cmh_pub_10-19 transportation corps - responsibilites, organization

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS: RESPONSIBILITIES,

ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS

by

Chester WaTdlow

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY

WASHINGTON, D.C. , 1999

ForewordThe matter of transportation at home and abroad becomes one of first

importance when war strikes. The strain on the transportation systems and theconflict of civilian and military demands become immediate and serious problems.In two world wars the United States has had to solve many of these problemsafter hostilities began, and therefore to solve them in haste, by trial and error.

As new and improved means of transport are introduced, the questions ofmilitary transportation become more difficult. The horse and mule had theirshortcomings, but their use involved few of the complications that bedevil themilitary in this machine age. The armed forces must have not only adequateequipment but also replacement parts to keep that equipment operating in thefield. Efficient use of transportation necessitates co-ordination within the armedforces and between military and civilian agencies. During World War II muchwas done to increase effective use of ships, railway cars, and motor vehicles, butefforts to balance the competitive demands of civilian and military traffic inthe zone of interior were only partially successful.

Careful planning is necessary to reduce difficulties such as those which besetus in 1917 and 1941. The present volume, first of this series to deal with theArmy's technical services, begins an account of the transportation problems ofthe Army and their solution in World War II, including those of inter-Alliedco-ordination. Between the covers of this book is to be found information thatwill contribute substantially to our planning and preparation for transportationemergencies in the future.

Washington, D. C.1 August 1951

ORLANDO WARDMaj. Gen., U. S. A.Chief of Military History

ix

PrefaceThis volume is the first of three concerning the Army Transportation Corps

in World War II. It delineates the nature of the transportation task, the functionsand organization of the Transportation Corps, and its operating problems andrelationships in the zone of interior. A second volume will deal with the executionof troop and supply movements in the zone of interior and to the oversea com-mands, the organization and training of Transportation Corps troops, and thedevelopment, procurement, and distribution of Transportation Corps matériel.A third volume will describe Transportation Corps organization and activitiesin oversea theaters and bases.

The reader quickly will discern that the discussion is not confined strictly tothe Transportation Corps. There are several reasons. A Chief of Transportationwas not designated by the Army until three months after the United Statesentered the war, and many important developments took place during 1940and 1941 when Army transportation was a responsibility of The QuartermasterGeneral, acting under the supervision of the Supply Division (G-4) of theWar Department General Staff. Transportation was so vital an element in themilitary program that throughout the war higher echelons of the Army took anactive interest in and exercised a measure of supervision over the developmentand activities of the transportation organization. Policies and decisions affectingtransportation were in fact Army policies and decisions, whether they were enun-ciated by the Chief of Transportation, the Commanding General of the ArmyService Forces, the Chief of Staff, the Under Secretary of War, or the Secretary.

Another reason for the breadth of the discussion is the extent of collaborationthat was necessary between the Transportation Corps and other governmentalagencies. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Office of Defense Trans-portation, the Maritime Commission, the War Shipping Administration, and theWar Production Board were civilian agencies which exercised a broad controlover the services and facilities used by the Army for the movement of its troopsand matériel. The Naval Transportation Service operated some of the vesselsutilized by the Transportation Corps, and the two organizations participated innumerous other joint logistic arrangements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and theCombined Chiefs of Staff dealt with many matters which directly affected theactivities of the Transportation Corps. A close liaison was necessary with theBritish Ministry of War Transport, whose vessels were used extensively by theUnited States Army. The activities of these agencies and the Army's relationswith them are important parts of the Transportation Corps' history.

The working relationships of the Transportation Corps with other govern-mental agencies, although they proceeded with a high degree of co-operation,involved matters concerning which there were divergent interests and differingopinions. Some differences pertained to policy and others to method; some werevery important and others less so; some were satisfactorily adjusted during the

war and others were not. Though an attempt has been made not to give undueprominence to these differences, their historical importance is obvious. Sometimesthey explain why things were done in a certain way, or were not done. Often theypoint to potential disputes, even weaknesses, which should be taken into accountin planning for possible future emergencies.

Although this discussion covers a broad field in presenting the significantdevelopments which affected the movement of troops and military supplies, itis in no sense a full history of the nation's wartime transportation effort. Theprimary purpose is to present the experience of the Transportation Corps asreflected in Army records, which in itself is a broad assignment. In such a studyit is inevitable that the views of the Chief of Transportation and his associatesshould be more fully stated than those of other officers and agencies. Wherecontroversial matters are involved, however, the basic issues should appear withfairness to all parties.

While the general plan has been to present only facts and opinions foundin the records, there has been some digression from that procedure. The recollec-tions of Transportation Corps officers and of civilians who held responsiblepositions under the Chief of Transportation have been used to supply details notfound in the records and to clarify obscure passages. Reports of the interviewswith those consulted are on file. The author's experience as a member of theexecutive staff of the Chief of Transportation throughout the war has helpedhim greatly in understanding and evaluating developments, but recollections ofevents and attitudes have not been allowed to take the place of documentaryevidence. Personal observations are confined almost entirely to the commentson policies and methods of the Chief of Transportation and his relationships withArmy Service Forces headquarters that appear in Chapter III and to the generalconclusions presented in the final chapter.

Many of the statistical data which have been used, while from responsiblesources, were compiled during or shortly after the war and so may differ some-what from figures which more deliberate research may make available. It isbelieved that these variations are inconsequential. Readers interested in datawhich have a greater degree of finality will be able to find them in the statisticalvolumes that are being prepared for publication as part of the series, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR IL

It is impossible to acknowledge in detail all the generous assistance whichthe author has received, during the preparation of this volume, from military andcivilian colleagues and from the staff of his own office. Aside from acknowledg-ments made in the footnotes, special thanks are due to the following: Dr. HaroldLarson, who prepared a number of monographs on Army transportation bywater, and who at present is working on the third volume of the TransportationCorps trilogy; Dr. Harold H. Dunham, Dr. James R. Masterson, and Mr. JosephBykofsky, who have written monographs on Army transportation in certain over-sea theaters; and Capt. William H. Schmidt, whose wartime monographs deal withvarious aspects of Army transportation in the United States. Final editing of thevolume was in charge of Mr. W. Brooks Phillips, who was assisted by Miss Michael

xi

Burdett and Mrs. Pauline Dodd; Mr. George Powell was most helpful in thechecking of charts and statistical data; and Mr. David Jaffé prepared the index.Miss Marie Premauer, Mrs. Lois Riley, and Mr. John Lee performed many serv-ices indispensable to preparation of the manuscript and production of the book.

Since the account in this volume is necessarily compact, rather extensive foot-notes have been provided. In connection with the effort which is being madeunder the Secretary of Defense to develop greater integration in the transportationservices of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, many aspects of transportationare currently undergoing careful study. Should the nation become involved inanother major war, the records pertaining to transportation in World War IIwill take on added significance. The author believes that the documents cited inthis volume, and the files in which they are located, will be of considerable assist-ance to future students of military transportation.

Numerous technical terms have been used in the text and the footnotes. Ratherfree use has been made of abbreviations, especially to avoid too frequent repeti-tion of the long titles of wartime agencies and officials. The identification of thenumerous files and records in which cited documents are located also has involvedthe use of terms and abbreviations which are not generally familiar. The readerwill be aided in these respects by reference to the Glossary of Technical Terms,the List of Abbreviations, the Bibliographical Note, and the Guide to Footnotes,which are appended.

Washington, D. C.1 February 1951

CHESTER WARDLOW

xii

ContentsChapter Page

I. TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALWARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Transportation as a Factor in Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Magnitude of the Army's Transportation Task. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10The Role of Long-Range Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Relative Advantages of the Contending Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

II. ANTECEDENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS... 28Army Transportation in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Developments Preceding Pearl Harbor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35The Early Months of the War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Transportation Service Established. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Transportation Corps Created. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

III. THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION.. . 56Initial Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Delegation of Authority to the Army Air Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Additional Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62The Headquarters Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68The Chief of Transportation and His Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73Relations with Other Elements of the Army Service Forces. . . . . . 78Relations with the Oversea Commands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

IV. THE FIELD ESTABLISHMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95Ports of E m b a r k a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95Transportation Zones................................... 111Other Field Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Supervision by Headquarters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Demobilization Planning and Adjustments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

V. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF SHIPPING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135Early Military Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136Preparations for Amphibious Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144The Submarine Threat.................................. 148The Shipbuilding Achievement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Central Control of Ship Employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163Co-ordination of Port Utilization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176Co-ordination of Ship Repair and Conversion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

VI. RELATIONS WITH OTHER SHIP-OPERATINGAGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186Relations with the War Shipping Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186Relations with the Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200Naval Convoy and Routing Arrangements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212Relations with the British Ministry of War Transport......... 220

xiii

Chapter Page

VII. OPERATION OF THE ARMY'S LARGE AND SMALLVESSELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228Civilian Crews on Ocean-Going Vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229Maintenance and Voyage Repairs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239Supplies for Vessels..................................... 241Food Service on Transports and Hospital Ships.............. 243Armament and Gun Crews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245Radio Service and Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247Assignment and Operation of Small Boats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249Manning of Small Boats................................. 255Proposals Regarding Marine Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

VIII. OTHER MARINE OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS. . . . . . . 262Pier Operation and Stevedoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262Efficient Utilization of Vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271Control of Ship Utilization in the Theaters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282Ship Conversions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

IX. UTILIZATION OF DOMESTIC COMMERCIALCARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Distribution and Control of Inland Traffic.................. 308Basic Relations with the Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312Wartime Expansion of Railroad Traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319Limited Capacity of the Western Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323Procurement of New Railroad Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328Railroad Manpower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335Efficient Utilization of Railroad Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341Temporary Government Control of the Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . 349The Highway Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353Inland Waterways and Airways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367Relations with Federal Regulating Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370

X. THE ARMY'S RAILWAY AND HIGHWAY OPERATIONS. . 375Utility Railroads....................................... 375Army Tank Cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381Army Hospital Cars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385Railroad Repair Shops. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391Motor Buses for Local Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394Administrative Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402

XI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406

Appendix

A. FUNCTIONS OF SUPERVISORY OFFICERS ANDDIVISIONS, OCT, 1 JULY 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415

B. WARTIME COMMANDERS, PORTS OF EMBARKATION,ZONE OF INTERIOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

xiv

Appendix Page

C. TRANSPORTATION ZONE TERRITORIES ANDOFFICERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424

D. INSTALLATIONS SUBORDINATE TO ZONE TRANS-PORTATION OFFICES, AUGUST 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL N O T E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426

GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435

I N D E X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

TablesNo.

1. Distribution of Personnel of the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tation: Designated Dates in 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

2. Personnel Employed at Port Installations: 31 December 1944. ... 1103. Distribution of Personnel Among Transportation Zones:

31 March 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1224. Employment of Ocean-Going Passenger and Dry-Cargo Shipping

Under U.S. Control on Selected Dates: 1943-1945. . . . . . . . . . 1755. Average Tons of General Cargo Loaded per Net Gang-Hour at

U.S. Ports on Vessels Loaded for the Army by ContractingStevedores: July 1943-March 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

6. Average Cost per Ton of Loading Army Cargo by ContractingStevedores at Principal U.S. Ports: 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

7. Analysis of Cost of Loading Army Cargo by Contracting Steve-dores at U.S. Ports: 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

8. Time Spent at U.S. Loading Ports by Dry-Cargo Vessels Loadedat Army Ports of Embarkation and Sailed During the PeriodFebruary-December 1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

9. Percent Distribution of Intercity Passenger and Freight Traffic inthe United States, by Type of Carrier: 1940-1945. . . . . . . . . . 309

10. Indexes of Passenger and Freight Traffic in the United States:1940-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

11. Equipment Requirements of the American Railroads (All Classes)as Stated by the Office of Defense Transportation, and ActualProduction: 1942-1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332

12. Production of Nonmilitary Trucks, Trailers, and Buses in theUnited States: 1936-1944. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

xv

ChartsNo. Page

1. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation:30 June 1 9 4 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

2. Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation:1 July 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

3. Typical Organization for Ports of Embarkation, Approved by theChief of Transportation: 1 July 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4. Typical Organization for Zone Transportation Offices, Approvedby the Chief of Transportation: November 1 9 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

5. Utilization of Deadweight and Bale Cubic Capacities of ShipsLoaded by the Army at U.S. Ports: December 1941-August1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

6. U.S. Dry-Cargo Ships Employed in Transoceanic Service for theArmy Held in Oversea Ports More than Ten Days: February1943-July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

7. Status of Dry-Cargo Vessels Loaded by the U.S. Army at U.S.Ports for Discharge in Northern Continental Europe: 1 Sep-tember 1944-31 March 1 9 4 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290

IllustrationsMaj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, Chief of Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iiAmphibious Operations—Normandy and Leyte. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Oversea Ports—Khorramshahr and N a h a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Battered Railroad Yards in France and I t a l y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Peacetime Ports of E m b a r k a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Troop Entrainment—December 1 9 4 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Military Railway Service Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Hard Going on Oversea Highways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Wartime Army Ports of Embarkation—Oakland and Newport N e w s . . . . . . 98Reactivated Army Bases—Boston and New O r l e a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108Transportation Corps Field Installations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Prewar Army Transports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Convoy Forming off a U.S. Atlantic Port. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150War-Built Cargo Ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157Troopships in the U.S. Pool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166Troopships Operated by the Navy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202Largest Troopships Afloat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223Instruction in Navigation and Marine Engines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234Boats Built for Theater Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

xvi

Page

Tight Stowage of Packaged Freight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275Crated and Uncrated Equipment Stowed on Deck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278Army Hospital S h i p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302Flatcars Moving Bulky Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322The Bracing and Lashing of Large E q u i p m e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346Motor Transport for Short Hauls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360Locomotives for Utility Railroads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377Army Hospital C a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388Army Buses for Local Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399

Most of the illustrations in this volume were supplied by the Department ofDefense. Of these, all are U.S. Army photographs except the following.U.S. Navy: pp. 89 (bottom), 150, 166, 202, 302 (bottom)U.S. Air Force: pp. 98 (top), 118 (bottom), 137 (bottom), 275 (bottom).

Photographs from other sources:U.S. Maritime Commission: p. 157.U.S. Maritime Service: p. 234.Higgins, Inc., New Orleans, La.: p. 252 (bottom).Association of American Railroads: p. 346 (top).Stage and Howe, Los Angeles, Calif.: p. 360 (top).General Electric Company: p. 377 (bottom).

xvii

THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS:

RESPONSIBILITIES,

ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATIONS

CHAPTER I

Transportation Implicationsof Global Warfare

The ability of the United States to turnthe course of World War II toward victoryfor the Allies was dependent on the ade-quacy of the transportation facilities madeavailable to our armed forces and the effi-ciency with which those facilities were used.Manifestly, success was dependent also onthe training and skillful employment ofmilitary personnel and on the quantity andquality of the war matériel produced forthe use of our own forces and those of ourallies. Yet our forces could not accomplishtheir mission until they had been trans-ported to the combat areas overseas, andamong the several elements which enteredinto the formula for victory it fairly may besaid that transportation, especially shipping,was the most critical.

Shipping was a constant source of con-cern to those planning military operations.There never was serious doubt that, giventhe time necessary for recruitment andtraining, the United States could develop afighting force capable of coping with theforces of the enemy. Nor was there anydoubt that, allowed a sufficient period forconversion from a peacetime to a wartimebasis, American industry could outproducethat of the hostile powers. But for more thana year after our entry into the war therewas grave doubt as to our ability to con-struct troop and cargo vessels rapidlyenough to offset the losses inflicted by sub-

marines and build up a shipping capacityadequate for the defeat of Germany andJapan.

In June 1942 Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somer-vell, commanding the Army's Services ofSupply, said, "The losses by submarinesinkings threaten failure of our wareffort."1 In the spring of the following yearhe reported, "Our plans to carry out adetermined and effective offensive during1943 and to strike further decisive blows in1944 are measured almost entirely by theshipping which can be made available formilitary operations." 2 Later in 1943 theSenate Subcommittee on War Mobilizationannounced, "We can never have more shipsthan are needed for all-out offensive war-fare," and warned against allowing ourincreasing output of merchant vessels to lullus into an attitude of complacency.3 InOctober 1944 General Somervell stated toGen. George C. Marshall, the Army Chiefof Staff: "Operations in both the Atlanticand the Pacific are accepting monthly defi-cits in their shipping schedules. Yet, new

1 Memo for CofS USA, 18 Jun 42, OCT 569. 14Losses.

2 Memo for CofS USA, 25 Mar 43, sub: ProposedAllocation of U.S. Shipping, ASF Hq CofS file1942-43.

3 Report from the Subcommittee on War Mobi-lization to the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S.Senate, October 7, 1943, pp. 3, 5.

2 THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS

demands on shipping develop almostdaily." 4

In fact, as subsequent discussion willshow, even up to the time of Germany'scollapse ocean transport was a limiting fac-tor in our oversea military effort. Althoughat times the troops or the cargo ready atthe ports failed to fill completely the avail-able ship space, such situations were localand temporary, and in the strategicplanning ship capacity usually was short ofwhat was desired.

While shipping presented the most acuteproblem, inland transportation also wasunder constant strain, which increased ashostilities continued. During World War Ifailure to control rail traffic and to utilizerail equipment efficiently resulted in seriouscongestion, particularly along the Atlanticseaboard, thereby causing delay and con-fusion in the movement of supplies toEurope.5 A similar and probably worsesituation would have arisen during WorldWar II had not effective measures beentaken to prevent it. As a result of thesemeasures, despite the unprecedented vol-ume of traffic and the severe limitationon the production of new transportationequipment, the railway, highway, and in-land waterway carriers were able to meetthe military requirements as they arose.This might not have been so had Japanattacked or seriously threatened our westcoast during the early days of the war, forat that time the carriers west of the Missis-sippi had little reserve capacity. But the factthat the Japanese were preoccupied with

the extension of their holdings in Asia andthe western Pacific, added to the strategicdecision of the Allies to consider the defeatof the European Axis their first objective,made it possible for domestic transportationto remain fluid and effective after the shockof our sudden entry into the war had passed.

"In global warfare considerations ofstrategy and transportation are insepa-rable," said Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross,Chief of Transportation, U.S. Army, dur-ing the period of hostilities, in his finalreport.6 Brief examination of this relation-ship, as exemplified in World War II, isessential background for a discussion of theresponsibilities and accomplishments of theTransportation Corps. Since under the pre-vailing circumstances the availability ofadequate transportation was a basic factorin the formulation of most of the importantstrategic plans and decisions that were madeduring the course of the war, the followingreview can touch upon only certain majoraspects of the subject.

Transportation as a Factor in Strategy

Transportation has been a factor instrategy since that period of history whenfighting men carried their equipment ontheir backs and lived off the countries inwhich they were engaged. The importanceof this factor has risen as the scope ofhostilities has been widened and the burdenof military impedimenta has been increased.In both respects World War II was in aclass by itself. It was the first truly globalwar, during which American troops weredeployed virtually throughout the world.The increased mechanization of the forces,

4 Memo, 24 Oct 44, sub: Increased Requests forShipping, ASF Hq Shipping 1944.

5 Report of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Armyto the Secretary of War, 1919 (Washington), pp.112-14; Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson,The Road to France (New Haven, 1921), pp. 112-16.

6 Report of the Chief of Transportation, ArmyService Forces, World War II, 30 November 1945,p. 2. The report, issued when Gross retired fromthe Army, is cited hereafter as Gross final rpt.

TRANSPORTATION IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL WARFARE 3

the greater weight of weapons and ammu-nition, and the fact that little or nomatériel was available in many areas whereour troops fought, meant that for the sup-port of each soldier sent into a theater ofoperations far more equipment and supplieshad to be shipped from the zone of interiorthan in any previous war.7

Following the Japanese attack on ourPacific outposts and our precipitation into atwo-ocean conflict, military demands on theUnited States far exceeded resources. Onthe Atlantic side there was the necessity ofsupplying Britain and the Soviet Unionwith war matériel to enable them to con-tinue their resistance against the Germanforces, together with the desirability ofopening an active second front as soon aspossible in order to relieve the pressure onour European allies. On the Pacific sidethere was the need of checking the extensionof Japanese aggression with as little delayas possible and of preventing the consolida-tion of gains already made. These jobscould not be tackled equally without dangerof failure in both. The preponderance ofour limited strength had to be thrown inone direction or the other. The decision toattack Germany first and assume a strategicdefensive in the Pacific was made initiallyon purely military grounds before PearlHarbor, but when the matter came up fordiscussion at the British-American confer-ences in late December 1941 it was evident

that transportation was an important con-sideration favoring that decision.8

The transportation considerations in-cluded more than simply the limited num-ber of ships available for a two-ocean war.9

Since distances were much shorter in theAtlantic than in the Pacific, a given numberof vessels could transport more men andsupplies to the combat areas in a givenperiod. Large-scale operations in the Pacificwould involve many assault landings andthe discharge of troops and cargo at poorlyequipped ports and over beachheads, whichmeant slow dispatch of the vessels andcorrespondingly longer round voyages. Thecapacities of the ports on our Pacific coastand the rail lines which fed those portswere not then equal to the task of handlinga major offensive to the west. The natureof the war in the Pacific required thepresence of the major portion of the UnitedStates Fleet in that area, and therefore ourwestern ports were required to handle alarge supply operation in support of ournaval forces in addition to whatever de-mands the Army might make upon them.

From the beginning of World War II itwas a generally accepted doctrine thattroops would not be sent overseas unlessthere was assurance that they could be

7 Rpt, Transportation, Comparative Data, WorldWar I-World War II, pp. 12, 16, prepared by ContlDiv OCT, Jul 43, OCT HB MPR. The report in-dicates that during 20 war months in 1917-18 theArmy shipped 2,052,830 troops and 8,883,297 MTof cargo to oversea destinations, while in a corres-ponding period, 1941-43, it shipped 1,769,901troops and 26,688,794 MT. Recent research inOCMH has refined the 1941-43 figures to 1,761,132troops and 26,573,995 MT.

8 Rpt of U.S.-British Stf Convs, Jan-Mar 41, 27Mar 41 (ABC-1), P&O GSUSA; ARCADIA Proceed-ings, 24 Dec 41, An. 1. Mark Skinner Watson, Chiefof Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITEDSTATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing-ton, 1950), Ch. IV, indicates that in the summerof 1940 General Marshall already had concludedthat in a war against Germany and Japan the de-feat of Germany should be the first objective.

9 See typescript monograph, Col M. B. Stokes, Jr.,C of Plng Div, OCT, Shipping in War—The Re-lationship Between Shipping and the LogisticalOperations and Strategy of World War II, 21 Mar46, OCT HB Topic Logistics Gen.


supplied adequately at all times.10 This wasa departure from the plan which had beenfollowed in the first world war, and itreflected the conviction which prevailedafter Pearl Harbor that virtually all equip-ment and the great preponderance of othersupplies required by the American expedi-tionary forces would have to be shippedfrom the zone of interior. Under thesecircumstances it was necessary to establishand maintain a careful balance betweentroop and freight carrying vessels. Suchbalance did not exist when the UnitedStates entered the war, and even after apractical balance had been achieved it wasdifficult to maintain, because of changes instrategic plans and the variation of shipcompletion and ship loss figures from theforecasts. An approximate balance was heldby emphasizing the construction of cargoships and converting such ships to troopcarriers when the need for additional troopcapacity became apparent. The alterationson cargo ships were begun while the shipswere under construction, and the timerequired to place such vessels in service wasmuch less than that required to build vesselsdesigned as regular troopships.

Continuance of the lend-lease policy ofsending large quantities of food, rawmaterials, and equipment to the SovietUnion and the nations of the British Com-monwealth after our entry into the war wasa strategic decision of major importance,since it not only diverted supplies from ourown armed forces but deprived them ofsorely needed shipping. The officers respon-sible for Army transportation took anextremely serious view of this situation. A

few days after the declaration of war theygave the Chief of Staff a summary in whichshipping was termed the bottleneck in theoversea effort, and the conflict between theshipping requirements for the lend-leaseprogram and those for the maintenance ofUnited States forces in the theaters waspresented in bold terms.11 Despite theextreme seriousness of the situation in theFar East during the winter of 1942, amovement of additional troops to that areareceived a shipping preference secondary tothat for Russian aid. The early planningfor the dispatch of American and Britishtroops to French North Africa was gov-erned by a ruling of President Rooseveltand Prime Minister Churchill that thereshould be no stoppage in the flow of sup-plies to the Soviet Union and the MiddleEast.12 In March 1943 the Chief of Trans-portation indicated that the increasingdemand for shipping aid to the British, ifaccepted, would imperil military opera-tional plans resulting from discussions atthe Casablanca Conference during the pre-ceding January.13

At times during the critical year 1942 asmuch as one-third of the ocean-going drycargo fleet under the control of the WarShipping Administration was allocated tolend-lease services. While the conflict be-tween Army and lend-lease shipping pro-grams eased somewhat as the output of theAmerican shipyards mounted and the rate

10 See Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4,21 Dec 41, sub: Estimate of Shipping Available forU.S. Overseas Effort 1942 and 1943, Sec. IV, par.1, G-4/29717-116.

11 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 11 Dec 41,sub: Shipping Situation, OCT HB Gross Day File;see also Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 12Jan 42, par. 5d, sub: Capacity of Shipping,G-4/29717-116.

12 Memo, ACofS G-4 for Rear Adm SherwoodeA. Taffinder USN, 14 Feb 42, OCT HB Gross DayFile; CCS Mtg, 23 Jan 42, Item 5.

13 Memo, CofT for CofS USA, 17 Mar 43, sub:CCS 183/1-Review of Availability of UN Shipping,OCT HB Gross Day File.


of sinkings fell off, it never was completelyremoved.14

Notwithstanding the decision to under-take the defeat of Germany first, our posi-tion in the Pacific soon became so seriousthat it was necessary to divert some vesselsfrom the Atlantic and to reduce plannedmovements to the United Kingdom andIceland proportionately. This decision wasmade at a meeting held at the White Houseon 12 January 1942, attended by the Presi-dent, the British Prime Minister, and theirprincipal military and civilian advisers.15

The first convoy from the east coast to thePacific, consisting of seven troopships, sailedfrom New York on 22 January 1942, anda second convoy consisting of five shipssailed from New York on 3 March 1942.Both convoys were destined to Australia,but the greater part of the troops was toproceed thence to New Caledonia to assurethe defense of that island, then under thecontrol of the Free French.16 In the Ameri-can-British discussions, New Caledonia wastermed a tempting bait for the Japanesebecause of its rich nickel mines, and it waspointed out that the enemy's seizure of theisland would necessitate moving all rein-forcements to the Southwest Pacific by thelong route south of New Zealand, and thuswould render more acute the already seriousshortage of shipping. During the first sixmonths of 1942, ships carrying a total ofapproximately 40,000 troops were dis-patched from New York to the Pacific.Some cargo vessels also sailed from Atlantic

coast ports with supplies for the Pacific.17

This early effort to increase our resistanceto the Japanese advance was reflectedclearly in the deployment of shipping in theservice of the Army. On 30 April 1942 theocean-going cargo and troopships servingthe Army in the Pacific areas totaled 1,891 ,-473 deadweight tons capacity, while thoseserving in the Atlantic areas totaled only677,776 deadweight.18 The former figureembraced not only the vessels diverted fromthe Atlantic during the winter of 1942,but also a number of the larger British andAmerican transatlantic liners which hadbeen employed in the Pacific and IndianOceans prior to that time and were beingheld there for the completion of plannedmovements of American and Britishtroops.19 Even at this early period Gen.Douglas MacArthur was pleading for theassignment of additional vessels to theSouthwest Pacific, which he considerednecessary to the execution of planned opera-tions within the theater. The Chief ofTransportation was exploiting every meansof meeting those requests, but with onlypartial success.20

Under these circumstances the early con-tributions to the build-up of Americanstrength in the United Kingdom, a projectdesignated by the code name BOLERO, weremodest indeed. The first contingent of 4,058troops departed on two vessels whichsailed from New York on 15 January 1942

14 WSA Monthly Shipping Summary shows dis-tribution of vessels under control of that agency.

15 Memo, CofS USA for ACofS WPD, G-3, andG-4, 13 Jan 42, G-4/33983.

16 ARCADIA Proceedings, 11 Jan 42, pp. 5-6. Un-usual routing is explained in Memo, G-4 for CofSUSA, 18 Feb 42, G-4/33888.

17 Certain types of matériel were in short supplyat this time and CofT had difficulty finding bal-anced cargoes for the available ships. See OCT HBGross Australia.

18 Army Service Forces Monthly Progress Report,Sec, 3, Transportation, 30 Apr 43, p. 16, hereaftercited as ASF MPR, Sec. 3.

19 ARCADIA Proceedings, 12 Jan 42, An. 1, and14 Jan 42, p. 2.

20 File OCT HB Wylie Australia Mar 42-Jul 44reflects this situation.


for Belfast, Ireland. A second group of ninevessels with 8,555 troops sailed from NewYork for Belfast on 19 February 1942.During the ensuing two months only smallnumbers of casuals left New York for theUnited Kingdom, and the next consider-able movement was on 29 April, when13,924 Army personnel were embarked oneight vessels, among them the British linerAquitania which had just been returnedfrom the Pacific. The large British linersQueen Mary and Queen Elizabeth, afterthe completion of assignments in thePacific, entered the New York—UnitedKingdom service in May and June, res-pectively. For several months thereafter themammoth "Queens" and an increasingnumber of smaller vessels landed substantialcontingents of American troops in theUnited Kingdom.21

After a slow start because of the criticalsituation in the Pacific, the build-up ofAmerican strength in the United Kingdomagain was delayed because of the invasionof North Africa. The North African ex-pedition had been discussed by the UnitedStates and British Chiefs of Staff on num-erous occasions during the winter andspring of 1942 under the code names GYM-NAST and SUPERGYMNAST, and agreementto proceed with the undertaking, under thenew name TORCH, was arrived at in thefollowing July.22 The earlier discussions hadcontemplated the landing of limited numbersof American and British troops with French

collaboration.23 The plan finally adoptedcalled for larger task forces, prepared toland against French resistance. The threatto the British position in Egypt from Axisforces based on Italian Libya, the possi-bility of a German invasion of Morocco andAlgeria through France and Spain, and thestrategic advantage of opening the Medi-terranean to Allied ships serving the Middleand Far East were factors in this decision.24

The period 27 October 1942 to 30 April1943 witnessed the embarkation of 761,000American and British troops destined toNorth Africa and the forwarding of 8,195,-000 measurement tons of matériel for theirsupport.25 These were men and supplieswhich otherwise might have been sent to orretained in the United Kingdom. A total of73.869 U.S. troops had been landed atBritish ports in August 1942, but this sub-stantial flow declined thereafter; it becamea mere trickle during the winter of 1942-43and did not again attain the August figureuntil a full year had passed.26 A correspond-ing reduction took place in the movementof cargo from the United States to theUnited Kingdom. Accordingly, a cross-Channel operation to establish an invasionforce in northern France, which had beenplanned originally for the summer of 1943under the code name ROUNDUP, was de-

21 For list of troopship sailings, see Summary ofHistorical Events and Statistics, NYPE, 1942, pp.10-11, OCT HB NYPE.

22 Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of theUnited States Army, July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943,pp. 18-19. Two such reports were issued by Gen-eral Marshall during the war period, cited here-after as Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1943, or 1945.

23 ARCADIA Proceedings, 24 Dec 41, pp. 4-5, and26 Dec 41, An. 2.

24 Biennial Rpts, CofS USA, 1943, p. 18, 1945,p. 9. OCT estimated that opening of Mediterraneanwould reduce shipping requirement 30 percent forshipments from U.S. and 40 percent for shipmentsfrom UK by eliminating long voyage around Cape.Memo, DCofT for Gen Moses, 9 Dec 42, sub: Sav-ing of Ships when Allies Contl Med, OCT 563.5.

25 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, May 43, pp. 85-86.26 Historical Report of the Transportation Corps

in the European Theater, Vol. III, Ch. VII, p. 16,OCT HB ETO; for schedule of BOLERO troop move-ments prior to decision on TORCH, Stf Conf, CGSOS, 26 Jun 42, Sec. 6, OCT HB ASF.


ferred until the spring of 1944 and renamedOVERLORD.27 While many considerationscontributed to this deferment of the mainassault on the Continent, including thedemands for men and matériel for combatareas in the Mediterranean and the Pacific,ocean transport was fully committed duringthe period and was in itself an effectiveblock to the more rapid accumulation ofstrength in Great Britain.28

After the surrender of enemy forces inNorth Africa in May 1943, the operationswere carried across the Mediterranean inan effort to force Italy out of the war. Atthe TRIDENT Conference of American andBritish leaders held in Washington in thatmonth, when the strategic plans for thecontinuance of the effort in the Mediter-ranean and in northern Europe were out-lined, it also was decided to maintain anunremitting offensive pressure on the Japa-nese in the Pacific and to increase the flowof matériel to China.29 It was feasible atthat time to plan with reasonable definite-ness for all of these undertakings because ofthe improvement in the shipping situation.American shipyards had so greatly in-creased their output that the total comple-tions for 1943 were expected to be morethan twice those in 1942. Also it was fairlyevident that the efforts of the Allies to curbthe submarine were becoming increasinglyeffective. Nevertheless it still was necessary

to use the available shipping most judicially,and those concerned with planning forocean transport constantly were engaged incalculating what deployment of vesselswould accomplish maximum results.

The increased volume of shipping whichbecame available to the Army during 1942and early 1943 was all needed for TORCH,BOLERO, and support of the bomber offen-sive from the United Kingdom, designatedSICKLE. On 30 April 1943 the tonnage ofthe merchant vessels serving the Army inthe Pacific was slightly less than it hadbeen a year previous, whereas the tonnageemployed in the Atlantic had increasedmore than five-fold.30 Very soon, however,because of the continued growth of themerchant fleet and strategic decisions of theAllies, the volume of shipping employed inthe Pacific began a steady rise. On 30 April1945, with Germany still putting up a last-ditch resistance, the shipping that served theArmy was divided about equally betweenthe Atlantic and the Pacific, with just under7,000,000 deadweight tons employed ineach area.31

The steadily increasing volume of ship-ping assigned to the Pacific by the Army,together with the merchant vessels servingthe Navy,32 made possible the vigorouscampaigns northward from Australia andwestward from Hawaii that enabled theAllied forces to advance within easy strikingdistance of the Japanese homeland evenbefore the termination of hostilities inEurope. The end of German resistance setin motion a carefully laid plan for the re-deployment of troops, matériel, and ship-

27 Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945, p. 11.28 Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 18 Dec 42,

sub: Shipment of Trs to UK, OPD 370.5 ETOSec 1, stated that additional troop lift would beavailable if (1) escorts could be provided fromBritish or other sources, (2) cargo shipping couldbe augmented by reducing lend-lease or other re-quirements, (3) initial equipment of troops couldbe reduced.

29 CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, sub: Final Rpt toPresident and Prime Minister, Sec. IV 3a, b, andSec. V9; Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945, p. 11.

30 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Apr 43, p. 16.31 ASF MPR, Sec. 3; Apr 45, p. 55.32 There was a high degree of interchangeability

in the utilization of the ships assigned respectivelyto Army and Navy in Central and Southwest Paci-fic, a fact which later chapters will amplify.


ping in order to place the preponderanceof our war strength in the Pacific with theleast possible delay. This operation was wellunder way when Japan surrendered.

One of the essentials in the preparationfor the final assault on Japan was theestablishment of an advance base or basesadequate for the build-up of personnel andsupplies and the eventual launching of theinvasion. In May 1944 the Joint StrategicSurvey Committee suggested that the sei-zure of Formosa and the bypassing of thePhilippines might hasten the end of hostili-ties in the Pacific.33 Despite the shorterdistance from Formosa to the objective, therecapture of Luzon was considered thesounder strategy, and among the advan-tages taken into account were the betterport and inland transportation facilitieswhich Luzon offered.34

Strategic considerations were reflected ina number of transportation projects on theNorth American continent. Alaska was thenorthern anchor of our war operations inthe Pacific. Even before Pearl Harbor thepotential importance of Alaska was recog-nized and the strengthening of our militaryposition in that territory was begun. Menand matériel were moved by the water route,but the feasibility of establishing a highwayconnection from a point on the CanadianNational Railways to Fairbanks was givenpreliminary consideration.35 Soon after ourentry into the war, the possibility that theJapanese might attempt an invasion of

Alaska and that their submarines mightseriously interfere with our shipping serv-ices, as well as the desirability of conservingshipping wherever possible, brought the so-called Akan Highway project to the fore.In February 1942 the Chief of Engineerswas instructed to prepare plans for such ahighway, and by October 1942 initial con-struction work had been completed overthe entire length of the 1,480-mile pioneerroad.36 The Canol project, under which theUnited States financed pipelines connectingNorman Wells, Watson Lake, White Horse,Skagway, and Fairbanks, and a refinery atWhite Horse, also was an attempt to pro-vide against the day when the movement ofgasoline and other petroleum products toAlaska by the water route might be limitedby enemy action.37 Since the Japanese madeno attempt to invade the Alaskan mainlandand since the anticipated submarine menacedid not eventuate, neither the Akan High-way nor the Canol installations played animportant role in the supply of our forcesin that area. A barge line which was op-erated by the Army from Seattle and PrinceRupert over the inside passageway to Juneau,Excursion Inlet, and Skagway handled anappreciable tonnage, but it did not attainthe importance which was envisioned in theearly days of the war.38

The strategic importance of Alaska as avantage point from which to move supplies

33 JCS 713/6, 29 May 44; JCS 713/15, 22 Sep44. Both in P&O GSUSA, ABC 384 Formosa (8 Sep43), Sec 1c.

34 Logistics in World War II, Final Report of theArmy Service Forces (1947), p. 52.

35 Memo for file, Trans Br G-4 WDGS, 8 Dec 41,sub: Alaskan International Highway, summarizedactions taken to date, OCT HB Alaska—Alcan Hwyand Ry. See also Charles B. Quattlebaum, "MilitaryHighways," Military Affairs (Fall 1944).

36 Memo, CofT for ACofS SOS, 27 Aug 42, sub:Org and Opn of Alcan Hwy, OCT 611 Alaska 1942Alcan Hwy. File G-4/30436-21 includes numerousdocuments on early phases. For summary of cost,maintenance, and operation see Ltr, Julius H. Am-berg, Asst to SW, to Sen James M. Mead, 26 Apr45, ASF Contl Div 032.3 Mead Com.

37 See Plng Div ASF file, Canol Project, 1942and 1943-44. See also Report of Senate SpecialCommittee Investigating the National Defense Pro-gram, The Canol Project, January 8, 1944.

38 See file AG 567 Alaska 1942 for pertinentdocuments.


to the Soviet Union and China gave rise toa number of other transportation projectswhich were not actually undertaken. Aproposal was brought forward in 1942 toconstruct a standard gauge rail line con-necting the Canadian National Railwayswith the Alaska Railroad at Fairbanks.39

Although the project was believed to befeasible from an engineering standpoint, itwas dropped because of the length of timethat would be required for completion, thegreat quantity of strategic materials in-volved, and the fact that it did not appearto be a definite military necessity. Thefeasibility of extending the railway and thehighway from Fairbanks to a port on thewest coast of Alaska was explored to someextent but not seriously considered.40

The Panama Canal's great stategic signi-ficance, the possibility that communicationswith Central America might be seriouslycurtailed by submarine activity, and theimportance of maintaining stable condi-tions in the Central American countries ledthe United States to take an interest in thecompletion of the Pan-American Highwayas far as Panama. In July 1942 the Chief

of Engineers was instructed to initiate con-struction work on completion of pendingnegotiations with the countries concerned.The movement of construction materialsfrom the United States proceeded slowlybecause of the scarcity of such materialsand of shipping. By mid-1943 the curbingof the submarine had canceled whateverimmediate military importance the under-taking may have had, and Army participa-tion was terminated in October of thatyear.41 The danger that the National Rail-ways of Mexico would prove inadequate tohandle the traffic in which the UnitedStates was interested, particularly the stra-tegic materials imported from Mexico forour war industries, led to an undertaking toaid the rehabilitation of that system byproviding technical personnel and equip-ment from the United States.42

After the confusion incident to the transi-tion from peace to war, and with theestablishment of an adequate system for thecontrol of portbound traffic, the railwaysand the ports in the eastern part of theUnited States proved capable of handlingall oversea movements promptly. Such wasnot the case in the west, however. In peace-time a much lighter export traffic hadmoved through the Pacific coast ports, andtheir railway facilities in particular requiredconsiderable expansion in order to properlyhandle the volume of freight which wasexpected to move that way when a full-scale offensive against Japan waslaunched.43 Correction of this situation be-

39 Memo, ACofS G-4 for WPD, 7 Jan 42,G-4/33820; Memo, the President for SW, 12 Feb42, OCT HB Alaska-Alcan Hwy and Ry; Ltr, SWto Secy State, 28 Apr 42, OSW C&R Railroads;Ltr, Gen Somervell to F. A. Delano Chm NatiResources Plng Bd, 15 May 43, ASF Hq Alaska.

40 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 10 Sep 42, sub:Northwest Route via Alaska-Siberia, OCT 370.5Russia; Memo, Admiral King for JCS, 21 Sep 42,sub: Campaign against Japan via Northern Route,ASF Hq Navy 1942-44; Memo, Somervell forCofS USA, 5 Oct 42, OPD 520 Sec 1 (Cases 1-24) ; Memo, CG SOS for CofS SOS (Styer), 6 Oct42, AG 611 Alaska (8-11-42) ( 1 ) ; Memo, ColR. T. Maddocks OPD for ACofS OPD, 4 Jan 43,sub: Northwest Route to China via Russia, OPD520 Sec 1 (Cases 1-24). Admiral King's memosuggested value of this route in attacking Japan viaKamchatka Peninsula. Maddocks" memo cited prob-lem of obtaining Soviet concurrence.

41 See files OCT 611 Pan-Am Hwy and ASF HqPan-Am Hwy. General Gross states that he neverconsidered the highway necessary from TC stand-point. See Ltr to author, 7 Dec 49, OCT HB TCGen Gross.

42 See files OCT 000.900 Mexico 1942 and AG617 Mexico 1942.

43 Subject more fully discussed in Ch. IX.


gan in 1942 with the installation of addi-tional storage tracks at the principal portsby joint action of the Army and the rail-roads. The transcontinental carriers alsotook steps to increase their line haul. Theseimprovements continued throughout thewar. Nevertheless, in planning for the finalblows against Japan it was necessary toprovide for the routing of some of thecargo destined to the Pacific bases throughGulf and Atlantic ports.

The foregoing brief review illustrates howbasic transportation was to the conduct ofthe war and how the adequacy of the trans-portation facilities available to the Armyconditioned strategic planning and opera-tions.

Magnitude of the Army'sTransportation Task

The task which fell to the TransportationCorps in World War II was described byRobert P. Patterson, the Under Secretaryof War, as one "entirely without precedentin the history of our country." 44 It was infact a transportation task without precedentin the history of the world. This was due tomany conditions and circumstances, but pri-marily to the scope of hostilities and to re-cent developments in the art of warfare. Itwill aid in the understanding of the Trans-portation Corps' operating problems andaccomplishments to review these conditionsand circumstances briefly.

World War II was actually global in itsscope. The first world war had been sodesignated because the belligerents includednations from all continents, but the focalpoint of the fighting during 1914-18 wasEurope. In the second world conflict every

continent was an actual or potential battle-ground, and many an island which pre-viously had been known only to historians,geographers, or explorers flashed into thenews headlines as the scene of bitter fight-ing. In addition, numerous continentalareas and islands were garrisoned and forti-fied either to prevent their seizure by theenemy or to secure them as bases for ourglobe-girdling aerial operations.

Hostilities on such a wide scale naturallycalled for large armed forces. In order tocarry out its mission in World War II, theU.S. Army inducted roughly two and one-half times as many troops as it had calledup in World War I. On 31 October 1940,just before the drafting of recruits underthe Selective Service Act began, the strengthof the Army was 519,805. Thenceforwardto 31 May 1945, when the Army reacheda peak strength of 8,291,336, nearly tenmillion men and women were placed inuniform.45 This huge army had to be trans-ported during the various stages of training,moved to the oversea theaters and bases asstrategic and logistic plans required, andeventually returned to the zone of interior.At all stages it had to be provided withsupplies and equipment adequate for thetask at hand.

The more elaborate training given by allbranches of the Army before the men weresent overseas resulted in more domestictravel per man in World War II than inWorld War I. Basically, the training of1917-18 called for three moves in the zone

44 Ltr to CofT, 15 Aug 45, OCT HB TC GenCommendations.

45 Rpt, STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 Jul 45,p. 61; WD press release, 14 Feb 46, gave accessions1 Nov 40 through 30 Jun 45 as 10,033,640, andseparations as 2,279,700, but it is believed thatthese figures include some duplications; LeonardP. Ayers, The War with Germany (Washington,1919), Ch. I, states that about 4,000,000 served inU.S. Army during WW I.


of interior—from home to cantonment,from cantonment to specialized trainingcamp, and thence to the port of embarka-tion.46 The typical trainee of 1941-45made five basic moves—from home to in-duction station, and thence successively toreception center, replacement trainingcenter, unit training center, and port ofembarkation. Furthermore, in World WarII many soldiers had to be transported tospecialized training centers for desert,mountain, jungle, and amphibious warfare;to schools for the study of technical subjectsand military occupational specialities; andto maneuver areas.47

Almost three and one-half times as manysoldiers were sent overseas in World War IIas in World War I. The Army embarkedroughly 7,293,000 passengers for overseadestinations during the 45-month period,December 1941 through August 1945, ofwhom 6,902,000 were officers and enlistedmen.48 About 350,000 of these soldiers weremoved to stations on the North and SouthAmerican continents or to near-by islandbases, but the great majority crossed the At-lantic or the Pacific. Approximately 4,300,-000 troops were transported to Europe,Africa, and the Middle East over distancesranging from 3,100 to 12,000 nautical miles.About 2,000,000 were transported to sta-tions in or across the Pacific where the sealanes ranged up to 6,500 miles. About 250,000 were transported halfway around theearth to India. In all cases the troops were

accompanied by their initial supplies andequipment and were supported subse-quently by regular shipments of mainte-nance matériel.

Delivering the men and their matériel tothe respective theaters and bases was onlypart of the ocean transportation job. Oneof the distinguishing characteristics ofWorld War II was the repeated advancesfrom established bases to new combat areaswithin the theaters. These intratheater op-erations might involve ocean voyages of afew miles as in the invasion of Normandy,several hundred miles as in the Mediter-ranean, or several thousand miles as in someof the Pacific operations which weremounted in Hawaii and Australia. Thefloating equipment which had to be pro-vided for such operations ranged fromnative outriggers used off the coast of NewGuinea to large ocean liners and includedmany types of transports and landing craftwhich were specially designed to meet thepeculiar requirements of amphibious war-fare. This large and complex task of oceantransportation may be compared with therelatively simple task of 1917-18, whichinvolved moving the American Expedition-ary Forces directly to Europe by steamshipservices which operated in shuttle fashionover distances averaging about 3,300 nauti-cal miles.

Intratheater movements of men andmatériel in some instances involved longoverland hauls. The use of Casablanca asone of the discharge ports for the NorthAfrican expedition necessitated rail andhighway movements up to 1,400 miles. Thedelivery of supplies to Kunming over theBurma Road, and later over the StilwellRoad, called for truck hauls of 710 and1,070 miles respectively. Lend-lease suppliessent to the USSR through the Persian Cor-

46 Crowell and Wilson, The Road to France, pp.51-67.

47 Because of lack of uniformity in actual trainingan accurate comparison is difficult, but this is be-lieved to be a fair presentation. In addition to theseofficial moves, each soldier made one or more fur-lough trips.

48 Gross final rpt, p. 42. Slightly over 2,000,000troops were carried to Europe in 19 months ofWW I. See Ayers, The War with Germany, p. 37.


ridor moved over 575 miles of railway toTehran and 636 miles of highway to Kaz-vin, where they were turned over to repre-sentatives of the Soviet Union. In these andother instances, because of the inadequacyof the local transportation systems, Ameri-can personnel, equipment, and supplieswere required in order that the operationsmight be accomplished efficiently.

The fact that World War II requiredgarrisons to be established in so many prim-itive and undeveloped places added to thetransportation load, because the largeamount of construction work required tomake those garrisons effective had to beaccomplished chiefly with personnel, equip-ment, and materials shipped from theUnited States. Docks and warehouses hadto be constructed at ports and beacheswhich previously had handled little or nodeepwater shipping. Roads had to be builtthrough tropical jungles and over arcticwastes. Airstrips, gun emplacements, andhousing had to be provided. Machinery forgenerating electric power, distilling water,and refrigerating foods had to be installed.Storage tanks for oil and gasoline had to beset up, and pipelines laid. Bulldozers, con-crete mixers, pile drivers, and other heavyequipment were needed to facilitate thework. A competent estimate places thenumber of installations built by the U.S.Army Engineers in oversea areas duringthe war at over 4,000.49 The Corps ofEngineers shipped more than 18,000,000measurement tons of cargo overseas duringthe war. The highest monthly movementwas 775,000 tons.50

Aside from the fact that their use in-volved extensive construction work, the new

oversea ports were slow in discharging armycargo while they were being developed,with the result that round voyages for theships were unduly prolonged. This problemwas encountered on a wide scale in thePacific, but it was present also in Alaska,Greenland, Iceland, the Antilles, West Afri-ca, the Persian Gulf, and wherever militaryport operations were undertaken beyondpeacetime capacities. It existed also at largeand formerly well equipped ports, such asNaples, Marseille, Cherbourg, and Manila,which were in badly damaged conditionwhen they were seized from the enemy andrequired extensive rehabilitation before theycould be used effectively by Allied shipping.

Among the new developments in war-fare which added to the transportation loadwas the amphibious assault. Although landand sea forces had co-operated in suchassaults down through the centuries as cir-cumstances required, the military exigen-cies of World War II dictated a much moreextensive use of this tactic than had beenknown before, and with greater use camea vast improvement in technique, includingthe addition of air power.51 Large amphib-ious operations required the assembling ofhundreds of vessels to move troops andmatériel during the assault and supportphases. Many of these vessels had to bewithdrawn from regular transoceanic serv-ice for weeks or even months, and some hadto be altered to prepare them for thisspecial type of service. Since most amphib-

49 Ltr, Hist Div OCofEngrs to Hist Br OCT, 21Mar 47, OCT HB Topic CofEngrs.

50 ASF Statistical Review, World War II, p. 129.

51 For general description of mounting large am-phibious force see Roy E. Appleman, James M.Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Oki-nawa: The Last Battle, UNITED STATES ARMYIN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp.36-43; for technical details see WD FM 31-5,Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, Nov 44,and Transport Quartermaster Manual, issued byArmy Port and SvC, Honolulu, Nov 44, OCT HBTopic Amph Opns.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS such as these marked the opening of numerouscampaigns in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas. Landing supplies and equipment

on the coast of Normandy (top). Beach operation at Leyte (bottom).


ious operations were launched from basesoutside the United States, the troops andsupplies reached the objective by two ormore voyages, rather than a single directvoyage.

The ships employed in assaults on enemy-held positions were combat loaded, whichmeant that insofar as possible the troopunits and their organizational equipmentwere placed in the same vessels and that theimpedimenta were stowed in such a mannerthat they could be unloaded quickly and inthe order required.52 The impedimentaincluded not only the strictly military equip-ment necessary to the capture of the ob-jective but also a great number of smalllanding boats for putting men and ma-tériel ashore, and a great variety of wheeledand tracked vehicles needed to give theattacking force mobility after landing. Forthis type of cargo and stowage it was nec-essary to sacrifice up to 35 percent of thenormal cargo capacity of the ships, as com-pared with commercial loading.53

World War II was the first great conflictduring which the U.S. Army was exten-sively motorized. Men, artillery, and sup-plies literally went into action on wheels,powered by internal combustion engines.With the Allied forces in France andFlanders on 31 October 1918 the ratio ofmen to motor conveyances—trucks, auto-mobiles, and motorcycles—was about 37 to1.54 With the American forces in the Euro-pean Theater of Operations on 30 April

1945 the ratio was about 4.3 to 1.55 DuringWorld War I—that is, up to the Armistice—the United States Government accepted lessthan a hundred tanks from Americanmanufacturers, and no other self-propelledmotor-propelled weapons were completed,whereas during the five-year period ending31 July 1945 about 136,000 tanks and otherself-propelled weapons were produced forthe Army.56 These comparisons illustratethe increase of motorization as between thetwo wars. The significance of the increasefrom a transportation standpoint lay in thefact that such equipment was bulky andtook up a large amount of space whenmoved by ship or rail; the requirements ofpersonnel, tools, and spare parts for assem-bling and maintenance work were heavy;and the engines consumed fabulous quan-tities of motor fuel and lubricants.57

World War II brought military air powerto maturity. The United States Army,which had less than 3,000 aircraft on handat the beginning of 1940, received morethan 227,000 new aircraft during the five-year period ending 31 July 1945, and onthe eve of V-E Day the military personnel

52 As the war progressed increasingly large per-centages of the vessels used in assault operationswere specially designed naval vessels rather thanmerchant types. See Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945,p. 73, for types of vessels used in seizure of Leyte.

53 In the assault on Makin 46 percent of basic shipcapacity was sacrificed—an unusually high percent-age due to extensive use of cargo pallets. See Makin,Hist Div SSUSA, American Forces in Action Series(Washington, 1946), p. 27.

54 Report of the Military Board of Allied Supply(Washington, 1924), I, 49, indicates that on thatdate the Allied forces numbered 8,516,678 officersand men and had a total of 229,452 motor con-veyances.

55 American Enterprise in Europe—The Role ofthe SOS in the Defeat of Germany (Paris, 1945),pp. 16, 64, gives the number of men as 3,065,505and the number of motor vehicles as 710,650. Com-pare Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe(Garden City, 1948), p. 501, n. 21.

56 Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, TheArmies of Industry (New Haven, 1921), pp. 132,199; Rpt, Munitions for the Army, prepared inOUSW, 9 Apr 46, p. 4, OCT HB WD Gen USW.

57 Against the increased transportation loadcaused by motorization, there is a partial offset dueto the great reduction of animals and forage asmilitary cargo.


of the Army Air Forces exceeded 2,300,-000.58 By way of contrast, during WorldWar I the United States produced less than14,000 trainer and service planes, and AirService strength at the time of the Armis-tice was under 200,000.59 With their equip-ment and personnel deployed around theglobe, the Army Air Forces in World War IImade heavy demands on land and watertransportation. As in the case of motorvehicles, aircraft were bulky cargo and therequirements of personnel, spare parts, gaso-line, and lubricants were heavy. In theUnited States railroad cars and trucks werespecially equipped to assure the safe trans-portation of delicate assemblies. Thirty-sixcargo ships were converted to accommodateassembled planes in their holds, while hun-dreds of cargo ships and tankers were spe-cially fitted to carry aircraft as deckloads.Although the Air Transport Commandhandled an increasing amount of passengerand freight traffic as the war progressed,and emergency movements by air were ofutmost military importance, the volume ofair traffic was small compared with ArmyAir Forces' movements handled by surfacecarriers.

The destructiveness of warfare reacheda new level in World War II. It was a warof movement and the tempo of the fightingwas high. Aided by motorized equipment,the combat units moved farther and fasterthan ever before and were on the movemore of the time.60 The greater weight andaccuracy of artillery fire produced devasta-

tion wherever the ground forces went intoaction and called for an amount of ammu-nition hitherto undreamed of.61 The rangeof the bomber subjected military objectiveswithin and far outside the combat zones toattack from the air.62 The swifter tempo ofthe fighting produced greater attrition inweapons and other mechanisms.63 It wascommon practice for a retiring force to de-stroy or damage local facilities which mightbe of service to an invading force. Insofaras this greater destruction and attrition af-fected the facilities, equipment, or suppliesof our own armies, it meant that promptreplacement had to be made in order tomaintain fighting efficiency, and this wasan added burden on transportation. Thesame was true in the case of facilities suchas docks, railroads, and power plants whichwere demolished while in enemy hands andwhich had to be rehabilitated by our ownadvancing forces with materials broughtforward over our own lines of communica-tion.

In a report following the defeat of theAxis Powers, General Marshall referred toour superiority "in mobility and in firepower." 64 This phrasing concisely sets forthone of the most important of the manytactical accomplishments of the war—thesuccessful combination of power and mo-bility. Until recent times weight of weaponsand flexibility were thought to be antagon-istic factors in combat; it seemed that onehad to be sacrificed in favor of the other.But the larger actions of the war, particu-

58 Rpt, Munitions for the Army, prepared inOUSW, 9 Apr 46, pp. 3, 5, OCT HB WD GenUSW; United States Air Force Statistical Digest,1947, pp. 27, 28.

59 Ayres, The War with Germany, Ch. VII.60 See Maj B. Corol and Maj I. Agibalov, "Tempo

of Offensive Operations," Military Review (Sep-tember 1944).

61 See statement by USW, WD press release, 13Nov 44.

62 On 9 Jul 45 the AAF dropped the 2,000,000thton of bombs on enemy objectives, WD press re-lease, 10 Jul 45.

63 See Donald M. Nelson, "The High Cost ofVictory," The Reader's Digest (December 1943).

64 Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945, p. 95.


larly in Continental Europe, proved thatunder modern conditions they are not in-compatible, and the burden of that proofrested on transportation—water, rail, andmotor. In demonstrating that large andheavily armored forces could be movedquickly and over great distances, with sup-porting supplies and replacements alwaysavailable, military transportation assumeda task in organized movement such as neverbefore had been undertaken.

Whereas in World War I more than halfthe equipment and supplies required by theAmerican Expeditionary Forces in Europewas procured from European sources,65

in 1941-45 the requirements of our armiesoverseas were met overwhelmingly by ship-ments from the United States. In WorldWar II substantial quantities of certainsupplies were obtained from the variouscomponents of the British Commonwealthand France, and smaller quantities fromother areas, under reverse lend-lease,66 butthis local procurement constituted only asmall percentage of the total matériel re-quired by our widely dispersed forces. Someof the areas occupied by our troops nor-mally were capable of producing only whatwas required by the local populations. Someareas had suffered so greatly from the rav-ages of war that their agricultural and in-dustrial productivity was far below normal.

Not only did the United States haveheavy shipping requirements for the sup-port of its own oversea operations, but alsofor extensive help to other nations. Refer-ence has been made to the demands placedupon shipping by the lend-lease programunder which approximately fifty billion dol-lars' worth of equipment and supplies wassent to nations which were actively fightingthe Axis. This program competed with theArmy for bottoms. Furthermore, the Armymoved millions of tons of supplies on ves-sels under its own control for the aid of theimpoverished civilian populations and forthe re-equipment of the armed forces ofcountries which had been occupied by theAxis Powers until released by Allied forces.By 31 July 1945, with the war still goingon in the Pacific, the Army had shippednearly 6,000,000 long tons of civilian sup-plies to liberated and occupied areas, mostlyin Europe.67 The shipments for the monthof July alone totaled 1,205,026 long tons—largely of wheat, flour, and coal. These car-goes from the United States were supple-mented by cargoes from British sources, andall of them occupied ship space which couldhave been profitably employed by thearmed forces.68

Because of the heavy fighting and thestrange and trying climatic conditions towhich American soldiers frequently weresubjected, World War II called forth un-usual efforts on behalf of health and morale.The aim—only partially satisfied—was to

65 The General Purchasing Agent, AEF, reportedthat between June 1917 and 31 December 1918the AEF received from U.S. 7,675,410 MT ofmatériel, and that during the same period 10,192,-921 MT were procured in Europe with a saving ofthat amount of transatlantic ship space. See Reportof the Military Board of Allied Supply (Washing-ton, 1925), II, 229, 246.

66 The President's Twenty-second Report to Con-gress on Lend-Lease Operations, June 14, 1946, p.20; Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1945, p. 100. About61 percent of total reverse lend-lease was furnishedby the UK, on dollar value basis.

67 Civilian supplies shipped as a military responsi-bility declined rapidly after the Japanese surrender.See WD Prog Rpt, Sec. 4-F, Civilian Supply, 31Dec 46, pp. 12, 14.

68 On 22 Mar 45, CofT ASF writing to CofTETOUSA, referring to the pressure for large ship-ments of civilian supplies said: "It is becoming abattle between the feeders and the fighters." OCTHB Gross Day File.


provide the troops with hot meals, includingfresh meats and vegetables, wherever thecircumstances of their employment madethis possible. The bulk of such supplies, aswell as the equipment for preserving andpreparing them, was shipped from theUnited States. Good shelter was important,particularly in cold and rainy areas, and athundreds of stations throughout the worldmobilization type barracks were built, fre-quently with American lumber, and thou-sands of quonset huts and prefabricatedhouses of American manufacture were setup. Supplies for up-to-date medical careand complete hospital facilities followed thetroops wherever they went, and The Sur-geon General's shipments to oversea stationsamounted to 50,000 measurement tons inthe peak month, or the capacity load of fivelarge cargo vessels.69 The American youthis accustomed to a full quota of recreation,and supplies for that purpose were providedat all Army stations—athletic goods, motionpicture equipment, theatrical properties,books, magazines, soft drinks, ice cream, etc.The best builder of soldier morale—mailfrom home—was encouraged, with onlymoderate restrictions on the size of pack-ages. The Army ports of embarkationshipped a monthly average of about 65,000measurement tons of mail during the winterof 1944-45, and in November 1944, whenChristmas mail was moving, they shippedmore than 178,000 measurement tons.70

These and other provisions for the welfareof soldiers created demands for transporta-tion, within the zone of the interior and tothe oversea bases, in addition to the de-mands for the movement of strictly militarymatériel.71

The possibility of a broken supply line toone of our transoceanic theaters was athreat which had to be taken into considera-tion until the war was well advanced. Withour troops deployed to many distant landsand largely dependent on supplies shippedfrom the zone of interior, this peril was veryreal. The Army's task was not only to sup-ply the current needs of the fighting forcesbut to establish in them a confidence thatall future needs would be met. Such con-fidence contributes to the soldier's will tofight, and lack of it may lower his effi-ciency.72 It cannot be claimed that Armytransportation never failed in this respect.Surrender of the Philippines was hastenedby inability to move matériel to that distantoutpost through the enemy blockade. Suc-cess in the campaigns at Guadalcanal andBuna was seriously threatened by difficul-ties in getting supplies to the troops. Afterthese early campaigns, however, our sup-ply lines to oversea combat areas werequickly established and were maintained in-tact. This became possible in part becauseof the effective protection given to our ship-ping and the great shipbuilding achieve-ment which added many more vessels thanthe enemy sank, but it was due in largemeasure also to effective strategic and lo-gistic planning in which transportation wasalways a basic consideration.

69 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Sep 44, pp. 26-27.70 Tabulation, Cargo Shipped by Army, in ASF

MPR, Sec. 3, for respective months.

71 Shipment of morale items was not entirely atthe expense of military items, since some could bestowed as filler cargo in spaces left empty by stow-age of bulky equipment.

72 Maj. Gen. J. C. F. Fuller of the British Armyhas presented this point in a dramatic manner. InThe Reformation of War (London, 1923), p. 164,he says: "In war, the chief concern of the soldier isnot to kill, but to live. He fixes his eyes on thecommunications of the army to which he belongs,and is terrified if they are threatened by theenemy."


The Role of Long-Range Planning

World War II, because of its geographicscope, the complexity of its military opera-tions, the strain which it placed on the re-sources of the Allied nations, and othercharacteristics which have been mentioned,called for planning of great range and per-spicacity. This planning had to be broadenough to comprehend the entire field ofhostilities and meticulous enough to insurethat the requirements of each operationwere provided for. Improvisation and op-portunism had no place in the strategicconcept, though they might become neces-sary in the execution of that concept.73 Care-ful calculation and recalculation were thebasis of each military undertaking. Theplanning embraced the build-up of ourtroop strength, military supplies, and meansof transportation, together with the co-ordination of these elements to avoid idle-ness and waste.

The object of transportation planningwas first to determine the deployment offorces that could be undertaken with thetransportation resources likely to be avail-able, and then to assure that when the timeto launch an operation arrived the com-mander could proceed boldly and with con-fidence in his logistic support. The AxisPowers had failed in certain aspects oftheir long-range planning, including thatfor transportation. The swift victory inFrance in June 1940 found Germany withno well-developed program for the inva-sion of Britain and no suitable and adequatemarine equipment for the purpose, a failurewhich had a pronounced influence on the

course of the war.74 Germany also under-estimated the transportation problems in-volved in carrying the invasion of the SovietUnion to a successful conclusion. The Jap-anese occupied numerous bases in the Paci-fic and the East Indies which proved to beof little or no value to them strategically butrather created logistic problems with whichthey eventually were unable to cope becauseof their shrinking merchant marine.70 It wascareful long-range planning on the part ofthe Allies which enabled them to avoid suchmistakes and to perform huge transporta-tion tasks repeatedly and with conspicuoussuccess.

Planning for Allied operations proceededon three levels—international, national, andwithin each armed service. The work oneach level contributed to that on the levelabove and conditioned that on the levelbelow.

Although certain general understandingshad been reached earlier, American-Britishplanning for specific military operations wasinitiated during the first month of the warwhen the Prime Minister and his militarystaff met with the President and his advisersin Washington to discuss the Allied strategy.It was continued at the frequent meetingsof the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which be-gan functioning early in 1942, and at theoccasional conferences between the Presi-dent, the Prime Minister, and the heads ofother Allied powers. The broad strategic

73 JCS 30, 5 Apr 42, JSP Rpt. On general subjectsee Col G. C. Shaw, Supply in Modern War (Lon-don, 1938), pp. 334, 340,

74 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Interv 55, 27Jun 45, with Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel,pp. 10, 11; postwar essay by Admiral Karl Doenitz,"Conduct of the War at Sea" (Div of Naval IntUSN), 15 Jan 46, pp. 9, 10; statement by BritishPrime Minister, in Hansard, Parliamentary Debates(House of Commons), 18 Nov 46, pp. 52-53.

75 Regarding Axis failures, see Biennial Rpt, CofSUSA, 1945, pp. 1-4; also, Hanson W. Baldwin,"Foe's Errors Aid Us," The New York Times,August 30, 1945.


programs and agreements resulting fromthese conferences and meetings were de-signed to utilize the combined resources ofthe participating powers to the best advan-tage of the Allied cause as a whole. Fromthe beginning, transportation—particularlyocean transportation—was one of the basicingredients of every strategic plan; and itwas one of the most difficult to deal with be-cause of the critical shortage of ships, theuncertainty as to the extent of ship lossesby enemy action, and the competing de-mands of the lend-lease and civilian ship-ping programs. The operation of the mer-chant fleets of the United States and theBritish Commonwealth, together with suchneutral passenger and cargo vessels as couldbe brought under Allied control, as a largeand flexible pool of shipping was one ofthe more notable logistic accomplishmentsof the war.76

On the national level, long-range militaryplanning was fostered by and centered inthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, which also func-tioned as the American component of theCombined Chiefs of Staff. JCS exercised abroad control over the strategic and logisticplanning and operations of the U.S. armedforces, with direct responsibility to the Presi-dent as Commander in Chief. One of thebasic tasks of JCS, as the over-all planningand co-ordinating agency for the militaryefforts of the Army and the Navy, was toinsure that the armed forces had the oceantransport needed for their operations. Onthe one hand this involved determining asfar in advance as possible the amount andtypes of merchant shipping required andarranging with the U.S. Maritime Commis-

sion for the construction of such new vesselsas were needed; and on the other hand itinvolved arranging with the War ShippingAdministration for the allocation of specificamounts of shipping to the Army and theNavy from the pool of vessels which wasoperated under the control of that agency.77

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also undertook toco-ordinate Army and Navy supply andtransportation operations, particularly inthe Pacific, in order to avoid unnecessaryduplication and waste, but it was less suc-cessful in this than in other endeavors be-cause of basic differences in the logisticpractices of the two services.

On the War Department level the pri-mary responsibility for transportation plan-ning naturally rested with the Chief ofTransportation. He worked in close co-ordination with the elements of the ArmyService Forces headquarters and the Op-erations Division of the War DepartmentGeneral Staff, which were concerned withplanning for the movement of military per-sonnel and matériel within the zone of in-terior and to oversea stations. It was histask to see that numbers of men and tons offreight were translated into terms of ship-ping space and to arrange that adequatetransportation should be available for theexecution of each projected operation. TheChief of Transportation was the most ac-tive War Department representative on theJoint Military Transportation Committeeand the Combined Military TransportationCommittee, which prepared studies andproposals for consideration by the JointChiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefsof Staff.

76 For discussion of pooling under the Allied Mari-time Transport Council in WW I, see J. A. Salter,Allied Shipping Control (Oxford University Press,1921), Pt. IV.

77 The work of CCS and JCS and their subsidiaryorganizations in regard to transportation will bemore fully discussed in Ch. V.


A strong planning staff, maintained inthe Office of the Chief of Transportation,kept abreast of military developments andprovided both General Somervell and Gen-eral Gross with transportation data for theirplanning activities on the War Department,national, and international levels. Gross hadestablished this staff in the spring of 1941as a section of the Transportation Branch ofthe Supply Division in the War DepartmentGeneral Staff. At that time the shippingshortage already was felt and a more crit-ical situation was foreseen. During themonths preceding entry of the United Statesinto the war, this section developed dataand techniques which were of great serviceduring the difficult days following PearlHarbor. Eventually it became the PlanningDivision in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation, Army Service Forces. It pre-pared, as frequently as circumstances re-quired, studies covering future shippingrequirements, the volume of shipping likelyto be available, and the capability of thatshipping to effect movements of men andmatériel under various plans for their utili-zation.78 Its studies covered also the capa-bilities of the inland transportation systemsand the ports of the United States to handlethe projected traffic.

The Chief of Transportation's PlanningDivision collaborated extensively with theplanning staff in Army Service Forces head-quarters, and one or more of the division'smembers accompanied the War Depart-ment representatives to the meetings of theheads of Allied governments to assist themin dealing with the ubiquitous transporta-tion problem. The inseparability of trans-

portation and supply matters, and the needfor continuous co-ordination, led to a pro-posal in the fall of 1943 to absorb the Chiefof Transportation's Planning Division intothe Army Service Forces headquarters staff.General Gross vigorously opposed the sug-gestion on the ground that it would weakena vital working relationship which had beenbuilt up between himself, his Director ofOperations, his several operating divisions,and his planning organization. His opposi-tion was successful, for although the trans-fer was ordered, the order was rescindedbefore actual transfer and the necessarychanges in procedures had been effected.79

The planning for ocean transportationinvolved many factors which were subjectto fluctuation, and a change affecting onefactor might, and frequently did, necessitatecomplete revision of earlier calculations.The introduction of a new military under-taking calling for a goodly number of shipsnecessitated a revision in the allocation ofvessels to other projects. Estimates of thefuture output of American shipyards wereimportant factors in determining what over-sea operations reasonably could be pro-jected, and any failure to realize those esti-mates had a disturbing effect. Possiblevariation in the rate of ship losses was takeninto account, and changes in the tactics andlocations of enemy submarines were care-fully watched. When sinkings off the coastof Norway made the northern route to theUSSR untenable, that route was abandonedtemporarily and more lend-lease supplies forthe Soviet Union were routed through Per-sian Gulf ports. When it became apparentthat the shorter route through the Medi-terranean would become available forAmerican and British movements to the

78 For activities of Plng Div see its Annual Rpt,FY 1945; Memo, Plng Div for Exec OCT, 3 Oct45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps; HistSummary, by Plng Div, 26 Jun 46. All in OCT HBPlng Div Gen.

79 ASF Adm Memos S-72, 21 Oct 43, and S-85,10 Nov 43, OCT HB Plng Div Gen.

OVERSEA PORTS. The Army-operated port of Khorramshahr, Iran (top).First large vessel to dock at Naha after the invasion of Okinawa (bottom). Thecapacity of ports to discharge and forward cargo had to be carefully calculated in

planning military operations.


Middle and Far East, full advantage of theresultant saving in ships was taken in plan-ning future operations. The same was truewhen the possibility of moving lend-leasesupplies to the Soviet Union through BlackSea ports rather than the Persian Gulf be-came reasonably certain. No transportationpolicy or program was considered inflexible;it was always subject to adjustment in thelight of new conditions.

It was part of the planning task to esti-mate the capacities of oversea ports to dis-charge cargo and clear it to dumps and de-pots. This was an especially difficult tasksince the estimates so frequently had to takeinto account the extent of damage and theamount of rehabilitation work likely to berequired at ports captured from the enemy,and also the uncertainties of discharge op-erations at beaches and in primitive har-bors. Similar estimates had to be made asto the capabilities of railways, highways,and inland waterways in the areas to beinvaded and the amount of reconstructionand new construction likely to be requiredin the establishment of adequate lines ofcommunication in those areas. The operat-ing divisions in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, which were concerned withthe respective types of transportation, con-ducted initial research into these questions,utilizing whatever sources of informationcould be tapped, in or out of the War De-partment. This information was co-ordin-ated and adapted to the use of the Chief ofTransportation by his Planning Division.

The progress of military operations in theprincipal theaters was followed closely bythe Planning Division, and revised estimatesof the capabilities of lines of communicationwere made from time to time. Such studiesthrew light not only on the quantities ofsupplies which the Transportation Corps

would be requested to move to the theaters,but also on the ability of the theaters toproperly handle the supplies which theyhad requisitioned and their ability to dis-charge vessels promptly and return them totheir home ports. The studies also forecastthe future requirements of the theaters fortransportation troop units and transporta-tion equipment, for the procurement ofwhich the Chief of Transportation was re-sponsible—a matter concerning which thePlanning Division had a co-ordinating re-sponsibility that called for close collabora-tion with the Director of Military Trainingand the Director of Supply in the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation.

Long-range planning for transportationin the zone of interior proceeded less au-spiciously than planning for ocean trans-portation and for the lines of communica-tion in oversea theaters. This was due partlyto differing opinions regarding the extentof the need for additional domestic trans-portation facilities and partly to disagree-ment as to whether the government or in-dustry should assume the cost.80 After theUnited States had entered the war the pro-duction of ships, tanks, aircraft, and otherstrictly military items made such heavy de-mands on the supplies of steel and otherstrategic materials that only limited amountsof these commodities could be made avail-able for the manufacture of equipment fordomestic carriers. Planning for zone of in-terior transportation, therefore, was directedtoward the judicious utilization of thelimited materials that were available andthe efficient employment of existing trans-portation resources, including both equip-ment and manpower. The Chief of Trans-portation took an active interest in all thesematters, and his planning and operating

80 Fuller discussion will be found in Ch. IX.


staffs co-operated closely with the other fed-eral agencies concerned, as well as with theseveral branches of the transportation in-dustry.

Relative Advantages of the ContendingPowers

Since transportation is so vital an ele-ment in a nation's ability to wage modernwar, an appraisal of the relative transporta-tion advantages of the Allies and the AxisPowers is of basic importance. From thestandpoint of geography the advantage wasstrongly with the Axis. Germany and Japanhad shorter lines of communication, whichmeant that they required less transportationequipment and had less military manpowerand matériel tied up in the "pipeline" fromthe zone of interior to the combat areas.Germany also had inside lines of communi-cation radiating from the homeland to thecombat areas, a situation which affordedgreater flexibility in the redeployment oftroops and supplies. The fact that Ger-many's lines of communication were mostlyoverland meant that her war potential wasless affected by the hazards which besetocean shipping and that her army couldemploy short-range transport planes moreextensively in its logistic operations. Thesenatural transportation advantages whichthe Axis Powers enjoyed in the beginninghad to be offset by the Allies before thewar could be won.

Germany's transportation systems hadbeen carefully planned with a view to theirutility in time of war. The railways werewell laid out and highly efficient. AfterHitler's accession to power a system ofsuperhighways had been constructed whichenabled mechanized forces and supplies tobe moved north, east, south, or west with

remarkable speed.81 It was reported fromvarious sources that during the 1933-38period the German railways were neglectedin favor of highway development, and con-sequently were under a handicap when warcame.82 Thereafter, railroad equipment hada high priority in the production program,and as late as January 1944 United Statesmilitary intelligence reports indicated thatthe rail lines were functioning effectivelyand were being maintained well.83 Theirservices were largely at the disposal of themilitary establishment, since civilian use wasseverely curtailed.

It is clear, on the other hand, that theGerman transportation systems at all timeshad a very narrow margin of safety. Bothimmediately before and during the war theproduction of railway and motor equipmentwas limited by the over-all scarcity of ma-terials and the heavy requirements forstrictly military items. While the Reich ac-quired a considerable number of locomo-tives, cars, and trucks in the conquest ofwestern Europe, her needs on the easternfront were large and her losses there ex-ceedingly heavy.84 The lack of readily acces-sible crude petroleum was a serious handi-

81 See Charles B. Quattlebaum, "Military High-ways," Military Affairs (Fall 1944), p. 227.

82 Ltr, AAR to Gen Gross, 11 Aug 42, and at-tached digest of rpts, OCT HB Gross Rail AAREquip Program.

83 Rpt 86, OSS, 20 Oct 42, sub: The LocomotivePosition in Axis Dominated Europe, OCT 453 RRRequirements; Col Curtis H. Nance, War Report,Min of Army-Navy Conf of Industry, Labor, andother Leaders, Los Angeles, 7-8 Jan 44, p. 21, OCTHB Topic Logistics Gen; U.S. Strategic BombingSurvey, Trans Div Rpt, The Effects of StrategicBombing on German Transportation, 20 Nov 45,pp. 1, 2.

84 Regarding German transportation problems oneastern front and in Balkans, see study, Advantagesand Defects of European Transport Networks, Ger-man Air Hist Br, 30 Oct 44, Translation VII/IV,OCMH.

RAILROAD YARDS at St. Lô, France (top) and Battipaglia, Italy (bottom) showthe cumulative effects of Allied bombing and German demolition. Aerial bombard-ment of railroads in Europe seriously disrupted enemy military and industrial

transportation.


cap, and the reserves of both natural andsynthetic oil fuels and lubricants were verysmall from the outset.85

Despite the strain which war on severalfronts imposed on the transportation sys-tems of Germany, there is no basis for stat-ing that her lines of communication inwestern Europe would have failed frominherent weaknesses or internal causes.Their failure in the late stages of the warresulted from the terrific aerial bombard-ment to which transportation and its sup-porting industries were subjected. Duringthe latter half of 1944 and the early part of1945, Allied bombers subjected Continentalrailways, highways, waterways, oil wells andrefineries, synthetic oil and rubber plants,railway equipment and motor vehiclemanufacturing plants, steel mills, and ballbearing works to a merciless pounding,which in the end largely immobilized trans-portation and in consequence seriously af-fected all branches of industrial activity.86

Up to the spring of 1944, when the heavybombing of Continental transportation tar-gets got under way, the railroads had beenable to meet the demands placed uponthem, but by the first week of March 1945(the last week of record) carloadings had

dropped to less than one-fourth of whatthey had been a year earlier. As the result ofair raids on truck manufacturing plants, theoutput of vehicles in March 1945 was only23 percent of the monthly average duringthe first six months of 1944, and the declineof fuel supplies which took place concur-rently immobilized much of the existingmotor equipment.87 The bombing and straf-ing of trains, marshaling yards, and motorconvoys, in addition to taking a heavy tollof the equipment directly attacked, sloweddown all transportation operations.88

Water transportation played a useful butsubordinate role in the German war effort.The highly developed inland waterway sys-tems of central and eastern Europe and thecoastwise services gave appreciable relief tothe hard-pressed railroads. During the pe-riod when Germany controlled the Frenchports and used them as submarine bases, hermerchant vessels were able to run the Alliedblockade with considerable freedom, but asthe Allied naval and air forces grew strongerthe risk became greater, and after Germanylost control of the western French ports heroperations on the long sea routes virtuallyceased. German shipping on the short routesin the Baltic and North Seas, which broughtvaluable imports, particularly iron ore, fromthe Scandinavian Peninsula, also felt theincreasing strength of Allied air and seapower. After the Allied success in North

85 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil DivisionFinal Report, January 1947, p. 1.

86 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 384-85,describes Operation CLARION, executed 22 Feb 45,as "one gigantic blow against the transportationsystem of Germany, with specific targets speciallyselected so as to occasion the greatest possible dam-age and the maximum amount of delay in theirrepair"; 9,000 aircraft from bases in England,France, Italy, Belgium, and Holland participated.See U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Interv 51, 25Jun 45, p. 5, Interv 55, 27 Jun 45, p. 21, and Interv62, 29 Jun 45, p. 10, for testimony of Generalfeld-marschalls Gerd Von Rundstedt and Keitel, andGeneraloberst Alfred Jodl, respectively, which indi-cate that transportation on western front was seri-ously affected from summer of 1944 and had almostceased to function in spring of 1945.

87 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Re-port (European War), September 30, 1945, pp. 39-45, 59-65, summarizes effect of air attack on oilsupply, transportation, and the motor vehicle in-dustry.

88 Allied Forces Supreme Headquarters, Eisen-hower's Own Story of the War (New York, 1946),p. 94. The effect of transportation disruption onGerman military operations in Normandy is de-scribed in Omaha Beachhead, Hist Div SSUSA,American Forces in Action Series (Washington,1945), p. 149.


Africa, German shipping operations in theMediterranean were on a rapidly diminish-ing scale.89

The transportation situation of Japanwas exactly opposite to that of Germany.Her principal sources of raw materials wereoverseas, and in consequence her war po-tential was dependent heavily on her mer-chant marine. After her entry into the war,Japan was confronted with the dual taskof maintaining a great circle of defensebases around the homeland and securingnew sources of raw materials to supplementthose already acquired on the Asiatic main-land. This task would have been an enor-mous one, considering the small size of Ja-pan's merchant marine and her limitedshipbuilding capacity, even under more pro-pitious circumstances. As the United Statesrapidly increased her fleets of aircraft andnaval vessels and extended her naval andair bases into the western Pacific, Japaneseshipping capacity was reduced to the pointwhere it was quite inadequate for the per-formance of the task with which it wascharged.

The position of Japanese transportationtoward the close of hostilities was clearlydefined by Premier Naruhiko Higashi-Kuniin an address to the Japanese Diet on 5September 1945.90 He stated that, in addi-tion to the shipping capacity having beenreduced about 75 percent by sinkings, theefficiency of operations had been curtailedmarkedly by the scarcity of fuel and byenemy interference. Because of bombingsand the depreciation of rolling stock, thecarrying capacity of the railways in mid-

1945 was less than half that of the preced-ing year. The supply of liquid fuel had beenreduced to what could be obtained in Ja-pan, Manchuria, and China. The reductionin coal output and the difficulty of trans-porting the product had caused a generaldecline in industrial activity. Steel produc-tion had been cut to one-fourth of prewaroutput, so that little was available for build-ing new ships. Under the circumstances itbecame barely possible to provide the Jap-anese forces in the various parts of "GreaterEast Asia" with adequate equipment.91 Onthe other hand, the Japanese Premier point-ed out, the capacity of the Allied nations forthe supply and replenishment of their forceswas always on the increase because of theirvast resources and industrial power.

To recapitulate: Germany, through mis-calculations or strategic blunders which in-volved her in a long multifront war, foundher vital land transportation systems sub-ject to disruption from the air to an extentwhich far exceeded her anticipation. Japan,with her multitude of oversea garrisons andsupply sources, saw her essential merchantmarine devastated by attacks of unforeseenintensity from air and sea. During the laterstages of the war the Allied strategists gavetransportation targets a high priority, andthe leaders of the defeated powers testifiedto the effectiveness of that strategy. TheAllies' ability to produce unprecedented

89 For discussion of Allied methods of limitingGerman imports, other than by attacks on shipping,see John V. Lovitt, "The Allied Blockade," De-partment of State Bulletin, November 19, 1944.

90 Transcription published in The New YorkTimes, September 6, 1945.

91 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Re-port (Pacific War), July 1, 1946, states that on1 Mar 45 the Japanese decided not to send furthersupplies to their ground forces outside the homeislands (p. 8); Japanese merchant fleet (vessels of500 gross tons or more) aggregated about 6,000,000tons gross in Dec 41, had accretions of about 4,000,-000 tons during the war, and suffered losses throughsinking or serious damage totaling 8,900,000 tons(p. 11 ) ; Japanese railway system had not been sub-jected to widespread attack but damage to localfacilities had seriously disrupted movement of sup-plies within and between cities (p. 17).


numbers of aircraft, naval vessels, and mer-chant ships, in addition to other necessarywar matériel, enabled them to carry thefighting to the German and Japanese home-lands over widely extended lines of com-munication and at the same time seriouslyreduce the efficiency of the foe's communi-cations. The Allies' ability to outproduceAxis industry by a large margin, plus theirmore accessible and abundant resources ofpetroleum and other raw materials, enabledthem eventually to more than offset thetransportation advantage which their op-

ponents had held at the beginning of thewar by reason of geography.92 This tre-mendous productive power completely up-set the conventional theory that the enemywould get tougher as his lines of communi-cation became shorter and the Allied linesbecame longer.93

92 For comparison of U.S. War production withworld production, see War Production in 1944, rptof WPB Chm (Washington, 1945), p. 22.

93 See Maj George Fielding Eliot, "The EnemyWill Get Tougher and Tougher," Look, February 9,1943.

CHAPTER II

Antecedentsof the Transportation Corps

When in December 1941 the UnitedStates was plunged into a global war withunprecedented transportation implications,the Army's plan for dealing with transporta-tion matters was essentially what it had beenin peacetime. There had been some expan-sion of personnel and facilities during theprewar emergency, but the organizationalset-up was basically the same as that whichhad existed during the 1930's. There wasa lack of integration and some disagreementas to where certain responsibilities rested.A long step toward correction of this weak-ness was taken in March 1942 when a trans-portation service under a chief of transpor-tation was established. Further progress wasmade when the Transportation Corps wascreated in July 1942, and again when thecorps' responsibilities were considerably ex-panded a few months later. Nevertheless,some transportation responsibilities re-mained outside the purview of the corpsthroughout the period of hostilities. In cer-tain respects, therefore, the experience ofWorld War II was a repetition of the ex-perience of World War I.

It would be misleading, however, to im-ply that Army transportation in World WarII did not benefit from the experience ofthe previous conflict. In many ways it did.During the years 1940-41, when the UnitedStates was drifting nearer and nearer to astate of open belligerency, some of the les-

sons of 1917-18 were recalled and appliedto the solution of problems then arising andto preparations for eventualities. After PearlHarbor knowledge of the adjustmentswhich had become necessary during theearlier war furnished a guide for the estab-lishment of new organizations and proce-dures, and a workable plan was evolvedmuch more quickly. On the other hand, thedifficulty of making sweeping adjustmentswhile working under wartime pressure pre-vented certain changes which would havebeen beneficial, and some of the rearrange-ments that were made fell short of the ideal.In order that the relationship between thetwo wars with regard to transportation ad-ministration may be understood more read-ily, a brief review of major developmentsduring the first world conflict is presented.

Army Transportation in World War I

The story of Army transportation in thefirst world war is an involved one, for themachinery of administration underwent analmost ceaseless evolution. Neither in thezone of interior nor with the American Ex-peditionary Forces in France was a satis-factory and stable form of organizationachieved until after the cessation of hostili-ties. There was, moreover, a lack of co-ordination between the Army transporta-tion organization in the United States and

ANTECEDENTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION CORPS 29

that in France, so that each developed alongindependent lines, under the influence ofdiffering conditions and different person-alities.

When the United States joined the Alliesin April 1917, transportation for the WarDepartment was basically the responsibilityof The Quartermaster General.1 He hadsupervision of transportation by commoncarrier between posts, camps, and stationswithin the United States, and of shipmentsoverseas by commercial vessels. He super-vised the operation and maintenance of theArmy Transport Service, which includedthe Army's ports of embarkation wheretroops and military supplies moving over-seas were transshipped, and a fleet of sevenArmy transports. While the Office of theQuartermaster General performed thesesupervisory functions, the actual control oftransportation operations was largely de-centralized. Shipments by inland carrierswere made by local quartermasters or by theshipping officers of other Army supply bu-reaus, who did not consult the Land Trans-portation Branch in The QuartermasterGeneral's Transportation Division exceptwhen the movements were so large as tocreate problems which they individuallycould not manage. Oversea shipments werehandled by Army Transport Service super-intendents at the principal ports, and at thesmaller ports, by local depot quartermasters,who acted under the general guidance ofthe Water Transportation Branch of theTransportation Division but enjoyed a largedegree of independence. The operation ofArmy port facilities and Army transportswas the responsibility of the Army Trans-

port Service superintendents, acting withinthe general policies developed by the WaterTransportation Branch.

Before the war had progressed manymonths it became evident that stronger or-ganizations would be required at the princi-pal ports to transship large numbers oftroops and large quantities of freight, andto perform other related functions such asstaging troops, storing supplies, and operat-ing shore facilities and floating equipment.The confusion which had developed in con-nection with the embarkation of troops toCuba in the Spanish-American War wasrecalled and the necessity of avoiding arepetition of that unhappy situation wasrecognized. Accordingly, early in July 1917primary ports of embarkation were estab-lished at New York (Hoboken) and New-port News, each under the command of ageneral officer. The Army Transport Serv-ice superintendents at those ports wereplaced under the jurisdiction of the portcommanders. Also, the authority of theWater Transportation Branch in the Officeof the Quartermaster General regardingship operations "was somewhat subordinateto that of the commanding generals of theports." 2

During the early summer of 1917 the un-regulated movement of troops and suppliesinto the port areas greatly added to theproblems of the port commanders. Need forco-ordination between the shippers and theports and among the ports themselves be-came urgent. This situation led to the estab-

1 Statements regarding transportation within theU.S. and ocean transportation, except as otherwiseindicated, are based on Report of the Chief of Staff,U. S. Army, 1919, pp. 15-23, 111-19, 147-67, 195-96, 208-12.

2 Ibid., p. 117. The ports of embarkation at NewYork and Newport News handled the bulk of thetroops and supplies moved to Europe, but other At-lantic and Gulf ports were used to a lesser extent.See Report of the Chief of Transportation Service,1919, pp. 32-34. San Francisco Port of Embarkationhandled the relatively small movements to Hawaii,Alaska, and the Philippines.


lishment of an Embarkation Service in theOffice of the Chief of Staff in August. Inaddition to responsibility for regulating themovement of traffic to the ports and itstransshipment overseas, the EmbarkationService was given supervision of the opera-tion of the Army's port facilities and theoperation and assignment of Army trans-ports. The Quartermaster General's WaterTransportation Branch became subordinateto this new unit in the Office of the Chiefof Staff.

As a first step in the effort to effectivelycontrol the flow of supplies to the ports ofembarkation, the shipping officers of theArmy's supply bureaus were required, be-ginning in September 1917, to obtain trans-portation "releases" from the port com-manders before starting such shipments. InNovember 1917 the plan was changed, andthereafter releases were issued by the Em-barkation Service, which was in a betterposition to understand the over-all railtransportation situation and the relativefluidity of the several ports. This controlfailed, however, because there was no ma-chinery for holding at points of origin ship-ments which had not been released, and inthe absence of such machinery the releaserequirement frequently was disregarded byshipping officers.

In a further effort to improve port op-erations and the utilization of shipping, theSecretary of War established the War Boardof the Port of New York in November 1917.This board, which functioned under theguidance of an experienced shipping manwho served as civilian executive officer, wasvested with authority to make regulationsfor the operation of the facilities of the port,to determine priorities in the use of suchfacilities, and to do whatever else might beconsidered necessary to assure the prompt

dispatch of War Department traffic.3 Butthe shipping problem involved much morethan the operation of a single port. Becauseof the growing military requirements, otherports were being used increasingly. Thecritical shortage of bottoms necessitated ajudicious withdrawal of ships from traderoutes and a greater co-ordination betweenthe United States and the Allies in regardto the employment of vessels. Accordingly, aShipping Control Committee was appointedin February 1918, by concurrent action ofthe Secretary of War and the United StatesShipping Board, with broad authority overall merchant shipping operations of theUnited States. This committee, which con-sisted of three civilians, one British and twoAmerican, was responsible for the allocationof shipping to the various uses, the distribu-tion of traffic among the several ports, theefficient utilization of ships and port facili-ties, and the exchange of ships and shippingspace between allied nations. Insofar as thecommittee's activities related to the portoperations and vessels of the Army, itworked in close co-ordination with the Em-barkation Service in the Office of the Chiefof Staff and the Army Transport Servicesuperintendents at the ports.4

The need for greater co-operation amongthe American railroads was apparent be-fore the United States entered World WarI, and steps in that direction were initiatedby committees established by the carriers.Immediately after the declaration of war aRailway War Board was appointed by theAmerican Railway Association. Althoughcomposed principally of railway executives,

3 Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1918,pp. 7, 8.

4 See Ltr, SW to Shipping Contl Com, 7 Feb 18,and proceedings of U.S. Shipping Board, 11 Feb 18,OCT HB Topic Traf Contl WW I; see also WDGO 14, 9 Feb 18.


the board included representatives of thesix territorial departments of the Army, andagents of the board were stationed at eachterritorial department headquarters and ateach mobilization camp and other impor-tant military station. The board undertookto supervise the operations of the railroadsinsofar as military movements were con-cerned, to co-ordinate carriers operating inthe same territories, and to regulate car sup-ply. With the approval of the War Depart-ment, the board issued instructions to therailroads regarding methods of handlingtroops and supplies. A subcommittee wasappointed by the board to deal especiallywith troop transportation and to co-operatewith the War Department in establishingroutes and expediting movements.5

Although the Railway War Board per-formed a valuable service, the steadily in-creasing production of war matériel byAmerican industry and the unregulatedflow of freight to the ports brought greaterand greater traffic congestion and resultedin an increasing number of freight cars be-ing immobilized because they could not beunloaded. In December 1917 the UnitedStates Railroad Administration was estab-lished and the federal government assumedcontrol of the carriers in an effort to im-prove the transportation situation through-out the country. Soon thereafter the WarDepartment created an Inland Transporta-tion Division in the Office of the Chief ofStaff, the director of which had jurisdictionover all inland transportation of Army sup-plies and troops, and served as chairman ofa War Department Priorities Committeewhich was established concurrently. Aroundthese new organizations a more effective sys-tem for controlling the movement of traffic

was built. Beginning 1 March 1918, ship-pers of War Department freight, whetherfor domestic or oversea destinations, wererequired to obtain releases from the InlandTransportation Division in addition to thereleases obtained from the EmbarkationService for oversea shipments, and thefreight agents of the carriers were instructedby the Railroad Administration not to ac-cept shipments until such releases had beenissued. From that date the traffic situationbegan to improve.6

A broad influence over the flow of trafficto the ports was exercised by the ExportsControl Committee, which was establishedin June 1918. The committee's membershipincluded representatives of the Army, theNavy, the Railroad Administration, theShipping Control Committee, and theBritish Ministry of Shipping. It met weekly,and on the basis of information assembledby its staff it undertook to determine theamount of military freight to be exported,the most advantageous routing for suchfreight, the amount of other essential ex-port traffic to be handled, and the totalamount of traffic to be passed through eachport. It effected a close liaison with allgovernment agencies utilizing inland andocean transportation, and with the rail-roads. The determinations of the ExportsControl Committee were given effect by theseveral agencies from which its membershipwas drawn.7

The establishment of first the Embarka-tion Service and then the Inland Transpor-tation Division in the Office of the Chief ofStaff, with the functions indicated above,meant that the Water Transportation


6 The passing of the unusually severe weatherwhich characterized the winter of 1917-18 contrib-uted to this improvement.

7 Exports Control Committee, Annual Report,1918, OCT HB Topic Traf Contl WW I.


Branch and the Inland TransportationBranch in the Office of the QuartermasterGeneral were relieved of many of theirresponsibilities. By June 1918 the absorp-tion of transportation functions by the Gen-eral Staff had gone so far that The Quarter-master General's Transportation Divisionwas ordered abolished. At that time theEmbarkation Service and the Inland TrafficService (new name for the Inland Trans-portation Division) functioned as subdivi-sions of the Purchase, Storage and TrafficDivision of the General Staff.8 They con-tinued in that relationship until March1919, four months after the Armistice, whenthey were consolidated into a single trans-portation organization, designated theTransportation Service, which was to func-tion outside the General Staff but under itsbroad supervision. This development wasin line with the policy then in effect to divestthe General Staff of the operating responsi-bilities which it had assumed during thewar.

