close combat 2
TRANSCRIPT
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AgendaAgenda
The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview
Focused Rotation a Vehicle for Change
Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No.99-16
Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat TrainingEnvironment (JRTC)
The CALL Homepage and MOUT
Other CALL Products
Questions
The Center for Army Lessons Learned Overview
Focused Rotation a Vehicle for Change
Urban Combat Operations, CALL Newsletter No.99-16
Lessons Learned in an Urban Combat TrainingEnvironment (JRTC)
The CALL Homepage and MOUT
Other CALL Products
Questions
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CALL OverviewCALL Overview
Organization and location.
Mission ~ Collect, analyze, anddisseminate lessons learned, tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) andresearch material to the U.S. Army.
History ~ 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.
Organization and location.
Mission ~ Collect, analyze, anddisseminate lessons learned, tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) andresearch material to the U.S. Army.
History ~ 1985, 89, 96, 97, 98 and NOW.
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Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change
Focused RotationA Vehicle for Change
The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP)identifies negative trends observed at the CTCsand assigns a lead proponent to develop acorrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct 96.
The proponent develops a solution set and gives itto a unit to use and validate at a focused rotation.
The proponent then implements a solution acrossthe Army in a way that permanently corrects the
problem.
The TRADOC Trends Reversal Program (T-RAP)identifies negative trends observed at the CTCsand assigns a lead proponent to develop acorrective action plan (TRADOC Reg. 11-13) Oct 96.
The proponent develops a solution set and gives itto a unit to use and validate at a focused rotation.
The proponent then implements a solution acrossthe Army in a way that permanently corrects the
problem.
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Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16
Urban Combat OperationsCALL Newsletter No. 99-16
The idea November of 1997
Soliciting support
CO-OP Infantry School (MOUTProponent)
MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop
Focused Rotation, March 1998
Newsletter development and consensus
The idea November of 1997
Soliciting support
CO-OP Infantry School (MOUTProponent)
MOUT Collection Plan and Workshop
Focused Rotation, March 1998
Newsletter development and consensus
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Urban Focused Pre-RotationAssumptions (as of Nov. 1997)Urban Focused Pre-Rotation
Assumptions (as of Nov. 1997)
1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areasis outdated.
2. The political realities of urban combat have resultedin the use of terms that tend to place limitations on
the conduct of these operations.3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban
combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under thecurrent downsizing agenda, the Army does not havethe soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian
experience at Grozny and meet its two regional warmission.
1. U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areasis outdated.
2. The political realities of urban combat have resultedin the use of terms that tend to place limitations on
the conduct of these operations.3. The manpower resources needed to conduct urban
combat is a problem for the U.S. Army. Under thecurrent downsizing agenda, the Army does not havethe soldiers to do the job on a scale of the Russian
experience at Grozny and meet its two regional warmission.
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Urban Focused Pre-Rotation AssumptionsUrban Focused Pre-Rotation Assumptions
4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for
combat in the large metropolitan areas.5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special
weapons needed and lack the quantities of weaponsnecessary for urban operations. The weaponshistorically needed to do the job are in many cases
either not in the inventory or not available fortraining in the urban environment.
6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Armymust be prepared to address in the urban combatsituation. Previous evidence shows that urban
combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, fromammunition to bandages.
4. Training in villages will not prepare the Army for
combat in the large metropolitan areas.5. U.S. forces currently do not have the special
weapons needed and lack the quantities of weaponsnecessary for urban operations. The weaponshistorically needed to do the job are in many cases
either not in the inventory or not available fortraining in the urban environment.
6. Quantity of supplies is another issue that the Armymust be prepared to address in the urban combatsituation. Previous evidence shows that urban
combat uses an inordinate amount of supplies, fromammunition to bandages.
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Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions
Urban FocusedPre-Rotation Assumptions
7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitablefor urban combat. In past wars the types ofammunition in the inventory worked for allpossibilities.
8. Specialty communications equipment is nowonly available to special units. Thiscommunications equipment is needed now forregular infantry for training and potentialcombat operations.
9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated intourban combat training.
7. Munitions now in the inventory are not suitablefor urban combat. In past wars the types ofammunition in the inventory worked for allpossibilities.
8. Specialty communications equipment is nowonly available to special units. Thiscommunications equipment is needed now forregular infantry for training and potentialcombat operations.
9. Realistic NBC hazards are not incorporated intourban combat training.
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TA.1 ManeuverTA.1 Maneuver
There is a lack of focus in the movement to theobjective, resulting in significant casualties.
Units lack focus in the use of combined armstactics, techniques and procedures for armor,
aviation, and close air support for urbancombat.
Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch aremore common in the urban environment.
Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with theexception of Special Operations Units.
There is a lack of focus in the movement to theobjective, resulting in significant casualties.
Units lack focus in the use of combined armstactics, techniques and procedures for armor,
aviation, and close air support for urbancombat.
Uncoordinated maneuver and over-watch aremore common in the urban environment.
Marksmanship at all levels is poor, with theexception of Special Operations Units.
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TA.2 Fire SupportTA.2 Fire Support
Units have problems with allocation ofresources and positioning of fire support assetsin the urban fight.
Units do a poor job using restrictive rule ofengagement in dealing with collateral damageand associated urban combat effects.
