climate security index

8/3/2019 Climate Security Index

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A M E R I C A N S E C U R I T Y P R O J E C

CLIMATESECURITY

INDEX

Bernard I. Finel and Christine Bartlf



The American Security Project is organized around the

belie that honest public discussion o national security

requires a better-inormed citizenry — one that under-

stands the dangers and opportunities o the twenty-frst

century and the spectrum o available policy responses.

Security is a undamental responsibility o government.

In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security

policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats

to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but

the United States has not built alliances or institutions

to protect and advance American security. Terrorists

have expanded their reach and lethality, but the moral

authority o the United States is at an all-time low.

Changes in the Earth’s climate are more evident every

day, but the United States has ailed to act, alone or with

allies, to avoid disaster.

America needs a new national security vision or this new

era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is real-

istic. Yet the quality o our discussion on national security

has been diminished. Fear has trumped conversation.

Artifcial dierences have been created and real dier-

ences have been let unexamined. The character o our

national dialogue has grown increasingly shrill while the

need or honest discussion has grown more urgent.

Only by developing real analysis and thoughtul answers

can a genuine oreign policy consensus be rebuilt or

a dangerous and decisive age. Only then will America

again marshal all her resources — military, diplomatic,

economic, and moral — to meet the challenges o a

complex world.

MISSIoN

Changes in the

Earth’s climate are

more evident every

day, but the United

States has failed to

act, alone or with

allies, to avoid

disaster.



climate security initiative

The HonorableGary Hart

ASP Chaiman

Brigadier GeneralStephen A. Cheney,USMC (Ret.)

Maine Militay

Academy

Nelson W.Cunningham

McLaty Assciates

The HonorableRichard L. Armitage

Amitage

Intenatinal

Lieutenant GeneralDaniel Christman,USA (Ret.)

United States

Chambe

Cmmece

Kenneth M.Duberstein

The Dubestein Gup

Vice Admiral LeeGunn, USN (Ret.)

ASP Pesident

The HonorableChuck Hagel

United States Senate

General Lester L.Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

The Lyles Gup

Ed Reilly

FD Intenatinal

Lieutenant GeneralClaudia Kennedy,USA (Ret.)

Ppulatin Actin

Intenatinal

The HonorableJohn Kerry

United States Senate

Board of directors

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman

Stnebidge-

Intenatinal L LC

A M E R I C A N S E C U R I T Y P R O J E C T




climate security indeX

This examination o the national security implications o climatechange adds an important piece to the public debate — a piece

that has been missing or too long. Addressing the consequences

o changes in the Earth’s climate is not simply about saving polar bears

or preserving the beauty o mountain glaciers, important as those are.

Climate change is a threat to our national security. Taking it head on is

about preserving our way o lie.

The consequences o climate change will be ound, and are being

ound now around the world. New climate conditions will drive human

beings to move in ever larger numbers, seeking ood, water, shelter

and work. No region will be immune. Climate reugees will increasingly

cross our own borders. The stress o changes in the environment will

urther weaken marginal states. Failing states will incubate extremism.

In South Asia, the melting o Himalayan glaciers jeopardizes resh water

supplies or more than one billion human beings. In North America,

agriculture could be disrupted by increases in temperatures and shiting

weather patterns that limit rainall. Globally, major urban centers could

be threatened by rising sea levels. Malaria and other tropical diseases

are moving into new areas, and outbreaks are increasing in requency as

Addessing the

cnsequences

changes in the

Eath’s climate is

nt simply abut

saving pla beas

peseving the beauty

muntain glacies,

imptant as thse

ae. Climate change

is a theat t u

natinal secuity.

Vice AdmirAl lee Gunn

(U.S. Navy, Retired)

President, American Security Project

I spent 35 years in uniorm serving our nation around the world

in the United States Navy. I entered the Navy during the Vietnam

War and retired ater the Berlin Wall ell. I helped evacuate UN

orces rom Somalia, weathered enormous storms at sea, oversaw

many billions o dollars o the Navy budget, and I have seen

threats materialize rom crowds that, the moment beore, looked

like peaceul civilians.

I have also seen the incredible power o the United States military,

and I have been humbled by the challenges we’ve aced, even

with that mighty military, in dealing with complex emergencies,

whether they are caused by corrupt leaders or nature’s ury.

So it is with this perspective that I write to introduce this report

rom the American Security Project. The scientifc community is

warning us about a new threat to our security — a threat I believe

is still misunderstood and underappreciated — but a threat to

which we must respond. The threat is climate change.

introduction




climate security initiative

and that Navy ships are designed to last 30 to 50 years. With

these extended time-rames, a basing structure secure rom

threats posed by climate as well as more traditional oes is

a real national security consideration. W st atiipat

w ad visd issios o o iitay os ad

ato thos ito o aatios o th osqs o

iat hag o Aia’s atioa sity.

AlliAnces

The Arctic is a prime example o how alliances will be orced

to adapt to the realities o climate change. Just a ew years

ago, the scientic community was predicting that the Arctic

wouldn’t be ice-ree until the middle o this century. Now the

predictions put that date at 2013; just our years rom now.

In the Arctic, the loss o sea-ice has caused concern in the

U.S. Navy or nearly a decade. What naval planners know

is that loss o sea-ice at the North Pole has the potential to

increase commercial and military activity by other powers. As

i we needed any evidence o this, look no urther than the

2007 expedition by Russia to plant its fag in the sea-bed at

the North Pole. Not surprisingly, Canada, Norway, Denmark,

and the United States — all nations bordering on the arctic

— responded critically to Russia’s actions. Undeterred, Russia

recently declared her intention to parachute troops into the

vicinity o the Pole as an exercise.

New climate conditions, new geographic realities, changes

in economic and commercial circumstances, and pressures

o migrating populations; all will test old alliances. Some

changes may create new international riendships that will

depend on America’s ability to help smooth the turmoil

associated with those changes. Supporting other nations’

successes will continue to be an important part o our

military’s role in U.S. national security.

Climate change poses a clear and present danger to the

United States o America. But i we respond appropriately,

I believe we will enhance our security, not simply by averting

the worst climate change impacts, but by spurring a new

energy revolution.

The report that ollows seeks to document both some o the

core evidence or the reality o climate change and many o

the likely security implications. It highlights the undamental

problem o reliance on ossil uels to power our economy. And

it provides a compelling call to action and an outline o some

o the most promising potential responses. I, ater reading

this report, you eel as compelled to act as I do, I hope you

will join us at the American Security Project to chart a new

course to ensure our nation remains prosperous and secure.

the planet warms and weather patterns change. All o this is

just the oretaste o a bitter cup rom which we can expect to

drink should we ail to address, urgently, the threats posed by

climate change to our national security.

A changing and uncertain climate will demand we adapt

to new conditions aecting:

Why we apply our nation’s power (in all its orms),

around the world,

How and where specically our military is likely to

have to ght,

The issues driving alliance relationships (and whom

are we likely to nd on our side on the battleeld).

Why We Apply poWer

Climate change will orce changes in “why” the United States

gives aid, supports governments, provides assistance, and

anticipates natural and manmade disasters, or goes to war.

It will do so because iat hag thats st

ad xtis as optitio o dwidig sos,

spiay wat, spads. Weak or poorly unctioning

governments will lose credibility and the support o their

citizens. Under these conditions, extremists will increasingly

nd willing recruits. In particular, climate change will certainly

expand the number o humanitarian relie and disaster

assistance operations acing the international community.

America’s men and women in uniorm will be called on

increasingly to help in these operations directly and to support

the work o legitimate governments and non-governmental

organizations alike.

hoW We Fight

Climate change will orce changes in how we operate our

orces around the world; changes will eect ground opera-

tions and logistics as well as operations at sea and in the air.

Sea level rise threatens large investments in U.S. acilities

around the world. Desertication and shits in the avail-

ability o water can change logistic patterns drastically or

all our orces. The fexibility o America’s military will be

tested, with our orces rendering aid, supporting peaceul

solutions to tough problems, and pivoting to combat i and

when necessary.

These challenges are not insurmountable. But they will be

expensive to address and have to be thought through careully

lest a prousion o missions impact readiness. In any case,

conronting changes in the military’s operating environment

and mission set may lead to somewhat dierent decisions

about U.S. orce structure. Consider that it takes 20 or more

years to build a new aircrat or the U.S. Air Force or Navy





Even when climates

changed slwly,

in espnse t

gadual centuies-

millennia-lng

cycles, species died

ut and civilizatins

cllapsed.




CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCES


The overwhelming consensus o climate scientists is

that increased greenhouse gases in the atmosphere

— particularly carbon dioxide (CO2) — are transorming

global climate. While it is true that CO2

levels have varied

over time, there is compelling evidence that current trends

are both unprecedented and man-made.

Scientists have been able to reconstruct several millennia

worth o atmospheric records by examining ice cores drawn

rom miles-deep ice sheets.1 These records show a constant

uctuation o CO2

levels, ranging rom roughly 200 parts per

million (PPM) to roughly 300 PPM. Over an ice core record o

800,000 years, scientists have never ound any levels signif-

cantly higher than 300 ( PPM) — until now. In the 1950s,CO

2levels were recorded above 300 PPM. They have risen

consistently since, and are now approaching 400 PPM.2

Total carbon dioxide emissions doubled between 1900 and

1950. They increased nearly our-old between 1950 and

2000. Today, human activity is responsible or producing

nearly 20 billion tons o carbon dioxide annually.3 Roughly

orty-fve percent o that total remains trapped in the atmo-

sphere, while the remaining fty-fve percent is absorbed

by plants, land, and oceans.4 There is no doubt that this

increased level of carbon dioxide emissions is responsible

for the dramatic increase in atmospheric carbon abovelevels recorded over the past million years.