Integration of transportation activities atfield installations was effected in April 1919.At that time each territorial department,procurement zone, post, camp, and stationwas required to consolidate under a singletransportation officer all transportation ac-tivities except those pertaining to the MotorTransport Corps, which was concerned pri-marily with organic motor equipment andpersonnel. Eventually such a transportationofficer was detailed by the commander ofeach military station and each tactical unit

(division or larger). The duties of thisofficer were those imposed upon the Trans-portation Service insofar as they applied tohis particular station, and he was directedto be guided by regulations promulgated bythe Chief of Transportation Service. Thetransportation officers at stations whichwere under the jurisdiction of Army de-partments were responsible directly to thedepartmental commanders. The transpor-tation officers at stations exempted from thejurisdiction of the departmental command-ers, except those at ports of embarkation,were supervised by zone transportation of-ficers designated by the Chief of Trans-portation Service. The ports of embarkationcontinued to be responsible directly to theChief of Transportation Service.9

During the latter part of World War Ithe Navy operated all of the troop transportsand many of the cargo vessels which werein the service of the Army. At the outbreakof hostilities the Army had planned to op-erate such vessels with civilian crews as wasits practice in peacetime; but the fact thatthe Navy was responsible for organizing andprotecting convoys, together with the diffi-culty of obtaining civilian crews because ofthe limited amount of merchant shippingunder the United States flag at that time,soon necessitated a reconsideration of thequestion. In July 1917 an agreement be-tween the Army and the Navy placed alltroopships under the operation of the lat-ter. This arrangement was extended laterto cover animal transports and cargo vessels,with certain exceptions. Some of the ex-cepted vessels were operated under the con-trol of the Army Embarkation Service and

8 The Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division wasthe end product of a series of reorganizations in theGeneral Staff which resulted in more and more re-sponsibility being taken over from the supply bu-reaus. In defense of this development the Chief ofStaff said: "Under the existing conditions ... noother alternative existed if the military program asa whole were to be carried out . . ." Report of theChief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1919, p. 23.

9 Report of the Chief of Transportation Service,1920, pp. 5-7. Regarding establishment of MTCin August 1918, see Report of the Chief of Staff,U.S. Army, 1919, p. 191.


some under the control of the U.S. Ship-ping Board. Early in 1918 the Navy and theShipping Board entered into an agreementwhich further enlarged the Navy's operat-ing responsibilities. On 11 November 1918the Navy's Cruiser and Transport Forceincluded 42 troopships and 25 cruisers andbattleships (the latter carrying troops inaddition to serving as escorts), and theNavy's Overseas Transportation Service wasoperating or had taken over for operation453 cargo vessels, of which 213 were en-gaged exclusively in carrying supplies tothe American Expeditionary Forces inFrance.10

With the American Expeditionary Forces,as in the zone of interior, the handlingof transportation matters suffered in thebeginning from an almost total lack of ad-vance planning, and then from the numer-ous organizational and procedural adjust-ments which were made while war was inprogress. When American troops and sup-plies began arriving in France, the Quarter-master Corps took charge of Army Trans-port Service operations at French ports.Procurement, operation, and maintenanceof motor transport were distributed amongthe several supply services, the Quarter-master Corps having the larger responsi-bility. Railway construction, operation, andmaintenance were placed in charge of theChief Engineer by GHQ, American Ex-peditionary Forces. The latter arrangementwas considered a temporary expedient tomeet the pressing need while a thorough

study of the general supply and transporta-tion problem was being made.11

From the summer of 1917 to the end ofhostilities the machinery for the administra-tion of transportation in the American Ex-peditionary Forces went through a series ofrapid changes, some of which were of majorproportions. By the end of 1917 railway op-erations and marine operations had beenbrought under the control of a Transporta-tion Service. Railway construction, and toa considerable extent railway maintenance,remained in the hands of the Chief En-gineer. On 12 November 1918, the dayafter the Armistice, the TransportationService became the Transportation Corps,with slightly increased authority in the railfield. Neither the Transportation Servicenor the Transportation Corps was respon-sible for motor transport, which was placedfor a time under the control of the Quarter-master Corps and then under the newly cre-ated Motor Transport Corps.12 All of theseactivities were subordinate to a general sup-ply service, which at first was known asServices of the Rear and later as Services ofSupply.

Aside from the lack of advance planningand the confusion attendant upon the manychanges which preceded the attainment ofa satisfactory organization, numerous otherproblems beset the Army TransportationService in France. There were misunder-standings with the Quartermaster Corps andthe Corps of Engineers, the organizations

10 Crowell and Wilson, The Road to France,XXVIII, XXX, App. F; Vice Adm Albert Gleaves,USN, History of the Transport Service (New York,1921), p. 27. On 1 Nov 18 the transatlantic fleetserving the Army included 512 vessels aggregating3,251,000 DWT, and the cross-Channel fleet num-bered 104 vessels of 311,000 DWT, according toReport of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1919,p. 156.

11 Statements regarding transportation arrange-ments in the AEF are based largely upon Monograph7, Organization of the Services of Supply, ArmyExpeditionary Forces, HB, WPDGS, Washington,Jun 21; a more detailed and personal account isgiven by Brig Gen Johnson Hagood, CofS SOS AEF,in The Services of Supply (Boston, 1927) .

12 Regarding motor transport see Final Report ofGeneral John J. Pershing (Washington, 1919), p.74, and Hagood, The Services of Supply, p. 343.


from which the new service had drawn itsprincipal functions. Railroad officials withthe Transportation Service found it un-satisfactory to have railroad constructionwork under the control of a separate agency,the Office of the Chief Engineer.13 Thedifficulty of getting trained personnel fromthe United States was great, and despite anauthorized strength of 6,000 officers and200,000 enlisted men to serve an Armywhich might reach 4,000,000, the actualstrength of the Transportation Service atthe time of the Armistice was only 1,810officers and 46,976 enlisted men.14 Differ-ences in language and technical terms com-plicated the problem of co-operation withFrench transportation personnel. Differ-ences between American and French railwayequipment and methods gave rise to delaysand accidents. The relationship of thecentral transportation organization to thecommanders of base and intermediate sec-tions and to the regulating and railheadofficers in the advance section was neversatisfactorily worked out, and the completejurisdiction of local commanders over trainand car movements within their respectivejurisdictions made the task of over-allmanagement extremely difficult.15

From the foregoing review it is apparentthat although considerable progress was

made during and immediately after the wartoward bringing the various types of Armytransportation under the control of a singleoffice, complete integration was notachieved either in the zone of interior orwith the American Expeditionary Forces inFrance. In his 1919 report to the Secretaryof War, Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, Chiefof Transportation Service, emphasized theadvantages of such integration and recom-mended the establishment of a transporta-tion corps "with complete jurisdiction overall matters of transportation for all branchesof the War Department."16 This recom-mendation was only partially heeded, for aplan "for the reorganization of the Army inthe light of the experience that has crystal-lized out of the war," submitted to theSecretary of War by the Chief of Staff,provided for both a transportation corpsand a motor transport corps.17

Bills to carry this plan into effect, includ-ing the transportation features, were intro-duced in the House of Representatives andthe Senate during August 1919. The hear-ings on these bills, however, disclosed alack of unanimity regarding Army transpor-tation, even among representatives of theWar Department, and neither was reportedout of committee. A further measure, whichincluded provision for a transportationcorps with jurisdiction over all forms oftransport, was introduced in the House ofRepresentatives, but it was not given a hear-ing and died in committee. These measureshaving failed, a bill was introduced inFebruary 1920 which provided for the re-turn of transportation to the control of TheQuartermaster General. Debate on this

13 William J. Wilgus, Transporting the AEF inWestern Europe, 1917-1919 (New York, 1931),pp. 144, 151, 160. Colonel Wilgus, experiencedAmerican railway executive, served in France as Di-rector of Military Railways and as deputy to Brig.Gen. W. W. Atterbury, Director General of Trans-portation. He wrote in detail regarding his ex-periences and expressed himself feelingly about theunpreparedness of the AEF for the transportationtask which confronted it and the hardships resultingfrom the eight reorganizations which were necessary.

14 Organization of the Services of Supply, Amer-ican Expeditionary Forces, p. 89; cf. Wilgus, Trans-porting the AEF, p. 201.

15 See Wilgus, Transporting the AEF, pp. 549-60.

16 Report of the Chief of Transportation Service,1919, p. 186.

17 Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1919,pp. 248, 252.


measure disclosed a preponderance ofopinion in favor of such an arrangement,economy being one of the chief arguments.Attempts to amend the bill to provide fora transportation corps failed.18

Accordingly, the Army ReorganizationAct of 1920 placed transportation for theWar Department, except military railways,under the jurisdiction of The QuartermasterGeneral.19 The War Department directiveto implement this law stated, "the Trans-portation Service shall be organized andoperated as a separate service of theQuartermaster Corps and shall be chargedwith transportation of the Army by landand water, including transportation oftroops and supplies by mechanical or animalmeans, and with the furnishing of means oftransportation of all classes and kindsrequired by the Army." 20 The Transporta-tion Service, as established within theQuartermaster Corps, included divisions todeal respectively with animal transport,motor transport, rail transport, water trans-port, and war planning.21

Thus it appears that although WorldWar I had demonstrated, at least to thosedirectly concerned, the need for an in-dependent and integrated transportationservice during hostilities, it had not madeclear, certainly not to Congress, the advis-ability of maintaining such a service duringpeacetime as a measure of preparedness.Instead of establishing transportation asan independent service, the Army Re-organization Act of 1920 again made it oneof the several responsibilities of TheQuartermaster General. Instead of com-

pletely integrating the control of Armytransportation under one head, it made theconstruction, maintenance, and operationof military railways a responsibility of theChief of Engineers, as it had been beforethe war.22 On the other hand, motor trans-port was brought into the TransportationService, and the need for advance planningfor war was recognized in the organizationof the Transportation Service.

Developments Preceding Pearl Harbor

Not only did World War I fail to bringabout the independence and integration ofArmy transportation which the Chief ofTransportation Service had hoped for, butmuch of the gain which had been crystal-lized in the organization which followedthe passage of the Army ReorganizationAct of 1920 was lost between the wars.23

The optimism which prevailed regardingthe continuance of peace, together with thelimited appropriations forthcoming fromCongress, had this effect. Operations be-came routine and planning for war lostits urgency. The Transportation Servicegave way to a Transportation Division inthe Office of the Quartermaster General.On the eve of World War II that divisionincluded a Commercial Traffic Branchwhich was responsible for controlling andco-ordinating all War Department trafficby commercial carriers; a Water TransportBranch which was responsible for traffic

18 See OCT HB Monograph 4, pp. 16-22, for dis-cussion of these measures and hearings.

19 PL 242, 4 Jun 20.20 WD GO 42, 14 Jul 20.21 OQMG Cir 11, 28 Jul 20; OQMG Office Or-

der 119, 30 Aug 21.

22 See Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson,The Armies of Industry (New Haven, 1921),XXVI; AR 100-50, 6 Jun 23.

23 For review of 1920-39 developments, see OCTHB Monograph 4, pp. 24-31; Monograph 5, pp. 22-26; Monograph 6, pp. 15-52. Of special interest inthe latter is discussion of relations with FederalTraffic Board and Coordinator for Traffic (pp. 18-20, 43-46), and transportation provisions of theseveral industrial mobilization plans (pp. 33-38).

PEACETIME PORTS OF EMBARKATION. The pier and warehouse facilities atFort Mason, San Francisco (top) and the Brooklyn Army Base, New York (bottom)

were adequate for Army shipping operations between the wars.


by Army transports, the scheduling of thetransports, supervision of the operation oftransports and ports of embarkation, andthe procurement and assignment of trans-ports and harbor boats; and a MotorTransport Branch which was responsiblefor the development, design, procurement,maintenance, storage, and issue of wheeledmotor vehicles.24 The Quartermaster Gen-eral also was responsible for the organiza-tion and training of troop units for the op-eration of ports and motor vehicles.

The outbreak of hostilities in Europe andthe launching of a rearmament program inthe United States impelled numerouschanges in this organization. In view ofthe tremendous increase in the motorvehicle procurement program, the MotorTransport Branch was withdrawn from theTransportation Division and set up as a co-ordinate division in July 1940.25 Otherwise,the developments in the TransportationDivision were in the nature of expansion orin the interest of efficiency. The CommercialTraffic Branch relinquished to the WaterTransport Branch control over the bookingof passengers and freight on commercialvessels, in order that all dealings with thesteamship lines might be concentrated inone office. Because of the growing numberof Army transports and the increasingdemand for harbor boats, a Marine Design,Construction, and Procurement Branch wasestablished to perform functions which pre-viously had been assigned to the WaterTransport Branch. A Traffic ControlBranch was set up to co-ordinate and ex-

pedite land and water movements and toplan for such further control of shipmentsas might become necessary. A Research andReview Branch was instituted to handlelegal and intelligence matters. An Adminis-trative Branch was introduced to relieve theother branches of certain responsibilitiesrelating to personnel, finance, statistics, andplanning.26 Within the branches, new sec-tions and units were created to deal moreeffectively with the enlarged responsibili-ties and the more complex problems.27 InJanuary 1941 The Quartermaster Generalappointed a Transportation AdvisoryGroup, consisting of leading executives fromthe fields of steamship, railway, motor truck,motor bus, inland waterway, and air trans-portation, and of warehousing, to advise onproblems confronting his TransportationDivision and to submit suggestions for theimprovement of its operations.28

During the 1939-41 period the Trans-portation Division functioned under a suc-cession of chiefs, namely, Brig. Gen.Richard H. Jordan, who served until July1940; Col, Douglas C. Cordiner, whoserved from August 1940 to March 1941;and Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Theodore H.Dillon, who served from March 1941 untiltransportation was removed from the con-trol of The Quartermaster General a yearlater.

Staff supervision over transportation wasexercised during this period by the SupplyDivision (G-4) of the War Department

24 OQMG Office Order 4, 7 Jan 37.25 OQMG Office Order 49, 26 Jul 40. Design

and procurement of motor vehicles was transferredfrom QMC to OD by WD Cir 245, Sec. IV, 25 Jul42. Staff and technical responsibilities for truckoperating troop units remained with QMC untiltransferred to TC by WD GO 77, 24 Jul 46.

26 The organization set forth in Trans Div OfficeMemo 45, 1 Jul 41, remained in effect without sub-stantial change to Mar 42. OCT HB OQMG TransDiv Gen.

27 See OCT HB Monograph 5, pp. 27-36, andMonograph 6, pp. 71-80.

28 See remarks of QMG in minutes of initial meet-ing of the group, 9 Jan 41, OCT HB OQMG TransAdv Group; OCT HB Monograph 1 reviews workof group.


General Staff. At the beginning of the pre-war emergency this supervision was rela-tively light, and was handled by one officer,Maj. Frank S. Ross, who with a secretaryconstituted the Transportation Section ofthe Supply and Transportation Branch,G-4. Since Ross's experience was mainlywith water and rail transportation, inOctober 1940 an expert in motor transportwas added. A reorganization which tookplace in G-4 in December 1940 assignedthe Transportation Section to the Require-ments and Distribution Branch but left itsfunctions unchanged. Those functions wereto aid the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, inthe fulfillment of his responsibilities for"the preparation of plans and policies andthe supervision of activities concerning . . .transportation by land and water, includ-ing ports of embarkation and their neces-sary auxiliaries," and "traffic control." 29

As the emergency advanced and trans-portation problems became more acute, thesupervision exercised by the TransportationSection, G-4, became closer. Early in April1941 Lt. Col. Charles P. Gross wasdesignated chief of the section, and Rossbecame his executive.30 Later in the samemonth, upon recommendation of its chief,the section was elevated to the status of abranch, and a program for increasing itspersonnel and expanding its activities waslaunched.31 By October 1941 sections hadbeen established to deal respectively withrail, water, and motor transportation, to co-ordinate lend-lease (defense aid) move-

ments, and to do long-range planning.32

The Assistant Secretary of War, and theUnder Secretary of War after the establish-ment of his office in December 1940, alsotook a hand in planning for Army transpor-tation. They considered this activity inci-dental to their responsibility for supervisionof the procurement of military supplies. InOctober 1940 the chief of the ContributoryDivision in the Office of the Assistant Sec-retary listed among the division's functionsthe assembling of War Department viewsand requirements regarding shipping, trans-portation, and port organization, and thepreparation of recommendations.33 InAugust 1941 the Contributory Division,then a unit of the Office of the Under Sec-retary, was renamed Liaison Division, andits field of interest was described as includ-ing transportation by railway, truck, water,pipeline, and air.34 The Contributory Divi-sion and the Liaison Division maintainedclose contact with the TransportationBranch of G-4 and The QuartermasterGeneral's Transportation Division, and tookan especially active interest in port condi-tions and in the provision of port facilitiesadequate to handle Army traffic.35

As the Army's transportation operationsexpanded, the various elements of the WarDepartment concerned with such activitieshad occasion to consult more and more with

29 AR 10-15, Sec. I, par. 11c, 18 Aug 36.30 Col Gross and Col Ross remained with Army

transportation throughout the war, the former be-coming CofT ASF and the latter CofT ETOUSA,each attaining the rank of Maj Gen.

31 Memo, C of Trans Br for Exec Off G-4 (Mal-lon), 5 Apr 41, OCT HB G-4 Trans Br Gen.

32 G-4 Org Chart, 20 Oct 41, OCT HB G-4Trans Br Gen.

33 Memo, C of Contributory Div for Dir of PlngBr OASW, 14 Oct 40, USW Plng Br 114.7 Con-tributory Div.

34 Memo, C of Plng Br for C of Liaison Div, 21Aug 41, USW Plng Br 114.7 Liaison Div.

35 Memo, C of Contributory Div for Dir of PlngBr, 16 Apr 41, sub: Proposed Sale and Lease ofHoboken Terminal, OCT HB Topic New York Ho-boken Terminal; Ltr, C of Contributory Div to Portof NY Authority, 12 Mar 41, OCT HB New YorkPort Plng and Contl of Trans.


the other federal agencies which wereinterested in the same field. The InterstateCommerce Commission, functioning since1887 as a regulatory body for the rates andservices of domestic carriers, except air, wasequipped with and prepared to exercisebroader powers than it had possessed in1917.36 The Maritime Commission, estab-lished under the Merchant Marine Act of1936 to foster the development of a mer-chant fleet adequate to carry a substantialpart of the water-borne commerce of theUnited States and to serve military needsin time of war or national emergency,played an increasingly active role in con-nection with both the construction and theoperation of ships. The Civil AeronauticsAdministration, established pursuant to theCivil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and subse-quent legislation to foster the developmentof air commerce and aeronautical facilities,was confronted with the difficult task ofadjusting the civil air services to meet mili-tary requirements. The TransportationCommissioner, a member of the AdvisoryCommission to the Council of NationalDefense which was established by the Presi-dent in May 1940, undertook through con-sultative and advisory methods to aid thedomestic carriers in handling the increasingload which they were called upon to liftand to provide for contingencies. The Divi-sion of Defense Aid Reports, concerned withthe administration of the Lend-Lease Actof March 1941, had many transportationinterests in common with the War Depart-ment.37

A number of jurisdictional problemscame to the fore during the emergencyperiod, including the question of responsi-bility for liaison with other federal agencies.These problems were the natural conse-quence of concurrent activities in regard totransportation on the part of the AssistantSecretary of War (later the Under Secre-tary), G-4 of the General Staff, and TheQuartermaster General. They were en-couraged by lack of explicitness in some ofthe Army regulations.

The problem of jurisdiction came up firstin the fall of 1939 when The QuartermasterGeneral and the commander of the NewYork Port of Embarkation differed regard-ing their respective responsibilities for thescheduling and operation of the Armytransports. The port commander recom-mended that the pertinent Army regulation(AR 30-1110) be amended to strengthenhis position, but G-4 refused concurrenceon the ground that The QuartermasterGeneral was in the better position to knowthe over-all requirements of the Army fortroop and supply movements, and that histechnical direction of the port installationsshould parallel that exercised over fieldinstallations of the Corps of Engineers andthe Signal Corps by the chiefs of thoseservices.38 Soon thereafter, on suggestion ofthe Chief of Staff, consideration was givento the feasibility of placing the port com-manders under the respective corps areacommanders, but such decentralization ofcontrol was opposed by both The Quarter-master General and G-4, and no further

36 Interstate Commerce Commission, 53d AnnualReport (Washington, November 1, 1939) pp. 22-23.

37 See Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease:Weapon for Victory (New York, 1944), pp. 95-96.

38 Memo, C of Supply and Trans Br G-4 forACofS G-4 (Tyner), 21 Dec 39, sub: Jurisdictionover ATS; Ltr, TAG to CG NYPE, 2 Jan 40, sub:Command Functions of CG NYPE, AG 370.5 (10-11-39). Both in G-4/29717-35.


steps were taken in that direction.39 Thequestion was again discussed after com-plaints had arisen regarding the handlingof troop movements at the ports. A newregulation was issued toward the close of1940. but its provision that the ports ofembarkation would be operated "directlyunder the War Department" was lackingin definiteness.40

Another jurisdictional question of in-creasing importance related to the dividingline between the transportation responsibili-ties of the General Staff and those of TheQuartermaster General. The intensificationof the supervision and control exercised bythe Transportation Branch of G-4, particu-larly after April 1941, substantially affectedthe operations of The Quartermaster Gen-eral, and there were misunderstandings anddelays. Various suggestions were offered forrevision and clarification of the pertinentregulations (AR 30-5 and AR 30-905),but agreement was not readily obtainedand the confusion continued until after ourentry into the war.41

The steady extension of control by theTransportation Branch of G-4 is illustratedby the growth of its liaison activities. Afteran important conference with officials ofthe Maritime Commission in February1941. in which representatives of the Under

Secretary of War, the TransportationBranch of G-4, and The QuartermasterGeneral participated, the. Assistant Chief ofStaff, G-4, arranged that thereafter arepresentative of his Transportation Branchshould conduct all negotiations with theMaritime Commission.42 An officer of theTransportation Branch was designated tomaintain liaison with the Highway TrafficAdvisory Committee which was set up bythe Secretary of War early in 1941.43 Whenthe Secretary of War appointed a represen-tative of the Under Secretary to confer withthe Transportation Commissioner regardingport operations, the Chief of the Trans-portation Branch immediately arranged toattend all such conferences.44 In July 1941the Chief of the Transportation Branch wasdesignated liaison officer for G-4 with theTransportation Section of the Army andNavy Munitions Board.45 Soon thereafterhe was assigned War Department liaison ontransportation matters with the Division ofDefense Aid Reports, later known as theLend-Lease Administration.40 He or hisalternate represented the War Departmenton the Cargo Clearance Committee and theInterdepartmental Shipping Priorities Ad-visory Committee, which were set up dur-ing the summer of 1941 by the Reconstruc-tion Finance Corporation and the Office

39 Memo within G-4 (Strong for Keyes), 19 Apr40,, sub: Ports of Emb, G-4/31685; Memo, QMGfor ACofS G-4, 26 Aug 40, QM 323.91A,G-4/31946; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 28Aug 40, sub: Contl of Ports, G-4/31946.

40 DF, G-4 to TAG and QMG, 6 Sep 40, sub:AR Governing Ports, AG 323.341 (9-6-40) ( 1 ) ;AR 270-5, 30 Nov 40, par. 2.

41 Memo, C of Trans Sec (Ross) for C of Reqand Dist Br G-4 (Aurand), 23 Jan 41, sub: Respon-sibility of QMG and GS in Trans Matters; Memo,ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 10 Mar 41; Memo,ACofS G-3 for ACofS G-1, 2 Apr 41; Memo,ACofS G-1 for CofS USA, 9 Apr 41. All inG-4/32572.

42 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 3 Feb 41,sub: Additional Army Transports, G-4/29717-26 ;Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 7 Mar 41, sub:Negotiations with Mar Com, G-4/29717-26; Ltr,SW to Chm Mar Com, 5 Aug 41, G-4/29717-80.

43 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 6 Feb 41, sub:WD Liaison for HTAC, G-4/32212, AG 537.4(1-30-41) HTAC.

44 Ltr, SW to Trans Com, 9 Apr 41, with pencilnotation by Col Gross on file copy, Trans BrG-4/334 (Port).

45 Ltr, ACofS G-4 for Exec Secy ANMB, 21 Jul41, G-4/21901-29.

46 Memo, ACofS G-4 for Dir Def Aid WDGS,11 Oct 41, G-4/32697-16.


of Production Management, respectively,to consider the availability and the alloca-tion of shipping to carry the strategic im-ports in which those organizations had avital interest.47

It became necessary on various occasionsto protect the established transportationprerogatives, and The Quartermaster Gen-eral and G-4 took a vigorous and successfulstand against all tendencies toward diffu-sion. The several supply services of the WarDepartment, in an effort to assure that theirsupplies, once they were ready for shipment,were moved without delay, established theirown traffic staffs.48 These staffs, concernedsolely with the prompt delivery of their ownshipments, sometimes were critical of TheQuartermaster General's operations andbelieved that they could get better resultsby direct action. As regards inland traffic,the criticisms dealt chiefly with the require-ment that local transportation officersobtain routings for all shipments of two car-loads or more from The QuartermasterGeneral.49 As regards ocean traffic, therewas an attempt on the part of the Corps ofEngineers to obtain authority to act in-dependently of The Quartermaster Generalin arranging for the movement of construc-tion personnel and materials to the newoversea bases.50 Efforts were made duringthe summer of 1941 to obtain a degree ofindependence for the Air Corps in thehandling of its traffic.51 As already stated,

these efforts toward dispersion of controlover Army traffic were forestalled.

The steadily increasing transportation re-quirements of the Army necessitated notonly increased administrative staffs inWashington but also additional field agen-cies. During the early part of the emergencyperiod there were two Army ports of em-barkation in operation, at New York andSan Francisco. By the time of our entry intothe war an additional port of embarkationhad been established at New Orleans,particularly to handle transports serving thePanama Canal Department, and subportshad been set up at Charleston, S.C., andSeattle. During the late summer of 1941construction work was begun on two hold-ing and reconsignment points, located atMarietta, Pa., and Voorheesville, N.Y.,which were designed to protect the NorthAtlantic ports from traffic congestion bysupplying intransit storage into which Armyand lend-lease supplies could be divertedpending the ability of the ports to receivethem and load them promptly on ships. InOctober 1941 commercial traffic agencieswere established in New York and Boston,particularly to keep the rapidly growingvolume of lend-lease supplies movingsmoothly through the ports and to preventrailway cars from being held unduly longunder load.52

Several criteria may be cited to indicatethe growth of Army transportation activityduring the prewar emergency period. On 1July 1940 the Transportation Division inthe Office of the Quartermaster Generalemployed 6 officers and 95 civilians, a totalof 101 persons. By 1 December 1941 the

47 See OCT HB Monograph 10, pp. 24-25; forfurther liaison activities see Memo, C of Trans BrG-4 for C of Plng Liaison Sec G-4, 4 Sep 41, sub:Bds and Coms, OCT HB G-4 Responsibilities.

48 AR 30-905, pars. 2e and h, 1 Aug 29, placedlimitations on such staffs.

49 See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 117-22.50 Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 3 Apr 41,

G-4/32834.51 Memo, Trans Br G-4 for Plng Liaison Sec

G-4, 23 Jul 41, sub: Transfer of Responsibilities toAAF, G-4/33163.

52 Special OCT Rpt, Developments in Army-Transportation during the Period of Military Pre-paredness, June 1940-December 7, 1941, pp. 25-28, OCT HB TC Gen Rpts.


staff had increased to 65 officers and 485civilians, a total of 550. On 1 July 1940 theoverhead personnel at the ports of embarka-tion, the only field installations at that time,included 91 officers, 152 enlisted men, and2,826 civilians, a total of 3,069. By 1December 1941 the overhead personnel atports of embarkation, holding and recon-signment points, and commercial trafficagencies included 574 officers, 2,488 en-listed men, and 9,466 civilians, totaling12,528.53 During the same period the per-sonnel of the Transportation Section (laterBranch) of G-4 increased from 1 officerand 1 civilian to 18 officers and 12 civilians.On 1 January 1939 the Army TransportService embraced 6 transports, all owned bythe War Department. On 7 December 1941there were 127 owned and chartered troopand cargo vessels in the service of theArmy.54 The total funds obligated by TheQuartermaster General's CommercialTraffic Branch, including salaries and alloperating costs and transportation charges,increased from $3,882,000 for the fiscalyear 1940 to $52,349,000 for the five andone-quarter month period, 1 July to 7December 1941. The funds obligated by theWater Transport Branch increased as be-tween these periods from $8,121,000 to$45,724,000.55

The Early Months of the War

The first three months of the war broughtabout marked changes in the managementof transportation. New agencies were set up

by the President to exercise more completecontrol over the employment of the nation'stransportation resources. The Army's ma-chinery for handling its transportation re-quirements was completely reorganized.The relationships between the Army and thenew civil transportation agencies were ten-tatively worked out.

The heavy movements of men and sup-plies which became necessary immediatelyafter the Japanese attack on our Pacific out-posts put the entire transportation system toa severe test. In some respects the demandsof a two-ocean war were met promptly andefficiently. In other respects there werehandicaps which could be overcome onlygradually. In the former class was the railmovement of about 600,000 troops withtheir organizational equipment during thefirst five weeks of war.50 The excellent work-ing relationships which had been establishedbetween The Quartermaster General'sCommercial Traffic Branch and the As-sociation of American Railroads' MilitaryTransportation Section paid off handsomelyduring this period. Allowing for minordelays due to lack of experience on the partof transportation officers with some of thetroop units, inadequate loading facilities atcertain camps, and the necessity of drawingrailway equipment from distant areas tomeet the requirements of large organizationsmoving out of western stations, the rail re-sults were gratifying.57 The situation in re-gard to shipping and port operations wasless propitious. There were not enough ves-sels available and many of those on handhad to be taken out of service temporarilyfor arming. The Atlantic coast ports wereembarrassed by the large amount of lend-

53 Statistical Summary, Transportation Corps, 15Oct 42, p. 10, OCT HB MPR.

54 1st Ind, Water Div OCT for Hist Off OCT(Watson for Wardlow), 5 Nov 42, SPTOW314.8-E, OCT HB OQMG Water Trans Br.

55 Special OCT Rpt, Developments in ArmyTransportation during the Period of Military Pre-paredness, p. 2, OCT HB TC Gen Rpts.

56 Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1943, p. 8.57 Ltr, Pres AAR to CofS USA, 30 Jan 42,

G-4/33858; OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 248-51.

TROOP ENTRAINMENT soon after the Pearl Harbor attack. A unit leaving CampRobinson, Ark., December 1941 (top). The unit's organic motor equipment being

loaded for movement with the troops (bottom).


lease freight which had to be transshippedin addition to military supplies. The Army'sport of embarkation at San Francisco, al-though an expansion of facilities had beenstarted a year earlier, was not prepared tohandle smoothly the large movements oftroops and matériel which were rushed tothe Pacific bases.58

The President was deeply concerned lestwe fail to achieve the most effective utiliza-tion of our inadequate shipping resources,and shortly after Pearl Harbor he an-nounced the creation of a Strategic Ship-ping Board, to act under his supervision.The board consisted of the Chairman ofthe Maritime Commission, the Army Chiefof Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations,and Mr. Harry Hopkins. Its function wasto establish policies for and plan the allo-cation of merchant shipping to meet mili-tary and civilian requirements and to co-ordinate the shipping activities of theagencies represented in its membership. ThePresident stated that it was his intention toreview the "recommendations" of the boardwith its members.59 The Chief of the Trans-portation Branch, G-4, was designated torepresent the Chief of Staff on this board.60

The effectiveness of the Strategic Ship-ping Board was limited because of differ-ences of opinion between the Army, theNavy, and the Maritime Commission re-garding the utilization of the merchant fleetand because of the absence of authority,short of the President, to resolve such dif-

ferences.61 Accordingly, steps were soontaken with a view to the establishment ofan agency with broader powers over ship-ping than those possessed by the MaritimeCommission. Such an agency was needednot only to insure the effective use of theAmerican merchant marine for our ownrequirements, but also to enable the UnitedStates to enter into a co-operative shippingarrangement with Great Britain, which al-ready had placed all British-controlled mer-chant ships under the management of theMinistry of War Transport.62 The resultwas the creation of a War Shipping Ad-ministration by executive order of the Presi-dent, issued 7 February 1942.63 Althoughthe authority vested in WSA exceeded thatwhich the Army had contemplated, officersof G-4 at once undertook to establish aworking relationship with the new agency.

The War Shipping Administrator, RearAdm. Emory S. Land, suggested that theStrategic Shipping Board be used as a chan-nel for informing his office of the "jointobjectives" of the Army and the Navy inregard to merchant shipping. The WarDepartment, however, took the attitude

58 See OCT HB Monograph 5, pp. 168-73.59 Ltr, the President to SW, 8 Dec 41, AG 334.8

Strategic Shipping Bd. Presumably Hopkins was toact as personal representative of the President inthis as in so many other matters.

60 Memo, Chm Mar Com for Harry Hopkins,17 Dec 41, AG 334.8 Strategic Shipping Bd.

61 Memo, CofS USA for WSA (Douglas), par.3, 8 Jan 43, AG 334.8 WSA; Memo, C of TransBr G-4 for WPD (Gerow), 23 Dec 41; Memo,CofS USA to USN (Admiral Stark), 24 Dec 41,sub: Sea Transportation; Memo, C of Trans BrG-4 for CofS USA, 26 Dec 41, sub: StrategicShipping Bd—Independent Action by Navy; Memo,CofS USA for USN (Stark), 27 Dec 41. Last fourin G-4/29717-26.

62 When establishment of CCS was being dis-cussed, Gen Marshall pointed out that U.S. couldsupport the proposal only in principle, because cen-tralized control of U.S. shipping had not yet beenaccomplished. See ARCADIA Proceedings, 10 Jan 42,p. 4.

63 EO 9054. Fuller discussion of powers of WSAand the Army's part in its establishment is re-served for Ch. VI.


that the order establishing WSA contem-plated a direct relationship between thatagency and the Army, and that in issuingit the President had abrogated his lettersetting up the Strategic Shipping Board.64

Moreover, the functions to which the WarShipping Administrator referred fell natur-ally within the scope of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff organization which was being devel-oped at that time. The Strategic ShippingBoard was not dissolved, but it functionedin a very limited way thereafter.

The President also recognized the neces-sity of getting the maximum service out ofdomestic transportation facilities, and on18 December 1941 he established the Officeof Defense Transportation, with broadpowers to co-ordinate and regulate the rail-way, highway, and inland waterway car-riers.65 The Under Secretary of War pro-posed that representatives of both his officeand G-4 be appointed to maintain liaisonwith ODT. This dual representation wasopposed by G-4, and eventually it was ar-ranged that a single Army representativewould be designated by the Assistant Chiefof Staff, G-4; that the Office of the UnderSecretary would co-ordinate its interest intransportation matters through that repre-sentative; and that a member of the Officeof the Under Secretary might accompanythe War Department representative tomeetings convened by the Director of De-fense Transportation, in order to be in-formed regarding proposed policies and pro-cedures that might affect the responsibilitiesof the Under Secretary. The Chief of theTransportation Branch, G-4, was desig-

nated War Department liaison officer withODT.66

The Chief of the Transportation Branch,Colonel Gross, arranged for an early con-ference with the Director of Defense Trans-portation, Mr. Joseph B. Eastman, duringwhich he explained the Army's transporta-tion machinery and procedures, expressedthe hope that "the operation of his office(ODT) would not be too restrictive," andemphasized the need for priority in themovement of troops and war equipment.67

Gross was favorably impressed with East-man's attitude on these matters. He kept awary eye, however, on the development ofODT activities during this formative pe-riod. When the ODT Director of Storage re-quested information regarding the materialsbeing used in the construction of ware-houses at Army holding and reconsignmentpoints, Gross expressed the view that he was"getting way beyond his proper province."The information was furnished, however,when ODT explained that it was desiredonly in connection with a study of thelength of the rail haul for lumber used inthe construction of such facilities.68 A re-quest from the ODT Director of RailwayTransport for information regarding therumored acquisition by the Army of certainwater-front property at Norfolk elicitedfrom the Transportation Branch, G-4, thestatement that all such acquisitions werecleared in advance with the Ocean Ship-ping Section of the Army and Navy Muni-tions Board, and an inquiry to determine

64 Ltr, WSA to SW and SN, 3 Mar 42, sub:Allocation or Requisition of Ships; Ltr, CG SOSto WSA, 9 Mar 42, G-4/29717-26. Both in OCTHB Topic Strategic Shipping Bd.

65 EO 8989.

66 Memo, USW for SW, 29 Dec 41; Memo, ACofSG-4 for USW, 12 Jan 42; Ltr, SW to Dir DefTrans, 21 Jan 42. All in G-4/33932.

67 Memo, C of Trans Br for ACofS G-4, 29 Dec41, OCT HB Gross Day File.

68 Ltr, C of Trans Br G-4 to ODT, 12 Feb 42;Ltr, ODT to C of Trans Br G-4, 16 Feb 42; Ltr,DC of Trans Br G-4 to ODT, 17 Feb 42. All inTrans Br G-4/000.900 ODT.


how far ODT expected to interest itself insuch matters. The ODT response indicatedthat its interest was in facilities or equip-ment to be acquired from operating rail-roads, and arrangements then were madeto supply the desired data.69 While guardingagainst ODT encroachment on what wereconsidered strictly Army prerogatives, Grossdemonstrated during these early weeks hisreadiness to co-operate with ODT in mat-ters of national interest, such as the estab-lishment of a system of traffic control, theimprovement of local transportation in in-dustrial areas, and the location of storagefacilities in such a manner as to impose aminimum burden on the transportationsystem.70

The necessity of moving large numbersof troops and great quantities of construc-tion materials and military supplies overseasas rapidly as ships could be found to trans-port them called for a prompt increase inthe Army port establishment. This meantexpanding existing ports of embarkation byconstructing and leasing new pier and ware-house facilities and enlarging troop stagingareas. It also meant increasing the numberof Army-operated ports. During the threemonths following our entry into the war thesubports at Charleston and Seattle weregiven independent status as ports of em-barkation, active steps were taken to set upsubports at Boston, Los Angeles, and Port-land, Oreg., and plans were laid for estab-lishing additional port organizations in thenear future. Although the general depotwhich had been maintained at the NewYork Port of Embarkation had been re-

moved prior to our entry into the war, soas to leave the installation free to performits primary function, it was not until Febru-ary 1942 that similar action was taken inregard to the San Francisco Port of Em-barkation.71 In order to remove the un-certainty which had existed as to whichbranch of the War Department was respon-sible for control of the ports of embarkationthey were placed under the "command"of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, andother elements of the Army were instructedthat no order should be issued to the portcommanders regarding movements oftroops, supplies, or equipment exceptthrough the Chief of the TransportationBranch, G-4.72

Before we had been in the war a fullmonth disturbing congestion had developedat the principal ports, New York and SanFrancisco, and it soon appeared also atPhiladelphia and New Orleans. During1941 the Army had established a releasesystem for the control of its own portboundshipments. Immediately after Pearl Harbor,Army regulating stations were establishedat strategic points on the transcontinentalrail lines for the purpose of holding or di-verting shipments destined to Pacific coastports, as port or other conditions might dic-tate. Additional holding and reconsignmentpoints were authorized to provide intransitstorage for supplies moving toward theSouth Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific seaboards.Additional commercial traffic agencies wereestablished at principal ports. It was soon

69 Ltr, ODT to G-4, 16 Feb 42; Ltr, Trans BrG-4 to ODT, 19 Feb 42; Ltr, ODT to Trans BrG-4, 23 -Feb 42; Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG,25 Feb 42. All in Trans Br G-4/000.900 ODT.

70 Ltrs, C of Trans Br G-4 to ODT, 10 Feb 42and 17 Feb 42, Trans Br G-4/000.900 ODT.

71 OCT HB Monograph 8, pp. 5-11.72 Memo, DCofS USA for TAG, 16 Dec 41,

G-4/33854; Memo, TAG for CG's for Armies andCorps Areas, CofS GHQ, and C's of Arms and Svs,17 Dec 41. Both in AG 612 (12-16-41). This di-rective evidently was intended to fix ultimate re-sponsibility for the ports but not to relieve QMGof responsibility for technical supervision.


evident, however, that the situation couldnot be met with anything short of an over-all traffic control system, covering not onlymilitary but also lend-lease and commercialshipments and capable of holding shipmentsat the source or of taking any other actionthat might be necessary to protect the portsfrom having to receive more freight thanthey could properly handle. The War De-partment, the War Shipping Administra-tion, and the Office of Defense Transporta-tion discussed this problem at length duringthe winter of 1941-42, with the result thatthe general principles of a system whichwould operate under a Transportation Con-trol Committee and make extensive use ofthe machinery already established by theArmy were agreed on in mid-March. Thedevelopment of details was undertakenpromptly.73

The pressure for quick delivery of sup-plies in the zone of interior and to overseabases necessitated further warnings againstdisregard of The Quartermaster General'stransportation prerogatives. The Associa-tion of American Railroads complained ofthe great number of requests for informa-tion and special services received from manysources, and the War Department met thissituation by requiring that all such requestsbe addressed to The Quartermaster Gen-eral's Commercial Traffic Branch.74 Becauseof the unusual problems encountered by theChief of Ordnance in synchronizing the flowof materials and component parts to manu-facturing and assembly plants in such a wayas to avoid production delays, such ship-ments were excepted from this require-

ment.75 The need for construction work wasespecially grave in Hawaii, and the DistrictEngineers at San Francisco and Honolulumade certain shipping arrangements di-rectly with the Navy and the MaritimeCommission, with the result that freight andpersonnel of relatively low priority weremoved while those of higher prioritieswaited. The Chief of Engineers was in-structed that all ship space, whether re-quired by the Corps of Engineers or by con-tractors, must be obtained through TheQuartermaster General and that prioritieson movements would be applied by G-4 inaccordance with approved recommenda-tions of the oversea commanders.76

Recognizing the need for technical ad-vice and direction of the highest order inconnection with the operating phases of theArmy's transportation task, The Quarter-master General took steps during the wintermonths of 1942 to acquire the service ofmen of broad transportation experience.77

Leading executives from the commercialfield were engaged to head the activities re-lating to water, rail and motor transporta-tion, traffic control, and intransit storage,and these men became full-time membersof the Army transportation staff. Therewere also special advisers appointed forrailway matters and general traffic prob-lems, who remained with their businesses

73 Detailed discussion of this subject will be in-cluded in Vol. II of TC history. See OCT HBMonograph 6, Ch. VII, and Monograph 23.

74 Memo, TAG for CG's of Armies, Army Corps,Corps Areas, etc., 22 Dec 41, AG 531 (12-16-41)MO-D-M, sub: Contact with AAR, G-4/33858.

75 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofOrd, 30 Dec 41,G-4/33858.

76 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofEngrs, 6 Feb 42,sub: Ship Space to be Obtained only throughQMG, G-4/29717-150; 2d Ind, ACofS G-4 forCofEngrs, 2 Mar 42, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

77 Memo, C of Trans Div OQMG (Dillon) forACofS G-4, 4 Feb 42, sub: Trans Org; Memo,ACofS G-4 for Dillon, 6 Feb 42. Both in ASF HqQMG. When this exchange took place G-4 (Som-ervell) believed that QMG had done well in ob-taining strong men as advisers, but needed more ofthat type on his operating staff.


but gave attention to War Department mat-ters when requested.78 Many other technicaltransportation men were added to the or-ganization at this time, some being engagedas civilian employees while others weretaken into the Army as commissioned of-ficers. During the three-month period from1 December 1941 to 1 March 1942, theofficer personnel of The QuartermasterGeneral's Transportation Division increasedfrom 65 to 74, the civilian personnel from485 to 632, and the total staff from 550 to706.79

During this period the TransportationBranch of G-4 further increased its organi-zation and intensified its supervision oftransportation operations. In order to effectthe closest possible co-ordination betweenstaff planning and the execution of troopand supply movements, it established aMovement Section. Since the ports of em-barkation had been made directly responsi-ble to G-4, the Water Section of the Trans-portation Branch was enlarged and redesig-nated the Port and Water Section. An AirSection was established to supervise emer-gency movements of Army personnel andmatériel by the civil air lines in the UnitedStates and its possessions.80 The task ofproviding ocean transportation for the per-sonnel of military missions to the USSR, theMiddle East, Africa, and China, togetherwith civilian representatives of the StateDepartment and other federal agencies, hadbecome extremely difficult because of the

scarcity of passenger space to certain des-tinations and the great military need; there-fore, with a view to obtaining better resultsthrough centralization, the TransportationBranch took over the making of arrange-ments for all such traffic.81 The Chief ofthe Transportation Branch also sought tocentralize dealings with the Navy on trans-portation matters insofar as practical, andas a step in that direction arranged for hisoffice to control the utilization of passengerand freight space made available to theArmy on Navy ships.82 An Executive andAdministrative Section was set up to relievethe branch chief and other sections of cer-tain office details. A Legal and Fiscal Sec-tion was projected, but evidently it was notactivated.83 The staff of the TransportationBranch on 9 March 1942 included 44 of-ficers.84 A competent estimate places thenumber of civilians employed with thebranch on that date at 40.

The overlapping interests of the UnderSecretary of War and G-4 again came intoevidence during these early war months.Pursuant to his concern with the procure-ment of war matériel, the Under Secretarydesignated a "traffic and transportation ad-viser" to assist him.85 The adviser promptlyundertook a survey of the organization andoperations of The Quartermaster General's

78 Ltr, CofT for Dir of Def Trans, 16 Mar 42,SPRYA 322 Trans Div, OCT HB Gross Day File.

79 Statistical Summary, Transportation Corps, 15Oct 42, p. 10, OCT HB MPR.

80 Memo, TAG for ACofS WPD and ACofS G-4,12 Apr 41, WPD 3397-27; Memo, TAG for ACofSWPD, ACofS G-4, and C of AAF, 16 Jul 41, WPD3397-27; Memo, ACofS G-4 for C of Trans BrG-4 (Somervell for Gross), 23 Dec 41, Trans BrG-4/580, Vol. II.

81 Memo for record by author, 17 Feb 44, sub:Missions to Middle East; Ltr, C of Trans Br G-4to State Dept (Davis), 26 Dec 41. Both in OCTHB G-4 Trans Br Misc.

82 Memo, by Lt Col C. H. Kells, 22 Jan 42, sub:Conf Held by Rear Adm Taffinder, OCT HB G-4Trans Br Army-Navy Relations; Memo, ACofS G-4for Rear Adm Taffinder USN, 6 Feb 42, OCT HBGross Day File.

83 Functional chart of G-4, 19 Jan 42, OCT HBG-4 Trans Br Gen.

84 OCT Assignment Memo 1, 13 Mar 42, OCTHB TC Gen Key Personnel.

85 Memo, OUSW for QMG, 13 Jan 42, sub:Survey of WD Trans; Memo, DCofS for USW,14 Jan 42. Both in ASF Hq QMG.


Commercial Traffic Branch. G-4 objectedto this survey on jurisdictional grounds, andpointed out that it might lead to serious con-fusion. An understanding was reached be-tween the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,and the Under Secretary that the investiga-tion would be limited to such phases of TheQuartermaster General's transportation ac-tivity as affected the movement of raw ma-terials and semimanufactured articles.86 Italso was arranged that copies of reports bythe Under Secretary's adviser would befurnished The Quartermaster General, whowould investigate any alleged inefficienciespromptly.

Concurrently, a thorough inquiry intothe work of the Commercial Traffic Branchwas undertaken by an experienced railroadexecutive who was then an officer on thestaff of the Transportation Branch, G-4.The report of this officer gave general ap-proval to the organization and operationsof the branch. His principal recommenda-tions were that aggressive steps be taken toovercome personnel shortages, that over-crowded office conditions be relieved, thatthe system of communication with field in-stallations be amplified, and that closerliaison arrangements be worked out be-tween the Commercial Traffic Branch andthe Water Transport Branch in connectionwith the release and routing of portboundfreight. The Quartermaster General's re-sponse indicated that steps already hadbeen taken to accomplish three of these ob-jectives, and that the other recommenda-tion was receiving attention.87

Aside from the lack of sufficient equip-ment and facilities to accomplish the trans-portation task which confronted the Army,the greatest handicap was the lack of in-tegration in the headquarters organization.The Quartermaster General was responsibleunder the law and the regulations for ac-complishing the movement of troops andmatériel. The Transportation Branch, G-4,was responsible for the supervision of theseoperations, and considered itself responsiblein the last analysis for their success.88 In itseffort to make sure that no undertakingfailed for lack of preparation and direction,the Transportation Branch sometimes en-croached on The Quartermaster General'sdomain. This was notably true in regard toports of embarkation, which were responsi-ble to G-4, but which at the same time re-quired technical supervision from TheQuartermaster General's staff of experts inconnection with the operation of both shorefacilities and floating equipment. The Chiefof the Transportation Division, OQMG,expressed the following opinion: "The realweakness of our transportation setup is thatthe entire job, inland, terminal, and overseais not the direct responsibility of one operat-ing organization." 89

This weakness was recognized in the Gen-eral Staff also. Accordingly, when the WarDepartment was reorganized under thewartime powers of the President, effective9 March 1942, and a Services of SupplyWas established to relieve the General Staffof the supervision of supply and administra-tive services, one of the components of SOSwas a transportation organization which ab-

86 Memo, ACofS G-4 for USW, 15 Jan 42;Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for Exec Secy ANMB,10 Mar 42. Both in OCT HB USW.

87 Memo, C of Rail Sec Trans Br G-4 for ACofSG-4, 7 Feb 42, sub: Functional Opn of CTB; 1stInd, QMG for ACofS G-4, 17 Feb 42. Both inOCT 022 OQMG Coml Traf 1941-42.

88 Memo, C of Trans Sec G-4 (Ross) for C ofReq and Dist Br G-4 (Aurand), 23 Jan 41, sub:Responsibilities of QMG and GS in Trans Matters,G-4/32572.

89 Memo for ACofS G-4, 4 Feb 42, sub: TransOrg, ASF Hq QMG.


sorbed the transportation functions previ-ously performed by G-4 and The Quarter-master General, and relieved the UnderSecretary of the work which had been as-sumed by his transportation staff.90 This wasa long first step in the direction of integra-tion in Army transportation administration.It is noteworthy that the step was takenboldly early in the war, and was not the re-sult of slow evolution as in World War I. Itis noteworthy also that the new transporta-tion organization was placed on the supplyor technical service level, rather than in theGeneral Staff as in 1917-18.

Transportation Service Established

"Transportation and traffic control" wereamong the responsibilities assigned to theServices of Supply (later renamed ArmyService Forces) in the reorganization ofthe War Department in March 1942.91 Forthe performance of these responsibilitiesGeneral Somervell, commander of SOS,created a Transportation Division, to whichhe assigned the staff and the functionspreviously assigned to the TransportationBranch of G-4 (except the Motor Section),The Quartermaster General's Transporta-tion Division, the ports of embarkation in-cluding their staging areas, the regulatingstations, and the holding and reconsignmentpoints.92 In his initial directive GeneralSomervell designated as Chief of Trans-portation Col. Charles P. Gross, who had

been Chief of the Transportation Branch,G-4, and Gross was promptly promoted tobrigadier general.93 Concurrently, Brig.Gen. Theodore H. Dillon, who had beenChief of the Transportation Division,OQMG, was designated Deputy Chief ofTransportation.

On the day he assumed office the Chiefof Transportation announced the initialorganization of the Transportation Divi-sion.94 It consisted of two groups of units,designated respectively the functional staffand the operating branches. The functionalstaff included the Deputy Chief of Trans-portation, who was to act as the principalco-ordinating agent of the division, and anumber of units which were to deal withthe various aspects of administration andthe supervision of operating activities. Theseveral operating branches were to deal withthe more technical aspects of transportationand with the execution of troop and supplymovements.

This organizational set-up, having beenhastily and experimentally accomplished,was subject to early revision. In April 1942the name of the Transportation Divisionwas changed to Transportation Service,and concurrently the staff units and the op-erating branches were redesignated divi-

90 EO, 28 Feb 42, sub: Reorg of the Army, etc.;WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, sub: WD Reorg; Memo,CG SOS for C's of Supply Arms and Svs, etc.,9 Mar 42, sub: Initial Directive for the Org ofSOS; WD SO 58, 6 Mar 42, par. 6; SOS AdmMemo 3, 21 Mar 42, sub: Reassignment of Sec-tions, etc.

91 WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, par. 7d (3 ) .

92 Memo, CG SOS for C's of Supply Arms andSvs, etc., 9 Mar 42, sub: Initial Directive for Orgof SOS, par. 14c (3) . Although not expressly men-tioned, commercial traffic agencies were transferredto Transportation Division. The Motor Section ofthe Transportation Branch G-4 had been dealingprincipally with organizational equipment, ratherthan with commercial motor transportation, whichaccounts for its not being transferred.

93 Ibid., par. 12f ( 7 ) . Although from April toJuly 1942 Gross officially was known as Chief ofTransportation Service, the title Chief of Trans-portation is used uniformly in this history.

94 OCT Office Memo 1, 9 Mar 42, sub: Org ofTrans Div.


sions.95 There is no apparent advantage intracing step by step the many organizationaladjustments which were made during thisformative period, but it may be noted thata number of new units were set up to dealwith rapidly expanding aspects of the workand that clearer definition was given to thefunctions of the Deputy Chief of Transpor-tation and the Executive Officer. The or-ganization of the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, as it had developed up to30 June 1942, is shown in Chart 1.

Although the headquarters organizationexpanded in most directions between itsestablishment and 31 July 1942 when theTransportation Service became the Trans-portation Corps, it lost control of the ad-ministration of priorities and the assign-ment of space for the air movement ofArmy personnel and freight. This control,which had been exercised by the Transpor-tation Branch of G-4 during the early weeksof the war, had passed naturally to theChief of Transportation on 9 March 1942.96

Originally the control had extended onlyto air movements by commercial planeswithin the United States and its possessions,but its scope had been broadened to coverdomestic and oversea movements by bothcommercial and Army aircraft.97 In orderto administer this responsibility properly,the Chief of Transportation had under-taken to build up a strong staff, known fora time as the Air Priorities Branch and

later as the Air Division, and had com-missioned an executive of one of the leadingcommercial air lines to head this unit.98 TheArmy Air Forces, however, was not favor-ably disposed toward this arrangement, andeventually General Somervell acquiesced inthe AAF view. Effective 1 July 1942 thecontrol over priorities and the personnel ofthe Air Division were transferred to theArmy Air Forces.99

General Gross was opposed to the change.As Chief of the Transportation Branch ofG-4 he had contended strongly for the re-tention of this prerogative when the ques-tion came up soon after Pearl Harbor, onthe ground that control of all Army trafficshould be centralized in one office.100 Afterthe conclusion of hostilities he again ex-pressed the opinion that movements by airrequire careful co-ordination with surfacemovements in order to obtain an impartialadministration of priorities, and that thisend can be accomplished satisfactorily onlyif the entire responsibility rests with oneagency. The experiences of the war, he said,justified his earlier claims.101

At this point it is of interest to note thatin May 1942, after conversations betweenBrig. Gen. W. D. Styer, Chief of Staff ofthe Services of Supply, and an officer of theAir Ferrying Command, Styer proposedthat "aerial ports of embarkation" be estab-lished and operated by the Transportation

95 SOS GO 4, 9 Apr 42; OCT Office Memo 28,11 Apr 42; OCT Office Memo 34, 22 Apr 42.These and other directives pertaining to organiza-tion are in OCT HB TC Gen Cirs.

96 Directive 3 of Military Director of Civil Avi-ation, 5 Feb 42, sub: Priorities for Air Trans, TransBr G-4/580, Vol. II; WD Cir 168, 1 Jun 42, sub:Air Travel and Trans.

97 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 21 Feb 42,sub: Priority Air Trans Overseas, Trans BrG-4/580, Vol. II.

98 Developments Dec 41-Jun 42 are reviewedin Hist Rec, Air Priorities Br and Air Div, 1 Jul42, OCT HB Air Div.

9 9Memo, Somervell for Gross, 21 Jun 42, ASFHq Trans 1942; WD Cir 211, 1 Jul 42, Sec. III.At this time Somervell was endeavoring to per-suade AAF to leave all port (water) operations toCofT SOS, and developments suggest that a tradewas made.

100 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for C of Plng andLiaison Sec G-4, 22 Dec 41, sub: EO GrantingSW Certain Powers over Civil Aviation, G-4/33887.

101 Gross final rpt, p. 18.

CH

AR

T 1—

OR

GA

NIZ

ATI

ON

OF

THE

OFF

ICE

OF

THE

CH

IEF

OF

TRA

NSP

OR

TATI

ON

: 30

JU

NE

1942

Sour

ce:

Adm

inis

trat

ive

Log

of

the

Tra

nspo

rtat

ion

Cor

ps,

prep

ared

in

the

His

tori

cal

Un

it,

OC

T,

July

194

5, p

erio

d I,

exh

ibit I

-F.


Service at West Palm Beach, Fla., PresqueIsle, Maine, and Hamilton Field, Calif.102

After the Transportation Service had de-veloped a tentative plan, the proposal wassent to the Army Air Forces for concur-rence.103 The response, received two monthslater, was not a concurrence.104 Rather, itstated that since the responsibility for themovement of cargo and personnel by air hadbeen assigned to the Army Air Forces as of1 July 1942, and since the basic directiveestablishing the Army Air Forces chargedthat agency with command and control ofall AAF stations not assigned to defensecommands or theaters of operation, aerialports of embarkation necessarily would beoperated by the Army Air Forces.

The build-up of the Army's transporta-tion field organization went forward rapidlyunder the Transportation Service. The sub-port of Boston became a port of embarka-tion; a port of embarkation was activatedat Hampton Roads, Va., and a subport wasinstalled at Mobile, Ala. In order to relievethe port of embarkation at Seattle and fa-cilitate the flow of supplies to Alaska, sub-ports were set up at Prince Rupert, BritishColumbia, and Juneau, Alaska. One addi-tional holding and reconsignment point wasauthorized, bringing the total to nine. Thecommercial traffic agencies were redesig-nated port agencies and their number wasincreased. A beginning was made of estab-lishing traffic control agencies to regulatethe movement of Army freight at important

inland industrial centers, freight consolidat-ing and distributing agencies to handle less-than-carload shipments moving between cer-tain points, and transportation agencies tosupervise all installations and activities ofthe Transportation Service within the areasassigned to them. The establishment of atraining center for transportation troopunits was authorized.

After the United States had been at warfor six months the Chief of Transportationsummarized the accomplishments of hisorganization during that period and com-pared them with accomplishments for acorresponding period in World War I.105

He stated that 390,000 troops had been em-barked for oversea destinations during thesix months since 7 December 1941, against122,400 during a like period in 1917; atotal of 1,900,000 short tons of cargo hadbeen shipped overseas, compared with 287,-000 short tons. Ten ports of embarkationand subports were being operated to serveseven oversea theaters in 1942, comparedwith three ports of embarkation serving oneoversea theater in 1917. The statementpointed out, furthermore, that a completesystem of traffic control had been placed inoperation, including numerous installa-tions operated by the Transportation Serv-ice, and that this system had effectively fore-stalled port congestion such as had seriouslyinterfered with the Army's oversea effortduring the first year of World War I. Thetotal military and civilian personnel of theTransportation Service was stated to beapproximately 60,000, or about four timesthe total transportation personnel of theArmy on 7 December 1941.

Although these results were consideredgratifying, the Chief of Transportation be-

102 Memo, CofS SOS for Dir Opns Div SOS, 1May 42; Memo, CofT for Dir Opns Div SOS, 4May 42. Both in OCT 323.3. For data regardingprojected North Atlantic Ferry Route see CMTC21st Mtg, 5 Jun 42.

103 Memo, CG SOS for CG AAF, sub: Air Portsof Embarkation, 23 May 42, OCT 323.3.

104 Memo, CG AAF for CG SOS, 21 Jul 42, OCT323.3.

105 Memo for Gen Somervell, 11 Jul 42, OCT563.5.


lieved that his organization was operatingunder certain handicaps and manifestedcertain shortcomings which demanded rec-tification. This situation was laid before theChief of Staff on 30 June 1942.106 It waspointed out that the transportation officerson duty with the armies, army corps, corpsareas, posts, camps, and stations were des-ignated by the respective commanders, thatthey sometimes were not qualified for thetask, and that they were not subject toproper supervision by the Chief of Trans-portation. Adequate provision had not beenmade for the procurement and training ofmilitary personnel to perform transportationtasks, though a large increase of such per-sonnel would soon be required. The factthat the military staff of the TransportationService consisted of officers detailed fromother branches of the Army meant that theTransportation Service lacked the unity ofpurpose, technical competence, and espritde corps which were considered essential. Be-cause of personnel shortages which alreadyexisted, the Transportation Service lackedthe means, as well as the authority, to satis-factorily carry out its full responsibility.

With a view to correcting this situation, anumber of recommendations were presentedto the Chief of Staff. It was proposed thatthe Transportation Service be constituted aseparate corps paralleling in a general waythe Corps of Engineers and the Quarter-master Corps, and that the TransportationCorps have a distinctive insigne. It wasproposed that the Transportation Corpshave its own replacement training centerand officer candidate school; that officers ofthe Transportation Corps be assigned astransportation officers at posts, camps, andstations, and on the staffs of tactical units;

that port battalions, port headquarters andheadquarters companies, and railheadcompanies, then designated Quartermasterunits, be redesignated Transportation Corpsunits. It was proposed also, in view of theurgent necessity for rapid expansion of thestaff, that the restrictions on recruitment ofmilitary personnel from civil life be relaxedin favor of the Transportation Corps, andthat the corps be authorized to acquireofficers and enlisted men having transporta-tion experience, although they already werein service with other branches of the Army.

The Judge Advocate General, who wasrequested to review these proposals from alegal point of view, found that the Secretaryof War by appropriate orders could createa transportation corps as a separate com-mand for the period of the war and sixmonths thereafter, but that under existingstatutes and regulations a transportationcorps could not be established as a perma-nent component of the Army.107 He alsopointed out certain conditions relating tothe acquisition of personnel from otherbranches of the Army by the proposed newcorps, conditions which existed because ofthe corps' temporary status.

Transportation Corps Created

The main proposal to establish a trans-portation corps was approved by the Chiefof Staff, but certain of the subsidiary recom-mendations were not accepted.108 The re-quest for a Transportation Corps replace-ment training center and a TransportationCorps officer candidate school, and forrelaxation of the restriction on the procure-

106 Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, sub: Reorgof TS, OCT 020 Org of TC.

107 Memo, JAGD for ACofS G-4, 14 Jul 42,sub: Reorg of TS and Creation of TC, OCT 020Org of TC.

108 Memo, DCofS USA for CG SOS, 17 Jul 42,OCT 020 Org of TC.


ment of personnel, were disallowed becauseit was believed that the problems whichgave rise to these recommendations couldbe met by means already available or soonto become available. Such means includeda training center for transportation troopunits which recently had been authorizedand an officer candidate school which wasthen under consideration for establishmentas an installation of the Services of Supply.

Creation of the Transportation Corpswas announced on 31 July 1942, effectiveas of that date.109 The new corps was placedunder a Chief of Transportation, who wascharged with "the direction, supervision,and coordination of all transportationfunctions of the War Department, andwith the operation of field installations per-taining thereto." All duties previously as-signed to the Transportation Service weretransferred to the Transportation Corps,and the former designation was ordereddiscontinued. All officers and warrantofficers who were serving with the Trans-portation Service on the date of its dis-

continuance were detailed to duty with theTransportation Corps, and enlisted menwho were assigned to the TransportationService were transferred to the Transporta-tion Corps. All officers and warrant officerswho had been designated by their com-manding officers to serve as transportationofficers at posts, camps, stations, and othermilitary activities were directed to continueperforming the duties of that office underthe jurisdiction of the commanders appoint-ing them, until the Chief of Transportationshould effect their detail to duty with theTransportation Corps or should designateTransportation Corps officers as their suc-cessors. The Quartermaster troop unitsknown as port headquarters and head-quarters companies, port battalions, rail-head companies, and aviation boat com-panies were transferred to the Transporta-tion Corps and appropriately redesig-nated.110

109 WD GO 38, sub: Estab of TC.

110 The transfer of railhead companies and avi-ation boat companies was rescinded within a fewweeks. WD GO 42, 17 Aug 42, Sec. I; WD GO 46,17 Sep 42, Sec. II.

CHAPTER III

The Officeof the Chief of Transportation

The mainspring of the new Transporta-tion Corps, the driving and controllingforce, naturally was the Office of the Chiefof Transportation. The functions assignedto General Gross were greatly enlargedwhen the Transportation Corps was estab-lished, and they were increased further asthe war progressed. The task which fell tohis immediate office therefore was an ex-panding one, involving not only themanagement of increased personnel andadded installations but also the develop-ment of organizations, equipment, and pro-cedures to meet the growing transportationrequirements of the Army.

An indication of the growth of Trans-portation Corps activities is found in thegrowth of its personnel. Between 31 July1942, when the corps was created, and 30June 1945 the total of the TransportationCorps' military strength and the civilianpersonnel directly employed by installationsunder the control of the Chief of Transpor-tation in the zone of interior increased from81,008 to 352,217, or 335 percent. On thelatter date, moreover, numerous otherworkers were employed at TC installationsin the zone of interior, including the mili-tary personnel of other arms and services,the employees of stevedores and other con-tractors, Italian service units, and Germanprisoners of war, and the Chief of Trans-portation reported that taking these into

account the total of the personnel under hiscontrol was 434,998. On that basis theincrease was over 400 percent.1

The functions assigned to the Chief ofTransportation, as stated in the directiveby which the Transportation Corps wascreated, were expressed in general termswhich might easily convey an inaccurateimpression of the duties actually assumedby the new corps.2 There were certainfunctions directly connected with transpor-tation which at that time were not withinhis jurisdiction. In one important trafficfield, where the Chief of Transportationclearly had jurisdiction, he was impelled bypractical considerations to delegate a con-siderable part of his authority to anotherbranch of the Army. Under these circum-stances, and in order to better understandsubsequent developments, it is desirable toexamine the responsibilities which actually

1 See Statistical Summary, TC, 15 Oct 42, p. 10,for data for 31 Jul 42; STM-30, Strength of theArmy, 1 Jul 45, p. 26, shows military strength ofTC as 263,139, of which 67,071 were in continentalU.S. and 196,068 were outside U.S.; ASF MPR,Sec. 5, Pers, 30 Jun 45, p. 22, shows civilians di-rectly employed in ZI as 89,078. Total of 434,998,given in Gross final rpt, p. 116, was computed byDir of Pers OCT to show total military and civilianpersonnel under the command or supervision ofCofT; this figure does not include personnel ofother services, civilians, or prisoners of war utilizedin transportation operations in theaters.

2 Statement of general duties of CofT in AR55—5, par. 3, 5 Oct 42, also lacked definiteness.

THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION 57

were assigned to the Chief of the Transpor-tation Corps at the beginning of the corps'existence.

Initial Responsibilities

As regards inland transportation in thezone of interior, the Chief of Transporta-tion was responsible for making all arrange-ments for nontactical movements of Armypersonnel and materiel by railway, highway,and waterway carriers. He was responsiblefor the control of such movements with aview to timely deliveries and for the avoid-ance of congestion along the lines and atthe terminals of the carriers, at Armyinstallations, and at the ports. He set up andcontrolled such installations as were neces-sary for the proper performance of thesefunctions. He established the requirementsfor locomotives and cars for utility railways,except at installations exclusively under thecontrol of other services, exercised a generalsupervision over the operation and mainte-nance of such equipment, and arranged withcommon carriers for services to and from allArmy installations. The Chief of Transpor-tation was charged with the effective utiliza-tion of the Army's fleet of tank cars, and infulfillment of that responsibility he deter-mined when additional cars were neededand what types were best suited to therequirements.3 He gave technical super-vision to the activities of transportationofficers at Army posts, camps, and stations(other than Army Air Forces installations),subject to the orders of the installation com-manders, and provided qualified officers tofill those positions upon request.4 He had noduties in connection with transportation byaircraft in the zone of interior.

As regards deepwater transportation, theChief of Transportation was responsible foroperating the ocean-going vessels whichwere owned or chartered by the Army, andarranging for the allocation of additionalvessels by the War Shipping Administra-tion to complete Army requirements. Heplanned for and executed the movementof Army passenger and freight traffic onthese vessels, as well as on transports op-erated by the Navy and on commercialvessels. He established and controlled portsof embarkation in the zone of interior forthe storage and transshipment of freight,for the staging and transshipment of troopsand other passengers, and for the operationand repair of vessels. He established therequirements of the Army for the manytypes of harbor craft and other smallvessels, procured such vessels, and assignedthem to the elements of the Army by whichthey were utilized. The Chief of Transpor-tation trained the troop units required forthe operation of ports in oversea theaters,and in the summer of 1942 he was prepar-ing to train other troop units which, it thenwas apparent, would be needed by theatercommanders in connection with theirmarine operations.5 He had no responsibili-ties in connection with transoceanic airtraffic.

In the communication zones of the over-sea theaters, transportation operations wereentirely under the control of the theatercommanders, but they depended largely onthe zone of interior for personnel and equip-ment with which to fulfill their responsibili-ties. The Chief of Transportation for theWar Department, upon request, detailedexperienced transportation officers to serve

3 AR 30-905, par. 14, 1 Aug 29.4 WD Cir 130, Sec. IV, 1 May 42; WD GO 38,

par. 4, 31 Jul 42.

5 AR 30-1105, 30 Jul 32; AR 30-1110, 1 Apr32; WD TM 10-380, 14 Feb 41, sub: Water Trans;WD GO 38, par. 5, 31 Jul 42.


in theater and base section headquarters. Asalready indicated, he procured equipmentand trained troop units for port and marineoperations in the theaters. He controlledthe movement of all supplies by water tooversea destinations in accordance withtheater requisitions. He developed shippingprocedures and co-ordinated ship sailingswith the theater commanders so as to avoidcongestion at oversea ports and confusionin the delivery of supplies to depots anddumps. At the inception of the Transporta-tion Corps the Chief of Transportation hadno responsibilities in connection with theoperation of railway, highway, or air serv-ices in the theaters.

Notwithstanding his clear authority inregard to arrangements for ocean transporta-tion, General Gross found it necessary soonafter the establishment of the Transporta-tion Corps to take steps to assure uniformcompliance with his prerogatives. In con-nection with the shipment of freight fromCalifornia ports for use in construction workon the Pan-American Highway, he objectedto the Corps of Engineers making shippingarrangements directly. The CommandingGeneral, San Francisco Port of Embarka-tion, accordingly was informed that all mat-ters relating to the procuring of ships orshipping space, the assembling of cargoat shipside, and the loading of vesselsproperly belonged to the TransportationCorps and that, while there would be noobjection to delegating authority for suchwork to an Engineer officer at a port wherethere was no representative of the Trans-portation Corps, such an officer should bedesignated acting transportation officer forthat particular operation.6 Similar advicewas sent to other ports of embarkation for

their guidance. Also the Chief of Trans-portation informed the War Shipping Ad-ministration that considerable confusionhad developed because of efforts on the partof the Army Air Forces to book cargodirectly with the operators of WSA vessels,and requested that no space on shipscontrolled by WSA be allocated to theArmy except through the TransportationCorps.7

In the field of domestic transportation,likewise, General Gross found it necessaryto protect his sphere of authority from en-croachment. He protested to General Som-ervell that, despite previous instructions,misunderstanding still existed among thesupply services. He specifically cited the factthat the Ordnance Department was main-taining two transportation sections whichoverlapped the Transportation Corps andwere not "adequately responsive" to thepolicies laid down by the Chief of Trans-portation.8 He pointed out, furthermore,that the Ordnance Department was operat-ing a school of transportation at one of itsarsenals, the curriculum and the policy ofwhich had not been reviewed or approvedby the Chief of Transportation. The resultof this protest was a directive to the chiefsof supply services, requiring that any trans-portation activities contrary to the regula-tions be discontinued at once, and pointingout that officers engaged in such activitiesfor other supply services were subject todetail in or assignment to duty with theTransportation Corps.9 This action had thedesired effect so far as the several elements

6 Ltr, ACofT for CG SFPE, 23 Nov 42, OCT486.1 Los Angeles.

7 Ltr, CofT to Dir of Allocations WSA, 17 Oct,42, OCT HB Gross WSA.

8 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 14 Oct 42, sub:Clarification of Responsibility for Trans Functions,AG 322.999 Trans Corps.

9 Memo, CG SOS for C's of Supply Svs, 17 Oct42, AG 322.999 Trans Corps.


of the Services of Supply were concerned. Adifferent situation prevailed in regard to theArmy Air Forces, and this is a matter whichcalls for some elaboration.

Delegation of Authority to theArmy Air Forces

During the prewar emergency and duringthe war there was a general trend towardgreater autonomy on the part of the ArmyAir Forces, and that trend was apparent intransportation matters. In the precedingchapter reference was made to the differingopinions regarding the control of move-ments by aircraft and also to the transferof that function from the TransportationService to AAF on 1 July 1942. A similarsituation was developing during the earlypart of 1942 in regard to shipments of AAFfreight by domestic surface carriers. TheAir Forces greatly enlarged their trafficorganization throughout the country andplaced at its head a former traffic managerof one of the large aircraft manufacturingconcerns. This organization paralleled inmany ways the field establishment whichwas being built up by the Chief of Trans-portation.

The tendency toward AAF autonomy inthe control of domestic freight traffic wasgiven a measure of recognition in May1942, when the responsibilities of the Chiefof Transportation for the supervision oftransportation officers at posts, camps, andother Army stations were being defined.The War Department circular dealing withthis subject expressly provided that thetransportation officers at air installationsand with air activities would be under thesupervision of the Director of Traffic andTransportation at Army Air Forces' head-quarters, "under authority delegated by the

Chief of Transportation Service." 10 Thedelegation of authority appears to havebeen made informally in the course of theconferences between General Gross andAAF officials regarding the text of the cir-cular.

During the summer of 1942 the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation was engaged inpreparing a revision of the basic directivegoverning transportation by commercialcarriers in the zone of interior.11 The ArmyAir Forces took that occasion to presenttheir claim for independence in the handlingof their own freight traffic. They proposedthat AAF be given authority to route,divert, and trace shipments; to contact therailroads with reference to classification andrate matters; to maintain a rate service;and to furnish transportation information toand obtain reports from transportationofficers at AAF installations.12 Numerousconferences and exchanges of memorandabetween representatives of the Air Forcesand the Chief of Transportation followed,during which the merits of the AAF pro-posal were explored and an effort was madeto determine how far such an arrangementcould be accepted without curtailment ofthe Transportation Corps' over-all effective-ness.13

The Chief of Transportation, althoughopposed in principle to any qualification ofhis control over the Army's domestic traffic,recognized that his field organization was

10 WD Cir 130, Sec. IV, 1 May 42; see also fileAG 300.5 (4-16-42) WD Cir 130, Sec. IV.

11 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, Trans by Coml Means-Gen.

12 Memo, C of Legal and Fiscal Div OCT forDCofT, 20 Jul 42, sub: Conf re Revision AR55-105 (30-905), OCT 519 (AR 30-905) Vol. II.

13 Memo, C of Legal and Fiscal Div OCT forAAF (Boudreau), 15 Aug 42; Memo, CofT forDir of Contl Div SOS, 30 Sep 42. Both in OCT500 (AR 55-105).


still in the formative stage, and knew alsothat the Deputy Chief of Staff supported theAAF position.14 The result of the dis-cussions, which extended over a period ofseveral months, was a compromise. InOctober 1942 it was agreed that the revisedregulation should leave the Chief of Trans-portation's authority over War Departmenttraffic unimpaired, but should provide thathe might delegate authority and duties ashe deemed proper and necessary. After thisagreement and before the revised regulationactually was published, the Chief of Trans-portation delegated to the Air Forces suchauthority as he considered "consistent withgeneral policy and retention of controlnecessary to avoid traffic congestion … and… with keeping the War Department ina strong position before the transportationsystems and other governmental agen-cies." 15

The authority delegated to the Army AirForces included the inland routing of allAAF freight shipments, but certain condi-tions were stipulated. As regards portboundshipments the Air Forces were to procurereleases from the Chief of Transportationand honor any requests which he mightmake for changes in terminal routings. Asregards domestic movements the Air Forceswere expected to follow any requests madeby the Chief of Transportation's TrafficControl Division relative to routings anddiversions considered necessary to the avoid-ance of traffic congestion. It was stipulatedfurther that any AAF regulations affectinggeneral transportation policies would bereferred to the Chief of Transportation for

concurrence prior to issuance, so as to avoidthe possibility of conflicting instructions andthe dissipation of War Department influ-ence with transportation agencies andregulatory bodies. The Air Forces expressedcomplete concurrence in these principlesand a desire to co-operate with the Chiefof Transportation in their enforcement.16

The Army Air Forces' letter of concur-rence informed the Chief of Transportationof a plan to establish fifteen transportationdistricts within the continental UnitedStates and to activate a field supervisoryoffice in each district, which would havetechnical control of all AAF transportationofficers. The plan included the decentraliza-tion of routing to the districts. At that time(October 1942) the Chief of Transporta-tion did not take exception to this arrange-ment.17 In the following December, how-ever, with his own field organization greatlyexpanded and reorganized under thecontrol of nine zone transportation officers,he took a different position. He then pointedout that with Air Forces and Transporta-tion Corps field agencies operating side byside there inevitably would be overlappingand duplication, and he proposed that theTransportation Corps absorb the AAFtransportation agencies, except those per-taining to organic motor equipment andair transportation.18 The Chief of Transpor-tation conceded that AAF headquarterswould require a transportation staff tomaintain necessary liaison with his office.

This proposal was not approved. Instead,the Deputy Chief of Staff directed that

14 See comments of Col L. W. Finaly, Exec OCT,5 Dec 49, OCT HB Topic AAF.

15 Memo, CofT for CG AAF, 5 Oct 42, sub:Changes in AR 55-105 and AAF Regulations 75-1,OCT 500 (AR 55-105); AR 55-105, par. 2g, 29Dec 42.

16 Memo, CG AAF for CofT, 17 Oct 42, OCT500 (AR 55-105).

17 See Memo, CofT for Dir of Traf and TransAAF, 23 Oct 42, OCT 500 (AR 55-105).

18 Memo, CofT for ACofS G-1, 3 Dec 42; sub:Offs for Trans Sv of AAF, SPTDC 320.21, AGWDGAP 210.31 (11-27-42) AAF Traf Org.


where Air Forces and Transportation Corpsfield traffic offices were located in the samecities they should occupy adjoining quartersand that AAF district offices should beorganized with a view to their ultimateabsorption in the TC field establishment.19

The personnel procurement objective of theAir Forces, which had contemplated thecommissioning of 1,000 officers from civillife for the traffic organization, was cur-tailed. The Chief of Transportation issuedinstructions to his field offices late in Decem-ber outlining the arrangement with the AirForces and the relations which should bemaintained between the two organizations,and corresponding AAF instructions wereissued in mid-February.20 Both instructionsreferred to the requirement that AAF andTC offices occupy adjoining quarters, butthis objective fell short of complete attain-ment, in part because of the scarcity ofoffice space in many cities.

In April 1943 the War Department Man-power Board took cognizance of the twotraffic organizations functioning side byside, observed that this did not appear to bean "intelligent use of personnel," andsuggested that the AAF transportationoffices were "superfluous." 21 Responding tothe board's request for an explanation, theAssistant Chief of Transportation for Op-erations, Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, re-viewed the circumstances leading up to theexisting arrangement, restated the positiontaken by the Chief of Transportation duringthe preceding December, pointed out that

AAF traffic constituted only about 7 percentof all carload traffic moving on War De-partment bills of lading, and stated that athorough survey had revealed no AAFtransportation problems which could not behandled by the TC field organization withthe addition of only a fraction of the person-nel proposed for the AAF district or-ganization.22 The War Department Man-power Board made further inquiry intothe matter, but was informed by the DeputyChief of Staff that he considered AAFcontrol of transportation essential to thesuccess of its procurement program, and ac-cordingly the board decided that nothingmore should be done toward changing theexisting arrangement.23

A representative of G-4, who made aninvestigation in the Chicago area in thespring of 1945, reported that he saw noreason why the functions of the AAFdistrict transportation offices could not beabsorbed by the TC zone transportationorganization.24 No action was taken, how-ever, to carry this suggestion into effect,and the separate transportation servicescontinued throughout the war and the de-mobilization period.

General Gross never was satisfied withthis arrangement. Although a high degreeof co-operation was developed between theTransportation Corps and the AAF trafficand transportation organization under thedirection of Col. Charles F. Nielsen, Grossbelieved that the division of responsibilitywas inconsistent with the principles of good

19 Memo, Asst Secy WDGS for ACofS G-1, 20Dec 42, AG WDGAP 210.31 (11-27-42) AAFTraf Org; Memo, CofS SOS for CofT, 21 Dec42, ASF Hq CofS Trans.

20 OCT Instructions 50-1, 26 Dec 42; AAFMemo 75-2, 17 Feb 43, sub: Estab of AAF Trafand Trans Contl Dists, OCT HB Topic AAF.

21 Memo, Pres WDMB for CofT, 6 Apr 43, AGWDMB 523.5.

22 Memo, ACofT for Pres WDMB, 24 Apr 43,sub: AAF Traf and Trans Org, AG WDMB 523.5.

23 Memo, Pres WDMB for CG AAF, 27 Apr 43,sub: Traf and Trans Org; 1st Ind, CG AAF forPres WDMB, 6 May 43; 2d Ind, Pres WDMB forCofT, 31 May 43. All in AG WDMB 523.5.

24 Memo, G-4 Investigator (Henderson) forACofS G-4, 12 May 45, sub: Trans Agencies inChicago Area, AG WDGDS 320.2 Trans Unit.


traffic management. In January 1944, whensummarizing for General Somervell theprincipal problems confronting his or-ganization, he referred to the duplicatingactivities of the Army Service Forces andthe Army Air Forces and remarked thatin the interest of efficiency constant effortshould be made toward the maximum uni-fication of their supply procedures.25 In hisfinal report, prepared shortly after thetermination of hostilities, the wartime Chiefof Transportation, referring to this situa-tion, stated: "Despite the good intentionsof all parties, such a divided responsibilitycannot exist without giving rise to incon-sistencies and misunderstandings." Accord-ingly, he recommended that the arrange-ment be terminated as soon as conditionsshould make this possible.26 The authoritydelegated to the Air Forces, it will be re-called, pertained only to domestic freighttraffic, not to AAF domestic passengertraffic or AAF ocean traffic, which wereunder the control of the Chief of Transpor-tation.

Additional Responsibilities

Establishment of the TransportationService in March 1942 was regarded asmerely a first step toward the fuller inte-gration of Army transportation administra-tion, although no master plan for laterdevelopments was then formulated. Theprocess of integration was carried furtherwhen the Transportation Corps was createdin July 1942, but there still were broadfields of surface transportation outside thejurisdiction of the Chief of Transportation,notably military railway services and mili-tary highway services. The former soon

were added to his responsibilities, but thelatter remained outside his purview untilafter the end of the war.

In April 1942, after discussion with theChief of Engineers, the Chief of Transpor-tation presented his views regarding mili-tary railways to General Somervell.27 Hestressed the advantage of having transporta-tion functions centered in one agency andhaving the transportation organizations inoversea theaters parallel that in the zoneof interior. He recognized, on the otherhand, that the process of effecting such achange during wartime would involvetemporary disadvantages, particularly in thefield of procurement. Accordingly he recom-mended that responsibility for military rail-ways be transferred from the Corps ofEngineers to the Transportation Service,except construction and the procurement ofrailway equipment and supplies.

The Chief of Engineers did not concur inthis proposal. He expressed the view thatthe railway activities of the Army were be-ing carried on efficiently and expeditiouslyunder the existing arrangement.28 Hepointed out, furthermore, that in the Corpsof Engineers railway functions were dis-tributed among many agencies and thatthe transfer of overhead personnel wouldinvolve considerable tearing down andwelding together again, with a resulting lossof time. The Chief of Engineers submitteda memorandum from his Supply Divisionindicating that contracts for railway equip-ment already let or about to be let totaledapproximately $100,000,000, and covered572 locomotives and 5,800 cars of varioustypes.

25 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 20 Jan 44, Item 22,OCT HB TC Gen Misc.


27 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 30 Apr 42, OCT020 Transfer of Functions.

28 Ltr, CofEngrs to CG SOS, 1 May 42, OCT020 Transfer of Functions.


General Somervell believed that furtherchanges regarding transportation might bedesirable, and as an aid to decision hesought advice from the theater point ofview. In June 1942 he wrote to Dwight D.Eisenhower, Commanding General, UnitedStates Army in the European Theater ofOperations, recalling the confusion that hadexisted in France during World War I be-cause of frequent changes in the organiza-tion that handled transportation mattersfor the American Expeditionary Forces andbecause of the lack of understanding be-tween the AEF and the War Department,and requested General Eisenhower's viewsas theater commander on two questions.29

One was the question whether the operat-ing personnel of the military railways shouldremain under the Chief of Engineers or beplaced under the Chief of Transportation.In his response, General Eisenhower statedthat he favored the latter arrangement, andstrongly endorsed the principle of integra-tion in transportation operations.30 Theother question, relating to motor transport,will be discussed later in this section.

The creation of the Transportation Corpson 31 July 1942 and the broader authoritythen assigned to the Chief of Transporta-tion placed him in a better position toassume and perform added functions. Hisassumption of control over military rail-ways was accomplished in two steps. InSeptember 1942 the Transportation Corpswas made responsible for operations and formaintenance of way and equipment.31 Soonthereafter a recommendation that allactivities in connection with military rail-

ways, except construction, be charged tothe Chief of Transportation was placedbefore General Somervell and received´ hisapproval.32 War Department action fol-lowed and the change became effective 16November 1942.33

This action made the Chief of Transpor-tation responsible for research, design,development, procurement, storage, anddistribution in connection with all rollingstock and distinctive railway equipmentfor both military and utility railways; op-eration and maintenance of all railwayspreviously assigned to the Corps ofEngineers, both in the zone of the interiorand in theaters of operation; activation,training, and assignment of all head-quarters, operating, shop, and other trooporganizations of the Military Railway Serv-ice; control of all funds, properties, andequipment pertaining to MRS. All civilianpersonnel engaged primarily in the activi-ties of MRS was transferred to the Trans-portation Corps, and all officers primarilyengaged in such activities were assigned toduty with the Transportation Corps. Newconstruction for military and utility rail-ways continued to be the responsibility ofthe Corps of Engineers.34 The administra-tive problems involved in the transfer weresimplified by arranging that personnel andfacilities which had been utilized partlybut not primarily for the military railways

29 Memo, CG SOS for Eisenhower, 22 Jun 42,OCT HB Rail Div MRS.

30 Memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 27 Jun 42,sub: Contl and Opn of Trans, AG Adm 341 A(Opns Rpts).

31 AR 100-50, par. 4, 1 Sep 42.

3 2Memo, CofS SOS for CG SOS, 26 Oct 42;Memo, CofS for CofT, 27 Oct 42. Both in OCT020 Transfer of Functions.

33 WD GO 60, 5 Nov 42, sub: Transfer ofActivities and Functions Pertaining to Rys fromCE to TC.

34 AR 55-650, 27 Feb 43, stated responsibilitiesof TC and CE after this transfer. Generally speak-ing, military railways were in oversea commandsand utility railways were for local operations atinstallations in the zone of interior.


and which consequently were to remainunder the Chief of Engineers would con-tinue to perform their railway functionsuntil the Chief of Transportation shouldannounce his readiness to take over suchfunctions.35

The overhead personnel shifted from theCorps of Engineers to the TransportationCorps in connection with the transfer ofrailway responsibilities included 9 officersand 54 civilians from the Office of the Chiefof Engineers and 94 civilian inspectors whohad been employed in the field.36 The Officeof the Chief of Transportation, alreadyshort of personnel and suddenly confrontedwith the task of assuming a further heavyresponsibility, claimed that additional civil-ians were subject to transfer, but the Chiefof Engineers maintained that the provisionsof the directive governing the change hadbeen fulfilled.37

Pursuant to the directive, twenty-fivemilitary railway troop units, which hadbeen activated or designated for acti-vation by the Chief of Engineers, weretransferred to the Transportation Corps.These included one headquarters and head-quarters company, Military Railway Serv-ice; three headquarters and headquarterscompanies, railway grand division; eightrailway operating battalions; three railwayshop battalions; two railway diesel shopbattalions; one railway transportation com-pany; six railway track maintenance pla-toons; and one railway operating detach-

ment.38 At the time of the transfer all unitswere in the zone of interior except one dieselshop battalion, three track maintenance pla-toons, the transportation company, and theoperating detachment, each of which hadbeen dispatched to oversea stations.

Within a few weeks after the transferhad become effective the basic directivewas modified in regard to maintenance re-sponsibilities, and a few months later it wassubjected to further modification and clari-fication.39 The net result was that the Trans-portation Corps had responsibility for main-tenance of equipment for both military andutility railways, except utility railways atcertain installations.40 The TransportationCorps also had responsibility for mainte-nance of way on military railways and onutility railways which were under the directcontrol of tactical commanders and towhich units of the military railway servicehad been assigned. The Corps of Engineershad responsibility for maintenance of wayon utility railways not maintained by theTransportation Corps, which for all prac-tical purposes meant the utility railways inthe zone of interior. The change regardingmaintenance of way on utility railroads wasmade because the only personnel which theTransportation Corps had for this purposewas in units which were required for over-sea service.41

It was necessary to determine, particu-larly for procurement purposes, where the

35 Memo, CG SOS for CofEngrs, 4 Nov 42, OCT020 Transfer of Functions.

3 6 Memo for record, unsigned, 16 Dec 42; OfficeMemo 32, Civ Pers Br OCT, 11 Dec 42. Both inOCT 020 Transfer of Functions.

37 Memo, CofT for CofEngrs, 26 Dec 42; 1stInd, CofEngrs for CofT, 5 Jan 43. Both in OCT020 Transfer of Functions.

38 Memo, C of Mil Ry Br OCT for CofT, 19Nov 42, sub: Situation Rpt on Ry Tr Units, OCTHB Rail Div MRS.

39 WD GO 66, Sec. II, 9 Dec 42; WD GO 17,Sec. II, 2 Apr 43.

40 See discussion of utility railroads in Ch. X.41 Memo, C of Adm Br Rail Div OCT for C of

Rail Div, 16 Nov 42, OCT 020 Transfer ofFunctions; Note on intraoffice routing slip by ColR. H. Soule, Exec for Pers and Tng OCT, 1 Dec42, AG 320.2 (11-4-42) GO 60.


dividing line lay between the constructionof military railways, a responsibility of theCorps of Engineers, and maintenance ofway, a responsibility of the TransportationCorps. This was accomplished by negotia-tion between the two services, which resultedin agreement that the Corps of Engineerswould be responsible in connection withnew construction and initial rehabilitationfor procuring and installing track items(such as rails, ties, and switches), bridgeand culvert materials, structures for shopuse, structures for fuel and water supply,turntables, and heavy or fixed shop equip-ment; that the Corps of Engineers wouldprocure and stockpile such of the aboveitems as might be required by the Trans-portation Corps for the maintenance ofmilitary railways; and that the Transporta-tion Corps would assist the Corps of En-gineers in estimating the over-all require-ment for such materials and equipment.42

Under the Chief of Engineers a head-quarters for the Military Railway Servicewas maintained at Fort Snelling, Minn.,with Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., as GeneralManager. Its primary function was to super-vise the training of military railway troopunits and to maintain relations with the com-mercial railroads under whose supervisionthe technical training of most of the unitswas being accomplished. Early in 1943General Gray and his headquarters staffwere moved to North Africa and he as-sumed responsibility for the military rail-ways in that theater. Thereafter the RailDivision in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation served as rear echelon for the mili-tary railway units which were overseas, andgave technical supervision to the organiza-

tion and training of the units which were inthe zone of interior. General supervision ofthe training of such units was assumed bythe Military Training Division, OCT, anddirect control of both military and technicaltraining was assigned to the commanderof the New Orleans Port of Embarkation.43

The disadvantage involved in transter-ring a major function after the beginningof hostilities was illustrated by the fact thateight months after the transfer of the Mili-tary Railway Service the Director of RailwayTraining for the Transportation Corps com-plained that certain elements of the Armyhad not taken cognizance of the new statusof MRS. He reported that enlisted men whodesired to serve with the military railwayshad been assigned to the Corps of Engineersin the belief that MRS still was a part ofthat organization. He reported further that,judging from communications received fromenlisted men, some induction stations andreception centers were unaware that MRSexisted. Confronted as he was with theproblem of finding suitable personnel foran increasing number of railway troop units,the Director of Railway Training advocatedthat the basic directive be recirculated. TheAdjutant General's Office demurred to thisproposal and suggested that other means beutilized to disseminate information regard-ing the military railways to the local com-mands which seemed to require it.44 Theprocess of making the Chief of Transporta-tion's need for experienced railroad menknown throughout the field was a gradualone.

42 Memo, ACofEngrs for CofT, 16 Jan 43, sub:Procurement of Ry Equip; 1st Ind, ACofT forSupply for OCofEngrs, 6 Feb 43. Both in OCT020 Transfer of Functions.

43 Interv, author with Col J. A. Appleton, C ofRail Div OCT, 10 Apr 43, sub: MRS, OCT HBRail Div MRS: OCT Cir 49, 5 Apr 43, sub: Tngof Ry Trs; OCT Cir 83, 28 Jun 43, same sub.

44 Memo, Dir of Ry Tng for Rail Div OCT, 16Jul 43; 2d Ind, AGO for CofT, 29 Jul 43. Bothin OCT 020 Transfer of Functions.


The second question which GeneralSomervell placed before General Eisen-hower in June 1942 was whether motortransport should be withdrawn from theQuartermaster Corps and assigned to a newautomotive corps. Eisenhower recommend-ed that this be done, pointing out that theQuartermaster Corps already had verybroad and diverse responsibilities.45 It isevident that Somervell had in mind the pos-sibility of establishing a new organization tohandle motor transport, separate from boththe Quartermaster Corps and the Trans-portation Service, as had been done inWorld War I. This arrangement was notconsummated, however. The design andprocurement of general purpose motor ve-hicles were transferred from the Quarter-master Corps to the Ordnance Departmenton 1 August 1942, and responsibility forthe organization and training of motortransport troop units was left with theQuartermaster Corps. In September 1942General Gross recommended to GeneralSomervell that the latter responsibility beassigned to the newly established Trans-portation Corps, but the proposal was notadopted at that time and the question re-mained in abeyance until after V-J Day.46

General Gross brought the matter for-ward again in September 1945. Having inmind that motor transport troop units per-form a necessary transportation function intheaters of operation and that many ofthem had been trained and utilized by thetheater transportation officers, he said at aconference of his key officers, "I feel it isessential for us to go after the motor trans-

portation end," and expressed the convic-tion that the theater commanders wouldsupport the change.47 The negotiations tothis end proceeded over a period of monthsand in July 1946 the War Departmentannounced that headquarters and head-quarters detachments for truck battalions,petroleum truck companies, troop truckcompanies, aviation truck companies, andcertain related organizations were redesig-nated as Transportation Corps units, anddirected that all officers then assigned to suchunits, except medical officers, be detailed inthe Transportation Corps and that allenlisted men be transferred to that corps.48

Thereafter all staff functions and technicalresponsibilities pertaining to such units andactivities, including organization and train-ing, were functions and responsibilities ofthe Chief of Transportation. Thus belatedlythe military personnel for motor transportwas brought under the same control as railand water personnel and a further impor-tant step was taken toward the completeintegration of Army transportation opera-tions.49

The postwar effort to extend the Trans-portation Corps' responsibility to the realmof motor equipment was only partially suc-cessful. A proposal submitted in September1946 by Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey,Chief of Transportation, to transfer fromthe Ordnance Department to the Trans-portation Corps responsibility for research,design, development, procurement, storage,allocation, issue, and maintenance of general

45 Memo for CG SOS, 27 Jun 42, sub: Contl andOpn of Trans, AG 500-G, AG Adm 341 A (OpnsRpts).

46 Pencil Memo by Gross, initialed by Somervell,exact date not shown, sub: Reorg of Motor Trans-port, OCT 020 Transfer of Functions.

