships (e.g., is your well-being
unaffected by climate change if you are still consuming 2000/2500 calories whilst your house
is engulfed by the ocean or you were injured due to the floods?).
Thirdly, the use of somewhat feeble conceptualizations is not only due to an
undeveloped conceptual framework, but should also be ascribed to an all-together lack of data
on climate-induced migration. Mostly, data on African states appear scarce (Black et al, 2013),
longitudinal and historical information in particular (White, 2011). One issue regarding data-
availability, that was not widely mentioned or noted by authors, is the inclusion of the most
vulnerable people in empirical data. While researchers often refer to the group ‘poorest of the
poor’ as the ones assumed to be most impacted by climate change, it remains unclear if these
people are actually included in the data-sets. Especially when using national data – which a
great many of studies do - the outcomes are irrevocably skewed as the poorest of the poor
and other marginalized groups are often not taken into account in surveys or simply have not
even been registered as citizens at all. For instance, in Bangladesh people living on Chars (i.e.
small river islands that are formed by sedimentation) are not included in the national censuses
(Asian Development Bank, 2009), which is problematic as these populations suffer greatly
from floods that destroy their lands and homes (Haq, 2014). In addition, only a handful of
authors mentions the political barriers for out-migration and none factored this variable into
their actual research (e.g., interviews or statistical analysis). This is remarkable as climate-
induced migration in the literature is characterized as typically internal migration, for which one
would imagine political barriers and as a result a lack of migration opportunities, could be a
significant explanatory factor. Interestingly, family networks are often considered as facilitators
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for out-migration via family-reunification (and by providing resources), functioning as a method
of overcoming said political barriers.
Fifthly, the literature review is conducted on the basis of materials exclusively published
in English and Dutch, and while English is considered to be the predominant academic
language (Altbach, 2007) it does limit the inclusion of non-English sources. This is especially
problematic considering that areas severely impacted by climate change (e.g., the Horn of
Africa) might not produce or translate reports in English. While arguably the core texts and
studies with regards to climate-induced migration are included in this research, it could be
possible different results would have been generated if sources from a richer language palette
were included. In addition, this language restriction could also have led to a predominately
Western perspective on the issue area.
Furthermore, even though considerable time and funds were invested in obtaining the
literature, its collection was limited to the availability of the (online) database of the Royal Dutch
Library (Koninklijke Bibliotheek van Nederland) and the IBL system (the Dutch Inter Library
Loan System). Thus, there is the possibility that results could vary due the differences in the
availability in other databases of studies relating to the effect of climate change on migration.
Lastly, since this research has opted to approach the issue of climate-induced migration
and climate refugees from a sociological perspective, issue may arise with regards the
transferability of its results in the legal field. This implies that in all likelihood legal scholars will
have re-categorize the findings of this research and re-conceptualize its empirical framework
to suit research purposes of legal studies and policy-making.
In final, this research concludes that the effect of climate change on migration is very
context specific and should thus be approached as such in research and policy-making.
Neither climate-induced (forced) migration and climate refugees as conceptualized in this
thesis were found to be have a solid empirical basis. Instead, developmental issues are
generally the factors that maintain vulnerabilities to any number of threats besides climate
change. Hence, it would be better to factor in climate change as one of the causes for
vulnerability and contributing factor to migration for the development of policies and
sustainable aid.
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9. Recommendations Even though the amount of empirical studies on the relationship between climate change and
migration has risen considerably since the new millennial, one would like to underscore the
remaining lack of an empirical framework. More specifically, empirical data is needed in the
following areas:
• Routes and destinations of migration induced and triggered by climate change.
• Context specific and regional case studies that offer more practical insights into to the
effect of climate change on migration and resilience strategies.
• The development of typologies based on vulnerabilities (e.g., poverty), climate change
induced contexts (e.g., floods, droughts etc.), and victim needs (e.g., access to
resources, health care).
• Gendered perspectives on climate-induced migration, since various forms of migratory
response to climate change such as labor migration more often feature male rather
than female migrants.
• (National) data on African countries.
• Longitudinal data sets in order to gain insights into the increasing effect of climate
change and to accurately map the temporality of migration (e.g., circular migration,
permanent resettlement etc.)