The connection between carbon dioxide levels in the atmo-

sphere — as well as the increase in other “greenhouse”

gases which only exist due to industrial activity — and

climate change is also increasingly a matter o settled scien-

tifc act.5 Greenhouse gases trap heat in the atmosphere.

This causes temperatures to rise globally, with the most

extreme temperature increases at the poles. High tempera-

tures reduce the extent o seasonal ice. In the northern

hemisphere, the Northwest Passage rom the Atlantic to the

Pacifc was ice ree in 2006 or the frst time in centuries.6

In the southern hemisphere, huge chunks o the Antarctic

ice shel have broken up and oated away over the past

decade and there is increasing concern over the status o

the massive West Antarctic ice sheet.7 Less ice results in

less sunlight reected back into space and more sunlight

absorbed by now ice-ree expanses o land and sea.8 This

promotes urther warming. At this point, global warming is

a sel-reinorcing process, a vicious cycle that threatens to

transorm the earth’s climate dramatically.

The earth’s climate has undergone several major transorma-

tions in its history. But or the most part, change has been

gradual enough or the planet’s creatures to adapt over

time. Animals migrated to more welcoming climates and

plants adapted and spread as the environment changed.

But even these broad adaptations were marked by tremen-

dous destruction. Climate change throughout history has

been a signifcant orce in the expansion and extinction o

species.9 Noting that the climate has changed in the past

is not a source of comfort, but rather a warning about

the fragility of our reliance on an interconnected web ofclimate-constrained habitats.

Indeed, even within the historical record, there are numerous

instances o climate change leading to massive political

upheaval.10 Many scholars attribute the movement o the

Huns and the Mongols to changes in the climate o the

Eurasian steppes. The Mayan civilization collapsed under the

stress o climate change, as did Native American civilizations

in the American Southwest.11

Even when climates changed slowly, in response to gradualcenturies- or millennia-long cycles, species died out and

civilizations collapsed.

But now we live in a world o rapid climate change due to

human activity. And we live in a world with more people than

ever. The consequences o the best case assumptions are

dire, o the worst, they are catastrophic.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CONSEQUENCES





GreenHouse Gas emissions

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC) has determined that greenhouse gas emis-

sions are very likely to have caused modern climate

change occurring since the 1950s.12 Specically, emissions

increase greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere,

which cause temperature levels to increase by trapping

heat. The increase in temperature creates other climate

changes including sea level increases, changes in precipita-

tion patterns, desertication, fooding, and extreme weatherdiscussed in other sections o this report. lookig at g-

hos gas issios is tho sstia wh osid-

ig iat hag, its ipats, ad ways to itigat it.

CO2

makes up 70% o total greenhouse gas emissions and

thus is the primary contributor to climate change.13 The

majority o CO2

comes rom the combustion o ossil uels

or electricity generation and transportation. CO2

levels in the

atmosphere have spiked to levels signicantly higher than

any measured over the last 800 millennia. Globally, CO2

levels

have risen sharply since the mid-nineteenth century as a

consequence o the Industrial Revolution.

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 M i l l i o n M e t r i c T o n s o f C a r b o n

1 7 5 1

1 7 5 8

1 7 6 5

1 7 7 2

1 7 7 9

1 7 8 6

1 7 9 3

1 8 0 0

1 8 0 7

1 8 1 4

1 8 2 1

1 8 2 8

1 8 3 5

1 8 4 2

1 8 4 9

1 8 5 6

1 8 6 3

1 8 7 0

1 8 7 7

1 8 8 4

1 8 9 1

1 8 9 8

1 9 0 5

1 9 1 2

1 9 1 9

1 9 2 6

1 9 3 3

1 9 4 0

1 9 4 7

1 9 5 4

1 9 6 1

1 9 6 8

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 2

1 9 8 9

1 9 9 6

2 0 0 3

Year

SoUrCE: http:// cdiac.nl.gv/tends/emis/te_glb.html

World Carbon Emissions From Fossil-Fuels

400

350

300

250

200

150

900,000BC 800,000BC 700,000BC 600,000BC 500,000BC 400,000BC 300,000BC 200,000BC 100,000BC 2009

Year

p p m v

CO2

Levels

1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006

Year

400

350

300

250

200

150

p p m v

CO2

Levels Over Last 50 Years

SoUrCE: Maland, G., T.A. Bden, and r.J. Andes. 2008. Glbal, reginal, and Natinal FssilFuel Co

2Emissins. In Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change . Cabn Dixide Inmatin

Analysis Cente, oak ridge Natinal Labaty, U.S. Depat ment Enegy, oak ridge, Tenn., U.S.A.

CO2

Levels Over Last 800 Millennia

geenhoe ae h a abon doxde ae a majo ae o lmae hane. cabon

doxde level n he amophee ae enly 30% hhe han a any pon n he pamllon yea and ae pojeed o neae.




climate cHanGe and conseQuences

chia ad th uitd Stats a th highst itts o

cO2. eah otibts w ov th tis th goba cO

2

issios o rssia, th xt agst itt. However,

when CO2

emissions are measured per capita, the United

States ranks 9th and China 82nd.14 Wealthy oil nations make

up our o the ve top emitters per capita with Qatar nearly

producing more than double America’s emissions on a per

capita basis. These countries typically have relatively small

populations and hydrocarbon intensive economies ocusing

on the extraction o petroleum. They also have high energy

needs due to their climates. Several European states with

high population density also emit signicant amounts o CO2

on a per capita basis.

CO2

emissions increased consistently around the world

between the 1960s and 1980s. A brie dip in emissions

associated with the recession o the early 1980s and

increased emphasis on uel economy ollowing the 1970s

oil shocks was ollowed by steady renewed growth in the

1990s.15 Western Europe has or the most part stabilized

its CO2

emission rate, while China recently overtook the

United States.

In addition to CO2, methane also is a signicant contributor

to climate change, making up an estimated 24% o totalgreenhouse gas emissions.16 Slightly over hal o methane

emissions come rom human activity, typically rom the

extraction o natural gas elds. But methane also comes

rom more mundane things, such as decaying trash in solid

waste landlls. While methane makes up a signicantly lower

percentage o overall emissions, it is 21 times more powerul

at warming the atmosphere than CO2. Additionally, methane

dissipates rom the atmosphere in 12 years. In comparison,

CO2

takes nearly one hundred years to dissipate.17 As a

consequence, policies to control or harness methane emis-

sions could have a signicant short-term impact, but in

the long-run addressing carbon emissions will be a crucialelement o managing climate change. International debate

over measures to reduce CO2

will refect these statistics and

play an important role in shaping the positions o individual

governments in the debate.

C h i n a

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

R u s s i a n F e d e r a t i o n

I n d i a

J a p a n

G e r m a n y

C a n a d a

U n i t e d K i n g d o m

S o u t h K o r e a

I r a n

M e x i c o

I t a l y

S o u t h A f r i c a

S a u d i A r a b i a

I n d o n e s i a

O t h e r A f r i c a

A u s t r a l i a

F r a n c e

B r a z i l

S p a i n

O t h e r M i d d l e E a s t

U k r a i n e

P o l a n d

T h a i l a n d

T u r k e y

1,800,000

1,600,000

1,400,000

1,200,000

1,000,000

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

0

T h o u s a n d T o n s

o f C a r b o n

SoUrCE: Cabn Dixide Inmatin Analysis Cente (CDIAC)

CO2

Emissions

Qatar

Kuwait

United Arab Emirates

Bahrain

Trinidad And Tobago

Luxembourg

Netherland Antilles

ArubaUnited States

Australia

Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Canada

Oman

Saudi Arabia

Brunei (Darussalam)

Faeroe Islands

Gibraltar

Estonia

Finland

Kazakhstan

Singapore

New Caledonia

Taiwan

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

CO2 Metric Tons Per Capita – 2006

SoUrCE: Intenatinal Enegy Annual 2006

CO2

Metric Tons Per Capita – 2006

0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

1400000

1600000

1800000

1 9 0 2

1 9 9 7

1 9 1 2

1 9 1 7

1 9 2 2

1 9 2 7

1 9 3 2

1 9 3 7

1 9 4 2

1 9 4 7

1 9 5 2

1 9 5 7

1 9 6 2

1 9 6 7

1 9 7 2

1 9 7 7

1 9 8 2

1 9 8 7

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 7

2 0 0 2

C O 2 i n T h o u s a n d M e t r i c T o n s o f C a r b o n

Year

Middle East

Japan

India

China

United States

Africa

Western Europe

SoUrCE: Cabn Dixide Inmatin Analysis Cente (CDIAC)

Historical Emissions





Current global climate change eects include increased

global surace temperatures, a rise in global sea

levels, altered precipitation patterns, and thawing o

sea ice and glaciers. Assessments o climate change are

most reliable or the past ty years — during which accurate

data has been systematically gathered all over the globe and

throughout the upper atmosphere.18 For data on the climate

in the distant past, scientists rely on a variety o sophisti-

cated methods including using coral rees, pollen samplesdrawn rom lake beds, and arctic glaciers to ascertain

climate conditions.