47 Proceedings, Port and Zone Comdrs Conf,27-28 Sep 45, p. 20, OCT HB TZ Gen.

48 WD GO 77, 24 Jul 46, sub: Transfer ofCertain Trans Functions.

49 It will be recalled from discussion in Ch. IIthat following WW I, the C of Trans Sv stronglybut unsuccessfully urged the establishment of atransportation corps which would control all formsof transportation including motor.


and special purpose wheeled vehicles wasrejected by the War Department GeneralStaff.50 The proposal contemplated that thedesign, development, and procurement oftanks and other tracked mobile equipmentwould remain with the Ordnance Depart-ment, and the reason given for its rejectionwas that this arrangement "would result ina loss in economy in the distribution anduse of common automotive supply items,in the use of maintenance equipment andinstallations, and in the utilization of serv-ices of supervisory and technical personnel."On the other hand, the Chief of Transpor-tation succeeded in having his organizationrecognized as the proper authority for mak-ing "basic determinations of requirements"for administrative, line of communication,cargo, and personnel vehicles, and relatedequipment.51

The foregoing paragraphs relate particu-larly to motor transport troops and motorequipment for employment in the com-munication zones of theaters of operations.During the course of the war two importantfunctions pertaining to highway transporta-tion in the zone of interior were assigned tothe Chief of Transportation. In June 1942he was charged with the establishment andcontrol of a pool of motor buses to be uti-lized in offsetting shortages of local commer-cial transportation in the vicinity of warindustries and Army installations. In June1945 he was charged with the assignmentand control of administrative vehicles uti-lized by Army Service Forces installations.52

The control of Army air traffic, whichGeneral Gross had surrendered so reluc-tantly in July 1942, was restored to theTransportation Corps after the close ofhostilities. In his conference with key per-sonnel in September 1945, referred toabove, Gross said: "Going still further, it[the Transportation Corps] should have con-trol over air priorities both for passengersand freight. There should be a stronger in-tegration in transportation than we havehad in this war." 53 That objective was at-tained under his successor in December1946, when the Chief of Transportation wasdesignated the agency to administer prior-ities for the War Department (as distin-guished from the theater commands) inconnection with the oversea movement ofpersonnel and cargo by the Air TransportCommand, to authorize the use of commer-cial aircraft for oversea movements of per-sonnel and cargo, to route domestic move-ments by commercial airlines when theyinvolved 40 or more persons or 5,000 poundsor more of cargo, and to deal directly withthe commercial airlines in arranging move-ments on a common carrier basis.54 TheChief of Transportation was directed toplace a movement control officer at eachArmy port of aerial embarkation in theUnited States, who would divert move-ments from air to rail or water, or viceversa, so as to accomplish the most expedi-tious delivery and the best utilization ofmilitary airlift, utilize commercial airlift incase military airlift should not be available,

50 Memo, Dir SS&P WDGS for CofT, 8 Oct 46,WDGSP/B1 255, sub: Transfer of Responsibilityfor Research, etc., of Motor Vehicles from OD toTC, OCT 451.

51 WD Memo, 55-5-2, par. 1v, 14 May 47, sub:OCT Org and Functions.

52 These developments are discussed in Ch. X.

53 Proceedings, Port and Field Comdrs Conf,27-28 Sep 45, p. 20. Theater chief transportationofficers had been accorded movement control ofnontactical air traffic by WD Cir 256, 16 Oct 43.

54 WD Memo 55-750-1, par. 3, 16 Dec 46, sub:Air Trans; Conf, author with Lt Col W. A. Hag-gerty, C of Air Contl Br Mvmts Div OCT, 22 Jun49, OCT HB Topic Air Trans Gen.


and co-ordinate the activities of ports ofaerial embarkation and ports of water em-barkation.55 The Chief of Transportationalso was made responsible for providing theWar Department General Staff with the in-formation and statistical data needed indetermining allocations of space to theatercommanders and the War Department,utilizing the airlift efficiently, and planningfor future air transportation.56

The Headquarters Organization

Since transportation was a factor affect-ing many Army activities, both in the WarDepartment and in the field, the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation functioned on abroad basis. It worked with the appropriatedivisions of the General Staff and the ArmyService Forces headquarters to insure thatstrategic and logistic plans, when finallyadopted, were practical from a transporta-tion standpoint. It translated those plansinto terms of transportation capacity andcontrol, and provided the installations, per-sonnel, equipment, and procedures neces-sary to the proper execution of the trans-portation mission. It directly controlled theexecution of such phases of the transporta-tion mission as could be controlled mosteffectively from a central office and super-vised the performance of such functions ashad been delegated to field installations. Itco-operated with the other technical serv-ices of the Army, with the Navy, the WarShipping Administration, and other federalagencies concerned with transportation, andwith the carriers, to insure that movementsof Army personnel and supplies were exe-

cuted promptly and efficiently. It assistedoversea commanders by supplying person-nel and equipment and developing tech-niques to aid them in the fulfillment of theirmany transportation responsibilities.

The headquarters organization which theChief of Transportation built up to performthese functions was subject to many adjust-ments during the course of the war. Someadjustments were the result of changed orexpanded responsibilities, while others rep-resented attempts to improve an organiza-tion which had been put together hastilywhen the Transportation Service was formedin March 1942 by the merger of elementsfrom G-4 and the Office of the Quarter-master General. Some improvements whichwere desirable from the standpoint of or-ganization were not undertaken, becausethe practical benefits which reasonablycould be expected did not seem-to justify therisk involved in disturbing vital operationsduring wartime.57 A general conception ofthe- extent of these adjustments is gainedby comparing Chart 1 which shows the or-ganization of the Office of the Chief ofTransportation as it was on 30 June 1942,just prior to the establishment of the Trans-portation Corps, with Chart 2 which showsthe structure as it stood on 1 July 1945.Most of the organizational changes madebetween those dates were of a secondarynature, such as the realignment of staffdivisions or changes within divisions, andthese will be dealt with in the discussionof the activities with which they were in-volved.58 At this point, therefore, only the

55 Memo, TAG for CG AAF, CofT, etc., 27 Dec46, sub: Mvmt Contl Offs at Ports of Aerial Emb,AGAM-PM 370.5 (26 Dec 46) WDGSP/C1.

56 WD Cir 53, Sec. I 4e, 25 Feb 47.

57 Gross final rpt, p. 122.58 The basic document on functions and organiza-

tion is TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, published inloose-leaf form, OCT HB TC Gen Org Manuals;see also Adm Log of the TC, 31 Jul 45, OCT HBTC Gen Rpts, which traces changes in organiza-tion and key personnel.

CH

AR

T 2—

ORG

AN

IZA

TIO

N O

F TH

E O

FFIC

E O

F TH

E C

HIE

F O

FTR

AN

SPO

RTA

TIO

N:

1 JU

LY 1945

Sour

ce:

Rep

ort

of t

he C

hief

of

Tra

nsp

ort

ati

on

, A

rmy

Serv

ice

For

ces,

Wo

rld

War

11,

30

No

vem

ber

1945,

p. 1

23

.


major changes which affected the principalsupervisory offices are presented.

The first major change in the organiza-tion, as it existed when the TransportationCorps was created, was made in the latefall of 1942. Previously the staff divisionshad been grouped under two supervisoryofficers, known initially as the operationsofficer and the executive officer and later asassistant chiefs of transportation for opera-tions and for administration. At that timea third staff officer was added, because ofthe increased supply and training programswhich resulted from assumption of responsi-bility for the military railways, and the staffdivisions then were grouped under assistantchiefs of transportation for operations, forsupply, and for personnel and training. Theduties of the executive officer under thisplan were confined to assisting the Chief ofTransportation and the Deputy Chief withadministrative matters.

In the summer of 1943 further major or-ganizational changes were made, the lastadjustments in the upper echelons duringthe war. In June of that year Brig. Gen.Theodore H. Dillon, Deputy Chief ofTransportation, resigned from the Armybecause of ill health.59 At about the sametime Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Fremont B.Hodson, Assistant Chief of Transportationfor Personnel and Training, was assigned tocommand the New Orleans Port of Em-barkation. With the departure of these men,who had played important roles in the earlydevelopment of the Transportation Corps,the offices which they had held were dis-continued. The principal supervisory re-sponsibilities thereafter were distributedamong five directors—who dealt respectivelywith transportation operations, water trans-

portation, the various aspects of supply,military training, and personnel—and theExecutive Officer.60

The functions and relationships of theseveral directors, staff divisions, and operat-ing divisions, as they existed in the latemonths of the war, are presented in somedetail in Appendix A. These functions andrelationships, moreover, will be discussed asoccasion requires in subsequent chapters ofthis history. There are, however, certainaspects of the organizational arrangementin the Office of the Chief of Transportationwhich call for special comment at this point.

The Director of Operations was the co-ordinator for all transportation operations.The basic purpose of his office was to insurethat troop and supply movements were exe-cuted promptly and according to plan. Thetask was an extremely complicated one sinceit involved, in addition to the co-ordinationof the several OCT divisions and the TCfield installations, constant collaborationwith the Operations Division of the GeneralStaff, various divisions of Army ServiceForces headquarters, the oversea theatercommanders, the Navy, the civilian agencieswhich were concerned with transportation,and the carriers. The Director of Opera-tions throughout the war was Brig. Gen.Robert H. Wylie, a Regular Army officerwho had had extensive experience withArmy transportation as an officer of theQuartermaster Corps. General Wylie, al-though he worked very closely with the op-erating divisions during the war and co-ordinated their activities, did not direct

59 See Memo, Gross for Somervell, 22 Mar 43,OCT HB Gross Offs and EM.

60 There was lack of consistency during 1942-43in using the terms Assistant Chief of Transporta-tion and Director, but the term Director eventuallywas used uniformly to designate all officers in thisechelon and the term Assistant Chief of Trans-portation was reserved for those directors who weregeneral officers.


them. Soon after the close of hostilities hewas given actual direction. In explanation,the Chief of Transportation stated thatwhile it had not seemed wise to subordinatethe wartime chiefs of the operating divisionsto the Director of Operations because oftheir "stature" in the transportation field,that consideration no longer governed andthe new arrangement was believed to be"the most effective solution to certain in-efficiencies under the old organization." 61

These "inefficiencies" appear to have arisenfrom the fact that some of the chiefs of op-erating divisions, who were topflight trans-portation executives commissioned fromcivil life, did not always recognize the needfor co-ordination, or took directly to theChief of Transportation matters whichmight have been disposed of more readilyby the Director of Operations.

The designation of a Director of WaterTransportation in June 1943 was promptedby the increasing number of ocean-goingtransports and smaller boats in the serviceof the Transportation Corps and the manytechnical problems which were arising inconnection with the construction, conver-sion, and operation of those vessels. Whilethis officer had general supervision of allwater transportation activities of the Trans-portation Corps, including the work of theWater Division, he was responsible moreparticularly for collaboration with theMaritime Commission, the Navy Depart-ment, and the various committees of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and the CombinedChiefs of Staff, in determining the types anddesigns of vessels to be constructed and inpromoting other technical developments

pertaining to floating equipment and portfacilities. This latter activity covered a widerange of projects, some of which were car-ried to completion while others were dis-carded or were still being considered whenhostilities ceased.62 From its inception theoffice of Director of Water Transportationwas held by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.)John M. Franklin, a veteran of World WarI who was president of one of the largerAmerican steamship companies at the timeof our entry into World War II.

The functions performed by the otherdirectors are fairly apparent from theirtitles. In the selection of men to fill thesepositions, experience as well as other quali-fications was taken into account. Col. HarryA. Toulmin, Jr., the first Director of Ma-teriel and Supply, had had experience withArmy procurement during World War Iand with various civilian engineering activ-ities between the wars. Brig. Gen. BurtonO. Lewis, who succeeded to this positionearly in 1944, had served previously asChief of the Boston Ordnance District. Col.Frank C. Scofield, the first Director ofMilitary Training, and Col. Geoffrey C.Bunting who succeeded him early in 1945,had been engaged in training activities inthe Coast Artillery Corps. Col. Herbert B.Wilcox, prior to his designation as Directorof Personnel, had been Chief of the MilitaryPersonnel Division in the Office of the Chiefof Transportation. Col. Charles E. Martin,who became Director of Personnel in De-cember 1944, had served previously asChief of the Industrial Personnel Division,OCT, and before the war had specialized inindustrial management as a civilian.

61 Ltr, CofT to Brig Gen William J. Williamson(Ret), wartime C of Traf Contl Div OCT, 21 Feb46, OCT 020 Org of TC; Ltr, Wylie to author, 10Mar 50, OCT HB Dir of Opns.

62 Memo, Asst to Dir of Water Trans for ExecAsst OCT, 22 Mar 44, OCT HB Dir of WaterTrans.


The position of Executive Officer ac-quired added importance after the reorgan-ization which took place in the summer of1943. General Gross then was endeavoringto relieve himself as much as possible ofthe burdens of administration, and onemeans to that end was to assign additionalresponsibility to his Executive. Lt. Col.(later Col.) Luke W. Finlay, who assumedthe position at that time, had been gradu-ated from the U.S. Military Academy, hadserved for a period in the Corps of En-gineers, and then had taken up a legalcareer in civil life. Gross and Finlay hadworked together during earlier Army assign-ments and the mutual understanding thatexisted between them facilitated their war-time collaboration. As developed under Fin-lay, the duties of the Executive Officerincluded the co-ordination of matters involv-ing two or more divisions which were notunder the jurisdiction of a single director,the disposition of executive matters whichin his judgment did not require the personalattention of the Chief of Transportation, thepreparation of data bearing on matters re-quiring action by the Chief, and such spe-cial tasks as General Gross chose to assignto him.

The terms "staff divisions" and "operat-ing divisions," as applied to the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation, were more con-venient than they were accurate. To a largeextent the work of the operating divisionsconsisted in supervision of the field installa-tions and the carriers. The work of certainof the staff divisions gave them a direct andsometimes decisive influence on operations.The operating divisions, as will be observedfrom Chart 2, were set up to correspond tospecific types of transportation or transpor-tation functions. The staff organization,consisting of directors and divisions, par-

alleled to a large degree the organization ofArmy Service Forces headquarters. Thelatter arrangement simplified co-ordinationbetween the OCT and ASF staffs, and wasencouraged by General Somervell.

It is worthy of note that for a period theOffice of the Chief of Transportation in-cluded a unit to deal with petroleum andpetroleum products. During the early stagesof the war the arrangements for handlingthese commodities on behalf of the armedservices were not fully developed. Sinceliquid fuels and lubricants were essential tothe operation of transportation equipment,and since the Chief of Transportation wasresponsible for their movement to the forcesoverseas (except bulk movements in tankvessels), General Gross soon after the estab-lishment of his office set up a staff to studythe subject. Its duties included the co-ordination of information on sources of sup-ply and means of transportation, the trans-lation of plans for troop movements intorequirements for petroleum products, studyof the problem of petroleum supply as itaffected or might affect military transporta-tion, and the development of proceduresand instructions for the safe and expedi-tious handling of shipments at intransitstorage depots and ports of embarkation.63

The Petroleum Branch attacked theproblems assigned to it on a very broadbasis, but soon found that to a considerableextent it was duplicating work done else-where.64 The establishment of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board in July 1942, theincreased attention given to this field byvarious headquarters divisions of the Army

63 OCT Adm Memo 62, 16 Jun 42.64 Hist Rec, Petroleum Br, to 30 Jun 42, OCT

HB Development and Liaison Div; Memo, ColJohn H. Leavell for CofT, 4 Mar 44, reviews someof his proposals as C of Petroleum Br and theirresults, OCT HB Gross Petroleum.


Service Forces, and the broadening of theresponsibilities of The Quartermaster Gen-eral relieved the Chief of Transportation ofthe necessity of pursuing the studies whichhe had launched, and in May 1943 the per-sonnel of the Petroleum Branch was trans-ferred to the Office of the QuartermasterGeneral.65 The responsibilities which re-mained with the Chief of Transportationrelated solely to the movement of fuels andlubricants in containers to oversea destina-tions, and the supervision of that activitywas assigned to the Water Division.66

Although initially all personnel of theOffice of the Chief of Transportation werelocated in Washington, toward the end ofthe war more than a third were working inother cities. The dispersion began in thespring of 1943 when a general effort wasbeing made to move elements of the WarDepartment away from Washington inorder to relieve congestion in the Capital,and eventually substantial numbers of OCTpersonnel were located in New York andCincinnati and a smaller number stationedat Baltimore.67 This separation of personnelfrom headquarters had disadvantage* froman administrative standpoint, but there alsowere some advantages. The location of theproduction staff of the supply organizationin Cincinnati gave it access to a better mar-ket for technical workers than had beenavailable in Washington. Units concernedwith ship conversions and military baggagefound New York a convenient base for theiroperations.

In the beginning of this chapter the state-ment is made that between 31 July 1942,

when the Transportation Corps was estab-lished, and 30 June 1945, the total of theTC military personnel in the zone of interiorand in the theaters, plus the other militarypersonnel and civilian workers employed atTC installations in the zone of interior, in-creased more than 400 percent. During thesame period the personnel of the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation increased about80 percent, or from 1,714 to 3,070.68 Thelargest group in the TC headquarters wasthe one concerned with the various aspects ofsupply, and it comprised about one-thirdof the total personnel. The Traffic ControlDivision, which dealt with all phases ofArmy traffic in the zone of interior, wasnext in size with over 600. The distributionof OCT personnel by locations and divisionsin early 1945, on dates for which the dataare available, is shown in Table 1.

The Chief of Transportation andHis Policies

Although the personality and the policiesof the Chief of Transportation are reflectedthroughout this history of the Transporta-tion Corps, a brief summary at this pointmay help in the interpretation of develop-ments.69 Charles P. Gross was born in 1889.Graduated from Cornell University in 1910and from the United States Military Acad-emy in 1914, he was commissioned a secondlieutenant in the Corps of Engineers andserved with that organization until 1941.While with the American ExpeditionaryForces in France during World War I, he

65 ASF Adm Memo S-20, 20 Mar 43; ASF Cir33, 26 May 43.

66 OCT Office Order 5-15, 23 Jun 43.67 See Adm Log of the TC, 31 Jul 45, OCT HB

TC Gen Rpts.

68 Statistical Summary, TC, 15 Oct 42, p. 10,OCT HB MPR; Rpt, Dir of Pers OCT, Status ofPers, 30 Jun 45, OCT HB Dir of Pers, Pers Statis-tics.

69 This section based partly on author's study ofrecords of OCT and partly on his observations asa member of OCT executive staff.


TABLE 1—DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THECHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION: DESIGNATED DATES IN 1945

a Personnel also in New York.b Personnel also in New York and Cincinnati.c All but the division chief and his executive staff was in New York.d Personnel also in New York. Unit of Intelligence and Security Division located in Baltimore in April 1945.e Personnel also in Cincinnati.

Source: Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 21 Mar 45; Rpt, TC Personnel, 31 Mar 45, by Dir of Pers OCT. Both in OCT HB Dirof Pers, Pers Statistics.


attained the temporary rank of colonel. Hisassignment between the wars included twotours of duty in Nicaragua in connectionwith the Nicaraguan Canal Survey and cer-tain highway projects. Gross was designatedchief of the Transportation Branch, G-4,War Department General Staff, in April1941, Chief of Transportation when thatoffice was created in March 1942, and com-mander of the Transportation Corps whenit was established in July 1942. He attainedthe temporary rank of major general inAugust 1942.

Gross had a clear realization of the im-portance of efficient transportation in theaccomplishment of the military mission. Herepeatedly importuned the members of hisstaff that they never lose a "sense of ur-gency" in the performance of their duties;never overlook a detail that might contrib-ute to the prompt and safe movement oftroops and supplies, or might facilitate theprocurement of transportation equipmentor the training of transportation personnel.He pointed out that a faltering transporta-tion system would adversely affect everyother phase of the Army's operations, in thezone of interior and overseas.

The full integration of Army transporta-tion was a cardinal point of doctrine withGeneral Gross. The dispersion of transpor-tation responsibility was in his opinion asource of weakness. Integration implied thatall nontactical transportation for the Armyshould be under the control of a singleagency and that the control should extendunbroken from the points where troop andsupply movements originated in the zone ofinterior to the oversea discharge ports.Such integration involved not only theestablishment of policies and procedures bya single headquarters in Washington, butactual direction by that headquarters of the

field installations necessary to carry thosepolicies and procedures into effect. Asearlier discussion has shown, the Chief ofTransportation's ideas regarding integrationwere largely but not completely realizedduring the war.

General Gross believed that, althoughcontrol of the transportation resources ofthe nation was vested by the President incivilian agencies, the armed forces shouldhave first claim on those resources to theextent that they were needed for the ac-complishment of approved military objec-tives, and that nonessential civilian trans-portation services should be curtailed oreliminated when that was necessary inorder to meet the military requirements. Inhis effort to make this view effective he tookissue with the civilian agencies from timeto time on their interpretation of what con-stituted essential civilian services.

The extremely critical position of ship-ping because of heavy losses through sub-marine activity and constantly mountingmilitary requirements was emphasized byGeneral Gross from the beginning. "Ship-ping is the key to the war effort," he saidrepeatedly; therefore he cast his influencein support of the maximum constructionprogram for merchant vessels consistentwith the requirements of other militaryprograms and urged that the available bot-toms be utilized with the greatest possibleefficiency. He was strongly of the opinionthat his responsibility for keeping the over-sea forces properly supplied, with the useof the minimum amount of shipping, couldbe fulfilled best if the vessels for this pur-pose were placed under his control, and hewas not content with the situation whichrequired him to move a large part of theArmy's supplies for the Pacific Ocean Areasin vessels controlled by the Navy.


The Chief of Transportation had a highsense of his responsibility to the theatercommanders, not only for the prompt deliv-ery of troops and maintenance supplies butalso for the provision of transportationtroop units properly organized and trainedfor the performance of their functions andtransportation equipment properly designedfor the type of service that would be re-quired of it. He urged his staff to be "im-mediately responsive" to theater needs. Thismeant anticipating the needs insofar as pos-sible and acting promptly when the requestswere received. An Oversea OperationsGroup was set up in his office, which hadfor its sole purpose the expeditious process-ing of requests from overseas and the co-ordination of the efforts of the several divi-sions which were required to act on them.Gross made a number of visits to the activetheaters in order to better understand theirproblems and to impress upon them thereadiness of his organization to be of serv-ice. He arranged for his principal assistantsto make similar trips.

Because of the great emphasis whichGeneral Gross placed on the maintenanceof close relations with the theaters, it isworth while to present his doctrine in hisown words. On the occasion of the secondanniversary of the Transportation Corpshe said: "Above all, we have had to beimmediately responsive to the needs of thetheater commanders. Tactical requirementsvary widely with the theaters; they changewithin the theaters as the point of attackmoves forward from one area to another.Always, they have an urgency that domi-nates all our efforts. Whether backing Mac-Arthur in the Southwest Pacific, Stilwell inChina and India, Devers in Italy or Eisen-hower in France, we must be flexible andfast. All this lends fascination and excite-

ment to our job. It gives us a sense of near-ness to the theater commanders and akeener appreciation of the vital importanceof our role." 70

Adequate officer personnel, qualitativelyand quantitatively, was a constant problemand one to which General Gross gave muchpersonal attention. The fact that the Chiefof Transportation's organization was a war-time creation and was required to expandrapidly as hostilities progressed, meant thatkey positions had to be filled by assignmentsfrom other services or by drafts on the civil-ian transportation industries. After theUnited States had entered the war thechiefs of the other services naturally werereluctant to part with good officers, and theChief of Transportation was forced to turnalmost entirely to the ranks of industry tobuild up the staffs of his own office and thefield installations. In this he was handi-capped by lack of advance planning suchas the older services had been privileged todo and by wartime personnel ceilings.

When, as the forces began moving over-seas, the theater and base commanders be-gan calling on the Chief of Transportationfor experienced men to build up their trans-portation organizations, Gross considered ithis duty to fill these requests to the best ofhis ability. Sometimes the men were takendirectly from industry, but often they weretransferred from stations under his com-mand. While willing to give up good mento the theaters, Gross was careful not todenude his own organization of competentleadership. He did not hesitate to deny therequests of oversea commanders for specificofficers whom he considered irreplaceablein the jobs which they were doing. In theearly part of the war he also stood firmagainst the requests of some of his key of-

70 Remarks, 31 Jul 44, OCT HB TC Gen Misc.


ficers who desired to leave desk jobs forfield commands. Before the close of hostil-ities, however, General Gross arranged formany of his officers to receive oversea as-signments in order that their experiencemight be broadened.

In the use of his key personnel Gross wasguided by one consideration—results. Whenan officer did not measure up to his assign-ment, he was relieved. On one occasion hewas heard to say to an officer who was pro-testing his removal from a port command,that unless he (Gross) was free to employpersonnel as he considered best, he did notwant the responsibility of heading theTransportation Corps. While the com-manders of Transportation Corps installa-tions were allowed broad latitude in carry-ing out the policies established at head-quarters, disregard of those policies was nottolerated.

A significant side light on the Chief ofTransportation's personnel policy is seen inthe fact that after the termination of hostil-ities in Europe the commander of the NewYork Port of Embarkation, who had beeneminently successful in supporting the Euro-pean theater, was transferred to the com-mand of the San Francisco Port of Em-barkation so that he might bring the bene-fit of his experience to bear on the opera-tions against Japan—this notwithstandingthe fact that the officer transferred fromSan Francisco was considered a successfulport commander. Although intensely loyalto his staff, Gross tried to subordinate senti-ment and personal preference to militaryconsiderations. He remarked to one of hissenior officers, in the discussion of a matterwhich involved personal preferences, thatif they could not decide the question on itsmerits they were getting too old for theArmy.

While believing strongly that the controlof transportation should be centralized,General Gross decentralized his operatingresponsibilities insofar as practical. Hevested a large amount of operating author-ity in the ports of embarkation and thetransportation zones in order to relieve theoperating divisions of his own office, buthe saw limits beyond which decentraliza-tion was not feasible. He refused, for ex-ample, to sanction a proposal to establish"a superior headquarters" on the Pacificcoast to supervise the ports of embarkationin that area, since that would have intro-duced an additional and unnecessary eche-lon. He was unwilling to delegate to a jointcommittee of Army, Navy, and War Ship-ping Administration representatives at SanFrancisco the authority to make allocationsof shipping to the various services in thePacific, since that function had broad policyimplications and therefore could be bestperformed by the headquarters organiza-tions in Washington.

Although he delegated his authorityfreely, General Gross kept the affairs of hisorganization under close observation. Heexpected his Control Division to provideinformation regarding the progress of thework, and particularly any phases of itthat seemed to be lagging. Under normalcircumstances he held a group conferencewith the key members of his staff once eachweek, at which time he informed them ofmatters that had been decided or wereunder consideration by Army Service Forcesheadquarters or the General Staff. Thesemeetings also enabled his directors anddivision chiefs to exchange information re-garding their problems and to co-ordinatetheir operations. Except for these meetings,which became less frequent toward the endof the war, he called in his assistants only


as their attention to specific matters wasrequired. It was generally understood, how-ever, that his door was always open to themwhen they desired his counsel. Gross wasfriendly but direct in his manner; he wasobjective in his approach to problems, andhe appreciated similar tactics on the part ofhis assistants.

The strong conviction which he held re-garding the necessity for an efficient Armytransportation service, and the acute prob-lems which he encountered as the head of awar-born organization, made Gross a strongadvocate of placing the TransportationCorps on a permanent basis. This he con-sidered necessary in order that a staff ofcompetent transportation officers mightalways be available as the nucleus of awartime organization, and that that organ-ization might have a recognized place inthe military establishment. A permanentTransportation Corps was considered de-sirable also in order that comprehensiveplanning might be pursued and transporta-tion equipment and methods developed tomatch the technological developments inother branches of military service. Duringthe fall of 1943 the Special Planning Divi-sion of the War Department Special Staffprepared a study looking to the perpetua-tion of the Transportation Corps.71 Whenthe study was presented to General Grossfor concurrence some months later, he ex-pressed complete agreement with the con-clusion that the war had demonstrated theneed for a permanent Transportation Corps,but suggested that it would be premature torequest the necessary legislation at that timeand that such a request should be part of

a more comprehensive proposal for the re-organization of the Army following the ter-mination of hostilities.72 That course ofaction was adopted as the more practical.73

Relations with Other Elements of theArmy Service Forces

Since effective transportation planningand operations were vital to the smooth exe-cution of the troop and supply programs ofthe Army Service Forces, the Chief ofTransportation functioned to a degree as amember of the ASF headquarters staff, aswell as a technical service chief. This be-ing so, his relationship with the command-ing general of the Army Service Forces wasof special significance. It was in all respectsa cordial and co-operative association. Gen-erals Somervell and Gross had been class-mates at the Military Academy. Both wereengineers by training. They saw eye to eyeon the proposition that transportation wasan essential and at the same time a highlycritical item in our military potential. Tobe sure, Somervell, because of the broadrange of his responsibilities, sometimes hadto moderate his opinion regarding the quan-tity of transportation equipment to be pro-duced, in order that other essential militaryrequirements might be met. Basically, how-ever, he and Gross were together in theconviction that for a successful prosecutionof the war adequate transportation was asine qua non.

71 See data prepared in OCT in Oct 43, at re-quest of SPD WDGS, sub: Historical and OtherInformation Bearing upon Proposal to EstablishPermanent TC, OCT HB TC Gen Postwar Plng.

72 Memo, CofT for Dir SPD WDGS, 1 Mar 44,sub: Estab of TC on Permanent Basis, OCT 321.

73 In Jan 46, in order to allay uneasiness amongpersonnel due to temporary status of TC, CofT ob-tained from CofS USA statement that WD favoredand would seek establishment of permanent TC.Memo, C of T for Pres WD Bd to Study Org, 7Jan 46, sub: Recommendations under Reorg Actof 1945, OCT 321; OCT Misc Ltr 26, 8 Feb 46,sub: Continuation of TC, OCT HB TC Gen Post-war Plng; WD Cir 218, Sec. IV, 20 Jul 46.


Because of the importance which he at-tached to the results, Somervell took anactive hand in high-level negotiations withthe other government agencies concernedwith transportation, such as the Navy withwhich the Army had constant dealings onboth the policy and the operating levels, theWar Shipping Administration which con-trolled the major portion of the Americanmerchant marine, and the Office of DefenseTransportation which regulated the inlandcarriers. He participated in the discussionof matters of broad logistical significancewhich were being considered by the Jointand Combined Military TransportationCommittees, on which he and Gross werethe War Department representatives. Som-ervell sometimes entered into the negotia-tions with the Association of American Rail-roads on matters of exceptional importance.The communications on such matters,which were signed by Somervell or for-warded by him to the Secretary of War, theUnder Secretary, or the Chief of Staff forsignature, usually were prepared by theChief of Transportation or his principalassistants. Sometimes these communicationswere modified by General Somervell; fre-quently they were signed as submitted. Itnaturally is impossible to judge how far thepolicies which the communications enunci-ated had been formulated by Somervell orGross, or had been arrived at jointly. It isclear, however, that the premises uponwhich the policies were based usually weredeveloped in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation.

Somervell kept current transportation op-erations under close observation. From hisvantage point as head of the Army's supplyorganization and a close collaborator withthe Chief of Staff, he could foresee many of

the demands which future military opera-tions would make on transportation, andhe issued instructions to insure that ade-quate preparations were made for meetingthem. During his visits to the theaters ofoperation he took note of transportationproblems and deficiencies and directed thatmeans be found for coping with them.74

He had the monthly progress reports deal-ing with transportation carefully analyzedand called upon the Chief of Transporta-tion for explanations of conditions whichfrom the statistics appeared unsatisfactoryor dubious. Such communications covereda wide range of points. For example, amemorandum to Gross regarding the reportfor February 1943 raised questions aboutthe turnaround time of ships in the serviceto North Africa, the marked increase in thenumber of special trains being used fortroop movements, the length of time freightcars were held for unloading at ports ofembarkation, the high percentage of un-used warehouse space under the control ofthe Transportation Corps, and the failureof deliveries of certain items of transporta-tion equipment to approach the forecast.The Chief of Transportation's replies tosuch inquiries, in addition to explaining thecircumstances, stated the actions beingtaken to correct unsatisfactory conditions.75

The constant pressure which Somervellplaced on Gross in regard to matters generaland specific reflected the technique of hisadministration rather than a lack of con-fidence in the transportation organization.This is evident from a letter which he wrote

74 See file, Somervell Trip to Africa (Jan-Feb43), OCT HB Exec; see also file, Somervell's Tripto Theaters Oct-Nov 43, OCT HB Theaters Gen.

75 See Memo, CG ASF to CofT, 23 Mar 43, andreply, 31 Mar 43, with atchd statement relating topoints mentioned, OCT 319.1 MPR.


in connection with the second anniversaryof the establishment of the TransportationCorps. Saluting Gross as "Dear Charlie,"he said in part, "I feel that the second birth-day of the Transportation Corps should notpass without my indicating to you infor-mally my appreciation of the magnificent jobthat you, your immediate staff, and all theofficers and enlisted personnel of the Trans-portation Corps have done in the past year."Addressing his reply to "Dear Bill," Grosssaid, "Your thoughtfulness in rememberingour anniversary will quicken our determina-tion to measure up in full to every assign-ment and expectation." 76

Even while General Gross was striving tobring under his control functions assignedto other services, which he felt properly be-longed to the Transportation Corps, he wasunder the necessity of combating efforts byother elements of the Army Service Forcesto withdraw functions from his jurisdiction.Reference has been made to the unsuccess-ful attempt of the ASF Director of Opera-tions to absorb the Chief of Transportation'sPlanning Division. The difficulty, however,was chiefly in the field. There was a senti-ment in some quarters that the ports of em-barkation and the transportation zonesshould be under the control of the servicecommands, rather than exempted stationsunder the Chief of Transportation. Evenafter these basic issues had been decided infavor of the Chief of Transportation he didnot have clear sailing. A considerable periodwas required to establish proper workingrelations between some of the service com-manders and the corresponding zone trans-portation officers. Again, it was argued thatthe holding and reconsignment points per-

formed essentially a storage function andshould be under service command control.Efforts were made to transfer such impor-tant activities as the co-ordination of over-sea supply and the staging of troops fromthe control of the commanders of the portsof embarkation. The firm stand which Gen-eral Gross took in these matters was sup-ported by General Somervell and by hischief of staff, General Styer. On the otherhand, certain unit training centers utilizedby the Transportation Corps were placedunder the operating control of the servicecommands contrary to the desires of theChief of Transportation.

The relationship between the correspond-ing divisions in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation and Army Service Forcesheadquarters were close. The necessity forthorough co-operation was fully recognizedby General Gross and his aides, since trans-portation affected many phases of the ASFresponsibility. They believed, however, thatthe ASF divisions should confine themselvesto staff work, and they sometimes chafedunder what they considered unwarrantedintrusions into operations. Gross took theposition that once plans had been approvedby ASF headquarters and the War Depart-ment General Staff, and after his organiza-tion had been given a technical task to per-form, the Transportation Corps should bewholly responsible for the execution of thattask and free to act without interference.The objection to interference was particu-larly strong with reference to the executionof troop and supply Movements, in whichcase it was felt that the ASF Director ofOperations was endeavoring to interposehis office between the Chief of Transporta-tion and the Operations Division of theGeneral Staff, and in so doing was assumingtechnical transportation functions which did

76 Ltr, Somervell to Gross, 2 Aug 44, and reply,4 Aug 44, ASF Hq Trans 1944.


not properly belong to his office and couldnot be performed properly by it.77

In an earlier chapter it was stated thatbefore and during the early part of the warit was necessary to take vigorous steps toprevent other technical services from dis-regarding the established transportationprerogatives in their efforts to expedite themovement of their supplies and personnel.This ceased to be a problem after the Trans-portation Corps became well established.There remained, however, the problem ofobtaining full compliance at technical serv-ice installations with the sound transporta-tion practices which the Chief of Trans-portation had undertaken to set up. TheTraffic Control Division, referring chieflyto movements by rail, pointed out that sincethe Transportation Corps operated on thesame level of authority as the other tech-nical services, the only means it had of en-forcing its standards in such matters as theloading and discharging of cars, the docu-mentation of shipments, and the use ofintransit rates, was by persuasion or by ob-taining directives from Army Service Forcesheadquarters. The division indicated thateither method was time-consuming, sinceit frequently involved convincing officersregarding technical matters concerningwhich they had no practical knowledge.78

Gross had a large degree of freedom inthe organization and management of hisoffice after the initial structure had beenestablished. From time to time, however,ASF headquarters made its influencestrongly felt. As has been indicated, that

headquarters desired that the Chief ofTransportation's staff divisions be organizedto parallel its own divisions in order tosimplify the processes of co-ordination. TheASF Control Division was constantly en-gaged in studying the organizations andmethods of the technical services and recom-mending improvements to General Somer-vell. Gross was fully convinced of the valueof the control function as conceived bySomervell, and readily followed the ASFbehest to establish corresponding divisionsin his own headquarters and principal fieldinstallations. On the other hand, it some-times was felt in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation that the ASF Control Divi-sion's recommendations missed the markbecause they were not based on an adequateunderstanding of transportation techniquesand that the necessity of analyzing and re-butting them added an unwarranted bur-den to the already heavy duties of the Chiefof Transportation and his assistants. Grosscleared with Somervell before making as-signments and reassignments affecting themore important transportation positions,but only one instance has come to the au-thor's attention in which a key figure in theTransportation Corps was relieved at theinsistence of ASF headquarters and againstthe convictions of the Chief of Transporta-tion.

After the establishment of the Servicesof Supply in March 1942 the Under Sec-retary did not take an active part in themanagement of transportation, but his in-terest in that aspect of logistics continued.In the fall of 1942 he appointed Col. JamesH. Graham (Ret.) as special consultant tokeep him informed on transportation mat-ters.79 Graham already had placed himself

77 Gross final rpt, p. 125; see also Memo, ExecOCT (Finlay) for Dir of Opns OCT (Wylie), 26Oct 43, sub: Establishment of Trans Co-ordinationSec, OCT HB Exec Staybacks.

78 See Memo, C of Gen Sv Br Traf Contl DivOCT for C of Traf Contl Div, 25 Sep 45, sub: Rpton Accomplishments and Handicaps, OCT HB TrafContl Div. Gen.

79 See Ltr, USW to Graham, 12 Sep 45, OCT HBGross-Graham.


informally at the disposal of General Somer-vell, with whom he had been associated inWorld War I. He had a keen interest intransportation and a strong desire to help theTransportation Corps fulfill its mission. Hehad observed the transportation failures of1917—18 and was eager to avoid a repetitionof them. The files disclose many informalobservations by Graham on the progress andproblems of the Transportation Corps, andsome reports on conditions and projectswhich apparently were made at Somervell'srequest. During the periods when he was inWashington, Graham visited Gross in hisoffice almost daily and discussed transporta-tion developments at length. He soon be-came convinced of Gross's ability to ad-minister the heavy task that had been as-signed to him, and while Gross was still abrigadier general, Graham recommended toSomervell that the Chief of Transportationshould have rank equal to that of the chiefsof the other technical services.80 Probablythe greatest service he performed was toimpress upon all with whom he came incontact the desirability of an integratedtransportation service—the centralization ofall transportation functions under the con-trol of one agency.81

Relations with the Oversea Commands

The relations of the Chief of Transporta-tion in Washington with the oversea com-mands can be grouped into two broad cate-gories : (1) those incident to the delivery ofcombat and service troops and materiel tooversea ports to meet theater requirements,and (2) those incident to helping the over-sea commanders to build up their port op-

erations and their intratheater lines of com-munication so that men and supplies wouldmove in orderly fashion from shipside tocamps and dumps and thence eventually tothe combat areas. The importance of thesefunctions to the successful conduct of mili-tary operations is obvious. The emphasiswhich General Gross placed on the re-sponsiveness of his organization to the thea-ter commanders' needs was therefore basicto the successful performance of his task.

In building up close working relation-ships with the theaters, Gross found thenewness of the Transportation Corps ahandicap. During a trip to various theatersin the fall of 1943, which began in theSouth Pacific, he observed that the corpswas "hardly known" at the various bases.82

Along with this general observation, henoted that officers were unable to obtainTransportation Corps insignia and thatship's manifests and other official documentsstill bore the inscription of the Quarter-master Corps. Gross instructed his head-quarters to take immediate steps to correctthese conditions and to find means of gain-ing recognition for the TransportationCorps in the oversea commands. These ob-jectives were accomplished only gradually,and less rapidly in some theaters than inothers.

Failure of some oversea commanders toestablish proper transportation organiza-tions and to give them adequate authoritywas another handicap which General Grossencountered. This not only affected theefficiency of theater transportation opera-tions, but it rendered more difficult the co-operation of the Chief of Transportation inWashington with the chief transportationofficers overseas. Although the preoccupa-80 Memo, handwritten and undated but evidently

written about 1 Jul 42, ASF Hq Trans 1942.81 See Memo, Graham for Somervell, 13 Oct 42,

OCT HB Gross-Graham.

82 Memo, Gross for Wylie, 20 Sep 43, OCT HBWylie Ltrs from Gross.


tion of the theater commanders with purelymilitary matters was a factor, basically thisdefect was traceable to the Army field serv-ice regulations, which were not modifiedpromptly to embrace the concept of an in-tegrated transportation service such as hadbeen established in the zone of interior. Thefield service regulations in effect when mosttheater organizations were taking shapestated that water transportation was a re-sponsibility of the Quartermaster Corps,rail transportation a responsibility of theChief Engineer, motor transportation theresponsibility of a Motor Transport Service(which had no counterpart in the zone ofinterior), inland waterway transportation aresponsibility of the Corps of Engineers, andair transportation a responsibility of the AirCorps, while the co-ordination of the severalmeans of transportation and the provisionof a plan for controlling traffic were respon-sibilities of G-4 of the headquarters com-manding the area.83 With this archaic doc-trine still in circulation, it is not surprisingthat, despite the personal efforts of GeneralsSomervell and Gross to make their viewsknown to the oversea commanders, the ar-rangements in the theaters for dealing withtransportation and traffic were divergentand in some cases unsatisfactory.

Gross took early cognizance of the needfor a revision of the field service regulations,but was handicapped in proposing changesby the fact that his own organization was ina state of flux both as regards functions andstructure.84 Even after the establishment ofthe Transportation Corps the process ofchange was slow, and the first revision,

published in October 1943, was not whollyadequate. This directive, which dealtbroadly with the reorganization of corpsheadquarters and organic troops, was de-veloped in the General Staff and ArmyService Forces headquarters, and the sectionpertaining to transportation failed to dealwith some of the problems which had beenclaiming the attention of the Chief ofTransportation.85 It recognized the theatertransportation service as including the Of-fice of the Chief of Transportation, theMilitary Railway Service, the Motor Trans-port Service, the Inland Waterway Service,and the Coastwise Transportation Service,and it provided that theater air transport,insofar as it was a nontactical means- oftransportation, should function under theoperational (movement) control of thetheater chief of transportation. The basicfault of the directive was its failure to stateexplicitly the place of the theater chief oftransportation in the theater organizationand to establish safeguards against his be-ing subordinated to other theater agenciesor handicapped by lack of control overtransportation in the base sections.

The drawbacks experienced by trans-portation officers in the respective theaterswill be discussed in detail in the third vol-ume of Transportation Corps history, but inorder to illustrate the problem brief state-ments regarding three major commands areincorporated here. In the North AfricanTheater of Operations, later known as theMediterranean theater, the Allied Forcesheadquarters, the U.S. Army headquarters,and the U.S. Army Services of Supply eachhad a transportation organization. The con-fusion which might have resulted from this

83 FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations, Ad-ministration, 9 Dec 40, pars. 32, 105, 106, 123, 132;see Gross final rpt, p. 73.

84 Memo, Opns Off OCT for Tng Br, 3 May 43,sub: Revision of FM 100-10, SPTSA 461-A (FM100-10), OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

85 WD Cir 256, 16 Oct 43, sub: Reorg of CorpsHq and Organic Trs, par. 17; see file AG 322 (10Aug 43) (20) for concurrences.


duplication fortunately was avoided by thedesignation of the same officer to head thetransportation staffs of NATOUSA andSOS NATOUSA, and to serve as U.S.Chief of Transportation for AFHQ, inwhich position he was co-ordinate with aBritish transportation officer.86 Another ar-rangement in that theater which GeneralGross considered basically unsound wasmaking the manager of the Military Rail-way Service responsible directly to the thea-ter commander rather than to the Chief ofTransportation, but there again the diffi-culties which might have resulted from thisorganizational weakness were avoidedthrough the harmonious co-operation of theofficials concerned.87

In the European theater, despite the evi-dent desire of General Eisenhower to havea strong centralized transportation service,the Chief of Transportation was greatlyhandicapped for a period following the in-vasion of the Continent by a lack of cleardifferentiation between his functions andthose of G-4 of the communications zone,and the latter's exercise of control in trans-portation matters.88 Eventually, and largelythrough the intervention of General Gross,this difficulty was overcome.

In the Southwest Pacific, transportationadministration was handicapped by a dis-persion of authority and frequent reorgani-zations. The Chief of Transportation in theU.S. Army Services of Supply (at timescalled the Chief Transportation Officer)was a permanent institution, but for a pe-

riod in 1943 he was subordinate to a Chiefof Transportation in U.S. Army head-quarters, and from late 1943 until near theend of the war he was overshadowed by aChief Regulating Officer in the theaterGeneral Headquarters, who exercised abroad control over all traffic and trans-portation.89

The chiefs of transportation in the largerand more active theaters experienced varieddegrees of difficulty in co-ordinating trans-portation in the base sections with over-alltheater requirements, because of the inde-pendent position of base section command-ers. This problem arose in connection withboth the operation of ports and the distri-bution of rail and motor equipment.

Wholly adequate doctrine to govern thea-ter transportation was not published by theArmy until after the war was over. In 1944the Chief of Transportation initiated studiesin the several theaters with a view to formu-lating regulations which would give theoversea transportation officers the scope andthe authority which they needed to properlyperform their tasks. The result of thesestudies was a manual dealing solely withtransportation, published in December1945.90 This manual stated that the theaterchief of transportation was a chief of serviceand as such was responsible to the com-mander of the communications zone or theservices of supply, if such an organizationexisted; that he also was the special staffofficer for transportation on the staff of thetheater commander, concerned with policyand planning; that he was the traffic man-

86 Gross final rpt, p. 74; OCT HB Monograph17, p. 106, and Monograph 29, p. 299.

87 Ltr, Gross to Brig Gen George C. StewartTrans Off SOLOC ETO, 5 Dec 44, OCT HB GrossDay File.

88 See OCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 243, 377;Hist Rpt of TC in ETO, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Ch. 2, p.6, OCT HB ETO.

89 Ltr, Gen Stewart CofT AFWESPAC to Gross,30 Aug 45, and reply, 17 Sep 45, OCT HB SWPAMisc; see also Monograph, James R. Masterson,U.S. Army Transportation in the Southwest PacificArea, 1941-1947, Ch. XV, OCT HB Monographs.

90 FM 55-6, Military Transportation Service inTheater of Operations.


ager for the theater and the chief operatingofficer for carrying out approved plans andpolicies; that in addition to operating themilitary railway, highway, inland water-way, and coastwise transportation servicesin the communications zone, he had move-ment control over nontactical theater airtransport and shipments of petroleum prod-ucts by pipeline; and that he was respon-sible for establishing transportation officesin the territorial subdivisions of the commu-nications zone, such as base, intermediate,and advance sections. Thus the theatertransportation officer belatedly was assuredof a suitable position in the theater or-ganization and was vested with adequateauthority to enable him to control the uti-lization of all the means of nontactical trans-portation and to co-ordinate transportationoperations so as to obtain the best resultsfor the theater as a whole.

Reference was made earlier in this chap-ter to the Chief of Transportation's effortsto provide the theaters with sufficient com-petent transportation officers. This was aresponsibility which General Somervell em-phasized after a visit to the North Africantheater early in 1943, and one which Gen-eral Gross considered germane to his posi-tion.91 The personnel furnished ranged fromsecond lieutenants for minor administrativejobs to experienced executives to fill keypositions. Although the selection of officersto head their transportation organizationswas entirely the prerogative of the overseacommanders, they normally requested theassistance of General Gross, or he volun-teered advice when circumstances war-

ranted.92 As the war progressed the moredifficult problem was to find a sufficientnumber of experienced men for the inter-mediate and lower echelons of the expand-ing theater transportation organizations.During 1944, because of the heavy require-ments in Europe, the Mediterranean, andthe Pacific, the Chief of Transportationstated that his organization was practicallystripped of such personnel, and that thebest remaining material was the graduatesof the officer candidate school and men whohad gained some shipping experience ascargo security officers on transports.93 Thedomestic transportation industries also hadvirtually dried up as sources of such person-nel, because of the increasingly heavy trafficwhich they were required to move and thegeneral shortage of manpower.

In assigning shipping to move men andmateriel from the zone of interior to theoversea commands, the Chief of Transpor-tation had to keep in mind the desirabilitynot only of providing a sufficient number ofvessels to meet the requirements, but alsoof avoiding the dispatch of a greater num-ber than could be handled properly at theoversea ports. The latter problem concerned

91 Memo, Somervell for Gross, 19 Feb 43, par.( 7 ) , OCT HB Exec Somervell Trip to Africa (Jan-Feb 43) ; Memo, CofT for port Comdrs and portagencies, 1 Dec 42, sub: Tng of Senior Off, OCTHB PE Gen Tng.

92 Memo, Gross for Maj Gen J. C. H. Lee CGSOS USAFBI, 7 May 42, sub: SOS BOLERO TransSv, OCT HB Gross Day File; Ltr, ACofT to MajGen S. B. Buckner, Jr., CG Alaska Def Comd, 2Feb 43, OCT HB Wylie Alaska; Ltr, CG ASF toMaj Gen James L. Frink CG SOS SWPA, dictatedby Gross, 17 Jun 44; Ltr, Gross to Brig Gen T. F.Farrell Comdg Cons Sv CBI, 10 Jul 44. Last twoin OCT HB Gross Offs and EM.

93 Ltr, ACofT to Maj Gen Ralph Royce CGUSAFIME, 23 Jan 44; Ltr, Gross to Col F. M.Fogle Trans Off Intermediate Sec Oro Bay SWPA,10 Aug 44, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks. Rail andWater Divisions of certain PE's had complete turn-overs of officer personnel within six months andCofT sent as many as 250 officers overseas in onemonth. See Min, Port and Zone Conf, 6-9 Jul 44,pers mtg, 8 Jul, p. 14, OCT HB PE Gen PortComdrs Conf.


movements of supplies and equipmentrather than movements of troops. An effortwas made by the Chief of Transportation'sWater Division to have on hand at all timesup-to-date information regarding dockingfacilities, cargo handling equipment, andharbor craft available at oversea ports, thefacilities for clearing cargo from the docksafter it had been discharged, and the gen-eral conditions prevailing at the terminals.His Control Division received radio reportsfrom the theaters and prepared reportsshowing the relative efficiency of the over-sea ports. Nevertheless, Army officials in thezone of interior were guided largely by thecapacity to receive supplies, and in 1944serious port congestion developed in a num-ber of major theaters and many ships wereviews of the theater commanders as to theiridle for weeks because they could not bedischarged promptly. In addition to beingtoo optimistic regarding their ability to dis-charge the vessels, General Gross believedthat the active theaters, in their desire totake all possible precautions against short-ages, requested supplies for delivery fartherin advance of the actual need than was req-uisite.94

From January 1942 control of the move-ment of maintenance supplies to the thea-ters was assigned to the ports of embarka-tion, which maintained large oversea supplydivisions to perform this function. Thesedivisions were in daily contact with thetheaters for which they were responsible,using radio, telegraph, and teletype for thepurpose. Adjustments in the amounts ortypes of supplies to be shipped in responseto theater requisitions and changes in ship-ping dates were discussed, and arrange-ments were agreed upon which would bestmeet the theater need. Radiograms sum-

marizing the supplies on board were sentimmediately after each sailing so that planscould be made for the docking and dis-charge of the ships, and cargo manifests andstowage plans were forwarded to the thea-ters by air mail to assist them in unloadingand distributing the cargoes. The ports ofembarkation also exercised final supervisionover the packing and marking of shipments,in order to minimize damage in transit andinsure that after arrival overseas the sup-plies would reach the services for which theywere intended. The Chief of Transporta-tion believed that vesting control of themovement of maintenance supplies in thezone of interior port commanders, who alsocontrolled the terminals and the loading ofthe ships, was the best method of giving thetheaters an adequate and well-regulatedsupply service.95

In moving combat and service troops tothe oversea commands the Chief of Trans-portation endeavored to have the units asnearly at full strength as possible, with com-plete individual equipment, before theywere embarked. Basically this was the re-sponsibility of the stations of origin, but inpractice, particularly during the early partof the war, many shortages were foundwhen the troops arrived at the port stagingareas, which had to be made up betweenthat date and the day of sailing. Also duringthis period men who were physically ormentally unfit were eliminated, training de-ficiencies were overcome insofar as possible,and instructions were given to prepare thetroops for the voyage and for debarkation.The Chief of Transportation also endeav-ored to have organizational equipmentreach the theaters before or at the same timeas the troops, and in condition for imme-diate use. This proved to be an intricate

94 See Gross final rpt, p. 125. 95 Ibid., pp. 56-59, 125.


problem, as will be more fully explained inthe discussion of oversea troop movements,but great progress was made during thecourse of the war. General Gross wasstrongly of the opinion that having the stag-ing areas under the control of the portcommanders, who also controlled arrivals oftroops at the ports and their embarkations,was the best way to effect orderly move-ments and to insure that units arrived over-seas in good condition.96 The ports of em-barkation maintained direct contact withthe theaters regarding troop movements andkept them informed as to the units and theorganizational equipment shipped on eachvessel.

With respect to lines of communicationin the theaters, the task of the Chief ofTransportation, aside from providing keyadministrative personnel, was mainly thatof supplying equipment and troop unitsfor the operation of transportation services.As indicated earlier in this chapter, thatresponsibility did not rest wholly with theChief of Transportation. During the firstyear of the war he was concerned only withthe requirements of the theaters for portand water operations. Then the militaryrailways were brought within his sphere.At no time during the war was he respon-sible for providing motor equipment ormotor troops to the theaters, although hisHighway Division through expert advicedid much to improve over-the-road vehiclesand highway operations. The Army AirForces provided the materiel and the per-sonnel for air services. The Corps of En-gineers installed and operated pipelines, aform of transportation which became prom-inent in certain theaters where large quan-tities of liquid fuel had to be moved inlandin support of advancing troops.

The principal oversea ports at whichtroops and cargoes were discharged wereoperated under military direction to insureuninterrupted work, control of movement,and the observation of security regulations.Insofar as practical, native longshore laborwas employed to supplement military per-sonnel, but at many ports utilized by theArmy the civilian labor force was inade-quate or inefficient, or both, and in someinstances, as where new ports were created,trained longshore gangs were nonexistent.The theaters' need for troop labor wastherefore heavy. Before the reorganizationof the War Department in March 1942,troops'for the operation of oversea portswere trained at ports of embarkation in thezone of interior, and The QuartermasterGeneral was responsible for tables of organ-ization and for training doctrine. The train-ing activity came under the supervision ofthe Chief of Transportation in March 1942,and the responsibility for organization anddoctrine was transferred to him in July1942. At that time there were two types ofport units, one known as headquarters andheadquarters company and the other as portbattalion. The former constituted the super-visory staff and the latter the labor force.With the rapid expansion of oversea activ-ities, the Chief of Transportation found itnecessary to develop three types of head-quarters organizations—headquarters andheadquarters companies for major and formedium ports, and headquarters and head-quarters detachments for smaller ports. Alsoit was found advantageous to train portcompanies as such rather than as compo-nents of port battalions, so that they wouldbe more self-sufficient and flexible. Allchanges affecting these organizations weremade as the result of consultation with thetheaters and consideration of their experi-96 Ibid., p. 45.


ence and prospective needs. This was truealso of the equipment assigned to the units,and the Chief of Transportation endeavoredto supply them with cranes, forklift trucks,and other gear suitable to their requirementsand adequate to enable them to functionefficiently.97

The Chief of Transportation providedvessels and crews for water transport in theoversea commands. As regards the largertypes of vessels, his task was to arrange thatthe required numbers be made available bythe War Shipping Administration and theNavy. As regards smaller vessels for harbor,coastwise, and inland waterway services—that is, vessels of less than 200 feet lengthand 1,000 tons gross—the Chief of Trans-portation directly procured such craft andsent them to the theaters to supplementvessels which could be procured locally. Heestablished tables of organization and equip-ment for and trained several types of marinetroop units for service in the theaters— har-bor craft companies to man the smallertypes of vessels, marine maintenance com-panies to operate shops on shore at overseaports, and marine ship repair companies toman specially equipped repair ships whichwere moved from port to port. He hadsimilar responsibilities with respect to am-phibian truck companies to operate andmaintain the 2½-ton Ordnance-procuredamphibious trucks which were used exten-sively overseas for harbor work and inassault operations. The composition oftroop units and the designs of vessels weredeveloped on the basis of reports receivedfrom the theaters.

After the Chief of Transportation hadbeen assigned full responsibility for the Mili-tary Railway Service (except construction)in November 1942, provision had to bemade to meet the heavy requirements forequipment and troops to conduct theArmy's oversea railway operations, espe-;cially those in North Africa, Italy, Conti-nental Europe, Iran, and India. Differenttypes of locomotives were needed in the sev-eral areas, and many types and gauges ofcars were required.98 The principal types ofrailway troop units were the headquartersand headquarters company, military railwayservice, which supervised operations andmaintenance in areas of major importanceand corresponded to the office of the generalmanager of a large American railroad; theheadquarters and headquarters company,railway grand division, which was a super-visory and administrative organization cor-responding to the office of the general super-intendent on an American railroad; therailway operating battalion, which was ade-quate to operate and maintain up to 150miles of right of way; and the railway shopbattalion, which was staffed and equippedto make heavy repairs. Other specializedtypes of units were found to be necessary oradvantageous as the war progressed and ex-perience accumulated. Here again, the Chiefof Transportation maintained close liaisonwith the theaters and worked out with themthe changes in the organization and train-ing of railway troops and the design of rail-way equipment which experience proved tobe desirable.

The density of traffic in the more activetheaters necessitated a systematic plan oftraffic regulation to insure that movements

97 Fuller discussion of training troops and pro-curing equipment and supplies will appear inanother volume of TC history. Preliminary datamay be found in Gross final rpt, Secs. V and VI,and in OCT HB Monographs 26 and 28.

98 In addition to rail equipment for U.S. Army,locomotives and cars were procured and shippedto allied nations under lend-lease.

PERSONNEL OF MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE operating European equip-ment at Naples, Italy, October 1943 (top). An American-built locomotive beingdelivered at Cherbourg, France, August 1944 (bottom). MRS rehabilitated and

operated railways in theaters of operations.


were effected in an orderly manner, so asto avoid delays to troops and supplies andobtain optimum service from transportationequipment. The need for such regulationwas felt first in connection with highwaytraffic in the North African theater, whereit was provided initially by improvisation."Foreseeing that similar regulation would berequired for railway, inland water, and airtraffic, the Chief of Transportation devel-oped the organization and the training doc-trine for units to perform this work. Thesetraffic regulation units consisted of severaltypes of teams trained to deal with the re-spective types of traffic. Those which re-ceived their military and basic technicaltraining in the zone of interior completedtheir technical training overseas. Manywere activated in the theaters because of theurgent need. Traffic regulation units func-tioned in the communications zone and usu-ally were assigned to base, intermediate,and advance sections. Regulating stations,which functioned in the combat zone, werenot classified as Transportation Corps unitsbut were activated and trained according totables of organization and training doctrineprepared by the Chief of Transportation,and the few which were activated in thezone of interior were trained under hissupervision.

Several other types of TransportationCorps troop units should be mentioned ascontributions to the efficient conduct oftransportation in the theaters. The stagingarea company was organized primarily toprovide mess service at oversea ports. Basedepot companies were organized to storeand distribute Transportation Corps equip-ment and supplies in the theaters. Floatingspare part depots, two of which were ac-tivated and trained during the late months

of the war, were for the operation of float-ing depots to deliver marine and rail spareparts at ports in the Pacific where shoredepots had not been established. A com-posite table of organization was devisedembracing more than sixty small teams oftechnicians trained to work in the severaltransportation fields. These teams could beutilized separately in cases where larger unitswould have been excessive, or in combina-tion with other teams or units. This table oforganization enabled the theater transporta-tion officers to select teams of skilled work-men to meet a wide variety of requirements,and it also simplified the Chief of Trans-portation's task of providing the skillsneeded.

The Transportation Corps units whichwere overseas on 31 March 1945 aggre-gated 195,193 officers and enlisted men.100

In addition, the theater transportationofficers made use of troop units of otherservices, and of troops of other services pro-visionally organized as TC units. This wasparticularly true in connection with high-way operations. On 26 March 1945 theChief of Transportation in the Europeantheater stated that the actual strength of theunits serving under him was 159,532 officersand enlisted men, of which 92,476 were inTransportation Corps units and 67,056 inQuartermaster Corps units serving with theMotor Transport Service.101

Whereas the training and procurementresponsibilities of the Chief of Transporta-tion in connection with the port, marine,railway, and certain other transportationactivities in the theaters will be dealt with

9 9See OCT HB Monograph 9, pp. 269-73.

100 Rpt, STM-30, Strength of the Army, 1 Apr45, p. 28.

101 TC ETO Weekly News Ltr, 26 Mar 45, OCTHB ETO. At that time more than 9,000 TC troopswere assigned to base sections and were performingwork other than transportation.


rather fully in another volume of Trans-portation Corps history, such is not the casewith respect to motor equipment and motortroop units, since he had no responsibilitiesin those directions. General Gross wasdeeply interested in such troops and equip-ment, however, because the theater chiefsof transportation utilized them extensivelyin their highway transport services, and theinfluence which he was able to exercise inboth fields was considerable. It is in order,therefore, to include here a brief review ofhis activities in connection with highwaytransport in the theaters. Unfortunately hisinfluence, which had to be exercisedthrough persuasion rather than authority,was slow in taking effect and was not feltoverseas until the war was well progressed.

The requirements of a highway transportservice in the communications zone of atheater, corresponding to the Military Rail-way Service, had not been visualized prop-erly when we entered World War IL102 Ithad been assumed that the general purposevehicles which were developed for use asorganic equipment would serve satisfac-torily for over-the-road operations. Early inthe war the highway experts on the staff ofthe Chief of Transportation pointed outthat this was not the case, and that the 2½ton 6x6 truck, which was the vehicle chieflyrelied on, was far from efficient as a meansof moving large tonnages over the highways.Studies were initiated to demonstrate thattrucks of larger capacity, and especiallytractor-trailer combinations, would saveoperating personnel and equipment and re-lieve road congestion.103 The time required

to propagate this doctrine among the mili-tary authorities, together with productionlags, meant that the better vehicles did notarrive in the theaters in substantial quanti-ties until the summer of 1944, and that thenumbers desired for such strategic opera-tions as the Red Ball, ABC, and XYZ motorexpress routes in the European theater werenot available.104 Nevertheless, the cargocarriers that were delivered overseas, espe-cially to Italy, to France, and to India foroperation over the Stilwell Road intoChina, were of great value to those theaters.

While endeavoring to have more suitablevehicles provided for oversea highway op-erations, the Chief of Transportation pro-moted tests to demonstrate the ability ofstandard Army trucks to carry more thantheir rated capacities. Those capacities hadbeen established for off-the-road operationand it was readily proved that for move-ments over surfaced roads the vehicles couldlift heavier loads without undue wear orstrain. As a result, the War Department inMay 1944 authorized overloads when thevehicles were employed on good high-ways.105 For example, the 2½-ton 6x6 truckwas permitted to carry up to five tons. Thelarger permissible loads effected a great sav-ing in equipment and manpower. The tests,performed under supervision of the Ord-nance Department, also demonstrated thatthe 2½-ton truck, even when carrying anoverload, could haul a 4-wheel trailer withup to 6½ tons payload. The Chief of Trans-portation had developed a trailer for use in

102 Gross final rpt, p. 83; Rpt, Hwy Trans inSupply Opns, by Hwy Div OCT, 28 Sep 44, OCTHB Hwy Div Rpts.

103 See Rpts, Strategic Studies Br Hwy Div OCT,17 Jun 44, Sec. IV, and 18 Jun 45, Sec. V, OCTHB Hwy Div Strategic Studies.

104 Memo, C of Hwy Div OCT for CofT, 9 Oct45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps,par. 3b, OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.

105 Ibid., par. la; WD Cir 212, Sec. IV, 29 May44, and WD Cir 255, Sec. IX, 22 Aug 45; Rpt byHwy Div OCT, Tests of Efficient Loading Practicesand Related Operating Characteristics for ArmyCargo Vehicles, 30 Sep 44, OCT HB Hwy DivCargo Vehicles.

HARD GOING ON OVERSEA HIGHWAYS. Trucks stalled in the mud.on Okina-wa waiting to be towed by bulldozers (top). Convoy en route to China slowed down

by repairs on the Burma Road (bottom).


this manner, but it was not put in produc-tion because of the urgent need for othertypes of vehicles for highway transport,especially in the European theater.106

The importance which highway trans-portation assumed in the North Africancampaign and in other oversea areas neces-sitated a large degree of improvisation bytheater transportation officers, with the re-sult that theater operating practices werecompletely out of line with published doc-trine. Proposals for revision of the doctrinewere made by the Chief of Transportationin the summer of 1943, and these were par-tially incorporated in War Department di-rectives issued later that year; further rec-ommendations were adopted subsequently.

After making a careful canvass of theseveral theaters, the Chief of Transporta-tion proposed tables of organization andequipment for the newly recognized High-way Transport Service. Efforts to justifythese tables were continued through 1944and until their publication was authorizedin May 1945.107 Representatives of theChief of Transportation conferred with rep-resentatives of The Quartermaster General,as well as theater transportation officers,regarding new tables of organization andequipment for quartermaster truck com-panies, made necessary by the introductionof new types of vehicles and new operatingmethods.

The Chief of Transportation was calledon by Army Service Forces headquarters

and the War Department General Staff forestimates of the capabilities of highways inoversea areas, and studies of this naturewere made covering large portions ofEurope, North Africa, the Middle East, andthe Far East.108 These studies undertook toestablish the maximum tonnages of militarysupplies that could be accommodated on agiven road during a given period, usuallya day or a month. Account had to be takennot only of the character of the highwaysand the vehicles, but also the volume oftactical and other essential traffic likely tobe moving on the same highways. Similarstudies were made to determine the capa-bility of streets and highways to clear fromthe ports materiel which had been dis-charged from ships. The data developedwere of value for strategic as well as logisticplanning. Lack of information that mighthave been collected during peacetime andthe difficulty of assembling facts during war-time, especially for areas held by the enemy,were serious handicaps in this work.

The emphasis which General Grossplaced on the maintenance of close workingrelations with the theaters brought progres-sively better results. In the beginning it wasan uphill effort in which good intentionswere pitted against adverse conditions—thescarcity of shipping, the lack of adequateprocedures for oversea movements, thebackwardness of the Transportation Corps'procurement and training programs becauseof the corps' recent establishment, the lackof authority over some transportation ac-tivities, and the unsatisfactory status of thetransportation organizations in some thea-ters. The year 1943, however, witnessed

106 Conf, author with Maj D. K. Chacey, 20 May49, OCT HB Hwy Div Cargo Vehicles. Maj Chaceyserved with Hwy Div during the war and at time ofthis conference was C of Engineering and LogisticsBr Hwy Transport Sv Div OCT.

107 Rpts, Strategic Studies Br Hwy Div OCT, 17Jun 44, pp. 14-16, 18 Jun 45, pp. 10-12, and Incl11, OCT HB Hwy Div Strategic Studies; T/O&E55-402T, TC Hq and Hq Co, Hwy Transport Sv,7 May 45.

108 Rpt, Strategic Studies Br, 17 Jun 44, pp.6—11, and Incls, which include copies of rpts onstudies, OCT HB Hwy Div Strategic Studies.


definite improvement, which was apparentin the support of the campaigns in NorthAfrica, Sicily, and Italy. The improvementcontinued during 1944 and 1945 and wasclearly manifest in the latter stages of thebuild-up of strength in the United King-dom, the support of the armies in their

rapid advance across France into Germany,and the preparations in the Pacific for thefinal thrust against Japan. The evidence ofthis progress will be seen as the various as-pects of the corps' activities are presented.The problems which limited progress incertain fields will also be examined.

CHAPTER IV

The Field Establishment

The field installations which the Chiefof Transportation maintained in the zoneof interior may be grouped into three cate-gories: first, the ports of embarkation,which dealt primarily with ocean trans-portation and which had existed in peace-time, though on a modest scale; second, thevarious types of wartime installations whichfunctioned under the control of the zonetransportation officers and dealt chiefly withinland transportation, procurement, andstorage; third, other field activities whichdid not fall into either of the above cate-gories and which also had been set up afterhostilities began.

These field installations were the agenciesthrough which the policies and proceduresestablished by the Chief of Transportationwere given effect in day-to-day operations,and by which he kept in touch with generalconditions affecting transportation and pro-curement. The latter function is worthy ofemphasis, for in these two major aspects ofhis work—transportation and procurement—the Chief of Transportation was largelydependent on private industries in the per-formance of his mission, and General Grosssought to forestall interruption of service inthose industries by keeping informed re-garding shortages of manpower and ma-terials or theatened labor difficulties andusing the influence of his office to preventsuch conditions from becoming acute.

While the numerous field installationswhich the Chief of Transportation main-tained were on the one hand an expression

of his policy of decentralizing operating re-sponsibility, they were on the other handan essential factor in carrying out his doc-trine of integration in the control of Armytransportation. Such integration impliedcontinuous control by the Chief of Trans-portation over the movement of troops andsupplies from their points of origin in thezone of interior to the oversea dischargeports where they were transferred to thetheater and base commanders. GeneralGross stoutly opposed the arguments whichwere presented from time to time for thedivorcement of certain activities from hisfield establishment, because the continuityof his control would have been brokenthereby.

Ports of Embarkation

An Army port of embarkation is a highlycomplex institution, especially during war-time. It is far more than a shipping ter-minal. This fact is at once evident from theregulation which defined the responsibilitiesof the port commander. It read in part:

The commanding officer of a port of em-barkation will be responsible for and will haveauthority over all activities at the port, thereception, supply, transportation, embarka-tion, and debarkation of troops, and the re-ceipt, storage, and transportation of supplies.He will see that the ships furnished him areproperly fitted out for the purpose for whichthey are intended; he will supervise the op-eration and maintenance of military trafficbetween his port and the oversea base orbases; he will command all troops assigned


to the port and its component parts, includ-ing troops being staged, and will be respon-sible for the efficient and economical directionof their operations. He will be responsible forthe furnishing of necessary instructions to in-dividuals and organizations embarked or de-barked at the p o r t … He will be responsiblefor taking the necessary measures to insurethe smooth and orderly flow of troops andsupplies through the port.1

A port of embarkation is a military com-mand with jurisdiction over the shipping,storing, staging, and other facilities neces-sary to the performance of its mission, mostof which lie within the geographic limitsof a municipality. Ports of embarkationwithin the continental limits of the UnitedStates were under the command of theChief of Transportation in World War II.Although ports in areas outside the UnitedStates ordinarily were under the commandof theater commanders, the regulationprovided that the War Department mightplace such ports under the control of theChief of Transportation, and this was donein the case of certain Canadian and Alaskanports.

The term "port of embarkation" hasbeen used loosely to designate all port in-stallations under the command of the Chiefof Transportation, but more precisely suchinstallations were of three types. Strictlyspeaking, ports of embarkation were in-stallations which performed all or most ofthe Army's port functions and handled bothpassenger and freight traffic. Subports ofembarkation were operated under the super-vision of ports of embarkation, and in prac-tice they were of less importance from thestandpoint of volume of traffic and varietyof activities. Cargo ports of embarkation

also were operated under the supervisionof ports of embarkation, and were set up tohandle cargo primarily. By placing subportsand cargo ports under the supervision ofthe larger ports of embarkation, a savingwas made in overhead personnel, while atthe same time the smaller installations weregiven the benefit of expert direction. Theregulations also provided for mobile portsof embarkation, which were troop unitsorganized primarily to operate oversea portsbut which were sometimes used at domesticports prior to assignment to the theaters.

On the Atlantic seaboard, at the out-break of war in September 1939, the Armywas operating one port of embarkation,located at New York. During the ensuingtwo years of preparatory rearmament, aport of embarkation was established at NewOrleans and a subport at Charleston, S. C.2

The New Orleans installation was set upprimarily to handle traffic with the PanamaCanal Department, but its wartime activi-ties covered a much broader field, includingshipments to Caribbean, South Atlantic,and Pacific bases. The subport at Charles-ton, which was under the jurisdiction ofthe New York Port of Embarkation, wasestablished primarily to relieve the latter ofsome of the growing traffic with the WestIndies and Caribbean bases, but it alsoserved a variety of interests during the war.After the United States became a belliger-ent, Charleston was made a full port ofembarkation, and additional ports of em-barkation were installed at Boston andHampton Roads. Cargo ports were set upat Philadelphia and Baltimore, operatingunder the supervision of New York and

1 AR 55-75, par. 2b, 1 Jun 44. This discussionrelates to ports of water embarkation. Ports ofaerial embarkation were under the command of CGAAF.

2 Copies of documents regarding new Army portsand reports of activities at all ports are in OCTHB files pertaining to respective ports.

THE FIELD ESTABLISHMENT 97

Hampton Roads, respectively.3 A subportof the New Orleans Port of Embarkationwas operated for a period at Mobile. Portssubordinate to the Boston Port of Embarka-tion were installed at Providence, R. I.,Searsport, Maine, Halifax, Nova Scotia,and Quebec and Montreal, Quebec. Thesubport at Providence functioned onlybriefly in the early part of the war. TheSearsport cargo port was set up just priorto the invasion of the-European Continent,particularly to load ammunition and ex-plosives. The Canadian subports were notsteadily active and handled only limitedamounts of traffic.4

On the Pacific coast the only Army portinstallation in operation in September 1939was at San Francisco. During 1940 thequartermaster depot at Seattle was ex-panded to handle the growing traffic withAlaska, and in 1941 a subport was estab-lished there. After our entry into the war,Seattle became an independent port ofembarkation; a subport was established atLos Angeles under the jurisdiction of SanFrancisco, which later became an independ-ent port of embarkation; a subport was setup at Portland, which retained that statusthroughout the war and functioned underthe supervision first of San Francisco andthen Seattle; subports to operate under thesupervision of Seattle were set up at Prince

Rupert, British Columbia, and at theAlaskan ports of Juneau, Excursion Inlet,and Skagway. The installation at PrinceRupert was established for the dual purposeof lessening the load on the port of Seattleand the railroads serving it and of shorten-ing the sea route to Alaska. The installationsat Juneau and Skagway served as dischargepoints for traffic destined to Army postsin those areas and as transshipment pointsfor freight destined to more distant parts ofAlaska. The Excursion Inlet subport wasset up solely as a transshipment facility.Juneau, Excursion Inlet, and Skagwayserved as northern terminals for a bargeline which the Transportation Corps op-erated out of Seattle and Prince Rupertover the inside passage, for the purpose ofreducing the demand for deepwater ships inthe Alaska service. Skagway passed fromthe control of the Chief of Transportationto that of the Northwest Service Commandin the summer of 1943. Excursion Inlet be-came of decreasing importance after theJapanese threat to Alaska had passed, andthe installation was inactivated before theclose of hostilities.

The establishment of additional independ-ent port installations on the Atlantic sea-board met with no opposition on the part ofthe commander of the New York Port ofEmbarkation. The port commander at SanFrancisco, on the other hand, believed thatall port activities on the Pacific coast shouldbe under his control. In July 1942 he pre-sented arguments, though unsuccessfully,for operating Seattle, which had been givenindependent status, as a subport of SanFrancisco.5 In the spring of 1943, with LosAngeles and Portland functioning as sub-ports of San Francisco but being considered

3 Initially these cargo ports were under controlof Dist Trans Off at Philadelphia and 3d ZTO atBaltimore. This was altered to afford the cargoports the benefit of close integration with andtechnical supervision by NYPE and HRPE. Seememo, AGSPX 323.3 (8 Sep 43) OB-I-SPTOF-M,13 Sep 43, AG 323.3; Ltr, CofT for 3d ZTO, 22Nov 42, OCT HB Gross TZ's.

4 TC mobile port organization was stationed atChurchill, Manitoba, during the summer of 1942to transship troops and materiel to northern airbases. See Memo, CofT for CO of 12th port, 15Jul 42, OCT 323.3 Churchill. It operated undercommand of CofT in Washington.

5 Ltr, CG SFPE to CofT, 8 Jul 42, with atchdmemo, 4 Jul 42, OCT 323.91 San Francisco.

WARTIME ARMY PORTS OF EMBARKATION. The Oakland Army Base,Calif., an Army-owned facility of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation (top).Leased facilities at Newport News, Va., operated by the Hampton Roads Port of

Embarkation (bottom).


for independent status, the commander ofthe San Francisco Port of Embarkationproposed that his headquarters be desig-nated headquarters for all U.S. Pacific coastports except Seattle. His plan was to givethe two installations in the San FranciscoBay area (Fort Mason and the OaklandArmy Base) and the installations at LosAngeles and Portland equal status as operat-ing agencies under a single command. Thishe believed would allow greater flexibilityin transportation and supply matters, andwould help to allay jealousies between thecities in regard to their proportionate sharesof Army traffic. The Chief of Transporta-tion did not approve this plan; he pointedout that the trend in Transportation Corpsorganization was toward decentralization.6

As already indicated, Los Angeles eventu-ally was given independent status as a portof embarkation, and Portland was placed

under the supervision of Seattle because ofits proximity to the latter port and theheavy traffic which San Francisco was re-quired to handle. Thereafter the com-mander of the San Francisco Port of Em-barkation commanded only the Army portinstallations in the San Francisco Bay area.

At the close of the war the Transporta-tion Corps was operating eight ports ofembarkation, three cargo ports, and twosubports, through which traffic was beingmoved regularly to oversea destinations.The relative importance of the thirteen in-stallations, as measured by the number ofpassengers and the tons of cargo embarkedduring the period December 1941—August1945, inclusive, is shown in the followingtabulation:7

6 Ltr, CG SFPE to CofT, 14 Apr 43; Ltr, CofTto CG SFPE, 19 Apr 43. Both in OCT 323.91 SanFrancisco.

7 Gross final rpt, p. 59. Traffic of subports whichwere closed before V-J Day was relatively light andis included in traffic of ports of embarkation towhich they were responsible. The small numbers ofpassengers embarked at cargo ports are included inthe figures for the respective ports of embarkation.


For the handling of this large traffic andthe performance of related functions theArmy utilized both owned and leased facili-ties. At the beginning of the emergency thegovernment-owned properties included thelarge Army bases at Boston, Brooklyn, New-ark, Philadelphia, Newport News, Charles-ton, and New Orleans, all of which hadbeen projected during World War I, andthe smaller terminal at Fort Mason, SanFrancisco.8 While the public and privatelyowned terminals on the Atlantic and Gulfcoasts were considered adequate, theshipping facilities on the Pacific coast werea cause of concern. Accordingly, early in1941 the Army acquired terminal proper-ties at Oakland and Seattle and immediatelybegan to improve them; Later, when estab-lishing subports at Prince Rupert andJuneau, the Army found it necessary toconstruct piers and warehouses, because theexisting facilities were exceedingly limited.Excursion Inlet was an entirely new port.Otherwise, so far as terminals for thehandling of troops and general cargo wereconcerned, the Army relied on the leasingof municipally and privately owned facili-ties to meet its requirements on all coasts.Naturally, specialized facilities for storingand transshipping explosives had to beprovided by new construction. Troopstaging areas also had to be built at mostof the ports. The plants required for theprocessing of vehicles, tanks, and otherautomotive equipment prior to shipmentoverseas usually were leased properties,

which the ports improved according to theirneeds.

The largest port installation was at NewYork. In December 1944 at that port theArmy was using a total of 28 piers withberths for 100 ocean-going vessels, 4,895,-000 square feet of transit shed space, 5,-500,000 square feet of warehouse space,and 13,000,000 square feet of open storageand working space. The next largest in-stallation was at San Francisco where theArmy used 20 piers with 43 berths forocean-going vessels, 1,984,000 square feet oftransit shed space, 2,867,000 square feet ofwarehouse space, and 7,640,000 square feetof open space. At that time the stagingareas connected with the New York Portof Embarkation had active space capableof accommodating 78,099 persons (stationcomplement and intransit troops), and thestaging areas of the San Francisco Port ofEmbarkation had a total active capacityof 34,338 persons.9

As the ports of embarkation were estab-lished they were organized along linesfavored by their respective commanders.The Chief of Transportation did not under-take to dictate the plan, although he didissue a "typical organization chart" for theguidance of port commanders. The resultwas a lack of uniformity which eventuallybecame a handicap to the Chief of Trans-portation in his effort to establish uniformprocedures and thereby simplify the rela-tions of the ports with his office and other

8 For data concerning seven Army bases oneastern seaboard see Report of the Chief of Trans-portation Service, 1920, pp. 33—38. Except for partof the Brooklyn base, all facilities were leased tocommercial operators between the wars. DuringWW II, TC utilized all except the Newark base,which was used by AAF.

9 For details concerning these and other portssee folders titled Terminal Facilities, in OCT HBfiles for respective ports. The variety of facilitiescontrolled by port commanders is indicated in listsattached to Memo, Dir of Plans and Opns ASFfor CofT, 25 Jan 44, sub: Utilization Posts, Camps,and Stations, AG 323.3 Trans Gen. See alsoExhibit B to 1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 29 Jun 44,OCT 323.31 Utilization Command Facilities.


elements of the Army Service Forces.10

Accordingly, study of the problem ofstandardization was undertaken by theDirector of Operations and the ControlDivision, and various proposals were pre-sented for discussion at a conference of portcommanders held in January 1944.11 Theattitude of the port commanders, generallyspeaking, was unsympathetic. They wereopposed to any plan of complete standardi-zation, since it would ignore differences inorganization based on differing local condi-tions and peculiar personal relationships.They were unfavorable also to a proposalto replace the general staff plan of super-vision with one which would divide super-visory responsibility between two officers,designated Director of Port Managementand Director of Operations.12 The con-sensus of the port commanders was that itwould be unwise to attempt to fashion theorganization of a military establishment onindustrial lines.

Despite the desire of the port com-manders that the organizations which theyhad developed be not seriously disturbed,progress was made in the direction ofgreater uniformity. A new typical organiza-tion chart was issued in April 1944, whichthe port commanders were urged to followinsofar as practical. The last wartime revi-sion of this diagram, as of 1 July 1945, isincorporated as Chart 3.13 An approxima-

tion of what was informally called the"director system" was achieved by makingthe deputy port commander responsible forco-ordinating the work of the so-called op-erating divisions, and the chief of staffresponsible for co-ordinating the remainingdivisions. Although organizational differ-ences continued as between the several portestablishments, sufficient uniformity in thebasic plan was evolved to accomplish thepurposes toward which the Chief of Trans-portation had been working.

The operating divisions were those whichwere concerned directly with the means oftransportation and the movements of troopsand matériel.14 The Water Division wasresponsible for the loading and dischargingof transports, the employment of crews andstevedores, the operation, maintenance, re-pair, and conversion of transports andharbor boats, and the operation and main-tenance of piers, docks, wet storage basins,and marine repair shops. The Port Trans-portation Division was responsible forcontrolling the movement of passengers andfreight into the port of embarkation, effect-ing movements of passengers and freightbetween facilities of the port of embarka-tion, and co-ordinating all such movementswith arrangements made by the other op-erating divisions for the loading and un-loading of transports. The Overseas SupplyDivision received and edited requisitionsfrom the oversea commands for which theport had primary supply responsibility,forwarded extract requisitions to the propersources of supply, scheduled the inland andoversea movements of such supplies in ac-cordance with shipping schedules and over-sea requirements, and kept the oversea com-manders informed as to the status of their

10 Compare typical port organization chart andorganization charts of the several ports in TC OrgManual, 20 Oct 42, OCT HB TC Gen OrgManuals. See remarks by Gen Gross at First PortComdrs Conf, 30 Aug 43, pp. 2-3, OCT HB PEGen Port Comdrs Conf.

11 Proceedings of Conf, New Orleans, 11-14 Jan44, I, 1-25, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

12 See record of voting on three proposals in un-signed undated memo obtained from office ofDir of Opns OCT, OCT HB PE Gen Org.

13 No significant change was made between April1944 and July 1945.

14 TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, Apr 44, Sec.501.00, pars. 4, 15-19.

CHA

RT

3—TY

PIC

AL

ORG

AN

IZA

TIO

N FO

R PO

RTS

OF

EMBA

RKA

TIO

N,

APP

ROV

ED B

Y TH

EC

HIE

F O

F TR

AN

SPO

RTA

TIO

N,

AR

MY

SER

VIC

E FO

RC

ES: 1

JU

LY

1945

.

*T

he

Ove

rsea

s Su

pp

ly D

ivis

ion

exer

cise

s su

perv

isio

n ov

er t

he T

echn

ical

Ser

vice

s in

con

nect

ion

wit

h ov

erse

as s

uppl

y m

atte

rs.

Sour

ce:

Rep

ort

of t

he C

hief

of

Tra

nspo

rtat

ion,

Arm

y Se

rvic

e F

orce

s, W

orl

d W

ar I

I, 3

0 N

ov

emb

er 1

945,

p.

64.


requisitions. The Troop Movement Divi-sion arranged for the orderly movement oftransient military personnel through theport, supervised the processing of suchpersonnel at staging areas, prepared em-barkation schedules and billeting plans, andco-ordinated the work of all other divisionsaffecting such movements. The InitialTroop Equipment Division controlled theflow through the port of equipment andsupplies accompanying troops and alsomateriel shipped separately but consignedto specific units overseas, and it supervisedport activities pertaining to the clothingand individual equipment of transientmilitary personnel. The chiefs of these divi-sions constituted the Operations Council,which met from time to time with theDeputy Port Commander to plan for portoperations and discuss the problems in-volved.

This brief description of the functions ofthe operating divisions is in substance adescription of the basic functions of theports. Broadly speaking, all other elementsof the port organizations existed for thepurpose of supplementing and supportingthe operating divisions or contributing tothe administration of the huge installationswhich were built up around them. Since themore important activities of both the op-erating and the nonoperating divisions willbe dealt with in other parts of this history,the remainder of this section will be devotedto certain significant developments concern-ing relationships within the ports and rela-tionships between the ports and other mili-tary agencies.

In the preceding chapter reference wasmade to the position taken by some officersin the ASF headquarters that ports of em-barkation should be controlled by the serv-ice commands. This was but one aspect of

the broader doctrine that there should be noexempted stations whatsoever. The argu-ment supporting this doctrine was thatexempted stations within the service com-mand areas violated the principle of unityof command and constituted an obstacle toefficient administration and effective utiliza-tion of personnel and facilities. This subjectwas discussed repeatedly, but in the summerof 1943 General Somervell ruled definitelythat the exempted stations would be con-tinued. In its bearing on the ports of em-barkation, General Gross considered thisdecision "one of the finest," and remarkedthat it had been achieved "not withoutstruggle." 15 He considered it essential thatthe ports be operated under the control ofthe same agency that controlled inlandtraffic and ocean transport, since they servedas a link between the two and performed aco-ordinating function which was necessaryboth to the orderly flow of troops and sup-plies from the zone of interior to the over-sea commands and to the avoidance of idletime for ships and railroad equipment.

In addition to suggestions that the portsof embarkation be removed entirely fromhis jurisdiction, General Gross had to con-tend with proposals to remove importantactivities from the control of the port com-manders. In the summer of 1942 draftsof directives prepared in Services of Supplyheadquarters for the establishment of theservice commands, as successors to thecorps areas, provided for control of troopstaging areas by the service commandersrather than the port commanders. TheChief of Transportation entered a protest.The proposed change, he believed, would

15 Questions and Answers, SvC Conf, 22-24 Jul43, Questions 6 and 28, WD Library; Port andZone Comdrs Conf, 27-28 Sep 45, p. 21, OCT HBTZ Gen.


interfere with the close co-ordination whichhad been possible because troop movementshad been under the control of a singleagency at all stages. It was necessary to co-ordinate the movement of troops from theirhome stations with the readiness of thestaging areas to accommodate them; toco-ordinate the processing of the units atthe staging areas (including the correctionof deficiencies in personnel, equipment, andtraining) with their embarkation on thetransports (including the staffing and equip-ment of the ships and the billeting arrange-ments); and to co-ordinate the movementof the troop units and the movement oftheir organizational equipment through theports. If such co-ordination had to beworked out between the port commandersand the service commanders, whose head-quarters in some instances were in widelyseparated cities, the possibility of delaysand discrepancies would be much greaterthan if the port commanders had controlthroughout. This argument was effectiveand the staging areas were left under thecontrol of the port commanders.16

A similar proposal relative to theadministration of oversea supply was putforward by Army Service Forces head-quarters during the spring of 1943. Thisfunction had not been assigned to the portcommanders prior to Pearl Harbor, hencewas not traditionally a part of the portresponsibility. The proponents of the newplan argued that the control of overseasupply was one of the most important ASFfunctions and should be administered by an

agency which devoted itself solely to thatpurpose and was more closely aligned withand more directly controlled by ASF head-quarters. They pointed out shortcomings inthe oversea supply operation as it had beenperformed under the port commanders upto that time. As an alternative they sug-gested that an Atlantic Oversea ServiceCommand be established at New Yorkto operate under the direction of ASF head-quarters and assume the supply function forthe transatlantic theaters; similar organiza-tions for other theaters were to be left forfuture consideration. Again the Chief ofTransportation voiced his protest. Hepointed out that lack of ships was the mostserious aspect of the oversea supply prob-lem; that the introduction of anotheragency into the operation would impairthe ability of the port commanders to co-ordinate the flow of supplies to the portswith the readiness of shipping to load them,and thus would affect the efficiency withwhich the available bottoms were used;that the responsiveness which the overseasupply divisions at the ports had developedin filling theater requisitions and in dealingwith changed priorities and other emer-gency demands would be disturbed by theproposed change. General Gross furtherstated that any changes in organizationand procedures at the ports that might beconsidered necessary to make the operationconform more fully to ASF standards wouldbe made. An independent study of thismatter by Maj. Gen. W. D. Styer, ASFChief of Staff, resulted in a finding thatoversea supply in general had been handledefficiently by the port organizations, andin a recommendation that no radicalchange be made in the plan then in opera-tion but that certain details of the system

16 Memo, Opns Off OCT for Gross, 26 Jul 42,sub: Effect of new SvC Org, and atchd papers,OCT HB PE Gen Staging Facilities; Conf of CG'sSOS, 30 Jul 42, App. to Rec of Afternoon Session,Question 40, p. 21.


be altered.17 This recommendation was ap-proved by General Somervell.

Although ports of embarkation wereexempted stations and hence independentof the service commands so far as theirbasic transportation activities were con-cerned, the service commands wereresponsible for a wide range of functionsrelating to the operation and maintenanceof the port installations.18 In many respectsthis arrangement was entirely acceptable tothe port commanders, but in others theyfound cause for complaint. Although someadjustments were made to meet the portcommanders' desires, and a high level ofco-operation was maintained, the arrange-ment was never wholly satisfactory tothem.19 Maj. Gen. H. M. Groninger, whocommanded the New York Port of Em-barkation during the greater part of thewar and later the San Francisco Port ofEmbarkation, pointed out in a postwarreview of problems that although the portcommander had the entire responsibilityfor the success of port operations, that

success was dependent in many instanceson new construction or the acquisition orrepair of existing facilities, concerningwhich he was required to make detailedjustification to the service command, withresulting delays and sometimes failures inobtaining authorizations. He also men-tioned internal security, public relations,utilities, post exchanges, and motor vehiclesas matters which were responsibilities ofthe service commands but which the portcommanders could have handled directlywith advantage. Brig. Gen. J. K. Herbert,commander of the Los Angeles Port ofEmbarkation, indicated that even thoughthere might be no inherent disadvantage inhaving the service command responsiblefor certain functions, the port sometimessuffered because the personnel assigned toperform those functions was inadequate innumber or experience, or because ex-perienced personnel was removed withoutnotice to the port commanders and withoutprovision of satisfactory replacements. Atthe foundation of the port commanders'problem was the fact that in certain aspectsof their work they had two bosses, theservice commanders and the Chief ofTransportation, whose interests and pointsof view did not always agree.

Each technical service or other War De-partment agency having a technical orsupply responsibility assigned representa-tives to the ports of embarkation. Theserepresentatives served as technical advisersto the port commanders and were respon-sible for the performance of the functionsof their respective services on behalf ofthe port establishments, the troops, equip-ment, and supplies handled in transit atthe ports, the vessels operated by the ports,and the supply requirements of the overseacommands for which the respective ports

17 Memo, C of Contl Div ASF for CG ASF, 16Mar 43, sub: Proposed Org of Atlantic OverseaSvC; Memo, ACofS for Opns ASF for CofT, 27Mar 43, sub: Shipments Overseas; Memo, Grossfor Styer, 1 Apr 43; Memo, Styer for Somervell,16 Apr 43. All in OCT HB PE Gen OverseasSupply.

18 AR 170-10, par. 4, 24 Dec 42; ASF Cir 265,Sec. VII and Incl 3, 11 Jul 45; See Memo, sub:Relationship between Sv Comdrs, PE's, and TZ's,drafted for Gen Gross's use at SvC Conf, Jul 43,OCT HB Exec Relations with SvC's.

19 Remarks of CofT at SvC Conf, 22-24 Jul 43,pp. 107-10, WD Library; see also remarks by CG2d SvC at same conf, pp. 293-94, WD Library; Ltr,CG SFPE to CofT, par. 11, 18 Sep 45, sub: Rpton Accomplishments, OCT HB SFPE Correspond-ence; Memo, CG LAPE for CofT, par. 3f, 17 Sep45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments, OCT HB LAPECorrespondence; Memo, C of Port and FieldAgencies Div OCT for Gen Wylie, par. 9, 12 Sep45, sub: Lessons Learned in WW II, OCT HBPort and Field Agencies Div Rpts.


were responsible. In most instances the porttechnical services required large organiza-tions. This was notably true in the case ofthe engineer officer whose responsibilitiesincluded the construction and repair of portfacilities, the ordnance officer who wasresponsible for the preparation of artillery,tanks, trucks, and other equipment for over-seas shipment, and the quartermaster officerwho supplied a great variety of subsistenceand equipment to the port installations andthe troops at the staging areas.20

Before the war the port representativesof the technical services, or supply servicesas they then were called, were responsiblemore to the chiefs of services than to theport commanders, but a change in thatrelationship was necessary because of theincreased responsibilities placed on theports during wartime and the necessity ofeffecting the closest possible co-ordinationof all port activities in order to avoid delaysto movements and insure the observanceof priorities. Insofar as their functionsrelated to oversea supply, the representa-tives of the technical services were underthe immediate direction of the port overseasupply officers, whose handling of complexrequisitions from the theaters required care-ful collaboration on the part of all con-cerned. In other respects the technicalservice representatives were responsibledirectly to the port commanders.21

The Chief of Transportation regardedthe functions of the technical service repre-sentatives to the ports as highly important,especially in relation to the movement oftroops and materiel. It was his policy that

on technical matters the chiefs of servicesand their depots should deal directly withthe ports, rather than through TC head-quarters, and that they should transact suchbusiness exclusively through their port rep-resentatives, rather than with the severaldivisions and branches directly.22 This wasdesirable not only as a matter of centraliz-ing responsibility for the respective services,but also because the port organizationsdiffered and it was difficult for an outsiderto know the office to which his businessshould be taken. The plan worked satis-factorily except as regards port air officers.Although the functions of these officers wereexplicitly defined by the War Department,and the Chief of Transportation requestedhis port commanders to make full use oftheir services, AAF headquarters restrictedthe activities of port air officers to themovement of troops and their accompany-ing equipment and made the Air ServiceCommand responsible for other equipmentand supplies moving overseas.23 The port airofficers, therefore, did not have the statusand effectiveness at the ports of embark-ation which the Chief of Transportationdesired.