• Marginalized populations that are excluded from national data-sets.
• People and communities ‘forced to stay’ due to the effects of climate change.
Furthermore, the cultivation of a greater understanding of the relationship between climate
change and migration is also severely hindered by the absence of common academic
language conceptualizing the climate change and migration nexus. It is therefore essential for
the cultivation of the understanding of the climate change migration nexus that key scholars
and organizations within the field of climate induced migration are to agree on common
academic language and terminology, and more importantly, offer solid methodological
approaches that enable researchers to contribute to the empirical framework of climate
induced migration in a structural way. In particular, better and more integrative options are
needed for systematic data collection and compatibility of studies.
Lastly, interviewing methods should be improved to better record respondent’s
experiences and migratory decisions. Several empirical studies based on surveys and
interviews (e.g., Birk & Rasmussen, 2014; Soroar & Routray, 2010) initially report extremely
low percentages of climate drive migratory decisions, however, when asking more relatable
and tangible questions more affirmative response were recorded. Moreover, as noted by
Pemberton (2014), most victims of climate change are unaware of the underlying causality
64
between climate change and their circumstances. Hence, it would be advisable to construct
questions that are compatible with the worldview of respondents.
While the expansion of empirical knowledge on the climate change and migration nexus is
desirable for academic purposes, this research concludes that examining the link for the
establishment of climate refugee rights is - at this point - ungrounded. As explained in the
introduction, the type of migration (i.e. forced or voluntary) is argued to be crucial in the
construction of a legal status of those displaced by climate change. In other words, “whether
or not climate refugees exist, has come to be interpreted as whether or not environmental
change can cause (or worse, force) human migration” (Morrisey, 2008, p. 39). Since no
substantive link between climate change and migration - and in extent climate refugees as a
distinctive group - could be established within the requirements set of this research, perhaps
the question now becomes how to develop better protective standards and policies can be
developed for the protection of those displaced in the climate change and migration nexus?
First and foremost, policies surrounding the climate change and migration nexus should
be focused on mitigating the vulnerabilities to and induced by climate change, in which the
agency of its benefactors is promoted. This includes the following:
1) Raising awareness and providing education for people in risk zones about the potential
risks of climate change and how to mitigate those. In context of (forced) resettlement
plans, evacuees should be well informed, have the opportunity to legal representation
and should be guaranteed informed consent.
2) Holistic approaches to development and support of adaption. Since the impacts of
climate change are determined by a wide variety of developmental contexts, the
approach to mitigating the effects and developmental aid should feature a broad
approach to diminishing vulnerability. This includes: education, poverty-relief, basic
services (e.g., health clinics, clean water), security measures (e.g., fortification of
homes and alarm-systems), promoting socio-economic development, investing in
infrastructure and the support of adaption strategies such as income diversification and
assisted migration.
3) Improving governmental resettlement and relocation plans by offering sufficient basic
services at the resettlement location such as sanitation, electricity, infrastructure etc,
opportunities for livelihood, and safety. Moreover, the evacuees should be involved in
the relocation process to ensure that cultural heritage is preserved.
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11. Appendices. Appendix 1. PRISMA-Protocol (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic review and Meta-Analysis Protocols)*
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION Title:
Identification 1a Climate Refugees: Flight from nature, man or both? A systematic literature review exploring the effect of climate change on forced migration in contexts of floods, sea-level rises and droughts.
Update 1b Not relevant Registration 2 Not relevant Authors:
Contact 3a Danielle Spierings MSc
Contributions 3b Thesis Supervisor: Prof.dr. Conny Rijken Amendments 4 No amendments Support:
Sources 5a Not relevant Sponsor 5b Not relevant Role of sponsor or funder 5c Not relevant
INTRODUCTION Rationale 6 There is a lack of consensus with regards to existence and prevalence of climate change induced forced migration
and in extent climate refugees as a distinct vulnerable group in need of specific policy address and rights (McNamara, 2007, McAdam, 2012; Bierman & Boas, 2010). One of the main drives for this debate is the disagreement on the effect of climate change on migratory behaviour (Dun & Gemenne, 2008; McNamara, 2007; Wood, 2001), especially considering the issue of multi-causality (McAdam, 2012; Wood, 2001). In addition, there’s also a degree of uncertainty and disagreement to what extent these climate-induced factors lead to forced migration instead of more voluntary forms of migration (Dun & Gemenne, 2008). This scholarly discord surrounding the climate change and migration nexus proves to be a significant obstacle in the protection of a large group of vulnerable people. Hence, the debate on the effect climate change on forced migration should perhaps precede the discussion on the effectiveness and legality of establishing climate refugees a distinct category of refugees entitled to certain rights. Hence, this research performs a systematic literature review to uncover the effect of climate change on migration and the volition thereof. Herewith, it seeks to to contribute comprehensive
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and structural knowledge of the scholarly debate surrounding the climate change and migration nexus and offer a new and expanded framework for the analysis and evaluation of empirical studies on the effect of climate change on migration for future research.