While temperatures around the world have risen, it is

important to note that temperature changes have not been

uniorm. So aas wi ad a gttig od, bt tds

i th a ad ad oa tpat hav iasd

by 1° c, ay 2° F i th past hdd yas.19 While seem-

ingly minor, warming o 3° F is enough to reduce crop yields

signicantly. Projected temperature increases in tropical

areas would reduce important calorie rich staple crops by 20-

40%, a reduction that would dramatically increase malnutri-tion levels in many o the world’s poorest countries.20 Areas

around the equator will be particularly hard hit by climate

change. Regions such as the Middle East and Northern Arica

are predicted to see their temperatures increase by over 6°

F by the end o the century.21

These increased temperatureswill aect everything rom sea levels, to resh water avail-

ability, to sanitation, to the spread o disease.

climate cHanGe

SoUrCE: Natinal Climate Data Cente — U.S. Depatment Cmmece

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Year

D e g r e e s

C e l c i u s

Global Temperature Trends

clmae hane ove he pa eny ha eled n hhe lobal empeae and

neaed ea level. in he e we an expe nan dpon n anallpaen and ae o eh wae.





The increase in tempera-

tures has caused sea

ice to melt beyond

seasonal thaws

and glaciers

to shrink.

The Arctic is

particularly

aected by

the increase

in temperature

and its melting

ice contributesto climate change.

Scientists looking at

long-term trends believe

that sea ice is declining by 3.3% per decade, or 15,500

square miles each year.22 Arctic sea ice refects sunlight and

helps moderate the global climate. As it melts, it produces a

vicious cycle o increased warming leading to urther reduc-

tions in sea ice.

Ice on land suraces also melts as temperatures warm.

The melting ice will increase sea levels and coastal erosion,

which also contributes to urther erosion o continental ice

shelves. Similar to global temperatures, global sea levels have

risen, although not uniormly, by roughly eight inches in the

past 100 years.23

risig sa vs i obiatio with xptd hags i

pipitatio wi at ass to sh wat. As tempera-

ture increases, demand or resh water to irrigate crops will

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007

Year

E x t e n t A n o m a l y

( # s t . d e v .

f r o m

1 9 7 9 - 2

0 0 0 M e a n )

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

Arctic

12 Month Running Mean

Monthly Anomaly

Antarctic

12 Month Running Mean

Monthly Anomaly

Linear Trend

SoUrCE: Natinal Ice Cente, 2000

Trends in Arctic and Antarctic Sea Ice

1 8 7 0

1 8 7 5

1 8 8 0

1 8 8 5

1 8 9 0

1 8 9 5

1 9 0 0

1 9 0 5

1 9 1 0

1 9 1 5

1 9 2 0

1 9 2 5

1 9 3 0

1 9 3 5

1 9 4 0

1 9 4 5

1 9 5 0

1 9 5 5

1 9 6 0

1 9 6 5

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 5

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 5

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 5

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 5

200

150

100

50

0

-50

-100

-150

M i l l i m e t e r s

Year

SoUrCE: Chuch and White Glbal Mean Sea Level recnstuctin —Pudman oceangaphic Labaty

Global Sea Level

Precipitation Trends

SoUrCE: Slman, Susan; Plattne, Gian-Kaspe; Knutti, ret; Fiedlingstein, Piee. “Ievesible climchange due t cabn dixide emissins.” PNAS 106, n 6, 2009: 1707.

Precipitation Predictions

increase and place urther stress on limited resh-water sources.

As a result, the salinity o water will increase, threatening its

suitability or irrigation or human consumption. This requently

results in migration to areas already environmentally stressed,

where the cycle is then repeated — highlighting the act that

climate change oten begets urther climate change.



climate security indeX0

The regions most at risk rom climate change are also

those regions with the highest incidents o interstate

confict, radicalism, and terrorism. These regions include

South Asia, North Arica, Sub-Saharan Arica, and Central America.

Climate change will urther exacerbate regional tensions, increasing

the risk o confict, mass migration, and humanitarian emergencies that

will jeopardize U.S. national interests and — i history is a guide — orce U.S.

intervention. Even i climate change does not result in more numerous American

military operations, it will aect the stability and capabilities o numerous riends and

allies. Climate change will, in a undamental sense, be a key element in dening threats

to American national security in the uture.

Coastline Erosion

Water Shortage

Increased Radicalism

Political Instability

Reugees/Mass Migration

Desertication

Etreme Weather

Confict

Disease

centrAl AmericA

Projected climate change will aect the

security o North America primarily through

the second-order impact o migration rom

Central and South America into the United

States. The result will be continued stress on the United

States’ southern border, which is already a conduit or drug

tracking, human smuggling and gang violence. Climate

change poses a signicant risk to Mexico which is already

vulnerable to political instability due to its rapid population

growth, poverty, and government corruption.24

sub-sAhArAn AFricA

Projected climate change will have a devastating impact on Sub-Saharan Arica.

Already home to the most vulnerable populations in the world, climate change

will exacerbate poverty, increase the spread o disease, and overwhelm the

limited governance capacity o many Sub-Saharan Arican states. State collapse,

massive reugee fows, and increased confict — both between countries and within them —

will be more common.25

Arica may witness some classic “resource” conficts, particularly over water. But a more signi-

cant risk is violence stemming rom either state collapse or inter-communal disputes. Studies

have shown, or instance, that the Rwandan genocide was most severe precisely in those districts

where population growth and soil erosion had reduced arm sizes to below subsistence levels.

Climate change will bring stresses such as this throughout Sub-Saharan Arica. 26

security impacts of climate cHanGe

the ey oneqene om

lmae hane nlde woennpovey, polal nably, and k

o onf. thee ae aleady aen

lae poon o he lobe.





south AsiA

Projected climate change could have serious

and destabilizing impacts on Asia. The expected

rise in sea level will likely cause coastal fooding

that would displace one million people in South

and Southeast Asia, as well as increasing the incidents o cholera,

malaria, and other diseases. The eects o climate change may

jeopardize the development and stability o parts o Asia. Tensions

among states over water, especially in South Asia, are probable. The

Himalayan glacier — the Earth’s third largest ice sheet — is expected

to continue melting, resulting in a dramatic reduction in the supply

o resh water to much o Asia, especially Pakistan, and large parts

o China and India.29

South Asia is already a dangerous region. Indiaand Pakistan remain locked in a decades long conrontation, and both

sides continue to build up their nuclear arsenals. Violence by extrem-

ists in India, Pakistan, and Aghanistan could destabilize the region

and all three states are among the top-ten countries surveyed by the

U.S. Marine Corps or instability and potential confict.30

north AFricA

Projected climate change will have a signicant

impact on North Arica and the Middle East

primarily as a consequence o diminished access

to resh water. The region is already very vulner-

able to water shortages and droughts. Poor subsistence armers will

be hardest hit, but or countries already struggling with rapidly rising

populations and lagging economic growth, the broader impact will

be signicant.27 Projected sea level rise could also displace millions

in the Nile river delta.28 Water scarcity could provoke mass-migration

rom North Arica to southern Europe, resulting in increased social

tensions within European states.

North Arica is already home to large, powerul, and sometimes

violent radical movements. Corrupt and illegitimate governments

ace a great deal o public discontent. Climate change will exacerbate

these dynamics, making the region even more prone to violence and

increase the risk o the development o radical groups willing to use

terrorism to pursue their interests. The nexus between authoritarian

regimes, radicalism, violence, and climate change will play an impor-

tant role in politics in the region over the coming years.






F the United

States, enegy is

als a me naw

secuity issue.

reliance n eign

enegy is a maj

U.S. vulneability.




enerGy security

Climate change is inextricably linked to energy use

patterns. Carbon emissions are largely a unction o

industrial activity and transportation. Nonetheless,

controlling carbon requires addressing patterns o energy

production and consumption.

For the United States, energy is also a more narrow security

issue. Reliance on oreign energy is a major U.S. vulnerability.

Ensuring access to oreign energy sources is costly, both

militarily and politically.

In 1973 and 1979, developments in the Middle East and

Persian Gul caused energy prices to spike. The resultant

economic disruptions caused trillions o dollars in cumula-tive lost economic growth.1 In 1991, the United States went

to war in the Persian Gul to prevent Saddam Hussein rom

controlling orty percent o proven global oil reserves when

he invaded Kuwait. Eighteen years later, the United States

— ollowing a second war with Hussein — is still ghting to

stabilize Iraq. Annually, the cost o buying oreign oil adds to

American trade decits.

Wos, o doas hp d ay o o advsais.

We buy oil rom Russia, a country that has become increas-

ingly authoritarian in the last decade while it has also helped

Iran develop nuclear technology that some suspect is really

intended to produce nuclear weapons. Our dollars help und

Hugo Chavez in Venezuela who bitterly condemns the United

States and is seeking to oment revolutionary politics in the

Western hemisphere. And in the Middle East, American

dollars have served to und some o our bitterest enemies.

Muammar Qadday in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq,

the Islamists regimes in Sudan and Iran, and even Saudi

supporters o Osama bin Laden have all benetted rom our

reliance on oreign oil.

Th goba gy iastt is tdosy v-

ab to disptios. Oil transits through a large number o

naval choke points, several o which have been disrupted by

confict over the past ew decades. The Persian Gul acili-

ties were targeted during the Iran-Iraq War (1980 -1988). The

Suez Canal shut between 1967 and 1975 as a result o the

Arab-Israeli confict. In any conrontation with Iran, it is likely

that trac through the Strait o Hormuz would be disrupted.