During the 1930's the general depots atNew York and San Francisco were underthe command of the commanders of theports of embarkation and were operatedat the same locations—the Brooklyn ArmyBase and Fort Mason. As the volume of

20 PE historical reports include sections relatingto technical services, and technical services atNYPE made separate reports. See OCT HB filesfor respective PE's.

21 See NYPE Org Manual, par. 500, 1 Jul 44,OCT HB NYPE Org.

22 Memo, CofT for port Comdrs, 12 Jun 43, sub:Liaison with C's of Tech Svs; Memo, CofT for C'sof Tech Svs, 12 Jun 43, same sub. Both in OCTHB Exec. Staybacks, Dec 42-Dec 44.

23 WD Cir 137, Sec. I, 10 Apr 44; Memo, CofTfor port Comdrs, 20 Apr 44, sub: Port Air Offs,OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Remarks of Lt Col R.D. Meyer at Mtg of Port Comdrs and Port AirOffs, 8 Jul 44, included in Min, Port and ZoneComdrs Conf, 8-9 Jul 44, OCT HB PE Gen PortComdrs Conf.


traffic at New York increased, the un-desirability of this arrangement from thestandpoint of possible congestion wasrecognized, and in May 1941 the New YorkGeneral Depot was ordered out of theBrooklyn Army Base. Finding new quarterswas a slow process and the removal was notcompleted until almost the end of the year.24

No corresponding action was taken in regardto San Francisco until after Pearl Harbor,and the necessity of moving through theport area supplies for both the theaters andthe troops of the Western Defense Com-mand contributed to the serious railwaycongestion which prevailed there duringthe early months of the war. At San Fran-cisco it was not merely a question of re-moving the general depot from the portof embarkation, but of moving it out ofthe San Francisco Bay area, and this wasnot a simple matter under prevailing cir-cumstances, since time was required by theseveral supply services to find suitable newquarters and relocate their depot opera-tions.25 In view of the increasing responsi-bility borne by San Francisco in the waragainst Japan and the limited capacity ofthe rail facilities serving the port, the Chiefof Transportation in 1944 opposed theallocation of even a small amount of spaceat the Army port of embarkation for the

accommodation of Signal Corps stocks in-tended for local distribution.26

The removal of the New Orleans GeneralDepot and the Boston Quartermaster Depotfrom the Army bases at those ports, alsoundertaken early in 1942, was slow ofaccomplishment, but the delays were not soserious as at San Francisco because thepressure on those ports was not so great.27

The Seattle General Depot was locatedsome distance from the Army port installa-tion when we entered the war, and althoughits removal to a location inland was pro-posed, such action was not found neces-sary.28

Although the port commanders clearlywere responsible for the operation of shipsand shipping terminals at their installations,during the early part of the war they werein some instances embarrassed by the tra-ditional independence of the Army Trans-port Service superintendents who were im-mediately responsible for these activities.This independence had developed duringpeacetime when ATS overshadowed allother phases of Army port operation.29 Inwartime other activities took on increasedimportance, and closer co-ordination withwater transportation was necessary. GeneralGross first attacked this problem in July1943 by calling attention to the fact that

24 WD GO 4, Sec. II, 15 Apr 32; Memo, C ofTrans Br G-4 for C of Req and Dist Br G-4(Aurand) , 18 Aug 41, OCT HB Gross Day File;Summary of Hist Events and Statistics NYPE 1941,pp. 4-5, OCT HB NYPE.

25 Memo, CG SFPE for ACofS G-4, par. 3, 4Jan 42, sub: Rail Congestion in SF Bay Area,G-4/33867-1; Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 18Jan 42, sub: Diverting Shipments from SF,G-4/33867-1; Memo, TAG for C's of Svs, 2 Feb42, AG 681 SFPE; 1st Ind, ACofS G-4 for CGSFPE, 1 Mar 42, G-4/33889.

26 Memo, CofT for Dir of Supply ASF (Heile-man), 31 May 44, OCT HB Gross Day File.

27 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 9 Jan 42, sub:Shipment of Cargo through NOPE and Discontinu-ance NOGD, OCT 000.900 NO; Hist NOPE, Bk.II, Warehousing Sec., p. 3, OCT HB NOPE; BPEHist Rec, Jan-Jun 42, pp. 2-3, OCT HB BPE.

28 Memo, TAG for CG's IX Corps Area, SFPEetc., 30 Sep 41 ; Memo, AG 681 Seattle QM Depots(7-5-41) MR-M-D; Memo for record only, 3Feb 42, sub: Change in Status of SF and SeattleGen Depots, with notation of Conf, author withCol T. J. Weed. All in OCT HB SPE Misc.

29 See WD TM 10-380, Sec. II, III, 14 Feb 41,sub: Water Trans.

REACTIVATED ARMY BASES. Built for World War I, these installations atBoston (top) and New Orleans (bottom) served the Transportation Corps well in the

second world conflict.


ATS operations were completely under thecontrol of the port commanders. Soon there-after, in order to further emphasize thisrelationship, he announced the abolitionof the term Army Transport Service andthe substitution of the title Water Divisionto designate that phase of port operation.30

After visiting ports in some of the theaters,he requested that this change be broughtto the notice of the oversea commanders inorder that it might be made effective atports under their control.

It was desirable sometimes to load ordischarge cargo and to embark or disem-bark passengers at a U.S. port where therewas no port of embarkation, subport, orcargo port. Initially, the responsibility forsuch an operation was assigned to the zonetransportation officer in whose territory theport lay. He might perform this functionentirely with personnel of an organizationunder his own control, such as a districttransportation office or a port agency, orhe might call on a near-by port commanderfor personnel or other assistance.31 Laterthis responsibility was assigned to the com-manders of the ports of embarkation, andeach was given jurisdiction over a sectionof the coast line adjacent to his command.The port commanders were directed toutilize local organizations of the transporta-tion zones insofar as possible but to supplyexperienced Water Division personnel fromtheir own organizations to whatever extentmight be found necessary. This proved tobe the better arrangement, since transporta-

tion zone personnel frequently were notexperienced in the technical aspects ofdocking and maintaining ships and handlingcargo.

The port commanders had extensivetraining functions. In addition to theirresponsibility for continuance of trainingtroops of all arms and services while theywere at the staging areas awaiting embarka-tion, the port commanders trained individ-uals and troop units for a variety of trans-portation tasks.32 In the early part of thewar all troop units for the operation ofports in oversea theaters were trained atports of embarkation in the zone of interior.Even after unit training centers had beenestablished for this purpose, the port com-manders provided some training for portheadquarters, port companies, amphibiantruck companies, and harbor craft compan-ies. The command of the port commanderat New Orleans included the unit trainingcenter at Camp Plauché and the Trans-portation Corps School for officers andofficer candidates. Prior to the establish-ment of the Transportation Corps Schoolat New Orleans in 1944, the port com-manders at New York and San Franciscooperated officer training schools, primarilyto provide instruction in military mattersand orientation to the work of the Trans-portation Corps for men recently com-missioned from civil life.

The personnel required to operate themany facilities and carry on the multi-farious activities at Army ports necessarilywas large. The commander of the NewYork Port of Embarkation stated early in1945 that the number of persons then em-ployed at his installation was over 50,000,twenty times greater than it had been in

30 OCT Cir 88, 16 Jul 43, sub: Status of ATS;OCT Cir 113, 13 Sep 43, sub: Designation ofWater Div; Memo, Gross for Dir of Opns OCT(Wylie), airmail from Fiji, 20 Sep 43, OCT HBTheaters Gen; WD Cir 234, Sec. III, 27 Sep 43.

31 OCT Cir 80-7 rev., 29 Nov 44, sub: Responsi-bility of ZTO's for Water Trans Matters; Ibid.,rev., 15 Mar 45.

32 PE's part in TC training program will be dis-cussed in second volume of TC history.


1940.33 The personnel of the ports, sub-ports, and cargo ports which were activeon 31 December 1944 totaled approxi-mately 171,000, of whom about 155,000were employed on shore and about 16,000on transports and small boats. These figuresdo not include officers and enlisted men intraining at the ports for oversea duty, orpersonnel of the service commands per-forming functions at the ports for whichthe service commands were responsible.The above total may be broken down intothree general classes: military personnel,including officers, nurses, and enlisted men,representing 36.6 percent; the ports'civil-ian employees, including marine personnel,representing 45.6 percent; other workers,

including contractors' employees (such aslongshoremen ), and Italian Service Unitsand German prisoners of war who wereassigned to the port commanders, represent-ing 17.8 percent. The distribution of thispersonnel among the port installations atthe end of 1944 is shown in Table 2.

Because efficient port operation was es-sential to the orderly flow of men andmateriel to the oversea commands, GeneralGross selected the port commanders withgreat care. He saw that executive abilitywas the prime requisite for the head of solarge and complex an installation. Expertassistants were provided in all technicalbranches, and the essential task of the portcommander was to co-ordinate and controltheir activities and to plan for the develop-ment of personnel and facilities adequate

33 Maj Gen H. M. Groninger, "50,000 People,"Army Transportation Journal (February 1945).

a Figures (for New Orleans) do not include personnel employed by port commander for operation of unit training centerat Camp Plauché and TC School.

Source: Based on statement prepared in Office of Dir of Pers OCT, 23 Feb 45, OCT HB PE Gen Pers.


for future military needs. The port com-manders also had to maintain successfullythe vital relationships with the service com-mands, with local representatives of theNavy, the War Shipping Administration,the British Ministry of War Transport, theOffice of Defense Transportation, and thecarriers, and with the oversea theaters.Eventually all commanders of ports of em-barkation (not subports or cargo ports)were general officers, and the commandersof the two largest ports were major generals.The wartime commanders of the ports ofembarkation are listed in Appendix B.

Transportation Zones

The Chief of Transportation was respon-sible in the zone of interior for the "direc-tion, supervision, and coordination of alltransportation by common carrier … forthe War Department." 34 It was his task tomake sure that movements of troops andsupplies were started and deliveries effectedaccording to the requirements of the mili-tary program. To achieve this result for theArmy, it was necessary for him to maintainclose surveillance over transportation ingeneral and to take timely steps to preventthe development of unhealthy conditions,since any serious deterioration in the over-all situation would affect military traffic.Delay or confusion in military movementsin the zone of interior, moreover, wouldaffect shipments to the theaters, directly orindirectly, and might affect combat opera-tions within the theaters. These facts are tobe kept in view when considering the num-erous types of independent field installa-tions set up by the Chief of Transportationto deal with inland traffic, and their even-tual incorporation into nine transportationzones.

During peacetime no such field organiza-tion was necessary, since there was littledanger of congestion or interrupted serviceon the common carriers, and military move-ments were mostly of a routine nature sothat failure to maintain schedules involvedno serious consequences. Under such cir-cumstances it was feasible to leave the han-dling of the Army's inland traffic to the trans-portation officers at posts, camps, and sta-tions, and to the carriers, with only generalsupervision by The Quartermaster General.The emergency which followed the outbreakof hostilities in Europe and brought an in-crease in both military and nonmilitarytraffic in the United States presented adifferent set of circumstances. This becameclearly apparent after the passage of theLend-Lease Act in March 1941, whichadded to the volume of both inland andoversea freight traffic. The first new unitsof the transportation field organization, tocomplement the ports of embarkation, wereestablished during the summer of thatyear.35

Lend-lease supplies did not pass throughArmy ports of embarkation but werehandled over commercial piers, and in thebeginning there was no adequate machineryfor co-ordinating their transshipment. Re-alizing that this situation might lead toport congestion which would affect militarymovements, The Quartermaster General'sCommercial Traffic Branch sought author-ity to establish commercial traffic agenciesat the ports as circumstances might warrant,and that authority was granted in July

34 AR 55-5, par. 3a, 5 Oct 42.

35 An office was set up by OQMG in Detroitearly in 1940 to aid the movement of 17,000 trucksfrom manufacturers to troop units then preparingfor maneuvers, but this was a temporary mission.Interv, author with Anthony G. Liebler, 25 Apr 47,OCT HB OQMG Coml Traf Br.


1941.36 The first such agency was opened atNew York during the same month and an-other was established in Boston during thefollowing October. Their function was toco-operate with the port representatives ofshippers, consignees, and carriers in orderto keep lend-lease supplies flowing freelythrough the ports; and to keep conditionsat railway and shipping terminals under ob-servation and report developments to TheQuartermaster General. After our entry intothe war, commercial traffic agencies, or portagencies as they then were designated, wereestablished at other large ports, where theyfunctioned under the general supervision ofthe Traffic Control Division in the Officeof the Chief of Transportation.37

During the spring of 1941 there wereextended discussions between officials of theDivision of Defense Aid Reports (laterknown as the Office of Lend-Lease Admin-istration ) and the War Department regard-ing the need for transit storage facilitiesback of the ports to serve as reservoirs intowhich equipment and supplies destinedoverseas could be diverted pending the abil-ity of the ports to receive and transship them.It was believed that the volume of materielproduced by American industry for useoverseas would increase more rapidly thanthe capacity of shipping to lift them, so thatprotection against port congestion would benecessary. In July 1941 these officials de-cided to build two such facilities, at Marietta,Pa., and Voorheesville, N. Y., to back up

the North Atlantic ports. Immediately afterPearl Harbor six additional transit storageinstallations were authorized, and later twomore were added, making a total of ten.These holding and reconsignment points, asthey soon were designated, operated underthe supervision of the Chief of Transporta-tion's Transit Storage Division and handledsupplies destined to the U.S. forces over-seas and to allied nations under lend-lease.

During the twelve months followingPearl Harbor the Traffic Control Divisionestablished additional field agencies. Con-currently with the designation of the West-ern Defense Command as a theater of op-erations in December 1941, regulating sta-tions were installed at Spokane, Ogden,Salt Lake City, Albuquerque, and El Pasoto expedite, hold, or divert westboundmovements upon request of the theater com-mander.38 In view of the growing need forrepresentation at important productioncenters to aid the carriers and the trans-portation officers at Army installations andindustrial plants in moving traffic promptlyand efficiently, traffic control agencies wereestablished at Detroit, Chicago, Philadel-phia, St. Louis, and Cincinnati, beginningin May 1942.39 In July the first steps weretaken in the development of an extensiveconsolidated freight service to handle less-than-carload shipments, by the establish-ment of a consolidating station at Chicagoand distributing agencies at San Franciscoand Los Angeles.40

Other operating divisions in the Officeof the Chief of Transportation also found itdesirable to place representatives in the

36 Memo, C of Trans Div (Dillon) for Exec OffOQMG, 21 Jul 41, approved by QMG on samedate, OCT HB OQMG Coml Traf Br; OQMGOffice Order 229, 11 Oct 41.

37 Memo, TAG for CG's SOS, corps areas, etc.,11 May 42, sub: Designation of Port Agencies asExempted Stations, AG 323.7 (5-8-42). Whereport agencies were located in same cities as PE'sthey received technical assistance from port com-manders when needed.

38 Memo, TAG for CG's of Armies, Army Corps,WDC, etc., 19 Dec 41, AG 320.2 Reg Stations.

39 OCT Cir 14, 18 May 42, defines functions oftraffic control agencies.

40 Rpt on Adm Developments in Traf Contl Div,pp. 6-7, 23 Nov 42, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts.


field.41 The Transit Storage Division, inorder to better supervise the operation ofthe holding and reconsignment points,established district offices at Philadelphiaand San Francisco in July 1942. The High-way Division obtained authorization in Sep-tember 1942 to establish highway agenciesat Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Cleve-land, and made plans for placing its repre-sentatives at numerous other points. TheRail Division assigned representatives to thelarger port agencies to assist with railwaytraffic problems.

This complex field establishment, em-bracing agencies of several kinds, each cre-ated to meet a specific need, presented cer-tain disadvantages. Over-all co-ordinationwas difficult because the different types ofagencies were responsible to different divi-sions in the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tion. These divisions, located in Washingtonand heavily burdened, were obliged to domost of their supervising at long range.Furthermore, having several independenttransportation field offices located in thesame city was uneconomical from the stand-point of personnel and office space.

The first attempt to correct this situationwas made in July 1942. At that time all fieldagencies, other than ports of embarkation,located in cities where there were portagencies, were placed under the control ofthe respective port agencies. New installa-tions, known as transportation agencies,were set up at important inland cities andwere given control over all field activitieswithin specified areas, except holding and

reconsignment points.42 While this realign-ment of the existing organization was beingworked out, the Chief of Transportationfound it necessary to establish a new typeof field agency to support his growing sup-ply program. Five zone procurement officeswere created in October 1942 to functionas parts of the transportation agency atChicago and the port agencies at Boston,Philadelphia, New Orleans, and San Fran-cisco.43

The reorganization of July 1942 was onlyan initial step in the direction of consolida-tion, since it left twenty-seven field installa-tions (port agencies, transportation agencies,holding and reconsignment points) func-tioning independently of each other andrequiring supervision in both operating andadministrative matters by the Office of theChief of Transportation. The need forgreater integration was apparent, and it wasgiven added importance in November 1942by the transfer to the Chief of Transporta-tion of procurement responsibility for mili-tary railway equipment.

This objective was achieved with the cre-ation of nine transportation zones, co-extensive with the nine service commands,effective 1 December 1942.44 All existingfield agencies of the Transportation Corps,

41 Memo for record, prepared in Transit StorDiv, 14 Nov 42, OCT HB Transit Stor Div; OCTCir 46, 2 Sep 42; Memo, C of Hwy Div for C ofPort and Field Agencies Div OCT, 17 Nov 42,OCT 323.3 Misc 1942; Rail Div Hist Rec, OrgDevelopments up to 15 Nov 42, p. 5, OCT HBRail Div Rpts.

42 WD Cir 236, Sec. VII, 20 Jul 42; OCT Cir60, 12 Oct 42, sub: Port Agencies and TransAgencies; TC Org Manual, Secs. 20-22, 20 Oct42. These documents give locations and definefunctions of port agencies, transportation agencies,and holding and reconsignment points. Latter docu-ment also gives locations of nine port agencies andeight transportation agencies and their subordinateactivities. List of subordinate activities includessome which were projected but not actuallyestablished.

43 WD Cir 341, 10 Oct 42 ; OCT Cir 61, 14 Oct42, sub: Zone Procurement Offices ; OCT Cir 62, 19Oct 42, sub: same.

44 SOS Cir 91, 1 Dec 42, sub: Reorg of TC FieldAgencies.


except those pertaining to the ports of em-barkation and to training, were made re-sponsible to the new zone transportationofficers.45 The port agencies, holding andreconsignment points, regulating stations,consolidating stations, and distributingagencies retained their separate identities.The traffic control agencies, transportationagencies, highway agencies, and transitstorage district offices were discontinuedand their work was taken over by the zonetechnical staffs. Concurrently, fourteen dis-trict transportation offices were createdwithin the zones, to have jurisdiction overinstallations and activities in areas locatedtoo far from zone headquarters for effectivesupervision by those offices. The Chief ofTransportation was authorized to establishadditional district offices as needed and toset up branches of zone and district officesin cities where the transportation activitydid not warrant the establishment of full-fledged district offices.

The nine zone transportation officerswere the field representatives of the Chiefof Transportation, to whom he delegated"full authority on transportation matters,"subject to the limitations imposed by Armyregulations and Transportation Corps di-rectives. Their stated mission was to exer-cise general supervision over all transporta-tion matters within their respective zones,except matters under the authority of defensecommands, service commands, port com-manders, the Military Railway Service, andinstallations not under the command of theChief of Transportation; to establish, com-mand, supervise, and control installations

necessary for carrying out the directions ofthe Chief of Transportation ; to assist theChief of Transportation in controlling theflow of traffic through the zones so as toavoid congestion ; to give assistance in trans-portation matters, upon request, to com-manders of service commands and com-manders of exempted stations under thecontrol of War Department agencies otherthan the Transportation Corps.

The zone transportation officers thuswere charged with certain functions whichpreviously had been performed by the op-erating divisions in the Office of the Chiefof Transportation, directly or through fieldinstallations under their control. While itwas essential that the operating divisionsand the zone transportation officers shouldco-operate closely, and desirable that theoperating divisions should continue to aidthe field installations in technical matters,the Chief of Transportation was insistentthat this relationship should in no way in-terfere with the zone transportation officersin the performance of their mission orqualify their responsibility. Accordingly, hedirected that the authority of the divisionsin his office to communicate directly withfield establishments on matters of generalroutine and on technical details should be"closely construed," and he laid down rulesto be observed to that end.46 General Grosswanted the zone officers to feel free to ex-ercise initiative in the fulfillment of theirpurpose.

While the directive establishing the trans-portation zone organization was under con-sideration, opposition to the idea was ex-

45 Installations placed under zone officers arelisted in Instruction 5—1, Operation and InstructionManual, Zone and Dist Offices, CofT, 22 Dec 42.For revised instructions see Zone and Dist TransOffs' Guide, Nov 43. Both in OCT HB TZ Gen.

46 Memo, CofT for C's of OCT Divs and ZTO's,23 Jan 43, sub: Direct Communication with FieldEstab, OCT HB TZ Gen.


pressed by the Assistant Chief of Staff forOperations in the Services of Supply head-quarters.47 That officer pointed out that theservice commands were concerned withmovements of troops and supplies, and thatthe transportation officers of the servicecommands could serve as co-ordinators forall Transportation Corps activities withintheir respective jurisdictions. He believed,therefore, that the transportation zoneoffices were not needed, except perhaps inconnection with the procurement, storage,and distribution of materiel peculiar to theTransportation Corps. Realizing that simi-lar views might be held by some of the serv-ice commanders, the Chief of Transporta-tion emphasized to his zone officers thedesirability of full co-operation, and ar-ranged that the SOS chief of staff shouldaddress a letter to each service commanderexplaining how the zone transportationofficers could be of aid to them.48

The directive by which the transportationzones were created stated not only that thezone transportation officers, upon request,would aid the service commanders in deal-ing with transportation matters, but thatthey would, upon request, act as additionalmembers of the service commanders' staffsfor transportation.49 Certain service com-

manders expressed the view that this op-tional arrangement would not prove satis-factory and that a direct order was pref-erable. General Gross accordingly arrangedthat this provision of the directive be re-vised to state positively that the zone trans-portation officers would be attached to thestaffs of the commanding generals of thecorresponding service commands and wouldbe charged with staff supervision over serv-ice command transportation matters.50

When this revision was transmitted to thezone transportation officers by the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation, they were in-formed that the change placed them in arelationship to the service commanderssimilar to that of the division engineers.

Despite the positive language of the latterdirective, the majority of the service com-manders did not comply at once. The Chiefof Transportation kept developments underclose observation and kept ASF head-quarters informed. He found that where thezone transportation officers were permittedto function in the dual capacity a veryworkable arrangement resulted, which re-duced rather than increased duplication ofpersonnel and activities.51 He found thatthe delay on the part of certain service com-manders in accepting the arrangement wasdue to lack of understanding as to what wasintended, inability to visualize how the ar-rangement could be effected without themaintenance of duplicating staffs, or dis-

47 Memo, ACofS for Opns SOS for CofT, 28 Nov42, OCT 020 Reorg of TC Field Installations.

48 Memo, CofT for CofS SOS, 5 Dec 42, sub:Reorg of TC Field Agencies; Memo, CofS SOSfor CG's of SvC's, 6 Dec 42, same sub. Both inOCT 020 Reorg of TC Field Installations. Prior toestablishment of TZ's, most SvC's had disregardedoffer of CofT to provide experienced personnel toserve as transportation officers at SvC head-quarters, posts, camps, and stations. See Memo,ACofT for CofT, 12 Sep 42, OCT HB Gross SvC's.

49 SOS Cir 91, pars. 8b (5) and 9; Memo, CofTfor TAG, 6 Jan 43, AG 320.2 (1 Dec 42) Reorgof TC Field Agencies.

50 SOS Cir 3, 6 Jan 43, sub: Reorg of TC FieldAgencies; Memo, OCT for ZTO's, 7 Jan 43. Bothin OCT 020 Reorg of TC Field Installations.

51 Memo, CG 6th SvC for CG SOS, 23 Jan 43,OCT 020 Reorg of TC Field Installations; 2d Ind,CofT for CG SOS, 10 Mar 43, and atchd papers,OCT HB Exec Relations with SvC's.

satisfaction with the incumbent of the zonetransportation office.52

For more than a year after the establish-ment of the zones the Chief of Transporta-tion was confronted not only with the re-fusal of some service commanders to placethe zone transportation officers on theirstaffs or otherwise utilize their services, butalso with the more basic contention that thezone transportation organizations should besolely under the control of the service com-manders.53 General Gross preferred to meetthis situation with persuasion rather than toseek an arbitrary enforcement of the SOSdirective. He pointed out that many of thefunctions of the zone transportation officerswere of a highly technical nature and en-tirely foreign to the normal operations ofthe service commands, such as those relatingto port agencies, holding and reconsignmentpoints, consolidating stations, distributingagencies, and the control of traffic move-ments. He indicated that while the servicecommanders were responsible for supervi-sion of transportation activities at Class Iand Class II installations, they had no suchresponsibility at Class III and Class IV in-stallations and that only the zone trans-portation officers were in a position to aid


the transportation officers at such stations.He emphasized that the zone transportationofficers dealt with many matters whichtranscended service command boundariesand could be satisfactorily handled only byofficers functioning under the direction ofthe Chief of Transportation, who operatedon a nation-wide basis.54

In July 1943 General Gross, in an ad-dress before a conference of service com-manders, explained the purpose and organ-ization of his office and the zone transpor-tation establishments, cited the satisfactoryresults which had been achieved in the sec-ond and sixth zones where the zone trans-portation officers had been fully utilized bythe service commanders, and indicated hiswillingness to place in charge of the zonesindividuals who were acceptable in all re-spects to the service commanders. At thisconference General Somervell, after hearingboth sides of the case, stated that he under-stood the service command point of view,but that in wartime control of transporta-tion should not be broken up by servicecommand boundaries, and that the existingarrangement would stand.55

In December 1943 it was reported thatthe second, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninthzone transportation officers were serving asrepresentatives of both the service com-manders and the Chief of Transportation.It was not until September 1944, however,that General Gross was able to announcethat all zone transportation officers hadbeen designated transportation officers on

52 Memo, 1st ZTO for C of Contl Div OCT, 8Mar 43; Memo, CofS ASF for CG 4th SvC, 24Mar 43; 1st Ind, CG 4th SvC for CG ASF, 11Apr 43; Memo, C of Contl Div OCT for C ofContl Div ASF, 23 Jun 43. All in OCT 020Reorg of TC Field Installations. See also Memo,4th ZTO for CofT, 1 Mar 43; Memo, Port andField Agencies Div OCT (Mathews) for Dir ofOpns OCT (Wylie), 16 Jun 43, sub: Relationshipbetween 4th Zone and 4th SvC. Both in OCT 020Org of TC.

53 Memo for record by 2d ZTO giving views ofrepresentative of Contl Div ASF, expressed duringvisit to 2d Zone, 1 Apr 43, OCT HB TZ GenProceedings; SvC Conf, Chicago, 22-24 Jul 43,pp. 9-11, 95-104, 110-12, WD Library. Latterreference appertains to all Class IV installations,not only those of TC.

54 1st Ind, CofT for CG SOS, 9 Mar 43, OCTHB Gross TZ's; Memo, sub: Arguments in Favorof Retaining TZ's under Direct Contl of CofT,prepared in OCT for use of CofT at Sv ComdrsConf, 22-24 Jul 43, OCT HB Gross TZ's; Pro-ceedings of ZTO Conf, 24-26 Sep 43, p. 8, OCTHB TZ Gen.

55 SvC Conf, p. 104, cited n. 53.


the staffs of the corresponding service com-mands.56

In addition to the installations and ac-tivities which were assigned to them initially,the zone transportation officers acquiredother responsibilities. In order to protectmilitary and other government personneltraveling on official business from delaysdue to inability to obtain reserved accom-modations, the railroads began during 1942to set aside blocks of space for the use ofsuch travelers. This arrangement did notfully meet the military needs, however, andduring the summer of 1943 the Chief ofTransportation established a chain of Armyreservation bureaus. These bureaus, whicheventually were located in more than fortyimportant railroad centers throughout thecountry, were attached to other TC fieldinstallations for operation.57 In October1943 more than forty open storage yards,which were operated by the railroads forthe accommodation of Army equipment,were transferred for purposes of operationalsupervision from The Quartermaster Gen-eral to the Chief of Transportation, whodelegated certain inspection responsibilitiesto the zones.58 The Chief of Transportationdelegated to the zone transportation officerscertain responsibilities in connection withthe operation and maintenance of utilityrailroads at Army installations, the opera-tion of Army railroad repair shops, theassignment of Army-owned buses to localtransportation services in the vicinity of

Army installations and war industries, andthe assignment and utilization of the greatvariety of administrative vehicles requiredby Army installations, except those of theAir Forces.59

The zone transportation organizationswere concerned with all phases of trafficmovement. In addition to the basic func-tions of the port agencies, the regulatingstations, the holding and reconsignmentpoints, and the consolidated car service, awide range of duties was performed bytransportation experts in the zone and dis-trict offices.60 These men took precautionsto avoid congestion at important trafficcenters, investigated the causes of slow de-liveries, gave special attention to movementswhich required expediting, worked with thetransportation officers at Army installationsand with the carriers to assure that theformer's requirements of rail and motorequipment were promptly met, endeavoredto correct practices at Army installationswhich resulted in the useless detention ofcars and motor vehicles, and coached thetransportation officers at Army installationsin the techniques of full loading, properdocumentation, and the correct routing ofsuch shipments as were routed locally. Thezone and district offices maintained an in-formation service on highway conditions toaid the motor carriers in routing their ve-hicles and assisted them in procuring spareparts, obtaining competent operating per-sonnel, and enforcing proper standards ofmaintenance. They also assisted the motorcarriers in complying with state laws or inovercoming obstacles created by dissimilarregulations regarding the weights and

56 Memo, Exec OCT for ACofT, C's of Divs,etc., 10 Dec 43; Memo, Exec OCT for 1st ZTO,17 Nov 43, and Incls. Both in OCT 020 Reorg ofTC Field Installations. See also OCT Cir 125-1,C 1,21 Sep 44, sub: ZTO's.

57 WD Cir 40, Sec. I, 4 Feb 43; WD Memo W55-40-43, 24 Aug 43, sub: Army ReservationBureau; WD Cir 396, Sec. I, 7 Oct 44.

58 ASF Cir 89, Sec. II, 25 Sep 43; OCT Cir124, 4 Oct 43, sub: Insp of TC Stor Areas.

59 These functions are detailed in Ch. X of thisvolume.

60 Zone and District Transportation Officers'Guide, Secs. 110.1, and 110.2, Nov 43, OCT HBTZ Gen.

TRANSPORTATION CORPS FIELD INSTALLATIONS supervised by the zonetransportation officers. Railroad open storage yard at South Plainfield, N. J. (top).

Aerial view of the Elmira Holding and Reconsignment Point, N. Y. (bottom).


measurements of vehicles permitted to usethe highways. They aided the oversea sup-ply divisions at ports of embarkation inmaintaining their shipping schedules by in-vestigating the causes for delayed shipmentsfrom technical service depots or contractors'plants to the ports, and delays in informingthe ports of the nonavailability of requisi-tioned items. Toward the close of the warthe first, second, and fourth zones had airfreight regulating officers stationed at aerialports of embarkation, which were operatedby the Army Air Forces, to supervise themovement of oversea shipments of theArmy Service Forces through those ports.61

In the Chief of Transportation's opinion,aiding the transportation officers at posts,camps, and stations to perform their dutiesefficiently and in accordance with the regu-lations was an important function of thezone organizations. Errors made at pointswhere troop and supply movements orig-inated might result in delay, confusion, andadded expense. Some local transportation of-ficers had little experience as background fortheir work, which involved complicated andtechnical procedures and frequently had tobe performed under pressure. Yet in givingthis aid the zone transportation officersworked under handicaps. The local transpor-tation officers were responsible in the first in-stance to the commanders of the installations.The commanders of Class I and Class II in-stallations were responsible to the servicecommanders, and after the zone transporta-tion officers had been appointed to the serv-ice command staffs they were in a positionto give direct supervision to the transporta-tion activities at such installations, although

in so doing they were subject to the policiesof the service commanders which sometimeswere at variance with the instructions issuedby the Chief of Transportation. Class IIIinstallations were under the control exclu-sively of the Army Air Forces and in dealingwith them the Chief of Transportation'sfield representatives were limited to offeringsuggestions. The commanders of Class IVinstallations were responsible to the chiefsof the respective technical services, and thezone transportation officers therefore lackedauthority to take direct action affectingtheir operations, except of course in thecase of Transportation Corps installations.62

Under these circumstances the ability ofthe zone transportation officers to bring thepractices of local transportation officers intoharmony with the policies and proceduresprescribed by the Chief of Transportationvaried according to the type of installationand was dependent in many instances onthe cordiality of the personal relations whichexisted between the zone officers and theinstallation and service commanders. Whilemuch was accomplished through the estab-lishment of such relations, it is noteworthythat postwar reports submitted by the sec-ond and sixth transportation zones, wherethe officers in charge were of broad experi-ence and unquestioned competence andwhere the relations with the service com-mands were satisfactory from the beginning,stressed the handicap under which theyworked. Because of lack of authority to dealdirectly and positively with all local trans-portation officers they experienced greatdifficulty in establishing uniform practices

61 WD Cir. 75, Sec. II, 8 Mar 45. The first airfreight regulating officer began functioning for 2dzone in Nov 44. See 2d zone hist rpt for last quarter44, OCT HB 2d TZ.

62 AR 55-5, par 5b, 5 Oct 42. At the end of the

war, ASF Cir 312, 16 Aug 45, sub: Responsibility—CG's of SvC's at Class IV installations, placedClass IV installations in same relationship to serv-ice commanders as Classes I and II.


and a co-ordinated transportation pro-gram.63

From the time of their establishment untilMarch 1945 all of the zone transportationoffices and some of the district offices in-cluded supply divisions which performed awide range of functions in connection withthe Transportation Corps procurement pro-gram.64 The zone supply officers maintainedup-to-date records of the qualifications andpast performances of contractors for guid-ance in future procurement. Although thebulk of the actual contracting was done bythe Office of the Chief of Transportation,the zone supply officers placed orders forcomponent parts and materials as author-ized by the Director of Supply. They super-vised the performances of contractors lo-cated in their respective zones, making in-spections to enforce specifications, assistingcontractors in maintaining productionschedules, and eventually testing and ac-cepting the finished products. They estab-lished the requirements of contractors inconnection with the administration of thecontrolled materials plan. They representedthe Chief of Transportation in proceedingsconnected with the termination of contractsand the disposition of termination inven-tories. They supervised the distribution andutilization of equipment furnished to con-tractors by the government. They exercisedgeneral supervision over the operation ofthe Transportation Corps depots, whichwere located at holding and reconsignmentpoints and were subject to the direct super-vision of the commanders of the "points"in operational matters. Both the procure-

ment and depot responsibilities were di-vorced from the transportation zones in thespring of 1945, under circumstances whichwill be more fully explained in the nextsection.

The transportation zones and districtshad industrial relations officers who func-tioned in accordance with policies and prac-tices approved by the Chief of Transporta-tion.65 They kept the manpower situationunder close observation. They endeavoredto forestall strikes at manufacturing plantswhich were working on TransportationCorps contracts or in the transportation in-dustry. When work stoppages occurred,they sought to effect prompt settlement ofthe disputes by informally bringing the par-ties together or by enlisting the services offederal or state agencies having legal au-thority to deal with such matters. The in-dustrial relations officers in the zones alsoassisted contractors in meeting their man-power problems by proposing methods forimproving the utilization and the efficiencyof the labor on hand and by supporting thecontractors' efforts to bring additional laborto their plants when that seemed to be theonly way of keeping up with productionschedules.

At the time of the establishment of thetransportation zones, it was recognized thatan approximation of uniformity in organi-zation was desirable, but that complete uni-formity was not practicable because of thevariation in the functions performed in theseveral areas.66 Nevertheless, typical organ-ization charts were issued from time to time

63 Memo, 2d ZTO for CofT, 20 Sep 45, OCT HB2d TZ; Memo, 6th ZTO for OCT, 18 Sep 45, p.10; Ltr, 6th ZTO to Exec Asst OCT, 2 Nov 45.Last two in OCT HB 6th TZ.

64 Zone and District Transportation Officers'Guide, Sec. 115.1, Nov 43, OCT HB TZ Gen.

65 OCT Cir 21, 9 Feb 43, sub: Estab of Port andZone Ind Relations Div; TC Cir 5-2, 1 Jan 44,same sub; Zone and District Transportation Officers'Guide, Sec. 110.6, Nov 43, OCT HB TZ Gen.

66 Instruction 5—1, Operation and InstructionManual, Zone and District Transportation Officers,22 Dec 42, OCT HB TZ Gen.

CH

AR

T 4—

TY

PIC

AL

ORG

AN

IZA

TIO

N FO

R ZO

NE

TRA

NSP

ORT

ATI

ON

O

FFIC

ES,

A

PPR

OV

EDBY

TH

E C

HIE

F O

F TR

AN

SPO

RTA

TIO

N,

AR

MY

SER

VIC

E FO

RC

ES:

NO

VEM

BER

1943

.

*Dis

tric

t of

fice

may

or

may

not

int

erve

ne b

etw

een

agen

cies

sho

wn

belo

w a

nd z

one

head

quar

ters

.

**W

hen

dire

ctly

un

der

zon

e of

fices

the

se i

nsta

llat

ions

bec

ome

bran

ch o

ffic

es.

Sour

ce;

Zo

ne

and

Dis

tric

t T

rans

port

atio

n O

ffic

ers'

Gui

de,

Nov

embe

r 19

43.


for the guidance of both zone and districtofficers. The zone chart published in theZone and District Transportation Officers'Guide in November 1943 gives the mostcomplete picture of the activities which thezones carried on during the greater part oftheir existence, and for that reason it isshown here as Chart 4. It is to be notedthat the railroad repair shops had not beendesignated Transportation Corps field in-stallations at that time, and that later theyoccupied a position in the zone organizationsimilar to that of the holding and recon-signment points. The last wartime revisionof the typical zone chart, issued 20 March1945, shows considerable simplification oforganization and omits the supply divisionwhich then was scheduled for deletion fromthe zone structure.67

At the close of hostilities the transporta-tion zones included the nine zone transpor-tation offices and sixty-seven subordinateinstallations. The latter number does nottake the reservation bureaus into accountsince they were attached to other TC instal-lations, nor does it include the railroad openstorage yards which were operated by therailroads rather than the TransportationCorps. By that time (August 1945) all portagencies and regulating stations had beenmerged with or redesignated district trans-portation offices or branch offices. The ter-ritories embraced in the transportationzones and the names of the zone transporta-tion officers at different times during thewar are shown in Appendix C. The typesand locations of the subordinate installationsat the end of the war are shown in Appen-dix D.

The personnel of the zone transportationoffices and their subordinate installations on

67 Copy of chart in OCT HB TZ Gen. See OCTHB files for respective zones for charts showingvariations from typical organization.

a Data not available for contractors' personnel and prisoners of war employed at installations under the zone transportationofficers. Supply divisions were still included in the zone organization, but were soon to be transferred.

Source: Rpt, TC Personnel, 31 Mar 45, by Dir of Pers OCT, OCT HB Dir of Pers, Pers Statistics.


31 March 1945, including military person-nel and civilians directly employed, totaled9,625 (see Table 3). This figure does notinclude contractors' personnel and prisonersof war who performed transportation tasksat some of the installations. Exact data forsuch personnel are not available, but anestimate based on fragmentary data indi-cates that the total did not exceed 5,000.Assuming that the activities embraced inthe transportation zones employed between14,000 and 15,000, the number is smallwhen compared with the personnel em-ployed at ports of embarkation (171,000 on31 December 1944). The comparison callsattention to the fact that the work of thetransportation zones was mainly admini-strative and supervisory, while the work atthe ports was mainly operational.

Other Field Agencies

While ports of embarkation and the trans-portation zones embraced the field agencieswhich were concerned directly with trans-portation and traffic, the Chief of Trans-portation's field establishment included anumber of other activities. Those activitieswere concerned with the training of Trans-portation Corps personnel and the design,procurement, and distribution of Transpor-tation Corps materiel. Some of them wereplaced under the supervision of port com-manders or zone transportation officers be-cause those officers were qualified by expe-rience, or were favorably located, to giveeffective direction to the work.

The first Transportation Corps unit train-ing center was established at the Indian-town Gap Military Reservation in Pennsyl-vania in July 1942, primarily to supplementthe ports of embarkation in the training ofport battalions. Initially the commander of

the New York Port of Embarkation was incommand of this activity, but control laterpassed to the Third Service Command. InJanuary 1943 a Transportation Corps unittraining center was established at NewOrleans to train various types of units andit remained under the commander of theNew Orleans Port of Embarkation through-out the war.68 These installations later wereredesignated Army Service Forces unittraining centers, but the Chief of Transpor-tation continued to be responsible for theestablishment of training doctrine, pro-grams, and quotas for Transportation Corpsunits, and for conducting inspections to de-termine the technical progress of units intraining.69

While the headquarters of the MilitaryRailway Service was stationed at Fort Snell-ing, Minn., it supervised the training of rail-way troops, but when that headquarters wasmoved to North Africa in the winter of 1943the responsibility for such training was as-signed to the commander of the NewOrleans Port of Embarkation.70 The basicmilitary training of such troops was givenat the New Orleans unit training center(later named Camp Plauché), except whenthe program exceeded the capacity of thatfacility, in which case Fort Sam Houston,Tex., handled the overflow.71 Most railwayunits received their technical and unit train-

68 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 10 Jun 42, sub:Estab of UTC, OCT 323.5 Misc 1942; Memo,CofT for CG NYPE, 11 Jul 42, OCT 353 Indian-town Gap; Memo, TAG for CG SOS, CofT, etc.,10 Nov 42, AG 320.2 (11-1-42) SOS UTC NewOrleans: Memo, TAG for CG 3d SvC, CofT, etc.,3 Jan 43, AG 320.3 (12-31-42) TC UTC.

6 9 A S F Cir 104, Sec. III, 15 Apr 44; ASF Cir135, Sec. IV, 11 May 44.

70 OCT Cir 49, 5 Apr 43, sub: Tng of Ry Trs.71 Memo, Rail Div OCT (Holland) for Hist

Unit OCT, 16 Sep 44, sub: Tech and Mil TngSites, OCT HB Tng Div Unit Tng; TC Cir 35-4,1 Jan 44, sub: Tng of Ry Trs.


ing on the right of ways and in the shops ofcommercial railroads, but a few were trainedon the Claiborne and Polk Military Railway,a 50-mile stretch of track in Louisiana builtby the Army specifically for training pur-poses. Railway replacements received tech-nical training at different times at CampClaiborne, La., Camp Shelby, Miss., andFort Francis E. Warren, Wyo. Late in thewar, with the training task largely com-pleted, all training of railway troops, asidefrom that conducted on the commercialrailroads, was transferred to Fort Francis E.Warren.

In the spring of 1943 the Chief of Trans-portation began to train personnel for theoperation and maintenance of small boatsand amphibian trucks at Charleston, S. C.,under the control of the commander of theCharleston Port of Embarkation.72 Late inthat year these activities were transferred toa newly established ASF training center atCamp Gordon Johnston in Florida, wheremore adequate facilities were available. AtCamp Gordon Johnston the training ofboth units and replacements was under theoperational control of the Fourth ServiceCommand, but the Chief of Transportationwas responsible for training doctrines andprograms.

Several schools for the training of officersand officer candidates were operated by theChief of Transportation. In October 1942the Atlantic Coast Transportation CorpsOfficer Training School was established atFort Slocum under the control of the com-mander of the New York Port of Embarka-tion, and at the same time its Pacific coastcounterpart was established at Camp Stone-man under the commander of the San Fran-

cisco Port of Embarkation.73 Both were dis-continued during 1944, after the establish-ment of the Transportation Corps Schoolat the New Orleans Air Base under thecommand of the commander of the NewOrleans Port of Embarkation. The Trans-portation Corps Officer Candidate Schooloriginally was located at Mississippi StateCollege but was transferred to the NewOrleans Staging Area and placed under thecommand of the commander of the NewOrleans Port of Embarkation in June1943.74 It was moved to the New OrleansAir Base the following February and be-came the Officer Candidate Department ofthe Transportation Corps School.

A Transportation Corps school for civil-ian marine officer cadets was established atSt. Petersburg, Fla., in August 1943. Itspurpose was to train cadets to the pointwhere they could be commissioned and as-signed to harbor craft companies or as-signed as civilian officers to ocean-goingTransportation Corps vessels.75 This train-ing activity continued at St. Petersburguntil April 1945, when it was transferred toNew Orleans and became part of the civil-ian marine school which was conducted bythe commander of the New Orleans Port ofEmbarkation. In both locations it was un-der the operational control of the Chief ofTransportation.

The depots which stored and issuedTransportation Corps equipment and sup-

72-Hist Rpt, Mil Tng Div OCT, Feb 45, sub:Tng of Units, pp. 15, 41, OCT HB Tng Div Rpts.

73 OCT Tng Memo 2, 14 Sep 42, OCT HB TngDiv Offs Schools; TC Cir 35-1, 25 Feb 44, sub:TC School.

74 WD Memo W 350-6-43, 7 Jan 43, sub:Transfer of Adm OCS 4; TC OCS SO 134, 25Jun 43, OCT HB Tng Div OCS; TC Cir 35-1,25 Feb 44, sub: TC School.

75 Annual Rpt, Dir of Pers, FY 1944, section onindustrial personnel, p. 13; OCT Misc Ltr 150, 7May 45, sub: TC Marine Off Cadet School. Bothin OCT HB Ind Pers Div Tng Civ Marine Pers.


plies occupied space at holding and recon-signment points. During the greater part ofthe war they were operated by the com-manders of those installations, under thegeneral supervision of the zone transporta-tion officers, and in accordance with policiesand procedures established by the Directorof Supply in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation.76 In January 1945 the de-pots were made independent of the zonesand responsible directly to the DistributionDivision in the office of the Director of Sup-ply, but the commanders of the holding andreconsignment points continued to performcertain administrative and housekeepingfunctions for them.77 The depots then werelocated in four holding and reconsignmentpoints—Marietta, Pa., Voorheesville, N. Y.,Montgomery, Ala., and Lathrop, Calif.;subdepots had been established at the Au-burn, Wash., and Yermo, Calif., holdingand reconsignment points, and other sub-depots were contemplated. In view of theincreasing number of depots and the grow-ing volume of materiel handled, as well ascomplications anticipated in connectionwith the shift of emphasis from Europe tothe Pacific, centralization of control underthe Director of Supply was considered desir-able in the interest of uniformity of operat-ing methods and over-all co-ordination.

The decision to place a supply division ineach of the nine zone transportation officesat the time of their establishment in Decem-ber 1942, and also in many of the districttransportation offices, was inspired by thegreatly increased supply program whichthen confronted the Chief of Transporta-tion, the multiplicity of contractors utilized

by the Transportation Corps, the limited ex-perience and inadequate facilities possessedby many of those contractors, and the ob-vious need for close supervision over con-tractors to enforce specifications and main-tain production schedules. After the Trans-portation Corps supply organization andprogram had become better established andthe major production problems had beenmet, it was found feasible and economicalto reduce the number of supply offices in thefield.78 Accordingly, in March 1945 theChief of Transportation announced that thesupply divisions of the zone and district of-fices would be taken over by four new areaprocurement offices as rapidly as practic-able. The new offices, located in New York,Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco,were attached to the second, sixth, eighth,and ninth zone transportation offices foradministrative purposes, and except at NewOrleans the zone transportation officer wasalso the area procurement officer. Basically,however, the area procurement offices wereindependent field installations and the of-ficers in charge were responsible directly tothe Procurement Division, which func-tioned under the Director of Supply in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation.

During the greater part of the war, re-search and development were conducted bythe several operating and technical divisionsof the Office of the Chief of Transportationas well as by the ports of embarkation, butin January 1945 the Chief of Transporta-tion established the Transportation CorpsBoard to give added impetus to this work.79

76 TC Cir 5-11 rev., 6 Dec 44, sub: TC Depots;TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, Sec. 102.04 rev., 1Jul 44.

77 TC Cir 5-11 rev., 19 Jan 45; TC Pamphlet 1,Org Manual, Sec. 210 rev., 15 Mar 45.

754-915 O-64—10

78 Memo, CofS ASF for CofT, 15 Feb 45, sub:TC Procurement, OCT HB Supply Org; TC Cir5-8, 9 Mar 45, sub: Consolidation of Zone andDist Procurement Offices.

79 TC Cir 5-7, 17 Jan 45, sub: TC Bd; Hist ofTC Bd, prepared at Fort Monroe and submitted toCofT, 22 Jun 45, OCT HB TC Bd.


The board was to deal with a wider rangeof projects and to assure more thoroughtechnical treatment for each. It was to de-velop not only improved designs and speci-fications for Transportation Corps equip-ment and supplies but also better trainingprograms and operating procedures. Thisnew field agency was situated at Fort Mon-roe, Va., and was responsible directly to theChief of Transportation.

Supervision by Headquarters

A close supervision was exercised overthe field installations by the Office of theChief of Transportation, extending to allphases of their activity. The supervision in-cluded establishment of policies and proce-dures to improve efficiency and maintainbasic uniformity among the several installa-tions, control of the acquisition of facilitiesand personnel to keep them in proper rela-tion to the amount of work to be performed,and analysis of results to determine whetherthey measured up to the desired standards.Although the Chief of Transportation him-self took an active interest in the function-ing of the field agencies, approved themajor policies and procedures laid downfor them, and followed the reports of theiraccomplishments from month to month,direct responsibility for supervision restedwith the directors and divisions of his office.

With regard to technical matters relatingto transportation operations, military train-ing, and the various aspects of supply, theChief of Transportation expected his head-quarters to keep the field installations underclose observation and assist them wherevernecessary with expert knowledge and guid-ance. It was General Gross' policy, how-ever, that supervision should not be carriedto the point of stifling the initiative of the

men in the field. Since technical supervisionis discussed elsewhere, this brief review isconfined to what broadly may be termedadministrative supervision.

The Director of Operations, in additionto co-ordinating the actual handling ofmovements by the field installations, wasconcerned with the readiness of the installa-tions to perform their tasks and with thedistribution of the work load. He forecastthe volume of troop and freight movementsand notified the field agencies what theirrespective shares would be. In this he wasaided by the Planning Division. He devel-oped with the respective installations theadditions or reductions to be made in plants,equipment, and personnel in view of pros-pective increases or decreases in their workloads. The Port and Field Agencies Divisiondid the detailed work on such matters. TheDirector of Operations kept informed re-garding conditions at important inland traf-fic centers and at the port staging areas andsteamship terminals, and endeavored tokeep the flow of traffic evenly distributed soas to avoid congestion at any point. In thisactivity he was assisted by the MovementsDivision with respect to troop traffic andby the War Department delegate to theinterdepartmental Transportation ControlCommittee with respect to freight traffic.

The constantly increasing volume of workto be handled by the Transportation Corpsand the manpower shortage throughout thenation necessitated very close supervisionby the Chief of Transportation of all person-nel matters affecting the field installations.80

The Director of Personnel was responsiblefor such supervision, and he was assisted by

80 For over-all discussion of pers adm see AnnualRpt, Dir of Pers, FY 1944, and Rpts, Mil Pers Divand Ind Pers Div for FY 1945, OCT HB files, Dirof Pers, Mil Pers Div, Ind Pers Div.


the Military Personnel Division and the In-dustrial Personnel Division. He scrutinizedthe requests for personnel in the light of theTransportation Corps' over-all authoriza-tion and the prospective work load of therespective installations, and issued authori-zations accordingly. Personnel survey teamswere sent throughout the field to determinewhether officers and civilians were beingused efficiently and to propose improve-ments. In accordance with ASF policies,methods of work measurement weredeveloped by which the efficiency of partic-ular groups was determined.81 Monthlyindices were computed, based on January1943 as 100, to show the relationship be-tween operating personnel and work loadfor the Transportation Corps in the zoneof interior. The fact that the work loadindex for June 1945 was 363 whereas theoperating personnel index was only 151indicates that the per capita work outputincreased substantially during this period.82

With regard to military personnel, thebasic problem during the greater part of thewar was to keep the field installations sup-plied with enough officers and enlisted menof proper grades and qualifications to fillthe positions for which military personnelwas considered the more desirable. Thesupply of officer personnel was a constantproblem, because of the numbers with-drawn from the field installations to meetthe requests of theater commanders. Aspointed out by Lt. Col. (later Col.) Aram

Kojassar, Chief of the Military PersonnelDivision, the Chief of Transportation usedfar more enlisted men as operating person-nel than any other technical service, andmore than any of the service commands. Ofthe 58,000 enlisted operating personnel as-signed to TC installations at the end ofApril 1944, more than 48 percent wereeligible for oversea assignment. The Chiefof Transportation's military personnel situa-tion, therefore, was deeply affected by theWar Department's edict in 1944 thatofficers and enlisted men capable of generalservice be sent overseas.83 The release ofthese men and their replacement withlimited service men, Wacs, civilians, pris-oners of war, and Italian service units wasa matter which required close attentionand energetic efforts at headquarters.

Because of the heavy turnover of officerpersonnel at Transportation Corps field in-stallations, care was necessary to insure thatofficers were assigned to the jobs for whichthey were best fitted. Qualification recordsand duty assignments were studied by ateam of officers from headquarters, and re-assignments were recommended when cir-cumstances warranted. During the fiscalyear 1944, 387 misassignments were cor-rected in this manner.84

Civilian personnel management at thefield installations came under the super-vision of the Chief of Transportation's In-dustrial Personnel Division. The problemswere acute. The setting up of jobs and theassignment of personnel in the rapidlygrowing organizations were frequently done

81 ASF Manual M703-5, Jan 45, sub: WorkMeasurement; TC Pamphlet 14 rev., 15 Sep 45,sub: same.

82 ASF MPR Sec. 3, Jun 45, p. 32. Work loadindex was based on volume of outbound and in-bound passenger and freight traffic handled byPE's. Operating personnel index was based onmilitary and civilian personnel employed by TC inZI, excluding troops in training and personnel onvessels in transoceanic service.

83 Statement of Kojasser at Port and Zone Conf,6-9 Jul 44, morning meeting of 8 Jul, p. 4, OCTHB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; ASF MPR, Sec.5, 30 Apr 44, p. 29. Nearly all TC enlisted operat-ing personnel were at the ports.

84 Annual Rpt, CofT, FY 1944, p. 64, OCT HBTC Gen Rpts.


in haste, with resulting inequalities anddissatisfaction. The competition of otherand more remunerative employment wasincreasingly severe, so that the turnover ofemployees was heavy. Relations with themaritime labor unions called for great cir-cumspection. The personnel officers in thefield were coached in the rudiments of goodmanagement. Training was furnished to themen who served as classification analystsin order that job classification would pro-ceed on a uniform basis. A wage administra-tion manual was prepared to assist in themaintenance of uniform procedures. Classeswere organized to improve the efficiency ofemployees, fit them for promotion, anddiminish the temptation to look for jobselsewhere. Incentives to improve effort andbuild up morale were introduced. A de-tailed set of regulations was promulgatedby the Industrial Personnel Division togovern all aspects of the employment ofmarine personnel and promote the main-tenance of harmonious labor relations inthat important field.

The Chief of Transportation was notmade responsible for intelligence and secur-ity at the field installations under hiscommand when his office was created inMarch 1942; that responsibility rested firstwith the corps areas and later with theservice commands. The arrangement didnot work out satisfactorily at the ports ofembarkation, however, and step by step theport commanders assumed direct controlof these functions.85 The port installationsembraced a wide variety of activities of aspecialized nature, which were not found atother Army stations and hence were notfamiliar to the service command personnel.Special knowledge and training were neces-

sary for the proper protection of water-frontfacilities, for the inspection of ships, fordealing with longshore and marine labor,for indoctrinating troops at staging areasin preparation for their ocean voyage andarrival overseas, and for obtaining informa-tion of value to the Transportation Corpsfrom military and civilian passengers andprisoners of war arriving from the theaters.The port commanders were in the bestposition to select and train personnel forthese purposes, and to provide the facilitiesrequired by their work. Near the end of thewar the port personnel dealing with suchmatters included 170 fire companies, 6,000military police, 7,000 auxiliary militarypolice (militarized civilian guards), and200 investigators.

Supervision of these activities at the portsrested with the Intelligence and SecurityDivision in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation.86 During the fiscal year 1945 thedivision reviewed 5,900 positive intelligencereports and disseminated the useful infor-mation gained from them, supervised theprocedures employed for the military cen-sorship indoctrination of almost 2,000,000troops passing through the port stagingareas en route overseas, and exercised staffsupervision over the training of 286 officersin censorship schools. The division dealtin a supervisory way with such matters ascharacter investigations of civilian em-ployees, investigations into alleged subver-sive activities, collection of informationregarding war crimes from returning troopsand prisoners of war, and indoctrination ofreturning troops in the safeguarding of mili-tary information. As the agency responsiblefor internal security, it had oversight of the


86 See Hist Rpt, Int and Security Div, FY 1945,OCT Int and Security Div.


preparation of fire regulations, the opera-tion of fire-fighting schools, the organizationand equipment of emergency riot forces, thetraining of military police, and the develop-ment of antipilferage measures. Its technicalintelligence functions included surveillanceof the handling of classified documents andthe transmission of confidential shippinginformation by telephone, disseminationof technical transportation informationgathered from captured enemy documents,and the procurement of captured Germantransportation equipment for study by theTransportation Corps School. Utilizing twoinspectors on the Atlantic and Gulf coastsand two on the Pacific coast, the divisioncarried out 175 inspections at the portsduring the fiscal year 1945, which resultedin 800 recommendations dealing with thedetails of intelligence and security arrange-ments.

Safety at the ports of embarkation alsowas a responsibility of the Intelligence andSecurity Division. A number of the portoccupations were hazardous, especially thatof the longshoremen, and the hazard wasincreased by the necessity of night workand the pressure to meet convoy sailingdates. The problem was attacked from allangles, including the education of workmenin the necessity for care, specific training inthe avoidance of accidents, the establish-ment of accident prevention rules, and theinstallation and testing of safety devices.Substantial results were achieved by thisprogram, which was given special impetusbeginning in 1944 when all activity at theports was intensified. In 1943 the accidentfrequency rate (number of time-loss in-juries per million man-hours worked) forall War Department personnel at ports ofembarkation was 20.38, in 1944 it was14.08, and during the first five months of

1945 it was 12.66.87 The accident frequencyrate for military personnel at ports of em-barkation (number of disabling injuries per1,000 mean strength per year), which was45.9 in July 1944, dropped to 36.9 inDecember 1944, and averaged 34.3 for thefirst five months of 1945. The motor vehiclesafety program, which did not get underway until late in 1944, brought an im-provement in the accident frequency ratefor passenger cars and trucks (number ofaccidents per 100,000 miles of operation)from 3.94 in January 1945 to 2.73 in May.

The Control Division in the Office of theChief of Transportation had a significantrole in the supervision of the field installa-tions. A major portion of its effort wasdevoted to keeping the Chief informedregarding the accomplishments and prob-lems of the installations and assisting in thedevelopment of organizations and procedures to promote their effectiveness andefficiency. In accordance with GeneralSomervell's policy, the larger field installa-tions also had control divisions and thesmaller ones had control officers, all ofwhich functioned under the guidance ofthe Control Division at headquarters andassisted it in the performance of its task.88

General Gross attached great importanceto the work of this division, made it directlyresponsible to him, and encouraged it inthe aggressive performance of its mission.

The monthly progress report prepared bythe Control Division was a collection of sta-tistical tabulations and charts, accompanied

87 Ibid., pp. 18—19. Since the basis of computa-tion is different, accident frequency rates for theseveral categories of employees are not to becompared.

88 See Manual for Control Officers, prepared byContl Div SOS, approximately Oct 42; OCT Cir73, 2 Nov 42, sub: Estab of Contl Div in FieldInstallations.


by brief explanatory or interpretative notes,covering the more significant aspects of theTransportation Corps' activities.89 Thereport regularly included studies of import-ant phases of inland transportation, oceantransportation, port operation, and shiputilization, and periodically it includedstudies of other phases which were of par-ticular interest at the moment. In additionto the monthly report, special and more de-tailed studies were prepared when theywere needed to clear up problems. The dataassembled by the Control Division provideda basis for comparing the several field in-stallations from the standpoint of both op-erational and administrative efficiency.They were used in bringing to the attentionof the installation commanders the featuresin which their commands appeared to beweak, and in proposing corrective measures.The data were assembled from manysources, including the installations them-selves, the several divisions in the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation, and otheragencies such as the War Shipping Ad-ministration, the Maritime Commission, theCombined Shipping Adjustment Board, theTransportation Control Committee, theOffice of Defense Transportation, and theAssociation of American Railroads. Fre-quent visits to field installations by membersof the Control Division provided data andgeneral information not available throughthe routine reporting system.

The Control Division analyzed themethods and procedures by which the var-ious elements of the Transportation Corpsaccomplished their missions and proposed

improvements.90 A generous part of itseffort was devoted to procedures in con-nection with the marking and documentingof shipments, the oversea supply operationsof the ports of embarkation, and the dis-tribution of information regarding ship-ments and troop movements to all con-cerned. These were fields in which peace-time practices failed to meet the require-ments of war. The late establishment andrapid expansion of the TransportationCorps gave little opportunity for study ofsuch matters during the early part of hostili-ties, but such study was emphasized as thewar progressed. The Control Division wasaided by a procedures committee, whichincluded representatives of other elementsof the Office of the Chief of Transportation.Collaborating with the War DepartmentCode Marking Policy Committee, the divi-sion aided in the development of a markingsystem which provided the informationneeded by shippers, consignees, carriers, andTransportation Corps installations, and yetpreserved necessary security in the execu-tion of troop and supply movements. Itworked closely with Army Service Forcesheadquarters in the development of theWar Department Shipping Document andthe Vendor's Shipping Document, whichprovided the necessary papers for both do-mestic and oversea shipments, with reducedpaper work and increased clarity. It workedwith Army Service Forces headquarters andthe Navy in the preparation of a manualwhich included uniform shipping proce-dures for the Army and the Navy where such

89 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Transportation. Althoughissued as ASF document, this report was preparedentirely in Contl Div OCT. Full set in OCT HBMPR.

90 Memo, C of Contl Div for Exec Off OCT, 5Nov 45, sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps,OCT HB Contl Div Rpts; TC Cir 5-9, 8 Feb 44,sub: TC Procedures Com; ASF M 401, 25 Jan44, sub: WD Shipping Document; ASF M 410, 5May 44, sub: Vendor's Shipping Document; WDTM-38-412, Mar 45, sub: U.S. Army and NavyOcean Shipping Procedures.


were found practical, gave information re-garding the methods of each service whereuniformity could not be achieved, and pro-vided for an adequate flow of informationregarding Army and Navy troop and cargomovements to and within the theaters. TheControl Division also developed and super-vised a plan by which Transportation Corpsofficers at the ports and in the transporta-tion zones took measures to insure compli-ance of Army depots and contractors withthe complicated regulations relating to thepacking and marking of shipments, the uti-lization of shipping documents, and otherprocedural matters.

Other activities of the Control Divisionwhich affected the field installations wereits effort to reduce as much as possible thetime-consuming compilation of recurrentreports and its supervision of a work simpli-fication program. The latter program, whichwas initiated throughout the Army ServiceForces in March 1943, was based on a studyof individual and gang operations, for thepurpose of eliminating unnecessary motionsand improving the utilization of equipmentin order to save man-hours. Several types ofTransportation Corps installations providedgood fields for this type of study, particu-larly the ports of embarkation and the hold-ing and reconsignment points, which hadextensive freight handling operations. Eachinstallation was assigned a monthly quotaof work simplification study to be accom-plished, and was coached in the conductof the activity. The results were gratifying.Jobs originally requiring an expenditure of22,750,000 man-hours per month were an-alyzed, with a saving of 3,594,000 man-hours per month, or almost 16 percent.91

With regard to the organizational struc-ture of field installations, the records do notalways indicate where the proposals forchange originated. The effort for greateruniformity in the organization of the zonetransportation offices originated in the Con-trol Division. The effort to standardize theorganization of the ports of embarkation ap-pears to have originated in the office of theDirector of Operations. Changes in the or-ganization of the several types of installa-tions functioning under the zone transporta-tion officers often originated with the op-erating divisions which had the most directinterest in the functioning of those installa-tions. In all cases, however, the ControlDivision studied and evaluated the pro-posals from the standpoint of their probableeffect on efficiency.

General Gross considered periodical con-ferences between the key personnel of hisoffice and the key officers of the port andzone establishments an important elementof supervision. Numerous references will befound throughout this history to statementsmade and directions given at such confer-ences. They contributed substantially to theunderstanding which officers at headquartersand those in the field had of each other'sproblems and opinions. In particular theyenabled the Chief of Transportation to de-termine by a frank exchange of views howfar new policies and procedures could beimposed upon the field without disturbingunduly the smooth performance of theirwork. The conferences were held at aboutsix-month intervals. The early meetingswere called for either port or zone officers.Later, both attended the same conferences;they met jointly with the officers from head-quarters to consider matters of common in-terest, and separately when matters of pecu-liar interest were discussed. During these

91 See Manpower Utilization Report on WorkSimplification, by ASF Contl Div, May 44, OCTHB Contl Div Procedures; Gross final rpt. p. 122.


meetings General Gross arranged for per-sonal and confidential talks with his fieldrepresentatives, so that they might feel en-tirely free in presenting their problems, par-ticularly in discussing the service and sup-port which they were getting from the head-quarters staff in Washington.

Demobilization Planning and Adjustments

Concrete planning for the adjustments tobe made in the field establishment after thecessation of hostilities was initiated in theTransportation Corps, as in other elementsof the Army Service Forces, more than ayear before the Japanese capitulation.92

This was a difficult problem for the Chiefof Transportation, because of uncertaintyregarding the rate of demobilization in theArmy as a whole and the extent to whichoccupation forces would be retained over-seas. It is not the intent to trace in thisvolume the intricate process by which thepertinent information was gathered andplans for the inactivation of TransportationCorps installations were evolved. It seemsdesirable, however, to note briefly the sig-nificant adjustments which took place dur-ing the demobilization period.

From the start of the planning for post-war adjustments it was foreseen that afterthe peak of the repatriation movement hadbeen passed it would be feasible to inacti-vate all Army port installations except thoseat New York, New Orleans, San Francisco,and Seattle. Also, it was foreseen that thepiers, warehouses, and other facilities whichhad been rented by the port commanderscould be released rapidly, and in fact such

release was begun well in advance of V-JDay.93 The New York and San Franciscoinstallations, it may be noted, were in op-eration when World War II began, andthe New Orleans and Seattle installationswere the first to be authorized during theemergency period. By the end of May 1946the number of Army ports had been re-duced to these four. Thereafter, the NewYork Port of Embarkation handled the bulkof the Army's transatlantic traffic; the NewOrleans Port of Embarkation served thePanama Canal and the Caribbean bases,and loaded a large quantity of civilian re-lief supplies for Europe; the San FranciscoPort of Embarkation handled the trans-pacific traffic; the Seattle Port of Embarka-tion was concerned principally with trafficto and from Alaska.

The abnormal wartime conditions re-sponsible for the establishment of the instal-lations which functioned under the supervi-sion of the zone transportation officersabated rapidly after the termination of hos-tilities. Holding and reconsignment points,regulating stations, freight consolidatingstations, freight distributing agencies, andreservation bureaus soon became unneces-sary, and by April 1946 all had been in-activated or were scheduled for inactivation.Also, the work performed by the technicalstaffs of the zone and district offices greatlydeclined in volume. Accordingly, in the in-terest of economy, the transportation zoneswere consolidated with the service com-mands, effective 1 May 1946.94 The trans-portation officers of the service commandsthereafter acted as agents of the Chief ofTransportation in the performance of func-tions for which he was responsible, and di-

92 Memo, CofS ASF for CofT, 20 May 44, sub:Command Facilities; 1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF,29 Jun 44. Both in OCT 323.31 Utilization ofCommand Facilities.

93 See list of facilities released by TC up to 28Feb 46, OCT HB Port and Field Agencies Div.

94 ASF Cir 97, Sec. I, 18 Apr 46.


rect communication between the Chief ofTransportation and those transportationofficers regarding such matters was author-ized. This relationship continued when, afew weeks later, the functions of the servicecommands were taken over by six newlycreated Army areas.95 Although the zonetransportation organization which the war-time Chief of Transportation had cham-pioned so vigorously thus lost its identityduring the first year of postwar readjust-ment, the validity of the institution was re-affirmed in the Transportation Annex to theWar Department Basic Plan of 1 October1946. which provided for its re-establish-ment if another emergency should arise.96

As the number of active Army installa-tions decreased, the amount of utility rail-way equipment in operation decreased cor-respondingly, and two of the four railroadrepair shops were closed. The shops atHolabird and Ogden, which continued inoperation, functioned directly under thesupervision of the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, rather than under the trans-portation officers of the Army areas.97 Manyof the railroad open storage yards continuedto serve the Army under contracts arrangedby the Chief of Transportation until early1947. when thirty-three of them were de-clared surplus to the War Department andtransferred to the control of the War AssetsAdministration.98 The procurement officesat Chicago and New Orleans were inactiv-ated in April 1946, and those at New Yorkand San Francisco were attached to the

ports of embarkation at those points, to con-tinue the work of contract termination, con-tract settlement, and property disposal." Ofthe seven depots and subdepots which werein operation at the close of hostilities, fourwere closed out promptly, leaving only thedepots at Marietta, Voorheesville, andLathrop in operation after 31 October1945.100 Eventually, all except the Mariettadepot were discontinued, but the Transpor-tation Corps also occupied sections of thefive general distribution depots which wereestablished under the Army's postwar depotplan, announced in May 1947.101 TheTransportation Corps Board continued tofunction as a permanent field installation,but was transferred from Fort Monroe tothe New York Port of Embarkation in May1946.

The arrangements for training Trans-portation Corps troops during the warpresented several disadvantages which werecorrected after V-J Day. One basic faultwas that technical training for differenttypes of units was given at different installa-tions, which meant that units which wererequired to work together in the theaters,such as port companies, amphibian truckcompanies, and harbor boat companies,were not trained together in the zone of in-terior. Also, the Chief of Transportationbelieved that having certain training cen-ters under the operational control of theservice commands, as was the case duringthe latter part of the war, made it moredifficult for his Military Training Division

95 WD Cir 138, par. 6, 14 May 46.96 See Transportation Annex, par. 9h rev., 14

Jan 47.97 TC Cir 5-13 rev., 1 May 46, sub: Opn of TC

RR Repair Shops.98 Memo, CofEngrs for CofT, 28 Feb 47, sub: RR

Open Stor Yds Excess to WD; Memo, CofT forCofEngrs, 4 Mar 47. Both in OCT 619.5 OpenStor Yds.

99 OCT Misc Ltr (Corrected), 25 Apr 46, sub:Changes … Procurement Offices, OCT HBSupply Org.

100 Memo, Dir of Materiel and Supply OCT forC of Req and Dist Div OCT, 13 Sep 45, OCT HBSupply Depots.

101 TC Cir 45-55-1, 18 Jul 47, sub: PostwarDepot System.


to establish methods and enforce standardsthan would have been the case if they hadbeen under Transportation Corps control.102

The suggestion was put forward early in1944 that a single Transportation Corpsunit training center be established, but itwas not acted on at that time.103 A concreteproposal to that end was placed beforeArmy Service Forces headquarters in May1945, with the recommendation that Fort

Eustis, Va., be selected as the site for theactivity. During the following January theArmy Service Forces announced the estab-lishment of an ASF training center at FortEustis, to be operated as a Class IV activityunder the control of the Chief of Transpor-tation. Two months later the Chief ofTransportation arranged that the Trans-portation Corps School also should bemoved to Fort Eustis. After the dissolutionof the Army Service Forces, Fort Eustisfunctioned as a Transportation Corps in-stallation embracing the TransportationTraining Center and the TransportationSchool.104

102 Gross final rpt, p. 114.103 Proceedings, Port Comdrs Conf, 11-14 Jan

44, I, 131-33, OCT HB PE Gen; Memo, CofTfor Dir of Mil Tng ASF, 2 May 45, AG 354.1(1945) Dir of Mil Tng; ASF Cir 11, Sec. II, 14Jan 46; TC Cir 35-1 rev., 7 Mar 46, sub: TCSchool. 104 WD Cir 294, 27 Sep 46.

CHAPTER V

The Critical Role of Shipping

Throughout the war the demand forships exceeded the supply, with the resultthat from first to last ocean transportationwas a persistent and sometimes a seriouslimiting factor to be dealt with in planningstrategy and preparing for combat opera-tions. This was true despite the fact that thesubmarine, which in the early stages ser-iously threatened our lines of communica-tions, eventually was curbed and that theshipping losses suffered by the Allies weremore than offset by the magnificent Ameri-can shipbuilding achievement. In a war ofsuch great proportions, the task of movingmen and supplies between the zone of in-terior and the theaters of operation, andwithin the theaters, created a need for ves-sels which never was wholly satisfied. Acareful co-ordination of military plans withanticipated shipping capabilities was there-fore necessary. Even then, new develop-ments frequently created unforeseen de-mands. This latter fact is illustrated by astatement of the British Prime Minister tothe House of Commons late in February1945. He said: "The reason why shippingis so tight at present is because the peakperiod of the war in Europe has been pro-longed for a good many months beyondwhat was hoped last autumn, and mean-while the peak period against Japan has

been brought forward by American vic-tories in the Pacific." 1

At the outbreak of World War II theocean-going merchant shipping of all na-tions, counting vessels of 1,000 gross tonsor more, totaled 13,004 vessels of 59,078,-000 gross tons, or 81,359,000 deadweighttons.2 This represented a tonnage increaseof more than 50 percent over the vessels ofcomparable size under all flags at the be-ginning of World War I.3 The volume ofshipping registered under the flags of theprincipal maritime nations on 1 September1939 is shown below, and it is noteworthythat the United States and the British Em-pire between them controlled about 45 per-cent of the total deadweight of 81,359,000given above for all nations:

1 Quoted by Acting Secy State Joseph C. Grew,in "Our Global War," Department of State Bul-letin, March 4, 1945, p. 329. In this address Mr.Grew said, "There is … a serious shortage ofshipping. There has been ever since the beginningof the war and there probably will be a shortageuntil some months after the final defeat of theenemy."

2 Statistical study, Merchant Fleets of the World,as of 1 Sep 39, prepared by Div of Economics andStatistics, Mar Com, 24 Aug 45. Vessels on GreatLakes and inland waterways, icebreakers and otherspecialized types excluded. Copy in OCT HB TopicShipping Statistics—All Countries.

3 Exactly comparable data are not found, butJ. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control (Oxford,1921), p. 8, states that in midsummer 1914 worldshipping of 1,600 gross tons or more totaled 8,445vessels of 35,145,000 gross tons.


Although the United States ranked sec-ond among the maritime nations of theworld in September 1939, it began feelingthe effects of a shipping shortage long be-fore it was forced to abandon the role ofnonbelligerent. The war in Europe stimu-lated a demand for vessels throughout theworld, with the result that American op-erators reached out into new services andforeign purchasers and charterers activelyentered the market for American bottoms.The President's policy was to help the de-mocracies with shipping as well as with sup-plies and equipment. The accelerated im-portation of strategic raw materials, for im-mediate use in the manufacture of muni-tions and for stockpiling against the daywhen the sources of those materials mightbe cut off, created additional demands forocean-going vessels. On top of this camethe increased transportation needs of thearmed forces, which were engaged in build-ing up oversea bases and otherwise prepar-ing for eventualities.4 Confronted with manycompeting demands for the limited number

of vessels that were available, the Army andthe Navy found shipping one of their majorproblems. The difficulties which they ex-perienced in this field during the period oftransition from peace to war throw interest-ing side lights on the nation's state of un-preparedness.

Early Military Requirements

The outbreak of war in Europe neces-sitated early adjustments in the Army'socean transportation program. For severalyears prior to 1939 the Army TransportService had operated six transports—fourtroopships and two freighters. Early in 1939two additional troopships had been ac-quired as replacements for two which wereoutmoded and scheduled for decommission-ing.5 These vessels Were operated by theNew York and San Francisco Ports of Em-barkation, in scheduled services betweenthose ports and to Puerto Rico, the Pana-ma Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4 See United States Maritime Commission Reportto Congress for the Period Ended October 25,1940, pp. 1-2, 24-25; … Period Ended October25, 1941, pp. 1-2, 34-36. Hereafter cited as MarCom Rpt.

5 Memo, QMG for CofS USA, 23 Jan 39,G-4/29717-26; Ltr, SW to Chm Mar Com, 13Feb 39, G-4/29717-26; Memo, QMG for TAG,20 Jul 39, sub: Army Trans Schedule for FY 1940,OCT 561 Army Transports. The small militaryestablishment in Alaska was served chiefly bycommercial carriers.

PREWAR ARMY TRANSPORTS. The freighter, Ludington, in Army service since1931 (top). The troop transport U. S. Grant, a former German vessel seized during

World War I (bottom).


Developments in Europe in the late sum-mer of 1939 called for the early dispatch ofreinforcements to Panama and Puerto Rico,and the need for strengthening the ArmyTransport Service was at once apparent.6

Because the existing transports were old andpoorly suited to the Army's requirements,it was proposed to proceed with the design-ing of a new vessel-a matter which hadbeen under discussion for some time. Acontract for the preparation of designs waslet to a New York firm of marine architectsand that work eventually was completed,but authority to construct the vessel wasnot requested. The immediacy of the needled to the acquisition by the Army of anadditional old passenger vessel in Novem-ber 1939 and an additional old freighterduring the following month.7 The plan todecommission two transports was changedand the vessels were returned to service aftersome reconditioning. At the end of 1939,therefore, the Army was operating seventroopships and three freighters.

That still was the status of the ArmyTransport Service when in May 1940 asailing schedule for the ensuing fiscal yearwas approved.8 The schedule soon was seento be inadequate, because of the accelera-tion of the rearmament program whichfollowed the German successes in northernand western Europe. Pursuant to conversa-

tions with members of the Advisory Com-mission to the Council of National Defense,which began in June 1940, the Secretary ofWar wrote to the Commission in August,pointing out the inadequacy and unsuit-ability of the existing transports and urgingthe Commission to make funds availablefor the construction of four new vessels.9

This was in a sense a revival of the earlierproposal to build a new and specially de-signed transport, and it was contemplatedthat the designs for that vessel, which bythen were well advanced, would be used.The Advisory Commission stated, however,that it had no funds for the purpose, andbecause of the urgency of the need theArmy then turned its attention to the ac-quisition of vessels which could be utilizedat once. A survey by The QuartermasterGeneral of ships already in service, and aneffort to obtain from the Maritime Com-mission the allocation of two vessels whichwere under construction, disclosed the diffi-culties involved in increasing the transportfleet—difficulties that were due to the greatdemand for ships in the world market andto the Army's lack of ready funds for thepurpose.10

Action to increase the Army transportfleet substantially came late in 1940. A re-port was submitted by G-4 to the Chief ofStaff in mid-November, showing the antici-pated shipping requirements and capabili-ties, and recommending the acquisition ofadditional vessels. Within a few weeks anenlarged program was submitted, calling

6 Memo, ACofS G-3 for TAG, 26 Aug 39, sub:Reinforcements to Panama, G-4/ 29717-30 ; Memo,G-3 for TAG, 5 Sep 39, sub: Trs to Puerto Rico,G-4/29717-30; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA,9 Sep 39, sub: Specifications and Plans for NewArmy Transport; Memo, QMG for ACofS G-4,21 Feb 40, sub: Employment of Sp Svs for Trans-port Cons. Last two in G-4/29717-31.

7 Memo, QMG for ASW, 17 Nov 39, sub:Acquisition by WD of U.S. Ships, OCT 561 ArmyTransports; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 19Oct 39, sub: SS Ancon, G-4/29717-30.

8 6th Ind, TAG for QMG, 25 May 40,G-4/29717-23.

9 Ltr, SW to Chm Adv Com, 3 Aug 40,G-4/29717-41; Ltr, SW to Adv Com, 23 Aug40; Ltr, Secy Adv Com to SW, 29 Aug 40. Lasttwo in OCT 561 Army Transports.

10 Memo, QMG for DCofS USA, 19 Sep 40,G-4/29717-44; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA,23 Sep 40, sub: Army Transports, G-4/29717-26;Ltr, Chm Mar Com to SW, 18 Sep 40, AG 571.4(7 -11-40) Army Transports.

THE CRITICAL ROLE OF SHIPPING 139

for the purchase and conversion of threepassenger liners and one freighter, the char-ter and conversion of seven passenger shipsand four freighters, the purchase of twosmall transports for use by the Alaska andPuerto Rico commands, and the recondi-tioning of existing transports to enable themto meet the requirements of the steamboatinspection service. The Secretary of Warrequested the President to authorize him toincur obligations totaling $17,508,800 forthese purposes at once, stating that he didnot consider it feasible to wait for Congres-sional action because of the backlog of traf-fic and the increasing scarcity of ships. ThePresident indorsed this letter, "approvedsubject to O.K. by Budget Director." Thelatter official gave his approval.11

By early 1941 the seriousness of the worldshipping shortage had been deeply im-pressed on all concerned and the need fora more closely knit national program wasapparent. In February the President tookspecific steps to deal with the situation.12

First, in a note addressed jointly to the Sec-retary of War, the Secretary of the Navy,and the Chairman of the Maritime Commis-sion, he pointed out that the shortage waslikely to increase in months to come anddirected that the Army and the Navy takeover "a minimum number of merchantships" for their own use and insure that theseships "not be kept idle." A few days laterthe President instructed the Chairman ofthe Maritime Commission to co-ordinatethe employment of American shipping care-

fully in order to obtain maximum utiliza-tion, to co-ordinate the acquisition and cre-ation of additional ships and shipping facili-ties, and to aid the Office of ProductionManagement by expediting the shipment ofmaterials essential to its program.

In order to deal more effectively withthese and related problems the MaritimeCommission created a Division of Emer-gency Shipping, and gradually the commis-sion's regulatory activities expanded.13 Al-though it lacked authority for direct action,it soon began to exercise such influence asit possessed to check the rapid advance inberth and charter rates charged Americanshippers—a matter in which the Army asa large shipper took an active interest. ThePresident's declaration of an unlimitedemergency on 27 May 1941 placed in effectthe commission's authority to requisitionvessels of American registry, and Congresspromptly authorized the utilization of for-eign flag vessels which were lying idle inAmerican harbors. The Ship Warrants Act,approved in July 1941, gave the commissioneffective means of controlling the employ-ment of privately operated vessels of bothAmerican and foreign registry, and therates charged, by the granting of prioritiesfor the use of docking, repairing, and fuel-ing facilities.14

The President's action in February 1941reflected a suspicion that the Army and theNavy were acquiring vessels which theydid not need immediately, or were not uti-

11 Memo, G-4 for CofS USA, 14 Nov 40, sub:Water Trans; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 2Dec 40, sub: Water Trans: Ltr, SW to the Presi-dent, 4 Dec 40; Memo, SW for CofS USA, 14 Dec40, sub: Expenditure for Water Trans. All inG-4/29717-41.

12 Memo, 4 Feb 41; Ltr, 10 Feb 41. Both inG-4/29717-48.

13 Mar Com Adm Order 37, Supp. 29, 28 Feb41, OCT HB Mar Com Opns.

14 Memos, Chm of Trans Adv Group for C ofTrans Div OQMG (Cordiner) , 6 Mar 41, and(Dillon), 4 Apr 41, OCT HB Mar Com Opns; MarCom press release, 1 May 41, OCT HB Mar ComOpns: Mar Com Rpt for period ending October25, 1941, pp. 7, 37; PL 101, 77th Cong., approved6 Jun 41 ; PL 173, 77th Cong., approved 14 Jul 41.


lizing fully. A spokesman for the MaritimeCommission had indicated that additionalships would be turned over to the Army onlyinsofar as it could show that commercialvessels could not meet its requirements.15

Mr. John M. Franklin, member of TheQuartermaster General's TransportationAdvisory Group, called attention to the ad-vantages to be gained by operating theAmerican merchant marine as a nationalpool under centralized control, rather thandistributing the vessels among a number ofagencies—a doctrine well supported by theexperiences of World War I.16

The Army, however, had additional re-quirements which it considered minimumand continued to press for more ships. Thechairman of the Transportation AdvisoryGroup observed from the negotiations thatthere was a lack of understanding betweenthe Army and the Maritime Commissionand urged the adoption and enunciation ofcertain policies by the Army with a view toovercoming this handicap, including thepolicy of using commercial vessels for Armymovements to the extent consistent withmilitary requirements. Although space oncommercial vessels was used increasingly, aclear statement of Army policy on the sub-ject was not forthcoming. The War Depart-ment succeeded in obtaining additional ves-sels from the Maritime Commission, butnot without difficulty. At the end of April1941 the Army Transport Service was op-erating 26 ships, of which 24 were owned

by the War Department and two werechartered.17

With the limited fleet under his controland with commercial space in great de-mand, The Quartermaster General was un-able to move promptly the large amount ofconstruction materials and the personnelwhich American contractors were requiredto send to the new Atlantic and Caribbeanbases. This led the Chief of Engineers topropose, in the spring of 1941, that an ex-ception to the regulation be made tempo-rarily so as to permit his office to arrange forsuch movements.18 This suggestion was op-posed by G-4 on the ground that, with theprevailing scarcity of ships, the exercise ofcentralized control by The QuartermasterGeneral was more than ever essential. Asan alternative, the Chief of Engineers andthe other supply services were directed toappoint special liaison officers from theirtraffic organizations to maintain contactwith The Quartermaster General's newlyestablished Traffic Control Branch, placebefore it as far in advance as possible theshipping requirements of their respectiveservices, follow through on the handling ofspecific shipments, and investigate any com-plaints regarding delays to shipments,whether by rail or by water, which mightbe received from their field offices.19 In aneffort to increase his capacity for movingcargo to the Caribbean bases, The Quarter-master General explored the. possibility ofestablishing barge services from New Or-

15 Memo, C of Trans Div OQMG (Cordiner) forQMG (Gregory), 25 Jan 41, OCT 561 ArmyTransports.

16 Ltr, Franklin to Chm of Trans Adv Group, 24Jan 41; Memos, Chm Trans Adv Group for C ofTrans Div OQMG (Cordiner), 6 Feb 41 and 19Feb 41. All in G-4/29717-48.

17 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 24 Mar 41,G-4/29717-56; 1st Ind, QMG to TIG, 30 Apr 41,OCT 561 Army Transports.

1 8Memo, CofEngrs for ACofS WPD, 27 Mar41; Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 3 Apr41, G-4/32834; Memo, ACofS WPD for TAG, 7Apr 41. All in WPD 4351-51 to 91.

19 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 15 Apr 41, AG210.69(4-9-41) Traf Contl; Memo, TAG forQMG etc., 17 Apr 41, OCT 020.


leans to certain Caribbean ports. Althoughthe idea met with some favor it was notpursued to a conclusion because ocean-going barges and tugs were exceedinglyscarce at that time.20

During 1941 the Army took other stepsto insure that the utilization of its transportswas in keeping with the generally stringentshipping situation. In March, in responseto approaches from the Reconstruction Fi-nance Corporation and the Maritime Com-mission, the War Department agreed to liftgovernment rubber from the Far East onhomeward transports, with the understand-ing that any loss of transport time would becompensated by the assignment of addi-tional vessels, and a few months later thisarrangement was extended to strategic gov-ernment cargoes from the west coast ofSouth America.21 Subsequently the JudgeAdvocate General was requested to deter-mine whether under emergency conditionsit would be legal for Army transports tocarry commercial passengers and cargoeswhen commercial space was not available,and an affirmative opinion was rendered.22

In April Army Transport Service sailingsbetween New York and San Francisco wereordered discontinued, the traffic betweenthose ports to move by rail.23 In June, be-

cause of the increasing number of militaryand civilian personnel stationed overseasand the scarcity of both passenger and cargospace, the transportation of dependents,household goods, and private automobilesto oversea stations by Army transports wasdiscontinued.24 In order to shorten the seavoyages to the Caribbean bases, the Pan-ama Canal, and Alaska, and also to lightenthe loads on the primary ports at New Yorkand San Francisco, increasing use was madeof the ports of Charleston, New Orleans,and Seattle.

Following up the action which he hadtaken earlier in the year, the President inJuly 1941 requested that the Army, theNavy, and the Maritime Commission makea joint investigation to determine whetherthe vessels operated by the military serviceswere being utilized with maximum efficien-cy. The War Department pledged its fullco-operation in such an investigation andsubmitted a list of its transports showingtheir current employment.25 This report ap-parently satisfied the President and theMaritime Commission.

One of the difficult problems of thisperiod was to obtain a reasonably accurateestimate of the tonnage of cargoes to bemoved overseas, as a basis for determiningthe amount of shipping which the ArmyTransport Service would need. The procur-ing services of the War Department werehandicapped in supplying such figures, notonly by the extreme elasticity of the over-sea requirements but also by uncertainty asto the rate at which industry would be able

20 Memo for record, by Col D. C. Cordiner, 9Apr 41, sub: Trans of Cargo to Atlantic Bases,OCT HB OQMG Traf Contl Br.

21 Ltr, SW to Chm Mar Com, 12 Mar 41,G-4/29717-54; DF, ACofS G-4 for TAG andQMG, 28 Jun 41, sub: ATS to South America,G-4/29717-26.

22 Memo, ACofS G-4 for JAG, 7 Oct 41. sub:Authority for Trans Coml Passengers and Cargo;Memo, JAG for ACofS G-4, 17 Oct 41. Both inG-4/29717-90.

23 OQMG Cir Ltr 78, 28 Apr 41, sub: Discon-tinuance of Intercoastal Trans Sv; Memo, ACofSG-4 for CofS USA, 28 Mar 41 ; 1st Ind, TAG forQMG, 3 Apr 41, sub: NY-SF and SF-NY TransSv. Last two in AG 575.1.

24 Memo, TAG for CG's all Armies, etc., 7 Jun41, sub: Trans of Dependents and HouseholdGoods, AG 541.1 (5-26-41).

2 5Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 9 Jul 41,sub: Utilization of Army Vessels; Memo, DCofSUSA for SW, 10 Jul 41 ; Ltrs, SW to the Presi-dent, 10 Jul 41 and 12 Jul 41. All in G-4/29717-26.


to deliver the materiel. An estimate pre-pared early in 1941 in The QuartermasterGeneral's Transportation Division indicatedthat, as compared with 419,769 measure-ment tons shipped during the fiscal year1940, the tonnage for the fiscal year 1941would be about twice that amount, whilefor the fiscal year 1942 it was expected toincrease to over 2,100,000 measurementtons.26 In July 1941 the TransportationBranch of G-4 gave the Maritime Commis-sion an estimate of 2,317,000 long tons(equivalent to about 4,600,000 measure-ment tons) to be moved overseas during thefiscal year 1942, of which about 40 percentcould be moved by the Army transportsthen in service, while the remainder wouldhave to be shipped on commercial vessels.27

A statement prepared by the Traffic ControlBranch of the Transportation Division as of30 September 1941, based on the best cal-culations that could be made by the severalsupply services, placed the Army's total out-bound movement of oversea cargo for thefiscal year 1942 at slightly over 6,000,000measurement tons. Actual Army ship-ments during that year were slightly under6,000,000 measurement tons. The abovefigures do not include shipments by WarDepartment contractors on commercialbills of lading, which in the 30 September1941 statement were estimated at approxi-

mately 2,600,000 measurement tons for thefiscal year 1942.28

In reviewing the situation for the Chiefof Staff in September 1941, the AssistantChief of Staff, G-4, expressed no concernover the Army's shipping position. Hestated that the "Army's main fleet" (pre-sumably the Army Transport Service) con-sisted of 31 vessels—16 troop transportsand 15 freighters; that in addition to thetraffic handled by these Army vessels, alarge amount of commercial space had beenused, and that the Maritime Commissionhad met all requests for such spacepromptly.29 His statement indicated that theArmy Transport Service then had a capac-ity of 18,000 troops and 177,000 measure-ment tons of cargo; that the Naval Trans-portation Service had a capacity of 35,000troops and 273,000 tons of cargo; that inan all-out effort the Maritime Commissioncould make available ships with capacityfor 96,400 troops and 1,852,000 tons ofcargo. It added, with a tinge of optimismwhich was scarcely warranted, that theshipping situation was improving as theMaritime Commission's construction pro-gram produced more bottoms. It gave thefollowing summary to show the growth ofthe Army's transportation activities atUnited States ports since the outbreak ofhostilities in Europe:

26 Memo within Trans Div, Liebler for Cordiner,12 Feb 41, OCT HB OQMG Water Trans Br.

2 7Ltr, C of Trans Br G-4 for Chm Mar Com,25 Jul 41, OCT HB Gross Day File.

28 Memo within Trans Div OQMG, Wardlowfor Dillon, 30 Sep 41, and accompanying statisti-cal tabulation, OCT HB OQMG Traf Contl Br.

28 Footnote cont, from col. 1.Actual shipments for July-November 1941 basedon Water Trans Br Data Book II, OCT HB OQMGWater Trans Br; Dec 41-Jun 42 figures fromTransportation, Comparative Data, World War I—World War II, Jul 43, OCT HB MPR.

29 Memo, 10 Sep 41, sub: Status of Water Trans,G-4/29717-86.


The effort to reinforce the Philippinesduring the fall of 1941 was beset with nu-merous problems which brought into sharpfocus the Army's unreadiness to provideand move overseas large emergency ship-ments of troops and materiel. This effortinvolved the equipment of the PhilippineArmy and the equipment and reinforce-ment of the United States garrison.30 Atentative schedule of freight movements,starting 1 November, was submitted to theCommanding General, U.S. Army Forcesin the Far East (USAFFE), with an in-quiry as to whether Manila would be ableto accommodate the shipments. The replywas in the affirmative, but on condition thatnot more than six ships would be in port atany time.31 At the end of October, approvedPhilippine supply requirements amountedto 790,000 measurement tons, of which itwas estimated that 720,000 tons could belifted by 1 March 1942, mostly in spacefurnished by the Maritime Commission, ifthe supplies could be made available for thescheduled sailings. Although at that timemateriel totaling 500,000 measurement tonshad been released or had been recom-mended for release by the supply services,up to 8 December only 87,045 long tons, or297,481 measurement tons, actually hadbeen offered for shipment, and the majorportion of that tonnage was motor vehicles.

In order to expedite the movement of about20,000 troops to the Philippines, six com-mercial passenger liners were chartered tosupplement the seven Army transportswhich could be made available for thepurpose, and there was delay in arrangingwaiver of the inspection regulations so thatthe maximum number of troops could becarried on the chartered ships.32

When word of the Japanese attack wasreceived six troopships and nine cargo shipswere at sea bound for Manila. Nonereached its destination. Acting under radioinstructions four of the troopships whichhad sailed recently from San Francisco re-turned to that port; the remainder headedfor other friendly ports, and all but onecargo ship arrived safely.

It was recognized that this urgent move-ment of troops and supplies to the Philip-pines would place a heavy strain on theSan Francisco Port of Embarkation. Torelieve the situation so far as troops wereconcerned, the 30th Infantry was orderedto vacate the Presidio in order to make thatfacility available for staging purposes, andthe sailings of two Coast Artillery units toHawaii were deferred.33 The principalproblem, however, was with the transship-ment of cargo. A representative of theTransportation Branch, G-4, was sent toSan Francisco to observe the operation. Hereported that under the circumstances asplendid job was being done, but he alsopointed out that to save confusion and lossof time better marking of shipments by the

30 Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 29 Jul41, sub: Emerg Mbl Phil Army, and Incls, WPD3251-52; Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 21 Aug 41,sub: Equip for Phil Dept. Both in G-4/27573-18,Sec. I.