Objectives 7 By mapping out the effect of climate change on forced migration the basis of a systematic literature review this study hopes to fulfill the following aims: (1) Firstly, this study aims to contribute comprehensive and structural knowledge of the scholarly debate surrounding the climate change and migration nexus. (2) Secondly, this study aims to provide a new and expanded framework for the analysis and evaluation of empirical studies on the effect of climate change on migration.
METHODS Eligibility criteria 8
Information sources 9 The literature was obtained via the WorldCat search engine), by collecting both online and hardcopy sources
made available in the online database of the Royal Dutch Library (Koninklijke Bibliotheek van Nederland). Furthermore, extensive use was made of the IBL system (the Dutch Inter Library Loan System) through which hardcopies are ordered from libraries throughout the Netherlands, including well-stocked international institutes such as the Peace Palace Library (Bibliotheek Vredespaleis Den Haag).
Search strategy 10 In the data-collection phase search terms such as: ‘climate change’, ‘human displacement’, ‘(forced) migration’, ‘climate refugees’ (and all variations of that term), ‘floods’, ‘sea-level rises’, ‘droughts’, ‘impact climate change’, ‘environmental change’, ‘vulnerabilities’, and various combinations and variations of these terms were used. Then, terms such as ‘linkages’, ‘nexus’, ‘effect(s)’, ‘relationship’, ‘(literature) review’, and ‘meta-analysis’ were also combined with the search terms above. Lastly, as advised by Greenhalgh & Peekock (2005), the snow-ball-method is employed by also using the references found in the obtained literature to optimize the effectiveness of the data collection process. Search limits can be derived from the recording of the data collection process in appendix 2.
Study records: Data management 11a During the data collection in the identification, screening and eligibility phase tabs will be kept on the number of
studies selected through the Prisma flow chart in figure 1. During the full-text analysis of any given study, literature may be rejected from the literature population and will be marked as such in the data matrix. The data
Table 1.1 Major variables for screening and determining the eligibility of the literature during data collection
Study
Focus of Climate change Type of migration
Type of study Methods Language
Publication Date
Codename General Migration Conceptual Qualitative English After 2000study Sea-level rises Forced Migration Empirical Quantitative Dutch
Floods Involunatary migration Literature Mixed MethodsDroughts Adaption Critique Review
Displacement Case-studies
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from the literature will be extracted and collected in accordance with the Table 1.1. and Table 2.2. and organized in excel formats within the text (i.e. figures 3.1, 4.1, 5.1. and 6.1; and tables: 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.1., 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4)
Selection process 11b After the search-terms were entered, only Dutch and English sources selected and were manually screened on the basis on their title and abstract. Hereafter, the selected sources were evaluated for eligibility by assessing them in terms of relevance and usefulness according to the following factors (for a detailed overview please consult Table 1.1): Firstly, the study had to have direct relevance to the issue of climate-induced migration in general or in relation to one or more of the selected climate change effects (i.e. floods, sea-level rising, and droughts). Secondly, while sources from a wide spectrum were collected, all studies required to have some sort of an empirical basis. This includes literature reviews and case studies using secondary data, but excludes normative and legal studies as they do not offer an empirical assessment of climate-induced migration. Furthermore, only studies after the year 2000 were eligible to be able to represent the relatively recent state of affairs concerning climate-induced migration. A schematic representation of the data collection process can be consulted in Figure 1.