Piracy in and around the Strait o Malacca and o the Somali

coast also impacts seaborne transit o oil.2 Most oil reneries

are located on coastal sites and many have been damaged

by powerul storms — which are predicted to worsen as the

climate continues to change.3

Access to oil and natural gas also raises security concerns

because o the vulnerability o pipelines to terrorist attack.

The reconstruction o Iraq, or instance, has been

dramatically aected by hundreds o attacks on Iraq's

pipeline inrastructure.4

Energy, in act, has two security implications. One, reliance

on the harvesting and transportation o ossil uels creates

national vulnerabilities and thus is a direct security challenge.

Two, burning ossil uels contributes to climate change whichhas its own security implications.

Energy, climate change, and security, as a consequence,

create a powerul nexus that must be addressed and

resolved together.

enerGy security





american enerGy dependence

The United States produces about 74% o its energy

requirements domestically; however, certain key

sectors o the U.S. economy are heavily dependent on

imported energy.5 Nevertheless, the United States possesses

vast, and oten underappreciated, resources.

Approximately 22% o U.S. energy comes rom the burning

o coal, virtually all o which is mined domestically. In act,

the United States is a net exporter o coal. Similarly, 23%

o U.S. energy comes rom natural gas, o which 83% is

produced domestically.6 Nuclear energy contributes signi-

cantly to electricity production and makes up 8% o total

energy use, while renewable energy sources, taken together,

provide or 7% o U.S. energy needs.7

The United States remains signicantly reliant on imported

petroleum, however. Petroleum helps ulll 39% o U.S.

energy needs and only 43% o U.S. petroleum requirements

are met rom domestic sources. As a osq, s-

sfiy i pto is aost taiy ahivab.8

According to the CIA World Factbook , the United States has

less than 2% o the world’s proven oil reserves.9 Increased

50

40

30

20

10

0Transportation Industr ia l Residential and

CommercialElectrical Power

Q u a d r i l l i o n B T U s

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, http: //ww w.eia.de.gv/

Dependence on Imported Energy by Sector

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy InmatinAgency, http:// www.eia.de.gv/

Total Energy

m United States Pduced

m Impted Enegy

74%

26%

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy InmatinAgency, http://www.eia.de.gv/

United States Energy Consumption

m renewable Enegy

m Nuclea Electic Pwe

m Petleum

m Natual Gas

m Cal

22%

40%23%

8%7%

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin

Agency, http://www.eia.de.gv/

Petroleum Sources (2008)

m United States Petleum

m Net Impts43%57%

m Dmestic

m Impted

the uned sae mee he majoy o eney need om dome oe,

b eman vlneable o dpon n ol pply.




enerGy security

300,000,000,000

250,000,000,000

200,000,000,000

150,000,000,000

100,000,000,000

50,000,000,000

0

B B L


C a n a d a

I r a n

I r a q

K u w a i t

U n i t e d A r a b E m i r a t e s

V e n e z u e l a

R u s s i a

L i b y a

N i g e r i a

K a z a k h s t a n

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

C h i n a

Q a t a r

A l g e r i a

B r a z i l

M e x i c o

A n g o l a

A z e r b a i j a n

N o r w a y

E u r o p e a n U n i o n

I n d i a

O m a n

S u d a n

SoUrCE: https://www.cia.gv/libay/publicatin/the-wld-actbk/ankde/217Bank.htm

Crude Oil Reserves

drilling — whether oshore or in protected wildlie areas —

is, at best, a temporary stop-gap measure to alleviate

American reliance on oreign petroleum.

Petroleum contributes a small amount to domestic elec-

tricity production, but is the overwhelming source o energy

or America’s transportation sector — and that has its own

security implications.10 The U.S. economy is tremendously

complex and interrelated. It depends on advances in supply-

chain management, the wide-spread adoption o “just-in-time” logistics, and a tremendous amount o specialization

and trade. In other words, the entire American economy is

stitched together by the cheap and reliable transportation o

goods. With 58% o the U.S. transportation sector depen-

dent on oreign energy,11 Aia’s ooi sity is

tdosy ssptib to disptios i th oi akts.

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

500,000

0 A n n u a l T h o u s a n d D o l

l a r s p e r D a y

C a n a d a


V e n e z u e l a

N i g e r i a

M e x i c o

I r a q

A l g e r i a

A n g o l a

R u s s i a

V i r g i n I s l a n d s ( U . S . )

K u w a i t

U n i t e d K i n g d o m

E c u a d o r

B r a z i l

C o l o m b i a

L i b y a

C h a d

N o r w a y

E q u a t o r i a l G u i n e a

A r u b a

A z e r b a i j a n

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy Inmatin Agency, http: //ww w.eia.de.gv/

2008 United States Net Imports by Country

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy InmatinAgency, http://www.eia.de.gv/

Natural Gas Source

m United States Natual Gas

m Net Impts

83%

17%

Greater energy independence, thereore, will require

dramatic changes in America’s transportation inrastructure,including a greater reliance on mass transit, high-speed rail,

and ultimately hydrogen-powered or advanced electric cars

and trucks.

Ttal Cude oil and Pducts





America’s reliance on oreign oil jeopardizes key

national security interests. Most oil consumed in the

United States comes rom regimes at high risk o

political instability. In addition, several major suppliers pursue

international objectives strongly at odds with American

interests. Finally, there is compelling evidence that the dollars

we spend on oreign oil impede democratization and urther

entrench oppressive authoritarian governments around

the world.12

Canada, which is the United States’ single largest supplier

o oil, is a stable, democratic and riendly neighbor. The next

eight largest suppliers o oil to the United States are rated by

the Economist as either at “high risk” or “very high risk” o

political instability.13 In act, 68% o U.S. petroleum imports

come rom countries in those two categories, akig th

uitd Stats stikigy vab to pottia oi sppy

shoks arising rom domestic disturbances or broader

regional conficts aecting just one

o the major oil exporters.

Some o our key suppliers

include Iraq (5% o totalimports), a nation

still in the midst o

severe domestic

confict and at

risk o splin-

tering along

ethnic and

sectarian lines;

Angola (4%), a

corrupt, quasi-

democracy that

only recentlyemerged rom a

decades-long civil

war; Nigeria (8%),

another quasi-democ-

racy with a long history o

Risk o Instability

COUNTRY INDEx SCORERISK

INCREASE/DECREASE

Canada 2.8 Lw risk

Saudi Aabia 6.1 High risk

Venezuela 7.3 High risk

Nigeia 7.0 High risk

Mexic 6.1 High risk

Iaq 7.9 Vey High risk

Algeia 6.6 High riskAngla 7.6 Vey High risk

russia 6.5 High risk

m Vey High risk mHigh risk mMdeate risk m Lw risk

SoUrCE: Ecnmist ’s Plitical Instabilit y Index, http :/ /ww w.ecnmist.cm/makets/ankings/displaysty.cm?sty_id=1334

SoUrCE: Ecnmist’s Plitical Instabiity Index, http://www.ecnmist.cm/makets/ankings/displaysty.cm?sty_id=13349331

Risk o Instability or Oil Eporting Nations

m Vey High risk

m High risk

m Mdeate risk

m Lw risk

55%

13%

21%11%

reliaBility of foreiGn enerGy sources

military rule and governmental corruption; and Algeria (4%),

a country that within the past 15 years suered a civil war

that resulted in over 160,000 deaths.

In addition to the risk o instability, several large suppliers are

actively hostile to American interests. American oil dollars

und Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez who has gradually

eroded democracy in Venezuela and has sought to export his

unique brand o authoritarianism and anti-American dema-goguery throughout the Western Hemisphere. Oil dollars

also und an increasingly authoritarian Russia that seeks to

reassert some control over ormer Soviet Republics and may

be threatening U.S. eorts to contain nuclear prolieration,

particularly acting as a de facto protector o Iran’s nuclear

the va majoy o Amean ol mpo ome om one aed a “hh k”

o “vey hh k” o polal nably.




enerGy security

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy InmatinAdministatin (EIA), http://www.eia.de.gv/

Natural Gas Imports (2008)

m Canada (90%)

m Tinidad (7%)

m Egypt (1%)

m Mexic (<1%)

m Nway (<1%)

m Nigeia (<1%)

m Qata (<1%)

1%

90%

7%

SoUrCE: Depatment Enegy’s Enegy InmatinAdministatin (EIA), http://ww.eia.de.gv/

Petroleum Imports (2008)

m Canada

m Saudi Aabia

m Mexic

m Venezuela

m Nigeia

m Iaq

m Algeia

m Angla

m russia

m rest Wld

4%

25%19%

12%

10%

9%8%5%

4%

4%

ambitions. Even Saudi Arabia, a nominal U.S. ally, is a signi-

cant cause o concern or American interests. Saudi Arabia

has dramatically curtailed aid to radical Islamist terror organi-

zations since 9/11, but continues to und schools, charities,

and severe interpretations o Islam that serve as incubators

or violent extremists.

mo gay, th assiv aots w spd o oi

sv to di Aia’s itst i pootig th

spad o doay. Oil money allows authoritarian govern-

ments to maintain power without popular consent. It creates

a tremendous incentive toward corruption and the establish-

ment o kleptocracies. Oil money encourages unnecessary

arms races and promotes regional confict.14

U.S. dependence on oreign oil increases the risks aced by

the nation and signicantly jeopardizes core U.S. national

security interests in democratization and regional stability.