31 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 22 Oct 41, sub:Schedule of Shipments to Phil; Rad 674, USAFFEto TAG, 25 Oct 41, AG 575.1 (10-25-41 )MC;Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 30 Oct 41;Memo, QMG for CofEngrs, 23 Oct 41, sub: Ship-ments to Phil Dept; Memo, ACofS WPD forACofS G-4, 1 Nov 41, WPD 4560-1; Summary byTraf Contl Br Trans Div OQMG, 9 Dec 41. All inG-4/27573-18, Sec II.

32 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 13 Nov 41,sub: Phil Movement; G-4/27573-18, Sec II;Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 28 Nov 41, sub:Waiver of Safety Requirements, G-4/29717-96;Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 9 Dec 41,G-4/29717-96; Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1943,pp. 4, 5.

33 Ltr, G-4 (Ross) to CG SFPE, 13 Nov41, G-4/27573-18, Sec II.


supply services and prompter forwarding ofthe shipping papers to the port were desir-able.34

A representative of The Inspector Gen-eral also observed the operation from 29November to 7 December. He found thatthe port's task of loading ships with severaltroop units and their organic supplies andequipment, some of which came from homestations and some from other stations anddepots, was complicated by four difficulties:(1) inability to determine whether short-ages of equipment were the result of limitedsupply or other causes, (2) insufficientspace at the port for segregating and verify-ing the equipment of the several units, (3)insufficient personnel in the advance detach-ments sent to the port by the units, and(4) lack of experienced commissioned per-sonnel on the staff of the port commander.35

Preparations for Amphibious Operations

The Army's difficulties in obtaining suf-ficient shipping to service its oversea basesproperly were intensified by the necessity ofproviding vessels for use in joint Army-Navyexercises and in preparing for joint op-erations against enemy opposition. Thearrangements for such exercises and opera-tions brought to light many points of physi-cal unpreparedness, a lack of understandingbetween the Army and the Navy regardingresponsibility for the provision of transportsand landing boats, and the absence of ade-quate doctrine and procedures.

For the joint exercises which were heldon the Pacific coast in January 1940, theSan Francisco Port of Embarkation was

responsible for assembling the Army trans-ports which were to be used, installing spe-cial equipment on them, loading ship storesand supplies for the troops, and handlingthe embarkation of troops at two ports onPuget Sound. In his report covering theoperation, the port commander stated thatthe War Department had sent him no in-structions until he had asked for them, andthat the Fourth Army, from which the troopunits had been drawn, had provided nobasic loading plan by which he could beguided.36 Among the conditions requiringcorrection, as listed by the War Plans Divi-sion after an analysis of all reports sub-mitted after these exercises, were the trans-port masters' unfamiliarity with convoyprocedure, lack of up-to-date drawings ofthe transports, lack of proper facilities onthe transports for radio and visual signaling,unsuitability of the transports for "combatloading," insufficiency and unsuitability ofthe boats available for landing operations,and lack of adequate training in loadingand unloading personnel and equipment.37

The reports on these joint exercises andsubsequent discussion brought out otherpoints of unpreparedness. There was a dif-ference of opinion as to who should con-trol the combat loading of transports, theport commander or the commander of thelanding force. The pertinent regulation gavethe commander of troops the final decision,and The Quartermaster General consideredthis the proper arrangement since the prob-

34 Personal Ltr, Lt Col F. S. Ross to Col C. P.Gross, 3 Dec 41, G-4/27573-18, Sec II.

35 Memo, Lt Col John W. Mott for TIG, 13Dec 41, G-4/27573-18, Sec II.

3 6Rpt to CG Fourth Army, 27 Jan 40,G-4/30557-11; Rpts of other observers at theseexercises are in AG 354.21 (9-29-39), Sec 3.

3 7Memo, WPD for CofS USA, 11 Jun 40, sub:Joint Army-Navy Exercises (WPD 4232-4), AG354.21(9-29-39), Sec 3. Combat loading involvedstowing organizational equipment and suppliesin the ships so that they might be unloaded quicklyand in the order needed.


lem was essentially a tactical one.38 Thesuggestion was offered that a stevedore bat-talion should be activated to facilitate op-erations at ports of embarkation and de-barkation when such exercises were beingconducted, but G-3 considered this imprac-ticable since it would necessitate the in-activation of other units and the matter wasnot pursued further.39 The Army ascertainedthat the Navy was placing only limited or-ders for new landing boats, and conse-quently ordered such equipment for usewith its own transports. The Army also in-stalled heavier booms on those transportswhich were earmarked for service in jointexercises.40

The discussions between the Army andNavy regarding a further program of jointexercises disclosed disagreement on manypoints, including the extent of such exer-cises and the sources of the marine equip-ment to be used. The Army desired to haveone division on the Atlantic coast and oneon the Pacific coast thoroughly trained inamphibious operations and regretted theNavy's inability to accept this plan becauseof other commitments.41

The exercises held off Culebra Island,Puerto Rico, 27 January-13 February

1941, again showed that the Army trans-ports which were used were deficient inequipment and that the arrangements forlanding troops and impedimenta were in-adequate.42 A proposal which grew out ofthese exercises, that amphibious vehicles beused in effecting assault landings, elicitedfrom G-4 the comment that such vehicleswere not yet available but that study wasunder way for the development of this typeof equipment. Regarding the need for modi-fications in existing transports to facilitateassault landings, and the advisability of ob-taining new vessels especially designed forthat purpose, G-4 favored recommendingto the Joint Board a revision of paragraph18 of "Joint Action of the Army and theNavy," to make the Navy alone respon-sible for providing suitable transport forjoint exercises, since it had that responsi-bility in operations where real opposition wasanticipated. There had been no agreementon the latter point up to the time of ourentry into the war.

The fact that the Navy was responsiblefor providing transports for joint operationsagainst enemy resistance did not mean thatthe Army Transport Service was unaffectedby the preparations for such operations.Early in 1941, in order to avoid the neces-sity for improvising emergency expeditionaryforces after the demand had arisen, certainunits were selected for organization intothree task forces and planning was begunto place them in a state of readiness foroversea service.43 The Navy, after estimat-

38 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 21 Jun 40, sub:Rpt on Army Participation, etc., G-4/30557-11;1st Ind, QMG for TAG, 23 Jul 40. Both in AG354.21 (9-29-39), Sec 3. AR 30-1190, par. 3b,23 Jul 32.

39 Memo, ACofS G-3 for ACofS G-4 and WPD,6 Apr 40, G-4/30557-11.

40 Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 29 Jun40; Memo, OQMG (Kells) for G-4 (Ross), 26Sep 40. Both in G-4/29367-81.

41 Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS USA, 27 Feb 40,WPD 4116.1; Informal Memo for Gen Marshall,initialed OW, 19 Mar 40, with notes for discussionwith Admiral Stark; Memo, CofS USA for CNO,15 May 40, sub: Army-Navy Exercises, FY 1941;Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G-3, 11 Jun 40,sub: Army-Navy Minor Joint Exercises, FY 1942,WPD 4232.3. All in AG 354.21 (12-7-39), Sec 1.

42 See rpt of observer, Lt Col D. S. Rumboughto TAG, 21 Feb 41, sub: Army-Navy Joint Ex-ercises (Fleet Landing Exercise 7) ; Memos, ACofSG-4 for ACofS G-3, 7 Apr 41 and 22 Jul 41. Allin G-4/30557-11.

43 Memo, TAG for CG First Army, 10 Feb 41,sub: Org of Emerg Exped Forces, AG 381(11-12-40) Sec 2.


ing with Army assistance the shipping re-quired for moving these forces, found thatit would not be able to obtain all of theneeded vessels from the Maritime Commis-sion and proposed that it take over three ofthe Army's troopships. The final result ofthis proposal was that in late May the Armywas directed by the President to arrange forthe transfer of six of its troop carriers to theNavy, including the largest of its fleet, theManhattan and the Washington.44 In sub-stitution for these ships, the President di-rected the chairman of the Maritime Com-mission to turn over to the Army sevensmaller passenger vessels.45 In the same letterhe directed the Maritime Commission toturn over to the Navy five passenger shipsand fourteen cargo ships. Among the pas-senger ships thus placed under Navy con-trol was the America, the largest vessel un-der the American flag.

Three of the ships transferred from theArmy to the Navy were converted intocombat loaders. In July 1941 the Navy pro-posed that it also be permitted to convertten of the Army's remaining transports tocombat loaders according to Navy stand-ards, so that they would be ready if andwhen needed.46 The Quartermaster Gen-eral pointed out that this would impair thevessels' effectiveness on the regular routeswhere they were sorely needed, and G-4registered a strong protest on the groundthat the proposal involved taking theArmy's best passenger ships out of service

for a period and reducing their capacitiesby conversion in order to provide againstthe "improbable contingency" that theymight be required for special operations.47

The Chief of Staff nevertheless approved arecommendation of the Joint PlanningCommittee that the ten Army transports beconverted, with the understanding that theconversion schedule would be so arrangedthat Navy transports would be available tothe Army during the conversion period, ifrequired.

In support of its July proposal to convertten additional Army transports the Navyhad stated that, from its own fleet and suchvessels as could be obtained from the Mari-time Commission, it had been able to pro-vide only seventeen combat loaders, where-as twenty-seven were needed in order tohandle two divisions and have three vesselsin reserve. In October the Navy raised itsrequirements to thirty-six vessels, and theJoint Board directed the Joint PlanningCommittee to make a study of the situa-tion.48 Our entry into the war and the emer-gency actions which followed that event re-moved the necessity for this study.

While losing its struggle to prevent a largenumber of Army troopships from being con-verted to combat loaders (in which statusthey were likely to be withdrawn from troopservice at any time for combat operations),G-4 was overruled also in its opposition toa Navy proposal that the large Navy troop-ships West Point (ex-America), Wakefield(ex-Manhattan), and Mount Vernon (ex-

44 Memos, SW for SN, 26 May 41 and 29 May41, G-4/29717-71; see also Memo, CofS USAfor CNO, 25 May 41, WPD 2789.

45 Ltr, 26 May 41, G-4/29717-26.46 Memo, BuShips USN for WD Liaison Officer

(Crane), 26 Jul 41, G-4/29717-51 ; Memo, ACNOfor JB, 5 Aug 41, JB 320 (Ser 715). Among theten were two vessels which were still being con-structed by the Maritime Commission for theArmy.

47 2d Ind, QMG for ACofS G-4, 7 Aug 41,G-4/29717-51; Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofSWPD, 30 Aug 41, sub: Conv Army Transportsfor Combat Loading, G-4/29717-81; Memo, JPCfor JB, 17 Sep 41, JB 320 (Ser 715) ; Memo, ACofSWPD for ACofS G-4, 18 Sep 41, G-4/29717-81.

48 JB Mtg, 22 Oct 41; Memo for JPC, 24 Oct41, JB 320 (Ser 733) ; JB Mtg, 9 Feb 42 (Ser 733).


Washington), be converted into airplanecarriers, for in September 1941 the Secre-tary of War approved a Joint Board reportwhich favored such action.49 The conversionwork on these vessels did not get under waypromptly, however, and was destined not tobe accomplished. After our entry into thewar the Army requested that those vesselscontinue as regular troopships, in view ofthe extreme need for greater troop capacity,and especially the need for fast transports.Plans then were adopted for providing air-plane carriers, as well as additional combatloaders, by converting vessels of othertypes.50

The position of the War Plans Divisionof the General Staff in regard to these mat-ters is of interest. Whereas G-4 and TheQuartermaster General were concerned pri-marily with maintaining an Army Trans-port Service adequate to handle the grow-ing traffic to the oversea bases, and the Navywas concerned primarily with the develop-ment of an adequate fleet of combat loadersfor the use of expeditionary forces, WPDwas concerned with both aspects of the situ-ation. G-4 observed that WPD "apparentlyfavored" the Navy's plan for converting tenArmy transports and presented its argu-ments against the proposal, but without suc-cess.51 The Deputy Chief of Staff took cog-nizance of this difference between the twostaff divisions and supported the G-4 posi-tion, expressing the view that the Navyshould obtain from the Maritime Commis-sion rather than from the Army the vessels

necessary to the performance of "one ofthe normal Naval tasks" under the agree-ment, "Joint Action of the Army and theNavy." 52 The War Plans Division also hadrecommended withdrawal of the Army'sobjection to the conversion of the WestPoint, Mount Vernon, and Wakefield toairplane carriers.53 Its reasoning appears tohave been that the Army could obtain othervessels for its troop service. That was nota ready solution, however, since it was thedifficulty of obtaining additional vessels thatmade the problem an acute one for boththe Army and the Navy.

In August 1941 a joint exercise was con-ducted in the New River area of NorthCarolina with a view to preparing theAtlantic Amphibious Force for action onshort notice. Looking backward at thatundertaking and forward to other plannedexercises, the Commander in Chief, U.S.Atlantic Fleet, vigorously asserted that heconsidered the force in no condition foractual operations. He stated that noeffective organization had been set up, thatall units lacked adequate equipment, andthat the available transports had neithersufficient capacity nor suitable facilities.54

Referring to this communication insofar asit pertained to the Army elements of theforce, the War Plans Division asserted thatthose elements had complete equipment asauthorized in tables of basic allowances,and expressed the view that any specialequipment required for landing operations

49 Memo, ACofS G-4 for DCofS USA, 24 Sep41; Memo, JPC for JB, 8 Oct 41, JB 320 (Ser723) ; Ltr, Secy WDGS to Secy JB, 24 Oct 41. Allin G-4/29717-26.

50 Memos, CofS USA to CNO, 22 and 30 Dec41, G-4/29717-81.

51 Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 30 Aug41, G-4/29717-81; Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofSG-4, 18 Sep 41. Both in WPD 2789.

52 Memo, DCofS for CofS USA, 2 Dec 41, sub:Conv of Army Transports for Combat Unit Load-ing, WPD 2789.

53 Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 2 Oct 41,WPD 2789; see also Memo, ACofS WPD for ACofSG-4, 5 Oct 41, WPD 4131.

54 Memo for CNO, 2 Oct 41, sub: AtlanticAmphibious Force—State of Readiness, WPD 423246-75; see also unsigned statement on New Riverexercises, G-4/33088.


should be prescribed by the task force com-mander—in other words, by the Navy.55

Late in November WPD observed that"due to the unavailability of shipping thepast several months, only one division hasbeen partially trained [for landing opera-tions] in the entire Army," and suggestedthat GHQ collaborate with the Navy inpreparing "a detailed plan" for the train-ing of a number of divisions.

The correspondence and reports concern-ing joint exercises during 1940—41 and thenegotiations in regard to vessels required forplanned expeditionary forces indicate howinadequate were the preparations for carry-ing on amphibious operations up to thetime of our entry into the war, and empha-size the magnitude of the task which layahead of the armed services in preparingthemselves for the successful execution ofthe many joint actions that would be re-quired both in Europe and in the Pacific.

The Submarine Threat

Less than a year after Hitler came topower, Germany opened a submarinecollege at Kiel and began training crewsunder the tutelage of officers experienced inU-boat warfare. German technicians alsobegan designing larger and more powerfulundersea craft. The U-boat had come closeto imposing a fatal stranglehold on theAllied effort in World War I, and the renas-cent German military machine recognizedits importance in the forthcoming strugglefor world power. Great Britain still wasdependent on shipping for a large portion

of her food and raw materials, as well asfor the deployment and supply of her forces.The Soviet Union still was underdevelopedindustrially, and her potential militarystrength could be realized only with the aidof tools and equipment supplied by overseaallies. The United States, if she again shouldbe drawn into the conflict, would have torely on ocean transport to make her mightfelt in Europe. The submarine thereforewas Germany's front-line weapon againsther greatest potential foes. In September1939 she had 60 such vessels in commission,30 of which were of 500 tons or larger andcapable of operation in the Atlantic.56

During the 28 months from September1939 through December 1941 about 15,-000,000 deadweight tons of merchantshipping were lost by Allied and neutralnations from all causes, of which an esti-mated 14,000,000 deadweight tons wereocean-going.57 The losses of ocean-goingshipping were more than two and one-halftimes the construction during the sameperiod by the United States and the BritishEmpire, which were virtually the onlysources of new shipping for the Allies.58

55 Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS USA, 3 Oct 41,WPD 4232 46-75; Memo, ACofS WPD for CofSof Field Forces GHQ, 28 Nov 41, WPD 2789. Aslate as April 1942 the Army registered with JCSconcern over lack of progress in amphibious train-ing. See JCS 10th Mtg, 13 Apr 42, An. IV.

56 Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm(Cambridge, 1948), pp. 423-24. Germany expectedto have 99 U-boats in service by early 1940.

57 Based on British Admiralty Rpt, BR 1337,British and Foreign Merchant Vessels Lost orDamaged by Enemy Action During Second WorldWar, 1 October 1945, statistical summaries 1 and10. This report gives only gross tonnages, but itis used extensively in discussing ship losses becauseof its comprehensiveness, and gross tons are con-verted to deadweight tons at the generally ac-cepted ratio of 1 to 1.5. Deadweight tonnages forship losses, although they must be regarded asrough estimates when based on this report, aregiven to permit of ready comparison with dead-weight tonnages for ship construction which arepresented in the next section.

58 BR 1337, summary 14, shows 3,535,000 GTof vessels 1,600 GT or over constructed, which ata ratio of 1 to 1.5 equals about 5,300,000 DWT.


After the entry of the United States into thewar the sinkings increased and during theyear 1942 the losses of ocean-going vesselstotaled slightly more than 12,000,000 dead-weight tons, or an average of 1,000,000tons per month. The 1942 losses exceededadditions by new construction by almost1,500,000 deadweight tons, and amountedto more than one-fourth of the totalshipping available to the Allies at the begin-ning of that year. About 75 percent of allmerchant shipping losses during 1942 weredue to submarine activity.59

To the Allies, confronted as they werewith the necessity not merely of holdingtheir own but of striking heavier andheavier blows against the enemy, theseshipping losses had serious implications. Afew illustrations will suffice. A British study-presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staffin February 1942 indicated that Britishimports, excluding oil, had amounted to52,000,000 tons in 1938, had been only30,500,000 tons in 1941, and were expectedto total only 5,250,000 tons during the firstquarter of 1942.60 The heavy losses sus-tained by convoys carrying lend-lease sup-plies to northern ports of the Soviet Union,because of advantages enjoyed by Germansubmarines, surface raiders, and aircraftbased on Norway, was a potent factor inthe decision to divert a large part of thattraffic to the longer route around the Capeof Good Hope to the Persian Gulf and to

develop a huge Anglo-American supply op-eration in Iran, embracing ports, railways,and truck services.61 Because of sinkings inMay and early June 1942, the WarShipping Administration found it necessaryto delete 17 vessels from a list of 74 whichit had nominated for June and July de-partures in the BOLERO movement.62 Thelarge number of vessels sunk in the Gulf ofMexico and the Caribbean forced the Armyfor a period to route the bulk of its sup-plies for the Panama Canal via Los Angeles,rather than New Orleans, thus increasingboth rail and water hauls.63

During 1942, although the output ofAmerican shipyards was increasing rapidlyand was expected to continue to increase,there was no way of knowing what newsubmarine onslaughts Allied shipping mighthave to withstand, and British and Ameri-can officials showed no disposition to soundan optimistic note on the shipping issue.Actually, that year proved to be the mostdisastrous from the standpoint of shiplosses. The cumulative deficit in the in-ventory of Allied and neutral merchantshipping of all types, compared withSeptember 1939, was greatest during thesummer months of 1942, when it amountedto almost 10,000,000 gross tons, or an esti-

59 Losses for 1942, stated in DWT, are fromTable I, Standard Statement of Gains and Losses,issued by Combined Shipping Adjustment Board,17 Sep 45, covering vessels of 1,600 GT and over;CCS 203, 24 Apr 43, p. 8, gives shipping availableto Allies on 1 Jan 42 as 44,390,000 DWT. Forcauses of losses see U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine Bul-letin, Mar 45, p. 1 7, and BR 1337, summary 4.

6 0 CGS 39, 14 Feb 42; see William K. Hancockand M. M. Gowing, British War Economy (London,1949),p. 357.

61 Concerning route to northern Soviet ports seeSamuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic,Ch. VII. Concerning Persian Gulf operations seeT. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aidto Russia, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II (Washington, 1951), Chs. X, XVI, XVII,XVIII. For number of sailings on respective routessee Office of Foreign Liquidation, Dept State, Re-port on War Aid Furnished by the United States tothe U.S.S.R., 28 Nov 45, p. 14.

62 CMTC 23d Mtg, 18 Jun 42, Item,4.63 Memo, CofT for CG's NOPE and SFPE, 28

Jun 42, sub: Los Angeles as Temporary SupplyPort for Panama, AG 563.5 Panama.

CONVOY FORMING OFF A U.S. ATLANTIC PORT (top). Navy aircraft at-tacking a submarine (bottom). Antisubmarine measures were increasingly effective

as the war progressed.


mated 15,000,000 deadweight tons.64

Thereafter, ship construction exceededlosses and the deficit steadily diminished. Itwas entirely wiped out in October 1943.

Addressing the Congress of the UnitedStates in May 1943, Prime MinisterChurchill said: "While I rate the U-boatdanger still the greatest we have to face, Ihave a good and sober confidence that itwill not only be met and contained butovercome." 65 The Commander in Chief,U.S. Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, re-ported: "By the spring of 1943, the waragainst German submarines in the Atlantichad turned in our favor and we were fullyon the offensive in that area."66 Thejustification for this optimism was soonapparent. The losses of Allied and neutralocean-going shipping from all causes totaledabout 5,300,000 deadweight tons in 1943,or less than half the losses of 1942, andonly about 2,100,000 deadweight tons werelost in 1944.67

During the entire war period, that is fromSeptember 1939 through August 1945, thelosses of Allied and neutral merchant ship-ping of all types totaled about 36,000,000deadweight tons (of which about 34,000,000

deadweight tons were ocean-going types).Of the total losses, British vessels accountedfor almost 19,000,000 tons, United Statesvessels for about 6,000,000 tons, and thevessels of other Allied and neutral nationsfor more than 11,000,000 tons. Almost 32,-000,000 deadweight tons were lost becauseof enemy action, including almost 22,000,-000 deadweight tons lost as the result ofsubmarine action; the remaining losses weredue to the usual hazards of the sea. Of thevessels lost on account of enemy action,about 18,100,000 tons were lost in theNorth Atlantic, 2,000,000 tons in the SouthAtlantic, 2,500,000 tons in the Mediter-ranean, about 2,200,000 tons in the IndianOcean, 5,200,000 tons in United Kingdomcoastal waters, the North Sea, and theBaltic, and 1,700,000 tons in the Pacific.68

While in discussing the extent of thelosses at sea the tonnage of ships sunk is aconvenient means of measurement, it is notto be forgotten that most sinkings involvedalso loss of life or loss of cargo, or both.The men and women who perished inmarine disasters (merchant seamen, serv-ice personnel, and civilian passengers) wereirreplaceable. Replacement of the cargoes,like replacement of the ships, required time,labor, and scarce materials, all of whichwere in short supply during the period ofintensive war effort. The significance ofeach sinking, therefore, reached far beyondthe loss of the services of a transportationfacility, damaging as that may have been.

Despite the perilous experience of1914-18, when the losses of Allied andneutral shipping had approached 19,000,-000 deadweight tons, the opening of WorldWar II found the Allies unprepared tomeet the submarine offensive which the

64 See chart, ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 43, p. 15.Cumulative deficit shows how far construction fellshort of replacing losses.

65 "Text of Churchill's Address before Congress,"The Washington Post, May 20, 1943; cf. WinstonS. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Cambridge,1949), p. 598.

66 Admiral Ernest J. King, Rpt to SN, up to 1Mar 44, Our Navy at War, U.S. News edition, p.24.

67 Table I, Standard Statement of Gains andLosses, 17 Sep 45, covering merchant vessels of1,600 GT or more. BR 1337, summary 10, indi-cates that including smaller vessels losses wereabout 5,600,000 DWT in 1943 and 2,260,000 DWTin 1944. 68 Based on BR 1337, summaries 1, 4, 8, 10


Germans had in store for them.69 Partic-ularly after the United States and Japanhad joined the hostilities, placing Pacificas well as Atlantic sea lanes in jeopardy,the number of escort vessels was wholly in-adequate and aircraft carriers were notavailable to accompany the many convoyswhich put to sea. Land-based air coveragealso was extremely thin, so that for a periodenemy U-boats reaped an easy harvest ofvessels moving in our Atlantic and Gulfcoastal waters.70 There was no effective or-ganization to co-ordinate and control theutilization of existing means and methodsamong the Allies.71

Time was required for rectifying our lackof readiness to meet the U-boat challenge,and the provision of needed escort vessels ofvarious types, escort aircraft carriers, andother antisubmarine equipment made heavydemands on construction facilities and ma-terials. Measures were devised, however, ac-cording to the principle laid down by theCombined Chiefs of Staff, "that the defeatof the U-boat must remain the first charge

on the resources of the United Nations." 72

The success which the Allies ultimatelyachieved in offsetting the submarine men-ace is attested not only by the reduction inlosses of merchant vessels, as indicatedabove, but by the increased destruction ofGerman U-boats. Whereas only 35 Germansubmarines were destroyed in 1941 and 85in 1942, the casualties were 237 in 1943and 241 in 1944.73 Throughout the war atotal of 781 German, 130 Japanese, and 81Italian submarines were destroyed. Of theGerman losses about 725 were vessels of 500tons or over, hence capable of operation inthe open ocean areas.74

The foregoing data on the areas in whichAllied merchant vessels were lost and thenationality of the enemy submarines de-stroyed indicate how preponderantly theU-boat hazard which confronted the Allieswas of German origin.

While the Germans lost about 725 sub-marines of the ocean-going type during thewar, they built about 1,040 and on V-EDay had about 350 in being, though notnecessarily in operational status. TheU-boat threat to the Allies' transatlanticlines of communication, therefore, nevercould be disregarded. This is evidenced bythe fact that in February 1945, with theend of the heavy troop movement to Europein sight, the British Admiralty thought itbest that the large British passenger linersshould be kept out of United Kingdom

69 Salter, Allied Shipping Control, pp. 355-59,gives the war losses of Allied and neutral nationsduring 1914-18 as 12,591,000 GT, or roughly 18,-886,000 DWT.

70 See remarks of Admiral H. R. Stark, CNOUSN, ARCADIA Proceedings, 24 Dec 41, Items 5and 14; Admiral King's report cited n. 66, p. 49.Concerning U.S. unpreparedness for antisubmarineaction by air and differences between Navy andAAF as to jurisdiction and strategy see The ArmyAir Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1948, 1949)Vol. I, Ch.15, Vol. II, Ch. 12. Concerning Civil AirPatrol, see Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp.276-81.

71 Rpt of Combined Stf Planners, sub: Measuresfor Combating the Submarine Menace, issued withCCS 203, 24 Apr 43, reviewed the Allied short-comings, which by then had been partially over-come, and made recommendations for furtheraction.

72 Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, in openingaddress at Atlantic Convoy Conference, Washing-ton, 1 Mar 43, p. 2 of minutes, OCT HB TopicConvoy and Routing.

73 Admiral King's final rpt to SN, U.S. Navy atWar, 1 Mar 45-1 Oct 45, U.S. News edition, p. 29.

74 Rpt, OCNO USN (OPNAV-P33-100 New5-46), German, Japanese, and Italian Sub-marine Losses, World War II, May 46; Rpt 51,Operations Evaluation Group, OCNO USN, Apr46, Pt. I, p. 144.


waters as much as possible because of thesubmarine danger.75 The U.S. Navy reportedthat the month of April 1945 had witnessedthe commencement in the Atlantic of the"long awaited German U-boat offensive,"which extended westward to the U.S. At-lantic seaboard.

A postwar statement by GrossadmiralKarl Doenitz made it clear that the Alliedanticipation of a renewed U-boat offensivehad good foundation. The reversal sufferedby German submarines in 1943 was dueprincipally to improved Allied air coverageand radar detection, which were especiallyeffective against the types of submarineswhich Germany then had in service—typesof slow speed and limited underwatercapability. By 1945, in addition to theSchnorckel which made more extensiveunderwater operation possible, the Germanswere producing new types of U-boats withhigher speed, longer range, and other tech-nical improvements, with which they ex-pected to again heavily harass Allied ship-ping. But they were not ready to launch thisnew campaign, Doenitz stated, when Ger-many was forced to capitulate.76

The Shipbuilding Achievement

The curbing of the submarine was onlyone factor in overcoming the limitationwhich shipping placed upon our overseamilitary effort. The other essential factorwas the construction of enough new shipsto offset the losses incurred and to providesufficient added capacity to make possiblethe heavy offensive operations which were

necessary to accomplish the defeat of Ger-many and Japan. The shipbuilding achieve-ment by which this goal was attained standsout as one of the more spectacular produc-tion feats of the war. It was largely anAmerican achievement, for reasons whichwill be explained. During the five-yearperiod 1941-45, American shipyards de-livered vessels aggregating 55,312,000 dead-weight tons against Maritime Commissionorders, of which well over 54,000,000 dead-weight tons were suitable for ocean-goingservice on the deepwater or coastal routes.This output was roughly three times the18,500,000 deadweight ton program whichwas set up by the United States ShippingBoard in World War I. It was approachingfour times the 15,000,000 tons actuallycompleted during the five-year period1917-21. It was substantially greater thanthe 48,000,000 tons launched by all nationsof the world during the seventeen years,1922-38.77

December 1941 fortunately found theUnited States relatively well prepared toundertake a large program of ship con-struction. The major portion of the mer-chant fleet built under the World War Iprogram had been lost or scrapped andmost of the shipyards had been dismantled,but the constructive provisions of the Mer-chant Marine Act of 1936 had establishedthe basis for a resurgence in the maritime

75 Msg 69637 Q(M)8, War Office to BritishArmy Staff Washington, 18 Feb 45, OCT HBMvmts Div British Files; U.S. Fleet Anti-SubmarineBulletin, May 45, p. 9.

76 Doenitz, Conduct of the War At Sea, printedby Div of Nav Int, USN, 15 Jan 46, pp. 18, 31.

77 World War II figures based on Rpt, UnitedStates Maritime Commission Official ConstructionRecord—Vessels Delivered 1939 Through 1945(No. 106), which includes a small amount ofauxiliary tonnage built for Navy. Edward N.Hurley, The Bridge to France (Philadelphia, 1927),p. 47; American Bureau of Shipping, The Bulletin(October 1941), p. 27; George S. Armstrong &Company, The Shipbuilding Industry and theLogistics of Amphibious Warfare (New York,1943), p. 48, OCT HB Topic Mar Com Shipbuild-ing.


industry.78 That law had enunciated a na-tional maritime policy and created a Mari-time Commission to carry the policy intoeffect. The Commission promptly preparedstandard designs for several types of mer-chant vessels and established a sound re-placement program to substitute fastmodern ships for old and outmoded ones.The long-range peacetime program which itinitiated in 1937 contemplated the con-struction of fifty ships each year over aperiod of ten years. With war in Europethreatening, that program was augmentedin August 1939 and increased again inAugust 1940. The year 1941 witnessed fur-ther heavy increases which brought the en-tire program up to approximately 1,200ships aggregating 13,000,000 deadweighttons.79

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 setforth the policy that the United Statesshould have a merchant marine not onlysufficient for commercial purposes but "ca-pable of serving as a naval and militaryauxiliary in time of war or national emer-gency." The Maritime Commission, beingspecifically charged with making that policyeffective, was the logical agency to adminis-ter the government's wartime program ofmerchant ship construction. During theearly part of the emergency the Army andthe Navy informed the Maritime Commis-sion directly of their requirements for regu-lar troop and cargo vessels, as well as forspecialized types of merchant ships. Latersuch requirements were considered andagreed on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. TheArmy, cognizant of its dependence on mer-chant shipping for the performance of its

mission overseas, kept its requirements con-stantly under review and never relaxed itspressure for a construction program ade-quate to meet its needs.

The cost of the entire program was cov-ered by appropriations to the MaritimeCommission. During peacetime the WarDepartment had paid the Commission forused vessels obtained for the Army Trans-port Service and its budget had includedfunds with which to reimburse the Mari-time Commission for new vessels orderedfor Army account. In considering a supple-mental estimate for the fiscal year 1942 theBureau of the Budget threw out an Armyrequest for funds to pay for fourteen vesselsand informed the War Department that theMaritime Commission would procure, build,or charter any vessels required by the Armyfrom funds available to it.80 The arrange-ment was in line with the President's policy,referred to earlier in this chapter, that mer-chant shipping should be held in a nationalpool insofar as practical, with only a limitednumber of vessels assigned to the Army andthe Navy for their exclusive use. It super-seded the clause in Joint Army and NavyBasic War Plan—RAINBOW 5, which pro-vided: ". . . all shipbuilding plants will beallocated to the Navy, and the Navy willfurnish the Army with such overseas trans-portation as the Army may require, con-sistent with national strategic needs as awhole." 81

Although the United Kingdom had beenthe principal shipbuilding nation of the

78 PL 835, 74th Cong., approved June 29, 1936.79 Mar Com Rpt for the period ending 25 Oct

40, pp. 6-7 ; for the period ending 25 Oct 41, pp.2-3, 10-11, App. C.

80 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 8 Feb 42;Ltr, CofS USA to Chm Mar Com, 12 Feb 42. Bothin G-4/33006-4.

81 See JB 325 (Ser 642-5), Rev. 1, Sec. IX, par.58c, 19 Nov 41. Arrangement did not apply tovessels under 1,000 gross tons which were procuredby Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission; norto auxiliary naval vessels which were procured byNavy and Maritime Commission.


world during peacetime, her wartime con-tribution of new merchant vessels was byagreement relatively small. During the visitof the British Prime Minister to the UnitedStates immediately after Pearl Harbor, thePresident and he agreed that "mutual ad-vantages were to be gained by concentrat-ing, insofar as it was practical, our energiesin doing those things which each of us wasbest qualified to do." 82 In line with thatprinciple it was decided that since theUnited States had the natural resources andthe industrial techniques for large-scaleproduction, the new merchant shipping re-quired by the Allies would be built pre-dominantly here, while the British woulddevote their resources and facilities princi-pally to the construction of combatant ves-sels. Accordingly, the United Kingdom con-structed only about 7,000,000 deadweighttons of ocean-going merchant ships duringthe five-year period, 1941-45, comparedwith more than 54,000,000 deadweighttons built in the United States.83 Duringthis period the British dominions and col-onies completed approximately 4,000,000deadweight tons, so that the entire outputof ocean-going merchant shipping by theBritish Commonwealth of Nations was ap-proximately one-fifth that of the UnitedStates. This heavy assignment in the fieldof merchant ships construction did not re-lieve the United States of the necessity ofproducing an unprecedented volume ofnaval tonnage.

Action to greatly expand the merchantshipbuilding program of the United Stateswas taken early in 1942. In February the

President requested the chairman of theMaritime Commission to prepare plans tocomplete 9,000,000 deadweight tons duringthat year and 15,000,000 deadweight tonsduring 1943.84 The objective for 1942 sub-sequently was reduced to 8,000,000 dead-weight tons, because of increased require-ments for nonmerchant type ships, and ac-tual completions totaled 8,044,527 dead-weight tons.85 In view of the heavy shiplosses in 1942 and the prospective militaryrequirements, the shipyard capacity was in-creased to 20,000,000 deadweight tons an-nually, and the actual output for 1943 was19,209,991 deadweight tons, which was thepeak annual performance. In 1944, withthe submarine crisis fading and plans underway for large-scale amphibious operations inthe Pacific, the emphasis shifted from themass production of slower vessels to theconstruction of faster troop and cargo car-riers, assault vessels, and other militarytypes, with the result that the completionsfor that year totaled only 16, 299,985 dead-weight tons. The Commission's schedule for1945 was about 13,000,000 deadweighttons. Although cutbacks were ordered in theearly spring when the German resistancewas seen to be crumbling, and others fol-lowed the Japanese surrender, the cancel-lations were not extensive and the 1945output was 10,598,154 deadweight tons.86

The Maritime Commission ship con-

82 Ltr, President to Prime Minister, read inHouse of Commons, 3 Aug 43, published in TheWashington Post, August 4, 1943.

83 WSA Shipping Summary, Sep 45, pp. 10, 150.Completions during the last four months of 1945are estimated.

84 Memo, FDR for Admiral Land, 21 Feb 42,copy in OCT HB Topic Mar Com Shipbuilding;Memo, ACofS G-4 for ACofS WPD, 24 Feb 42,WPD 2789-33.

85 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 8 Mar 42, sub: Confbetween Army and Mar Com, Trans Br G-4/560Mar Com; United States Maritime CommissionOfficial Construction Record—Vessels Delivered1939 through 1945 (No. 106).

86 Mar Com Rpt for period ending 30 Jun 45,pp. 4, 5; "Byrnes is Firm on Cutbacks," Journalof Commerce (New York), April 2, 1945.


struction program during the period 1941through 1945 included a number of basictypes and some special types. Most basictypes were subject to modification to meetspecial war needs. Some modifications weremade during construction, while otherswere made following delivery. It is difficult,

therefore, to present a wholly satisfactorysummary by types. The following tabulationclassifies the vessels completed during theperiod 1941-45 according to their basictypes, except that "military types" includesome other types which were convertedprior to delivery: 87

The Liberty ship, it will be observed, ac-counted for more than half the deadweighttonnage completed during 1941-45. Thisdesign originated with an order for 60vessels placed with American yards by theBritish late in 1940, and was an adaptationof a British coal-burning riveted ship knownas the Sunderland Tramp.88 Since speed ofconstruction was essential, the fact that thebasic plans were available was an importantconsideration. Reciprocating engines, oil-fired, were used in the Liberty ship becausethey could be procured promptly and with-out encroaching on the Navy's turbine anddiesel requirements for combatant vessels.

The substitution of electric welded for riv-eted seams also meant a saving of time andlabor. The construction plan included ex-tensive prefabrication of parts and assembly-line methods. The original contracts con-templated completion in 210 days. The firstLiberty to be delivered, the Patrick Henry,required 244 days to build, but graduallythe time for standard Liberties was reduceduntil it reached an average of about 42 daysin the late months of 1943. December 1943produced the lowest monthly average—39.2days. The Liberty ship was criticized be-cause of its slow speed (11 knots), faultsof design, and structural weaknesses; it wasjustified, as an emergency design, on thebasis of its large capacity and the rapiditywith which it could be produced. Althoughbasically a cargo design, it was convertedfor use as a troop transport, hospital ship,prisoner of war ship, tank and airplanetransport, repair ship, and bulk oil andwater carrier.

The Victory ship was developed from theLiberty ship design after the pressure for

87 Rpt, United States Maritime CommissionOfficial Construction Record—Vessels Delivered1939 through 1945 (No. 106). Rpt shows 727minor types completed, but this figure includes124 tugs and 1 derrick barge for which no tonnageis included in total.

88 Mar Com Rpt for period ending 25 Oct 41,p. 10; for period ending 30 Jun 45, p. 3. MerchantShipping, additional rpt of the Senate SpecialCommittee Investigating the National Defense Pro-gram, Rpt 10, Pt. 18, June 23, 1944, pp. 5-7,15-27.

WAR-BUILT CARGO SHIPS. The Liberty ship (top) and the Victory ship (bot-tom) were designed as freighters, but many were converted to carry troops. Ships of

this type were built under the supervision of the U.S. Maritime Commission.


the mass production of Liberties had eased,and the first delivery was made in February1944. The Victory had greater speed (15 to17 knots) than its prototype, which not onlyenabled it to complete its voyage faster butrendered it less vulnerable to submarine at-tack. Construction of this new type of vesselwas undertaken against considerable oppo-sition, which stemmed from the fact thatit required more steel than the Liberty andpropulsion machinery that was less readilyavailable.89 Although basically a cargo car-rier, numerous Victory ships were convertedto troop transports, APA's, and AKA's. Thestandard Victories delivered in May andagain in June 1945 required an average of73 days for completion, which was thelowest monthly average.90

The so-called "standard cargo" shipswere types which had been developed bythe Maritime Commission before the begin-ning of the war in Europe. These vesselshad speeds ranging from 14 knots for theC-1 to 17 knots for the C-4. By conversionthey were made to serve as troop transports,APA's, AKA's, and hospital ships. Sincethey were produced by more conventionalmethods, the standard types required longerperiods for completion than the Libertiesand the Victories. For example, the lowestaverage completion time for C-2's deliveredduring a wartime month was 113 days.91

"Military types" included both vesselsthat were basically merchant types but which

had been converted to serve the Armyand the Navy in overseas areas, and dis-tinctly naval designs. In the former classwere the Liberties, Victories, and standardcargo types which were altered to serve astroop transports, APA's, AKA's, and escortaircraft carriers, and the tankers which theNavy used in large numbers. In the latterclass were the LST's and the frigates (smallescort vessels).

While barges, carfloats, and other vesselsfor inshore work were included among the"minor commercial types," a considerablepart of the tonnage of this category wasmade up of cargo vessels and tankers offrom 2,500 to 5,000 deadweight tons, whichwere required for military purposes in theoversea theaters.

The fact that, despite the great need fortroop and cargo carriers, tankers accountedfor approximately one-fourth of the totaldeadweight tonnage built by the MaritimeCommission during the war years testifies tothe great quantities of petroleum productsrequired by the Allies and the heavy lossessustained by this type of vessel under the con-centrated attack of German submarines.92

This remarkable American shipbuildingrecord during World War II was achievedonly by the most judicious and intensive useof facilities, labor, and materials. The ex-pansion of shipbuilding facilities is illus-trated by the fact that from 1 January1941, by which date considerable expansionalready had taken place, to the peak of thewartime effort, the number of commercialshipyards capable of building vessels morethan 400 feet in length increased from 19to 40, and the number of shipways for

89 Shipbuilding and Shipping, additional rpt ofthe Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Rpt 10, Pt. 8, April22, 1943, p. 8; WPB Special Study 26, Shipbuild-ing Policies of the War Production Board, 15 Apr47, pp. 170-172 (cited hereafter as WPB Study26), in OCT HB WPB.

90 Hist Rpt 2, Gerald J. Fischer, Statistical Sum-mary of Shipbuilding under the U.S. MaritimeCommission during World War II, 1949, p. 83.

91 Ibid.

92 Mar Com Rpt for period ending 30 Jun 43,pp. 11-12.


such vessels increased from 75 to 313.93 Thenumber of workers employed in these yardsfor the Maritime Commission program in-creased from 47,000 in January 1941 to591,000 in the peak month of July 1943.94

Working conditions for shipyard employeeswere made as favorable as possible by gov-ernment provisions for housing, feeding,local transportation, health, and safety, andby nation-wide agreements for the stabiliza-tion of wages and the equalization of work-ing conditions.95 Intensive training wasgiven to as many as 90 percent of the em-ployees of certain yards to prepare them forthe better performance of their work. Theprincipal yards were operated on 24-hourbasis. The extensive use of electric weldingand prefabrication permitted much con-struction work to be done at a distance fromthe congested shipyard areas.

The merchant shipbuilding program hadto compete with many other military andnonmilitary programs—warships, escort ves-sels, landing craft, aircraft, tanks, guns, in-dustrial plant expansion, and lend-lease re-quirements, to mention a few—for thatbasic and critical commodity, steel.90 Thecompetition extended to other essential ma-terials, and, particularly as between themerchant ship and naval programs, to manycomponent assemblies which were in shortsupply, such as engines, winches, pumps,valves, fans, and electrical equipment. The

programs had to be co-ordinated so that thetotal production would most effectively sup-port the over-all strategic plan.

The President kept under active observa-tion the entire production schedule—mili-tary, lend-lease, civilian—and from time totime gave specific instructions regardingquantities to be produced and priorities tobe observed. He recognized the essentialrole of ocean transport and in May 1942,when the competition between programswas keenest, he wrote to the chairman ofthe War Production Board with referenceto the merchant shipbuilding objective forthat year: "I cannot over-emphasize thenecessity that this objective be met, as thesuccess of our war effort must rest on ourability to provide the shipping required forthe transportation of our troops and theirsupplies, and to continue the flow of essen-tial military equipment to our associates inthe United Nations." 97

The War Production Board was thePresident's agent for co-ordinating and con-trolling the nation's entire production effort.This involved not only bringing the pro-grams into accord with the production ca-pacity and allocating materials and compo-nents in proper proportion, but also control-ling the flow of materials and componentsto the individual industrial plants so as toavoid the development of uneconomicalsurpluses and shortages. For the better exe-

93 Hist rpt 2, Statistical Summary of Shipbuild-ing, pp. 94-96. The maximum number of buildingberths used by Maritime Commission for vesselsover 400 feet was 267. Great expansion also tookplace in facilities for building smaller vessels, andin plants for producing engines and other marineequipment.

94 Hist rpt cited n. 90.95 Mar Com Rpt for period ending 25 Oct 41,

p. 13; for period ending 30 Jun 42, pp. 10-12;for period ending 30 Jun 43, pp. 23-28; forperiod ending 30 Jun 44, pp. 11-13.

96 Donald M. Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy(New York, 1946), Ch. 12, deals with the con-flicting programs from WPB standpoint; WPBStudy 26, pp. 1-27, further develops this subject;WPB Report of Steel Division on Steel Expansionfor War, 14 Jun 45, pp. 1-42, indicates that duringyear ended 30 Jun 44 Maritime Commission re-ceived 44.85 percent of total steel plate shipmentsfrom mills and 56.85 percent of steel plate ship-ments for military uses including lend-lease.

97 Ltr, 1 May 42, reproduced in An. II, JCS 13thMtg, 4 May 42.


cution of this complicated task insofar as itaffected shipbuilding, WPB in January 1943appointed a Controller of Shipbuilding.This official, in addition to working closelywith the Maritime Commission, the WarDepartment, and the Navy, served as chair-man of a committee appointed by the Com-bined Chiefs of Staff to study the simplifica-tion and standardization of ship designs asa means of increasing output and improvingoperating efficiency.98

As regards the broad range of militaryrequirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff keptthe programs under constant review to as-sure that they were in adjustment with thestrategic situation. The need for this hadbeen discussed at length at a meeting ofthe Joint Board in February 1942. AdmiralKing then pointed out that the first necessi-ties were merchant shipping and escort ves-sels, without which supplies and equipmentcould not be moved overseas. He expressedthe conviction that by producing too muchof certain items which could not be usedimmediately in the prosecution of the warwe were limiting the production of otheritems which were needed more urgently.99

As a result of this discussion, the JointPlanning Committee was directed to reviewthe probable military objectives in order ofpriority and determine the vessels, tanks,aircraft, guns, etc., which should be pro-duced to implement prospective operations.This became standard procedure for theJoint Chiefs of Staff, which began function-ing about that time, and their supportingorganizations, notably the Joint Staff Plan-

ners, the Joint Logistics Committee, theJoint Military Transportation Committee,and the Joint Production Survey Com-mittee.100

It was not merely a matter of establish-ing proper balance between ship construc-tion and the production of other types ofwar matériel, but also balance within theshipbuilding effort. First, there had to beco-ordination between the merchant vesseland naval vessel programs. In addition tothe usual types of combatant vessels, whichwere built in sufficient numbers to establishthe greatest navy in history, many minortypes of naval craft were needed. Escortvessels were required to protect convoys,and throughout the greater part of 1942and 1943 such vessels were given high pri-ority.101 After the invasion of North Africa,the planning for amphibious operations inEurope and the Pacific called for greatlyincreased numbers of landing craft, and thisprogram remained heavy until well into1944.102 Beginning in 1943, and especiallyafter the invasion of Normandy, with theattention of the long-range planners di-rected toward the broad ocean expanses andnumerous Japanese-held objectives in thePacific, the provision of additional combatloaders (AKA's and APA's) became a mat-

98 CCS 191, 25 Mar 43; JMTC 43d Mtg, 29 Jul43; WPB press release for August 22, 1943, OCTHB WPB. The Office of Controller was discon-tinued in March 1944, according to WPB Study26, p. 203.

99 JB Mtg, 20 Feb 42.

100 Memo, JCS for the President, 20 Jul 43, sub:Logistics Planning, OPD 381, Sec IV; Memo, USN(Forrestal) for the President, 21 Sep 43; Memo,the President for SN, 28 Sep 43, sub: Navy Build-ing Program. Last two in G-4/561. The Army andNavy Munitions Board, although technically in-dependent, functioned in close co-ordination withthe JCS organization.

101 Ltr, the President to Donald M. Nelson, 1May 42, reproduced as An. II, JCS 13th Mtg, 4May 42; Memos, JCS for the President, 16 Oct42 and 2 Jan 43. All in G-4/561.

102 Memo, CG SOS (Somervell in North Africa)for CofS SOS (Styer), 23 Jan 43, par. 4, OCT HBWylie Urgent Matters; WPB Study 26, pp. 134-38.


ter of primary importance.103 This involvednot only converting some of the faster cargoships but building specially designed com-bat loaders which were smaller and there-fore more suitable than the convertedvessels for operation at Pacific beachheadsand in small harbors. Every combat loaderwas built at the expense of more than twodry cargo vessels, because of the longer timerequired to build them and the amount ofcritical materials and equipment utilized.104

It was estimated that the construction of175,000 tons of tank landing ships (LST's)was at the expense of at least 775,000 dead-weight tons of Liberty ships.

Also, the program for the constructionof the various types of merchant shipsneeded careful watching to keep it in har-mony with the changing requirements. Bas-ically, the problem was to provide troopcarriers, dry cargo ships, and tankers in suchproportions as to avoid having an excess ofone type over the others, since that wouldresult in some vessels not being employedto the maximum.105 Many variables en-tered into the calculations, but the principalconsiderations were changes in the strategicsituation, changes in the loss rates for theseveral types of ships, prospective comple-tions of ships, and oversea port conditions.106

Immediately after our entry into the warthere was urgent need for moving troops tostrategic oversea bases, and a critical short-age of troop carriers was the natural result.

The shortage of troop lift was relieved forthe moment by altering existing Americanpassenger vessels to increase their capacitiesand by arranging for the use of Britishliners, and the construction of new troop-ships was ordered with deliveries beginningin 1943.107 As the year 1942 progressed, theheavy shipping requirements for the move-ment of lend-lease supplies, the increasingmaintenance requirements of our growingoversea forces, and the heavy losses sus-tained by the freighter and tanker fleetsforecast serious shortages of those types, andall possible pressure was exerted to increasedeliveries under expanded programs.108

During 1943, as antisubmarine measurescut down the loss rate for freight ships andcompletions of new freighters exceededearlier estimates, it became apparent thatthere would be need for greater troop ca-pacity than had been planned for. This wasobtained by converting cargo vessels totroop carriers. A practical balance betweentroop and cargo capacities was attained inthat manner, and it was maintained to theend of the war in Europe by a constantreview of military plans and require-ments.109 After V-E Day the need for

103 Rpt, Chm of WPB, War Production in 1944,June 1945, p. 19; Ltr, JCS (Leahy) to WSA(Land), 8 Jan 43, OCT HB Topic Mar ComShipbuilding; WPB Study 26, pp. 177-86.

104 Memo, CG ASF for CofS USA, 6 Nov 43,OCT HB Topic Mar Com Shipbuilding; Nelson,Arsenal of Democracy, p. 255.

105 JMTC 17th Mtg, 29 Oct 42, discussed needof revision of program.

106 See Annual Rpt, Plng Div OCT, 4 Jul 44, pp.1-2, OCT HB Plng Div Gen.

107 CCS 56/1, 6 Mar 42, par. 7; Biennial Rpt,CofS USA, 1943, n. 6.

108 CCS 39/1, 14 Mar 42. 1943 program was themost critical and was considered repeatedly by JCSand JMTC during 1942 and 1943. See JMT 9,12 Nov 42, sub: Modification of 1943 Shipbuild-ing Program; JCS 151, 13 Nov 42, same sub.

109 See Ltr, WSA to JCS, 21 Jul 43, in JCS420, 22 Jul 43; Statement, Plng Div OCT for CGASF, The Problem of Personnel Versus CargoShipping, 2 Aug 43, OCT HB Plng Div Gen; State-ment, Plng Div OCT, Maintenance of a BalancedOverseas Fleet, Feb 44, OCT HB Plng Div Gen;Statement atchd to Memo, Shipping RequirementsBr Plng Div OCT for Hist Unit OCT, 21 Apr44, OCT HB Plng Div Gen; Statement atchd toMemo, CG ASF for Sp Asst to SW, 8 Mar 44, sub:Senate Investigation, Liberty Ships, AG 564 LibertyShips.


greatly increased troop capacity for rede-ployment and repatriation was met largelythrough further cargo ship conversions.

The Joint Military Transportation Com-mittee, consisting of two representatives eachof the Army and the Navy, kept the mer-chant shipbuilding programs under constantreview in order to hold them in properrelationship with anticipated military ship-ping requirements.110 A representative ofAdmiral Land, who was both chairman ofthe Maritime Commission and War Ship-ping Administrator, was invited to attendJMTC meetings as an associate memberwhen matters of interest to those agencieswere to be considered. Reports and recom-mendations relating to the shipbuilding pro-gram might originate with the committee,or they might follow directions issued bythe Joint Chiefs of Staff that particularmatters be studied. When such recom-mendations had been approved by JCS theywere transmitted to the chairman of theMaritime Commission, who did what wasnecessary to give them effect, subject togeneral or specific directives issued by thePresident.111 The interests and opinions ofthe armed services and the civilian agenciesover which Admiral Land presided werenot always identical, but a free exchange ofinformation and views and the fact that themilitary requirements were recognized asparamount enabled JMTC to function ina highly effective manner.

Generals Somervell and Gross were theArmy representatives on the Joint MilitaryTransportation Committee, and they gaveclose attention to all aspects of its work.Somervell actually participated in the com-mittee's work only occasionally, but he waskept informed of significant developments.Gross attended most of the meetings, sup-ported by members of his Planning Divisionand sometimes by his Director of Opera-tions or his Director of Water Transporta-tion. His planning staff kept future supplyand demand in the shipping field constantlyunder review and prepared frequent analyseswhich took into account all foreseeabledevelopments in the strategic and logisticsituation.112 On the basis of these analysesrecommendations were placed beforeJMTC for such adjustments in the ship-building program as seemed necessary toassure to the Army the amounts and typesof shipping that it would require. BothGross and Somervell looked upon JMTCas the proper and best qualified agency fordealing with such matters. They objectedto the Navy's attitude, encountered duringthe summer of 1943, that recommendationsof JMTC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ifquestioned by the Navy, should be referredto the Joint Administrative Committee forreview. Somervell brought to AdmiralHome's attention the delay which this pro-cedure entailed; he stated that the Armywas prepared to stand by the actions ofits representatives on the Joint MilitaryTransportation Committee and urged thatthe Navy adjust its representation so thatit could do likewise.113

110 For charter of JMTC see JCS 202/16/D, 11May 43, and JCS 202/27/D, 13 Oct 43. Repre-sentative of AAF was invited to meetings at whichmatters of special interest to AAF were considered.JCS 20/2/D, 30 Jun 45, increased membership ofArmy and Navy to 3 each to permit G-4 to berepresented.

111 See Ltrs, Admiral Leahy to Admiral Land, 17Sep 42, 8 Jan 43, 2 Mar 43, OCT HB Topic MarCom Shipbuilding.

112 Copies of numerous studies are in OCT HBPlng Div Studies, and OCT HB Gross AnalysesTrans.

113 Memo, 12 Jul 43, sub: Navy Representationon JMTC, AG 334 JMTC. Operating as well asshipbuilding matters were involved.


The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Com-bined Military Transportation Committee,and the related American-British organiza-tions did not ordinarily deal directly withthe American merchant ship constructionprogram, but because of their concern withthe utilization of Allied resources and thesuccess of Allied strategy their deliberationstouched that field on a number of occasions.In the summer of 1942, when the shortageof steel was a governing factor in determin-ing the amount of merchant ship and navalconstruction that could be undertaken, Mr.Harry Hopkins, as Chairman, MunitionsAssignment Board, referred to CCS a mem-orandum from the Munitions AssignmentBoard (Navy), recommending an increasein the American escort vessel program,which under the circumstances would in-volve a decrease in the merchant vesselprogram.114 When the matter was presentedat a CCS meeting, General Marshall statedthat the U.S. Chiefs of Staff already had itunder consideration and recommended thatsince only American shipbuilding was con-cerned the memorandum should be referredto the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Several weekslater it was reported that upon recom-mendation of JCS the President had re-duced the merchant shipbuilding objectivefor 1942-43 from 28,000,000 to 24,000,000deadweight tons.115 The question of theadequacy of the escort vessel and landingcraft programs came before the combinedorganizations from time to time thereafter,but without direct reference to the amountof merchant shipping to be built in theUnited States.

An appreciation of the American ship-building achievement requires considerationof the programs of the Navy and the Army,which competed with the Maritime Com-mission for facilities, materials, equipment,and labor. During the years 1941-45 theNavy completed under its own contracts atotal of 10,735 new vessels, including com-batant, amphibious, auxiliary, mine, patrol,and service vessels. In addition the Navycompleted about 98,000 small landing craftand other small boats. The Army under itsown contracts completed about 13,900 smallvessels and other items of floating equip-ment.116

Central Control of Ship Employment

Because of the persistent scarcity of bot-toms to carry out Allied military designs, itwas necessary that the available shipping beemployed in the most effective manner. Asalready indicated, that necessity was fore-cast well before the United States enteredthe war, and early in 1941 the Presidenttooks steps to place the greater portion ofthe American merchant fleet under the con-trol of one agency, the Maritime Com-mission. There remained, however, theproblem of determining how ships in thepool should be used to best serve the nationalinterest. During 1941 and the early monthsof 1942 this problem remained unsolved.The Maritime Commission, and the War

114 CPS 33/D, 9 Jun 42, Incls A, B, C; CCS 25thMtg, 16 Jun 42, Item 1; see CCS 118, 15 Oct 42,for British position.

115 CCS 30th Mtg, 2 Jul 42, Item 2; JCS 70, 11Jul 42, Items 3 and 4. The cut in the program waslater restored.

116 New Navy vessels (10,735) based on Ltr,BUSHIPS USN to C of Hist Div SSUSA, 27 Mar50, excluding vessels built for Navy by Mar Com,OCT HB Topic Navy. Navy small landing craft andsmall boats (98,000) based on Admiral King's rpt,cited n. 73 above, which includes limited numberof used vessels. Army completions from WD, Reportof Army Small Boats Constructed, 1 July 1940 to31 May 1945, 18 Dec 45, are extended to 31 Dec45 by data from Supply Div OCT, OCT HBWater Div Small Boats.


Shipping Administration after its establish-ment early in February 1942, were con-fronted with the difficult task of allocatingvessels to meet the needs of the Army andthe Navy and fulfill lend-lease commit-ments, while at the same time maintainingwhat were considered essential commercialservices. That was a task which under thecircumstances could not possibly be per-formed to the satisfaction of all parties.The deficit in ships had to be distributed—there was no alternative.117

It was the hope of the President that theStrategic Shipping Board, which he estab-lished soon after we entered the war, wouldbe an effective instrument for planning shipallocations. It failed to accomplish thatpurpose, however, because of the differingviews held by the participating agencies—the Army, the Navy, and the MaritimeCommission.118 The Army submitted itsrequirements to the Maritime Commissionand later to the War Shipping Administra-tion but received no better assurance thanthat every possible effort would be made tomeet them.119 The President gave specificdirections from time to time regarding the

utilization of ships, and at that period thereseemed to be no other means of resolvingdifferences between the several claimantagencies than by appeal to the Chief Execu-tive.120

Aside from ships to carry out immediatetasks, the Army's great need was for a long-range plan for the distribution of shippingto enable it to determine in advance, andwith reasonable assurance of fulfillment, thenumber of troops and the tons of cargo itwould be able to move overseas during theensuing year. As a step in that direction aplan for the distribution of cargo shippingduring the remainder of 1942 was workedout early in March, in conferences betweenrepresentatives of the Army, the Navy, theLend-Lease Administration, and the WarShipping Administration.121 This prelimin-ary step in long-range planning was fol-lowed by the development of more per-manent procedures.

While these early difficulties were beingencountered in connection with the employ-ment of shipping under the American flag,the same problem was being dealt with onan international scale. Co-ordination ofthe employment of American and Britishbottoms so as to obtain maximum resultsfor the Allied cause was undertaken in-formally at the British-American confer-ences which began in Washington late inDecember 1941, and more systematic stand-ing procedures soon were developed. The

117 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 12 Jan 42,sub: Shipping Capabilities to Reinforce ABDARegion, Trans Br G-4/560 Mar Com; Memo, ChmMar Com for the President, 17 Feb 42, sub: Confwith Hopkins, Somervell, Gross, Trans Br G-4/560Mar Com; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 20Feb 42, sub: Acquisition of Vessels for Contem-plated Movements; Memo, CofS USA for thePresident, 21 Feb 42, same subject. Last two inG-4/29717-115.

118 See Bureau of the Budget, The United Statesat War (Washington, 1946), pp. 148, 149. Seealso n. 61, Ch. II, of this volume.

119 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4, 26Dec 41, sub: Conf with Mr. Harry Hopkins, OCTHB Gross Day File; Memo, ACofS G-4 for ChmMar Com, 31 Jan 42, OCT HB Gross AnalysesTrans; Ltr, WSA for CG SOS, 4 Mar 42 (SOSwas not established officially until 9 Mar 42), OCTHB Gross Day File.

120 Memo, ACofS G-4 for Rear Adm TaffinderUSN, 14 Feb 42, sub: Use of Navy Transports forMovement to X, OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo,ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 20 Feb 42, sub:Acquisition of Vessels, with draft of memo forsignature of President, for Chm Mar Com, direct-ing assignment of troop and cargo ships to Armyfor movement to Pacific, G-4/29717-115.

121 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 7 Mar 42,sub: Allocation of Cargo Shipping for 1942, OCTHB Gross Day File.


Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, ahigh-level civilian agency responsible di-rectly to the President and the PrimeMinister, was established in January withbranches in Washington and London.122

Its function was to propose such exchangesof British and American shipping as wouldproduce the best over-all results, taking intoaccount civilian and lend-lease requirementsas well as military needs. The CombinedChiefs of Staff, which began functioning inFebruary, dealt primarily with the militaryaspects of shipping, but in its estimation ofmilitary requirements and its effort to pro-pose sources from which those requirementscould be met, CCS necessarily took into con-sideration the possibility of reducing civilianand lend-lease shipping services. The effec-tive utilization of shipping was an in-evitable subject for consideration at the re-current meetings of the President, the PrimeMinister, and the heads of other Alliedgovernments for the determination ofstrategy, on which occasions both thecivilian and the military aspects were re-viewed.

The shipping which served the Allies,excluding those vessels which were more orless permanently assigned to the armedservices, was operated in two large pools,one under control of the War Shipping Ad-ministration and the other under the controlof the British Ministry of War Transport.The pools included not only the merchantfleets of the Allied countries but as muchneutral tonnage as could be chartered and

such enemy vessels as had been internedor captured. Exchanges of shipping be-tween the British and American poolsusually did not involve changing flags oroperating controls but merely the assign-ment of the use of a vessel or vessels for avoyage or a period. The United States,however, transferred many vessels to theflags and the controls of other nations,chiefly the United Kingdom and the SovietUnion.123 On 1 January 1942, a few weeksafter the entry of the United States into thewar, the ocean-going merchant shippingavailable to the Allies totaled 44,390,000deadweight tons. By 30 June 1945 the totalhad increased to 88,035,000 deadweighttons, of which 52,648,000 were available tothe United States and 35,387,000 to otherUnited Nations, principally the BritishCommonwealth. Of the total for 30 June1945, 66,228,000 deadweight tons wereaccounted for by dry cargo and passengervessels and 21,807,000 deadweight tons bytankers.124

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Americancomponent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,had an important role in determining theemployment of shipping. In regard to stra-tegic and logistic matters, of which shippingwas at all times an essential element, JCSperformed the dual function of planningand controlling the American military op-erations and representing the American in-terests in the combined deliberations. JCSdetermined the employment of the shippingwhich was made available to the American

122 Memorandum of Organization, 19 Feb 42,signed by Admiral Emory S. Land and Sir ArthurSalter, members of Washington branch, statespurpose, policies, and principal tasks of CSAB,OCT 334 CSAB. Members of London branch wereW. Averell Harriman for U.S. and Lord Leathersfor UK. See Bureau of Budget, The United Statesat War, p. 151.

123 "WSA Announces Charter Pool to SupplyAllies with Ships," Journal of Commerce (NewYork), July 30, 1943. WSA Shipping Summary, 30Jun 45, p. 16, shows total of 427 U.S. vesselslend-leased to other countries, including 325 to UKand 98 to USSR. The number increased subse-quently.

124 CCS 203, 24 Apr 43, p. 8; ASF MPR, Sec.3, Jul 45, p. 65.

TROOPSHIPS IN THE U.S. POOL. The Mariposa, a prewar American passengerliner (top), and the John Ericsson, a former Swedish vessel (bottom). Both were

operated by agents of the War Shipping Administration.


armed forces and estimated the volume andtypes of shipping which future operationswould require. Despite the inevitable con-flict of interests between the Army and theNavy, JCS dealt with the shipping aspectsof its work in an effective manner. The factthat the President was represented on JCSby Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief ofStaff to the Commander in Chief of theArmy and Navy, facilitated decisions andmeant that it was not often necessary to callon the Chief Executive himself to settledifferences relative to the utilization ofshipping.

The basic work for the Combined andJoint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the em-ployment of shipping was done by theCombined and Joint Military Transporta-tion Committees.125 The numerous studiesprepared by these committees covered theentire range of Allied shipping operations.They provided the transportation calcula-tions upon which the parent organizations,and the heads of governments at theiroccasional meetings, based their strategicand logistic decisions. They provided thedata for determining the deployment ofshipping to most economically and ef-fectively implement strategic decisions. Thestrategic proposals of the Combined andJoint Staff Planners were necessarily hypo-thetical until they had been translated intoterms of shipping by CMTC and JMTCand their practicability tested in the light oftotal shipping requirements and the capa-bilities of the vessels expected to be avail-able. Those committees estimated the lossrates to be used in determining, for planningpurposes, the amount of shipping likely tobe available at specific future dates. They

dealt not only with the employment ofblocks of tonnage but on occasion with theassignment of specific vessels to specifictasks. They gave attention to the efficiencywith which shipping was employed andmade proposals for improving the dispatchof vessels at ports, reducing the time re-quired for round voyages, and regulatingthe retention of ships in the theaters forstorage purposes or for intratheater opera-tions.

Authority to allocate the shipping underUnited States control to the several usesrested with the War Shipping Administra-tion, under Presidential directive. In theexercise of that authority WSA was obligedto take into account, in addition to militaryrequirements as formulated by JCS, thePresident's views and commitments relat-ing to lend-lease, decisions of the President'sSoviet Protocol Committee, policies of theBureau of Economic Warfare and the StateDepartment pertaining to international re-lations, and the need for strategic imports.Because there usually was not enough ship-ping to meet all needs fully, and inorder to avoid the delays to strategic andlogistic planning which resulted from ad-justments in its shipping program after suchplanning was well progressed, JCS en-deavored to effect a distribution of thedeficit among the several programs as earlyas possible. To accomplish this a representa-tive of WSA was invited to sit as an as-sociate member with the Joint MilitaryTransportation Committee. This repre-sentative had knowledge of lend-lease andcivilian shipping plans as well as of theprospective availability of bottoms, andwith his assistance JMTC was able to workout many adjustments and eliminate manyconflicts which would have resulted if theseveral programs had been established en-

125 CCS 24, 2 Feb 42, Item 1, records establish-ment of CMTC, and CCS 24/1, 10 Feb 42, statesfunctions and composition.


tirely independently of each other. Despitethis attempt to place the respective pro-grams on a realistic basis in their earlystages, there still were conflicts which had tobe settled ultimately by the President.126

A similar procedure was followed by theCombined Military Transportation Com-mittee in endeavoring to adjust programswhich affected both British and Americanshipping. Representatives of the BritishMinistry of War Transport and the WarShipping Administration sat with this com-mittee when shipping allocations were beingconsidered. The problems of CMTC dif-fered from those of JMTC, however, be-cause the broad aspects of the employmentof the combined British-American shippingresources were in large measure covered inthe strategic decisions of the President andthe Prime Minister.

General Gross, as a member of both theJoint and the Combined Military Trans-portation Committees, consistently took theposition that military requirements, that is,requirements of the Army and the Navy,should have first priority in the allocationof cargo vessels.127 In support of this posi-tion he could cite the language of the ex-ecutive order creating WSA, which stated:"In allocating the use of ... vessels, theAdministrator shall comply with strategicmilitary requirements." This attitude wasreflected in a study, prepared under his

supervision in January 1942, regarding theavailability of shipping for troop move-ments. It was evidenced a few weeks laterin his criticism of preliminary proposals con-cerning the establishment of CMTC, whichhe felt left the allocation of shipping toomuch in the hands of the Combined Ship-ping Adjustment Board, a civilian agency.It found expression in a memorandum forrecord, prepared in December 1942 aftera conference with Mr. Harry Hopkins, inwhich he stated that the allocation of ad-ditional ships to the Russian lend-lease pro-gram was a strategic decision which shouldbe made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Itwas reflected again in his remarks beforeCMTC regarding the "devastating" effectwhich the proposed allocation of Americanvessels to the British import program wouldhave on plans for the movement of Ameri-can troops to oversea theaters in 1943.

The Army's Chief of Transportationmade a clear presentation of his views onthis subject, which he indicated were sharedby the U.S. Navy, at meetings of the Com-bined Military Transportation Committeeearly in 1945 when consideration was be-ing given to the supply of cargo shippingin relation to projected military opera-tions.128 He contended specifically that mili-tary requirements should have first priorityand that until those requirements had beenmet the other programs should be subjectto clearance by the military authorities. Theopposite view, expressed by the representa-tive of the War Shipping Administrationand supported by British military and civil-ian representatives, was that the militaryauthorities had not been vested with control

126 See monograph by Col M. B. Stokes, Jr., C ofPlng Div OCT, Shipping in War, 22 Mar 46, pp.8-10, OCT HB Topic Logistics Gen.

127 EO 9054, 7 Feb 42, par. 4: Memo, ACofSG-4 for CofS USA, 19 Jan 42, sub: MaximumTroop Movement ... if Given First Priority,OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo, C of Trans BrG-4 for ACofS G-4, 30 Jan 42, sub: Navy Draftof Paper Setting up CMTC, G-4/33813-1; Memofor record by Gross, 30 Dec 42, sub: Conf withHopkins, OCT HB Gross Day File; CMTC 61stMtg, 15 Mar 43, Item 1; see also Memo, CofT forCofS USA, 17 Mar 43, ASF Hq Shipping, 1942-43.

128 CMTC 92d Mtg, 2 Jan 45, Item 1; CMTC93d Mtg, 12 Jan 45, Item 1; Memo, CG ASF(Styer) for ASW (McCloy), prepared 15 Jan 45,sub: Recommendations on Cargo Shipping, OCTHB Wylie Staybacks.


over allocations for nonmilitary programsand that decision regarding the shipping tobe utilized by such programs rested withthe heads of governments. As has been in-dicated, the latter was a correct statementof the manner in which the broad aspectsof ship allocations were dealt with through-out the war. Since lend-lease and the civil-ian economy were so thoroughly interrelatedwith the military program it is a matter ofconjecture how different the allocationswould have been if the procedure advocatedby Gross had been in effect.

The Joint Military Transportation Com-mittee dealt with long-range programs forthe utilization of shipping, usually makingits estimate for six-month periods but keep-ing those estimates constantly under reviewand revision. Since the Army was thelargest claimant for vessels, the Chief ofTransportation on his own initiative keptthe entire shipping situation under studythrough his Planning Division. That divi-sion prepared frequent statements regardingthe whole or particular phases of the oceantransportation problem, utilizing estimatesof troops to be sent overseas prepared bythe Operations Division of the GeneralStaff, experience data concerning the supplyrequirements of troops already overseas,forecasts of the delivery of new vessels andof sinkings by the enemy, probable turn-around cycles on the several routes, theprobable lay up of vessels for repairs, theprobable shipping needs of the oversea com-manders for intratheater operations, andother factors which required consideration.When it became apparent that the shippingallocated to the Army would be inadequateto meet its needs, that fact was brought tothe attention of the Joint Military Trans-portation Committee, with recommenda-tions regarding adjustments to remedy the

situation. In the relatively few instanceswhen shipping capabilities were found topermit the expansion of certain operationsbeyond what had been planned, JMTCwas so informed.129

Supplementing their role in connectionwith the distribution of shipping, the JointChiefs of Staff took an active hand in im-proving the utilization of vessels in thetheaters. Long delays in discharging cargoesin some of the oversea areas and the free-dom with which certain theater command-ers retained transoceanic ships for use inintratheater operations appreciably reducedthe number of bottoms available for out-ward loading from the United States andthus accentuated the effect of the shippingshortage on all military programs. Late in1944, when the accumulation of shippingin oversea ports became so serious as to callfor Presidential intervention, JCS tookdrastic action to reduce the congestionwhich already existed and established ruleswhich were intended to prevent the recur-rence of such a situation. The effect of theseactions will be discussed in a later chapterof this volume.

The Army and the Navy negotiatednumerous agreements outside the JointChiefs of Staff, which affected the employ-ment of the ships under their control. Sincethe two services worked side by side in thetheaters, co-ordination was necessary toavoid needless duplication and resultantwaste in their supply and shipping opera-tions. This was particularly true in thePacific where the Navy's logistic responsi-

129 Concerning functions and methods of PlngDiv, see its annual reports; Col M. B. Stokes, Jr.,C of Plng Div, Presentation Before Army ServiceForces Headquarters Staff School, undated; State-ment prepared in Plng Div, 28 Sep 45, sub: Plngfor Ocean Shipping. All in OCT HB Plng Div Gen.


bilities were larger then elsewhere. An effortfor co-ordination, which General Gross fullyendorsed and supported, brought success insome directions and frustration in others.

The first significant agreement of thatnature, entitled "Joint Logistics Plan for theSupport of United States Bases in the SouthPacific," was adopted in July 1942.130 Itspurpose was to reduce the waste which hadresulted from the maintenance of whollyindependent supply systems in the SouthPacific Area, where joint bases were set upduring the early months of the war. Sup-plies which were in common use werebroken down into categories, and responsi-bility for each category at each base wasassigned either to the Army or the Navy.The commander of the South Pacific Area(a naval officer) was given control of allUnited States shipping assigned to the areaand over-all responsibility for the distribu-tion of supplies within the area. A JointPurchasing Board was established at Well-ington to procure such supplies as wereavailable in New Zealand and Australia andthus to reduce the weight of the requisitionssent to the zone of interior and the amountof shipping utilized in filling them. Thatagreement served as a prototype for ar-rangements affecting other areas.

In February 1943 a series of agreementswas approved by the two departments, pro-viding for a division of responsibilities inorder to avoid overlapping in the supplyand transportation of food and petroleumproducts for Army and Navy personnel atcertain Atlantic and Caribbean bases andin Africa and the British Isles.131 During thefollowing month a further and broaderagreement was signed, the purpose of which

was to "insure co-ordinated logistical effortand procedure in each command area . . .involving joint Army-Navy operations inwhich unity of command and responsibilityhas been established to the end that thecombined personnel, equipment, supplies,facilities, shipping and other services of theArmy and Navy are most effectively utilizedand adequately provided." 132 Under thisBasic Logistical Plan each oversea areacommander was required to effect co-or-dination of all existing agencies chargedwith the planning, conduct, and supervisionof logistical services within the area, andArmy and Navy seaboard agencies in theUnited States which served such areas werecharged with co-ordinating the allocation ofshipping and the loading and routing ofships.

The Chief of Transportation informedthe commanders of the several ports of em-barkation that while the principles of theBasic Logistical Plan were especially ap-plicable to the Pacific they were to beapplied to some extent to other ports, anddirected the Army port commanders toinitiate conferences with the correspondingnaval commanders in order to implementthe agreement.133 The port commanderswere instructed also to take the initiativein forming committees, including repre-sentatives of the War Shipping Administra-

130 Plan signed by Admiral Home and GeneralSomervell, 15 Jul 42, OCT HB Topic Army-NavyJoint Logistics.

131 Joint Memo, CG SOS USA and VCNO USNfor Army and Navy Comdrs at home ports andoversea bases, 27 Feb 43, sub: Army and NavyAgreements Relating to Supply of Food andPetroleum Products in Atlantic, OCT HB TopicArmy-Navy Joint Logistics.

132 Agreement, Basic Logistical Plan for Com-mand Areas Involving Joint Army and Navy Op-erations, promulgated by TAG USA, 7 Mar 43,and by CinC U.S. Fleet, 8 Mar 43, OPD 381(120-140).

133 Memos, ACofT for port Comdrs, 7 Mar 43and 24 Mar 43, OCT HB Topic Army-Navy JointLogistics.


tion as well as the Navy, to deal with theemployment of shipping, longshore labor,and ship repair facilities. Special instructionswere sent to the Army port commander atSan Francisco, where a committee of Army,Navy, and WSA representatives already hadbeen set up and was functioning infor-mally.154 He was advised that the shippingschedules worked out by the committeeshould be forwarded to Army and Navycommanders in the respective oversea areas,with requests that they submit joint state-ments of priorities based on the anticipatedmovement capabilities. He was informedthat all cargo vessels, whether owned orchartered by the Army or the Navy orallocated to them by WSA, were to be con-sidered available for either or both servicesfor use in accordance with the joint prioritylists established in the theaters. The SanFrancisco port commander was advised fur-ther that while the approved plan appliedonly to cargo, a similar arrangement re-garding troop movements was desirable,since the Army believed that the Navy some-times asserted priority rights to troop spacebecause the vessels were operated by orallocated to the Navy, not because navalpersonnel was the more urgently neededoverseas.

In May 1943 the Basic Logistical Planwas supplemented with an agreement whichdirected that a single joint priority list beprepared for personnel moving to all areasof the Pacific, except the northern andsoutheastern areas, and that standing op-erating procedures be established for theimplementation of the priority lists con-templated by both the original and the sup-

plementary agreements.135 Soon thereaftera general plan for the administration ofjoint priorities for personnel moving fromwest coast ports to the Central, South, andSouthwest Pacific Areas was adopted.136

The Chief of Transportation then proposedmore detailed joint procedures for cargo aswell as personnel movements, includingstrong central control of shipping, but afterconsideration of the proposal the Navystated that it considered such further actionunnecessary.137

The question of joint cargo priorities con-tinued to receive attention, but an arrange-ment wholly satisfactory to the Army wasnot achieved. Although joint cargo prior-ity lists were prepared by the commandersof the respective Pacific theaters, means ofestablishing proper balance between thetheaters was lacking, and this was a seriousweakness in view of the scarcity of shippingand the competition between the overseacommanders for cargo space.138

The Joint Army-Navy-WSA Ship Opera-tions Committee, which was set up in-formally at San Francisco early in 1943,

134 Ltr, CG SFPE to CofT, 6 Feb 43, OCT HBGross Day File; Ltr, ACofT to CG SFPE, 7 Mar43, OCT HB Topic Army-Navy Joint Logistics.

135 Agreement, CofS USA and COMINCH,26 May 43, sub: Joint Priority List for PacificShipments, OCT HB Topic Army-Navy JointLogistics.

136 Memo, Dir NTS and CofT for Comdt TwelfthNaval Dist and CG SFPE, 7 Jun 43, OCT HBTopic Army-Navy Joint Logistics.

137 Memo, CofT for Dir NTS, 1 Jul 43, sub:Joint Troop and Cargo Movements West Coast,OCT HB Topic Army-Navy Joint Logistics; 1stMemo Ind, Dir NTS for CofT, 28 Jul 43, OCT HBTopic Army-Navy Joint Logistics; Memo, Dir NTSfor CofT, 5 Jun 44; Memo, CofT for Dir NTS, 7Jun 44. Last two in OCT 563.5 Pacific OceanAreas.

138 For OCT view see Ltr, Lt Col R. D. Meyer,Deputy Dir of Opns during the war, to C. C.Wardlow, 21 Jul 49, OCT HB Army-Navy JointLogistics. Concerning Navy experience with cargopriorities see Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S. NavalLogistics in the Second World War (Princeton,1947), pp. 229-33.


undertook to co-ordinate the shipping activi-ties of the three agencies in order to obtainthe best possible utilization of ships sailingfrom the Pacific coast in accordance withdeterminations of the Joint Chiefs of Staffand to control the use of port facilities. InNovember 1943 the Navy, which was inprocess of vesting greater authority overnaval logistics in its Pacific coast organiza-tion, proposed that the committee's functionsbe more clearly defined.139 The Armyobjected to certain provisions in the Navy'sdraft of an agreement, which it believedmight be so interpreted as to give the com-mittee greater control over ship and portoperations than the Army was willing toaccord.140 In the Office of the Chief ofTransportation critics of the proposedagreement argued that in view of the tighttransportation situation and the necessityof controlling steamship and railway opera-tions and troop and supply movements froma central point, it would be unwise to de-centralize to the San Francisco committeeany of the functions then being performedin Washington. Following a conference be-tween General Somervell and AdmiralHome, and after modifications had beenmade in the text of the agreement to meet

the Army's objections, signatures wereaffixed in February 1944.141

The difficulties encountered in thenegotiation of this agreement reflected thebasic difference between the Army andNavy logistic systems, the former beingbased on centralized control while the latterwas relatively decentralized. The agreementmade clear that the duties of the San Fran-cisco joint operations committee were notbeing extended.142 It provided that "similarcommittees with the same functions" shouldbe set up at Los Angeles and Seattle. Itstated that the Army port commanderswould act independently with respect toship operations in order that they might "bemore responsive to the daily control ex-ercised by Washington over the integratedmovements of troops and supplies fromorigin to destination."

Despite the limitation placed on theirauthority relating to ship operations, thewest coast joint committees performed auseful function in connection with themovement of troops and supplies to thePacific. Their role in regard to the ad-ministration of priorities and the utilizationof port facilities was an important one. TheSan Francisco committee, which had thecentral role, included the commandant ofthe Twelfth Naval District (later the PacificCoast Coordinator of Naval Logistics), who

139 Draft of Memo prepared by Navy, 19 Nov43, sub: Pacific Coast Joint Committee forShipping, Shipbuilding and Repair, OCT HB GrossPacific Coast Joint Committee. For developmentsin Navy's logistical organization see Ballantine,U.S. Naval Logistics, pp. 208-15.

140 Memo, CG ASF for VCNO (Home), 15 Dec43; Memo, VCNO for CG ASF, 23 Dec 43; Memo,CG ASF for VCNO, 28 Dec 43; Memo, C ofWater Div OCT for CofT, 8 Feb 44; Memo, DCof Traf Contl Div for CofT, 8 Feb 44. All in OCTHB Gross Pacific Coast Joint Committee. See alsoTel Conv, ACofT and CG SFPE, 20 Apr 44, andMemo, CG SFPE for CofT, 24 Apr 44, OCT 370.5POA (Geog file, 2d Sec).

141 Memo, CG ASF for VCNO, 11 Feb 44, andagreement signed 12 Feb 44, OCT HB GrossPacific Coast Joint Committee.

142 Members of this committee also served onPacific Coast Joint Committee for Shipbuilding andShip Repair. For functions of committees andtheir working subcommittees see chart preparedby SFPE, 7 Aug 43, and Ltr, CG SFPE to CofT,8 Oct 45, OCT HB Topic Port Co-ordination. Forminutes of meetings see OCT 334 Joint Army-Navy-WSA Opns Com.


acted as chairman, the commander of theArmy port of embarkation, and the westcoast representative of the War ShippingAdministration.

The distribution of allocated cargo ship-ping for use in the Pacific was a matterof continuous concern to the Chief ofTransportation.143 From the beginning theNavy was believed to be maintaining ex-cessive standards in the operation of itsoversea bases, particularly in the extent andcharacter of the construction work, whichmade its demands upon shipping unneces-sarily heavy. In the spring of 1944 GeneralGross presented computations relating tothe several Pacific areas, from which hededuced that on the average each Armycargo sailing was supporting twice as manymen as a Navy cargo sailing. In workingout the monthly allocations of ships inWashington it was found that the estimatedrequirements submitted by the Navy's westcoast representative were not closely calcu-lated.

Another problem from the Army stand-point arose from the fact that the vastPacific Ocean Areas, embracing what wereknown in the early part of the war as theCentral Pacific and the South Pacific, wereunder a Navy commander, and all WSAallocations of cargo vessels for operationwest of Hawaii were made to the Navy. TheChief of Transportation considered his lackof control over the ships moving supplies to

Army forces in that area a handicap.144

Lack of information concerning ship move-ments and port activities in POA also wasa source of inconvenience, not only inWashington but also to the Army commandin the Southwest Pacific to which some ofthe vessels were destined.140 The shippingsituation in POA was given careful con-sideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff andthe Joint Military Transportation Com-mittee during the greater part of 1944. Theresultant agreement, however, did not sub-stantially alter the Army's position, sinceit provided for the continued allocation ofcargo ships to the theater commander, whowas to reallocate them to the Army, theNavy, and the subarea commanders "inaccordance with the requirements of theoverall military situation." 146

Although the Army was given strongrepresentation on the POA logistics staff,the plan of ship allocation for that areanever was considered a satisfactory one bythe Chief of Transportation, who as lateas May 1945 remarked that while the planhad "functioned" it had not done so with-

143 Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, 4 Dec 42(approx), sub: Trans Requirements PacificTheater, G-4/561; Joint Memo, Lt Col A. W.Parry and Lt Col R. G. Lehnau for Gen RobinsonContl Div ASF, 12 May 43, par. 5c, sub: Rpt onInsp Trip, OCT HB Gross Pacific Theater; Memo,CofT for Gen Wood Plns and Opns Div ASF, 9Mar 44, OCT HB Gross Pacific Theater; Opns MtgOCT, 14 May 44, sub: West Coast-Navy, OCTHB Opns Council Mtgs.

144 Memo, Deputy Dir of Opns OCT for CofT,31 Oct 44, OCT HB Wylie Supply and Shipping inPacific 1944-45; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 14Nov 44, sub: JCS 1087/5, OCT HB Gross JointArmy-Navy Trans.

145 Memo, C of Mvmts Div OCT for Dir ofOpns (Wylie), 15 Nov 44, OCT HB Mvmts DivGen; Memo, C of Ship Contl Br Contl Div OCTfor Deputy Dir of Opns (Meyer), 21 Nov 44,OCT HB Wylie Supply and Shipping in Pacific1944-45; Ltrs, CofT to Maj Gen Edmond LeaveyACofS for Logistics POA, 24 Oct and 25 Nov 44,OCT HB Gross Pacific Theater.

146 Memo, CINCPOA for CNO, 20 Oct 44, sub:Centralization of Contl of Cargo Shipping in POAOCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo, Deputy Dirof Opns for CofT, 31 Oct 44, sub same, OCT HBMeyer Staybacks; Memo, CG ASF for CofS USA,11 Dec 44, sub: Procedure for Allocation andContl of Cargo Shipping in POA, OCT 565.2POA; JCS Policy Memo 8, 26 Dec 44.


out "anguish to the Army." 147 GeneralGross believed that the only way he couldbe sure of fulfilling his responsibility forsupplying the Army forces in POA was tohave control of the ships which transportedthe supplies.

During the spring of 1945, in anticipa-tion of the surrender of the German forcesand the intensification of the war againstJapan, the Navy proposed that a joint con-ference be held to discuss supply and ship-ping problems in the Pacific.148 Thedesignation of General Douglas MacArthuras commander of all Army forces in thePacific (CINCAFPAC) and AdmiralChester W. Nimitz as commander of allNavy forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC)presented a new command set-up whichnecessitated new arrangements in regard toocean transportation. In addition to repre-sentatives of the Navy Department, theArmy Service Forces, and the Army AirForces, representatives of the land, sea, andair commands in the Pacific were invited tothe conference. The discussions were heldin Washington, 1-5 May 1945, under thechairmanship of Admiral Royal E. Inger-soll, Commander, Western Sea Frontier.According to a report filed with the Assist-ant Chief of Staff, G-4, agreement was

reached on all matters except the controlof shipping.149

The Navy plan presented at the confer-ence was that all shipping matters shouldbe dealt with by a joint organization to beestablished by General MacArthur andAdmiral Nimitz. The Army, recalling itsunsatisfactory experience in the PacificOcean Areas where a joint logistics staffhad existed, contended that such an ar-rangement would be unduly cumbersomeand slow. The Chief of Transportation andother Army representatives at the confer-ence proposed that the Army and the Navycommands in the Pacific make their ship-ping arrangements separately—which itwas believed would be more satisfactory andentirely practical in most instances—andthat joint control be established only whenthe exigencies of joint operations or othercircumstances rendered such control neces-sary.150 The discussion brought out the factthat the Seventh Fleet, serving in the South-west Pacific under an Army commander,had had complete independence in logisti-cal matters until early 1945, and that after-ward the Army commander had reviewedthe Seventh Fleet requests for supplies inthe light of the over-all capacity of theports but had not undertaken to control itsshipping operations. By way of contrast, itwas stated that shipping for the supply ofArmy forces in POA west of Hawaii hadbeen completely under Navy control. Theconference ended without either servicemodifying its position on the point at issue.

Early in June the Navy placed thequestion of control of shipping in the Pacific

147 3d Mtg, Army-Navy Supply and ShippingConf, 1-5 May 45, p. 69, files of Plans and PolicyGroup, P&O Div, GS USA, ABC 337 (1 May 45).For fuller discussion of shipping arrangements inPOA see Col David H. Blakelock, Notes for Lectureon Joint Overseas Trans Problems, 27 Jan 47, OCTHB Topic Army-Navy Joint Oversea Trans Prob-lems.

148 JCS 1259/4, 3 Apr 45, sub: Command andOperational Directives for the Pacific; Memo,ACofS ASF for CG ASF, 10 Apr 45, sub: Studyof Supply and Shipping Problems Relative toSupport of Pacific War; Memo, CNO for CG AAF,17 Apr 45. Last two in G-4/400.22, Vol. II.

149 Memo, C of Policy Br G-4 USA, 7 May 45,G-4/400.22, Vol. II.

150 Army-Navy Supply and Shipping Conf, 1-5May 1945, esp. pp. 66-80 of 3d mtg and pp. 8-13of 4th mtg, files of Plans and Policy Group, P&ODiv, GS USA, ABC 337 (1 May 45).


TABLE 4—EMPLOYMENT OF OCEAN-GOING PASSENGER AND DRY-CARGO SHIPPINGUNDER U.S. CONTROL ON SELECTED DATES: 1943-1945 a

a Includes merchant-type vessels of 1000 gross tons or more. Naval auxiliaries are excluded, but merchant-type vesselsconverted to assault vessels (AKA's and APA's) are included. WSA allocations are shown according to allocations foroutbound voyages.

Source: WSA Shipping Summary, September 1945, p. 38.

formally before the Joint Chiefs of Staff.151

It recommended that CINCAFPAC andCINCPAC be directed to set up a jointagency for the co-ordination and control ofall merchant-type shipping except assaultcraft. A meeting between CINCAFPACand CINCPAC had been held on Guam,1-4 June 1945, during which the shippingproblem had been discussed and estimatesof shipping requirements to February 1946

had been prepared.152 The Army Chief ofStaff requested the opinion of CINCAFPACwith regard to the joint agency recom-mended by the Navy, and was informed byGeneral MacArthur that he was opposedto the arrangement since it would deprivethe Army of control of the shipping serving

151 JCS 1286/6, 5 Jun 45, sub: Joint Agency forCo-ordination of Shipping within Pacific.

152 Rad, CINCPOA Adv Hq for COMINCH,CM-IN 5530, 6 Jun 45. CofT found the estimatesinadequate and requested more information; seeRad, OPD to CG AFPAC Manila, CM-OUT13.186, 7 Jun 45.


its forces.153 While he recognized the needfor Army-Navy co-operation, General Mac-Arthur favored separate shipping responsi-bilities; he recommended that his intra-theater shipping requirements be submitteddirectly to the War Department and thatvessels to meet those requirements be allo-cated to him and be operated under hiscontrol. The Navy proposal had not beenacted on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff whenhostilities ended.154

The intricacy of the problems involvedin the exercise of centralized control overthe employment of U.S. shipping, as well asthe Army's interest in the proper solution ofthese problems, are best understood whenthe volume and distribution of such ship-ping are visualized. Table 4 shows the dis-position, according to outbound allocations,of the ocean-going passenger and dry cargovessels under U.S. control at the beginningof 1943, 1944, and 1945, and in mid-1945.As of 1 January 1945, when the campaignagainst Germany was at its height, out ofa total of 36,022,000 deadweight tons,17,330,000 tons (48.1 percent) were atthe disposal of the Army, and 8,016,000tons (22.3 percent) were at the disposal ofthe Navy. Six months later, with Germanydefeated and the concentration of strengthin the Pacific well begun, the Army's per-centage had shrunk and the Navy's hadincreased. The latter fact, however, mustbe interpreted in the light of the arrange-ment under which vessels for both Armyand Navy use in the Pacific Ocean Areas

were allocated to the Navy. In other words,the shift of allocations from the Army to theNavy does not imply a correspondingchange in the actual utilization of shipping.

Tankers are not included in Table 4. Bulkshipments of petroleum products to meetthe Army's oversea requirements were trans-ported by the Navy. On 1 July 1945, outof a total of 14,582,000 deadweight tons ofocean-going tank vessels in the service of theUnited States, 9,143,000 deadweight tons,or 62.7 percent, were owned or chartered bythe Navy or were allocated to the Navy bythe War Shipping Administration.155

Co-ordination of Port Utilization

During the first year of the war in Europeit was foreseen that the port facilities of theUnited States, while generally well devel-oped and probably adequate for the na-tional need if the United States should enterthe war, would have to be conserved andutilized with care if their potential ade-quacy was to be realized.156 The problemwas twofold. First, there was the matter ofpreventing piers and warehouses, whichwere suitable for handling the export trafficflow, from being used for storage, repairwork, or other nontransportation purposes.Second, there was the matter of distribut-ing the traffic among as many ports as prac-ticable so as to avoid some being neglected,with resulting diversion of their water-frontfacilities and longshore labor to other em-

153 Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, CM-OUT12523, 6 Jun 45; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall,CM-IN 11431, 12 Jun 45.

154 Memo, Secy JCS for the chiefs individually,22 Aug 45, listed the Navy proposal (JCS 1286/6)among items removed from JCS Agenda, files ofPlans and Policy Group, P&O Div, GS USA, ABC381 United Nations, 23 Jan 42, Sec 3-D.

155 WSA Shipping Summary, September 1945,pp. 148, 154; Conv, author with Mar Com repre-sentative, 12 Nov 47, sub: Allocation of TankerTonnage, OCT HB Topic Mar Com Opns. Totalfigure for tankers does not include those lend-leased to other countries for their operation.

156 The Atlantic ports were the chief concern atthat time; the possibility of war in the Pacific wasnot so strongly felt.


ployment, while a few were being over-burdened.

Early in 1941 concern over the prospectof deepwater steamship terminal facilitiesbeing improperly used was expressed by theBoard of State Harbor Commissioners atSan Francisco and the Traffic AdvisoryCommittee of the Maritime Association ofthe Port of New York.157 The latter organ-ization referred to rumors that the Navywanted to obtain exclusive occupancy ofthe Bayonne (N.J.) Terminal, which cur-rently was being used for loading ships withexplosives and was the most suitably locatedpier in the harbor for that purpose; it feltthat the Navy's oversea traffic did not war-rant its acquisition of the installation. Otherpiers in New York harbor, including theArmy base in Brooklyn, were cited as notbeing used fully for loading and discharg-ing steamships. Both organizations sug-gested that the Transportation Commis-sioner, Advisory Commission to the Councilof National Defense, set up a plan of co-ordination and control. At about that timea representative of the Port of New YorkAuthority visited the several interestedagencies in Washington with a view tostimulating interest in this subject.158 It wasrecognized that since the Army, the Navy,and other federal agencies were concerned,effective control could not be exercised bylocal committees or municipal authorities.