Data collection process 11c The data will be collected and compared in Excel following the key-data items of Table 2.1. and organized in their respective tables (i.e. figures 3.1, 4.1, 5.1. and 6.1; and tables: 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.1., 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4)
Data items 12 The data items to be extracted from the literature population can be consulted in Table. 1.2. Further information on the definitions of said data-items can be consulted in chapter 1.
Outcomes and prioritization 13 Not relevant, this research is predominately explorative has not included hypotheses. Risk of bias in individual studies 14 The literature was organized and analyzed by firstly, making an overview in excel of the studies for each of three
main categories of climate change effects (i.e. floods, sea-level risings, and droughts) and the section on the debate surrounding the climate change and migration nexus. Hereafter, key terms and statistics were delineated in terms of various factors either mediating or inducing climate change induced forced migration. In evaluating the quality of the studies, the following factors were taken into account: The methodology, strength of empirical evidence, objectivity (e.g., inclusion of contradictory evidence), and overall persuasiveness and value of the work. Other factors thought to be influential to the relation between climate change and migration was also noted.
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Data synthesis 15a
15b Not relevant (no quantitative data synthesis performed) 15c Not relevant (no subgroup analyses or meta-regression performed) 15d The qualitative synthesis of this research consists out of 4 distinct parts in which first a synthesis will be made of
the debate on the climate change and migration nexus is offered. Then, the following three chapters will comprehensively condense the studies of each of climate induced contexts (i.e. droughts, floods, and sea-level rises) and (forced) migration. Hereafter, the results are summarized and a conclusion and extensively discussed. Additionally, recommendations based on the results are offered at the end of this research.
Meta-bias(es) 16 After the individual assessment of the selected studies, this research identified common and divergent threads and patterns within the literature and determined possible knowledge gaps that may have affected the reliability of the literature population. In addition, Close attention will be paid to the objectivity of the studies by assessing the inclusion of contradictory evidence and by identifying possible publication biases. Nonetheless, the following research biases may occur: The, literature systematic review is conducted on the basis of materials exclusively published in English and Dutch, and while English is considered to be the predominant academic language (Altbach, 2007) it does limit the inclusion of non-English sources, especially considering that area’s severely impacted by climate change (e.g., the Horn of Africa) might not produce or translate reports in English. Moreover, this language restriction could also lead to a predominately Western perspective on the issue area.
Table 1.2. Key data items for qualitative synthesis of the literature populationFocus of Climate change
Type of migration
Methods Climate induced Factors for migration
Suggested strength effect climate change on migration
Extent of Forced Migration
General Migration Qualitative x x xSea-level rises
Forced Migration
QuantitativeFloods Voluntary
MigrationMixed Methods
Droughts Adaptation ReviewDisplacement Case-study
Mediating factors for climate induced migration
non-climate induced factors for migration
Suggested strength non-climate change induced factors
Key statistics Objectivity & Strength of the argument/ persuaviness
Peer-reviewed/grey literature
x x x x x x
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On that previous note, while one would argue that the core texts and studies with regards to climate induced migration are included in this research, limiting the language of the studies to English and Dutch could also affect the reliability of this study. Admittedly, it could be possible different results are generated when including sources from a richer language palette. Furthermore, even though the researcher has invested considerable time and funds in obtaining the literature population, the use of the literature was limited to the availability of the (online) database of the Royal Dutch Library (Koninklijke Bibliotheek van Nederland) and the IBL system (the Dutch Inter Library Loan System). Again, there is the possibility that results could vary due the differences in the availability of studies in other databases relating to the effect of climate change on migration.
Confidence in cumulative evidence
17 The confidence of the cumulative evidence was based on the heterogeneity and consistency between studies, directness of the evidence presented and the overall assessment of the risk-biases in individual studies, across studies and meta-biases.
* This Prisma Protocol format (2015 version) has been derived from: Shamseer L, Moher D, Clarke M, Ghersi D, Liberati A, Petticrew M, Shekelle P, Stewart L, PRISMA-P Group (2015). Preferred reporting items for systematic review and meta-analysis protocols (PRISMA-P) 2015: elaboration and explanation. BMJ. 2015 Jan 2;349(jan02 1):g7647.
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Appendix 2. Systematic literature search
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Appendix 3. Literature selection
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