The imperatives o climate change as well as traditional

U.S. national security calculations both support greater

energy independence and an overall reduction in our reliance

on petroleum.



PANAMA CANAL



american enerGy dependence

World oil supplies are not just threatened

by political instability. Th iastt

qid to ov assiv aots o

oi is both vast ad highy vab. There are three

principle risks to oil transportation. First, much o the

world’s oil transits through relatively constricted passages

that can be closed to trac by states and others with a

desire to do so. Second, tankers travelling in large numbers

along predictable routes are vulnerable to the rapidly growing

threat o piracy. Third, oil pipelines, the major alternative to

seaborne shipment o oil, are also susceptible to attack.

Existing waterway choke points

are easy targets o terrorist

attacks, have seen trac

disruptions by states in times o

confict, and continue to be hubs

o piracy. The threat rom state actors is severe. Over50 countries possess signicant inventories o anti-ship

missiles.15 And in 2006, Lebanese Hezbollah used anti-ship

missiles against Israeli vessels.16 Nearly twenty percent o

the world’s oil fows through the Strait o Hormuz, a 21 mile-

wide body o water vulnerable to Iranian anti-ship missiles.17

Nearly the same amount o oil transits the 1.7 mile-wide

Strait o Malacca between Malaysia and Indonesia.

GeoGrapHic cHoke points

inenaonal eney

fow — palalyol — pa hoh a elavely

mall nmbe o hokepon

and ae hhly vlneable o

dpon de o eonal onf,

eom, and pay.



SUEZ CANAL

BOSPHORUS

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

STRAIT OF MALACCA

BAD EL-MANDEB

Chke Pints

Piacy Activity

Maj oil Wateway Shipping rutes

Middle East

Fme Sviet Unin

Aica

Cental & Suth Ameica

Nth Ameica


enerGy security

In addition to this high-tech threat, there has been an

increasing amount o piracy reported globally. Tota attaks

by piats dobd o 2007 to 2008, ad ths a i 2009

a o pa to dob agai.18 Remarkably, even the largest

ships are vulnerable, as evidenced by the November 2008

seizure o the Sirius Star o the coast o Somalia. In this

case, small bands o pirates seized control o a 350,000 ton,

1000 oot-long ship.19 Most o the attacks have occurred near

three key sea lanes or oil tankers: o the Somali coast at the

exit to the Persian Gul and Red Sea; in proximity to the Strait

o Malacca; and in the Caribbean where oil transits to the

American Gul Coast. With more than 2,600 tankers trans-

porting oil globally, there is no shortage o attractive targets.20

There is no good alternative to moving oil by sea. Pipelines

cannot cross oceans, and even those constructed to move

oil rom inland drilling sites to sea coasts or shipment are

expensive to construct and maintain. Pipelines are also highly

vulnerable. The Iraq Pipeline Watch, or instance, docu-

mented over 450 attacks on Iraqi pipelines and oil acilities

rom 2003 to 2008.21

The costs o saeguarding this oil inrastructure is massive.

Some analysts believe that “total [U.S.] military expenditures

related to oil now total $132.7 billion annually,”22 though

other analysts place the gure closer to $50 billion annually. 23

Regardless, the expense is a massive addition to the other

costs — climate and security related — o oil dependence.





While thee is a

slid — and gwing

— cnsensus in

the United States

that climate change

is bth eal and a

cnsequence human

activity, thee emain

signicant challenges.




policy alternatives

Addressing the security

implications o climate

change is simple in

concept and dicult in execu-

tion. The policy responses are

straightorward. Th uitd

Stats wod b o s

i w dd o abo

issios ad psadd

oths to do th sa. The

best way to do so would be to

invest in a dramatic expansion

o alternative energy production

capacity — notably, wind, solar,

and nuclear — combined with a

massive investment in shiting

our transportation inrastructure

rom its reliance on internal

combustion engines ueled

by gasoline to electric and

hydrogen-powered vehicles.

Translating this concept into

action is hampered by two sets

o actors — public opinion and

the state o existing technology.

While there is a solid — and growing — consensus in the

United States that climate change is both real and a

consequence o human activity, there remain signicant

challenges. First, a large percentage o the public remains

skeptical o the science despite the overwhelming evidence.

Some o these skeptics are proessional contrarians, but

many are simply poorly inormed individuals. The public

education challenge remains signicant. Second, many are

concerned about the capacity o the ederal government to

address climate change airly and eectively, and preer not

to enact policies that would expand the reach and power o

Washington. Finally, there are many Americans who consider

climate change a pressing issue, but who are worried about

supporting a vigorous eort to address climate security

because o the potential and real costs to themselves, their

communities, and the nation.

The state o existing tech-

nology is also a challenge.

Transitioning to alternative

energy on a mass scale

would be tremendously

costly, and in the case o

some economic sectors

essentially impossible at the

present time. There is a great

deal o uncertainty about

the uture costs. Optimists

argue that greater investment

in alternative energy would

generate economies o scale

and more rapid innovation.

Pessimists argue that much

o the science o alternative

energy is mature and that

transormational develop-

ments are unlikely. Nuclear

energy also raises a special

set o concerns as memories

o Three Mile Island and

Chernobyl linger in the public

consciousness.

As a patia att, a daati shit away o th s

o oa o tiity podtio wod qi a sigif-

at ivstt i a pow. But nuclear plants are

large and expensive, raising challenges o both power trans-

mission and nancing. Nuclear plants also produce hazardous

waste that must be saely stored or many centuries.

Transorming the transportation inrastructure could be even

more daunting. There are over 250,000,000 motor vehicles

on American roads.1 Replacing or converting even a signi-

cant percentage o them would be a massive undertaking.

Investing in additional electricity generation or battery-

powered vehicles, or in a hydrogen distribution system would

be even more expensive. As a consequence, changes are

likely to be made at the margins over a period o decades,

ensuring that unless we begin charting a new course imme-

diately, our actions could occur too late to mitigate the worst

consequence o climate change.

policy alternatives





American public opinion is important when considering

climate change action and viable energy alternatives.

Public understanding o the phenomenon and its

implications are important considerations as voters choose

policy makers and policy makers choose courses o action to

enact preventative measures and deal with the ramications

o climate change.

Public attitude surveys yield three major ndings. The rst is

that Americans see climate change as a problem. The second

is that the American public wants to see political action on

climate change. The third is that Americans are willing to pay

to do something about climate change.

According to a poll conducted by NBC News and the Wall

Street Journal in 2006, 66% o Americans believed climate

change was occurring and required action. This was up 12%

rom when the question was asked in 1999. In addition,

35% were concerned enough to state that immediate

action is needed. In 1999, only 24% o respondents said

the same.2 Similar polling as recent as April 2009, suggests

that the trend has not reversed despite the downturn in the

economy.3 55% o Americans according to an American

Security Project poll believe climate change is a threat to

national security.4 Data suggests that growing numbers o

puBlic opinion

From what you know about global climate change or global warming,which one o the ollowing statements comes closest to your opinion?

m Glbal climate change has been established as a seius pblem, and immediateactin is necessay

m Thee is enugh evidence that climate change is taking place and sme actinshuld be taken

m We dn’t knw enugh abut glbal climate change, and me eseach isnecessay bee we take any actins

m Cncen abut glbal climate change is unwaanted

35% 31%

8%26%

2006

24%30%

34%

12%

1999

SoUrCE: HatMcIntu/The Wall Steet Junal/NBC NewsMethdlgy: Telephne inteviews with 1,002 Ameican adults, cnducted mJune 9-12, 2006, Magin e is 3.1 pecent.

the Amean pbl only ppo eo o adde lmae hane, even meae

o do o neae he o o eney domeally.




policy alternatives

Do you think the United Statesshould take action on globalwarming only i other major indus-

trial countries such as China andIndia agree to do equally eec-

tive things, that the United Statesshould take action even i theseother countries do less, or that

the United States should not take

action on this at all?m Take actin even i the cunties

d less

m Take actin nly i the cunties d

m Shuld nt take actin at all

SoUrCE: ABC News/Washingtn PstPll, June 18-21, 2009

21%19%

60%

Americans believe climate change is a real issue and ewer

Americans believe that we should wait or additional inorma-

tion beore taking action.

A large majority o Americans also eel the government

should do more to deal with climate change. Nearly three

ourths o those polled, 72%, think the government should

do more now to deal with the eects o climate change. Only

7% o those eel the government should be doing less. In our

poll conducted in August o 2009, 60% o Americans strongly

supported the government taking action to reduce carbon

pollution. In an earlier poll conducted in July o 2009, 58%

o Americans believe that climate change should be a higher

government priority than it is today.5 The American public

clearly wants action to meet the climate change challenge.

Some Americans worry about the risk to America’s economic

competitiveness i the United States takes action alone

to reduce carbon emissions while India and China do not.

However, 60% o Americans believe the United States

should take action even i China and India don’t implement

similar measures.6

While Americans seem ready to do something about climate

change, economic actors matter. According to Rasmussen

Reports, 21% o Americans are willing to pay $100 more

per year or cleaner energy, but only 14% are willing to

pay more.7 In a similar poll, 56% o people were willing to

support a cap and trade program that signicantly lowered

greenhouse gases, but raised monthly electrical bills by

$10. O note, respondents supporting a cap and trade

program dropped to 44% when the cost was raised to $25per month.8 The percentage o those supporting cap and

trade programs, also slightly decreased rom 2007 to 2008,

suggesting that the price people are willing to pay is elastic

and sensitive to economic downturns.