The Army, with its shipping operationsrapidly expanding, was fully cognizant ofthis problem, and when opportunity afford-ed it registered opposition to proposals which

it believed would result in the improper useof specific port facilities.159 The AssistantSecretary of War and The QuartermasterGeneral favored the early establishment ofa central co-ordinating authority.160 InApril 1941 the Transportation Commis-sioner met with representatives of the in-terested government and private agenciesfor a discussion of the subject. It was pro-posed that he and the chairman of theMaritime Commission undertake to workout a solution, but nothing came of theproposal since neither had authority to takeplenary action.161 In June the Army wasspurred to further efforts by informationthat the Navy had acquired the Bayonneterminal and that the facility soon wouldbecome unavailable for ships loading Armyor lend-lease ammunition. The Army rec-ommended to the Navy that thereafter eachdepartment, before taking final action insuch a matter, obtain clearance through theArmy and Navy Munitions Board. TheNavy agreed, but appropriate directiveswere not issued at once.162 This was done

157 Ltr, Pres of Bd to QMG, 4 Feb 41, AG 612(2-4-41) (1) Co-ordination of Port Facilities; Ltr,Chm of Com to Mgr Port Traf AAR Washington,10 Feb 41, OCT HB Topic Port Co-ordination.

158 Conv, Chm Trans Adv Group OQMG andAsst Gen Mgr PofNYA, 28 Feb 41, OCT HB TopicPofNYA.

159 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 23 Jan 41, sub:Allocation to Navy of Piers 96 and 98 Philadel-phia, G-4/29901-20; Memo, C of Trans Br G-4for ACofS G-4, 17 Apr 41, sub: Lease of HobokenTerminal, OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo, JB forJPC, 6 Mar 41, sub: Proposed Sale or Lease ofHoboken Terminal, and Rpt, JPC to JB, 31 Mar41, JB 356 (Ser 679), OCT HB Topic NY (Portof) Hoboken Terminal.

160 Memo, Dir Plng Br OASW for Trans Com-missioner (Budd), 16 Oct 40, G-4/31852-1;Memo, QMG for ACofS G-4, 12 Mar 41, AG 612(2-4-41) (1) Co-ordination of Port Facilities.

161 Memo for record, Deputy Trans Com, 2 May41, sub: Mtg of Port Com; Memo, Chm Trans AdvGroup OQMG for C of Trans Div OQMG(Wardlow for Dillon), 8 Aug 41, sub: Co-ordina-tion in Use of Port Facilities. Both in OCT HBTopic Port Co-ordination.

162 Memo, C of Contributory Div OUSW forExec Secy ANMB, 20 Aug 41; Ltr, Chm Mar Comto USW, 6 Oct 41; Ltr, USW to Chm Mar Com,23 Oct 41. All in OCT HB Topic ANMB.


some months later, after the chairman ofthe Maritime Commission had urged thatsuch a plan be placed in effect so that com-mercial interests as well as the armed serv-ices would be assured of proper considera-tion.

The Ocean Shipping Section of the Armyand Navy Munitions Board, which wasdesignated to deal with such matters, ini-tially consisted of representatives of theUnder Secretary of War, the Under Secre-tary of the Navy, and the chairman of theMaritime Commission. During the earlymonths of the war a number of changeswere made in the membership of the Sec-tion. The representative of the MaritimeCommission became the representative ofthe newly created War Shipping Adminis-tration. A representative of the Chief ofTransportation replaced the representativeof the Under Secretary as the Army mem-ber. A representative of the Office of De-fense Transportation was added.163

Soon after our entry into the war Gen-eral Somervell, then G-4, instructed allelements of the Army that, in order to in-sure that port facilities were used for theirprimary purpose, the transshipment of per-sonnel and supplies overseas, all requests forauthority to acquire such facilities shouldbe submitted to his office for staff actionand clearance with the Munitions Board.After the creation of a Chief of Transporta-tion the instructions were changed to pro-vide that requests be filed with him.164

General Gross took a keen interest in thematter. During the early part of the emer-

gency the Air Forces and the Corps of En-gineers had acquired piers for the storageand assembling of their matériel. Gross be-lieved that these piers should have beenkept free for use as oversea shipping ter-minals, and he was anxious that additionalpiers should not be tied up in this manner.

During the spring of 1942 the Army com-plained that the representative of the WarShipping Administration on the OceanShipping Section was withholding approvalof requests for facilities which were con-sidered essential to the Army's oversea op-erations.165 The explanation given for thiswithholding was that facilities once underthe control of the Army or the Navy wereused exclusively for their operations and nolonger were available for handling lend-lease and commercial cargoes, for whichWSA was responsible. WSA also com-plained that the Army had taken overwater-front facilities without prior clearanceby the Ocean Shipping Section, and theArmy admitted that this was true of severalterminals for which clearance had been re-quested but not obtained because of WSAopposition. Later, when better understand-ing and closer co-ordination had beenworked out between the Army, the Navy,and WSA, agreement in regard to such mat-ters was more readily achieved. In thespring of 1944 the Chief of Transportationtook the position that further leasing ofpiers and transit sheds for the exclusive useof either service was not desirable, since by

163 Ltr, USW to Chm Mar Com, 23 Oct 41;Memos, Secy ANMB for Divs of ANMB, 16 and23 Apr 42. All in OCT HB Topic ANMB.

164 Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 29 Jan 42,G-4/33618-3; Memo, CG SOS for TAG, 21 Apr42, AG 612 (1-7-42) (1) Clearance of Proposalsfor Taking Over Port Terminal Facilities.

165 Memo within OCofEngrs (Meier for O'Brien),7 May 42, OCT HB Topic ANMB; Memo, alter-nate Army member of OSS ANMB (McCoubrey)for CofS SOS, 12 May 42, OCT HB Topic ANMB;Memos, Opns Off OCT for CofT, 5 and 7 Jun42; Ltr, Opns Off OCT to WSA, 8 Jun 42. Lasttwo in OCT HB Wylie WSA. The WSA attitudewas in harmony with its plan to relieve the Armyof the loading of WSA vessels allocated to it,which will be discussed in the next chapter.


then both had increased their terminal facil-ities considerably and it had been estab-lished that commercial piers could be usedfor military shipments in emergencies.166

The matter of avoiding a concentrationof export freight traffic at a few large portsrequired constant attention. It was naturalthat the Army should tend to utilize to ca-pacity the ports where it already had well-equipped installations and experienced or-ganizations, since that procedure was con-ducive to both efficiency and economy. Thesame argument applied to lend-lease andNavy supply operations. Nevertheless it wasrecognized that there was danger of over-concentration and that the use of all majorports would become a necessity as the warprogressed. The Ocean Traffic Branch ofthe Chief of Transportation's Water Divi-sion kept the question of distributing theArmy's cargo operations constantly alive.167

General Gross registered strong oppositionto a suggestion from G-4 that the New Or-leans Port of Embarkation might be aban-doned and its functions transferred to otherports.

In the spring of 1944, when the port situ-ation was becoming acute, intensive studyof the problem was undertaken by a numberof agencies. The Stevedoring and Ship Fa-

cilities Branch of the Water Division pre-pared monthly estimates of the current andpotential capacities of the ports for han-dling general cargo and ammunition, basedon available facilities and labor supply.168

The joint operations committee at SanFrancisco maintained a subcommittee togive this subject particular attention. A PortUtilization Committee, established in Wash-ington under War Shipping Administrationsponsorship and consisting of representativesof WSA, the Army, the Navy, and theOffice of Defense Transportation, kept thesituation on all seaboards under observa-tion, making use of information submittedby joint committees at the ports and bynumerous agencies in Washington.169 Theformation of this committee satisfied a re-quest which ODT had made for participa-tion with the other agencies in keeping theport situation under control—a participa-tion to which ODT considered itself entitledin view of its responsibility for inland andcoastwise transportation.170 The Joint Mili-tary Transportation Committee delved intothe problem from time to time,

The question of port capacity and uti-lization was a particularly vital one duringthe latter stages of the war in relation tothe Pacific coast. There it was not alone a

166 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 24 Apr 44, sub:Additional Pier Requisitions, OCT HB Wylie Stay-barks; Comments of OCT on Report of PacificCoast Coordinator of Naval Logistics, May 44, pp.8, 10, OCT HB Topic Port Capacity and Utiliza-tion; 1st Ind, CofT for CG ASF, 23 Aug 44, OCTHB Wylie Port Capacity Studies.

167 Memo, CofOTB for C of Water Div (Frank-l in) , 27 Nov 42, OCT 563.5 ( 1 9 4 2 ) ; Memo,CofOTB for ACofT for Opns, 22 Oct 43, sub:Projected Shipments through PE, OCT 563.5(1943); Memo, ACofS G-4 for CG ASF, 3 Mar44, sub: New Orleans Port of Embarkation: Memo,CofT for Gen Somervell, 20 Apr 44, sub: U.S.Port Capacities. Last two in OCT HB Wylie PortCapacity Studies.

168 Random copies in OCT HB Topic PortCapacities and Utilization and in OCT HB WyliePort Capacity Studies.

169 WSA Adm Order 57, 16 Feb 44, OCT HBTopic Port Capacity and Utilization; Ltr, ACofTfor CG SFPE, 26 Jul 44, sub: Assignment ofShipping, OCT 563.51 West Coast; 2d Mtg,Army-Navy Supply and Shipping Conf, 1-5 May45, p. 10; two Ltrs, WSA member of PortUtilization Com to Army and Navy members, 7Mar 45, OCT HB Topic Port Capacity andUtilization.

170 Ltr, USW to ODT, 7 Nov 43; Ltr, ODT toUSW, USN, WSA jointly, 24 Mar 44; Ltr, USWto ODT, 29 Mar 44. All in OCT HB Topic PortCapacity and Utilization.


question of piers and warehouses. Theability of the railroads to move the vastquantities of supplies required for the waragainst Japan into and through the portswas a matter of concern, despite the meas-ures taken by the railroads and the Armyto increase facilities. Labor supply also wasa factor which demanded constant con-sideration, but the Army had anticipatedthis problem and was prepared to useTransportation Corps port companies tosupplement civilian labor to the extentnecessary.171

The Chief of Transportation had ac-cepted the conclusion that a portion of themilitary freight destined to the Pacificwould have to be loaded at Gulf and At-lantic ports, but he planned to use easternports only to the extent necessary after westcoast ports had been used to capacity. Inpreparing advance loading plans to this endhe came into conflict with the War Ship-ping Administration, which apparently hada lower estimate of west coast capabilitythan that which the Transportation Corpshad worked out and which favored moreeast coast loadings because the ships werebecoming available there in greater num-bers.172 In General Gross's office it was feltthat the WSA view with regard to Pacificcoast loading was colored by the constantthreat of congestion at San Francisco andthat the San Francisco situation was due, inpart at least, to failure of the joint commit-tee at that port to plan for loading moreships at Los Angeles and Seattle sufficiently

in advance of the loading dates to enablethe Army and the Navy to divert the re-quired quantities of cargo into those ports.

The west coast port situation was ren-dered more difficult by the growing quantityof lend-lease freight shipped across thePacific to the USSR. That service employedSoviet vessels and Liberty ships which hadbeen transferred to the Soviet flag underlend-lease arrangements. In view of theheavy Army and Navy operations at SanFrancisco, the joint committee for opera-tions endeavored to confine the Soviet trafficas much as possible to the northwest ports.173

Portland, Oreg., was the principal loadingpoint for ships in that service, which utilizedthe facilities of the Army subport of em-barkation. The Army and the Navy movedrelatively little traffic through Portland, inaccordance with a directive of the JointChiefs of Staff that Soviet vessels be givenpreferential use of that port.174 When theUSSR representatives complained to thePresident's Soviet Protocol Committee re-garding the slowness of the loading opera-tion at Portland, the Army pointed out thatthe irregularity of the sailings had causedmuch longshore labor to drift away but thatthe larger part of the available labor wasbeing employed in loading Soviet vessels. Itindicated also that a contributing factor inthe delay was the failure of the local Sovietagent to decide sufficiently in advance whatcargo was to be loaded on specific ships.

In addition to the above-mentioned prob-lems of properly utilizing port facilities and

171 OCT Comments on Report of Pacific CoastCoordinator of Naval Logistics, May 44, pp. 14,17, 18, OCT HB Topic Port Capacity and Utiliza-tion.

172 Memo, C of Plng Div OCT for ACofT forOpns (Wylie), 20 May 45, sub: West CoastShipping Position; Memo for record by ACofT forOpns, 27 May 45. Both in OCT HB Topic PortCapacity and Utilization.

173 JMTC 38th Mtg, 30 Apr 43, Item 1; JMTC39th Mtg, 31 May 43, Item 4.

174 Ltr, ACofT for Acting Exec, the President'sSoviet Protocol Committee, 5 Jul 44, AG 563.5West Coast. Brig Gen R. H. Wylie, ACofT, rep-resented the CofT on this committee, which wasconcerned with supplying and moving matériel toUSSR in accordance with the President's commit-ments.


avoiding the overconcentration of traffic,there were the problems of keeping the rateof freight movement to the seaboard com-mensurate with the capacity of the shipsavailable, and preventing the accumulationof unnecessarily large "banks" of suppliesat the ports as insurance against possibleshortages of cargo. The Army, the Navy,the War Shipping Administration, and theOffice of Defense Transportation, as well asthe British Ministry of War Transport, wererepresented on the Transportation ControlCommittee, which was established in Wash-ington in March 1942 and charged withthe responsibility of keeping the ports fluid.The results were very satisfactory. A de-tailed discussion of the methods and accom-plishments of that committee will be pre-sented in another volume of this history.

While much was accomplished in thedirection of improved port utilizationthrough the co-operative efforts of theArmy, the Navy, and the civilian agenciesconcerned with transportation, much morecould have been accomplished by the actualconsolidation of the port operations of thearmed services. This point was developedin a detailed study prepared in the WarDepartment soon after the termination ofhostilities.175 The Army and the Navy main-tained separate establishments at most ofthe larger ports for the transshipment ofpersonnel and supplies and the performanceof related functions. The elimination of thisduplication, the study pointed out, wouldhave reduced the total demand for piers,warehouses, administrative personnel, andlongshore labor and at the same time would

have lightened the problem of co-ordinationin the over-all utilization of the ports andtheir facilities. As will be more fully ex-plained in the next chapter, the efforts forconsolidation which were made during thewar were without avail. The question ofjoint port operation was closely tied in withthe question of joint vessel operation, andneither the Army nor the Navy was willingto accept the proposals made by the otherto achieve that end.

Co-ordination of Ship Repair andConversion

The demand for ship repairs and altera-tions at American yards expanded tremen-dously as the war progressed, and althoughthe facilities were expanded there was al-ways a backlog of work on urgently neededvessels. This was a natural consequence ofthe increase in the number of merchant andnaval vessels in service and the unusualhazards of wartime operation, but therewere other contributing causes. The Armyand the Navy required many special typesof vessels—combat loaders, hospital ships,repair ships, airplane and tank transports,animal transports, to mention a few—whichto a considerable extent were provided byaltering existing bottoms. The heavy de-mand for troop transportation necessitatedthe conversion of many freight vessels tofit them for that purpose. Ships hastily builtunder war conditions were more likely todevelop machinery trouble and structuralweakness than were those constructed underthe more favorable conditions of peacetime.Recently recruited crews were less adeptthan experienced seamen at preventivemaintenance and the performance of smallrepair jobs in time to stop them from be-coming big ones. Repair facilities in manytheaters of operation were wholly inade-

175 Memo prepared in OCT, 27 Nov 45, sub:Sec IV—Trans (Surface) Port Operation, OCTHB Topic Port Co-ordination; Report to the Sec-retary of War on Common Activities of the Armyand Navy, 12 Dec 45, pp. 62-64, AG A49-212,RG 114.


quate and were susceptible of only limitedenlargement; therefore much repair workneeded while the ships were overseas wasdeferred until the vessels returned to UnitedStates ports. American yards were calledupon to repair, convert, and arm many for-eign flag vessels, including those requisi-tioned by the United States and those op-erating in the American and British pools.176

The pressure upon the repair yards washeavy and unremitting. Getting vessels inserviceable condition so that they might sailwith the convoys to which they were as-signed was a matter of utmost importance.One large concern which had yards on bothAtlantic and Pacific coasts reported that itswartime activities had included the per-formance of 37,778 repair jobs on merchantand naval vessels; another concern reportedthat it had performed more than 20,000 re-pair and conversion jobs.177 The War Ship-ping Administration, which in May 1942took over from the Maritime Commissionresponsibility for supervising repairs ongovernment-owned merchant vessels and onforeign vessels under lend-lease arrange-ments, handled 42,076 jobs, of which36,476 were on ships under the Americanflag and 5,600 on ships under foreign flags;about 100 repair yards throughout theUnited States were utilized for this work,and in addition about 230 other concernsperformed specialized types of work in con-nection with maintenance, repairs, andconversions.178 Ship repair work was in di-

rect competition for facilities, materials,and labor with the shipbuilding program,and sometimes suffered by reason of thehigher priority given to the construction ofnew vessels.

In June 1941, in an effort to bring betterorder to the private ship repair industry andeliminate bottlenecks, the Maritime Com-mission established a Coordinator of ShipRepair and Conversion, with headquartersat New York.179 The Navy, which reliedupon private yards for a considerableamount of repair work, participated in theplan from the beginning, and the Armysoon became a party to it. When a shipneeding repair entered an American harborthe owner or operator, instead of placing anorder with a yard of his own choice, filedwith the Co-ordinator an application forthe use of repair facilities. The Co-ordinator,who maintained complete informationregarding the facilities, materials, and laboravailable at each repair yard, as well as thestatus of the work already in hand, indi-cated where the order should be placed sothat the work might receive the promptestand most efficient attention. Participationof the Army and the Navy in this plan wasvoluntary, but private owners and operatorsof merchant vessels were required by WSAto obtain advance approval of the co-ordinator before contracting for work atwaterside repair facilities. When the workdid not involve waterside facilities, advanceapproval of the Co-ordinator was not neces-sary, but it was required that he be notifiedregarding the work and its probable dura-tion within five days after the contract hadbeen placed. All ship repair concerns were

176 Mar Com Rpt for the period ending 30 Jun42, pp. 58, 59.

177 "Shipyards Reveal Feats in Wartime," TheNew York Times, February 10, 1946; "Todd YardsSped 21,000 Ships to War," The New York Times,February 24, 1946.

178 Report of the War Shipping Administrator tothe President, The United States Merchant Marineat War (Washington, January 15, 1946), pp.48-50.

179 "U.S. Coordinates All Ship Repairs," TheNew York Times, June 27, 1941; Memo for recordby Wardlow, 31 Mar 43, sub: Co-ordinator of ShipRepairs; WSA GO 36, 5 Aug 43. Last two in OCTHB Topic Mar Com Ship Repairs.


required to report to the Co-ordinator weeklyregarding work performed on a subcontractbasis. The Co-ordinator established branchoffices on the Pacific coast and the Gulf toaid in the performance of his functions inthose areas.

The Army, the Navy, and the War Ship-ping Administration also joined efforts indeveloping a form of repair contract whichwould enable them to eliminate the usualdelays in getting work started and at thesame time protect the government's finan-cial interest. In peacetime the Army hadlet contracts for repair work on a fixed pricebasis.180 That method presupposed ade-quate time for making surveys, writing spec-ifications, and obtaining competitive bids.During the war, despite the necessity ofgetting repair work started with the leastpossible delay, the preparation of specifica-tions and cost estimates could not keep upwith the demand because competent per-sonnel were not available in sufficent num-ber. Moreover, since the yards were over-crowded with work, competitive biddinglost much of its effectiveness in keepingdown charges.

As a result of the joint efforts of the threeagencies and with the aid of suggestionsfrom the Comptroller General, a mastership repair contract was drawn up, whichbecame effective 1 July 1943.181 Under thenew procedure, as soon as a repair yard hadbeen designated by the Co-ordinator, arepresentative of the yard and a governmentcontracting officer inspected the vessel and

prepared a job order for each item of re-pair. The order when executed by bothparties was the contractor's authority toproceed with the work. The charges whichhe eventually submitted were based on anhourly average rate for all classes of directlabor negotiated on the basis of the con-tractor's recent experience, plus the cost ofmaterials, facilities, and subcontracts and areasonable percentage for profit. The con-tractor's accounts were open to governmentinspection and his charges were subject torevision when the profit on a job was foundto be excessive. The principal fault foundwith the master ship repair contract wasthat it removed the incentive which thecontractor had under a fixed price arrange-ment to obtain maximum output from hislabor force, but the Army believed that thisdisadvantage was more than offset by bene-ficial features, particularly the accelerationof the work.182

The ship repair situation was especiallycritical on the Pacific coast, primarily be-cause a large part of the naval fleet wasassigned to the Pacific and repair facilitiesat advance bases were either nonexistent orvery inadequate. Collaboration in regard toship repairs had been carried on betweenlocal representatives of the Army, the Navy,and the War Shipping Administration priorto the adoption of the Basic Logistical Planby the armed services in March 1943, andthereafter it took on a more definite form.The Pacific Coast Joint Committee forShipbuilding and Ship Repair which wasthen established included the commandantof the Twelfth Naval District (later thePacific Coast Coordinator of Naval Logis-tics), the Commander, San Francisco Portof Embarkation, and the Pacific coast repre-

180 Memo, SFPE for QMG, 18 Jul 41; Memo,QMG for SFPE, 20 Aug 41. Both in OCT 574Army Transports.

181 Memo, Hist Rec of Army War Ship RepairContract Agency, 30 Jun 44; Memo, sub: Explana-tion of Background and Opns of Master Ship Re-pair Contract; WD Contract Form TC 103 ShipRepair. All in OCT HB Water Div Ship Repairand Conv.

182 See Ltr, 2d ZTO to Exec OCT, 4 Apr 44,OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv.


sentatives of the War Shipping Administra-tion, the Maritime Commission, and theCoordinator of Ship Repair and Conver-sion. Its basic function was to allocate shipsto private yards in accordance with theavailability of facilities and labor and todetermine priorities. The authority of thecommittee took precedence over that of theCo-ordinator.183 This main committee,which was located at San Francisco, wasaided by subcommittees at Los Angeles,Seattle, and Portland.184 Notwithstandingthe good work done by these joint organiza-tions and the tapering off of shipbuildingactivity in 1945, the west coast ship repairsituation remained critical to the end of thewar.185

Ordinarily a foreign government desiringto have its ships repaired in American yardssubmitted a request to the Foreign Eco-nomic Administration (Lend-Lease Ad-ministration). After determining that fundswere available for the purpose, FEA for-warded the request to the War ShippingAdministration, which decided whether thework could be undertaken in view of thesituation at the yards.186 Early in 1944, inconnection with the proposed conversion ofthree British transports and five British

armed merchant cruisers, this procedurebroke down because the U.S. Navy objectedto placing the additional burden on Ameri-can repair facilities. The Army recognizedthat there had not been wholly satisfactoryco-ordination in this field on the east coastbut believed that the work in question couldbe undertaken without prejudice to Navyrepairs.187 The Army Chief of Transporta-tion contended that in view of the greatneed for troop lift the basic question waswhether the conversion of these vesselswould require more or less time and expensethan would be needed to provide equaltroop lift by converting new vessels.188 TheJoint Military Transportation Committee,to which the matter was referred, recom-mended that the three transports be con-verted and that the armored merchantcruisers be surveyed by a joint committee todetermine whether and to what extent con-version was warranted.

Differences of opinion resulting fromthese surveys and consequent delays in dis-posing of the question led to the establish-ment of a high-level Joint Ship Repair andConversion Policy Board, consisting of theDirector of War Mobilization, who acted aschairman, the War Shipping Administrator,the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, andthe Commanding General, Army ServiceForces.189 This board was assisted by aworking committee composed of representa-tives of the member agencies, with the Co-

183 Joint Memo, CNO, CG ASF, AdministratorWSA, and Chm Mar Com for Pacific Coast Co-ordinator of Naval Logistics, etc., 12 Feb 44, sub:Pacific Coast Joint Committee for Shipbuilding andRepair, OCT 334 Pacific Coast Joint Committee.

184 Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 8 Oct 45, OCTHB Topic Port Co-ordination.

185 "Shipbuilding Yard Layoffs to be Absorbedby Repair Unit," The Washington Post, February 7,1945; "Navy Wants 15,000 to Repair Vessels Dam-aged in Pacific," The New York Times, May 31,1945; Memo, Comdr WSF for SN, 7 Jun 45, sub:Ship Overhaul Load—West Coast, OCT HB TopicNavy; co-ordinator's list of ships under repair orconversion on Pacific coast, 19 Jul 45, OCT 564.

186 Memo, Secy JCS for Maj Chapman, 2 Mar44, sub: Refitting and Conv of British Ships, CCS564 (1-14-44).

187 Memo, COMINCH for CofS USA, 31 Jan 44;Memo, CG ASF for CofS USA, 1 Feb 44; Memo,CofS USA for COMINCH, 3 Feb 44. All in OCT564 British Vessels.

188 CMTC 79th Mtg, 14 Jan 44, Item 3; JMTC59th Mtg, 11 Feb 44; JCS 709, 14 Feb 44.

189 JCS 709/1, 16 Feb 44; JCS 709/5, 6 Mar 44;JCS 709/6, 8 Mar 44; Memo, Dir of War Mobfor CofS USA, CNO USN, and WSA, 25 Feb 44,OCT HB Exec Relations with OWM.


ordinator of Ship Repair and Conversionacting in an advisory capacity.

The close co-operation of the Army, theNavy, and the War Shipping Administra-tion in regard to ship repairs extended over-seas. In view of the large number of mer-chant vessels operating under WSA controland the congestion at domestic yards, therepresentatives of that agency at foreignports did what they could to assure thatships which had been damaged on theoutbound voyage or while abroad shouldobtain needed repairs before they returnedto the United States. Stocks of materials andspare parts were assembled at the oversea

ports, sometimes being salvaged from shipswhich had been damaged to the point whereit was uneconomical to restore them to serv-ice.190 Such materials were available for therepair of transports operated by the Armyand the Navy. Navy dry docks and machineshops overseas were utilized on occasion forrepairing merchant vessels. The Army con-verted and equipped a number of marinerepair ships which were sent to oversea portswhere shore facilities were inadequate orentirely lacking.

190 "WSA Describes Foreign Repair Problems,"Journal of Commerce (New York), December 26,1944.

CHAPTER VI

Relations with Other

Ship-Operating Agencies

A large percentage of the vessels utilizedby the Army were operated by or under thecontrol of other agencies. On 31 July 1945,for example, out of a total of 1,706 ocean-going vessels in the service of the Army, only186 were operated by the Army.1 The re-mainder were operated by agents of theWar Shipping Administration or by theU.S. Navy or were included in the pool offoreign vessels controlled by the BritishMinistry of War Transport. The mainte-nance of smooth working relations withthese agencies was therefore an importantaspect of the Army's transportation task.

The total of 1,706 vessels in Army serviceat the end of July 1945 embraced all ves-sels of 1,000 gross tons or over which werecarrying Army personnel to at least 50 per-cent of their passenger capacity, or werecarrying at least 5,000 measurement tons ofArmy cargo.2 This total included 261 vesselswhich were classified as troopships becausethey had permanent accommodations for

500 or more troops, and 1,445 which wereclassified as cargo ships although some ofthem carried limited numbers of troops.This fleet provided 620,355 permanenttroop spaces and had a total cargo capacityof 16,192,700 measurement tons. Seventeenof the troopships and 78 of the cargo shipswere under foreign registry.3

Relations with the War ShippingAdministration

The Army was dependent on the WarShipping Administration for vessels to carrythe bulk of its oversea traffic, and duringthe winter of 1945 it was using almost 50percent of the dry cargo and passenger ship-ping controlled by that agency.4 While alimited number of vessels was made avail-able to the Army by WSA under variousforms of charter or on permanent alloca-tion, most of them were allocated for thevoyage only and therefore were subject toreallocation when they returned to theUnited States. The WSA pool of cargovessels had to meet demands from othersources, and in view of the almost continu-

1 AG 560 (3 Aug 45), 13 Aug 45, sub: MonthlyList of U.S. Army Transports.

2 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, 31 Jul 45, p. 66. Total of1,706 vessels in Army service was peak or near peakfor war period. ASF Statistical Summary, WorldWar II, p. 145, shows 1,765 vessels in Army servicein December 1944. Due to new and more restrictivemethod of counting adopted early in 1945, it isdoubtful whether figures are strictly comparable.For new basis of counting see Memo, Water Div forContl Div OCT, 28 Mar 45, OCT HB Water DivMisc.

3 Statistical table, Water Div, Vessels in ArmyService, 31 Jul 45, OCT HB Water Div VesselOpns Analysis.

4 Ltr, SW to Chm House Com on MerchantMarine and Fisheries, 6 Mar 45, OCT HB WaterDiv Postwar Fleet; WSA Shipping Summary, Sep45, p. 38.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER SHIP-OPERATING AGENCIES 187

ous over-all shortage of shipping the ques-tion of priorities frequently was an acuteone. Naturally there were many problemsof policy and procedure to be worked outbetween the Chief of Transportation andWSA, in order that the Army might receivethe numbers and types of vessels which itrequired at the places where they wereneeded.

The Army had concurred in the estab-lishment of an agency to control the em-ployment of U.S. shipping, but it had notvisualized such broad authority in the handsof a civilian official as was given to the WarShipping Administrator. Military leadersrecognized that an agency of this type wasnecessary to insure that American vesselswere operated in the national interest andto facilitate collaboration with the BritishMinistry of War Transport in the effectiveutilization of all vessels under Allied control.But the Army officers most directly con-cerned believed that since military victorywas the objective and shipping was essentialto that victory, the military authoritiesshould have the deciding voice in determin-ing what portion of the merchant marinewas to be assigned to military uses. Otheragencies and individuals had differentviews, however, and the end product variedconsiderably from the Army's conception.

An understanding of the circumstancesunder which the War Shipping Administra-tion was created is aided by taking a quicklook at the British Ministry of War Trans-port. During the early part of the war inEurope the control of British transportationwas divided between two agencies; theMinistry of Transport, which had existedin peacetime, was responsible for inlandtransportation, and the Ministry of Ship-ping, which was established in September1939, was responsible for ocean transporta-

tion. In May 1941 these hitherto independ-ent agencies were combined to form theMinistry of War Transport in an effort toachieve closer co-ordination between theinland carriers, the ports, and the steamshiplines, and more efficient utilization of all.5

The Minister of War Transport, LordLeathers, was responsible directly to thePrime Minister, and the means under hiscontrol had to be employed in the mannerthat would best meet both civilian and mili-tary requirements.

Immediately after our entry into the warthe President established the Office of De-fense Transportation, with authority overthe rail, motor, and inland waterway car-riers, and in so doing departed from theBritish example of a single transportationagency. In creating the War Shipping Ad-ministration some weeks later the ChiefExecutive followed the British example ofvesting a broad control over shipping in acivilian agency. In practice, however, WSAdid not exercise as complete control overport operations and the loading of ships asdid BMWT—a matter which will be pre-sented more fully hereafter.6

When it became apparent that the Stra-tegic Shipping Board, which President Roo-sevelt had established immediately after ourentry into the war, would not be able tosolve the problem of shipping allocations byagreement among the three agencies repre-sented in its membership—the MaritimeCommission, the Navy, and the Army—anumber of alternatives were put forward.A plan which originated in the Navy pro-

5 See Hancock and Gowing, British War Econ-omy, X, 120-35.

6 Keen interest of BMWT in establishment ofcorresponding U.S. agency is disclosed in StateDept Msg 744 from Amb John G. Winant (Harri-man for Land and Hopkins), 17 Feb 42, paraphrasein OCT 540 Gen.


posed the establishment of a shipping co-ordinator with cabinet rank. That plan wasnot acceptable to the Army, which objectedto placing the Army-owned transports andthe Army ports of embarkation under theabsolute control of such an official.7 TheArmy proposed instead that a "centralshipping administration" be established,with the chairman of the Maritime Com-mission as administrator, to function underthe general supervision of a board consist-ing of the administrator and representativesof the Army, the Navy, and the Office ofProduction Management; that all trans-oceanic vessels, except those of the armedservices, be pooled "under the exclusivedirection" of the new agency; and that thecentral shipping administration "be guidedby the decisions of the Army-Navy JointBoard with respect to the movement oftroops and supplies for the Army and theNavy and in the allocation of the necessaryshipping to initiate and maintain such mili-tary and naval operations as may beadopted." 8

An informal expression of opinion by arepresentative of the Maritime Commissionindicated that that office was favorably dis-posed toward the latter arrangement andalso that it was willing to undertake themanning and operation of the vessels neces-sary to carry the troops and supplies of theArmy, if called on to do so.9 The Army andthe Navy then agreed on a plan conforming

to the Army's contention that ship alloca-tions should be in accordance with jointdecisions of the armed services, and theysubmitted a draft of an executive order em-bodying that idea.10 Rear Adm. Emory S.Land, who was chairman of the MaritimeCommission and slated to head the newagency also, objected to this subordinationof his authority, and Mr. Harry Hopkinslikewise opposed it on the ground that lend-lease might not receive sufficient considera-tion. The President supported these viewsand accordingly the final draft of the ex-ecutive order, which was prepared in theBureau of the Budget, gave the War Ship-ping Administrator sole direction of the newagency and made him directly responsibleto the President.11

The War Shipping Administrator's dutiesincluded control of the "operation, pur-chase, charter, requisition, and use" of allocean-going vessels under the flag or controlof the United States, except combatantvessels of the Army, the Navy, and the CoastGuard, fleet auxiliaries of the Navy, trans-ports owned by the Army and the Navy,and coastwise vessels controlled by the Officeof Defense Transportation. He was chargedwith the allocation of vessels under his con-trol for use by the Army, the Navy, otherfederal departments and agencies, and thegovernments of the United Nations. He wasdirected to "comply with strategic militaryrequirements" in allocating vessels, to col-laborate with existing military, naval, andcivil departments and agencies of the gov-ernment in order to secure the most effectiveutilization of shipping in the prosecution ofthe war, and to be guided by schedulestransmitted to him by the chairman of the

7 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 28 Dec 41,sub: Admiral Turner's Proposed JB Action,G-4/33920.

8 Ltr, ACofS G-4 for Harry Hopkins, 31 Dec 41,inclosing draft of EO; Memo, CofS USA for Ad-miral Stark USN, 31 Dec 41, sub: EO Establish-ing Central Shipping Adm. Both in ASF Hq Ship-ping 1942-43.

9 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4,1 Jan 42, sub: Opn of Water Trans, Trans BrG-4/560 Mar Com.

10 Bureau of the Budget, The United States atWar, pp. 149-50.

11 EO 9054, 7 Feb 42.


War Production Board prescribing the pri-orities of movement of cargoes essentialto the war production effort and the civilianeconomy. Broadly speaking, the plan con-templated that WSA would concern itselfwith the utilization of vessels in service,while the Maritime Commission woulddevote its main effort to the construction ofnew tonnage.12

The War Shipping Administrator con-sidered it essential that the operating rela-tionships of his office with the transportationoffices of the Army and the Navy, under thegeneral terms of the executive order, shouldbe defined in some detail. To that end hefirst worked out an understanding with theNavy and then approached the Army onthe subject.13 After about a month of negoti-ation, agreement was reached and amemorandum on interdepartmental rela-tionship was signed on 13 June 1942 byGeneral Somervell on behalf of the Armyand by Mr. Lewis W. Douglas, the DeputyAdministrator, on behalf of WSA.14

The memorandum provided that theArmy would operate its owned vessels,keeping the War Shipping Administrationinformed regarding their employment andmaking them available to WSA on thehomeward voyage when military require-ments permitted. WSA troopships assignedto the Army were to be handled throughexisting operating organizations (WSA

agents) in accordance with existing charters,and their homeward employment was to bedetermined by WSA subject to the require-ments of the Army's troop movementschedule. WSA freighters were to be as-signed on a voyage basis; they were to beloaded outbound by the Army and revertto WSA upon completion of discharge atoversea ports. The memorandum providedthat additional piers and terminals mightbe placed under the control of the Armywhen necessary to carry out strategic move-ments ; that Army terminals would be madeavailable to WSA, and WSA terminals tothe Army, when not needed by the control-ling agency; that when commercial ter-minal facilities were taken over by the Armyit would, insofar as practicable, continue touse the same contracting stevedores andterminal operating personnel; and that theArmy and WSA would confer regarding thepurpose and the terms of occupancy inconnection with the acquisition of piers andterminals by the Army. The memorandumfurther provided that except in emergenciesWSA would be the sole contracting agentof the Army for the purchase, charter, orrequisition of ocean-going vessels; thatArmy and WSA representatives in Wash-ington and at the ports would maintainclose liaison in an effort to interchangecargo and obtain "full and down" load-ings; and that the conversion and alterationof ships to fit them for Army use would beaccomplished by WSA, or the Army, or bythe two agencies jointly, as might be ar-ranged. In the last paragraph of the agree-ment each party foreswore any "intentionor ambition" to absorb the functions of theother "by use of its requisition powers orotherwise."

This memorandum, together with someamplifications which were agreed on later,

12 This intent was clarified by EO 9244, 16 Sep42, which expressly transferred certain functionsfrom Mar Com to WSA.

13 Ltr, WSA to SW, 15 May 42, OCT HBWylie WSA.

14 Memorandum Covering the InterdepartmentalRelationship Between the Army and the War Ship-ping Administration to Form a Basis for Full andComplete Cooperation in Connection with the Pur-chase, Charter, Use and Operation of Vessels andTerminal Facilities, transmitted with Ltr, Douglasto Somervell, 13 Jun 42, OCT HB Wylie WSA.

754-915 O-64—14


served as a guide in the successful operatingrelationships of the Army and the WarShipping Administration. It did not fore-stall, however, a heated controversy on aquestion which both sides considered ofimportance in its bearing on the perform-ance of their responsibilities. The questionrelated to the loading of the large fleet ofcargo vessels which WSA allocated to theArmy. The Army had handled the loadingof such vessels prior to the creation of WSA,and when the executive order establishingthat agency was being formulated ColonelGross suggested that the point be coveredexpressly. His suggestion was not followed,and Gross indicated later that he had notpressed the matter because he had been in-formed by a representative of the MaritimeCommission that no change in the Army'sauthority in regard to loading ships was in-tended.15 The Army continued to load al-located vessels at its own terminals, butwhile the above-mentioned agreement oninterdepartmental relationship was beingformulated Gross learned that WSA wasendeavoring to have this function trans-ferred to its own agents who operated thevessels. On 10 June 1942 the issue wasplaced before WSA in a frank communica-tion from General Somervell to Mr.Douglas.16 Somervell remonstrated stronglyagainst the attempt to "usurp" what heconsidered the proper functions of the Army

and the Navy. He said that the Army'smethods of handling oversea movementsand loading ships were the result of ex-perience during and since the last war andthat no other interests could be permittedto interfere with the war effort. When ap-proved a few days later the memorandumon interdepartmental relationship includeda clause which provided: "All freightersassigned to the Army shall be loaded by theArmy Transport Service."

The issue remained in the background fora period of about six months and thensuddenly came to the fore again when amemorandum was received by the Secre-tary of War from the War Shipping Ad-ministration, transmitting a copy of a Presi-dential directive dated 18 December 1942,which dealt expressly with the subject.17 Thedirective, which was addressed to the Ad-ministrator, provided that WSA shouldhandle the loading of all allocated vesselsexcept those required for special task forcesor assault forces, and fleet auxiliaries. Thismeant that the large fleet of allocated vesselswhich handled regular movements of mili-tary cargo to the theaters would be loadedat commercial piers by WSA agents. Secre-tary of War Henry L. Stimson, in ac-nowledging the memorandum to the Ad-ministrator, said he understood that thedirective had been initiated by WSA.18 Heexpressed surprise that a matter which soobviously affected the interests of the Armyshould have been advanced without anyone in authority in the War Departmenthaving had an opportunity to state his viewsto the Bureau of the Budget or to the Presi-dent.

15 Pencil Memo, Gross for Somervell, pars. 5 and6, 4 Jan 43, sub: Intent of EO of Feb 9 ( 7 ) ,1942, ASF Hq Shipping 1942-43.

16 Memos, Opns Off OCT (Wylie) for CofT,5 and 7 Jun 42, sub: Contl of Ship Opn andPier Facilities, OCT HB Wylie WSA; Memos,Gross for Somervell, 9 and 10 Jun 42, OCT 563.5Gen; Memo, Somervell for Douglas, 10 Jun 42,ASF Hq Shipping 1942-43. The WSA positionhad been foreshadowed in Ltr, Land to Somervell,4 Mar 42, par. 5, OCT HB Gross Day File.

17 Ltr, WSA to SW, 18 Dec 42; Memo, thePresident for Admiral Land, 18 Dec 42. Both inOCT HB Exec Relationships with WSA.

18 Ltr, 23 Dec 42, ASF Hq Shipping 1942-43.


Several weeks prior to the signing of thePresidential directive, the Army, as the nextsection of this chapter will show, had pro-posed to the Navy the establishment of ajoint transportation service and the placingof the War Shipping Administration vesselsused by that service under naval operation.Whether the WSA action to gain control ofthe loading of such vessels was in the natureof a countermeasure is not apparent fromthe documents reviewed.

Since the Army and the Navy wereaffected similarly by the new directive, thematter was placed before the Joint Chiefsof Staff. That body promptly arranged ameeting with the War Shipping Administra-tor and his deputy, in order that the intentof the directive and its effect on the armedservices might be determined.19 The DeputyAdministrator, Mr. Douglas, who presentedthe WSA position, asserted that there nolonger was a reservoir of shipping and thatthe shortage of vessels could be lessened byimproving the operation of those available.He pointed out that the most economicaluse of ship space could be attained only bya proper mixture of weight and measure-ment cargo (that is, a mixture of lend-leaseand military cargoes, since the former wasrelatively compact and heavy and the latterwas relatively bulky and light). He referredto the separate operations of the Army andthe Navy in the Pacific, which he felt hadnot given the best possible utilization ofships and ship space. Mr. Douglas concededthat there were types of loading in con-nection with task forces which the armedservices could handle best and disclaimedany intention of interfering with them.With regard to the large number of vessels

which WSA allocated to the Army for themovement of maintenance supplies, he in-dicated that if WSA had "control" of theloading so as to insure economical utiliza-tion it would not attempt to take over theactual physical loading. He felt that in thepast full co-operation had not been givenby the armed services in the effort of WSAto avoid wasted cargo capacity. He agreedthat it might have been better if the armedservices had been consulted before thedirective was issued, but he did not con-sider that procedure necessary since WSAderived its authority directly from the Presi-dent.

At this meeting, and in connection witha memorandum prepared in the JointChiefs of Staff for the President but notofficially delivered, the views of the Armyand the Navy with regard to the effect ofthe directive were presented at length.20 Itwas pointed out that the ship-loading opera-tion was a link in the chain of militarysupply and that military control and co-ordination throughout the chain were neces-sary. Full utilization of cargo space was anideal to be sought, but it had to be sacrificedat times in order to get supplies to thetheaters in the most expeditious manner.Sometimes it was difficult to differentiatebetween supplies for task forces and so-called maintenance supplies. The loading ofmilitary cargoes by commercial operatorswould endanger the security of ship move-ments. Military, ports of embarkation wereset up to meet rapidly changing prioritiesand modifications in requisitions from over-sea commanders, which commercial ter-minal operators were not prepared to do.

19 Minutes, Mtg in Admiral Leahy's office, 28Dec 42, OCT HB Exec Relationships with WSA.

20 Incl A to proposed memo for the President, 26Dec 42, circulated by Secy JCS, OCT HB ExecRelationships with WSA.


Military ports of embarkation had adequatestorage facilities to hold in reserve sufficientquantities of a great variety of supplies tomeet emergency requests from the theaters,which commercial terminal operators didnot have. Military ports of embarkationwere called on to distribute certain ship-ments over several vessels to minimize thedanger of complete loss and to "marry up"related items which arrived at the portsseparately for movement in the same ship,and such processes required a technicalknowledge not possessed by civilian opera-tors. The pooling of military and lend-leasecargoes at the loading ports would handi-cap oversea commanders in diverting theships to whichever discharge ports mightbest meet the military need of the moment.In the Army-Navy protest against the direc-tive of 18 December it was asserted thattheir recent agreement for joint loadingsin the Pacific would be impeded in its op-eration if the approval of schedules by athird party were required.

On 31 December 1942 Mr. Douglas pre-sented to Admiral William D. Leahy, onbehalf of the War Shipping Administration,a plan under which allocated ships wouldbe loaded in accordance with a "mutuallysatisfactory program" and military techni-cians would be on hand to give advicewhenever military cargo was being loadedby WSA operators.21 Although AdmiralLeahy thought the proposal went far towardresolving the difficulty, General Gross com-mented that it was based on a completeacceptance of the WSA interpretation ofthe executive order of 7 February 1942 andexpressed the view that "there cannot be

divided responsibility for the success of themilitary effort." 22

A few days later, in a personal letter toMr. Douglas, General Marshall referred toa "serious" and, he thought, "profitable"conversation at luncheon; stated that theArmy's purpose in supporting the creationof WSA was to make available the maxi-mum number of ships in a pool for alloca-tion to the various uses; asserted that theArmy had understood at that time thatthere was no intent to change the theneffective practice of loading ships; remarkedthat he had made special inquiry regardingthe shipping personnel utilized by the armedservices and had found an "impressive list"of men drawn from civil life, who couldscarcely have lost their judgment and skillthrough donning a uniform; and com-mented that the method of procedureadopted by WSA in this affair "was boundto cause grave difficulties, animosities anddelays." 23 On the same day SecretaryStimson advised Admiral Land that thematter was under discussion with the Presi-dent.24

The President's directive of 18 Decemberwas not rescinded, but it was not enforcedby the War Shipping Administrator. Theapparent purpose of WSA to exercise asupervision over the loading of militarycargoes on WSA vessels similar to thatexercised by the British Minister of War

21 Memo, Admiral Leahy for General Marshalland Admiral King, quoted in JCS 173/3, 1 Jan 43.

22 Memo, for Somervell, 2 Jan 43, sub: Com-ment on Douglas Memo, OCT HB Exec Relation-ships with WSA; Ltr, WSA to Admiral Leahy,5 Jan 43, OCS 570, 1943.

23 Ltr, 8 Jan 43, AG 334.8 WSA. First draft ofthis letter stated that while the Army had under-stood that the word "operation" in the EO of7 Feb 42 had given WSA the manning, fueling,victualing, repairing, and navigating of the shipsunder its control, the Army had never consideredthat operation included loading.

24 Ltr, 8 Jan 43 OCT HB Gross Day File.


Transport was not realized. The Army portsof embarkation continued throughout thewar to load such vessels at their own piers.As the burden on Army facilities becameheavier, increased use was made of piersoperated by WSA agents, but the numberof vessels loaded in this manner was a smallpercentage of the total.

In the spring of 1943 Army shippingoperations, along with those of the Navy,were attacked from another quarter and ona broader basis. The CIO maritime unions,charging inefficiency in the handling ofAmerican cargoes, proposed that all opera-tions, including warehousing, terminalmanagement, and stevedoring, be cen-tralized under the War Shipping Ad-ministration and that the formulation andadministration of policies governing thoseactivities be vested in tripartite bodies rep-resenting labor, management, and govern-ment. In rejecting the proposal as "whollyunwise," WSA cited, among various con-siderations, the long-established transporta-tion services and large marine organizationsof the Army and the Navy, the abandon-ment of which in the midst of war wouldcreate greater problems than already ex-isted.25 The Senate Special Committee In-vestigating the National Defense Program(Truman Committee), while recognizingthat there were inefficiencies in the war-time use of shipping, substantially supportedthe WSA position.26

A recommendation that all cargo ship-ping and terminal operations be placed

under the control of the War Shipping Ad-ministration was made by the Subcom-mittee on War Mobilization of the SenateCommittee on Military Affairs in October1943.27 That subcommittee cited the opera-tions of the British Ministry of War Trans-port as an example of the efficiency whichcould be achieved by placing both militaryand civilian shipping under one agency.Again the War Department defended itsmethod of handling cargo movements, pre-senting much the same arguments as thosestated above.28 The War Department alsoopposed a recommendation of the subcom-mittee that a new group be established, con-sisting of representatives of the severalinterested government agencies, to plan shipallocations; it considered such a group un-necessary since the existing allocationsystem, in which the Joint Military Trans-portation Committee and WSA co-operated,was "completely effective and smooth run-ning." No action was taken on either recom-mendation.

The pooling of cargo in order to obtainmore complete utilization of ship capacity,which was one of the principal argumentsoffered in favor of bringing the loading ofboth military and lend-lease cargoes underWSA control, had been given attention bythe Army during 1942, but with only partialresults.29 In August the TransportationCorps and the British Ministry of War

25 Ltr, WSA to Sen Harry S. Truman, 8 Apr 43,and atchd WSA reply to unions, OCT HB MarCom Opns; "CIO Ship Operations Plan May BeRevived in Congress," Journal of Commerce (NewYork), April 12, 1943; Frank R. Kent column, TheEvening Star (Washington), April 14, 1943.

26 Rpt 10, Pt. 8, Shipbuilding and Shipping, 22Apr 43, pp. 28, 29.

27 Rpt 3, Mobilization of Shipping Resources,7 Oct 43, p. 9.

28 Ltr, USW to Sen Harley M. Kilgore, 3 Nov43, OCT HB Topic Kilgore Com.

29 Ltr, CG SOS to British JSM, 23 Apr 42, ASFHq British 1942-43; Conf with British, 10 Aug 42,OCT HB Wylie Cargo; Memo, C of Mvmts DivOCT (McIntyre) for Dir of Opns OCT (Wylie),21 Aug 42, sub: Vehicles for British, OCT HBWylie Cargo; Ltr, WSA to CG SOS, 9 Oct 42; Ltr,CG SOS to WSA, 19 Oct 42; Ltr, WSA to CGSOS, 22 Oct 42. Last three in ASF Hq Shipping1942-43.


Transport had agreed on a more activeinterchange of cargo for vessels sailing to theUnited Kingdom. In an exchange of com-munications with WSA in October theArmy had acknowledged the validity of theprinciple of pooling, but had pointed outthat the extent of its application was limitedby military considerations. In November thePresident, apparently at the instance ofMr. Douglas, had addressed a joint mem-orandum to the Secretary of War, the Sec-retary of the Navy, and the War ShippingAdministrator, emphasizing the need forcomplete co-operation in obtaining fullutilization of ship space, to which the Sec-retary of War had responded that thematter was receiving constant attention andthat the co-operation between the supplyagencies of the Army and the Navy wasmore effective than some reports indi-cated.30 Following the discussions which re-sulted from the issuance of the President'sdirective of 18 December 1942, cargo pool-ing made better progress.

In connection with sailings from thePacific coast the War Shipping Administra-tor proposed a co-operative arrangementto bring about quicker turnarounds as wellas fuller ships, an arrangement which in-cluded utilization of the Joint Army-Navy-WSA Ship Operations Committee thenbeing organized at San Francisco.31 GeneralGross agreed to the proposal with certainreservations. He wanted it clearly under-stood that ship allocations to the Armywould be made by WSA as in the past and

not by the Pacific coast joint committee,which he considered only a local organiza-tion to insure better use of the shippingwhich had been allocated for loading on thewest coast. He also stated that Army cargocould not be scattered widely over com-mercial piers and would not be deliveredto such piers until the vessels on which itwas to move actually had been assigned.Understanding on these points was followedby better understanding on the generalquestion.

On 19 February 1943 the Army informedthe War Shipping Administration that "as... in the past" it would call on WSA forspace to lift less-than-shipload lots, in orderto take advantage of deck loading on WSAvessels and to utilize earlier WSA sailingsfor high priority items; also that the Armywould "continue" to offer space in shipswhich it operated, or which were allocatedto it, for bottom and filler cargo to be sup-plied from lend-lease shipments.32 Althoughthe Army communication indicated, andquite accurately, that no new principle wasbeing invoked, the actual pooling of cargowas increased considerably during themonths which followed. This was particu-larly true of cargo interchanges between theArmy, the War Shipping Administration,and the British Ministry of War Transportfor sailings to the United Kingdom. Duringthe month of February 1943, according toa WSA report, 93 WSA and BMWTvessels, which had loaded heavy lend-leasecargo for British ports, had sailed withalmost 5,000,000 cubic feet of unused space

30 Memo from the President, 19 Nov 42, AG 540(19 Nov 42) ; Ltr to the President, 24 Nov 42, AG540 (19 Nov 42.); Memo, CofT for CG NYPE,15 Dec 42, sub: Cargo, OCT HB Wylie Shippingand Cargo for UK.

31 Memo, n.d., sub: Program to Speed up Turn-arounds of Ships Operating in S and SW Pacific,submitted to Army by WSA; Ltr, CofT to WSA,18 Jan 43. Both in OCT HB Gross WSA.

32 Ltr, CofS SOS to WSA, OCT HB Gross WSA.Bottom cargo is heavy cargo, such as steel, placeddeep in ship's hold to add to its stability. Fillercargo generally is packaged goods which can bestowed in spaces left empty by the stowage ofbulky items such as vehicles, or in irregular spacescreated by the shape of the ship.


—some of which might have been utilizedto lift light Army cargo.33 The Transporta-tion Corps and WSA offices in Washingtonthereafter followed the practice of inform-ing each other of their prospective needsfor heavy and light commodities to makebalanced cargoes in order that interchangesmight be planned in advance. A list ofArmy freight categories subject to inter-change was established and an order ofprocedure was worked out for the guidanceof the Army port of embarkation at NewYork, which was the port chiefly concerned.

One of the first problems which had tobe worked out after the establishment of theWar Shipping Administration was thedevelopment of a satisfactory method forthe allocation of shipping to the severaluses. The Army, in order to do effectivelong-range strategic planning, needed toknow well in advance and with reasonableassurance how much shipping it couldexpect to receive from WSA in the Atlanticand the Pacific. In the beginning WSAwas not able to give the Army such assur-ance because of uncertainty as to the rateof new ship deliveries, the extent to whichships would be sunk or damaged by theenemy, and the number of vessels whichwould have to be assigned for other pur-poses, especially lend-lease. Soon after theestablishment of WSA the Army took theinitiative in setting up tentative require-

ments by informal agreement among theshipping agencies of the government, andas indicated in Chapter V this task soonwas undertaken by the Joint Military Trans-portation Committee, in collaboration withWSA. Meantime WSA developed itsmachinery for establishing long-range re-quirements, making long-range allocationsof blocks of tonnage to meet those require-ments, and eventually nominating specificvessels for specific voyages. In May 1942Mr. Douglas, as Deputy War ShippingAdministrator, took charge of these activi-ties.34

After the War Shipping Administrationhad received an indication through theJoint Chiefs of Staff regarding the amountof shipping needed for Army movementsduring ensuing months and had determinedthe number of ships it could allocate, itremained for the Chief of Transportation toinform WSA as to the vessels required forloading at the respective ports in the im-mediate future and to obtain from WSAthe nomination of specific vessels to meetthese requirements. The first function wasperformed for a time by his operationsofficer, but it was soon shifted to the chiefof the Water Division, together with certainrelated activities.35 The second function wasperformed by the Water Division from the

33 Memo, Water Div OCT for Gen Wylie, 11Mar 43, transmitting WSA statement of 9 Mar 43,OCT HB Wylie WSA; Memo, WSA for CG SOS,11 Mar 43, sub: Shipping Requirements throughJune 1943, OCT HB Wylie WSA; Memo, CofTfor WSA, 13 Mar 43, not sent but used as basisfor conf with WSA, OCT HB Wylie WSA; Memoprepared in WSA, 4 May 43, OCT HB Wylie WSA;Memo, Water Div OCT for CofT, 29 Apr 43, sub:Daily Rpt of UK Cargo, OCT HB Wylie Shippingand Cargo for UK; Memo, CG NYPE for CofT,2 May 43, sub: Policy for Mvmt of Cargo to UK,OCT HB Wylie Cargo.

34 Memo, ACofS G-4 for Mr. Hopkins, 24 Feb42, sub: Allocation of U.S. Shipping for 1942,G-4/29717-116; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofSUSA, 26 Feb 42, G-4/29717-116; Ltr, CG SOSto WSA, 9 Mar 42, sub: Requests for Allocations,G-4/29717-26; Ltr, WSA to CG SOS, 2 May 42,OCT HB Topic Mar Com Opns; Bureau of theBudget, The United States at War, p. 152.

35 OCT Office Memo 12, 27 Mar 42, sub: Pro-cedure—Procurement and Acquisition of Vesselsfor WD, OCT HB Water Div Misc; Ltr, Opns OffOCT to WSA, 13 May 42, OCT HB Water DivMisc; Memo, Opns Off OCT for Water Div OCT,3 Jun 42, sub: Duties Transferred, OCT HB MeyerStaybacks.


beginning. The WSA officer in charge ofallocations held daily meetings with repre-sentatives of the Water Division and theNaval Transportation Service, at whichvessels were nominated for specific move-ments.36 The preparation of daily estimatesof cargo available at the respective portsand of vessels required to load such cargowas a function of the Ocean Traffic Branchof the Water Division, and the chief of thatbranch usually attended the daily meetings.When it appeared probable that therewould be insufficient cargo at a particularport to fill vessels nominated for loadingthere, the Ocean Traffic Branch initiatedaction to have additional supplies broughtforward from technical service depots.

These daily meetings between representa-tives of the War Shipping Administrationand the armed forces dealt not only withinitial allocations of ships but also withadjustments necessitated by changed mili-tary plans, by the sinking or delay of vesselsen route to loading ports, by prospectiveshortages of cargo at certain ports, and bychanged movement priorities. During thelatter part of the war, as the result ofaccumulated experience in planning, re-duced submarine activity, the increasednumber of ships in the WSA pool, and themore dependable flow of supplies to theports, less frequent meetings were neces-sary. In addition to the routine procedures,emergency actions to obtain vessels fromWSA for special purposes were initiatedfrom time to time by the chief of the WaterDivision, the Director of Operations, theChief of Transportation, and even the com-manding general of the Army Service

Forces. Consultation with the Ocean TrafficBranch usually.preceded such actions. Sincecargo vessels normally were allocated to theArmy for outward voyages only and re-verted to WSA after they had completeddischarging at oversea ports, special ar-rangements were necessary when the Armydesired to use certain ships for return cargoor for intratheater operation.

Notwithstanding the close co-operationbetween the two offices and the steady in-crease in the cargo fleet, the War ShippingAdministration's allocations frequently fellshort of the Army requirements recognizedby the Joint Military Transportation Com-mittee. Acting on a request from the UnderSecretary of War, General Gross in Febru-ary 1943 submitted a statement of "definitefailures" on the part of WSA to providethe number of vessels requested, and in sodoing expressed the view that more shipsshould be withdrawn from nonmilitaryuses.37 When this statement was presentedto the Board of Economic Warfare, theDeputy War Shipping Administrator statedthat military requirements had been metduring the past sixty days and that civilianshipping had been cut as much as was wise.The Chief of Transportation persisted, how-ever, in his contention that Army require-ments were not being met and in April 1943presented a detailed study of the situationto General Somervell.38 While recognizingthe difficulty of matching requirements withspecific ship nominations, in view ofchanging military plans and uncertain shiparrivals, he stated that a balancing of totalallocations against total requests for the

36 Memo, Dir NTS for CofT, 13 Mar 42, OCTHB Wylie WSA; Memo, CofT for Dir NTS, 14Mar 42, sub: Daily Mtgs, OCT HB Wylie WSA;Mtg, 27 Mar 42, OCT 565.4 Army Vessels.

37 Memo for USW, 25 Feb 43, sub: Failures toMeet Ship Requirements; Memo, USW for CofT,6 Mar 43. Both in OCT HB Gross WSA.

38 Two Memos, both 9 Apr 43, sub: ShippingSituation, OCT HB Wylie Shipping Requirementsand Allocations 1943.


months of January, February, and Marchshowed monthly deficits of 11, 14, and 24vessels. He pointed out that since cargo hadto be brought to the ports in anticipation ofship allocations, the inevitable result of adeficiency of ships was a backlog of sup-plies which interfered with port operationsand rendered efficient loading difficult.

Despite the careful attention given to thematter, these monthly deficits continued tooccur. The obvious explanation was thatcargo ships did not become available forallocation as anticipated in the long-rangeplanning. The less apparent explanationwas that while the planners took intoreasonably accurate account the progressivereduction in ship losses and the increase inconstruction, they did not fully foresee theextent to which vessels would be held in thetheaters for use in local operations and onaccount of discharging delays.39

Although the supply of cargo shippingusually was short of what the military plan-ners wanted and the vessels available forallocation to the Army frequently fell shortof its approved requirements, there weretimes when cargo was short at particularports or for particular destinations. This wasnotably true in 1943 when the cargo fleetwas being increased rapidly and the pro-duction of war matériel was lagging.40 InSeptember of that year Brig. Gen. RobertH. Wylie, the Acting Chief of Transporta-

tion, stated that the "cargo availabilitypicture" was bad at most ports and thatthe Army had all the ships it required anda "comfortable cushion." How long thatsituation would continue, he observed,depended on the rate of increase in theproduction of supplies and whether thecurrent favorable position in regard to shiplosses was maintained. The failure of thetechnical services to move supplies into theports as rapidly as the ports called for themhad been brought to the attention of ArmyService Forces headquarters, General Wyliesaid, and he would continue to press for amore adequate flow. Cargo still was shortat east coast ports in November, but theproduction curve was swinging upward anda shortage of such scope did not occur againduring the war.

The allocation of troopships was on adifferent basis. In the early months of thewar the Army applied to the MaritimeCommission and later to the War ShippingAdministration for the allocation of troop-carrying vessels to meet specific require-ments in much the same manner as itapplied for cargo vessels. The Army thencontrolled the vessels only on the outwardvoyage, and the ships reverted to WSAafter completing discharge at oversea ports.Later, because of the urgent need for gettingthe vessels back to their home ports with-out the delays incident to loading returncargo, the Army requested that troopshipsbe allocated for the round voyage.41 Thisarrangement, which apparently becameeffective late in 1943, ostensibly appliedonly to the faster troopships which hadsmall cargo capacity. In effect, however, all

39 Memo, CofT for Plans Div ASF, 20 Apr 44,sub: Priority of Ships for Pacific Theaters, OCT563.5 POA; Opns Mtg OCT, 27 Jul 44, sub: Shipsfor August Program, OCT HB Dir of Opns; Memo,Gen Somervell for Gen Hull OPD, 24 Oct 44,sub: Increased Requests for Shipping, P&O ABC560 (4 Jul 44) Sec 2; Memo, Admiral Land WSA,22 Nov 44, ASF Hq Shipping 1944.

40 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 5 Jul 43, sub:Bank of Cargo, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Ltr,Wylie to CG BPE, 26 Sep 43, OCT 563.5 Boston;Ltr, Wylie for CG BPE, 16 Nov 43, OCT HB WylieStaybacks.

41 Ltr, CofT to WSA, 8 Dec 42, OCT HB MeyerStaybacks; Memo, Gen Wylie for Gen Franklin,8 Jun 43, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Ltr, C ofWater Div OCT to WSA, 25 Aug 43, OCT 565.4Army Vessels.


WSA troopships, except the temporarilyconverted freighters, were allocated forround voyages, since their employment wasgoverned solely by troop movement re-quirements.42 When nonmilitary passengersand cargo were available for homewardvoyages they were lifted by arrangementsbetween WSA representatives and Armytransportation officers at the oversea ports,but with the understanding that the voyageswould not be delayed. Since there was asubstantial amount of such traffic, detailedregulations were published covering themovement of nonmilitary passengers onWSA vessels, both outbound and inbound.43

Prior to the establishment of the WarShipping Administration the Army had in-cluded in its budget estimates funds re-quired for the procurement, conversion, re-pair, and operation of Army-owned trans-ports and also for the hire, conversion,repair, and operation of vessels obtainedunder various forms of charter. In con-nection with the budget estimates for thefiscal year 1943, which were under con-sideration in the spring of 1942, the Bureauof the Budget announced that it wouldeliminate from the Army estimates all fundsrequested in connection with vessels ob-tained under forms of charter other thanbareboat. That action was predicated onan indication by Congress, in connectionwith the Sixth Supplemental National De-fense Appropriation Act, 1942, that suchexpenses should be met out of a WSArevolving fund. General Gross strongly

recommended that all funds required by theTransportation Corps to carry out its over-sea shipping responsibilities be appropriatedto the Army, and the Secretary of Warsupported him in that position; but a meet-ing between representatives of the Armyand the Bureau of the Budget resulted inagreement substantially on the basis whichthe Bureau had put forward.44 Funds forthe hire, conversion, repair, and operationof vessels operated by WSA agents and al-located to the Army were thereafter to beappropriated to WSA. The memorandumon interdepartmental relationship, approvedby the Army and WSA shortly after theabove matter was determined, providedthat except in cases of emergency WSAwould be the sole contracting agent forthe Army in the purchasing, chartering, orrequisitioning of ocean-going vessels.

The First Supplemental National DefenseAppropriation Act, 1943, provided fundsfor the War Shipping Administration tocarry on all the activities and functionswhich had been assigned to it, including"costs incidental to the acquisition, opera-tion, loading, discharging, and use ofvessels transferred for use of any depart-ments or agencies of the United States." 45

In accordance with the policy implicit inthat act, and in furtherance of the pro-visions of the memorandum on interdepart-mental relationship, agreements were

42 Memo, C of Mvmts Div OCT for Dir of OpnsOCT (Wylie), par. 1d, 15 Nov 44, OCT HBMvmts Div Gen; Conf, author with Lt Col H. H.Naughton, 5 Apr 48, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.The arrangement was formally sanctioned byJMTC in JMT 80, 6 Nov 44, par. 4.

43 WSA Traf Reg 6 (rev.), 20 Apr 44; OCT Cir80-9, Supp. 1, 16 Jan 45, sub: Civilian PassengerTraffic, OCT HB Topic Mar Com Opns.

44 Memo, Mil Budget Estimate Sec SOS for CGSOS, 21 May 42, sub: Water Trans Policies; Ltr,SW to Bureau of Budget, 27 May 42; Ltr, Bureauof Budget to SW, 4 Jun 42. All in OCT 545.02Army Vessels. Agreed basis permitted WD to in-clude estimates for vessels "permanently assigned"to it, which would be mostly bareboated vessels, butmight include a few assigned on other bases. WDestimates also included funds for loading and dis-charging WSA vessels allocated to the Army atArmy piers. See Ltr, WSA to OCT, 21 Sep 42,OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring.

45 PL 678, 77th Cong., par. 14, 25 Jul 42.


worked out between the Army and WSAcovering financial and other arrangements.46

The principal financial arrangements wereas follows: When title to a vessel was trans-ferred from WSA to the Army, no chargewas made for the vessel or for any conver-sion effected by WSA prior to transfer inorder to make the vessel suit the Army'sneed, but the Army bore the cost of subse-quent alterations and the cost of operation,maintenance, and repair. When vessels wereassigned permanently by WSA under bare-boat charter or similar arrangement theArmy paid no charter hire, and the ar-rangements regarding conversion, opera-tion, maintenance, and repair were the sameas in the case of vessels transferred outright.When vessels operated by WSA agents wereallocated to the Army for its use, the costof maintenance and operation was borne byWSA; no charge was made for the trans-portation of Army cargo and mail on suchvessels, and conversely the Army made nocharge for WSA cargo carried on Armytransports. When WSA vessels allocated tothe Army were loaded or discharged atdomestic or foreign piers which the Armycontrolled, the Army assumed the cargo-handling costs. When WSA vessels allocatedto the Army were loaded or discharged atcommercial or WSA piers, WSA assumedthe cargo-handling costs usually borne bythe ship, but the Army paid the chargesthat accrued on the piers. Army passengerstraveling on WSA vessels paid no transpor-

tation or subsistence charges, but the per-manent military complements placed onsuch vessels paid subsistence charges. OnArmy transports military and Army-spon-sored civilian passengers paid neither farenor subsistence charges, passengers travelingat the expense of other government agenciespaid subsistence only, and other passengerspaid prescribed fares which included sub-sistence charges. No reimbursement wasmade for supplies furnished to Army trans-ports by WSA, but since WSA vessels wereoperated by private agents supplies fur-nished to such vessels from Army sourceswere paid for.47

Conferences between Assistant Secretaryof War McCloy and Deputy War ShippingAdministrator Douglas during the latterstages of the controversy over the loadingof allocated vessels led to a request by thoseofficials that the Chief of Transportationdesignate an officer to serve as permanentWar Department liaison with WSA.48 Theofficer so designated, Col. Werner W.Moore, had been in charge of marine designand procurement for The QuartermasterGeneral and the Chief of Transportationduring the emergency period and the earlymonths of the war and later had served astransportation officer for the Trinidad sec-tor of the Caribbean Defense Command.His experience, therefore, gave him an in-sight into both the constructional and theoperational phases of Army marine trans-portation. As special assistant to the DeputyAdministrator, Colonel Moore was as-

46 WD Cir 332, 22 Dec 43; amplified and revisedby TC Cir 25-5, 1 Jan 44; TC Cir 40-2, 24 Jan44; OCT Misc Ltr 49, 4 Aug 44; WD Memo55-44, 29 Sep 44; TC Cir 80-9, 28 Oct 44; WDMemo 55-44, 22 Dec 44. All in OCT HB TopicMar Com Opns. Summary of financial arrange-ments is based mainly on WD Memo 55-44, 29Sep 44. Agreement incorporated in this directivedid much to eliminate earlier confusion regardingfinancial adjustments.

47 WD Memo 55-45, 28 Aug 45, stated thatthereafter WD would reimburse WSA for fuel oiland coal furnished to Army vessels.

48 Memo, OASW for ACofS for Opns SOS, 14Jan 43, OCT 201 Col. Werner W. Moore; Memo,C of Mil Pers Div OCT for CG ASF, 19 Nov 43,OCT 201 Col. Werner W. Moore; Conf, authorwith Col. Moore, 31 Mar 48, OCT HB Topic MarCom Opns.


signed to work on many problems in whichboth WSA and the Army had an interest.Such assignments were made by WSA, notby the Army. The position was discontinuedin July 1944, by which time the workingrelationships between WSA and the Trans-portation Corps had become stabilized.

As indicated above, General Gross heldstrongly to the opinion that matters affect-ing allocation of ships, as well as matters ofpolicy, should be worked out between hisoffice and the headquarters of the WarShipping Administration rather than be-tween Transportation Corps and WSArepresentatives at the ports. He believedthat better utilization of the limited shippingresources would be achieved in that way.Experience showed also that the head-quarters offices were in a better position tosolve difficulties by compromise, as was sooften necessary. The latter point was illus-trated early in 1942 when a controversydeveloped between the Seattle Port of Em-barkation and the Seattle representative ofWSA regarding the control of shipping andthe determination of priorities in the Alaskaservice, then considered of high strategicimportance.49 After a futile attempt to havethe matter settled between representativesof the Army and WSA at the port, a divi-sion of responsibility was worked out inWashington in consultations between theOffice of the Chief of Transportation, WSA,and the Navy.

While firm in his insistence on centralizedcontrol of ship allocations, General Grossfavored direct dealings and full co-

operation between the local representativesof the War Shipping Administration andthe Transportation Corps in matters affect-ing the loading, discharging, operation, andrepair of vessels.50 In addition to participat-ing in numerous joint committees at theports, the personnel of the two agenciesworked in close co-ordination in the day-to-day handling of the affairs of the ships withwhich both were concerned. The recordsindicate that a high degree of harmony andhelpfulness prevailed in these relationships.

Relations with the Navy

The relations of the Army and the Navyin connection with ship operations wouldhave been comparatively simple had theprewar plan been carried into effect. JointArmy and Navy Basic War Plan, RAINBOW5, contemplated that in case of war theArmy would continue to operate ports ofembarkation but that the Navy would"provide sea transportation for the initialmovement and the continued support ofthe Army and Navy forces oversea," andin so doing would man and operate theArmy transports.51 That arrangement wasset aside, however, and the maintenance ofseparate ocean transport services gave riseto numerous problems in connection withthe joint use of troop and cargo ships andthe convoying and routing of merchantvessels.

The question of placing the Army trans-ports under Navy manning and operationwas actively considered during the yearpreceding our entry into war. In November1940 G-4 suggested that this be done with-out waiting for an actual state of war, butthe War Plans Division and The Quarter-

49 Memos, Opns Off OCT for CofT, 5 and 19Apr 42, OCT HB Wylie Seattle; Draft of agree-ment initialed by Gross, 6 Apr 42, OCT HB WylieSeattle; Ltr, Opns Off OCT for WSA, 12 May 42,OCT 544.2 Seattle; Memo, CG SOS for ACofSOPD WDGS, 15 May 42; 2d Ind SPE for CofT,6 Oct 42. Last two in OCT 544.2 Alaska.

50 See Ltr, CofT to CG NOPE, 22 Oct 42, OCTHB Wylie Staybacks.

51 JB 325 (Ser 642-5), 30 Apr 41, Sec VII, par.50, and Sec IX, par. 55; also rev. 1, 19 Nov 41.


master General did not concur.52 In April1941, actuated by the U.S.-British staffconversations which were concluded duringthe preceding month, the Navy proposedthat the subject be discussed by representa-tives of the two departments. The Armyassented, with the understanding that ifsuch an arrangement should be made theArmy would retain control over the missionsand the movements of the vessels.53 Agree-ment was reached substantially on thatbasis, and since the Navy believed that itcould accomplish the manning in from 30to 45 days, a schedule was prepared whichwould have placed all Army troopshipsand freighters under Navy operation bythe end of July.54 The Navy did not ac-complish the task as had been anticipated,however, and by November had placedcrews on only seven Army transports;G-4 then expressed doubt as to the Navy'sability to give satisfactory service to theArmy, because of the subordination of thisservice to other Navy interests.55

On the day after the Japanese attack onPearl Harbor, representatives of the armedservices and the Maritime Commission dis-cussed the subject and decided that the

Army and the Navy should continue theirseparate transport services, subject to theNavy's preponderant interest in ships in thePacific.56 The Navy, confronted with aheavy demand for crews for combatantvessels, soon proposed removing its per-sonnel from six of the seven Army trans-ports and retaining the operation of onlyone, which was being converted to a com-bat loader; it also proposed turning over tothe Army the LaFayette (ex-Normandie)which was then undergoing conversion toa troop transport. To this the Army agreed,anticipating no difficulty in providing civil-ian crews for these ships, in addition to ap-proximately 140 other vessels then in itsservice.57

The entire question was reopened almostimmediately, however, when the Armyundertook to bring the joint war plans intoharmony with these informal arrangements.The Navy then advised that, after furtherconsideration, and with the consent of theArmy Chief of Staff, it would continue toman the six Army transports; also that itwould man the LaFayette when that vesselwas ready for service.58 Late in February

52 Memos, ACofS G-4 for DCofS USA (Moore),26 Nov 40 and 7 Dec 40, sub: Opn of ATS byNavy; Memo, QMG for ACofS G-4, 3 Dec40, QM 570 T-W-C (Army Transports) ; Memo,ACofS WPD for ACofS G-4, 23 Dec 40, WPD2789-1. All in G-4/29717-51.

53 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4,7 Apr 41, OCT HB Wylie Navy Crews for ArmyTransports; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 7Apr 41, sub: Manning Army Vessels with NavyCrews, G-4/29717-51.

54 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 14 Apr 41,G-4/29717-51; Memo, CofS USA for CNO USN,30 Apr 41, G-4/29717-51; see also Memo, JPC forJB, JB 320 (Ser 686), 28 Apr 41, OCT 571.22Army Transports.

55 Memo, CNO for all Bureaus and Naval Dis-tricts, 7 Jul 41, G-4/561.22 Navy; Memo, ACofSG-4 for WPD, 19 Nov 41, sub: Transfer of ATSto Navy, G-4/29717-51.

56 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for Exec TransBr G-4, 8 Dec 41, Item 1, OCT HB Gross DayFile; Memo, CNO for JB, 17 Dec 41, sub: SeaTrans, OCT HB Gross Navy; Memo, C of TransBr G-4 for WPD (Gerow), 23 Dec 41, WPD2789-29.

57 Memo, CNO USN for CofS USA, 9 Jan 42,sub: Removal of Navy Crews from Army Trans-ports; Memo, CofS USA for CNO, 14 Jan 42;Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 23 Jan 42. Allin G-4/29717-51.

58 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 17 Jan 42,sub: Change in Joint Action on Water Trans,OCT HB Gross Day File; Memo, CNO for CofSUSA, 26 Jan 42, G-4/29717-51; Memo, CNOfor BUSHIPS, etc., 27 Jan 42, G-4/29717-51.Four of the six Army transports were turned backto the Army later in the war. The giant LaFayette,following serious damage by fire during conversion,capsized at her pier in New York harbor and neverreturned to service.

TROOPSHIPS OPERATED BY THE NAVY. The Wakefield (top), Mount Vernon(center), and West Point (bottom). These converted American passenger liners

served both the Army and the Navy as personnel carriers.


1942 the Chief of Naval Operations re-quested the concurrence of the Army Chiefof Staff in a memorandum to be sub-mitted to the Joint Board, which proposednot only placing all Army transports underNavy operation but also making the Navyresponsible for arranging with the WarShipping Administration for the allocationof such additional ships as were requiredfor military purposes. General Marshalldid not concur; rather, he contended thatthe establishment of WSA by executiveorder of 7 February 1942 had abrogatedthat feature of the Army-Navy joint actionagreement and had provided for Armycontrol of its own transports and for alloca-tion of WSA vessels directly to the Army.59

Late in 1942, when the general questionof more effective co-ordination betweenArmy and Navy oversea supply operationswas being considered, the subject of unifiedoperation of the transport fleets again cameto the fore, together with consolidation ofother transportation functions. On 9 No-vember 1942 General Gross forwardedto General Somervell a plan which pro-posed making the supply of the overseabases of both the Army and the Navy afunction of the Army Services of Supply;having all movements of Army and Navysupplies for oversea destinations "controlledand performed" by the Army; and havingall troop and cargo transports used by theArmy and the Navy operated by the Navywith Coast Guard crews, but controlled bythe Army Transportation Corps.60 The planwas presented as a basis for discussion withthe Navy, and Gross evidently had mis-givings regarding the outcome. In an ac-

companying note he stated to Somervellthat in consenting to turn over all troopand cargo ships to the Navy for operation,the Army would be losing "much of thepower of independent action" which it thenenjoyed in accomplishing its supply mission.He warned that unless the Army firmly con-trolled the loading and assignment of thevessels its position would be weakened morethan could be risked in a war in which theshipping requirements were so predomi-nantly those of the Army. He also consideredit important that the Army have control ofthe movement of supplies of both the Armyand the Navy, not only by sea but frompoints of origin to the ports. Gross recom-mended that, if the Navy should reject theseArmy controls, the proposed agreement belimited to supply matters and leave thetransportation situation unchanged. He didnot then indicate how, if the Army proposalwere acceptable to the Navy, vessels cur-rently operated by agents of the War Ship-ping Administration and allocated for theuse of the armed services would bebrought under Navy. operation, but statedlater that it would require a change in theexecutive order by which WSA was created.

After consideration of the Army's plan,the Navy submitted a counterproposalwhich provided for Navy operation of thetroop and cargo transports used by theArmy and the Navy, including those allo-cated by the War Shipping Administration,Navy control of routings and diversions,assignment of vessels to particular areas andoperations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op-

59 Memo, CNO for CofS USA (Betty forGeorge), 26 Feb 42, and Incl; Memo, CofS USAfor CNO, 27 Feb 42, sub: Opn of Army Trans-ports. Both in OCS 16374-53.

60 Plan to Simplify Supply and Trans of Over-seas Forces of both Army and Navy, indorsed toSomervell by Gross, 9 Nov 42; Penciled Memo byGross atchd to plan, n.d., sub: Conf with Navy.Both in ASF Hq Trans 1941-42. Col Finlay, ExecOCT, recalls that plan was prepared at Somervell'srequest.


eration of ports of embarkation and overseadischarge terminals by the Army, andseparate control by the Army and the Navyof their respective supply movements tothe ports.61 Gross discussed the counterpro-posal thoroughly with his staff and theninformed Somervell that he was convincedthat the Navy plan, which contemplatedunified control of shipping but not of themovement of supplies, would not work andwould not justify turning over the shipsthen under Army control to the control ofthe Navy. He expressed the opinion that"nothing less than the full control overthe use of all transports and dry cargo shipsby the Army to move all troops and cargoin accordance with theater priorities andwithin allocations set from time to timeby the Joint Chiefs of Staff would do thejob effectively." He stated that the Army,because of its huge supply responsibility,could not be satisfied with a system thatdepended on compromising conflictingopinions. Gross accordingly recommendedthat "no change be made in the operationand control of ships by the transportationservices of the Army and Navy other thanon the basis of mutual cooperation to meetpriorities set by theater commanders."

Consideration of the subject did not endthere, however. Somervell, or Gross, orboth believed that the duplications andconflicts which seemed inevitable if theArmy and the Navy continued to maintainseparate transportation systems should beavoided if possible. Accordingly, in mid-December 1942 another plan was put for-ward by the Army. This plan called for aunified oversea transportation service, to be

responsible for all transportation for thearmed services (except for the Fleet), or-ganized along the following lines: the trans-portation agencies of the Army Services ofSupply to control the movement of overseasupplies to the ports, the storage of suchsupplies en route to and at the ports, andthe loading of the ships; the Navy to handlethe manning and repairing of vessels, thecontrol of vessels in port, and the routingand escorting of vessels; the head of thejoint oversea transportation service to be anArmy officer with a Navy officer as prin-cipal deputy (since 75 to 90 percent ofthe forces overseas would be Army per-sonnel) ; the joint service to be under thecommand of the commanding general ofthe Army Services of Supply, who wouldhave a dual responsibility to the Chief ofStaff of the Army and the Chief of NavalOperations; the Joint Chiefs of Staff toassign shipping to the several strategicareas.62 A detailed proposal for the imple-mentation of this plan, including proceduresrelating to movement priorities, was for-warded to the Navy a fortnight later. In itwas a clause calling for the installation ofnaval crews on War Shipping Administra-tion vessels allocated to the joint service,"as expeditiously as practicable."

Once more the Navy came back with acounterproposal. The idea of "sweepingunification" put forward by the Army wasrejected, since the Navy considered it in-advisable to make drastic changes in theorganization or in the logistical responsibili-

61 Plan to Consolidate Supply and Transport ofOverseas Forces of Army and Navy, n.d., OCT HBTopic Army-Navy Joint Logistics; Memo, Grossfor Somervell, 23 Nov 42, same sub, OCT 020 JointTrans Sv—Army and Navy.

62 Memo, General Somervell for Admiral HomeVCNO, 13 Dec 42, sub: A Single Oversea TransSv; Draft Memo for Home, submitted by Gross toSomervell, 21 Dec 42, with detailed plan. Both inOCT 020 Joint Trans Sv—Army and Navy. Planeventually was forwarded with Memo, Maj GenW. D. Styer CofS SOS for Admiral Home, 30 Dec42, ASF Hq CofS Trans File.


ties of the services at that time. "Resultsequally effective," the Navy believed, couldbe obtained by a "system of coordinators, ifvested with sufficient power of decision, con-trol, and supervision." 63 But the Army didnot look with favor on the Navy's plan forco-ordination of transportation through asystem of boards operating under the JointChiefs of Staff. The Army preferred toeffect the necessary co-ordination of the twotransportation services through the alreadyestablished Joint Military TransportationCommittee, or by direct negotiations. TheArmy believed that the plan for a unifiedtransportation service was worthy of furtherconsideration but apparently was convincedthat it was not likely to be adopted "be-cause of basic differences of organization."For all practical purposes, the wartimeeffort to set up a single transportation serv-ice for the Army and the Navy ended there,and from that point forward the emphasiswas on co-ordination of operations.

Underlying the differences of opinionwhich produced a stalemate in the effort toachieve a unified transportation systemwere fundamental differences in the logisti-cal systems of the Army and the Navy. Theentire system of naval logistics at that timewas decentralized: the Naval Transporta-tion Service dealt only with ocean trans-portation; the movement of supplies to theports and within the country was a functionof the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts;because of the dispersion of procurementand shipping responsibilities Navy head-

quarters had no adequate facilities formaking accurate estimates of its shippingrequirements.64 The Army's transportationsystem was more closely integrated: theChief of Transportation had supervision ofboth inland and transoceanic transporta-tion, had a close liaison with the technicalor supply services of the Army and the head-quarters organization of the Services ofSupply (later Army Service Forces), andactually controlled the movement of bothtroops and supplies through the TrafficControl Division in his office and the Over-sea Supply Divisions at the ports of em-barkation. The Army based its effort tocentralize control of transportation andsupply movements for the armed serviceson its own experience. The Navy shrankfrom the adoption of such a plan, becausethat would have required extensive adjust-ments in its logistical organization andmethods.65 Beyond the organizational andprocedural differences, however, there wasa natural and evident reluctance on the partof each service to place complete controlof any important phase of its logistical op-eration in the hands of the other.

Although the efforts to bring the oceantransportation systems of the Army and theNavy under a single operating management

63 Memo, AGNO for Logistical Plans (AdmiralOscar C. Badger) for VCNO, 7 Jan 43, sub: Planfor Co-ordination of Army-Navy Oversea Transand Logistics; Memo, General Styer for AdmiralBadger, 16 Jan 43. Both in OCT HB Topic Army-Navy Joint Logistics. The exchange of communica-tions was accompanied by frequent discussions ofthe subject by representatives of the two services.

64 See Duncan S. Ballantine, U.S. Naval Logisticsin the Second World War (Princeton, 1949), pp.70-80, 90-94, 101-08, 119, 124-28. Memo, Som-ervell for Home, 1 Apr 43, sub: Increasing thePowers of the Naval Trans Sv, OCT 020 JointTrans Sv—Army and Navy.

65 For Army views on duplications and conflictsarising from separate Army and Navy transporta-tion operations see joint Memo, Wylie, McIntyre,and Meyer, for Finlay Exec OCT, 19 Apr 44, sub:Testimony, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks. See alsostatement by Somervell before Select Com onPostwar Mil Policy, HR, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.,Hearings pursuant to H. Res. 465, Proposal toEstablish a Single Department of Armed Forces,Pt. 1, pp. 100-102.


did not succeed, the Navy provided crewsfor certain Army transports and operatedthem on missions established by the Army.In other respects also the Army Transporta-tion Corps and the Naval TransportationService complemented and assisted eachother in an effort to increase the efficiencywith which the men and matériel of thearmed services were moved between thezone of interior and the theaters and withinthe theaters.

Soon after our entry into the war the Armyarranged that the Maritime Commissionshould construct fifty troop transports forits use.66 Up to the end of 1942 the Trans-portation Corps had planned to man thevessels with civilian crews, but since it wasanticipated that they would be utilized ex-tensively in forward areas the Under Sec-retary of War proposed that considerationbe given to the advisability of manningthem with naval personnel.67 The views ofthe commanding general of the New YorkPort of Embarkation were sought on thegeneral question of replacing civilian withnaval crews, and he strongly favored thelatter on grounds of discipline, continuityof service, and co-operation between vesselcrews and gun crews.68 Similar inquiriessent to the theater commanders broughtreplies which predominantly favored naval

crews, although the Army commanders inthe Central and the Southwest Pacific sawno advantage in naval as against civilianmanning.69

Early in 1943 the Navy, having learnedthrough "informal conversations" that itmight be called on to man the new troop-ships, requested the Army to advise it inthis regard as soon as practicable, in orderthat it might begin to assemble personneland arrange with the Maritime Commissionfor crew accommodations according toNavy standards to be installed while thevessels were under construction.70 Thisrequest brought into active discussion amatter in which the Transportation Corpshad a keen interest—the larger crews car-ried by Navy-manned transports and theconsequent danger of reduced troop capac-ity on the new vessels.71 The Army's replyto the Navy indicated that existing plans forthe new transports called for Army man-ning, but apparently hinted that these planswere subject to change, for the Navy at oncebegan to study the possibility of restricting

66 CCS 56/1, 6 Mar 42, par. 7; Memo, MvmtsDiv OCT for Col. Wylie, 2 Sep 42, sub: Shipsunder Cons for Army, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.Of these troopships 30 were converted cargo ships(C-4 type) and 20 were wartime passenger shipdesigns (P -2 type). Other cargo ship conversionswere arranged later.

67 Memo, USW for CG SOS, 1 Jan 43, andReply, 2 Jan 43, AG 231.8 (12-29-42) ( 1 ) . Navyhad proposed and Army had agreed to installfeatures which would make these vessels morereadily adaptable for combat loading. Memo, CNOfor CofS USA, 19 Aug 42, sub: U.S. Army Troop-ships, and reply, 24 Aug 42, OCT HB Gross Navy.

68 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 29 Dec 42, sub:Disadvantages of Civ Crews, OCT HB Gross Crews.

69 Rads, CM-OUT 9568 to 9576, 29 Dec 42;Memo, Styer for Gross, 25 Jan 43, OCT HB GrossCrews.

70 Memo, VCNO for CofS USA, 15 Jan 43, sub:Army Transports—Manning by Navy, OCT 231.8Army Vessels.

71 General Wylie presented comparisons indicat-ing that both operating and gun crews on Navy-manned transports were much larger than on simi-lar Army transports, and that larger reserves ofstores were carried. See Memo for Gen Gross, 24Mar 43, OCT HB Wylie Navy Crews of ArmyTransports. Larger naval crews are explained asnecessary on transports operating in Pacific for-ward areas to avoid delays in unloading at portswhere there were no shore gangs and delays onaccount of needed repairs at ports where therewere no shore repair facilities. See Memo, RearAdm John B. Heffernan for C of Hist Div SSUSA,13 Dec 49, pars. 4 and 5, OCMH. Naval transportssubject to use in assault operations naturally carriedlarger gun crews than vessels in regular transportservice.


the size of its crews on the vessels in ques-tion.72

A concrete proposal on this subject wassubmitted to the Navy in April by GeneralSomervell, who in so doing referred to a"suggestion made by the Navy that the newArmy transports be crewed by the Navy." 73

The proposal stipulated that the Armyshould have control over the missions andthe schedules of the vessels and over theirloading and unloading, as in the case of theseveral old Army transports already mannedwith naval personnel; that the vessels shouldbe returned to transport service promptlyafter completion of any task force opera-tions to which the Joint Chiefs of Staffmight assign them; and that the size of theNavy crews should be limited so as not toimpair their capacities as transports. TheNavy agreed in principle to these stipula-tions, but indicated that it would be thejudge as to what size crews were requiredfor the services to be rendered. GeneralSomervell accepted this condition, but ex-pressed the view that the determination ofsuch matters should be "a commanddecision with all phases of the shippingproblem in mind," rather than a technicaldecision by a bureau with professional repu-tation to consider. In this as in other aspectsof shipping Somervell and Gross felt that

the Navy held too rigidly to its technicalstandards, considering the scarcity of bot-toms.

Responsibility for the decision to placenaval crews on these transports is notclearly established in the records. TheOffice of the Chief of Transportation hadno enthusiasm for the plan, probably be-cause it feared that its control over thevessels would be qualified thereby. A navalofficer who participated in some of the con-ferences states that the Navy was notanxious to undertake this manning task, butreluctantly agreed to do so because thatseemed to offer the best solution to a prob-lem.74 The evidence seems to warrant theconclusion that the initiative came fromGeneral Somervell or some higher officialin the War Department.

The army urgently needed the new trooptransports, and early in May it entered avigorous protest on learning through theMaritime Commission that completionswould be delayed several months becauseof the extent of the alterations required bythe Navy.75 The Navy's response defendedthe structural changes which were beingmade in order to adapt peacetime designsto wartime service, but indicated that everyeffort would be made to expedite deliveries.Soon thereafter the Maritime Commissionreported to the Chief of Transportationthat as a result of the Army's protest theNavy had become more moderate in its re-quirements. Nevertheless, after two monthsthe Army again approached the Navy on

72 Memo, VCNO for BUSHIPS, 1 Feb 43, OCT231.8 Army Vessels; Memo, VCNO for BUPERS,3 Feb 43, OCT 231.8 Army Vessels; Memo fromArmy, 26 Jan 43, cited in Navy Memo of 1 Feb43, was not found.

73 Memo, Somervell for Home, 1 Apr 43, sub:Navy Crewing of Army Transports, OCT HB GrossCrews; Memo, Home for Somervell, 24 Apr 43;Memo, Somervell for Home, 27 Apr 43. Last twoin OCT 231.8 Army Vessels. In addition to the50 new troopships, Somervell suggested placingnaval crews on 50 projected airplane and tankcarriers and on certain older troopships, but thiswas not done.

74 Memo, Rear Adm John B. Heffernan for Cof Hist Div SSUSA, 13 Dec 49, pars. 4 and 5,OCMH.

75 Memo, Somervell for Home, 7 May 43, andreply, 11 May 43, sub: Delivery Dates; PennedMemo, Gross for Somervell, 12 May 43. All inOCT HB Gross Mar Com.


this subject.76 The Army pointed out thatit had made commitments at the Casa-blanca Conference based on the MaritimeCommission's delivery schedule and wasembarrassed by the serious disruption ofthat schedule. The Transportation Corpssuggested that in order to place the newvessels in service with the least possible de-lay, the armament and crew quarters in-stalled prior to delivery be kept to essentialsand that any further work of that nature bedone during subsequent lay-up periods; alsothat the shakedown cruise be omitted whenthis would enable a vessel to join an earlierconvoy. The available records do not showthe Navy's reaction to these suggestions, butthe testimony of officers who were in aposition to observe the developments indi-cates that the only concession which theNavy made was to shorten shakedowncruises when the need for the ships wasespecially urgent.77

The Navy actually placed forty-nine ofthese transports in full commission. In addi-tion to manning them, the Navy was respon-sible for their maintenance. The Army con-trolled their schedules and also their loadingand unloading, which for the most part tookplace at Army piers. The Office of the Chiefof Transportation and the Naval Trans-portation Service conferred in preparingsailing schedules and in establishing theavailability of ships for repairs.78

In general the operation of these trans-ports worked out satisfactorily to GeneralGross and his staff. There were numerousproblems, but through close liaison theywere soon settled. The Army, for example,reported that some of the Navy ship com-manders had "inflexible" ideas regardingbilleting, and requested NTS to call to theirattention the fact that the agreement con-cerning the vessels provided for billeting inaccordance with plans prepared by theArmy port commanders. In a few instancesNavy ship commanders insisted on gettingNavy concurrence before executing home-ward sailing orders issued by Army overseacommanders involving diversions from theusual routes. Conflicts of authority betweenNavy commanders and the Army's perma-nent complements on the vessels causedsome difficulty, until detailed joint instruc-tions covering jurisdictional matters and op-erating procedures were issued.79 A morebasic complaint from the Army's standpointwas that, although the Navy had agreed tooperate the ships on schedules establishedby the Army, it did not do so automaticallybut entered into long "bargaining" discus-sions in support of its own interests.80 Thistype of joint operation increased the amount

76 Memo, CofT for Dir NTS, 23 Jul 43, OCT564 Army Vessels; Memo, OCNO for CofT, 24Jul 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels; Memo, Somervellfor Home, 2 Aug 43, sub: Loss of Troop Lift, OCTHB Meyer Staybacks.

77 Confs, author with Capt W. N. Mansfield USNand Lt Col. H. H. Naughton USA, 7 Apr 48,OCT HB Topic Navy.

78 WD Cir 167, par. 1, 29 Apr 44; Memo, DirNTS for CofT, 18 Sep 43, sub: Transport Assign-ment; Memo, ACofT for Dir NTS, 28 Sep 43.Last two in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

79 Memo, Dir NTS for Fifth Naval Dist, 19 Sep43, indicated original intention of NTS was thatNavy should control homeward routing, OCT HBMeyer Staybacks; Memo, Exec for Opns OCT forCapt Hunt USN, 7 Mar 44, sub: Navy TransportsAssigned Army Missions, OCT HB Meyer Stay-backs; Memo, ACofT for Dir NTS, 24 May 44,sub: General Mann, OCT HB Mvmts Div FarrStaybacks; WD Memo, 55-45, 22 May 45; Confwith Col Naughton cited n. 77; Conf with Lt ColJ. A. Griffin, 7 Apr 48. Last three in OCT HBTopic Navy.

80 Comment 3, Col Donald E. Farr, on Ltr,Wardlow to Farr, 24 Feb 48, OCT HB Mvmts DivGen. Col Farr was Chief of Mvmts Div OCT andwas responsible for scheduling these and othertransports.


of administrative detail and the time re-quired to dispose of it.