Units were not effective in the use of counterbattery fires.
Units did a poor job in the use of precisionmunitions.
Units have problems with allocation ofresources and positioning of fire support assetsin the urban fight.
Units do a poor job using restrictive rule ofengagement in dealing with collateral damageand associated urban combat effects.
Units were not effective in the use of counterbattery fires.
Units did a poor job in the use of precisionmunitions.
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TA.3 Air DefenseTA.3 Air Defense
There is a poor allocation of air defenseartillery assets to support the urban fightoverall.
Attack aviation vulnerability in battle
positions is not taken into consideration inthe operations order planning.
Focusing the correct air defense asset atthe proper place and time in the battle is
poor.
There is a poor allocation of air defenseartillery assets to support the urban fightoverall.
Attack aviation vulnerability in battle
positions is not taken into consideration inthe operations order planning.
Focusing the correct air defense asset atthe proper place and time in the battle is
poor.
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TA.4 Command and ControlTA.4 Command and Control
Units do not effectively locate their commandand control nodes.
Leaders at all levels have problems with rulesof engagement and proportionality.
Sniper teams are not properly planned for orconsidered eyes on the objective.
Wargaming and course of action developmentfor urban combat needs work; this must bemore precise.
Units do not effectively locate their commandand control nodes.
Leaders at all levels have problems with rulesof engagement and proportionality.
Sniper teams are not properly planned for orconsidered eyes on the objective.
Wargaming and course of action developmentfor urban combat needs work; this must bemore precise.
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TA.5 IntelligenceTA.5 Intelligence
The intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) is not specific enough for the urban battle.
The use of psychological operations and civil
affairs operations are not planned well enough.
Identification of decision points and settingconditions for success are not emphasized.
Little thought is given to intelligence collectionor care of civilians on the battlefield.
The intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) is not specific enough for the urban battle.
The use of psychological operations and civil
affairs operations are not planned well enough.
Identification of decision points and settingconditions for success are not emphasized.
Little thought is given to intelligence collectionor care of civilians on the battlefield.
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TA.6 Mobility and SurvivabilityTA.6 Mobility and Survivability
The operations order does not properlyallocate engineer resources for urban fight.
Units are not effective in suppress, obscure,secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
Lack of eyes on the objective prevent
obstacle identification.
The operations order does not properlyallocate engineer resources for urban fight.
Units are not effective in suppress, obscure,secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
Lack of eyes on the objective prevent
obstacle identification.
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TA.7 Combat Service SupportTA.7 Combat Service Support
Allocation of assets to support the urbanfight is poor.
Re-supply and casualty evacuation are notconducted well.
Urban specific supply items: ladders, kneeand elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks,as well as specialty weapons and ammunitionneed to be made available.
Speed, not haste, should be the norm inurban operations.
Allocation of assets to support the urbanfight is poor.
Re-supply and casualty evacuation are notconducted well.
Urban specific supply items: ladders, kneeand elbow pads, ropes with grappling hooks,as well as specialty weapons and ammunitionneed to be made available.
Speed, not haste, should be the norm inurban operations.
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ConclusionsConclusions
The world in which the Army will fight in the21st century is even more politically complexand dangerous than just a few years ago.There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of
weapons available to hostile elements. TheUnited States must cope with advancedtechnologies that re-invent themselves inhours, days, and weeks.
The world in which the Army will fight in the21st century is even more politically complexand dangerous than just a few years ago.There is a dramatic increase in the lethality of
weapons available to hostile elements. TheUnited States must cope with advancedtechnologies that re-invent themselves inhours, days, and weeks.
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ConclusionsConclusions
The Army now faces a dangerousworld without a defined foe. The enemyis nebulous, and the Army is caught
between a highly successful (butincreasingly outmoded) doctrine andthe desire to prepare to meet futureadversaries. Urban combat will be asmall piece of any new doctrine.
The Army now faces a dangerousworld without a defined foe. The enemyis nebulous, and the Army is caught
between a highly successful (butincreasingly outmoded) doctrine andthe desire to prepare to meet futureadversaries. Urban combat will be asmall piece of any new doctrine.
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ConclusionsConclusions
The Army cannot wait for the next revision
of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed.
Possibly the best approach is to develop
new TTP for future contingencies andconflicts now. Developing and formalizing
the TTP may generate broader thought that
will lead to the new doctrine.
The Army cannot wait for the next revision
of FM 100-5, Operations, to be completed.
Possibly the best approach is to develop
new TTP for future contingencies andconflicts now. Developing and formalizing
the TTP may generate broader thought that
will lead to the new doctrine.
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The CALL Homepage and MOUTThe CALL Homepage and MOUT
http://call.army.mil
MOUT hot button
Links
Published Articles
CALL/FMSO/Others DOD Urban Operations Journals
SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum
USMC Related Articles
Briefings
http://call.army.mil
MOUT hot button
Links
Published Articles
CALL/FMSO/Others DOD Urban Operations Journals
SAMS Urban Operations Curriculum
USMC Related Articles
Briefings
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Connect
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Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training Environment
Lessons Learned in anUrban Combat Training Environment
DTLOMS
Doctrine
Training
Leader Development
Organization
Materiel
Soldiers
DTLOMS
Doctrine
Training
Leader Development
Organization
Materiel
Soldiers