4%

SoUrCE: Ameican Secuity PjectNatinal Suvey, August 2009

40%

I the United States took action toreduce the carbon pollution thatcauses climate change, wouldit make the United States moresecure, less secure or would ithave no eect on the security o

the United States?

m Much me secue

m Smewhat me secue

m Much less secue

m Smewhat less secue

m N aect

m N pinin/dn’t knw

23%24%

6%3%

SoUrCE: Ameican Secuity PjectNatinal Suvey, August 2009

Do you avor or oppose the UnitedStates taking action to reduce

the carbon pollution that causesclimate change?

m Fav, stngly

m Fav, nt s stngly

m oppse, stngly

m oppse, nt s stngly

m Undecided

m N pinin/dn’t knw

56%

13%

6%

18%

3%

4%





Electricity Generation by Source

enerGy consumption By sector

Transportation and electricity generation are the two

greatest practical challenges to America’s desire to

address climate change. The challenges these sectors

pose are quite dierent and dicult to resolve.

The generation o electricity in the United States is heavily

reliant on coal. Roughly 50% o all electricity consumed in

the United States comes rom coal-red power plants. With

the introduction o better emissions controls, coal plants haveSoUrCE: http://www.eia.de.gv/emeu/ae/txt/ptb0802b.html

m Petleum

m Natual Gas

m Cal

m Nuclea

m renewable Suces50%

20%

20%

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

01973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006

Years

T r i l l i o n

B T U s

Energy Consumed by the Industrial Sector

Energy Consumed by the Transportation Sector

Energy Consumed by the Residential Sector

Energy Consumer by the Commercial Sector

SoUrCE: http://www.eia.de.gv/emeu/ae/cnsump.html

Energy Consumption by Sector

managed to signicantly reduce the level o pollutants they

emit, but nevertheless continue to produce CO2

at alarming

rates. Technology to capture and sequester carbon emission

remains in its inancy. No coal-red power plant captures

any signicant amount o its carbon emissions at present. 9

There are also tremendous logistical problems with seques-

tering massive amounts o carbon even i it were captured.

rdig th b o oa-fd pats is a ssay

stp to addss cO2

issios, but doing so would require

a signicant investment in an alternative inrastructure to

produce and eciently distribute electricity.

In comparison, the transportation sector has the astest

energy demand growth rate and it is also most reliant on

the most problematic energy source — imported petroleum.

replan oal wh nlea, ola, and wnd o eley eneaon and nean

he el eeny o Amean vehle ae he mo eeve way o ede Ameanabon doxde emon and ede dependene on oen ol.

9%

1%




policy alternatives

25

20

15

10

5

01923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year

M P G

All vehicles Cars All trucks Light trucks Medium and heavy trucks

SoUrCE: Sivak, M. and Tsimhni, o. (20 09) . Fuel Eciency Vehicles n US rads:1923–2006, Energy Policy , vl. 37, pp. 3168-3170

Fuel Eciency o Vehicles on U.S. Roads: 1923-2006

20

15

10

5

01978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 200 8

Year

T h o u s a n d

B T U

p e r

C h a i n e d

( 2 0 0 0 ) D o l l a r

SoUrCE: http://www.eia.de.gv/emeu/ae/txt/ptb0105.html

Energy Consumption per Real Dollar o GDP

The United States lags behind many industrialized nations in

mass transportation and inter-city connectors like high-

speed rail. Going rom London to Paris by rail — a

distance o slightly more than 200 miles — takes

two-and-a-quarter hours.10 Amtrak rom New

York to Boston — roughly the same distance

— takes three-and-a -hal hours, literally50% longer.11 Because the United States

is so large and spread-out, compared

to many other industrialized nations,

we ace unique challenges in the

transportation sector.

Nonetheless, total vehicle uel e-

ciency has barely improved in over

20 years, even as the number o

vehicles on the road has continued

to increase dramatically.12 nw

ooy stadads aodby th Obaa adiistatio i

may o 2009 wi hopy ad

to ipovts. Progress on this

ront would signicantly reduce both

America’s carbon emissions and reliance

on oreign oil.

In the past 20 years, energy consumption

per real dollar o GDP has declined by approxi-

mately 50%.13 Interestingly, cost savings measures

and greater eciency in American industry have resulted

comparatively in less energy consumption growth than inother major sectors o the U.S. economy. This demonstrates

that economic incentives can drive signicant improvements

in energy eciency.





alternative enerGy

Greater energy independence is possible. Increased

eciency is projected to reduce the rate o growth

o electricity demand in the United States. In the

uture, the price o renewable energy is projected to drop,

while the price o non-renewables will remain static, and

may, in act increase i requirements or carbon capture

are implemented.14 Nonetheless, or at least a generation,

higher priced alternative energy will have to compete with

lower cost coal and natural gas by promoting its small carbonootprint. Nuclear energy, less expensive than renewable, but

still more expensive than coal and natural gas, will need to

serve as a bridge until clean, renewable energy sources and

technologies mature

rwab gy — otaby soa, wid, ad hydo-

ti — say s o high, p-ot osttio

osts, bt bft o ow ad aita osts.

Because they do not produce carbon, their contribution to

climate change is negligible. Additionally, alternative energy

technologies create ewer strategic vulnerabilities. They

do not rely on imports and are less vulnerable to disruption

due to political disturbances. Because o the unortunately

high cost o some o these energy sources, however, it is

clear that the short-term alternative is increased reliance on

nuclear energy.

In order or nuclear power to have an impact on emissions,

it would need to make up a higher percentage o the United

States’ overall electricity production. In the past, however,

growth o nuclear power has been stymied by concerns

over saety and the risk o prolieration. France already uses

nuclear power to supply over 75% o its electricity while

the United States only uses nuclear power to supply around

20% o its electricity.15 Without some mechanism to penalize

carbon emissions — such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade

system, nuclear power will remain more expensive than coal

and natural gas due primarily to higher capital costs, particu-

larly or construction.16

Nuclear energy is, like other non-renewable energy, depen-

dent on resource availability. The Massachusetts Institute o

Technology (MIT) conservatively estimates that at least an

80 year global supply o nuclear uel exists or 800 reactors

(there are nearly 440 commercial reactors operating world-

wide today) and specically states that, “the world-wide

supply o uranium ore is sucient to uel the deployment o

1000 reactors over the next hal century”.17

12

10

8

6

4

2

01950 1970 1990 2010 2030

Year

% D

e m a n d G r o w t h

2007

History Projections

SoUrCE: DoE/EIA-0383(20 09) http ://www.eia.de.gv/ia/ae/electicity.html

United States Electricity Demand Growth

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Nuclear

Wind

Natural Gas

Coal

Mills per Kilowatt Hour

Capital Operations and Maintenance Fuel Transmission

SoUrCE: http:// www.eia.de.gv/ia/ae/electicity.html

Electricity Costs or New Power Plants 2020

Fe neae n eley demand an ealy be me by nvemen n enewable

eney. Alenave eney ehnoloe alo eae ewe ae vlneableo he uned sae.




policy alternatives

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

France

Lithuania

Slovakia

Belgium

Sweden

Ukraine

BulgariaArmenia

Slovenia

South Korea

Hungary

Switzerland

Czech Republic

Germany

Finland

Spain

United States

United Kingdom

Russia

Canada

Percent

SoUrCE: IAE A, http:// www-pub.iaea.g/MTCD/publicatins/PDF/rDS1-27_web.pd

Electricity Supplied by Nuclear Power Reactors in 2006 Americans continue to worry about the saety o nuclear

reactors and ear reactor accidents and the eects o

nuclear waste. However, the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s saety standards are rigorous. There is a strong

scientic consensus that nuclear reactors can be built and

operated saely.18

The issue o nuclear waste remains unresolved. Yucca

Mountain, originally intended to store nuclear waste, is no

longer a politically viable option and does not have the capacity

needed now or America’s nuclear waste. Since the United

States has not come up with a long-term waste management

solution, nuclear plants currently store their waste on site. As

a result, with over one hundred reactors operating in thirty

one states, there are waste storage sites scattered all over the

country with ew problems or protests.19 Ths atos high-

ight th at that a gy od sv as a bidg

thoogy btw today’s ia o ossi s ad

a t ooy powd by wab gy sossh as soa ad wid.

2032

1158

1219

3241

667

427

886

780

560

2138

2105

1781

2803

2512

1763

2546

3727

385

299

12475

2129

1037

1768

1640

541

488

287

584

479

1765

646

348

SoUrCE: Andews, Anthny. “Spent Nuclea Fuel Stage Lcatins and Inventy.” CrS rept Cngess, Washingtn DC, 2004

Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage

Measuements ae in metic tns.





Climate change will aect human lie and security.

Because it is unlikely that even concerted action will

wholly prevent all negative climate change conse-

quences, the United States will need to take steps to mitigate

the eects. As a result, we must consider how well prepared

the United States is to deal with some o the predicted

security ramications o climate change such as humanitarian

emergencies, military confict, and the spread o disease.

Climate change will increase global poverty and cause

humanitarian emergencies. The United States will need to

und a generous program o oreign assistance. U.S. capacity

to alleviate global poverty is at a low ebb. The U.S. Agency or

International Development shed a great deal o expertise over

the past two decades, and now serves largely as a contracting

instrument rather than an eective instrument o U.S. policy.