During the repatriation period an ac-cumulation of complaints by soldiers return-ing from the Pacific theaters regarding con-ditions on Navy-operated transports led toa request by the Chief of Transportationthat The Inspector General investigate thismatter.81 The Inspector General's reportindicated that some of the complaints werewithout foundation and that those relatingto the insufficiency and poor quality of foodwere not general but applied only to certainvessels. The Navy took steps to improve thefood but stated that because of the rapidrate of demobilization, there was small pos-sibility of carrying out a suggestion thatadditional commissary and steward person-nel be assigned to the vessels.

While consideration was being given tothe question of placing Navy crews on thenew Army transports which were intendedprimarily for operation between the zoneof interior and the theaters, the Navy pro-posed that all merchant vessels which wereoperated habitually within the theaters, indirect support of naval or military activitiesin forward areas, be Navy-manned.82 Gen-eral Gross opposed this proposal because ofthe increased "power to veto" it would givethe Navy over Army operations, the largerspace required for Navy crews, and thefact that the existing system had not beenfound unsatisfactory.83 During the discus-sion of this subject in the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General Somervell stated that "the

Army would prefer to have all ships mannedby Navy crews," but did not like the pros-pect that it then would have to "petition"the Navy for their use.84 Also, Somervellwas opposed to disturbing the crew situa-tion in the Southwest Pacific, where he feltan excellent job had been done in obtainingships and manning them with civilians.Agreement was reached in April 1943 onthe basis that when Navy crews were placedon vessels which had been operated by orfor the Army, those vessels would remain inthe service and under the control of theArmy and that the Southwest Pacific wouldbe excepted from the arrangement unlessand until the theater commander should re-quest naval manning.85 Some months later,when WSA protested against the manningof so many freighters and tankers by theNavy on the ground that this made themunavailable for lend-lease and civilian uses,the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that thearrangement did not apply to vessels in serv-ice between the zone of interior and thetheaters, even though they might remain inthe theaters for extended periods. It de-veloped that this agreement was of limitedeffect, since combat loaders and certaintransports used in the theaters already hadNavy crews, and other merchant vesselsmoved in and out of the forward areasrather than operating there consistently.86

81 Memo, SFPE for Comdr WSF, 11 Feb 46, andreply, n.d.; Memo, CofT for TIG, 18 Feb 46;Memo, TIG for CG ASF, 22 Mar 46. All in OCT560 Navy Vessels.

82 JCS 240, 20 Mar 43.83 Memo, Gross for Req Div SOS, 22 Mar 43,

sub: JCS 240, OCT HB Wylie Navy Crews onArmy Transports.

84 JCS 69th Mtg, 23 Mar 43, Item 2.85 JCS 240/2/D, 23 Apr 43; JCS 240/5/D, 27

Oct 43; JCS 641, 23 Dec 43; JCS 641/1, 31 Jan44; see also Memo, Wylie for Somervell, 28 Dec 43,sub: JCS 644, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

86 Request of CG SWPA that Navy man certainmerchant vessels permanently assigned to theaterwas only partially complied with because of limitedpersonnel. See Memo, CG ASF for CNO, 15 Nov43, OCT 565.4 SWPA; JLC 42/3, 19 Feb 44, InclA; JCS 644/1, 14 Mar 44; Memo by JCS Secre-tariat, 22 Mar 44, P&O ABC 570 (3-1-43) Sec 2.


Both the Army and the Navy procured alarge amount of equipment which had to betowed to the theaters, such as barges, smalltugs, cranes, car floats, and floating powerplants. In addition to the ocean-going tugsowned by the Army, the Navy and the WarShipping Administration had craft of thistype. Some of these large tugs were intendedfor use in the theaters, but others returnedto home ports after delivering their tows.Early in 1944, in order to bring this trafficunder better regulation, the three agenciesagreed to prepare joint priority lists.87 Thepurpose of the agreement was to insure thatall ocean-going tugs were used to best ad-vantage and that the tows included theitems most urgently needed overseas. As re-gards towing in the Pacific, the agreementwas administered by a committee in Wash-ington which met weekly to establish prior-ities and prepare towing charts. The Chiefof Transportation was represented on thecommittee by an officer of his Water Divi-sion, usually the head of the Harbor BoatBranch. The detailed instructions issued bythe committee permitted the west coast rep-resentatives of the agencies concerned tochange the towing charts when such actionwas found desirable, but the Chief of Trans-portation required his port commanders toobtain the approval of his office beforeagreeing to such adjustments. Transatlantictows during the spring and summer of 1944were of great strategic importance, andtherefore the basic arrangements were madeon higher levels. Thereafter little equipmentwas towed to Europe and the emphasis was

on the Pacific. On 7 July 1945 Col. Ray-mond M. Hicks, Chief of the Water Divi-sion, stated that the Transportation Corpshad been self-sufficient up to that time butthat nearly all of its ocean-going tugs hadbeen delivered to the theaters so that itsoon would be dependent on the Navy andWSA in that respect.88 On that date theTransportation Corps had forty-one tugsand tows at sea en route to the theaters.

The adoption of the Basic Logistical Planearly in 1943 was followed by broader co-operation between the Army and the Navyin oversea logistical operations, includingthe joint utilization of ships and ship space.General arrangements for handling theoversea movements of the two services wereworked out by the Office of the Chief ofTransportation and the Naval Transporta-tion Service in Washington. This involvedconsiderable trading which did not alwaysprove easy, and in OCT it sometimes wasfelt that the Navy drove a hard bargain.89

The detailed arrangements for the jointloading of vessels were worked out at theports. At Atlantic and Gulf ports, wherethe Navy's traffic was relatively light, thisfunction was performed by local repre-sentatives of the Army, the Navy, and theWar Shipping Administration, workingmore or less informally. On the Pacificcoast, where the Navy's traffic was heavy,the Army-Navy-WSA Ship OperationsCommittee exercised an over-all supervision.The interchange arrangements in regard tofreight were relatively simple, and all types

87 Memo of Agreement, 28 Jan 44, sub: JointPriority Lists for Ocean Towing Operations, ASFHq Shipping 1944; Joint Memo, Dir NTS, CofT,and WSA for their representatives at Pacific ports,7 Mar 44, OCT HB Water Div Towing; Memo,CofT for CG SFPE, 30 Sep 44, sub: Tug and TowMvmt Charts, OCT 565.2 SF 3d Geog File.

88 Proceedings, Mtg of Supts of Water Divs, 7 Jul44, pp. 15-16, OCT HB Water Div Misc.

89 See pencil Memo, Gross for Wylie, 8 Aug 42,regarding proposal to borrow refrigerator ship fromNavy for one trip to Alaska, OCT HB Topic Navy;Memo, Oversea Tr Br Mvmts Div OCT for C ofPlng Div OCT (Farr for Stokes), 19 Nov 43,OCT HB Farr Staybacks.


of ocean-going vessels with cargo capacitywere considered in the pool, including thelarger types of Navy landing ships. Thejoint use of ships which had troop capacity,including combat-loading merchant vesselsand combatant vessels, involved more com-plicated problems, which will be dealt withwhen oversea troop movements are dis-cussed.

The joint logistical operations of theArmy and Navy, including their joint useof ships, created a demand for greater uni-formity in shipping procedures. The firstreal progress in that direction came with thepublication of "United States Army andNavy Shipping Procedures" in March1945.90 This pamphlet, an adaptation of aWar Department manual, was developedby personnel of Army Service Forces head-quarters, the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation, and the Navy. Its basic purposewas to simplify and regulate the flow ofshipping documents and information re-garding ship movements, passengers, andcargoes between the United States and thetheaters, and between theaters. Insofar aspractical it prescribed uniform proceduresfor both Army and Navy, and where com-plete uniformity was not considered feasibleit explained the differing methods so thateach service would understand the other'ssystem. It provided that a central recordcontrol unit, to facilitate the execution ofthe plan, should be set up at each UnitedStates port and in each theater, jointlywhenever practicable. Up to the end of thewar joint units, known as Army-Navy

Shipping Information Agencies (ANSIA),had been established at San Francisco, LosAngeles, Seattle, and Boston. Although theearly termination of hostilities prevented athorough testing of the plan, the Army portof embarkation at San Francisco, whereANSIA began functioning in May, reportedfavorable results. Whether any such unitswere established overseas is not indicatedin the records available.

Close liaison on all levels was maintainedin the Army-Navy co-operative effort, andGeneral Gross and the Director of theNaval Transportation Service assigned per-manent liaison officers each to the other.The Navy liaison officer, Lt. Comdr. GeorgeE. Taylor, made his headquarters in theOffice of the Assistant Chief of Transporta-tion for Operations, but also worked closelywith the Water Division on technical devel-opments affecting the two services.91 TheArmy liaison officer with NTS was Lt. Col.Joseph S. Crane. In addition to giving per-sonal attention to a great variety of matterson behalf of the Chief of Transportationand his principal assistant, Colonel Craneserved as Army representative on the JointMerchant Vessel Board. During peacetimeand the early months of the war the boardwas engaged in surveying merchant vesselsand preparing general plans to facilitatetheir conversion to war service.92 The boardalso served as a clearing house for technicalinformation regarding merchant vesselswhich the Army or the Navy desired to ac-quire, but that service was on a diminishingscale after the War Shipping Administra-tion began functioning.90 WD TM 38-412/OPNAV 39-H3; Memo, Dir

Contl Div ASF for CG ASF, 8 May 45, OCT HBContl Div Procedures Br; Monthly Vessel Utiliza-tion Summary, 27 Aug 45, OCT HB Water DivVessel Utilization; SFPE Quarterly Hist Rpt, Apr-Jun 45, pp. 62-65, OCT HB SFPE; Memo,SFPE for CofT, 8 Oct 45, sub: Hist Rec and Incl,ANSIA, OCT HB Topic Port Co-ordination.

91 Memo, CofT for Dir NTS, 31 May 45, givesGross's high estimate of Taylor's services, OCTHB Gross Day File.

92 Memo, Lt Col Crane for TC Historian, sub:Joint Merchant Vessel Bd, 7 Sep 42, OCT HBTopic Army-Navy JMVB.


Naval Convoy and Routing Arrangements

Under the joint war plan of the Armyand the Navy the protection of merchantshipping was a naval responsibility.93 Earlyin 1941 the Navy and the British Admiraltymade arrangements for sharing this re-sponsibility, in case the United Statesshould become a party to the war in Europe,in order to obtain the most economical useof their combined resources. Immediatelyafter Pearl Harbor those arrangementswere amplified and adapted to the prob-lems of a world-wide battle against the sub-marine.94 The situation was thoroughly re-viewed again at the Atlantic Convoy Con-ference which was held in Washington inMarch 1943. The controlling factor duringthe early part of the war was the shortageof escort vessels, and all planning was con-ditioned by that circumstance. Availabilityof escorts determined the number and thesize of the convoys that could be organized,hence the extent to which vessels wouldrun independently and rely on diversiverouting for protection. The subject of con-voying and routing is an exceedingly broadone, and the story properly belongs to theNavv.95 This section will review only cer-

tain features which were of special concernto the Army.

Though the Navy had done some escort-ing prior to Pearl Harbor in both the Pacificand the Atlantic, these were scattered andminor operations compared with the taskwhich was to be undertaken as soon as theUnited States entered the war, and the de-tails of an adequate system had to beworked out step by step. During December1941 and January 1942 each convoy wasset up by special arrangement between theArmy and the Navy. The most urgent Armyresponsibility was the dispatch of troops andsupplies to Hawaii. The San Francisco Portof Embarkation made extraordinary effortto get two vessels ready to sail to Honoluluon 13 December, only to find that the Navywas not prepared to provide escorts until twodays later.96 A Navy announcement that itwould be able to escort only one convoyfrom San Francisco to Australia duringJanuary necessitated a revision of Armytroop movement plans, with the result thatthe departure of the first contingent wasdelayed.97 G-4 objected to holding certainfast freighters, loaded with supplies urgentlyneeded in Australia and the Caribbean, foruncertain convoy sailings and arranged thatthe Navy waive its requirement and permitthe vessels to sail unescorted, contendingthat the risk was warranted under the cir-cumstances.98 At Navy request the Army

93 Joint Basic War Plan, RAINBOW 5, Sec. VII,pars. 30a and 35c, JB 325 (Ser 642-5), Incl A, 30Apr 41; ABC-1, An. V, U.S.-British Stf Convs,Washington, ended 27 Mar 41.

94 Memo, Secy for Collaboration USN for ChiefStf Off British Naval Stf, Washington, 22 Dec 41;USN Memo, 22 Jan 42, sub: Routing MerchantVessels in Areas under Strategic Contl of U.S.;Atlantic Convoy Conf, 1-12 Mar 43. All in OCTHB Topic Convoy and Routing.

95 See History of Convoy and Routing, typescriptfirst draft narrative, signed by Rear Adm MartinK. Metcalf, USN (Ret), Dir of Convoy and Rout-ing, May 45, prepared under general supervisionof the Dir of Naval History; also Samuel EliotMorison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September1939-May 1943 (Boston, 1947).

96 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 12 Dec 41 ;Memo, CofS USA for Admiral Stark USN, 13Dec 41. Both in OCS 21276-21350. G-4 complainedthat the Army's need was subordinate in this caseto a less urgent Navy need for escorts.

97 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4,26 Dec 41, sub: Conf with Navy, OCT HB TopicConvoy and Routing.

98 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 14 Jan 42;Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for CO's of ports, 30 Jan42, sub: Release of Slow and Fast Freighters. Bothin OCT HB Topic Convoy and Routing.


combined a troop movement from New Yorkto Australia and New Caledonia, scheduledto sail 20 January, and one from Charlestonto Bora Bora, scheduled to sail 25 January,as a measure of economy in the use of escortvessels.99

At this period G-4 was responsible formaking convoy arrangements with theNavy, and the incumbent chief, GeneralSomervell, protested when the Chief ofStaff authorized GHQ to deal directly withthe Navy in connection with movements toIceland and North Ireland.100 Somervellcontended that since G-4 arranged for thetransports and controlled the ports at whichthe vessels were loaded, it was in the bestposition to work out the details regardingconvoys. General Marshall accepted thatpoint of view.

The Navy repeatedly emphasized thatmovements must be kept within the escortpossibilities.101 Late in January 1942 Ad-miral King protested to General Marshallthat his office was being embarrassed byrequests for convoys made without sufficientadvance notice. Upon being informed thatthe Army would notify the U.S. Naval

Shipping Control Officer as promptly aspossible of any changes in schedules or addi-tional movements, Admiral King repliedthat the Navy was "unable to provide es-corts ad lib," and that it would participatein preparing schedules which could bemaintained as soon as the current "flurry"had subsided. In another protest, filed afew days later, Admiral King stated that hecould not accept the premise that it wasthe Navy's business to furnish escort for anytroopship sailing that the Army might setup, when the plan was made without co-ordination with the Navy. G-4 took theposition that it merely had stated what es-corts were wanted and expected the Navyto indicate whether they could or could notbe furnished; it noted that the Navy thusfar had provided the escorts requested with-out much delay.102 Admiral King then wasinformed that the Army would endeavor toconform to any plan of co-operative actionthat the Navy might propose. The Navyrequested one month's notice of the Army'sneed for a convoy, whenever that was pos-sible.

By mid-February 1942 the Navy hadworked out a plan for convoys on the prin-cipal routes, which provided one sailingevery 40 days to the United Kingdom, Ice-land, Greenland, and Newfoundland; onesailing every 30 days to Bermuda, the Car-ibbean, South America, Australia, and theislands of the Pacific ferry route; 6 sailingsmonthly to Hawaii.103 The plan contem-

99 Memo, CNO USN for CofS USA, n.d., sub:Convoy for BOBCAT and Australia; Memo, Grossfor Ross (Trans Br G-4), 15 Jan 42. Both inG-4/29717-115.

100 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 1 Jan 42,sub: Liaison with Navy, with approval by GCM,G-4/29717-89. For establishment of GHQ and re-lationship to WDGS see Kent R. Greenfield, RobertR. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization ofGround Combat Troops, in UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE ARMYGROUND FORCES (Washington, 1947), Chs. I,IX, X.

101 Memo, CofS USA for ACofS G-4, 27 Jan 42,sub: Notification of Army Convoys, G-4/29717-89;Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 28 Jan 42, for-warded to Admiral King, G-4/29717-89; Memo,Admiral King for General Marshall, 30 Jan 42,OCT 045.4 G-4 file Jan-Feb 42; Memo, King forMarshall, 7 Feb 42, OCT HB Topic Convoy andRouting.

102 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 9 Feb 42,sub: Admiral King's Note on Escorts,G-4/29717-89;Memo, Marshall for King, 10 Feb 42, 21343-18,OCS 21276-21350; Memo, COMINCH for CofSUSA, 9 Feb 42, sub: Escorts in Atlantic,G-4/29 717-89.

103 Memo, Marshall for King, 21 Feb 42, sub:Navy Escorts for Army Transports, 21343-19, OCS21276-21350; Memo, King for Marshall, 24 Feb42, OCT HB Gross Day File.


plated that cargo vessels would sail un-escorted unless they had sufficient speed toaccompany troopship convoys; that troop-ship convoys would have a speed of at least15 knots; and that high-speed troop trans-ports would sail unescorted but with off-shore air coverage. The Army commentedthat this convoy schedule placed a severelimitation on the oversea war effort. Itrequested that the 40-day intervals be re-duced to 30 if possible; that the convoyspeed limitation be placed at 13 knots in thePacific and 14 knots in the Atlantic inorder that the slower troopships might beincluded; and that convoy arrangementsbe developed for Alaska. The Army accept-ed other features of the Navy plan, with theunderstanding that it was subject to revisionin the light of experience and that the Navywould keep the Army informed as moreescorts became available. The Navy indi-cated that it was not then able to go farin complying with these requests but wouldco-operate to the fullest extent possible inmeeting the Army's transportation problems.

Thenceforward there was a running ex-change of information between the twoservices and an effort toward closer co-ordination, the Army always pressing formore frequent convoys, the Navy adjustingits plans to meet the Army's needs as faras possible but urging that requests forspecial movements be kept to a minimum.Late in March 1942 Admiral King calledattention to the special convoys which hadbeen arranged for that month, and, whileacknowledging that the movements in ques-tion were of highest priority, stated: " . . .this sort of thing cannot go on—we simplyhave not the means to escort multifariousexpeditions." 104 The Army response, pre-

pared by General Gross for General Mar-shall's signature, stated that every effortwould be made to reduce the demand forconvoys and added that a better liaison anda better understanding of each other's prob-lems were developing between the two de-partments.

By summer, 1942, the weakness of theJapanese submarine threat had become ap-parent, and convoys in the Pacific were lim-ited to scheduled sailing between San Fran-cisco and Honolulu and irregular sailingsinto the forward areas. Later, convoys toHonolulu were discontinued; they were re-vived briefly in 1944 after a submarinescare and then abandoned altogether. InMay 1945 vessels in the Pacific were beingpermitted to run independently as far westas Kossol Passage, about 750 miles south-west of Guam.105

In the Atlantic, on the other hand, therewas a steady increase in convoy operationsas rapidly constructed escort vessels cameoff the ways in greater and greater numbers.After taking severe losses during the earlypart of 1942 in the western Atlantic, theGulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean, suffi-cient escorts became available to enable theNavy, with the aid of air patrols, to provideeffective protection for merchant vesselsmoving in those waters. Increasingly fre-quent schedules of fast (14-15 knot) andslow (8-10 knot) convoys were requiredto effect the build-up of U.S. forces in theUnited Kingdom and to support the Alliedcampaigns in North Africa, the Mediter-ranean, and eventually on the EuropeanContinent. Up to V-E Day 1,134 principal

104 Memo, King for Marshall, 23 Mar 42; Memo,Marshall for King, 27 Mar 42, sub: Navy Escorts.Both in OCT HB Gross Day File.

105 History of Convoy and Routing, pp. 97-98;Memo, Lt Col Meyer for Lt Col Finlay, 4 Sep 43,OCT HB Topic Convoy and Routing; TC NewsLetter, 15 Nov 44, OCT HB Topic Convoy andRouting; Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 17 May 45,ASF Hq Trans 1945.


convoys were escorted by the combinedAmerican-British-Canadian naval forces inthe North and Middle Atlantic.106 Theseconvoys involved 47,997 merchant vesselsand 8,233 escort vessels, or an average of42.3 merchantmen and 7.3 escorts per con-voy. The peak year was 1944 when 380convoys sailed, including 18,856 merchantships and 3,070 escorts. There were, in addi-tion, less frequent convoy sailings betweenU.S. Atlantic and Gulf ports and SouthAmerica, the Middle East, and other areas.

During the critical part of the war, whenGerman submarines were a constant threat,all vessels crossed the North and Middle At-lantic in convoys except those freighterswhich were too slow to keep up with theslow convoys and except fast ships of 19 or20 knots sustained speed which could out-run the U-boats.107 Late in the war inde-pendent routing was the rule for tankers ofall speeds and a greater number of freighterswere permitted to run free, but all troop-ships except the more speedy ones con-tinued to sail with escort. The fast convoys,which included the troopships, were keptsmall in the interest of security, and theyseldom exceeded 24 vessels.108 The largestslow convoy to sail during the war consistedof 167 merchant vessels destined to theUnited Kingdom. Of this total, 109 wereloaded at and sailed originally from United

States ports, and 58 originated at Canadianports.

The troopships which sailed unattendedin the Atlantic were, with a few exceptions,prewar passenger liners which had beenconverted for troop service. They includedthe largest and fastest American and Britishvessels, as well as several French, Dutch,and former Italian vessels which had comeunder American or British control. Althoughthey ran without escort in the open ocean,they were given special protection in coastalwaters.109 Not a single ship of this fast groupwas lost in the Atlantic as the result ofenemy action—an accomplishment attrib-utable to close teamwork between Ameri-can, British, and Canadian officials, accur-ate information regarding U-boat activities,careful control of routings and diversions,and skillful seamanship.

Outside the North and Middle Atlantic,although protected convoys were employedwherever and whenever the danger wasgreat and escorts were available, indepen-dent routing was used extensively. Some-times such routings involved wide diversionsand greatly lengthened voyages. For ex-ample, increased submarine concentrationsin the South Atlantic in the latter part of1942 caused more than 200 vessels boundfrom U.S. east coast ports to the IndianOcean to be sent through the PanamaCanal, down the west coast of SouthAmerica, and around Cape Horn. WhenU-boats became active in the area off Cape-town, such vessels were diverted to the

106 History of Convoy and Routing, pp. 59-60,100-102.

107 In March 1942 proposal by General Somer-vell to permit 1,000 U.S. troops to sail for Irelandon an unescorted British ship of 19 knots wasvetoed by General Marshall. Memo, CG SOS forCofS USA, 13 Mar 42, sub: Carrying Trs in SSCarnarvon Castle, OCT HB Gross Vessels—British.Later some troopships of 19 knots were permittedto run independently in the North Atlantic.

108 Memo, Port Dir Third Naval Dist for CGNYPE, 18 Nov 48, sub: Convoy Arrangements,OCT HB Topic Convoy and Routing; History ofConvoy and Routing, p. 73.

109 Ltr, Admiral E. J. King USN to AdmiralAndrew Cunningham RN, 10 Oct 42, ASF HqNavy 1942-44; Memos, COMINCH for ComdrESF, 23 Oct 42 and 2 Dec 42, sub: Escort ofBritish and U.S. Fast Transports, OCT HB GrossNavy; CCS 93d Mtg, Item 5, 22 May 43; CCS94th Mtg, Item 3, 23 May 43; CCS 246, 23 May43; History of Convoy and Routing, pp. 94-96.


longer route across the South Pacific andaround New Zealand and Australia. Morethan 500 vessels were routed in this mannerprior to the opening of the eastern Mediter-ranean to Allied shipping in July 1943.110

Any comparison of losses as between es-corted and unescorted ships would involvea more detailed analysis of the data thancan be undertaken here, but the followingfigures are of interest.111 From September1939 to the end of the war, of a total of4,786 Allied and neutral merchant vesselsof 1,000 gross tons or more lost on accountof enemy action, 2,115 were lost while pro-ceeding independently, 1,266 while in con-voy, 318 while proceeding as stragglers fromconvoys, 367 after being detached or dis-persed from convoys, and 720 during mili-tary operations at anchor or in port. During1939—42 many more vessels were lost whileproceeding independently than were lost inconvoy, but thereafter the losses in convoywere somewhat the greater.

The campaign in North Africa, the firstlarge-scale Allied operation of the war andone calling for heavy and carefully sched-uled movements of troops and supplies,brought to light many problems in connec-tion with the organization and operation ofconvoys. A study made in General Gross'soffice of the convoys which sailed to thattheater during the winter of 1942—43 pre-sented a disturbing picture of ship failures,collisions, and other mishaps that resultedin loss of ships' services and delay in thedelivery of troops and cargoes overseas.112

Gross immediately launched a vigorouscampaign to place all Army transports inproper mechanical condition for operationin convoy and to avoid faulty stowagewhich might result in the shifting of cargoesat sea, and he requested the War ShippingAdministration to undertake similar meas-ures in regard to vessels operated under itscontrol. He also urged the Navy to exerciseclose supervision to insure that each vesselassigned to a convoy was mechanically fitfor the voyage and capable of maintainingthe scheduled speed.

This action had scarcely been taken,however, when more misfortune was re-ported.113 Analysis of a convoy immediatelyafter its sailing from New York on 1 April1943 disclosed that of a total of 51 cargoships and tankers which had been loadedfor the departure, 6 had been eliminatedwhile getting under way in a heavy mist—5 because of collisions and 1 because of get-ting lost. Later information revealed thatother vessels which had sailed with the con-voy had returned to port because of damageresulting from collisions and still others hadgone astray in the fog. As a result, morethan 20 percent of the cargo loaded hadnot gone forward. In addition to this delayof supplies actually put aboard, two vesselsintended for the convoy had been elimi-nated before they reached the loading port,one because of collision and the other be-cause of machinery trouble. Further con-sultations with the Navy were immediatelybegun.

110 History of Convoy and Routing, pp. 36-40.111 British Admiralty Rpt, BR 1337, British and

Foreign Merchant Vessels Lost or Damaged byEnemy Action during Second World War, 1 Oct45, p. 19.

112 Memos, General Marshall for Admiral KingUSN and Admiral Land WSA, 30 Mar 43, sub:Losses in Effective Use of Shipping, and atchdtabulation, OCS 570, 1943; ASF MPR, Sec. 3,31 Mar 43, pp. 70-74.

113 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 2 Apr 43, sub:Sailing of Convoy UGS-7, OCT 045.4 UGSMemos, Marshall for Land and King, 3 Apr 43,OCS 570, 1943: Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 3 Apr43, sub: Effect of Fog and Collision upon UGS-7,OCT HB Gross WSA; Memo, Marshall for King,9 Apr 43, ASF Hq Navy 1942-44. "UGS" desig-nated slow convoys, "UGF" fast convoys, fromU.S. ports to Gibraltar.


While attributing the misfortune whichbefell this convoy largely to fog, the Navycited it as "another example of crowdedconditions in New York" and as a strongargument for moving some of the convoysto other ports.114 Further measures recom-mended by the Navy were the better main-tenance of machinery, the assignment ofthe best qualified masters to ships sailing inconvoy, and limitation of the size of con-voys. The Army replied that the size ofconvoys could not be reduced until moreescorts were available and more frequentsailings possible; it pointed out that theArmy already was loading vessels at Boston,Baltimore, and Hampton Roads and wouldsoon begin loading at Philadelphia but that,as long as the ships had to assemble at NewYork for convoy sailings, outport loadingoffered no relief so far as this particularproblem was concerned; and it suggestedthat in addition to investigation by theNaval Inspector General, a joint review ofthe whole problem be made.115 As the resultof conferences on this subject and discussionin the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coastwise con-voys were soon established between Bostonand Halifax, an arrangement which en-abled vessels loading at Boston to join anAtlantic convoy at Halifax rather than atNew York, and the slow North Africanconvoys were shifted from New York toHampton Roads.116

Although the Combined and Joint Mili-tary Transportation Committees necessarilyconcerned themselves with convoy matters,

the determination of the size and frequencyof convoys remained a naval prerogative.In February 1943 a proposal to increase thesize of the slow convoys to North Africaabove the existing limit of 60 vessels, whilestrongly supported by General Gross, wasopposed by the Navy.117 In May, as theresult of continued pressure from bothAmerican and British sources for an in-creased movement of cargo to North Africa,CMTC recommended that the Navy's limitof 60 vessels be raised at once to 80 andthat, beginning in midsummer, convoy de-partures be increased from one every 15days to one every 10 days. Admiral King,while recognizing the urgency of the need,stated that the first proposal could not becarried out because of the shortage of es-corts and that the second proposal, althoughtentatively approved, might be found im-possible of accomplishment. However, theNavy, which had sole responsibility for es-corting U.S.-North Africa convoys as far asGibraltar (where they were taken over bythe British Admiralty), was able to raisethe limit to 80 vessels beginning withUGS-13 which sailed in July 1943, and itsoon increased the frequency to once very10 days.

As the time approached for the sailingof UGS-16 (U.S.-Gibraltar slow convoy),it was disclosed that a total of 91 vesselshad been presented for inclusion by the U.S.

114 Two Memos, King for Marshall, 5 Apr 43;Memo, Admiral Edwards for General Somervell, 5Apr 43. All in OCT HB Gross Navy.

115 Memo, Marshall for King, 9 Apr 43, ASFHq Navy 1942-44; Memo, Marshall for King, 21May 43, OCS 570, 1943. For report of NIG andresulting actions by Navy and JMTC, see JMT23/D, 27 May 43, and JCS 352, 8 Jun .43.

116 Memo, King for Marshall, 18 Apr 43, OCTHB Gross Navy; Memo, Dir NTS for CofT, 16May 43, sub: Use of Boston as Convoy LoadingPort, OCT 565.2 Boston Geog File; Memo, AdmiralEdwards for CofT, 20 Jun 43, OCT 045.4 Gen;JCS 352, 8 Jun 43.

117 Memo, CofT for Secy CMTC, 26 Jan 43,OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; CCS 182, par.III-1 (a) of Incl, 25 Feb 43; CCS 222, 14 May 43;CCS 222 /1 , 2 Jun 43; Rad to British Admiralty,21 Jul 43, WD CM-IN 15169, OCT 045.4 Navy;CCS 222/5, 20 Sep 43; CCS 120th Mtg, 24 Sep 43,Supp. Min, Item 5.


Army, the War Shipping Administration,and the British Ministry of War Transport.It then became a question of again raisingthe limit or of establishing priorities underwhich some vessels would be eliminatedfrom the convoy.118 An ad hoc committee,appointed by the Combined Military Trans-portation Committee to consider the sub-ject, recommended a basis for priorities,proposed that after priorities had beenestablished by the Combined Chiefs of Staffthe enforcement of them be delegated toCMTC, and suggested that the Navy berequested to fix the earliest possible datefor increasing the frequency of UGS con-voys to four per month. In a JCS discussionof this report Admiral King expressed con-cern regarding the extent of activity of thead hoc committee, but was satisfied withthe assurance of General Somervell, whowas a member of that committee, that itintended to deal only with priorities andnot with the size and other operational as-pects of convoys. The report of the ad hoccommittee was approved by CCS.

When the question of permitting morevessels to proceed independently was takenup in the Combined Military Transporta-tion Committee during the summer of 1944,the Navy again displayed opposition to anyqualification of its responsibility for theprotection of merchant shipping. The Brit-ish Admiralty had suggested the possibilityof saving shipping by making the convoysystem more flexible and releasing shipsfrom the necessity of proceeding in slowconvoys when there was no enemy threat

in the area where they were operating.119 ANavy spokesman pointed out that economyalso involved prevention of unnecessarylosses and expressed the view that if sucha practice were initiated there would begreat difficulty in keeping it within bounds.Upon suggestion of General Gross, who feltthat the proposed flexibility might applyto the faster cargo vessels operated on trans-atlantic voyages as well as those in thewestern Atlantic, a subcommittee was ap-pointed to review the situation. Soon there-after Gross was informed by a Navy spokes-man that Admiral King did not regard thecharter of CMTC as giving it authority tolook into his convoy and routing policy andthat the subcommittee was distinctly per-sona non grata with him.120 At the nextmeeting of CMTC the Navy representativerequested that the subcommittee be dis-solved, and this action was taken.

The numbers of passengers that might becarried on escorted and unescorted vesselswere fixed by the Navy, but the Army'sviews were taken into consideration.121 TheArmy's position was influenced naturallyby the urgent need for troop lift, and con-sequently the Army favored taking advan-tage of any space that could be used with-out excessive hazard. The problem wasa complicated one, involving not onlyquestions of route, speed, and escorts, butalso the question of lifeboat capacity anddistinctions between service and nonservicepersonnel. Co-ordination with the British

118 CMTC, 68th Mtg, 19 Aug 43; Memo, EMJr for Gen Somervell, 19 Aug 43, ASF Hq Trans1943; CCS 222/2, 20 Aug 43; CCS 222/3, 22 Aug43; JCS 111 th Mtg, Item 11, 23 Aug 43; CCS116th Mtg, Item 4, 24 Aug 43.

119 CMTC, 89th Mtg, Item 1, 16 Jun 44; CMTC,90th Mtg, Item 1, 1 Jul 44.

120 Memo, Admiral W. W. Smith for GeneralGross, 13 Jul 44, OCT HB Gross Navy; CMTC,91st Mtg, Item 1, 14 Jul 44.

121 Memo, Admiral Edwards for CofT, 18 Jul 42,ASF Hq Navy 1942-44; Memo, CofT for AdmiralEdwards, 5 Aug 42; Memos, CofT for DeputyCofS USN, 23 Nov 42 and 14 Feb 43. Last threein OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.


concerning rules applicable to the respectiveareas of responsibility was necessary. Be-cause of changing conditions the rules werein a state of flux throughout the war.

The convoy system imposed numerousproblems on the Transportation Corps,particularly in connection with the largecargo convoys in the Atlantic. The assem-bling of so many vessels in port at one timenot only intensified the hazards of navigationbut caused loading, repairing, and supply-ing operations to be concentrated in cer-tain periods, with resulting pressure on thepersonnel and facilities concerned. TheArmy ports of embarkation carefullyscheduled their loading operations, takinginto account the convoy sailing dates, theavailability of pier facilities, and theadequacy of labor, and the Chief of Trans-portation undertook to arrange with theWar Shipping Administration, which pro-vided most of the vessels, to have themdelivered promptly in order that theschedules might be maintained.122 Delayedarrivals due to submarine activity, unfore-seen repairs, and other causes frequentlyprevented WSA from making deliveries asplanned. If the vessels so delayed were nu-merous, decision whether to eliminate themor hold the convoy was made after consulta-tion between the Transportation Corps,which had knowledge of the theater's cargorequirements, and the Navy, which knewthe general convoy and escort situation.Army port commanders were urged to beginloading vessels promptly and to proceed asrapidly as possible, even though the convoysailing date allowed more than enough time,because of possible interruptions due to

weather, labor shortage, or other unfore-seen circumstances. The matter of getting upto a half million tons of cargo to the sea-board in sufficient time to complete theloading of a convoy, but without port con-gestion and in accordance with prioritiesestablished by the theaters, required carefulplanning and strict control on the part ofthe Transportation Corps.123

For several months after General Grosswas designated Chief of Transportation inMarch 1942, the Army's arrangements withthe Navy regarding convoys were made byhis Operations Officer. In June 1942, con-voy procedures having become somewhatstabilized, the Navy was informed thatalthough long-range schedules still wouldbe co-ordinated by the Operations Officer(later known as Director of Operations),the final and detailed arrangements there-after would be made by the chief of theWater Division.124 The latter official foundit convenient to utilize the TransportationCorps' permanent liaison officer with theNavy as his agent in negotiations with theconvoy and routing section. That procedurecontinued throughout the war so far ascargo convoys were concerned. Troopshipconvoys eventually became the specialinterest of the Movements Division, which

122 Memo, BPE for OCT, 15 Oct 43, and sub-sequent correspondence illustrates scheduling planused at Boston, OCT 565.2 Boston Geog File.

123 See summary of cargo shipped to NorthAfrica up to UGS-12, in binder labeled Miscel-laneous Shipping Information, p. 75; see also an-alysis of certain convoys, pp. 63-70, OCT HBPlng Div Gen; see also file OCT HB Wylie UGConvoys.

124 Memo, Opns Off OCT for Dir NTS, 7 Jun42, sub: Arrangements for Escorts, OCT HBMeyer Staybacks; C of Water Div OCT for DirNTS, 8 Jun 42, OCT HB Topic Convoy andRouting; Memo Convs, author with Maj W. E.Nowell, formerly with Ocean Traf Br of WaterDiv, and Lt Col H. H. Naughton, formerly C ofConvoy and Scheduling Br of Mvmts Div, 6 May48, OCT HB Topic Convoy and Routing.


as a rule made its arrangements directlywith the appropriate Navy officials.125

While the basic arrangements were madein Washington, details pertaining to theorganization and dispatch of convoys wereworked out by the Navy port directors inconjunction with the Army port com-manders and the local representatives ofthe War Shipping Administration and theBritish Ministry of War Transport.126 Armyport commanders were responsible for see-ing that the masters and chief radio opera-tors of vessels under Army control attendedthe meetings held by the Navy port directorsprior to convoy sailings, at which instruc-tions regarding operations and informa-tion for their guidance were given.127

There is abundant evidence from theArmy standpoint that after the shortage ofescort vessels had been overcome and theprocedures for organizing and escortingconvoys had been improved through ex-perience, the Navy's convoy system workedsmoothly and effectively.128 In short, theNavy made every effort to meet the Army'srequirements, within the limitations im-posed by the means at its disposal and itstechnical standards.

Relations with the British Ministry ofWar Transport

The necessity of pooling American andBritish shipping was recognized as soon asthe United States entered the war. A reportof the Joint U.S.-British Planning Com-mittee to the heads of the two governments,at the beginning of their conferences inWashington in December 1941, stated:"No major overseas operations can be per-formed by the United States unless adequateshipping is immediately made available forpreparat ion as t roop transports." 1 2 9

Although the most urgent immediate needwas for vessels with which to reinforce theSouthwest Pacific, it was realized that long-range planning was necessary in order thatthe fullest combined use of shipping for allpurposes might be obtained.

Ocean transport unquestionably was oneof the major "services" contemplated forexchange under the British Master Agree-ment which was executed on 23 February1942 to implement the Lend-Lease Act of11 March 1941.130 It was a two-way ex-change from the beginning, each side con-tributing vessels which were physically well-adapted or suitably located to fulfill specificrequirements in a common cause. In thisexchange the British gave the more heavilyof troop-carrying capacity, because of the

125 The Director of Operations and his staff hada key position in convoy matters throughout the war,and in recommending Col. Richard D. Meyer,Deputy Director of Operations, for Legion ofMerit General Gross cited his outstanding servicein this connection. See Memo for TAG, 19 Feb 45,OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

126 Memo, Asst Navy Port Dir NY for Hist OffNYPE, 18 Sep 42; Telg, CofT for Army portComdrs, 28 Mar 43. Both in OCT HB TopicConvoy and Routing.

127 Memo, CofT for Army port Comdrs, 11 Mar43, OCT 045.4 Navy.

128 Memo, CofT for COMINCH, 11 Feb 44, sub:Commendation—Comdr W. R. Edsall, and Ind byGen Somervell, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; OCTHB Monograph 30, p. 171; Convs, author withNowell and Naughton, cited n. 124.

129 ARCADIA Proceedings, An. 1, p. 2, 26 Dec 41;CMTC 3d Mtg, Item 9, 3 Mar 42.

130 The President's Seventh Report to Congresson Lend-Lease Operations, App. V, Arts. I and II,December 11, 1942. After extensive negotiationsregarding a troop transport loaning agreement theU.S. and British Governments decided early in1943 not to enter into formal agreement but toallow the principles of reciprocal aid to be workedout as occasion might require. See communications,British Embassy Washington to Secy State, 9 Feb43; Secy State to SW, 1 Mar 43; SW to Secy State,12 Mar 43. All in OCT 092.2 Loan of TroopTransports.


assignment of their largest passenger linersto the service of the U.S. Army in the NorthAtlantic, and the United States gave themore heavily of cargo-carrying capacity, byvirtue of its tremendous freighter and tankerconstruction programs. In addition to trans-portation, the lend-lease and reciprocal aid(reverse lend-lease) agreements covered allexpenses, except pay and allowances tocrews, incurred by vessels of either nationin the ports of the other nation, or inother approved areas.131 Under the so-calledknock-for-knock agreement each govern-ment waived all claims against the other onaccount of loss or damage of vessels orcargo due to the acts of the other govern-ment or its agents.132

The American pool of ships whichfunctioned under the control of the WarShipping Administration and the Britishpool under the control of the BritishMinistry of War Transport included manyvessels of other nationalities. Germany,which had substantially aided the Allies inWorld War I by allowing many of her bestships to be interned in United States portsat the outbreak of hostilities, was carefulnot to make a similar mistake in September1939. Italy and Japan also arranged to havethe bulk of their merchant shipping in safe

ports or on the high seas when they enteredthe war. But a substantial part of theFrench, Belgian, Dutch, Danish, Nor-wegian, Polish, and Greek merchantmarines escaped Axis seizure when thosecountries were invaded, and served thecause of the United Nations thereafter,mostly under British control.133 Victory inNorth Africa brought additional Frenchshipping under Allied control. When Italysurrendered, a limited number of vesselswhich had escaped complete destructionwhile in Axis service, or had been internedin neutral ports, became available. Thesmall amount of German shipping whichwas afloat when that nation capitulatedwas acquired by the Allies, but too late tobe of use in the war against Japan.

The extent of the assistance which theUnited States should receive from theBritish shipping pool and the amount ofshipping aid which the British should re-ceive from the United States were matterswhich received constant attention from theCombined Shipping Adjustment Board, acivilian agency concerned with all aspectsof the subject, and the Combined MilitaryTransportation Committee, concerned pri-marily with military movements. The utili-zation of shipping invariably was consideredat the conferences between the Presidentand the Prime Minister, at which the aboveagencies were represented. There frequentlywere differences of opinion between the

131 Rad, International Div ASF to oversea com-mands, 8 Feb 44, CM-OUT 4488; Memo, TAGfor CG's of Theaters, etc., 16 Jun 44; AG 400.3295(13 Jun 44), sub: Services Furnished for ArmyTransports as Reciprocal Aid in British ColonialPorts and other Approved Areas. Last two in OCT120 Reverse Lend-Lease, Sec. 2.

132 Agreement between the Government of theUnited States of America and the Government ofthe United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthIreland, 4 Dec 42, OCT HB Topic British Ship-ping. For negotiations leading up to this agree-ment, see OCT files 092.2 Loan of Troop Trans-ports, 092.2 Knock for Knock—England, 092.2Knock for Knock—Misc. Similar agreements weremade between the U.S. and other United Nations.

133 Study prepared by Div of Economics andStatistics, U.S. Mar Com, as of 30 Sep 42, pub-lished in ASF MPR Sec. 3, Dec 42, pp. 15-27,indicates that of 25,790,000 DWT of shippingunder direct British control, 6,165,000 DWT wereof foreign flag, including 2,700,000 DWT Nor-wegian, 1,450,000 DWT Dutch, and 1,025,000DWT Greek; of 14,383,000 DWT under U.S.control, 2,000,000 DWT were of foreign flag, in-cluding more than 1,000,000 DWT Panamanianand 350,000 DWT Dutch.


civilian and the military authorities, orbetween the British and the American rep-resentatives, and final decision rested withthe heads of the two governments. Suchdecisions seldom were arrived at easilysince both sides were plagued with short-ages, but through a free exchange of in-formation it generally was possible to findwhat seemed to be the most practicaladjustment in the interest of the Alliedwar effort.

The most persistent difference of opinionwas over the shipping requirements of theBritish import program, which were par-tially met with American vessels. Althoughthat program had been severely cut, Ameri-can representatives on the Combined Mili-tary Transportation Committee repeatedlypressed for further withdrawals of shippingin order that the vessels might be assignedto strictly military missions.134 This lengthyargument was highlighted by a misunder-standing at the Casablanca Conference inJanuary 1943, when an agreement betweenGeneral Somervell and Lord Leathers,Minister of War Transport and Britishmember of the London branch of the Com-bined Shipping Adjustment Board, whichthe former understood to assure additionalvessels for forthcoming American militaryundertakings, was found to be without "acomplete meeting of minds," so that the

entire situation had to be reviewed afterthe conference.135

The more exacting problems in con-nection with this combined use of shippingconcerned troop transports, particularly thelarger and faster vessels which ran withoutescorts and were moved freely from routeto route according to the urgency of theneeds. Among the vessels of this type inthe British pool were the British linersQueen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, Aquitania,Mauretania, Empress of Scotland, andAndes, the French Ile de France andPasteur, and the Dutch Nieuw Amsterdam.Among the larger American troop carrierswere the Navy-operated West Point, Wake-field, Mount Vernon, Monticello, andHermitage; the Army-operated GeorgeWashington and Edmund B. Alexander',the Argentina, Brazil, John Ericsson, Lur-line, Mariposa, Monterey, and Uruguay,which were operated by agents of the WarShipping Administration; and the war-built, Navy-operated "Admirals" and"Generals" (P-2 type).136 The MovementsDivision in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation and the British Ministry of WarTransport maintained a running exchangeof information regarding the scheduling ofthese and other troopships, and kept eachother fully informed regarding prospectivechanges of sailing dates, changes in spacerequirements, lay-ups for repairs, and other

134 CCS 74th Mtg, Item 2, 5 Mar 43; CMTC, 61stMtg, Item 1,15 Mar 43; Memo, Gross for Marshall,17 Mar 43, sub: Review of UN Shipping, OCT HBWylie Shipping Requirements and Allocations 1943;CMTC, 93d Mtg, Item 1, 12 Jan 45; Memo, CGASF for CofS USA, 30 Mar 45, sub: CCS 746/13,OCT HB Gross Day File; CCS 746/14, 3 Apr 45;see also Memo, Harry Hopkins for Lewis W.Douglas WSA, 28 Apr 43, OCT HB Gross WSA;Ltr, WSA to CofT, 2 Oct 44, OCT HB GrossWSA; Ltr, Acting SW to Secy State, 16 Dec 44,ASF Hq British 1944. For British view see Han-cock and Gowing, British War Economy pp.428-35.

135 Ltr, CofT to WSA, 27 Feb 43, OCT HBGross WSA; Ltr, Sir Arthur Salter, British mem-ber of CSAB in Washington, to CG SOS, 9 Mar43, and Reply, 12 Mar 43, ASF Hq British1942-43; Ltr, WSA to CofT, 13 Mar 43, OCT HBGross WSA; Memo, CofS USA for Harry Hopkins,22 Mar 43, OCS 570, 1943.

136 Troops Transports in Service (British Doc),30 Sep 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div British Files;Troop Ships by Speed Class, 8 Nov 43, preparedin Mvmts Div OCT, OCT HB PE Gen TransportLists.

LARGEST TROOPSHIPS AFLOAT. The Queen Mary (top) and Queen Eliza-beth (bottom), operated under the control of the British Ministry of War Transport,

carried between 14,000 and 15,000 troops on each of many trips.


matters affecting the movement and utiliza-tion of the vessels.137

During the heavy movement of troops tothe European theater almost the entirespace on eastbound transatlantic Britishsailings was assigned to the U.S. Army.About 21 percent of the troops embarkedat U.S. ports throughout the war wereembarked on vessels under the control ofthe British Ministry of War Transport;during the year 1944 the percentage was28.2.138

The Queen Mary and the Queen Eliza-beth, because of their great size and speed,were of utmost importance in the movementof American troops. After a brief periodof service in the Pacific, they served mainlyin the North Atlantic despite the submarinemenace. General Gross naturally was desir-ous of having them carry the maximumnumbers, and this was accomplished bydegrees. In February 1942, when the QueenMary first embarked American troops inthe Pacific, her capacity was about 8,200.The President then was reluctant to placeso many men on a single ship, but approvedan urgent recommendation of the Armythat this be done, because of the extremeneed of troop lift to Australia.139 By Aprilthe capacities of the Queen Mary and theQueen Elizabeth had been increased to

9,500 and 10,500, respectively.140 GeneralGross was of the opinion that Americanmethods of troop fitting should be appliedso that the vessels could carry about15,000.141 The British did not at once fall inwith the idea, but further negotiation re-sulted in agreement and during the summermonths the "Queens" frequently carriedpassengers approximating that number ontransatlantic voyages.142

Vessels of the British pool which were as-signed to the transportation of Americantroops were inspected in the same manner asAmerican troopships by personnel from theArmy ports of embarkation, representingthe Port Inspector, the Port Surgeon, andthe Superintendent of the Army TransportService (later called the Water Division).143

The U.S. Coast Guard, which was chargedwith enforcement of the U.S. vessel in-spection laws and regulations, assigned arepresentative to the Army port of embarka-tion at New York to serve as a member ofthe inspection team. Inspections were madeas soon as practicable after the ships arrived

137 Much of the correspondence is in OCT HBMvmts Div British Files; see also Memo, ACofTfor CofT, 23 Apr 43, regarding use of U.S. troop-ships to move 17,000 British troops in convoy toCapetown, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

138 Allocation List, issued periodically by BritishArmy Staff, Washington, OCT HB Mvmts DivBritish Files; Monograph, Col. M. B. Stokes, Jr.,Shipping in War, 22 Mar 46, p. 7, OCT HBLogistics Gen; Monthly Rpt, Mvmts Div, Classi-fication of Outbound Passengers, Management DivOCT.

139 Memo, CofS USA for ACofS G-4, 3 Feb 42,G-4/29717-97.

140 Memo, CG SOS for CofS USA, 25 Apr 42,OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Rad, British ArmyStaff to War Office, 27 Apr 42, OCT HB BritishShipping.

141 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 19 Jun 42, ASFHq British 1942-43.

142 Memo, CG SOS for CofT, 1 Jul 42, ASF HqTrans 1942; Notes on mtg at BMWT New York,6 Jul 42, OCT HB Wylie British; Rad, CG SOS toCG SOS ETOUSA, 30 Aug 42, CM-OUT 9329,OCT 370.5 England; War Office Instructions, 30Aug 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div British Files.

143 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 30 Jun 42, ASFHq Trans 1942; Memo, British Army Staff forOCT (Wylie), 13 Oct 42, and Reply, 17 Nov 42;Memo, CofT for all port Comdrs, 17 Nov 42, sub:Prevoyage Insp of Vessels; Memo, British ArmyStaff for OCT (Wylie), 11 Dec 42. Last four inOCT 333.7 Prevoyage Insp of Vessels. Memo,ACofT (Wylie) for BAS, 25 Nov 43, sub: SS Em-pire Battleax, OCT 000.900 Empire Battleax.


at U.S. ports, in order to allow full timefor the correction of any deficiencies thatmight be reported, and the Chief of Trans-portation requested that the British Ministryof War Transport assign a representativeto the inspection team with authority totake immediate action on such deficiencies.

There naturally were differences ofequipment and service as between Britishand American troopships. These differencesled to American complaints against Britishvessels and British complaints againstAmerican vessels. Sometimes the complaintswere initiated by inspectors at the portsand sometimes by military personnel whichtraveled on the ships.144 Requests for im-provements following such complaints weredelaying and sometimes led to unnecessaryexpense. Discussion of this subject in theCombined Military Transportation Com-mittee resulted in agreement that minimumstandards should be established, and a com-mittee was appointed to study the matter.The committee listed what it considered tobe acceptable conditions on American andBritish vessels, respectively, and recom-mended that when the conditions on aparticular ship equalled the applicableminimum standards, they be consideredsatisfactory and the other nation refrainfrom requesting further alterations.145 Theserecommendations were approved byCMTC, and accepted by the BritishMinistry of War Transport and the WarShipping Administration, and the resultantagreement greatly simplified this problem.

The furnishing of transportation onAmerican and British vessels to the othernation under lend-lease and reverse lend-lease involved many questions of eligibilityand procedure, particularly as regardspassenger traffic, and the rules were workedout in considerable detail. The personseligible for transportation under the mutualaid plan were defined as members of anybranch of the armed forces of either govern-ment when traveling under orders, civiliansoperating as an integral part of such armedforces when traveling under orders, mem-bers of the merchant marine and civiliancrews of vessels operated by the armedforces of either government when travelingunder orders, prisoners of war and theirescorts, and Red Cross personnel movingto or from service with the armed forces.146

All U.S. Army requests for transportationon British vessels sailing from ports of thecontinental United States were made to theBritish Ministry of War Transport by theMovements Division in the Office of theChief of Transportation.

Following the invasion of the Continent,with the liberation of the western Europeancountries in prospect, the continued use ofthe shipping of those countries in supportof the far-flung Allied war effort was amatter of great importance, especially tothe United States because of commitmentsin the Pacific. In August 1944 an "Agree-ment on Principles," sponsored by theCombined Shipping Adjustment Board,

144 See CMTC 77th Mtg, Item 1, 30 Dec 43;Memo, Comdr ESF for COMINCH, 16 Feb 43,OCS 570, 1943; Memo, CofT for NYPE andBPE, 24 Feb 43; 1st Ind, CofT for NYPE, 27 Oct43; Memo, Mvmts Div OCT for Mil Pers Div ASF,10 Nov 44. Last three in OCT HB Farr Staybacks.

145 Rpt on Minimum Standards, 14 Jan 44, OCTHB Wylie Vessels Gen; CMTC, 82d Mtg, 18 Feb44; CMTC, 87th Mtg, 25 May 44.

146 Administrative Arrangement, between U.S.and UK, 22 Dec 42, OCT HB Mvmts Div TransUnder Lend-Lease; WD Memo 55-44, 29 Aug44, sub: Ocean Trans of Pers. The rules wereretroactive to the beginning of lend-lease and re-ciprocal aid. Transportation under lend-lease forpersonnel of governments other than British wasavailable on U.S. troopships only to the membersof the armed forces of such governments and civil-ians operating with the armed forces.


gave assurance that the shipping under theauthority of the recognized governments ofFrance, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,Poland, and Greece, as well as that of theUnited Kingdom, Canada, and the UnitedStates, would continue to be available tocarry on the war in Europe and the FarEast.147

General Gross believed that this agree-ment, together with an informal British-American understanding, also assured theutilization of any captured German vesselsfor the movement of Allied troops.148 Thematter was not finally determined, how-ever, until the Potsdam Conference in July1945, at which time it was agreed that theseven usable passenger vessels which hadbeen surrendered by Germany would beemployed by the United States as troop-ships until the end of 1945. In view of theearly termination of the war against Japanand the length of time needed for the re-habilitation of those vessels, the U.S. Chiefsof Staff recommended in September thatonly two of the seven be employed as trooptransports. These two, the former Germanliner Europa and the Vulcania, whichoriginally flew the Italian flag, were usedfor a short time in the repatriation ofAmerican troops from Europe.

The U.S. Army also took early steps toforestall withdrawal of foreign vessels fromU.S. military service immediately after thetermination of hostilities, in order to avoiddelay in the repatriation of American

troops.149 General Gross was desirous notonly that the British and other foreign flagtransports should continue in troop servicebut that they should remain under the con-trol of the Combined Chiefs of Staff andavailable for both American and Britishmilitary movements. The British Ministryof War Transport did not agree on thelatter point, and a British spokesman onthe Combined Military Transport Com-mittee stated that this was a question whichwould have to be settled between the PrimeMinister and the President.

No definitive agreement on this subjecthad been reached by V-E Day, but the dis-cussion was revived soon thereafter. Earlyin June 1945 the U.S. Army requested theBritish to reconsider their reallocation ofwestbound troop space for that month, anallocation which greatly reduced theamount available to Americans returningfrom Europe and increased that assignedto Canadian personnel. This was followedby a War Office announcement that theQueen Mary, the Queen Elizabeth, and theAquitania would be devoted to the trans-portation of U.S. troops from British portsup to the end of 1945. The United Statesagreed to allocate ten Victory-type and twoother small troopships to the British inpartial compensation.150

147 JCS Memo for Info 261, App. A, 7 Jul 44,sub: Continuance of Coordinated Contl of Mer-chant Shipping; Rpt of the UN Maritime AuthorityPlng Com, London, Sep-Oct 44, OCT HB TopicCSAB.

148 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 4 Sep 44, sub:Employment of Captured German Passenger Ships,ASF Hq Shipping 1944; CCS 900/3, par. 20, 24Jul 45; CCS 679/14, 28 Sep 45.

149 Memo, CG ASF for CofT, 18 Apr 44, ASF HqTrans 1944; CMTC 86th Mtg, Item 1, 5 May 44;88th Mtg, Item 2, 1 Jun 44; 89th Mtg, Item 2,15 Jun 44; 91st Mtg, Item 3, 14 Jul 44.

150 Ltr, CG ASF to War Office, London, 2 Jun45, ASF Hq Trans 1945; Memo, British ArmyStaff Washington for C of Mvmts Div OCT (Farr)et al., 25 Jun 45, and atchd War Office Directive,Jun 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div British Files. OtherBritish troopships in British pool were allocated totransport British Empire personnel. See Trans-Atlantic Sailings and Allocations (British ships),Aug and Sep-Oct 45, OCT HB Mvmts Div BritishFiles; CCS 679/7, 19 Jul 45.


Early in October 1945 the PrimeMinister informed the President that hewould be unable to justify to the Britishpublic the further use of their biggest shipsfor U.S. troop repatriation unless an"equivalent lift" could be provided forBritish use.151 There was a difference ofopinion as to what would constitute anequivalent lift, and General Gross statedthat he would prefer to release the largeBritish liners, which were available onlyfor the North Atlantic, rather than give upthe services of the number of smaller andmore flexible ships which the Britishdesired.152 The Joint Chiefs of Staff thenagreed that only one of the three Britishvessels (the Queen Mary subsequently wasdesignated) should continue in U.S. re-patriation service and that the other twoshould be released.153 In December arrange-ments were made for further use of thewestbound voyages of the Queen Mary untilApril 1946, primarily to carry British warbrides of American soldiers and their chil-dren to the United States, and for the tenU.S. Victory ships to continue in Britishservice for a like period.154

The extensive use which the Americansand the British made of each other's ship-ping necessitated hour-to-hour collabora-tion between the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, the British Army Staff inWashington, and the representatives of theBritish Ministry of War Transport in New

York. In order to facilitate such collabora-tion and the exchange of pertinent informa-tion, a British officer was assigned to OCTto serve as liaison for BAS and BMWT.Since troopships and troop movements werehis principal concern, that officer occupieda desk in the Movements Division. ColonelsR. Bramwell Davis, L1. Wansbrough-Jones,W. B. N. Roderick, and G. J. G. Fisheralternately held the assignment. The ar-rangement worked out very satisfactorilyto the Chief of Transportation. Col. DonaldE. Farr, the head of his Movements Divi-sion, in a report on lessons learned fromthe war, contrasted the smoothness withwhich personnel movements were handledbetween the British and American officeswith the less felicitous manner in whichmovements of the troops of other Allieswere accomplished on American ships, be-cause of the lack of a similar liaison ar-rangement.155

On the operating level, close collabora-tion was necessary between the U.S. Armyports of embarkation and representatives ofthe British Ministry of War Transport atthe ports. This was especially true at NewYork where the head American office ofBMWT was located and where the largerBritish troopships were loaded and dis-charged. Differences in methods of handlingships and troops necessitated adjustments onboth sides, and the embarkation of as manyas 14,000 troops within a few hours calledfor the closest possible co-ordination. As thewar progressed and experience was gainedthe British-American co-operation at thewater front reached a high level of smooth-ness and speed.

151 Msg, 3 Oct 45, published in JMT 72/11, 5Oct 45, Incl B.

152 CMTC, 94th Mtg, Item 2, 6 Oct 45.153 JCS 1539/1, 16 Oct 45, approved 23 Oct 45.154 CCS 679/18, 21 Dec 45; CCS 679/19, 15

Jan 46; Memo, CofT for OPD WDGS, 25 Jan 46,OCT HB Farr Staybacks. Later it was arranged thatthe Queen Mary should carry dependents of U.S.soldiers on one westbound voyage in May andthat U.S. troopships surplus to Army needs shouldhelp with the British repatriation task. CCS 679/20,21,22,23.

155 Ltr, Wansbrough-Jones to CG ASF, 20 Jun 43,OCT HB Gross UK; Memo, C of Mvmts Div forExec Off OCT (Finlay), par. 6, 19 Sep 45, sub:Lessons Learned, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

CHAPTER VII

Operation of the Army's

Large and Small Vessels

Although, as indicated in the precedingchapter, the Army operated only a smallpercentage of the ocean-going vessels whichit utilized, the Army-operated fleet was abig and varied one in comparison withpeacetime commercial fleets. On 1 August1945 there were 186 vessels of this class(1,000 tons gross or larger) under fullArmy management. These vessels weremanned, supplied, maintained, altered, andscheduled by the Transportation Corps. Onthe same date the Transportation Corpshad differing degrees of operating responsi-bility for more than 12,000 smaller boats.It is with these two groups of vessels thatthis chapter is concerned primarily.

Of the 186 ocean-going vessels operatedby the Transportation Corps on 1 August1945, 40 were owned by the Army, 144were under bareboat charter to the Army,and 2 were loaned by the War Shipping Ad-ministration.1 Among these vessels were 51Army transports (troopships and cargoships), 26 hospital ships, 55 interislandvessels, 17 floating warehouses, 12 repairships, 7 spare parts depot ships, 2 cableships, 1 news transmission ship, and 15training ships. Of the total, 89 were assigned

to ports of embarkation in the zone ofinterior, 4 were undergoing conversion inthe zone of interior, and 93 were assignedto oversea commands. The making of suchassignments was a responsibility of the Chiefof Transportation, and transfers betweenports or between oversea commands re-quired his prior approval except in emer-gencies. The Chief of Transportation dele-gated the control of assignments andreassignments to the chief of his WaterDivision.

In August 1942 when the Army ownedor had under bareboat charter about 75ocean-going vessels, General Gross expressedthe opinion that advantages would begained by having a larger number ofvessels under Army operation.2 The ad-vantages which he envisioned were fasterturnarounds, greater secrecy, better controlof crews and greater familiarity of the crewswith their vessels. He believed that the WarShipping Administration could place agreater number of ships under Army op-eration without prejudice to the plan ofmaintaining a flexible national pool ofshipping under WSA control. But while thenumber of Army-operated ocean-goingvessels increased somewhat as the war pro-gressed, WSA met the expanding mili-1 AG 560 (3 Aug 45) OB-S-SPTWO-M, 13

Aug 45, sub: Monthly List of U.S. Army Trans-ports, etc.; AR 55-515, par 4, 1 Sep 42, sub:TC Charters of Vessels; AR 55-305, 10 Oct 42,sub: TC Water Trans Gen.

2 Memo for Gen Somervell, 25 Aug 42, sub:Action to Improve WD Water Trans, OCT HBGross Day File.

OPERATION OF THE ARMY'S LARGE AND SMALL VESSELS 229

tary need chiefly by allocating vessels tothe Army on a voyage basis and operatingthem through its own agents. In followingthis practice WSA was acting in accordancewith a policy laid down by the President inFebruary 1941 and with principles dis-cussed by Admiral Land, who was the WarShipping Administrator and the Americanrepresentative on the Washington branchof the Combined Shipping AdjustmentBoard, and Sir Arthur Salter, the Britishmember, soon after CSAB was established.3

Military, naval, and civilian personnelwere used in operating the Army's ocean-going vessels. With the possible exception ofa few ships assigned to oversea theaters andconcerning which full information is notavailable, the crews on these vessels werecivilians, divided into the usual deck,engine, steward's, and administrative de-partments, serving under a civilian master.4

The medical staffs were military personnelprovided by The Surgeon General. Thearmed guards (gun crews) were for themost part naval personnel. The signalsections which handled radio communica-tions embraced military, naval, and civilianpersonnel. In addition, the troop transportshad military complements under transportcommanders to deal with passenger mat-ters, the cargo transports had cargo securityofficers (later known as ship transportationofficers), and the floating warehouses, spareparts depot ships, and repair ships hadmilitary personnel to perform the specializedtasks for which the ships were equipped.

Civilian Crews on Ocean-Going Vessels

During peacetime when seamen wereplentiful the Army Transport Service wasable to maintain a rather independent posi-tion in regard to terms of employment, butthis condition changed as the United Statesapproached a state of war. Rates of pay,also manning scales, were subject to ap-proval by the Secretary of War.5 During theearly emergency period wage increases wererecommended by The Quartermaster Gen-ral as they were found necessary to enablethe ATS superintendents to obtain crewsfor the growing transport fleet, but theylagged behind those granted by civilianoperators.6 When civilian operators beganpaying bonuses during the months just priorto Pearl Harbor, ATS undertook to do like-wise, but because of the complicated bonussystem and the many areas of Army opera-tion there was considerable confusion, andfull conformity with civilian practices wasdifficult.7 Payment for overtime, a growingpractice among civilian operators, could notbe made on Army vessels without the ap-proval of the Secretary of War, and therewas some uncertainty as to the legalauthority for such payment.

There also were differences betweenArmy and commercial practices in regardto conditions of employment. The Army

3 CSAB 6th Mtg, 25 Mar 42.4 Functions defined in AR 55-310, 11 Nov

44 (Master) ; AR 55-335, 30 Sep 42 (Deck Dept) ;AR 55-340, 1 Sep 42 (Engine Dept) ; AR 55-345,11 Nov 44 (Steward's Dept) ; AR 55-320, 11 Nov44 (Trans Agent or Adm Dept).

5 OQMG Cir 1-15, 1 Jul 37, pars. 166 and167, as amended 23 Feb 39, sub: RegulationsGoverning Civilian Employees.

6 Statement, Gen Gross to Subcom of the Comon Appropriations, HR, 79th Cong., Hearings onMilitary Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1946,p. 505; Conf, author with Col Alexander Corey,26 Mar 48, sub: Crews on Army Transports, OCTHB PE Gen Transport Crews. Col Corey dealtwith these matters in OQMG and later was Chiefof Industrial Personnel Division, OCT.

7 Ltr, C of Trans Br G-4 to Secy of SailorsUnion of the Pacific, 27 Jan 42, OCT HB WylieStaybacks.


ran its vessels on an open-shop basis andemployed union and nonunion men withoutpreference. It thoroughly investigated com-plaints and endeavored to administer crewmatters with full justice to the men butrefused to recognize union grievance com-mittees as agencies for adjusting differencesbetween masters and crews. From the unionstandpoint these were disadvantages. Onthe other hand, as civil service employeesthe crews on Army transports enjoyed cer-tain advantages which were not general inthe maritime industry, such as those relatingto annual and sick leave, the benefits of theCivil Service Retirement Act, and thebenefits of the U.S. Employees Compensa-tion Act.8 During the emergency periodprior to Pearl Harbor, with the Army'sshipping operations expanding rapidly, theseamen's unions complained frequentlyabout the disadvantages suffered by theirmembers on Army vessels, but they con-tinued to give the ports of embarkationtheir full support in the procurement ofcrews.

After our entry into the war the unionsincreased their efforts to obtain full accept-ance by the Army of the terms and condi-tions of employment which were in effectwith civilian operators. After the establish-ment of the Maritime War EmergencyBoard in December 1941, the Army en-deavored to conform to the decisions of theboard regarding bonuses, war risk insur-ance, and compensation for loss of personalproperty, and although there was the cus-tomary lag in making those decisions effec-tive, the unions had no serious cause forcomplaint in such matters. But the Army'sposition on overtime, closed shop, and therecognition of grievance committees still

gave rise to union complaints, and in August1942 a situation arose in the Gulf ofMexico which brought the matter to anopen issue. The New Orleans Port of Em-barkation reported that during the processof taking over the vessels Yarmouth, Evan-geline, and Florida from private operators,the crews, which at first appeared satisfiedwith the terms offered by the Army, werepersuaded by representatives of one of theunions to leave the ships. After about aweek of effort by Army officials some of theoriginal crew members returned to thevessels, and the remaining positions werefilled with newly recruited union and non-union seamen.9

Soon after this incident Mr. Edward F.McGrady, labor relations consultant to theSecretary of War, called a series of confer-ences which were attended by representa-tives of General Somervell, General Gross,and the unions. While the discussions werein progress, General Gross informed Mr.McGrady that the Transportation Corpswas having no difficulty in obtaining crewsfor its vessels under the existing policy andurgently recommended that the War De-partment continue to adhere to thatpolicy.10 He maintained that the ArmyTransport Service should not change itsattitude with regard to grievance com-mittees, since it had to be free to operateits vessels "under strict military control."With regard to the unions' demands for thepayment of overtime, he stated that there

8 Memo, C of Civ Pers Br OCT for C of WaterDiv OCT, 26 Oct 42, OCT 231.8 Army Vessels.

9 Summary of information by Col FranklinKemble G-2 Hq Southern Def Comd, 10 Aug 42;Memo, C of Water Div OCT for CofT, 5 Sep 42,OCT HB PE Gen Transport Crews; Memoswithin Crewing Office NOPE, Hays for Higgins andHiggins for Ederer, 14 Aug 42; 1st Ind, Supt ATSNOPE for CofT, 15 Aug 42. Last two in OCT545.02 Army Vessels.

10 Memo, 22 Aug 42, sub: Protest of SeafarersInternational Union, OCT 545.02 Army Vessels.


was "pending legislation" which if enactedwould enable the Army to promulgate suchregulations as it might deem necessary onthe subject.11

The result of these conferences was theissuance of a statement of War Departmentlabor policy for vessels, which had been for-mulated in the Services of Supply head-quarters and the Office of the Under Secre-tary.12 This document, published at the endof October 1942, referred to the vital mis-sions which Army transports performed andstated: "It is imperative, therefore, thatfactors of military necessity—the need forsecrecy, the prevention of sabotage, themaintenance of strict discipline, the pres-ervation of troops and cargo in the best ofcondition, the possibility of participation inactual combat—be accorded proper recog-nition in the operation of these vessels andreceive precedence over all other considera-tions." It stated that Army Transport Serv-ice employees were free to join or refrainfrom joining employee organizations. Itgave assurance that the crew of any vesselbeing taken over by the Army would begiven preference in employment, but statedthat in the employment of additional crew-men "the sources of labor supply normallyutilized by the War Department" would bedrawn upon. Suspension on suspicion ofsubversive or other inimical activitieswould be executed summarily under pro-

cedures established by the Secretary ofWar, but the employees involved wouldbe accorded opportunity for review of theircases. Discharges for other forms of mis-conduct would be reviewed upon requestto the responsible Army official within areasonable period. Grievances would beadjusted and disputes settled upon the ter-mination of voyages in continental ports ofthe United States, and mass meetings andthe formation of committees on board wereprohibited. Noncompliance with orders ofthe ship's master, or infraction of laws relat-ing to conduct aboard, would be consideredgrounds for discharge or other appropriatedisciplinary action as provided for by statuteor regulation. The prevailing basis of com-pensation in the industry would be observedon all vessels operated by the War Depart-ment, including emergency and overtimewages, war bonuses, and repatriation andallotment conditions, effective 1 November1942.

This statement of policy met the morecritical points of the unions' complaints.However, early in January 1943 a state-ment was filed by the National MaritimeUnion with the Under Secretary allegingthat, with the exception of review of dis-charge cases, the provisions of the policyhad not gone into effect.13 After investiga-tion, the Water Division reported that, con-trary to the allegation, the policy had beenin full force and effect, except in regard toovertime wages. The report stated that thepreparation of regulations governing thepayment of overtime on Army vessels op-erating in all parts of the world had re-quired extensive study, but that records had

11 Bill to authorize payment of overtime had beendrafted in OCT in June 1942, but Gross haddecided not to press it then. Memo, Pers Div OCTfor Water Div OCT, 13 Jun 42, OCT 231.8 ArmyVessels; Memo, Pers Div OCT of OSW, 27 Jun42, sub: Draft of Proposed Overtime Legislation,OCT 231.8 Army Vessels; Conf with Corey citedn. 6.

12 Memo, CofS SOS for TAG, 29 Oct 42, AG570.1 (10-29-42); WD Memo W620-4-42, 31Oct 42, sub: WD Labor Policy Governing VesselsOperated by WD, in AG 570.1 (10-29-42); Confwith Corey cited n. 6.

13 Ltr, Vice Pres NMU to USW, 7 Jan 43;Memos, DC of Water Div OCT for ACofT forOpns (Wylie), 14 and 18 Jan 43. All in OCT231.8 Army Vessels (10-31-42).


been kept since 1 November 1942 and anyregulations issued subsequently would bemade retroactive to that date. A ruling ofthe Comptroller General was considerednecessary before overtime could be paidlegally, but Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer,Acting Commanding General, Services ofSupply, gave oral direction that overtimepayments be started without waiting forsuch a ruling. The pertinent regulationswere issued immediately by the Chief ofTransportation.14 The payment of overtimeon Army transports was legalized a fewmonths later by the War Overtime Pay Actof 1943.15

During the remainder of the war the rela-tions of the Transportation Corps and theseamen's unions were on a mutually co-operative basis. There were problems of alocal nature, but no serious threats of strikesor other crises. When the rapid increase inthe merchant fleet, the competition of lesshazardous jobs ashore, and the operationof the Selective Service Act made the taskof obtaining full crews increasingly difficult,the unions, when called upon, provided mento the extent of their ability.16 The relationsbetween the Transportation Corps and theorganizations of licensed marine officers alsowere orderly throughout the war, and therewere no serious disputes or strikes.

In July 1944 a further statement of laborpolicy governing vessels operated by theWar Department was issued to supplement

and amplify the statement of October1942.17 It then was announced that marinepersonnel regulations to implement the ap-proved policies would be issued by the Chiefof Transportation and that thereafter theregular civilian personnel regulations wouldnot apply to seamen unless they specificallyso provided. A volume of Marine PersonnelRegulations, in which was assembled allrules relating to the subject, was publishedconcurrently "for the information and guid-ance of all War Department installationscharged with responsibility for civilian ma-rine personnel engaged on vessels operatedby and under the jurisdiction of the Chiefof Transportation." 18 The policies and pro-cedures were "indorsed to commanding of-ficers outside the continental limits of theUnited States for adoption." It is not pos-sible to review the many provisions of thesevoluminous regulations. Certain sectionswill be referred to, however, in the follow-ing discussion of a number of matters whichwere basic to the Army's plan of operatingvessels.

Although the officers and crews of Armyvessels were civil service employees, practi-cal considerations, particularly during war-time, dictated that certain of the civil serv-ice requirements be relaxed. Such positionswere not subject to the Classification Actof 1923, but were ungraded, so that theChief of Transportation was free to adjustwages and overtime payments to the levelsprevailing in the industry. The Civil ServiceCommission, at first informally and thenformally, agreed to exempt this personnel

14 Conf with Corey cited n. 6; CPRTC 20-80,23 Jan 43, sub: Overtime Compensation for CrewMembers of Transport Class Boats. Overtimeregulations for crew members of harbor andinterisland boats were issued separately on the samedate.

15 PL 49, 78th Cong., Sec. 13, 7 May 43.16 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for DCofT

(Franklin for Dillon) 25 Apr 42; Conf with Coreycited n. 6. Both in OCT HB PE Gen TransportCrews.

17 WD Civ Pers Cir 80, 17 Jul 44, sub: PolicyGoverning Marine Pers Adm.

18 TC Pamphlet 4, 1 Jul 44, sub: Marine PersReg, OCT HB Ind Pers Div Civ Marine Pers. Theregulations covered both transports and small boats;they were subject to frequent revision as conditionschanged.


from the requirements of competitive exam-ination and approval by the commissionprior to appointment.19

In accordance with maritime practice,the Marine Personnel Regulations providedthat crew members sign the ship's articlesat the beginning of each voyage, thus plac-ing themselves under contract for the roundvoyage.20 But provision was made also forindividual contracts with masters, officers,and men of unlicensed ratings who wereengaged for longer periods of duty, as wasnecessary in the case of vessels permanentlyassigned for service within the oversea com-mands. Individual contracts were usedmore extensively in engaging crews forharbor boats and interisland vessels thanfor transports, and therefore they will bediscussed in a later section of this chapter.

Authorized crew strengths, or manningscales, were established by authority of theChief of Transportation.21 They were basedon requests made by the ports of em-barkation or the oversea commands towhich the vessels were assigned, on studyand recommendation by the Water Divi-sion, and on final approval by the Indus-trial Personnel Division.22 Manning scalescould not be changed without the approval

of the Chief of Transportation except in anemergency, in which case the ports and theoversea commands were authorized to takesuch immediate action as might be neces-sary and afterwards obtain review and con-firmation of their action.23 The practice wasto allow the ports of embarkation consider-able latitude in the exercise of this emer-gency power, so that they would not behandicapped in meeting unforeseen require-ments or be delayed in putting transports tosea. The oversea commands required evengreater freedom in manning the vessels per-manently assigned to them, since operatingconditions in the theaters were less stable,but in general they conformed to the prac-tices prescribed in Washington.

Transport personnel was recruited by thecivilian personnel officers of the ports ofembarkation, to meet the requirements ofthe vessels for which the ports were respon-sible or to fill requisitions submitted by theoversea commands and approved by theChief of Transportation. The Transporta-tion Corps endeavored to be self-sufficientin this respect. Recruitments were made inthe open market, and only when thismethod fell short of the desired results wasassistance requested from the Recruitmentand Manning Organization of the WarShipping Administration or the union hir-ing halls. Appointments were made by theport civilian personnel officers, after ap-proval of the appointees by the port waterdivisions which were responsible for the op-eration of the vessels. The employment ofaliens was permissible if they met the tech-nical and security requirements. The policywas to appoint aliens only when citizen

19 Marine Pers Reg, pars. 11.1, 31.2; Hist rpt,Ind Pers Div OCT FY 1945, p. 2, OCT HB IndPers Div Gen.

20 Marine Pers Reg, pars. 32.2, 32.3.21 Marine Pers Reg, par. 11.2; see TC Cir 80-4,

1 Jan 44, sub: Standard Crew Strength for C-2and C-3 Type Freight Vessels. Numbers ofauthorized jobs on transports and hospital shipsare given in lists attached to Memo, Ind Pers Divfor Hist Unit OCT, 16 Sep 44, OCT HB Ind PersDiv Gen.

22 Memo, Civ Pers Br Pers Div OCT for OCTHistorian, 27 Jan 47, OCT HB PE Gen Trans-port Crews; Memo, Water Div OCT for Civ PersBr Pers Div OCT, 27 Jul 43, sub: Manning ScaleUSAT Lakehurst, OCT 000.900 Lakehurst Misc;Memo, NYPE for CofT, 30 Oct 43, OCT 231.8Army Vessels 1943.

23 Marine Pers Reg, par. 11.3; Ltr, C of WaterDiv OCT for CG SPE, 3 Nov 42; Memo, C ofWater Div OCT for C of Contl Div OCT, 20 Jul43, sub: Work Simplification. Both in OCT HBPE Gen Transport Crews.

INSTRUCTION IN NAVIGATION AND MARINE ENGINES given at theMarine Officer Cadet School, St. Petersburg, Fla., to prospective civilian officers in

training for service on Army transports and small boats.


applicants were not available, and in themanning of Army transports at Americanports it was necessary to employ only alimited number of noncitizens.24

In his endeavor to meet manning require-ments through the efforts of his own organi-zation, the Chief of Transportation directedall ports of embarkation to maintain man-ning cadres, or stand-by pools of seamen ofvarious types. The size of each cadre wassubject to approval by the Industrial Per-sonnel Division at headquarters.25 The menwere used to fill vacancies in order thatsailings from U.S. ports might not be de-layed, and also to meet urgent requestsfrom the theaters for marine personnel.During the latter part of the war manyvacancies on the transports were filled withofficers graduated from the Marine OfficerCadet School at St. Petersburg, Fla., andwith licensed and unlicensed personnelwhich had completed courses at the CivilianMarine School at New Orleans. Theseschools were established by the Chief ofTransportation during the summer of 1943primarily to provide personnel for smallboats operated in the theaters, but, afterthe peak of that demand had passed, quali-fied trainees were placed on ocean-goingvessels as required.

Active ocean-going seamen were eligiblefor deferment under the Selective ServiceAct, and this provision applied to seamen onArmy vessels whether they were engaged intransoceanic or coastwise service.26 Requests

for deferment and notices of termination ofemployment were filed with the Recruit-ment and Manning Organization of theWar Shipping Administration, which keptan over-all record of seamen and processedsuch matters with the local selective serviceboards. Civilian personnel officers at thehome ports initiated requests for the defer-ment of seamen and certified as to theirregular employment. Masters and trans-portation agents on the vessels were respon-sible for notifying home ports when deferredseamen deserted, failed to join the ship, orotherwise were separated from the service.Draft deferment and the threat of its can-cellation were effective aids in recruitingand holding personnel for the transports, andthe reduction in the upper age limit formen subject to the draft had an appreci-able though not serious effect on the man-ning problem.

By maintaining stand-by pools and tap-ping all available sources of marine man-power, the Transportation Corps was ableto avoid the necessity of delaying the sail-ing of any Army-operated transport froma U.S. port because of inadequate crew. Inthis the Army was aided by a relaxation ofthe enforcement of the inspection regula-tions in favor of vessels carrying troops andmilitary cargoes, authorized by the Secre-tary of Commerce in December 1941. Pro-motions from the lower grades to meet re-quirements in the higher grades frequentlywere necessary in order to sail ships asscheduled, and some vessels were permittedto sail with less than the prescribed crewcomplements, but in making such depar-tures from the usual practices care was takennot to jeopardize the safety of the ships.27

24 Conf with Corey cited n. 6. Crews providedfor transports and small boats operating within theoversea theaters included a larger percentage ofaliens.

25 Size of cadres for transports authorized as of1 Sep 44 ranged from 25 at Prince Rupert to 257at San Francisco. Memo, Ind Pers Div for HistUnit OCT, 16 Sep 44, OCT HB Ind Pers Div Gen.

26 Marine Pers Reg, par. 81.1-3; Conf withCorey cited n. 6.

27 Gross final rpt, p. 68; Conf with Corey, citedn. 6; Ltr, Secy Commerce to SW, 31 Dec 41, withatchd instructions to collectors of customs, 30 Dec41. Last two in OCT HB PE Gen Transport Crews.


Though some vessels operated by agents ofthe War Shipping Administration were de-layed because of insufficient crews, theywere remarkably few considering the rapidgrowth of the fleet and the over-all man-power shortage and they decreased as theWSA recruiting and training organizationexpanded.28 The accomplishments of thatorganization naturally eased the Army's re-cruiting problem.

While no attempt was made to determinethe rate of personnel turnover for the entireArmy transport fleet, samplings were madeat different times. In January 1943, for ex-ample, the turnover was found to be 32percent per voyage for the vessels con-sidered.29 In September 1944 the availabledata indicated an average turnover of about34 percent.30 These percentage figures rep-resent replacements for particular ships andvoyages and do not take into account thefact that many seamen returned to thesame or another Army vessel after a periodashore. The rate of turnover was not con-sidered excessive, in view of the hazardsinvolved and the long trips made by manyof the ships.

The War Department adopted certainarrangements for the promotion of the wel-fare and the morale of seamen and theirfamilies. The provisions of Public Law 490,77th Congress, relating to continuation ofpay and dependency allotments for missing

or captured personnel were made applicableto seamen on Army vessels.31 In accordancewith the provisions of Public Law 523, 77thCongress, the War Department requestedthe War Shipping Administration to pro-vide insurance under an open policy tocover the death or injury of seamen andthe loss or damage of seamen's personaleffects.32 A clause was inserted in the ship-ping articles for Army vessels, under whichthe seaman or his beneficiary could choosebetween the benefits accruing under theEmployees Compensation Act of 1916 andthose accruing under the new act.33 TheArmy assumed the expense of "maintenanceand cure" during sickness or injury in-curred while in the service of its vessels, inaccordance with a long-standing practiceof the industry.34 The Army supported aMaritime Commission proposal which re-sulted in the passage of Public Law 524,77th Congress, and in accordance with thatlaw it recommended from time to time tothe Merchant Marine Medal Awards Com-

28 Rpt of WSA to the President, The UnitedStates Merchant Marine at War, January 15, 1946,p. 55; "West Coast Ships Lack Men to Sail," TheNew York Times, June 25, 1944; "Thin CrewsDelay Convoy Departures," The Washington Post,August 5, 1944.

29 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for Dir of OpnsOCT, 18 Jan 43, OCT 231.8 Army Vessels(10-31-42). Statement was made in response tounion charge that Army crew replacements hadreached a new high of 70 percent.

30 Memo, Ind Pers Div OCT for Hist Unit OCT,16 Sep 44, OCT HB Ind Pers Div Gen.

31 WD Cir 97, 3 Apr 42; Memo, TAG for CGSOS, 13 May 42, sub: Adm of PL 490, AG 240( 1 - 3 - 4 2 ) Sec I, PL 490; 1st Ind, CofT for TAG,18 May 42, AG 240 (1-3-42) Sec I, PL 490;Marine Pers Reg, pars. 141.1-4.

32 Ltr, SW for WSA, 18 Jul 42, OCT 019.3 PL523; Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 11 Aug 42, sub:Authority to Declare Risks; Memo, CG SOS forCofT, 12 Aug 42. Last two in OCT 019 ArmyVessels.

33 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for C of ContlDiv, OCT, sub: Payment of $5,000 Under Ship-ping Articles; Memo, DC of Water Div OCT forCG BPE, 14 Jun 43, sub: War Risk Benefits;Memo, C of Water Div OCT for CG BPE, 9Oct 43, sub: Payment of Claims. All in OCT 019Army Vessels.

34 Memo, Legal Div OCT for Civ Pers Div OCT,6 Apr 43, sub: Payment of Charges for Hospitaliza-tion of Seamen, OCT 019 Army Vessels; Memo,CofT for CG ASF, 19 Oct 43, OCT 231.8 ArmyVessels; TC Cir 80-11, par. 1-4, 11 Jan 44, sub:Approved Rider for Shipping Articles; MarinePers Reg, par. 131.4.


mittee that the Merchant Marine Distin-guished Service Medal be presented to de-serving seamen.35

When the War Department labor policywhich was announced 31 October 1942 wasbeing formulated, the maritime unionsplaced great stress on the establishment ofgrievance procedures similar to those exist-ing in industry, and the idea had supportin the Civilian Personnel Division of Serv-ices of Supply headquarters.36 The WaterDivision and Civilian Personnel Branch inthe Office of the Chief of Transportationopposed the introduction of such elaborateprocedures on the ground that they wouldinvolve delay in dealing with matters ofcrew discipline and possibly in making ves-sels ready for sailing. Their opposition wassuccessful and a less cumbersome procedurewas set up. Any employee or group of em-ployees who believed they had a grievance,upon termination of the voyage in theUnited States could present the complaintto the commander of the vessel's home port,directly or through representatives. If theport commander's settlement was not satis-factory, the complainant could take thematter up with the Secretary of Warthrough the Chief of Transportation.37

Although the necessity of sailing shipswithout delay resulted in many seamen be-ing signed on who otherwise would not havebeen employed, a strong policy against theemployment of men suspected of subversiveactivity was enforced. Under the Act toExpedite the Strengthening of the NationalDefense, 2 July 1940, the Secretary of War

was authorized to remove "forthwith" fromthe classified civil service of the UnitedStates any employee in the military estab-lishment who after thorough investigationhad been found guilty of conduct inimicalto the public interest and the defense pro-gram. The commanding officer of the sta-tion by which a suspected individual wasemployed was authorized to suspend himduring the investigation if his presence wasbelieved to jeopardize the security of thestation.38 The statement of War Depart-ment labor policy governing vessels affirmedthe applicability of these provisions to sea-men. Under direction of the Chief of Trans-portation the commanders of ports of em-barkation not only were required to refuseto employ persons suspected of subversiveactivities and to suspend those already em-ployed on Army-operated vessels, but alsoto cause such persons to be removed fromWar Shipping Administration vessels whichwere allocated to the Army and berthed atArmy piers. In order that prompt and fairreview of suspensions might be afforded atthe ports, the port commanders were di-rected to designate reviewing officers en-tirely independent of the officers whose dutyit was to initiate suspension actions.39 Ac-

35 Memo, SW for Bureau of Budget, 23 Feb 42,AG 334.8 U.S. Mar Com (2-9-42) ; Memo, AdmDiv OCT for Chm of MMMAC, 23 Apr 43, OCT230.72 Merchant Marine DSM; Memo, DC ofWater Div OCT for Exec Secy MMMAC, 19 Jun43, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Crews.

36 Conf with Corey, cited n. 6.37 WD Memo W620-4-42, par. 3f2, 31 Oct 42.

38 PL 703, 76th Cong.; Memo, TAG for CG'sAAF, AGF, SOS, etc., 31 May 42, AG 230(5-28-42).

39 Memo, CofT for port Comdrs, 6 Nov 42, sub:Removal of Suspected Subversives, OCT 231.8Gen. WSA vessels were included in this directivedespite contention of Navy that authority to re-move subversives from such vessels belonged ex-clusively to Coast Guard Captain of the Port,and in June 1943 agreement between CofT andCommandant of USCG recognized authority of TCover WSA vessels. Memo, CofT for Port Int OffNYPE, 21 Aug 42; 1st Ind, ACofS G-2 NYPE toC of Int Div OCT, 24 Aug 42; 3d Ind, ACofSG-2 WD to CofT, 30 Sep 42. All in OCT 230.8Gen. See also Memo, C of Legal Div OCT for Intand Security Div OCT, par. 7, 23 Aug 43, OCT231.8 Gen.


tions against suspected subversives werebased chiefly on reports of the Military In-telligence Service of the Army but also oninformation obtained from the U.S. CoastGuard and the British Security Coordina-tion under exchange arrangements.40

Crew discipline was a matter of constantconcern to the Army, because of the casualtypes of seamen which had to be employed,the relative inexperience of many mastersand mates, and the unusual conditions en-countered in wartime. The problem wasparticularly acute at those oversea portswhere seamen were required to assist inloading and unloading cargo or to performother unusual tasks because of the lack oflocal longshoremen or equipment.41 Atmany such ports civil courts were non-existent or ineffective. Accordingly in Octo-ber 1942 the commanders of theaters ofoperations, defense commands, service com-mands, and ports of embarkation were in-formed that the military tribunals of theUnited States had jurisdiction over thecrews of merchant vessels—not only Armytransports but other American and foreignvessels—operating within a base or militaryarea or carrying matériel or personnel inconnection with U.S. military operations.These commanders were instructed to exer-cise necessary authority whenever militaryconsiderations required.42 Clarification of

the extent to which this authority should beexercised was necessary as the result of in-quiries from the War Shipping Administra-tion and the British Government. The WarDepartment's position was that while mili-tary commanders had court-martial juris-diction over merchant seamen, such juris-diction should not be invoked when civiltribunals were available in which the mili-tary commanders had confidence, andwhich had the authority and the disposi-tion to punish offenders promptly and ade-quately.43

A word is necessary regarding the shiptransportation agent, who was in charge ofthe administrative department on Armytransports, since his functions varied some-what from those of the purser on commer-cial vessels. The prewar regulation providedthat home port commanders should assignto each vessel a transport quartermaster(commissioned officer), or a quartermasteragent (civilian). Under the TransportationCorps the designations were changed totransportation officer and transportationagent, and since as the war progressed itbecame increasingly difficult to assign offi-cers, the regulation eventually was revisedto provide only for transportation agents.44

The ship transportation agent was chargedwith the care and issue of supplies, the careand disbursement of funds, the performance

40 Misc Ltr 34, CofT for CO's of PE's, 27 Jan45, OCT 231.8 Gen; Memo, MID WD, 21 Jul 42,MID 231.82; British List of Suspected Seamen,April 1942. Last two in OCT 231.8 Jan 42-Jun 43.

41 Memo, CofT for CofS ASF, 26 Jun 43, OCT250.401 Crews; Memo, C of Int Div OCT forLegal Div OCT, 17 Oct 42, OCT 560.1 ArmyVessels.

42 Memo, by order of SW, 9 Oct 42, WD 250.01(10-8-42), sub: Authority of Commanders andJurisdiction of Military Tribunals with respect toCrews of Merchant Vessels, OCT 250.401 Crews;WD Cir 164, Sec. I, 19 Jul 43; WD Cir 175, Sec.IV, 30 Jul 43.

43 Ltr, WSA to ASW, 9 Oct 42; Summary byCofT, 19 May 44; Ltr, USW to WSA, 22 May 44.All in OCT 250.401 Crews. Extensive correspond-ence with British is in file OPD 250.4 Great Britainand AG 250.4 (6 Oct 42) . For American seamen'sattitude see Memo, Col E. S. Greenbaum for USW,27 Oct 42, in OCT HB Gross Crews; Ltr, ChmNati Maritime Union's Ships Com to JAG, 12Apr 44, OCT 250.401 Crews; Memo, JAG forCofT, 19 May 44, OCT 250.401 Crews; WDPamphlet 27-5, Feb 45, sub: Mil Jurisdiction overMerchant Seamen.

44 AR 30-1120, 23 Jul 32; AR 55-320, 11 Nov44, sub: Ship Trans Agent.


of the duties of baggage-master and civilianpersonnel officer for the ship, and the prep-aration of papers and reports required bylaw or by Transportation Corps regula-tions.45 He was responsible to the masterand the home port commander in all mat-ters except funds, for which he accounteddirectly to the Fiscal Director of the ArmyService Forces. On cargo vessels the trans-portation agent himself usually handled allthe work of the administrative department,but on troop transports he had as many assix assistants.46

Maintenance and Voyage Repairs

Army-owned vessels, being public vesselsused for a public purpose, were not subjectto the navigation and inspection laws, andduring peacetime they were permitted tofall below the standards of maintenancenecessary to obtain certificates of inspec-tion.47 Funds were obtained late in 1940 torecondition the transports then in service,and thereafter in the interest of efficiencyand safety it was the policy of The Quarter-master General, and later of the Chief ofTransportation, to comply with the vesselinspection laws and regulations to the ex-tent that military considerations would per-mit.48 As regards vessels serving the Army

but not exempt from the navigation andinspection laws, arrangements for the issu-ance of waivers were made, pursuant toSection 501 of the Second War Powers Act,1942, which in effect left to the Army thefinal decision as to when such waiversshould be issued.49 In accordance with thesearrangements, the Army port commanderswere authorized to file requests for waiverswith the U.S. Coast Guard, and, in case theinitial request should be denied, to file astatement that the military urgency out-weighed the marine hazard involved, whichwas tantamount to a directive that thewaiver be issued.50 The Army agreed not tooverride Coast Guard denial of waiveruntil a conscientious effort to reach agree-ment had been made by officers of the twoagencies.51

During the war standards for the main-tenance of ocean-going vessels to preventexcessive deterioration, promote economicaloperation, and observe safety requirementswere defined in considerable detail in Armyand Transportation Corps regulations.52

Primary responsibility for the enforcementof maintenance standards on vessels as-signed to ports of embarkation in the zoneof interior rested with the superintendents

45 FM 55-105, par. 47, 25 Sep 44, sub: WaterTrans: Ocean-Going Vessels.

46 Conf, author with John J. Bratton, 4 Mar 47,OCT HB PE Gen Transport Crews. During thewar Bratton was a ship transportation agent andlater an employee of Water Division, OCT. Memo,Civ Pers Div OCT for Water Div OCT, 24 Oct42, OCT 231.8 Army Vessels 1942, gives crewstrength in all departments.

47 Memo, Cordiner for Dillon, 12 May 41, OCTHB OQMG Water Trans Br. For definition ofpublic vessel see USCG Navigation and Vessel InspCir 41, 21 Sep 43, OCT HB PE Gen TransportInsp.

48 TC Cir 80-1, par. 1, 1 Jan 44.

49 Regarding application of navigation and in-spection laws to such vessels, see Memo, JAG forCofT, 4 Aug 43, sub: Application of Insp Lawsto Privately Owned Vessels Employed by WD,OCT 333.7 Prevoyage Insp of Vessels.