Furthermore, even with increases in oreign assistance under

President George W. Bush, American oreign assistance has

been declining as a percentage o GDP or nearly 50 years.20

Increasing poverty will mean a higher likelihood o amine,

economic migration, and confict.

According to current predictions, climate change will also

lead to an increase in communicable diseases including

malaria and dengue ever, and, indirectly — due to human

migrations — HIV/AIDS. As a result, the United States will

need to ocus on eorts to eradicate and contain these

diseases abroad as well as establish eective monitoring and

rapid response measures at home. In 2002, the World Health

Organization documented the eects o climate change on

global health. The authors examined ten major risks, including:

temperature extremes; weather disasters; disease vectors;

ood- and water-borne illnesses; smaller harvests; diseases

aecting plants and animals; resh-water scarcity; air pollu-tion; and armed confict. These developments — essentially

climate change and its eects — were responsible or 2.4%

o the world’s cases o diarrhea, 6% o malaria cases in some

middle-income countries, and 7% o the cases o dengue ever

in some industrialized countries.21 By o stiat, iat

hag otbts to 300,000 aths aay.22 Under

President Bush, the United States dramatically increased global

american Government capaBility and responses

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

M i l l i o n s C u r r e n t U S D

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

Year

SoUrCE: Organization or Economic Cooperation and Development http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

Ocial U.S. Development Assistance to All Recipients

1 9 6 2

1 9 6 4

1 9 6 6

1 9 6 8

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 2

1 9 7 4

1 9 7 6

1 9 7 8

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 2

1 9 8 4

1 9 8 6

1 9 8 8

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 6

1 9 9 8

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 8

Year

P e r c e n t o f G D P

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

SoUrCE: Budget the United States Gvenment: Histical Tables http:/ /www.gpaccess.gv/usbudget/y10/hist.html

Aid as a Percentage o GDP

Year

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

M i l l i o n s o f C u r r e n t U S

D

SoUrCE: Salaam-Blyther, Tiaji, “Global Health: Appropriations to USAID Programs rom FY2001 throughFY2008”, CRS Report or Congress. Washington, DC: 2008. http://pd.usaid.gov/pd_docs/PCAA B934.pd

Appropriations to USAID Global Health Programs

clmae hane and mpa wll e he u.s. ovenmen’ ably o epond

a home and aboad.




policy alternatives

health expenditures, notably under the President’s Emergency

Plan or AIDS Relie (PEPFAR) and the President’s Malaria

Initiative (PMI).23 These expenditures will need to continue to

increase in the uture.

The U.S. government will also need to take a leadership role in

establishing principles or the equitable sharing o increasingly

scarce resources — particularly water — beginning in North

America.24 Establishing a North American water agreement

may require a contentious revision o the 1922 Colorado River

Compact, but doing so would show the world that the United

States is working seriously to alleviate the worst impacts o

climate change — despite domestic political pressure. 25 Such

an agreement would also serve as a useul model to the world

o how states can peaceully negotiate sustainable solutions

to the impacts o climate change.

In order to cope with these and other consequences oclimate change, the US military will need the ability to

respond to amines, epidemics, interstate confict, mass

migrations, and resource scarcity. Whi th uitd Stats

iitay aady has sigifat apaity o haitaia

itvtio, o ais hav aggd i dvopig

siia apabiitis.26

Nonetheless, with US orces committed to a large, open-

ended deployment to Aghanistan, it seems unlikely that the

United States will be in a position to respond quickly to any but

the most extreme crises. Darur, or instance, has languished

in the shadow o Iraq and Aghanistan. There is little reasonto assume that the United States will be able or willing to do

more in the uture than it has done there. American leaders

will ace a multitude o tough choices as climate-induced

national security threats begin to compete with and crowd out

our ability to respond to traditional threats such as terrorism,

rogue states, and the rise o peer competitors.

INDIAPAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

KASHMIR

INDUSRIVER

ARABIAN SEA

The Indus rive system, iginatingin India and unning thugh Kashmiint Pakistan, is shaed thugh theIndus rive Teaty. The teaty has

thus a suvived tw was between

the natins; but inceased iigatin needs, allegatins that India ismisapppiating wate, cntinuedlw-level cnfict in the aea, and

the melting the Siachen Glacie(the suce the ive system)due t climate change, theaten theageement and peace in the egin.

INDIA

KASHMIR

JORDAN

SYRIA

JORDANRIVER

SEA OF

GALILEE

LEBANON

GOLAN

HEIGHTS

ISRAEL

WEST

BANK

DEADSEA

Few wate ageements that gven the divisin suace and gund-wate esuces in the MiddleEast egin exist. The majity cunties have signicant ppula-

tins highly dependent n agi-cultue and despeate scacewate. Access t wate esucescntinues t play a lage le in

teitial disputes including theGlan Heights and the PalestinianTeities.

KENYA

EGYPT

SUDAN

ETHIOPIA

ERITREA

BURUNDI

DEM. REP.OF THE CONGO

CENTRALAFRICAN REP.

RWANDA

TANZANIA

NILERIVER

BLUENILE

WHITENILE

UGANDA

LAKE VICTORIA

The Nile Basin is shaed between ten Aican cunties withEgypt dminating wate usage.Allcatin the wate esucescntinues t be a cntentiusissue dealt with the mst pat

successully unde the Nile BasinInitiative. Egypt has in the pastindicated that it was willing t usece t guaantee its access t

the Nile—a gwing cncen asppulatins cntinue t ise in

the aea.

ZIMBABWE

ZAMBIA

MOZAMBIQUE

MALAWI

ZAMBEZI

RIVER

The Zambezi ive basin and ivesystem is seveely explited.Disputes within and between the

cunties bdeing the ive willlikely escalate as ames intensiyiigatin, natinal gvenments insti-

tute wate tanses m the ive tdistant aeas with dught, individualcunties g thugh with plans wide-scale wate withdawal, andcnficts ve aeas land cntinue.

CHINA

BURMA

VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

THAILAND

LAOS

MEKONGRIVER

LANCANGRIVERINDIA

Althugh Thailand and Las shae the bulk the Mekng rive Basin,China is able t stngly infuencedistibutin wate esuces due

t its plitical clut and gegaphicpsitin upsteam. Cuntiesdiveging inteests in t he iveincluding cheap hydpwe,sheies, and iigatin agicultue ae mediated by theMekng rive Cmmissin, withutChina’s paticipatin. Chinacntinues t build dams inceasing

the ate envinmental degada- tin and putting the livelihds cunties dwnive at stake.

Potential Water Conficts





The United States is conronted by the related threats

o climate change and energy insecurity, which place

in jeopardy lives, property, our economic health, and

— potentially — our very way o lie. As such, they constitute

a clear and present danger to the national security o the

United States.

Climate change is real and human activity is contributing to it.

Atmospheric CO2

concentrations are now at unprecedented

levels due to industrial activity and the burning o ossil uels.

As a result, the planet’s atmosphere and seas are getting

warmer. The cascading consequences o continued warming

are sobering to consider: insucient water supplies, shiting

rainall patterns, disruptions to agriculture, human migrations,

more ailing states, increased extremism, and even resource

wars. These predictable consequences will strain the capacity

o the United States and its allies to adapt and meet the chal-

lenges o the coming century.

We ace a troubling climate uture because o our depen-

dence on ossil uels — coal, petroleum, and natural gas.

Imported petroleum makes us doubly vulnerable. Not only

do we do urther damage to the climate with its use, but we

also make ourselves — and our economy — susceptible to

disruptions in global oil supplies and subject to the whims

o authoritarian despots who undermine our interests and

values around the world nanced with the money we spend

on oil.

To meet these threats, we must harness a new American

revolution in energy — becoming more ecient across our

entire economy, investing in renewable energy technologies,

and increasing our use o sae and reliable nuclear power.

We must leverage the inventiveness o American industry

— yes, the same industry that produced dramatic

increases in vehicle uel eciency rom the mid-

1970s to the late-1980s and allowed American

wealth to rise while reducing the cost o energy

used in manuacturing.

The economic opportunities o the twenty-

rst century will be ound in developing

solutions to meet the challenges o climate

change and energy dependence. I we

ignore the warnings o scientists and

national security leaders, we will only

deepen our addiction to imported oil,

hamstring our economy, and weaken our

country. But i we heed those warnings, the

United States will lead the world in a new

wave o protable, green technology, reduceour dependence on oreign energy supplies,

and reduce our contribution to global warming.

Our economic strength and our national security

will grow in tandem.

clmae hane eal and hman avy onbn o .

conclusion




endnotes31

ClIMATE ChANgE ANd CONSEqUENCES

1 Dieter Lüthi, Martine Le Floch, Bernhard Bereiter, Thomas Blunier, Jean-MarcBarnola, Urs Siegenthaler, Dominique Raynaud, Jean Jouzel, Hubertus Fischer,Kenji Kawamura, et al., “High-resolution carbon dioxide concen tration record650,000–800,000 years beore present,” Nature , Vol. 453, No. 7193, pp. 379-382, 15 May 2008.

2 Tans, Pieter. Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide - Mauna Loa . July 2009. www.esr.

noaa.ov/m/cc/trens (accessed July 13, 2009).

3 Energy Inormation Agency. Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy .May 2008. ttp://www.eia.oe.ov/bookse/brocures/reenouse/

Capter1.tm (accessed June 30, 2009).

4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Are the Increases in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide and Other Greenhouse Gases During the Industrial Revolution

Caused by Human Activities? March 27, 2008. ttp://ipcc-w1.ucar.eu/w1/ FAq/w1_a-7.1.tm (accessed June 10, 2009).

5 Doran, Peter T.; Maggie Kendall Zimmerman (January 20, 2009 ). “Examiningthe Scientic Consensus on Climate Change”. EOS, Transactions AmericanGeophysical Union, vol. 90, no. 3: 22–23.

6 Northwest Passage - Map o Arctic Sea Ice . ttp://eooy.com/artices/

nortwest-passae.stm (accessed June 23, 2009).

7 Bamber J.L., Riva R.E.M., Vermeersen B.L.A., LeBroq A.M. (2009).“Reassessment o the potential sea-level rise rom a collapse o the WestAntarctic Ice Sheet”. Science 324: 901.

8 Ramanujan, Krishna. “Dwindling Arctic Ice.” NASA Earth Observatory . October24, 2003. ttp://eartobservatory.nasa.ov/Features/ArcticIce/ (accessedJuly 21, 2009).

9 Biello, David. “Mass Extinctions Tied to Past Climate Changes.” Scientifc

American . October 24, 2007. ttp://www.scientifcamerican.com/artice.cm?i=mass-extinctions-tie-to-past-cimate-canes (accessedJuly 21, 2009).

10 Brian Fagan, Floods, Famines, and Emperors: El Niño and the Fate o Civilizations .New York: Basic Books, 1999.

11 Diamond, Jared. Collapse . London: Viking Penguin, 2005, 311-328.

12 IPCC. “IPCC Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis o Climate Change.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . 2007. ttp://ipcc-w1.ucar.

eu/w1/Report/AR4Wg1_Print_FrontMatter.p (accessed June 15, 2009).

13 United States Environmental Protection Agency. “International Analyses.”Climate Change-Climate Economics . 2001. ttp://www.epa.ov/cimat-

ecane/economics/internationa.tm (accessed July 7, 2009).

14 Marland, G., T.A. Boden, and R.J. Andres. 2008. Global, Regional, andNational Fossil Fuel CO

2

Emissions. In Trends: A Compendium o Data on Global

Change . Carbon Dioxide Inormation Analysis Center, Oak Ridge NationalLaboratory, U.S. Department o Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

15 Ibid.

16 United States Environmental Protection Agency. “Global Mitigation o Non-CO2

Greenhouse Gases.” Oce o Atmospheric Programs, Washington, DC, 2006.

17 Ibid.

18 IPCC. “IPCC Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis o Climate Change.”Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . 2007. ttp://ipcc-w1.ucar.

eu/w1/Report/AR4Wg1_Print_FrontMatter.p (accessed June 15, 2009).

19 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “Global SuraceTemperature Anomalies.” National Climatic Data Center . 2007. ttp://www.

ncc.noaa.ov/oa/cimate/researc/anomaies/inex.pp#anomaies (accessed June 15, 2009).

20 Singh, Seema. “Global warming could hurt crop yields: study.” Livemint.com and The Wall Street Journal . January 8, 2009. ttp://www.ivemint.

com/2009/ 01/08200758/ goba-warmin-cou-urt-crop.tm (accessedJuly 1, 2009).

21 Parr y, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutiko, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson.Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability . IPCC FourthAssessment Report (AR4) , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

22 National Snow and Ice Data Center. “Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis.” 2009.ttp://nsic.or/arcticseaicenews/ (accessed July 9, 2009).

23 NOAA. “Sea Level Data.” National Oceangraphic Data Cente r. 2006. ttp:// www.noc.noaa.ov/genera/seaeve.tm (accessed June 17, 2009).

24 The CNA Corporation. “National Security and the Threat o Climate Change.”Alexandria, 2007. ttp://securityancimate.cna.or/report/Nationa%20S

ecurity%20an%20te%20Treat%20o%20Cimate%20Cane.p , 24-27.

25 Center or Emerging Threats and Opportunities. 2008 Edition o Flashpoints .Quantico: Potomac Institute or Policy Studies, 20 08, 17-19.

26 Freimuth, Ladeene, Gidon Bromberg, Munqeth Mehyar, and Nader Al Khateeb.Climate Change: A New Threat to Middle East Security . Prepared or the UnitedNations Climate Change Conerence, Bali: EcoPeace / Friends o the EarthMiddle East in special consultative status with the Economic and SocialCouncil (ECOSOC) o the United Nations, 2007, 21.

27 Parr y, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutiko, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson.Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability . IPCC FourthAssessment Report (AR4) , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007,443-445.

28 Parr y, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutiko, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson.Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC FourthAssessment Report (AR4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 443.

29 Diamond, Jared. Collapse . London: Viking Penguin, 2005, 311-328.

30 Viniegra, María Eugenia Ibarrarán, and Salimah Mónica Cossens González.“Climate Change Research and Policy in Mexico: Implications or NorthAmerican Securit y.” Politics and Policy 35, no. 4 (December 2007): 684-701.

ENERgY SECURITY

1 Ikenberry, John G. “The Irony o State Strength: Comparative Responses tothe Oil Shocks in the 1970s.” International Organization 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986):107-109.

2 Otterman, Sharon. “Pirates Briefy Rattle Oil Market.” The New York Times ,November 17, 200 8.

3 “Climate Change, Extreme Events, and Coastal Cities.” Conerence Report,Rice University & University College o London, Houston, 2005.

4 Christo, Joseph A., interview by United States Senate Committee onForeign Relations. Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges (February 8, 2006).

5 Energy Inormation Administration. Energy Price Impacts on the U.S. economy since the early 1970s? April 10, 2001. ttp://www.eia.oe.ov/oia/

economy/enery_price.tm (accessed July 10, 2009).

endnotes

The endnotes in this online fle are updated rom the printed report to correct or an error in the numbering o the notes.





6 —. Ofcial Energy Statistics rom the US Government . http://www.eia.doe.

gov/ (accessed June 15, 2009).

7 Ibid.

8 —. Renewable & Alternative Fuels . http://www.eia.doe.gov/uelrenewable.

html (accessed June 15, 2009).

9 Central Intelligence Agency. “Country Comparison: Oil-Proved Reserves.” The World Factbook . January 1, 2008. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-actbook/rankorder/2178rank.html (accessed July 20, 2009).

10 (Energy Inormation Administration n.d.)

11 Ibid.

12 Ross, Michael Lewin. “Does Oil Hinder Demoncracy.” World Politics 53, no. 3(April 2001): 325-361.; Barro, Robert J. “Determinants o Democracy.” Journal o Political Economy 107, no. 6/2 (December 1999) : Supplement 158-183.;Tsui, Kevin K. More Oil, Less Democracy? Theory and Evidence rom Crude Oil Discoveries . Job Market Paper, Chicago: University o Chicago, 2005.

13 The Economist . “Political Instability Index.” March 25, 2009. http://www.

economist.com/markets/rankings/displaystory.cm?story_id=13349331.

14 Colgan, Je. “Oil and Revolutionary Regimes: A Toxic Mix.” Paper prepared orInternational Political Economy Society Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 2008.

15 “Lethal Sting.” Anti-Ship Missiles . http://www.global-deence.com/2003/

anti_ship.htm (accessed July 24, 2009).16 Mazzetti, Mark, and Thom Shanker. “Hezbollah’s unexpected frepower.”

The New York Times . July 19, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/

world/arica/19iht-missile.2238629.html (accessed July 23, 2009).

17 Energy Inormation Administration. “World Oil Transit Chokepoints.” Country Analysis Bries . January 2008. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_

Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html (accessed May 28, 2009).

18 ICC Commercial Crime Services. “IMB Live Piracy Map.” 2009. http://www.

icc-ccs.org/inde.php?option=com_abrik&view=visualization&

controller=visualization.googlemap&Itemid=219 (accessed July 27, 2009).

19 Glendinning, Lee, and James Sturcke. “Pirates take over oil tanker with Britishcrew on board.” Guardian . November 17, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2008/nov/17/oil-tanker-pirates (accessed July 20, 2009).

20 “International Tanker.” OSG. http://www.osg.com/inde.cm?pageid=46

(accessed July 15, 2009).21 IAGS. Iraqi Pipeline Watch . March 27, 2008. http://www.iags.org/iraqpipe-

linewatch.htm (accessed July 23, 2009).

22 Copulos, Milton R. Testimony or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington DC, (March 30, 2006). http://oreign.senate.gov/testi-

mony/2006/CopulosTestimony060330.pd.

23 Delucchi, Mark A., and James J. Murphy. “U.S. military expenditures to protectthe use o Persian Gul oil or motor vehicles.” Energy Policy 36 (April 2008):2253-2264.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

1 Research and Innovative Technology Administration. Table 1-11: Number o U.S.Aircrat, Vehicles, Vessels, and Other Conveyances . http://www.bts.gov/publi-

cations/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_11.html.

2 “Hart/McIntur /The Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll.” June 9-12, 2006.http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/12286.

3 “Marist College Poll.” April 1-3, 2009. http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm.

4 “American Security Project poll.” August 5, 2009.

5 “World Public Opinion Assessing Governments on Climate Change.” WorldPublic Opinion. July 29, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/

pd/jul09/W PO_ClimateChange_Jul09_quaire.pd.

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