50 OCT Cir 114, 14 Sep 43, sub: Waiver of Navand Vessel Insp Laws; OCT Cir 174, 22 Dec 43.

51 TC Cir 80-20, 29 Mar 45, sub: Army VesselInsp. Question of seaworthiness involved in waiverarrangements included adequacy of crews as wellas physical condition and equipment of vessels. SeeMemo, Comdt USCG for district Coast Guardofficers, 14 Dec 42, sub: Presailing Insp, OCT333.7 Prevoyage Insp of Vessels.

52 AR 55-505, 1 Sep 42; TC Cir 80-2, 1 Jan44; Supp. 1, 3 Apr 44; Supp. 2, 14 Apr 44; Supp.3, 9 Jun 44.


of the Water Divisions at the ports. Shortagesof labor and material, and the necessity ofdispatching vessels on designated convoysailing dates, often prevented full compli-ance with the regulations. Important de-partures from the maintenance routine,such as delay in dry-docking a vessel beyondthe permissible period, required the ap-proval of the Chief of Transportation. Thesuperintendents were required to establishboards of competent technical inspectors tomake complete and thorough inspections ofall compartments, machinery, equipment,and underwater parts at least once a year,independent of any inspections conductedby the Coast Guard. The port commanderswere required to have an adequate, thoughnaturally less thorough, inspection madeprior to the sailing of each Army-operatedtransport and of other troop-carrying shipsserving the Army, and to submit a copy ofthe inspection report to the Chief of Trans-portation.53

General Gross, while anxious to avoiddelayed sailings, was insistent on the ob-servance of all safety measures. He placedspecial emphasis on thorough prevoyage in-spection of troop-carrying vessels andprompt action to correct any deficiencies,and he impressed on the port commandersthat responsibility for the safe carriage oftroops was primarily theirs.54

The performance of maintenance and re-pair work was carefully controlled. Themaster, chief engineer, and chief steward ofeach vessel were required to prepare requisi-

tions for their respective departments, whichthey submitted to the superintendent of theWater Division upon arrival at the homeport. The superintendent or his representa-tive inspected the proposed work and de-cided which jobs should be done during thecurrent stay in port, and whether theyshould be done by the crew, the dock force,or at a contractor's plant.55 Each port ofembarkation had a marine repair shopwhich functioned under the superintendentof the Water Division and performed shiprepairs to the extent of its capacity. Becauseof the backlog of work at contractors' yards,the Army shops were called on for a widevariety of work and their facilities andequipment were expanded greatly duringthe war.56 At the same time an effort wasmade to restrict the work of the Army shopsas much as possible to normal voyage re-pairs and not to undertake larger jobs whencommercial yards could perform them. Anexplicit rule was given for differentiatingbetween "normal or voyage repairs" and"alterations and major repairs." 57 Ports ofembarkation were authorized to accomplishthe former at their own discretion but werenot permitted to undertake the latter typeof work without approval of the Office ofthe Chief of Transportation. Alterations andmajor repairs to Army and War ShippingAdministration vessels to make them moresuitable for military service constituted avery important phase of TransportationCorps' wartime activity and will be dis-cussed more fully in a subsequent chapter.

53 TC Cir 50-20, rev., 15 Jun 44, sub: PrevoyageVessel Insp Rpt.

54 Memos for port Comdrs, 23 Sep 42, and 17Nov 42; Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 11 Nov 42,sub: Ports of Emb. All in OCT 333.7 PrevoyageInsp of Vessels.

55 AR 55-505, par. 4, 1 Sep 42.56 Remarks, Brig Gen Robt H. Wylie at Port and

Zone Comdrs Conf, Omaha, Sep 1945, p. 49, OCTHB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

57 TC Pamphlet 34, Sec. I, 1 Apr 45, sub: Re-pairs and Alterations to Vessels, OCT HB WaterDiv Ship Repair and Conv.


Supplies for Vessels

The method of handling supplies onArmy transports was found to be loose andinefficient by the chief of The Quarter-master General's Transportation Division,who investigated the matter during thesummer of 1940.58 That official took stepsto correct the situation, but ten months laterhe was able to report only limited progress.The reason given for the delay was that theArmy Transport Service superintendents,whom he had charged with finding waysand means of effecting improvement, werehampered by "the press of other business."A likely further reason may be found in thefact that although the regulations statedthat the transport quartermasters, who atthat time had charge of supply matters onthe vessels, were representatives of the ATSsuperintendents, the inspection of the trans-port quartermasters' property and financialaccounts at the end of each voyage was aresponsibility of the finance officers of thecorps areas. This inspection responsibilitywas transferred to the port commanders inMarch 1942.59 The Water Division in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation gavethe subject continuous attention, and otherimprovements in the system were effectedgradually.

During the war the handling of supplieson an Army vessel, except medical and salescommissary supplies, was a function of theship transportation agent, who was assignedby and was responsible to the commander ofthe vessel's home port.60 He prepared requi-

sitions based on requests made by the chiefsof the several ship departments, submittedthem for the approval of the master in thecase of supplies required for the operationof the vessel and for the approval of thetransport commander in the case of sup-plies required for the permanent militarystaff of the vessel, and finally submitted theapproved requisitions to the port com-mander on arrival. He arranged for all sup-plies to be checked on and off the vessel andinvestigated shortages. He kept simple stockrecord cards, on a prescribed War Depart-ment form, for each item of supply forwhich he was responsible, except subsistencesupplies for which more detailed accountingwas required.61 The commander of the ves-sel's home port was required to have fre-quent inspections made to establish that thetransportation agent's records reflected thetrue status of the stock and that there hadbeen no waste or misuse of governmentproperty. The Chief of Transportation wasrequired to issue "standard tables of allow-ances" to govern the storing of vessels.

In the enforcement of economy in thesupply of Army transports, emphasis wasplaced on the use of standard stocks and therestriction of local purchases to the practi-cal minimum. Standard stocks were definedas those listed in the stock catalogs of theseveral technical services. "Special andfancy equipment and supplies" were not tobe used, and when standard stocks were notavailable the nearest practical substituteswere to be found. Since subsistence storesoffered an exceptionally wide range ofchoice, purchases were limited to items andqualities listed by the Chief of Transporta-tion. The list stated that expensive cuts of

58 Memo, Cordiner for Dillon, 12 May 41, par.3e, OCT HB OQMG Water Trans Br.

59 AR 30-1250, 22 May 31, sub: Supplies forTransports; Memo, TAG for CG's of Corps Areasand PE's, 5 Mar 42, AG 333.7 (2-20-42) Inspof Vessels.

60 AR 55-320, 11 Nov 44, sub: Ship TransAgent.

61 AR 35-6580, 6 Jun 42, sub: Accounting forSubsistence; AR 55-450, 11 Nov 44, pars. 3, 4, 7,9, 10, sub: Supplies on Transports.


meats were to be omitted; good but not deluxe qualities of canned goods were to beused; smaller quantities than those specifiedfor the several items were to be purchasedonly when unavoidable. Local purchases ofstandard or nonstandard items by shiptransportation agents or by ports of em-barkation were restricted to cases of emer-gency.62

Each technical service was responsiblefor the procurement, storage, and issue ofstandard items peculiar to it for use onArmy transports, and the Chief of Trans-portation was directed not to procure, store,or issue the standard items of other techni-cal services.63 Requirements of nonstandarditems were determined by the Transporta-tion Corps, which was responsible also fortheir storage and issue, but such items wereprocured by the technical services respon-sible for the purchase of similar standarditems. As regards items procured by theTransportation Corps, the Water Divisionfurnished the Director of Supply with theinformation necessary to enable him tostockpile what would be needed for thesupply, maintenance, repair, and conversionof vessels.

Up to April 1945 the Water Division,which was charged with preparing stand-ard tables of allowances, had not succeededin doing so because of the many types ofvessels involved and the many differentmissions which they performed.64 Its repre-

sentative, who completed an investigation atthe New York Port of Embarkation inApril, reported that although the stockrecords on the vessels were found in goodorder so far as the receipt and disburse-ment of supplies were concerned and theports had endeavored to edit requisitionsfrom the ships in order to control the typesand quantities of supplies furnished, nosatisfactory control was possible withouttables of allowances from which to work.The Chief of Transportation then issueddetailed instructions for the establishmentof such tables.65 They were to be based onlists prepared initially by the heads of theseveral ship departments and reviewedsuccessively by the ship transportationagents, the ports of embarkation, and theOffice of the Chief of Transportation. Aftertables of allowances had been established,the port commanders were to be responsiblefor keeping them current.

In a further effort to improve the pro-cedures and rules, the Chief of Transporta-tion established a Committee on Standardi-zation for Army Vessels, consisting ofrepresentatives of the Director of Supply,the Water Division, and the Port and FieldAgencies Division.66 At its first meeting thecommittee decided that in addition to tablesof allowances for individual transports andhospital ships, a port supply catalog, in-cluding all items contained in the tables ofallowances, was desirable. Meetings wereheld with the supply and technical servicerepresentatives of the ports of embarkationto obtain information and make plans forthe furtherance of this work.67 Tables of

62 OCT Cir 133, 19 Oct 43, sub: Supplies forArmy Transports; OCT Cir 80-16, 4 Apr 44, sub:Vessels—Supplies; WD Cir 310, Sec. VII, 20 Jul44; AR 55-450, par. 2, 11 Nov 44.

6 3ASF Cir 387, Sec. VI, 25 Nov 44; TC Cir5-21, 6 Dec 44, sub: Supply Responsibility; TCCir 150-29, 6 Jan 45, sub: Supplies for ArmyVessels.

64 Rpt, Maj K. N. Sachs to Acting Dir of OpnsOCT, 2 Apr 45, extracts in OCT HB PE GenTransport Equip and Supplies.

65 OCT Misc Ltr 174, 24 May 45, sub: T/AArmy Transports.

66 OCT Office Order 5-39, 2 Jun 45.67 Com Mtg, 19 Jun 45: Mtgs, 26-27 Jun 45, at

NYPE, and 13-14 Jul 45, at SFPE. All in OCTHB PE Gen Transport Equip and Supplies.


allowances for individual vessels were ap-proved as rapidly as recommendations fromthe vessels could be obtained and the pre-scribed checking completed. The approvedlists of allowances, as they eventually weredesignated, were in two parts, one partcovering items common to all vessels andthe other covering items peculiar to aspecific vessel or type of vessel. Though veryfew lists were approved prior to V-J Dayand such lists were considered only tenta-tive, the committee continued its work andeventually approved lists of allowances forall vessels under Army operation. Portsupply catalogs were not prepared, since itwas found that the approved lists of allow-ances, giving the correct descriptions ofitems, the stock numbers, and the issuingagencies, in addition to the quantities tobe stored by the respective vessels, obviatedthe need for such catalogs.68

Although considerable progress wasmade, a complete system for controllingthe storing of transports was not achievedduring the war. A number of reasons maybe cited. That task naturally was given alower priority than others which had directbearing on the prompt and safe movementof troops and supplies. There was a scar-city of men with sufficient technicalknowledge to formulate a practical system,and their services were in great demand inother branches of marine activity. Theshortages which existed in many branchesof Army supply frequently placed port andtransport officers on their own resources tocomplete the storing of vessels before sail-ing time and limited the effectiveness ofthe effort to enforce standardization. In

June 1945 the technical services at theNew York Port of Embarkation estimatedthat 8,050 different nonstandard itemswere being furnished Army vessels, com-pared with 4,500 standard items. Estimatesprepared a few weeks later indicated that6,200 nonstandard and 15,238 standarditems were being supplied at San Francisco,and that 10,300 nonstandard and 8,268standard items were being furnished atSeattle.69 These figures represent onlyrough computations, as the wide variationsbetween the ports indicate, but they shownevertheless that the ports had to supply avery large number of nonstandard itemsright up to the end of the war.

Food Service on Transports and HospitalShips

The messes on Army troopships were thesubject of careful study, along with themesses at port staging areas. The problemof maintaining proper standards on theships was accentuated by the abnormalnumber of passengers carried and the limi-tation on the expansion of galleys and messquarters. Under Army regulations, theship's chief steward was charged with super-vising the preparation and serving of mealsand with assuring that the stores used weregood in quality and adequate in quantity.The superintendent of the Army TransportService (later called Water Division) atthe ship's home port was directed to "ingeneral terms prescribe the bills of fare"on transports; the commanding officer oftroops (later called transport commander)was directed to see that suitable and propermeals were provided for the variouspassenger messes; the transport surgeon was68 Conf, author with Philip E. King, Water Div

OCT, 30 Jan 48, OCT HB PE Gen TransportEquip and Supplies. King worked in close collab-oration with the committee from its inception. 69 Mtgs at NYPE and SFPE cited n. 67.


responsible for hospital messes on transportsand hospital ships.70

In July 1943 Army Service Forces head-quarters launched a program for the im-provement of the food service at Class Iand IV installations, made the commandinggenerals of the service commands respon-sible for the execution of the program, anddesignated The Quartermaster General togive the activity staff supervision.71 Theplan called for the appointment of a direc-tor of food service in each service commandand a food service supervisor at each in-stallation, including the ports of embarka-tion. The supervisory functions which theArmy Transport Service superintendentslong had exercised over transport messesoverlapped the functions committed to thenew food service supervisors assigned to theports, a fact which led to some confusion.Late in August 1945, in order to clarify thesituation, the Chief of Transportation de-fined in detail the duties assigned to thefood service supervisors, the port stewards,the transport commanders, and the ships'chief stewards.72 His directive stated thatthe port steward would conduct a foodservice and supervise all phases of feedingon the vessels on behalf of the superintend-ent of the Water Division, but it also placedthe port stewards under the staff supervisionof the food service supervisor. The sourceof the difficulty was not thus removed, andwhile at most ports the officers involvedworked harmoniously toward a commongoal, at one important port the dual re-sponsibility of the superintendent of Water

Division and the food service supervisorled to considerable friction.73

During the greater part of the war therewas a lack of clarity in the regulations re-garding the respective duties of TheQuartermaster General, The Surgeon Gen-eral, and the Chief of Transportation inconnection with food service on transportsand hospital ships. Toward the close ofhostilities War Department and ArmyService Forces directives were issued toclarify this situation.74 The ASF directivestated that The Quartermaster General wasresponsible for formulating policies regard-ing the supervision, inspection, organiza-tion, and operation of facilities pertinent tofood service on vessels, except hospitalships; The Surgeon General had a similarresponsibility in regard to the feeding ofpatients on hospital ships. The directiveapplied not only to Army transports butto other troopships in Army service. TheChief of Transportation was directed tosupervise the conduct and operation offood service activities on all such vessels,in accordance with the policies, methods,and standards prescribed by The Quarter-master General and The Surgeon General.

The Chief of Transportation believedthat the food service on ships and at thestaging areas deserved special considerationas an important factor in maintainingmorale among troops destined overseas.Accordingly, he arranged with The Quar-termaster General early in 1944 for thetransfer of an experienced food serviceofficer to the Transportation Corps to act

70 AR 55-420, pars. 6 and 8, 1 Sep 42, sub:Transport and Harbor Boat Messes; AR 55-345,par. 2b, 11 Nov 44, sub: Steward's Dept.

71 ASF Cir 45, 1 Jul 43.72 TC Cir 80-24, 31 Aug 45, sub: Food Service

Programs Aboard Army Transports, etc.

73 Conf, author with Harold H. Beattie, 30 Jan48, OCT HB Port and Field Agencies Div MessAdviser.

74 WD Cir 149, Sec. IV, 21 May 45; ASF Cir235, Pt. 1, par. 5, 22 Jun 45.


as mess adviser.75 That officer found thatthe staging areas, which at that period wereprocessing large numbers of troops, con-sumed all of the time he was able to devoteto inspections. Consequently he was givenan assistant in August 1944, whose chiefduty was to inspect transport messes, reportdeficiencies to the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, and recommend improve-ments.

Armament and Gun Crews

Although the question of guns and guncrews for Army vessels had been before theWar Department and the Navy since No-vember 1940, adequate preparation hadnot been made when the Japanese attackedPearl Harbor.76 Consequently, in the earlyweeks of the war considerable confusion at-tended both the installation of armamentand the provision of gun crews, or armedguards as the Navy called them. Initially itwas understood that the Navy would pro-vide the armament and that the Armywould provide detachments from the CoastArtillery Corps to man the guns.77 It de-veloped that the Navy, which was respon-sible for arming privately owned Americanmerchant vessels and which also armednumerous foreign vessels, was short ofequipment, and the Army undertook tomake up the deficit so far as its own trans-

ports were concerned.78 Army sources wereunable to furnish the prescribed equipmentin many instances and some vessels werenot capable structurally of taking normalarmament; therefore considerable impro-visation was necessary in order that shipsmight sail without delay and with a reason-able degree of protection. The Western De-fense Command reported that the necessityof providing armament for vessels sailingfrom the Pacific coast had created a seriousshortage of weapons in that command.79

In the midst of the confusion regardingthe installation of armament, the Navy,without warning to the Army, decided toman the guns which the Navy had installedon Army vessels, with the result that bothArmy and Navy gun crews were assignedto certain ships.80 The Army requested thatthe Navy order be rescinded and that Navycrews be withdrawn pending further con-sideration of the matter. The Navy Depart-ment complied but instructed its personnelat the ports that in the future Navy armedguards would be furnished wherever Navyguns were installed. At San Francisco,where the situation was particularly acute,the Army port commander found it expe-dient to place mixed gun crews on somevessels. G-4 directed that this practice be

75 Maj. Edward O. Matthews was transferred 17Jan 44 and attached to the Port and Field AgenciesDiv OCT.

76 Ltr, Acting SN for SW, 13 Nov 40; 2d IndQMG, 25 Nov 40; Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofSUSA, 30 Nov 40; Memo, SW for SN, 3 Dec 40,sub: Degaussing and Arming Army Transports. Allin AG 573.9 (11-13-40).

77 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for Port Comdrs,19 Dec 41, sub: Arming Transports and CharteredVessels, G-4/29717-50; Memo, C of Trans Br G-4for CG SFPE, 7 Jan 42, G-4/29717-51.

78 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for ACofS G-4, 22Dec 41, OCT HB Gross Day File; Ltr, SN to Chmof Mar Com, 3 Feb 42, sub: Arming ForeignVessels, G-4/29717-50. See Morison, The Battleof the Atlantic, App. III, for statistics of U.S. andforeign vessels armed.

79 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CG's NYPE and SFPE,23 Dec 41, sub: Army Transports; Memo, CGWDC for CG GHQ, 31 Jan 42, sub: Armamentfor Ships; Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for CGSFPE, 17 Feb 42. All in G-4/29717-50.

80 Memo, C of Trans Br G-4 for CG SFPE, 8Jan 42, sub: Gun Crews, G-4/29717-51; Memo,CofS USA for CNO (Stark), 10 Jan 42,G-4/29717-51; Telg, Nav Dept to Naval Dists,etc., 17 Jan 42, OCT HB Wylie Armament.


discontinued; that insofar as the Navy couldprovide full crews it should be permittedto do so but that otherwise the Army shouldprovide full crews.81

In July 1942 the Army, which by thenhad placed gun crews on more than sev-enty vessels, inquired as to the possibilityof the Navy's assuming the entire respon-sibility and was informed that since theshortage of naval armed guards had beenrelieved, such guards could be provided forall Army transports. The War Departmentthen directed that the Coast Artillery de-tachments be replaced by Navy personnelas rapidly as this could be accomplished.82

The relationship between the navalarmed guards and the civilian officers onArmy transports caused some concern. InDecember 1942 the commander of the SanFrancisco Port of Embarkation reportedthat this relationship long had been a matterof controversy, with resulting lack of disci-pline. In reply the Chief of Transportationpointed out that their respective jurisdic-tions were adequately defined in the regula-tions.83 He indicated that the Navy regula-tion, which was incorporated by referencein a recently issued Army Regulation (AR55-330, paragraph 5, 1 December 1942),made the commander of the armed guardsubject to the orders of the master in allmatters pertaining to the internal organiza-tion of the ship, including matters of con-

duct, dress, and leave. The military disci-pline of the armed guard, on the otherhand, was to be administered by its com-mander, and the members of the armedguard were not to be required to performany duties except their military duties. TheChief of Transportation also explained thatthe commanding officer of troops, who hadbeen mentioned in the San Francisco report,had no authority whatsoever over the armedguard, and stated that it was not consideredadvisable to suggest such an arrangement tothe Navy. He further stated that the NavyDepartment informally had recognized that,in view of the paramount position of themaster affecting the internal organizationand safety of the ship, in an extreme caseof disobedience on the part of the com-mander or members of the armed guardthe master might be justified in taking ac-tion on the spot to the extent of placing therecalcitrants in confinement.

Other reports regarding jurisdictionaland disciplinary disputes arising betweenofficers of the civilian crews and the navalarmed guards were received by the Chiefof Transportation, but they were not nu-merous. On the other hand, the personal re-lationships between civilian seamen and theenlisted men of the naval armed guardsfrequently were troubled. During the earlypart of the war, according to a Navy source,30 percent of the armed guard officers re-ported friction.84 The dissimilar responsi-bilities of these groups, the disparity in therates of compensation, and the differingconceptions of their responsibilities towardthe ships on which they were employed werebasic causes of antagonism. Nevertheless,as time went on and civilian and naval per-sonnel became accustomed to working sideby side the relationship improved.

81 Memo, CG SFPE for C of Trans Br G-4, 21Jan 42, sub: Arming Vessels; Memo, C of TransBr G-4 for CG SFPE, 4 Feb 42. Both inG-4/29717-51.

82 Memo, Asst Opns Off OCT for CofT, 9 Jul42; Memo, ACofS for Opns SOS for VCNO USN,30 Jul 42; Memo, OCNO for ACofS for Opns SOS,11 Aug 42; Memo, TAG for CofT, 4 Sep 42. Allin OCT 322 CA Trans Det.

83 Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 21 Dec 42; Memo,CofT for CG SFPE, 24 Feb 43. Both in OCT 560.1Army Vessels.

84 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 299.

OPERATION OF THE ARMY'S LARGE AND SMALL VESSEES 247

Radio Service and Radar

Under the regulations the radio operatorson the Army's ocean-going vessels might beeither enlisted men assigned by the SignalCorps or commercial operators employed bythe home port commanders.85 But the regu-lations also provided that instructions re-garding the use of radio equipment aboardthe transports would be issued by the Chiefof Naval Operations, and a Navy directivepromulgated soon after our entry into thewar provided for the assignment of Navycommunication liaison groups.86 Thesegroups normally would consist of a com-missioned officer, three radiomen, and threesignalmen. In view of the scarcity of trainednaval radio personnel, however, it was pro-vided that when Signal Corps or commer-cial operators were retained, they would becounted as members of the communicationliaison groups, provided at least one Navyradioman was assigned to each transport.

Although this Navy directive requiredonly that one Navy radioman be installedon each Army vessel, reports from SanFrancisco and Seattle disclosed that theTwelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districtswere assigning more.87 Because of limitedaccommodations on the vessels and thenumber of naval personnel assigned, it wasnecessary sometimes to remove the SignalCorps personnel. The Army ports of em-barkation indicated that they had found the

Signal Corps operators fully competent tohandle radio communications according toNavy requirements and that the assign-ment of naval operators was a waste ofmanpower. After consideration of thesearguments, the Chief Signal Officer andthe Chief of Transportation concurred inthe view that, since Navy radio procedurewas used on Army transports and only Navyradio stations were authorized to communi-cate with the transports, it was desirablethat Navy radiomen be carried and thatthey be permitted to stand watch.88 Never-theless, a revision of the Navy directive is-sued soon thereafter explicitly stated thatNavy personnel would be assigned only tocomplete communication personnel com-plements, not to replace Signal Corps andcommercial operators.89

The Navy directive contemplated that,as it became available, naval communica-tion personnel would be placed not only onArmy vessels but on all U.S. merchant ves-sels of 1,000 gross tons or more. This didnot eventuate, however, and in May 1944a new plan was agreed on by the Navy, theArmy, and the War Shipping Administra-tion.90 It provided that "the present prac-tice" of assigning Army radio technicians toArmy transports would be continued. WSAvessels carrying 250 or more troops were tobe assigned either Army or Navy radiomen,according to the service to which the vesselswere allocated when the assignments were

85 AR 30-1160, Ch. 2, 30 Nov 39; AR 55-360,17 Nov. 42.

86 Memo, CNO for Naval Dists, etc., 24 Jan 42,sub: Com Liaison Groups—U.S. Flag MerchantVessels and U.S. Army Transport Vessels, OCT221 Army Vessels.

87 Msg, Thirteenth Naval Dist to VCNO, 4 Sep42; Memo, Port Dir Thirteenth Naval Dist forVCNO, 19 Nov 42; Memo, CG SFPE for CSigOSOS (through CofT), 21 Dec 42; Memo, PortSig Off SPE for CSigO SOS, 6 Feb 43. All in OCT221 Army Vessels.

88 1st Ind, CSigO for CG SOS, 21 Dec 42;Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 9 Mar 43 (similarletters to other ports) ; 4th Ind, CSigO SOS forCofT, 10 Mar 43. All in OCT 221 Army Vessels.

89 Memo, VCNO for Dir BuPers and Naval Dists,30 Mar 43, sub: Com Liaison Pers, OCT 221 ArmyVessels.

90 Memo, CNO for Naval Dists, 6 May 44, AG220.3 (22 May 44 ) ; WD Memo W55-44, 23Jun 44, sub: Assignment of U.S. Army RadioTechnicians or Navy Radiomen.


made, and Army and Navy personnel werenot to be assigned to the same vessels at thesame time. All WSA cargo vessels were tobe assigned commercial radio operators, re-gardless of their allocation. The Navy direc-tive on this subject stated that when com-mercial operators were not available Navyoperators would be assigned to cargo ships;it also stipulated that Navy radio personnelmight be assigned to any vessel at the dis-cretion of the Chief of Naval Operations.

In June 1943 it was arranged that emer-gency radio rooms would be installed on thetroop transports which were being providedfor Army use by new construction and bythe conversion of existing cargo vessels.91

The emergency rooms were located in theafter parts of the ships within the hulls,where they would be least subject to dam-age by enemy action. The radio equipmentinstalled in them did not have the rangerequired for the regular radio installationson transports but was adequate for emer-gency purposes. These rooms were intendedfor use only when the regular communica-tions equipment was out of service.

Although earlier efforts had been madeto have Army troop transports providedwith radar equipment for aiding navigation,this end was not accomplished until 1945,and installations had been made on only afew of the transports when the war ended.The provision of seaborne radar equipmentrested entirely with the Navy, for under a1942 agreement between the Army and theNavy the Signal Corps confined its activ-ities to air and ground equipment. In April1943 the Transportation Corps approachedthe Navy on this subject and was informed

that there was not enough radar equipmentto permit installation on Army transports.92

A further request was made in November1943, with the same result. In March 1944the Navy announced that its policy did notpermit the installation of radar in merchantvessels, because operation by civilian crewswould jeopardize security on equipmentwhich was believed to be superior to that ofthe enemy and there was not enough quali-fied naval personnel to permit its use for thispurpose; also that materials, facilities, andmanpower were inadequate to meet themilitary requirements.93

In September 1944, after conversationswith Navy representatives, the Chief ofTransportation furnished the Navy with alist of Army troop transports, requested thatradar be installed as soon as it became avail-able, and stated that military operatorswould be assigned to the vessels with theunderstanding that the Navy would pro-vide instruction in the handling of radar tothose requiring it. At the same time he pro-vided the Navy with a list of War ShippingAdministration troopships allocated to theArmy, for which radar equipment was de-sired. But the Navy still was unwilling tocommit itself to this proposal, and in statingits position stressed the security aspect andthe fact that on Navy ships radar was partof the armament, its use as a navigationalinstrument being incidental.94

In January 1945 the Navy announced aplan to establish pools of radar equipment

91 Memo, OCT for U.S. Secy CGS, 10 Jun 43,sub: Conversion of Transports, OCT 564 ArmyVessels; Conf, author with Geo. A. Anthony, Main-tenance and Repair Br OCT, 5 Aug 48, OCT HBPE Gen Transport Radio Sv.

92 Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 8 Apr 43, sub:Radar, USAT James A. Parker, OCT 240-900James A. Parker.

93 Memo, VCNO for Deputy Dir ODT, withcopies to WD, WSA, etc., 29 Mar 44, OCT 413.44Troop Transports.

94 Memo, CofT for CNO USN, 3 Sep 44; Memo,CNO for CofT, 9 Oct 44. Both in OCT 413.44Troop Transports.


under the control of the commanders of theEastern and Western Sea Frontiers for in-stallation on fast, independently routedArmy and WSA transports, the entire pro-gram to be limited to 150 sets of equipmentand 450 men.95 In April further details asto the execution of the plan were an-nounced. By 7 July, however, radar instal-lations had been completed on only sixArmy transports; installations on sixteenothers were under way or had been ar-ranged for. On that date a radiogram fromSecretary of War Stimson, then en route tothe Potsdam Conference on a transportwhich had been passing through heavy fog,expressed surprise that so few Army vesselshad been provided with radar, in view ofthe large number of troops carried and thefact that Navy transports were so equipped,and requested a confidential report on thesubject and advice as to steps being takento remedy the omission.96

Thereafter, the installation of radar ontroopships was expedited. The Navy re-versed an earlier decision to include highspeed tankers among the merchant ships toreceive such equipment.97 The Transporta-tion Corps renewed its effort to have radarinstalled on all War Shipping Administra-tion troop transports allocated to the Armyand informed the ports of embarkation thatif WSA should refuse to bear the cost of

installation, the Army would do so.98 Co-ordination of the installation program wasassigned to the Chief Signal Officer, whodesignated the signal officers at the portsof embarkation as local co-ordinators.

Assignment and Operation of Small Boats

Aside from the ocean-going vessels re-ferred to above, the Army required smallboats and other floating equipment formany purposes. The types with which theChief of Transportation was concerned in-cluded tugs, barges, lighters, floating cranes,fireboats, launches, marine tractors, anddories for harbor use; tugs, barges, patrolboats, passenger and cargo vessels for coast-wise and interisland service; rescue and air-plane retrieving vessels for the Army AirForces; mine laying and target vessels forthe Coast Artillery Corps.99 These unitswere under 1,000 gross tonnage and 200feet length; they included both self-propelledand nonpropelled types. As a class theywere known as "small boats"; sometimesthey were referred to as "harbor boats," butthat designation was not accurate, sincemany types were built expressly for coast-wise and interisland service.

In December 1940 the Army had a totalof 386 such boats. By the end of the warthe fleet under the control of the Chief of

95 Memo, CNO for Comdrs WSF and ESF, 10Jan 45, sub: Radar for use as Navigational Aid onFast Troop Transports; Memo, CNO for BuPersand BuShips, 17 Apr 45. Both in OCT 413.44Troop Transports.

96 Rad, Stimson for Marshall, 7 Jul 45, CM-IN6344; Memo, CG ASF for ACofS OPD, 11 Jul45, OCT 413.44 Troop Transports, reviews TCeffort to obtain radar from November 1943.

97 Memo, BuShips for Comdrs WSF and ESF,etc., 7 Jul 45, OCT 413.44 Troop Transports.

98 Ltr, C of Water Div OCT for WSA, 19 Jul45; Memos, CofT for the several PE's, 1 Aug 45,sub: Installation of Radar Equip; Memo, CSigOfor CG's of PE's, 10 Aug 45, sub: Installation ofNav Aids. All in OCT 413.44 Troop Transports.

99 AR 55-510, par. 1, 9 Oct 42, sub: HarborBoat Service. General characteristics of vesselsshown in Report of Army Small Boat Construction,1 July 40 to 31 May 45, issued by WD, 18 Dec 45,in OCT HB Water Div Small Boats. See also Crit-chell Rimington, "The Army's Navy," Yachting(March 1943).


Transportation had grown to 12,466 ves-sels.100 Of the latter number, 3,413 wereassigned to commands in the zone of in-terior, 7,791 had been dispatched or wereassigned to oversea commands, 67 wereassigned to lend-lease purposes, 995 werein the zone of interior awaiting assignment,and 200 had been reported as available fordisposition. These figures, and the discussionin this section, relate only to vessels subjectto assignment by the Transportation Corps;they do not comprehend Navy-procuredlanding craft, Ordnance-procured amphib-ious trucks, specialized vessels procured bythe Board of Engineers for Rivers and Har-bors, or vessels acquired by the theater com-manders from oversea sources.

In the zone of interior the largest users ofsmall boats naturally were the ports of em-barkation. Their varied marine activities,sometimes involving widely separated facil-ities, called for numerous craft for the trans-portation of personnel and supplies withinthe harbors and the handling of cargo atshipside. On 1 August 1945 there were 377units of such floating equipment underassignment to the New York port com-mander, 275 to Seattle, 228 to San Fran-cisco, 164 to New Orleans, 125 to Boston,and lesser numbers to the other ports ofembarkation, subports, and cargo ports,making a total of 1,337. The equipmentassigned to the Seattle Port of Embarkationincluded that utilized in the Alaska BargeService, established in 1942 to transportsupplies from Seattle and Prince Rupertover the inside passage to Juneau, Skag-

way, and Excursion Inlet.101 A total of 815units was assigned to the seaboard servicecommands and defense commands for theutilization of installations within their juris-dictions, 768 units were assigned to ArmyAir Forces headquarters, and 468 to theChief of Engineers, some of which wereactually utilized overseas. Twenty-five boatswere assigned to other government agencies.

Small boats were required by the over-sea theaters not only for port operation andthe transportation of men and supplies be-tween ports and areas, but also for the sup-port of invasion operations. In the springof 1942, when preparations were beingmade for a possible invasion of the Euro-pean Continent in the fall of that year, themilitary planners got their first inkling ofthe extent of the marine requirements forsuch an operation.102 The marine procure-ment program was still in its infancy, andto supplement such new craft as could becounted on, a survey of river and coastwisevessels was made to determine how manywould be suitable for cross-Channel serv-ice.103 The result of this survey was notencouraging, and the lack of adequate float-ing equipment was one of the factors which

100 Gross final rpt, p. 72. Classification by de-signs and assignments is shown in statistical table,Harbor Boats in Service, in Storage, and Intransit,1 Aug 45, OCT HB Water Div Small Boats.

101 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 15 May 42, OCT544.2 Alaska; Min, Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30Aug 43, pp. 207, 209, in OCT HB PE Gen PortComdrs Conf. Supplies were distributed inlandfrom Juneau and Skagway and were transshippedto other Alaskan ports from Juneau and later fromthe newly constructed port at Excursion Inlet.

102 CCS 15th Mtg, par. 7, 7 Apr 42; CCS 17thMtg, par. 4, 28 Apr 42; Memo, Gen Somervell forAdmiral King, 13 Apr 42; Memo, Col Wylie forGen Gross, 13 May 42, sub: Cross-Channel Boats.Last two in OCT HB Gross European TheaterBoats.

103 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 29 Apr 42, sub:Procurement of Small Fast Passenger Ships, OCTHB Wylie Staybacks; Memo, Gross for Somervell,2 Jul 42; Memo within WSA, Ralph Keating forthe Administrator, 7 Aug 42. Last two in OCT HBGross European Theater Boats.


made a cross-Channel operation in 1942appear impractical.104 When the invasionactually took place two years later it waswith the benefit of a mature and carefullyplanned marine procurement program. On1 April 1945, just before the German sur-render, the Transportation Corps had 1,845boats of this category in the European thea-ter, including 887 barges, 295 marine trac-tors, 287 towing launches, 95 otherlaunches, 167 tugs, 45 tankers, and 50 float-ing cranes.105 Naturally the British contrib-uted heavily of their small boats for opera-tions in Europe, and many landing craftand other small vessels of the U.S. Navywere utilized in the assault on the Nor-mandy coast.

The need for floating equipment wasespecially critical in the Pacific, becauseeach move toward Japan was over a waterroute and because so many military opera-tions involved the landing of men and sup-plies at undeveloped beachheads or primi-tive ports. The first-mentioned circumstancecreated a demand for both large and smallvessels for operation between bases withinthe theater; the second created a need forharbor craft to discharge vessels lying off-shore. To illustrate the latter point: a studyprepared by the Joint Logistics Plans Com-mittee during the summer of 1944 con-cerning lighter equipment for planned op-erations in the Pacific enumerated 89 portsand beachheads to be used, of which only

11 would afford facilities for docking trans-ports.106

The theater commander in the South-west Pacific Area foresaw these needs, andhis accumulated requisitions for small boatsran into large figures. In addition to suchused boats as could be acquired locally,more than 3,100, mostly the smaller types,were constructed in the theater for theTransportation Corps and 2,504, includingthe larger types, were constructed in thezone of interior and assigned to the thea-ter.107 Of the latter number, 1,896 boatswere actually in the theater on 1 August1945, including 708 barges and lighters, 209freight supply boats, 260 towing launches,208 other launches, 171 tugs, and 180 ma-rine tractors. Late in 1943 Admiral Kingexpressed the fear that the TransportationCorps procurement program to meetSWPA requirements was wasteful of bothmaterials and personnel and recommendedthat it be referred to the Joint LogisticsCommittee for study. That committee ap-proved the program and proposed measuresfor meeting the problem of manning; soonthereafter the entire TC marine procure-ment program received the sanction of theJoint Production Survey Committee.108

Since the Pacific Ocean Areas was aNavy command it received most of itssmall boats through Navy channels, but on1 August 1945 the Chief of Transportation

104 TC was procuring landing craft at that time,but since they were essentially combat vessels, theirprocurement was made exclusively a Navy functionin September 1942. See Memo, ACofS OPD forCG SOS, 14 Sep 42, OPD 560 (Harbor Boats andHarbor Boat Service) Sec 3 (81-139).

105 Harbor Boats in Service, in Storage, and In-transit, 1 Apr 45, OCT HB Water Div Small Boats.

106 An. A to App. A of JLPC paper, LighterEquipment for Port Operation, OCT HB TopicArmy-Navy Joint Logistics.

107 Harbor Boats in Service, 1 Aug 45, cited n.100; OCT HB Monograph, U.S. Army Trans inSouthwest Pacific Area, 1941-47, pp. 368-80, givesdetails about SWPA small boat program.

108 JCS 644, 24 Dec 43; JCS 644/1, 14 Mar 44;JCS 573/3, 20 May 44. For exposition of TCposition regarding construction and manning seeMemo, CofT for Joint Logistics Com, 5 Jan 44,OCT HB Gross Day File.

BOATS BUILT FOR THEATER SERVICE. Motor tow launches, 46-foot, in wetstorage at the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation awaiting assignment to Pacific

theaters (top). Interisland supply vessel, 168-foot (bottom).


had 764 units under assignment to thattheater. The other principal oversea assign-ments of TC floating equipment on thatdate were 1,815 to the European theater,912 to the Alaska command, 510 to thePanama Canal command, 458 to the Asi-atic theater (China, Burma, India), 309 tothe Mediterranean theater, and 221 to theAntilles command.

Marine equipment was acquired by theChief of Transportation through purchase,charter, or new construction. The old vesselswhich were purchased or chartered fromprivate owners or from other governmentagencies were a relatively small proportionof the total, but they were welcome addi-tions to the fleet in view of the limited num-ber of new craft that could be built. Thetotal of 1,647 units acquired during thefiscal year 1945 included 1,422 new vesselsdelivered under TC contracts, 121 acquiredby purchase through the War ShippingAdministration, 77 chartered from theOffice of Defense Transportation, and 27transferred from the Corps of Engineers.109

All requests for vessels needed by thevarious elements of the Army were made tothe Chief of Transportation.110 Such re-quests were passed on first by the WaterDivision, which checked the validity ofthe need and the suitability of the designs.Approved requests then were sent to theDirector of Supply, who either contractedfor the construction of new vessels or under-took to find suitable used equipment.111 The

distribution of used vessels to the variousgovernment agencies requiring them wascontrolled by a committee representing theArmy, the Navy, and the Maritime Com-mission (later, the War Shipping Adminis-tration), which was established during theearly weeks of the war as an element of theStrategic Shipping Board.

The program of small boat constructionwhich was administered by the Director ofSupply was a major undertaking. The pro-cedures and problems involved in such pro-curement will be dealt with in some detailin another volume of Transportation Corpshistory. Here it will suffice to state thatduring the fiscal years 1942 through 1945marine equipment with an aggregate valueof $833,991,000 was completed under con-tracts let by the Army.112 The great increasein the volume of procurement during thewar period is seen in the fact that whereasthe value of marine equipment completedand accepted during the fiscal year 1942was $34,368,000, during the fiscal year1944 it was $371,674,000.

The Transportation Corps' late entranceinto the market for marine equipment, afterconstruction facilities and materials hadbeen heavily committed under Navy andMaritime Commission contracts, togetherwith the general scarcity of materials,equipment, and labor, placed it at a dis-advantage, and in the beginning its progressin marine procurement was slow. In No-vember 1943, in connection with his inquiryinto the progress of the troopship conversionprogram, the Director of War Mobilizationinformed the Secretary of War that he was

109 Annual Rpt, Water Div OCT, FY 1945, p.13, OCT HB Water Div Rpts.

110 AG 561 (1-30-42) MO-D-M, 31 Jan 42,sub: Acquisition of Vessels under 1,000 tons; WDMemo W55-9-42, 4 Dec 42, sub: same, OCT HBWater Div Small Boats.

111 Memo, Water Div OCT for Wardlow, 28Nov 42, OCT HB Water Div Small Boats; Memo,C of Water Div OCT for ACofT for Supply OCT,9 Dec 43, sub: Procurement of Used Vessels, OCT561.1.

112 OCT HB Monograph 28, Table A. The figureincludes some Marine equipment procured by QMCduring FY 1942. It does not include equipmentprocured by the Navy and Maritime Commissionfor TC account, nor does it include marine sup-plies.


"somewhat persuaded" that the deletion ofmarine procurement from TC functionswould leave the corps in a better positionto cope with its other heavy responsibil-ities.113 The Secretary of War in replyargued strongly that if the Army was to bein a position to respond promptly to therequirements of the commanders in thefield, the procurement of equipment to meetthose requirements should be lodged in theagency charged with the review and ap-proval of the design and use of such equip-ment—in other words, the TransportationCorps.114 Such procurement remained a TCresponsibility throughout the war.

The assignment of appropriate floatingequipment to meet the needs of zone ofinterior installations and oversea commandswas a function of the Chief of Transporta-tion, which he delegated to the chief of hisWater Division, who in turn entrusted thedetails to the Harbor Boat Branch.115 Twoexceptions are to be noted. Throughout thewar the assignment of mine laying and minetending vessels was handled by the CoastArtillery Corps. In the early part of thewar the Chief of Transportation assignedArmy Air Forces vessels in accordance withAAF requests, but from September 1944this function was performed directly byAAF.116 Although equipment was con-tracted for on the basis of specific requestsfrom the field, the Chief of Transportation

did not commit vessels in advance of theircompletion, since conditions were changingcontinually and it was considered advisablethat each unit be assigned where it was mosturgently needed at the time it became avail-able.117

The Harbor Boat Branch endeavored tomaintain up-to-date records on all vesselsunder its jurisdiction, showing the char-acteristics of the vessels and their employ-ment. It was fairly successful as regardsthose which remained in the zone of interiorbut found it impossible to hold the overseacommands accountable for the vessels as-signed to them. Ports of embarkation andother zone of interior installations were in-structed to submit reports on the operatingexpenses and the activities of the harborboats which they utilized, but in view ofthe pressure under which the installationsworked and the large amount of detail in-volved in compiling such reports the regula-tion was not enforced.118

The Transportation Corps had differingdegrees of responsibility for the operationand maintenance of the Army's small boats.Vessels assigned to TC installations in thezone of interior were entirely its responsibil-ity. They were manned with civilian crews,supplied, and maintained by the installa-tions in accordance with policies establishedby the Chief of Transportation. Vessels as-signed to other installations in the zone ofinterior, except the specialized Coast Ar-tillery and Air Forces vessels, were mannedwith civilians, supplied, and maintainedby those installations under the supervisionof the service commanders and in accord-ance with TC policies, except that the

113 Ltr, 3 Nov 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels Oct43-May 44.

114 Ltr, 23 Nov 43, OCS 570, 1943.115 TC Pamphlet 1, Org Manual, Sec. 301.00,

par. 11, April 1944, OCT HB Org Manuals; AR55-305, 10 Oct 42.

116 WD Cir 388, par. 1f, 27 Sep 44; AAF Reg65-89, par. 2 (2 ) , 12 Oct 44; Memo, CG AAFfor CofT, 19 Dec 42; 1st Ind, CofT for CG AAF,13 Apr 43; 2d Ind, CG AAF for CofT, 31 May43. Last three in OCT 563-900 Cargo Vessels1942-43.

117 1st Ind, CofT for SPE, 22 Apr 43, OCT561.4.

118 WD Cir 327, Sec. 2, 16 Dec 43; Conf, authorwith Maj H. M. Miles, 18 Aug 48, OCT HBWater Div Small Boats.


Transportation Corps controlled repairswhich were not performable by the crewsand supplied spare parts and technical ad-vice when needed.119 Mine planting andmine tending vessels were manned withmilitary crews, operated, and maintainedby the Coast Artillery Corps, except thatthe Transportation Corps supplied spareparts, gave technical advice, and took re-sponsibility for the heavier maintenancework.120 AAF rescue and retrieving vesselsemployed in the zone of interior were op-erated and maintained in a similar manneruntil September 1944 when AAF was as-signed complete responsibility, with theprivilege of calling on the Chief of Trans-portation for technical advice and spareparts and for aid in arranging for the useof repair facilities.121 Vessels employed inthe oversea commands were solely the re-sponsibility of the oversea commanders,except that the Chief of Transportationestablished policies in regard to crews andmaintenance and supplied needed spareparts and equipment. Some of the vesselsstationed overseas were manned with civil-ian crews, some with military crews, andsome with Coast Guard personnel.

Most new boats, except the specializedCoast Artillery and Air Forces craft, were

delivered on completion to ports of em-barkation, by which they were dispatchedto the assignees or held in wet storage pend-ing assignment. In either case the vesselsreceived a thorough processing at the portsto prepare them for efficient operation.Because of hasty construction as well aschanging ideas regarding design and equip-ment, the repair work performed at theports was considerable.122 Sometimes, whenvessels proceeding under their own powerto oversea stations passed through two ormore ports, each port undertook to makethe repairs and alterations which it con-sidered necessary. In an effort to eliminateunnecessary work of this nature, a repre-sentative of the Water Division visited theports of embarkation and listed the repairsand alterations customarily made on eachtype of craft. From this information amaster list was prepared, including allchanges considered necessary to place thevessels in proper operating condition. Thesechanges were incorporated in the construc-tion contracts subsequently let, and theports were instructed to make no furtheralterations on vessels delivered under suchcontracts without prior approval of theWater Division. The ports were also in-structed to limit the repairs and alterationsof vessels delivered under old contracts tothose contained in the master list.123

Manning of Small Boats

Early in 1943 it was apparent that extra-ordinary means would have to be employedto provide crews for the several thousand

119 TC allocated repair work to ports of embarka-tion, service commands, or commercial repair shopsaccording to circumstances. See AR 55-510, par.2, 9 Oct 42.

120 See Memo, CofT for CG 9th SvC, 9 May 44;1st Ind, CG 9th SvC for CofT, 19 May 44. Bothin OCT 564 9th SvC.

121 WD Memo W55-28-43, 25 Jun 43, sub:Maintenance of AAF Floating Equipment, OCT HBWater Div Small Boats; AAF Reg 65-89, par. 3,12 Oct 44. AAF used civilian crews during the earlypart of the war, but began replacing them withmilitary crews in 1943. See Memo within Mainte-nance and Repair Br OCT (Hoch for Warren), 18Mar 43, OCT HB Water Div Small Boats; alsoMemo, CG AAF for CofT, 11 May 43, OCT 231.8New Orleans.

122 See Memos, Maintenance and Repair Br(Warren) for C of Water Div OCT, 21 and 23Jun 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels, concerning defi-ciencies in newly constructed vessels.

123 Mtg of Supts of Water Divs, Chicago, 7 Jul44, pp. 12, 13, OCT HB Water Div Misc.


units of floating equipment for which theTransportation Corps had contracted. InMay the Water Division estimated that10,000 marine officers and seamen wouldbe needed for the small boats that wouldbe delivered in the United States during thenext twelve months, and at about the sametime General MacArthur indicated that4,000 would be required for boats beingbuilt in Australia.124

Several methods were adopted to providethis personnel. Since it was becoming in-creasingly difficult to engage civilian crew-men and since military crews were desirablefor certain types of vessels which served inthe forward areas, the TransportationCorps began the training of harbor craftcompanies at the Charleston Port of Em-barkation in March 1943, and later in theyear moved this activity to Camp GordonJohnston, Carrabelle, Fla., where it couldbe conducted on a broader scale. A total of12,782 officers and men were trained underthis program in the zone of interior, andcompanies embracing more than 3,000 wereactivated overseas.125 During the summer of1943 an intensive campaign to recruit civil-ian marine personnel was launched, inwhich 40 government and private agenciesand 44 marine publications were calledupon for aid. Concurrently a MarineOfficer Cadet School was established at St.Petersburg, Fla., and schools to provideadditional training for civilians alreadyholding licenses in the deck and enginedepartments were opened at the ports ofembarkation at New Orleans, New York,and San Francisco. About 20,000 civilians

were employed on small boats at the endof the war. The need for military crews inthe Southwest Pacific had not been fullymet in the spring of 1944, and it was de-cided to place Coast Guard crews on someof the boats operating in the forward areasof that theater. In August 1945 there wereCoast Guard crews on 250 Army boats,totaling 6,851 officers and men.126

The most critical need was for qualifiedlicensed officers. The Marine Officer CadetSchool graduated 1,073 civilian junior deckofficers and 1,107 civilian junior engineofficers—a total of 2,180—during its periodof operation, August 1943 to April 1945.127

The site had been used by the United StatesMaritime Service, an agency of the WarShipping Administration, for training pur-poses, and it was arranged that the incum-bent training staff should remain. TheTransportation Corps supplied additionalmarine equipment, built barracks, provideduniforms and subsistence, and reimbursedWSA for its out-of-pocket expenses. Thecadets were selected from among the gradu-ates of the several WSA training institu-tions, after very severe tests. So carefullywere these cadets chosen that only 103of the 2,283 who started the course failedto complete it satisfactorily. About 750 ofthe graduates were commissioned in theArmy and were assigned to TC harborboat companies, and the remainder were

124 Memo, C of Civ Pers Div OCT for Exec OffOCT, 1 Aug 43, OCT HB Ind Pers Div CivMarine Pers.

125 OCT HB Monograph 26, pp. 57-66, ExhibitII. This military training program will be dis-cussed in detail in another volume of TC history.

126 JCS 644/1, 14 Mar 44; Memo by Joint Sec-retariat, 22 Mar 44, approving JCL recommenda-tions with slight modifications, OCT 231.8 ArmyVessels; Memo, Acting Comdt USCG for CofT, 20Aug 45, OCT 231.8 Army Vessels. OCT HBMonograph, U. S. Army Trans in Southwest PacificArea, 1941-47, pp. 608-36, discusses marine per-sonnel problems in SWPA, including small boatcrews.

127 Rpt, Ind Pers Div OCT, FY 1945, Sectionon Tng Marine Offs, OCT HB Ind Pers Div Gen;Conf, author with Col Alexander Corey, 24 Aug48, OCT HB Ind Pers Div Civ Marine Pers.


sent to the Civilian Marine School at NewOrleans for further training as civilianofficers.128 The schools at New York andSan Francisco, which were in operationonly about one year, provided final trainingand tests for young civilian marine officerswho were shipped overseas from those ports.All civilian training activities were underthe general supervision of the IndustrialPersonnel Division in the Office of the Chiefof Transportation.

Initially, an effort was made to placepermanent crews on new vessels when theywere delivered at the contractors' plants,but because of the scarcity of personnelqualified for oversea service and the un-willingness of many civilian seamen tosign the articles of a vessel whose area ofemployment had not been determined, itwas decided during the spring of 1943 toutilize delivery crews for moving vessels tothe ports of embarkation and to reservethe assignment of permanent crews untilthe boats were ready to go into service.129

In June the respective ports were furnishedlists of vessels which were to be delivered toor through them and were instructed toestablish delivery crew pools and recruit asmany men for these pools as might reason-ably be required.130 Thereafter such listswere distributed at intervals in accordancewith information furnished by the Directorof Supply, and the ports were requested toconfirm the delivery dates with the con-

tractors, in order that crews would be onhand to take over the vessels as soon asthey were ready.131 Beginning in the springof 1944 the Army Air Forces provideddelivery crews for vessels procured by theTransportation Corps for AAF use.132

The delivery pools, or harbor boat cadres,not only provided reservoirs from whichcrews could be drawn as required but alsoafforded an opportunity for training menwho were not fully qualified when theywere employed. Though these cadres wereutilized principally in providing deliverycrews, when occasion required they weredrawn on also for permanent crews.133

Authorized ceilings for harbor boat cadreswere set by the Chief of Transportation,but the ports were instructed to employ ata given time only as many men as theybelieved would be required in the nearfuture. Therefore the size of the cadresvaried as the prospective deliveries of vesselsfluctuated. Theoretically such cadres werekept separate from the transport crewcadres, referred to earlier in this chapter,but qualified men were considered inter-changeable in case of need.

The manning scales for harbor boats andother floating equipment were authorizedby the Industrial Personnel Division in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation, onrecommendation of the Water Division,which in turn was guided by the experience

128 The New Orleans school absorbed the cadetschool in April 1945. Its activities are reviewed inMemo, Paul C. Grening for Acting Dir of OpnsOCT, 19 Apr 45, OCT HB Ind Pers Div CivMarine Pers.

129 Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 27 Mar 43, OCT231.8 Seattle. Similar memos to other ports.

130 Memo, CofT for CG NOPE, 9 Jun 43, OCT231.8 Harbor Boat Pers 1943. Similar memos toother ports.

131 Memo, CofT for CG SFPE, 1 Sep 43, OCT561.2-563.5 San Francisco. For complete directionsregarding acceptance, delivery, storage, and ship-ment of floating equipment see TC Cir 80-15 rev.,13 Sep 44.

132 Memo, CofT for CG AAF, 24 May 44, OCTHB Water Div Small Boats.

133 Conf, author with Maj E. H. Buysse, 26 Aug48, OCT HB Ind Pers Div Civ Marine Pers.Major Buysse was chief of Field Service Branch,Industrial Personnel Division, during the war.


of the ports of embarkation.134 Because ofthe scarcity of competent personnel, aneffort was made to limit crew strengths tothe practical minimum. The chiefs of thewater divisions at the ports, who were re-sponsible for the assignment of crews, wereinstructed to spread experienced officers asthinly as possible, but to be sure that eachvessel was "properly manned" and to notifythe port civilian personnel officers if themen made available did not have the neces-sary qualifications.135 The Industrial Per-sonnel Division endeavored to maintainup-to-date lists of the civilian employees oneach vessel in order to facilitate thehandling of insurance claims and depend-ency benefits. Such information was receivedregularly from installations in the zone ofinterior, but the oversea commands reportedchanges in crews very irregularly.136

The Industrial Personnel Division, actingwith the advice of the Water Division,established the basis of compensation forcivilian crews. For this purpose the Army'ssmall boats were classified as harbor boatsor interisland vessels.137 As in the case of theocean-going vessels, wages and bonuses forsmall boats followed the practices in themaritime industry and the decisions of theMaritime War Emergency Board. Overtimewas not paid until after the issuance of the

War Department's policy governing vesselson 31 October 1942. Insofar as possible, theArmy's overtime rates were based on theprevailing rates for similar types of vesselsin the respective localities.138 Where no pre-vailing overtime rate could be established,as frequently was the case in oversea areas,the Army rate was in accordance withPublic Law 821, 77th Congress, which pro-vided for the payment of time and a halffor work over forty hours per week.

In the spring of 1943 the SouthwestPacific Area, which already had a largenumber of vessels employed in intra-theater services, reported that great diffi-culty was being experienced in administer-ing the complicated system of war bonusesapplicable to the seamen who signed theusual ship's articles. Also the theater waslosing the services of many experienced menwho desired to return to the United Statesafter a period in foreign waters, someclaiming that the home ports from whichthey shipped had not made it clear thattheir vessels would remain overseas. Thesedifficulties existed not only in connectionwith the crews of small boats but also withcrews of the limited number of Army-operated ocean-going vessels permanentlyassigned to the theater. In order to meetthe problem a new form of individual con-tract was developed, calling for one year ofservice overseas and providing for a flatpayment of 100 percent of the base wagein lieu of all bonuses. This additional pay-ment approximated the average bonus pay-ments to seamen serving overseas undership's articles. The individual contract gavea clearer definition of the employee's rights

134 Memo, CofT for CG NOPE, 11 May 43, OCT231.8 Harbor Boat Pers 1943. Strength of crewsauthorized for various types of vessels is shownin attachment to Memo, Water Div for Dir ofMil Tng OCT, 6 Dec 43, in same file.

135 Memo, CofT for NOPE, 20 May 43, OCT231.8 New Orleans; Mtg of Supts of Water Divs,Chicago, 7 Jul 44, pp. 14, 15, OCT HB Water DivMisc.

136 Memo, CofT for CG SPE, 5 Feb 43, OCT231.8 Seattle; Memo, CofT for CG APO 851 N.Y.,16 Apr 43, OCT HB Water Div Small Boats; Confwith Buysse cited n. 133.

137 Rpt, Dir of Pers, FY 1944, Ind Pers Sec, p. 7,OCT HB Dir of Pers.

138 OCT Memo CPRTC 20-80, 23 Jan 43, sub:Overtime Compensation for Crew Members ofHarbor and Interisland Class Boats, OCT HB IndPers Div Civ Marine Pers.


and responsibilities than did the ship'sarticles. It expressly stated that the em-ployee was eligible for treatment by theMedical Corps and thus cleared up a dis-puted point which had given trouble in thepast. The contract form soon was revisedto provide for service over a mutuallyagreed period, rather than for a year.139

Although this type of contract had beendevised particularly for SWPA, it wassuitable for and was extensively used in theemployment of marine personnel to servein other theaters. Alaska, it may be noted,had a special form of contract which tookinto account conditions peculiar to thatarea.

Subsequently a shorter form of individualcontract, known as an agreement of enroll-ment, was introduced, which by referenceincorporated all the pertinent provisions ofthe law and the Transportation CorpsMarine Personnel Regulations.140 It wasused particularly in employing marine per-sonnel who were to be put through a courseof training at Transportation Corps expensebefore being sent overseas. From the TCstandpoint the object was to attract andhold good men, build up an esprit de corpswhich could not exist among casuals, andreduce the turnover in Army crews. The in-ducements from the individual's standpointincluded steady employment, increased skillacquired at government expense, prefer-ence in job assignments, and more rapid

advancement. The contract provided that,if the employee should breach the agree-ment, he could be required to reimburse thegovernment for the reasonable cost of theformal training which he had received andthe cost of travel to his first duty stationafter enrollment. No record of breachedcontracts is available, but the number wassmall in relation to the number of enrolledemployees and did not detract from thevalue of the plan.141

Civilian officers and crewmen on smallboats had the same status under civil serviceas did the crews on the Army's ocean-goingvessels. They were not required to undergocompetitive examinations, their appoint-ments were not subject to prior approval bythe commission, and their compensation wasnot governed by the Classification Act. Onthe other hand, they enjoyed all the privi-leges of civil service employees, includ-ing the leave and retirement features. Otherbenefits provided for in TransportationCorps Marine Personnel Regulations wereequally applicable to them.

The seamen on small boats were eligiblefor occupational deferments under theSelective Service Act if they were engagedin "active ocean-going service." At firstthis was interpreted to apply only to thoseengaged in coastal or offshore service, butlater, in view of the difficulty of obtainingcompetent crews, it was permissible torequest deferment for crewmen on boatsassigned to ports of embarkation in the zoneof interior.142 The policy of the Chief of139 Contract Forms WDTC CPD #2 SWP and

WDTC CPD #3 Gen (rev.), OCT HB IndPers Div Civ Marine Pers; Rpt, Dir of Pers FY1944, Ind Pers Sec, p. 2, OCT HB Dir of Pers;Conf with Buysse, cited n. 133.

140 Conf, author with Col Alexander Corey, 26Mar 48, OCT HB PE Gen Transport Crews; Rpt,Ind Pers Div, FY 1945, p. 1, OCT HB Ind PersDiv Gen; see form, Agreement of Enrollment(rev.), 1 Jun 45, OCT HB Ind Pers Div CivMarine Pers.

141 Conf, author with Anthony J. Clemente, IndPers Div OCT, 30 Aug 48, OCT HB Ind Pers DivCiv Marine Pers.

142 OCT Misc Ltr 56, 17 Feb 45, sub: Occu-pational Deferment of Employees Assigned toHarbor Boats; TC Marine Pers Cir 5, 18 Apr 45,sub: Marine Deferments. Both in OCT HB IndPers Div Civ Marine Pers.


Transportation, however, was not to seekdeferments for marine personnel employedon vessels which were operated entirelywithin domestic harbors.

Proposals Regarding Marine Personnel

On 1 August 1945 the large and smallvessels which were manned with civiliancrews provided by the Chief of Transporta-tion had positions for 33,846 officers andmen. Of these, 14,755, were on vesselsassigned to oversea stations and 19,091were on vessels assigned to commands in thezone of interior. Broken down in anotherway, the total included 7,909 positions onArmy troop and cargo transports, 3,508 onArmy hospital ships, 10,018 on interislandvessels which were chiefly in the small boatclass, 11,467 on harbor boats, and 944 onboats of the Army Air Forces.143

The foregoing pages have indicated someof the problems involved in providing asufficient number of competent men to fillthese positions. While the results were goodunder the circumstances, they left some-thing to be desired. The number of menavailable for this service was severely limitedby the requirements of the armed forces andthe attractiveness of jobs offered by otherwar industries. Men with marine experiencehad to be employed regardless of records ofirresponsibility, because experience is some-thing for which there is no substitute. In-experienced men had to be trained hastilyand placed in positions of responsibilitywithout adequate seasoning.

The majority of the men who served onArmy transports and small boats during thewar did so in a civilian status. While many

arguments were offered in favor of com-plete militarization of crews, especially thecrews on vessels assigned to the theaters,there were practical considerations to thecontrary. The principal consideration wasthat many experienced marine officers andseamen could be utilized satisfactorily ascivilians, although they would not havebeen eligible for military service because ofage or physical limitations. Completemilitarization of crews would have involvedusing a larger percentage of inexperiencedmen and would have necessitated deflect-ing a considerable number of young menfrom the fighting elements of the armedforces where youth and physical staminaare more essential.

In view of the fact that the demand forcivilian marine personnel probably would beheavy in case of another national emergency,thought was given to ways and means ofavoiding some of the handicaps experiencedby the Army in World War II. Mr. Paul C.Grening, who served in an advisory capacityin the Water Division after long experienceas a master of merchant vessels, consideredthe establishment of a permanent civilianorganization for such personnel highly desir-able.144 Such an organization eventuallywould acquire traditions and prestige,would give the men a greater sense of per-forming an essential war service, and wouldimprove esprit de corps. If the Army couldfurnish uniforms to the unlicensed ratings,which it did not have authority to do duringWorld War II, that feature would add tothe attractiveness of the service. While theprovision of adequate and competentmarine personnel to meet the greatly en-

143 Civ Marine Pers Recapitulation, 1 Aug 45,OCT HB Ind Pers Div Civ Marine Pers. Manysmall boats did not require permanent crews, suchas barges, lighters, dories, and row boats.

144 Conf, author with Grening, 4 Nov 44; Memo,Grening for Dir of Opns OCT, 19 Apr 45, sub:New Orleans Trip. Both in OCT HB Ind Pers DivCiv Marine Pers.


larged requirements of war must alwaysremain a problem, Grening believed thatmuch could be done in advance to lightenthe difficulty.

Col. Alexander Corey, Chief of the In-dustrial Personnel Division, who dealt withrecruiting and training problems through-out the war, proposed the establishment ofa system for selecting, training, and allocat-ing personnel for manning merchant vessels,including the smaller types, separate frombut similar to the selective service systemunder which personnel was supplied to theseveral branches of the armed forces.145 The

physical requirements would be less severethan those under Selective Service. Besidessolving the problem of crew turnover andimproving discipline and efficiency, Coreypointed out that such a plan would elimi-nate competition for men among the severalgovernment agencies which operate vesselsand would assure distribution of the avail-able personnel according to carefully deter-mined requirements. It would add thedignity and prestige which this type ofservice does not have when it is run on apurely voluntary basis in wartime.146

145 Memo to Capt R. G. Miller, Exec OfficeOCT, 19 Oct 45, OCT 561.4 Joint Army-NavyShipbuilding Program.

146 For review of various possibilities in the lightof wartime experience see Memo, Gen Wylie forGen Leavey, 6 Jan 46, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

CHAPTER VIII

Other Marine Operations

and Problems

The operating matters discussed in thepreceding chapter related to vessels whichwere owned by or were under bareboatcharter to the Army, but the Chief of Trans-portation had operating responsibilities inconnection with all vessels utilized by theArmy, including those of the War ShippingAdministration and the Navy. He was re-sponsible for the efficient operation ofthe Army ports of embarkation where mostof the vessels were loaded and discharged;for the efficient utilization of the ships'time and carrying capacity; and for thealteration of the vessels to adapt them toArmy requirements. It is with the perform-ance of these responsibilities that the presentchapter is concerned.

Pier Operation and Stevedoring

The port operations of the Transporta-tion Corps in the zone of interior duringthe latter part of the war repeatedly in-volved the loading in a single month ofmore than 400 cargo vessels carrying morethan 4,000,000 measurement tons of cargo,besides 60 to 80 troop transports with vary-ing cargo capacities.1 The facilities and pro-cedures for accomplishing this task weredeveloped chiefly after we entered the war.

Reports made by a representative of TheQuartermaster General's TransportationDivision during the spring of 1941 indicatedthat the equipment and techniques em-ployed by Army ports of embarkation priorto the emergency had been antiquated andthat the improvement achieved up to dateof reporting had been limited.2 The findingsof an expert who was assigned to study op-erations at the New York Port of Embarka-tion early in 1941 started a cycle of im-provements, which was continued afterresponsibility for the ports had been takenover by the Chief of Transportation inMarch 1942. Recognizing the importanceof the loading operation in getting optimumservice from the available ships and promptdispatch of supplies to the forces overseas,General Gross kept this phase of portactivity under constant observation andanalysis.

During peacetime the ports of embarka-tion at New York and San Francisco, eachof which operated a single Army-ownedterminal, employed both dock and long-shore labor by direct hire and utilized suchlabor under the direct management of thesuperintendent of the Army Transport

1 Monthly summaries, Planned and Actual Sail-ings of Army Loaded Vessels, OCT HB Water DivVessel Opns Analysis.

2 Memo, Col D. C. Cordiner, retiring C of TransDiv OQMG, 29 Mar 41, p. 8; Memo, Col Cor-diner for Col T. H. Dillon, C of Trans Div OQMG,12 May 41, p. 3. Both in OCT HB OQMG WaterTrans Br.

OTHER MARINE OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS 263

Service.3 The policy of employing docklabor by direct hire was in effect throughoutthe war at most Army terminals, though afew were operated by contractors. Mostlongshore labor, on the other hand, wasprovided by contracting stevedores. TheNew York Port of Embarkation continuedto engage longshoremen by direct hire forthe Brooklyn Army base, but contractingstevedores were employed at the many otherterminals which it leased and operated.4

The San Francisco Port of Embarkationcontinued to employ longshore labordirectly for the old Army base at FortMason, and followed the same practice atthe new Army base at Oakland, but itengaged contracting stevedores to handlevessels loaded at leased commercial piers.5

At the many new ports which were estab-lished by the Army during the emergency,contracting stevedores were employed. Thegeneral policy of the Chief of Transporta-tion was to use the most responsible steve-doring contractors available but to avoidconcentrating the work at any port in thehands of a single stevedore.6

When the United States entered the war,the Army foresaw the huge shipping taskahead and quickly recognized the desir-ability of keeping commercial terminals andstevedoring organizations employed, inorder that the facilities might not be per-mitted to deteriorate or the personnel todrift into other occupations.7 This task in-volved close co-operation with the MaritimeCommission and later with the War Ship-ping Administration. The agreement whichthe Army and WSA concluded in June1942 stated the general nature of theirco-operation.8 The two agencies agreed toconsult each other regarding the purposeand terms of occupancy before requisition-ing, renting, or purchasing piers or ter-minals. The Army agreed that in takingover commercial terminal facilities it wouldutilize the existing contracting stevedoreswhenever practicable, under terms con-sonant with those approved by WSA, andwould take over also the personnel whichhad been operating the terminals, providingacceptable arrangements could be made.

The attraction of other industries offeringhigher wages and better working conditionsnaturally had an adverse effect on thesupply of longshore labor. At certain portsthe situation was aggravated by the tem-porary reduction of water-front activitywhich followed the curtailment of com-mercial shipping and which encouragedlongshoremen to seek other employment.9

At a large port like New York, where Armyships were loaded at numerous terminals

3 Memo, Trans Div OQMG for Gen Sv Div(Congressional Br) OQMG, 23 May 41, sub:Loading and Discharge of Army Transports; Conf,author with Mr. Joel P. Shedd, Jr., Sp Asst, LegalDiv OCT, 25 May 48. Both in OCT HB PE GenStevedoring.

4 Memo within Water Div OCT (Warwick forKells), 17 Jul 42, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring;Ltr, CofT to Maritime Terminal Company, NewYork, 23 Jul 42, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring;Memo, NYPE for OCT, 28 Mar 42, OCT 486.1New York; Conf, author with Mr. D. J. McKenzie,Stevedoring and Ship Facilities Br Water DivOCT, 28 May 48, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring.

5 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for CofT, 11 Nov42, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring; Memo, TIG forCofT, 4 Apr 42, and atchd rpt by Col McFayden,1 Apr 42; Memo, C of Opns Div OCT for CofT,16 Apr 42, sub: Cargo Handling at San Francisco.Last two in OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

6 Memo, CofT for ASW (McCloy), 26 Aug 42,OCT 486.2 HRPE.

7 Ltr, SW to Chm Mar Com, 22 Jan 42, OCS17396-22.

8 Memo Covering Interdepartmental Relation-ship, 13 Jun 42, OCT HB Wylie WSA.

9 Ltr, Boston Port Authority to CG SOS, 28 Oct42, and Reply 1 Nov 42, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks;Ltr, OCT to WSA, 17 Dec 42, regarding re-sumption of sailings from New Orleans to Panama,OCT 563.51-565.3 (Los Angeles 1942).


worked by different contractors, the portcommander endeavored to arrange theberthing plan so as to distribute the demandfor longshore gangs and provide employ-ment for as many as possible.10 There wasconsiderable disparity between estimates oflongshore gangs available and the extent ofany shortages, but data assembled by theWar Shipping Administration coveringcivilian longshoremen required for workingdry-cargo and passenger ships indicate thatduring late 1944 and the first half of 1945there were shortages on all coasts on daysof peak employment.11 The greatest peakday shortage on the Atlantic coast was 93gangs in December 1944; on the Pacificcoast, 182 gangs in May 1945.

In the fall of 1943, in view of the pros-pective increase in Army traffic and as insur-ance against vessels being delayed because ofthe scarcity of civilian water-front labor, theChief of Transportation recommended thatthe Transportat ion Corps t roop basisfor the year 1944 include 10,000 officersand men to be trained in port activitiesand reserved for duty at U.S. ports. Thisrecommendation resulted in the authoriza-tion of 60 port companies in addition tothose which were to be trained for serviceoverseas.12 The policy was extended to thefollowing year, and on 30 April 1945 therewere 42 port companies assigned to portson the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts.13

These troop units were used in loadingships only when the supply of civilian long-shoremen was inadequate or when special

types of cargo were involved. For the mostpart they were employed on other workabout the ports, such as clearing the docks,unloading rail cars, and repairing gear.14

Nevertheless, they were included as poten-tial stevedore labor in monthly statementsprepared in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation comparing the prospective trafficload with the facilities and labor expectedto be available to handle it.15 In April 1945there also were 65 Italian service units, em-bracing 10,847 officers and men, assigned toArmy ports of embarkation. Some of themwere used at the water front, but not inloading ships.

Although selective service took a con-siderable number of men from the waterfront, the War Department was reluctantto support requests for deferment except inthe most urgent cases, since this type of laborwas more readily replaceable than the moreskilled types which were required by somany of the war industries. Furthermore,the Army needed experienced longshoremenfor its port operations overseas. The Armyports of embarkation aided in replenishingthe supply of workers by making theirfacilities available for the training of re-cruits.16

The Chief of Transportation made aclose study of the efficiency of contractstevedoring, and comparative data on thehandling of general cargo were compiledfrom the middle of 1943. The tons ofcargo loaded per gang-hour varied con-

10 Port Comdrs Conf, Boston, 30 Aug 43, p. 11,OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf.

11 WSA Shipping Summary, Sep 45, p. 142.12 Memo, ACofT for CG ASF, 30 Oct 43; Memo,

Mil Pers Div ASF for CofT, 18 Nov 43. Both inOCT HB Tng Div Unit Tng.

13 List, T/O Units Assigned to ZI Ports, as of 30Apr 45, OCT HB Dir of Pers.

14 Conf, author with Col G. C. Bunting, 20 Apr50, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring.

15 Monthly statements, Estimate of Present andPotential Port Capacities, OCT HB Topic PortCapacity and Utilization.

16 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for Pers DivOCT, 22 Oct 42, OCT 231.8 Gen; Ltr, USW toSen Kilgore, 3 Nov 43, p. 14, OCT HB TopicKilgore Report; Conf, author with Col AlexanderCorey, 28 May 48, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring.


TABLE 5—AVERAGE TONS OF GENERAL CARGO LOADED PER NET GANG-HOUR AT U.S.PORTS ON VESSELS LOADED FOR THE ARMY BY CONTRACTING STEVEDORES:

JULY 1943-MARCH 1945a

a Gang-hours are net, i.e., time actually worked. General cargo excludes explosives (ammunition and bulk explosives). Onlycargo actually lifted by ship's tackle is considered.

b A measurement ton is 40 cu. ft., and the average for Army general cargo, while it varied considerably from time to time andport to port, was about two measurement tons to one long ton, e.g., 76 cu. ft. during first half of 1944, 85 cu. ft. during lasthalf of 1944, and 82 cu. ft. during first quarter of 1945.

c Includes small amounts of general cargo loaded at Searsport, Me., and San Jacinto, Texas.

Source: Based on summaries compiled in Stevedoring and Ship Facilities Branch, Water Division, OCT, from data submittedby the respective ports, and published in ASF Monthly Progress Report, Sec. 3.

siderably as between the several Army portsand terminals, and also varied at differenttimes at the same terminals. The varia-tions were due to many factors, includingquality of labor, local stevedoring practices,the relative density of the cargo handled, theproportion of exceptionally large or diffi-cult-to-handle items, and the special typesof stowage required for safe transit or tomeet theater requirements. Consequentlyany efficiency data given without detailedanalysis, which is not available from the

records, must be viewed with reservations.This fact is to be considered in readingTable 5, which shows the average tons ofgeneral cargo (excluding explosives) loadedper gang-hour on contract at the severalArmy ports. Certain of the basic causes ofpersistent differences in the number of tonsloaded may be noted. At New Orleans,which maintained a high efficiency record,the cargoes included relatively few difficult-to-handle items, and local stevedoringpractices permitted the size of the gangs to


vary according to the types of cargo to beworked. On the Pacific coast the limitationof a sling load to 2,000 pounds and thesmaller number of men in a standard gangwere factors in keeping down the numberof tons loaded per gang-hour.17 The all-ports averages for the periods covered byTable 5 show a general improvement incargo loading efficiency.

Data comparing the results obtained inloading general cargo with Army civilian(direct-hire) labor, contractor's civilianlabor, and soldier labor are available only

for the San Francisco Port of Embarka-tion.18 These data, which give monthly andquarterly averages for the period October1944 through June 1945, show that as be-tween direct-hire and contractors' laborthere was no consistent advantage on eitherside. As between civilian labor (17-mangangs) and soldier labor (22-man gangs),the former produced far better results. Thisis explainable on the ground that the troopsat best had limited experience, and in somecases they were only completing their train-ing preparatory to being assigned to over-sea stations. The following tabulation shows,by quarterly averages, the number of longtons and measurement tons of general cargoloaded per net gang-hour at the San Fran-cisco Port of Embarkation:

Explosives were loaded for the most partat piers specially constructed and equippedfor that purpose. The longshoremen em-ployed on such piers were selected frommen who held U.S. Coast Guard "redcards," indicating their qualification forengaging in this hazardous work. This typeof cargo was relatively uniform in densityand shape, and the palletizing of the smallersizes of artillery and aerial ammunitionmade them easy to handle. Consequently,in spite of the special precautions requiredin the interest of safety, the all-ports aver-age for long tons of explosives loaded pernet gang-hour compared favorably with theaverage for long tons of general cargoloaded. For example, the average duringthe last half of 1944 was 15.3 long tonsfor explosives and 15.1 long tons for general

cargo. During the first quarter of 1945 theaverage was 16.8 long tons for explosivesand 16.0 long tons for general cargo. Since,however, a long ton of explosives on theaverage was approximately equal to ameasurement ton (40 cubic feet) and along ton of general cargo was approximatelyequal to two measurement tons, the numberof measurement tons of explosives loadedper gang-hour was roughly half the numberof measurement tons of general cargo.19

17 Conf with McKenzie cited n. 4; Ltr to SenKilgore cited n. 16. Standard gang on east coastwas 21-22 men, on west coast 16-17 men.

18 SFPE Quarterly Progress Reports, p. 10 ofeach issue, OCT HB SFPE.

19 Based on summaries compiled by Stevedoringand Ship Facilities Br Water Div OCT from datasubmitted by ports of embarkation, OCT HB PEGen Stevedoring. During last half of 1944 averagemeasurement of a long ton of explosives was 41cubic feet and during the first quarter of 1945 itwas 39 cubic feet. The term explosives is used tocover ammunition and bulk explosives.


TABLE 6—AVERAGE COST PER TON OF LOADING ARMY CARGO BY CONTRACTINGSTEVEDORES AT PRINCIPAL U.S. PORTS: 1944a

a Costs cover only operation at end of ship's tackle, and do not include lashing, blocking, cradling, shoring, and bin con-struction, which were accomplished by Army direct-hire employees, or by other contractors.

b Includes ammunition and bulk explosives.c General cargo and/or explosives were loaded at Searsport, Me., and San Jacinto, Tex., during two months; explosives were

loaded at San Francisco and Portland on contract during one month. These costs are taken into account in the all-ports average,though not shown for the individual ports.

Source: Based on statistics prepared by the Stevedoring and Ship Facilities Branch, Water Division, OCT, from data submittedby the respective ports.

The cost per ton of loading Army cargoby contracting stevedores varied consider-ably at the several ports because of differ-ing conditions and differing contract terms.Table 6 gives the average cost for the year1944, and the low and high averagemonthly costs, at the principal ports. Thegeneral cargo loading costs are based onmeasurement tons and the explosives load-ing costs on long tons and therefore thefigures are not strictly comparable. Since,however, a long ton of explosives was on ageneral average approximately a measure-ment ton, the annual average costs areroughly comparable on a measurement ton

basis. A study based on long tons, whichwas prepared in the fall of 1944 coveringa period of six months, disclosed an aver-age loading cost of $2.95 for a long ton ofgeneral cargo and $6.17 for a long ton ofexplosives.20

The monthly average cost of loadingcargo for the Army by contracting steve-dores showed a gradual downward trendin the case of general cargo, but in the caseof explosives this trend did not becomeclearly apparent until early 1945 whenshipments through the North Atlantic ports,

20 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, 31 Oct 44, p. 44.


where costs were relatively high, weregreatly reduced because of the passing ofthe crisis in Europe. These trends can beseen in the following all-ports average costs,starting with November 1943 when thefigures began to be consistently available:

The higher loading cost for explosiveswas due principally to the fact that the basewages were much greater than those paidlongshoremen handling general cargo.Other contributing factors were the higherovertime differential resulting from thegreat urgency of explosives shipments tothe theaters, the more frequent interruptionsin the explosives loading operation becauseof the special care required in handlingand stowing such cargo and the restrictionsagainst large accumulations at shipside, and

the payment of transportation costs to menemployed at explosives piers located out-side the normal port areas.21 The effect ofthese factors can be seen in Table 7.

The longshore unions announced a non-strike policy early in the war, and that policywas carried out remarkably well.22 Althoughthere were some labor disturbances at Armyterminals and a few ships were delayed insailing because of interruptions in loading,such disturbances were rare and of shortduration. In principle the longshoremendid not endorse the employment of troopsat Army terminals, but the Army practicegave them little cause for complaint sincesoldier labor was utilized only when civilianlabor was not available or when specialsecurity measures were considered neces-sary.23 At certain ports union longshoremenwere willing not only to work side by sidewith soldiers on the piers and ships butalso to assist in training port companies,since the primary purpose of these troopunits was to operate ports in the overseatheaters.

For a period delegates of the longshoreand other maritime unions were admittedfreely to Army ports of embarkation. Thenumber of such visitors became so great,however, that in December 1943 the Chiefof Transportation directed the port com-manders to stop this practice.24 The para-mount reason for this ruling was military

21 Conf with McKenzie cited n. 4. Longshore-men working general cargo at explosives piers re-ceived explosives rates of pay. See Ltr, Pres ofInternational Longshoremen's Assn to Maj War-wick OCT, 2 Dec 42, OCT 080 ILA.

22 Conf with Corey, cited n. 16.23 Memo, CofT for Deputy Chief, Legislative and

Liaison Div WDSS, 25 Sep 45, OCT HB WylieStaybacks.

24 Memo for all port Comdrs, 23 Dec 43, OCT680.2 Admission of Union Delegates to TC Ports;Conf with McKenzie, cited n. 4.


TABLE 7—ANALYSIS OF COST OF LOADING ARMY CARGO BY CONTRACTINGSTEVEDORES AT U.S. PORTS: 1944a

a Costs include only operation at end of ship's tackle, and do not include lashing, blocking, cradling, shoring, and bin con.struction, which were done by Army employees, or by other contractors.

b Costs are computed on 3,606 ships loaded with 26,731,377 Measurement Tons of cargo.c Costs are computed on 1,207 ships loaded with 3,580,685 Long Tons of cargo.d Consists mainly of extra labor necessitated by failure of equipment or other circumstances causing temporary stoppage

of work.e Includes travel time and carfare allowed to men working on explosives piers which for safety reasons were located outside

normal port areas.

Source: Based on summaries compiled in Stevedoring and Ship Facilities Branch, Water Division, OCT, from data submittedby ports of embarkation.

security, but it had been found also thatthe presence of numerous union delegatesdistracted the workmen and interfered withthe performance of their duties. It wasrecognized, however, that union representa-tives could be of aid in maintaining goodemployee relations, and provision was madefor them to conduct their necessary businessin the office of the port industrial relationsofficer. Port commanders were givenauthority, moreover, to admit union dele-gates to the piers and the ships in ex-ceptional cases when this was necessary tothe performance of their mission.25 Com-

ments from the commanding general ofthe San Francisco Port of Embarkation re-garding the difficulties involved in enforcingthe plan at his port called forth a firm replyfrom the Chief of Transportation, in whichhe stated that the Under Secretary of Warhad sustained his policy in this matterafter the receipt of complaints from officialsof certain unions, and he directed that im-mediate steps be taken to place the policyin effect at San Francisco, as already hadbeen done at all other Army ports.26

25 Memo, CofT for all port Comdrs, 21 Jan 44,OCT 680.2 Admission of Union Delegates to TCports.

26 Memo, CG SFPE for CofT, 15 Apr 44; Memo,CofT for CG SFPE, 22 May 44. Both in OCT323.3 San Francisco. See also remarks of MajCharles Rothouse at Port and Zone Comdrs Conf,morning session, 8 Jul 44, p. 35, OCT HB PEGen Port Comdrs Conf.


While pier operation and stevedoringwere the direct responsibility of the portcommanders, the Chief of Transportationmaintained a close supervision over theseactivities. Soon after the establishment ofan independent transportation service inMarch 1942, Mr. Andrew D. Warwick(later Colonel), a man of extensive experi-ence in commercial stevedoring, was en-gaged to head the Army Transport ServiceBranch of the Water Division, later desig-nated the Stevedoring and Ship Facili-ties Branch.27 Among his assistants in thebranch were two merchant marine masters,Mr. Daniel J. McKenzie, who had servedon Army transports, and Mr. Edgar C.Seward. This Branch completely rewrotethe Army technical manual dealing withpier operation and stevedoring. The manualwas issued as a guide for use by Army portorganizations in the zone of interior and inthe theaters and later was adopted by theU.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard.28 Itdeveloped improvements in stevedoringequipment and new techniques for handling,lashing, blocking, and stowing, which werepromulgated to the ports.29 It devised re-ports on cargo operations to be submittedmonthly by the ports of embarkation as abasis for the analyses of stevedoring efficiencyand costs referred to above. The branchpromoted and secured the adoption of thefixed-price commodity basis for stevedoringcontracts at Army ports.30

In the early part of the war various types

of stevedoring contracts were used by theseveral ports. The Water Division, how-ever, favored a fixed-price commodity basisas providing the greatest incentive to effi-ciency and the best means of reducingcargo loading costs, and eventually it wasarranged for this type of contract to beused at all ports.31 Because of differing con-ditions at the ports it was not found prac-ticable to require that the contracts beuniform in all respects, but standard clauseswere worked out gradually, and in May1945 the Chief of Transportation informedthe ports that thereafter deviations fromthe recommended clauses would be permit-ted only when the ports could justifythe exceptions. When the flow of suppliesback from the theaters became substantial,fixed-price commodity rates were adoptedalso for discharging cargo at U.S. ports.

Commodity rates were arrived at bynegotiation, and bids might or might notbe called for. When it was found that therewere not sufficient data for fixing com-modity rates, a short-term contract on aman-hour basis was authorized as a meansof developing the needed cost information.After 90 days' experience under a contract,and at 90-day intervals thereafter, eitherparty had the right to request a revision ofrates and submit an analysis of costs tosupport its request.32 In case of general wage

27 Memo, CofT for TAG, 26 Sep 45, sub:Recommendation for Award of Legion of Merit,OCT 201 Warwick.

28 WD TM 55-310, 20 May 44, sub: Stevedor-ing.

29 See occasional issues of Monthly Vessel Utiliza-tion Summary, OCT HB Water Div Vessel Utili-zation Rpts; also Suggestions for Securing of Cargo,24 Apr 45, and TC Pamphlet 42, Cargo Checking,26 Jun 45, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring.

30 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for Exec OffOCT, 1 Oct 45, sub: Rpt of Accomplishments andHandicaps, OCT HB Water Div Rpts.

31 Conf with Shedd, cited n. 3; Memo withinWater Transport Br OQMG (Long for Kells), 2Mar 42; Memo, CofT for NOPE, 12 May 42;Memo, Warwick for Kells, 14 Aug 42; OCT MiscLtr 137, Supp. 1, 3 May 45. All in OCT HB PEGen Stevedoring.

32 Conf with McKenzie cited n. 4; Memo, C ofWater Div OCT for CG NYPE, 29 Oct 43, sub:Reduction in Stevedoring Rates at Bush TerminalPiers; 1st Ind NYPE for CofT, 1 Dec 43. Lasttwo in OCT 486.2 New York.


adjustments the 90-day limitation was notapplicable. The government had access tothe contractor's records and accounts atall times for the purpose of determiningwhether his profits were excessive. In April1945 the Chief of Transportation, takinginto account the volume of cargo thenmoving, informed his contracting officersthat 5 to 8 percent profit, based on directlabor cost after all allowances had beenmade for contractor's expense items, suchas insurance, social security taxes, overhead,supervision, and gear, was considered fair.33

When profits were found to be excessiveafter three months' experience, the con-tracting officers were expected to take im-mediate steps toward readjustment of thecommodity rates. Since there was consider-able variation in the density of many com-modities, contracts included both weightand measurement rates and contractors hadthe privilege of billing on whichever basiswould produce the greater tonnage.34

In order to prevent excessive insurancecosts from entering into contracts, the Armyagreed to indemnify contracting stevedoresin case of claims exceeding $250,000. Thisarrangement grew out of the contractors'desire for adequate protection in case anexplosion on a ship or a pier should killor injure many workmen. The Army paidno claims under the arrangement, sincedisastrous explosions were avoided despitethe large quantities of ammunition andbulk explosives handled.35

Toward the close of the war the Navyadopted the fixed-price commodity basis

and thenceforward closer co-ordination be-tween Army and Navy contracting forstevedoring work was possible.36 The WarShipping Administration stevedoring con-tracts were on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis.

Materials-handling equipment was sup-plied by the Army to contracting steve-dores on a rental basis under certain cir-cumstances. This was generally true ofheavy lift equipment (over 5-ton capacity)which contractors ordinarily did not possess.It was true also of certain smaller types ofgear, such as fork lift trucks and crawlercranes, which were extensively used butwhich contractors could not readily pro-cure because of priorities. All such gear wasscarce and the Army's requirements fordomestic and oversea ports were great. Inorder to assure maximum utilization, theChief of Transportation directed that a poolof materials-handling equipment be estab-lished at each port of embarkation and thata qualified officer be placed in charge, tobe responsible for its proper distribution,economical use, and correct maintenance.37

At ports where the facilities were widelyscattered, subpools were established in likemanner.

Efficient Utilization of Vessels

The Chief of Transportation, confrontedfrom the beginning with a shortage ofbottoms and the prospect that this condi-tion would continue throughout the war,was under pressure at all times to makethe best possible use of the shipping placed

33 TC Cir 120-9, 24 Apr 45, sub: StevedoringContracts.

34 Memo, Stevedoring and Ship Facilities BrWater Div for Fiscal Div OCT, 19 Jan 43, OCTHB PE Gen Stevedoring.

35 Conf with Shedd, cited n. 3.

36 In May 1946 the Army and the Navy adopteda uniform type of contract based on the Armyform, and a joint form of stevedoring performancerecord. See Army-Navy Conf, 27-28 May 46, withapproved contract form, OCT HB PE Gen Steve-doring.

37 TC Cir 120-4, 16 Feb 44.


at his disposal. His effort to do so wasbeset with difficulties arising from theabnormalities of wartime and the fact thatsome of the circumstances which en-couraged waste were not under his control.The problem of obtaining optimal utiliza-tion was twofold, involving the fullestpossible loading of the vessels and the fastestpossible completion of round voyages be-tween home and oversea ports.

This problem was considerably simplerwith troopships than with cargo vessels. Be-cause of the unrelenting demand for moretroop lift, the capacities of the troopshipswere increased to what was consideredmaximum by the installation of additionalbunks, with due regard for safety and sani-tation. Troopship schedules were preparedinitially in accordance with basic strategicdecisions, and insofar as possible subsequentchanges in troop movement plans wereascertained in advance from the OperationsDivision of the General Staff so that sail-ing schedules could be adjusted accord-ingly.38 When the troop requirements of aparticular theater were light, or when therewere sudden changes in troop movementplans, ships might sail with empty spaces.When the troop requirements of a theaterwere heavy, the vessels sailing to that theaterwere loaded to practical capacity. Thisoften was well beyond the berthing capacityand necessitated troops sleeping in the corri-dors, or on the decks if the weather per-mitted, or in berths which were used byother soldiers during other parts of the dayor night.39

Troopship turnaround figures were notinfluenced by some of the circumstances

which affected cargo vessels, but they weresubject to many varying conditions suchas the speed and frequency of convoys, thespeed and routing of vessels which sailedindependently, delays pending the readinessof oversea ports to effect discharge, anddelays incident to conversion and repairwork performed in home ports. Conversionand repair work was an important factor,particularly on the Pacific coast where therepair facilities were limited and the Navy'srequirements were heavy. A study of 175troopships which sailed from the Pacificcoast during six months in late 1944 andearly 1945 showed that 99 of them under-went repairs or alterations while in homeports and that the average time consumedby such work was 21.47 days.40

The data regarding the length of troop-ship round voyages (turnaround cycles)during the war are meager and hence oflimited value. They are averages computedon a theater or area basis, although thedistance from the United States to thevarious ports in certain theaters differedgreatly. The average turnaround cyclesshown below include the days spent in U.S.and oversea ports and the days spent onoutward and homeward voyages; theycover a representative number of Army-controlled troopship voyages to the respec-tive areas ending during the specifiedperiods, but probably not all voyages in anycase:41

38 See Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 10 Apr 43,OCT HB Wylie Shipping Requirements and Alloca-tions 1943.

39 Ltr, Col D. E. Farr to author, 14 Feb 50, Item7, OCT HB Mvmts Div Gen.

40 Memo, C of Mvmts Div OCT for Gen Wylie,16 Mar 45, sub: Utilization of Troopships, OCTHB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv.

41 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Jul 43, p. 84; Oct 43, p.

18; Jul 44, p. 14. Low UK figure for 1943 prob-ably due to inclusion of fast British ships; highUK figure for 1944 due to long average stay inU.S. ports, probably because of conversion or repairwork.


After the end of the fighting in Europeand the discontinuance of convoys in theAtlantic, the turnaround cycles for troop-ships plying between U.S. Atlantic coastports and Europe naturally were shorter.During the period June—December 1945,the round voyages to Northwest Europeaveraged 29.2 days, and those to theWestern Mediterranean averaged 35.6days.42

The problem of utilizing the greatestpossible percentage of dry cargo ship capa-city was a complex one. The criterion wasto load such vessels "full and down," thatis, to fill the space and at the same time liftas much weight as the respective ships weredesigned to carry. This criterion wasdifficult to achieve even in peacetime com-mercial loading, and under wartime condi-tions the Transportation Corps could onlyendeavor to approach it as nearly aspracticable. When critics alluded to theunused cargo space (bale cubic) or dead-weight capacity on Army-loaded vessels, theChief of Transportation pointed out that

there were circumstances which made thatresult unavoidable.43

Although there were a number of condi-tions which militated against the completeutilization of cargo ship capacity, the basicdifficulty was the lack of balance in Armymatériel—the preponderance of bulky andlight items over dense and heavy items—which made it impossible to use the entiredeadweight capacity even if the cargo spacewere entirely filled. In order to load aLiberty ship full and down the cargo shouldhave an over-all ratio of about one longton to 1.25 measurement tons; in otherwords, it should average about 50 cubicfeet to the long ton.44 An analysis of Armycargoes shipped to the United Kingdomduring the 16-month period, January 1942through April 1943, disclosed the followingfacts regarding the principal types ofmatériel:45

42 Based on data published in monthly issues ASFMPR, Sec. 3.

43 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 10 Jun 42, sub:Contl of Ship Opns, and Incl, OCT HB WylieWSA Controversy; Memo, CofT for Mr. JuliusAmberg, Sp Asst to SW, 13 Apr 43, sub: EfficientUse of Shipping, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedoring.

44 WD TM 55-310, Stevedoring, 20 May 44, p.100.

45 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, May 1943, p. 89.


The high ratio of measurement to weightin so many of the principal items of Armycargo was partially offset in the actual load-ing of ships by a variety of methods whichwill be outlined later. The results naturallydiffered from time to time and from port toport. The average ratios attained duringthe three full war years at ports on theAtlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts are shownbelow:46

In addition to the lack of balance be-tween heavy and light cargo, Army matérielincluded many items which created an ab-normal amount of lost space, or brokenstowage. The lost space around and aboveunboxed trucks, tanks, and artillery, forexample, was much greater than in the caseof boxed, bagged, or packaged commodities.A well-balanced general cargo stows towithin 10-15 percent of the total bale cubic

capacity (below deck). On the other hand,a study of vessels loaded by the Army dur-ing the first nine months of 1943 showed19.32 percent lost space on 201 vesselsloaded at Boston, 15.63 percent lost spaceon 753 vessels loaded at New York, 16.22percent lost space on 190 vessels loaded atHampton Roads, and 16.27 percent lostspace on 302 vessels loaded at Seattle.47

Numerous measures were taken to offsetthe handicaps imposed by the character ofArmy matériel and so improve the utiliza-tion of cargo ship capacity. Exchange ar-rangements were worked out with the WarShipping Administration and the BritishMinistry of War Transport, so that whenpracticable vessels sailing under the controlof those organizations loaded some of thebulky Army cargo and Army ships loadedsome of the heavier lend-lease items.48 Army

46 Data prepared for transportation section ofstatistical history of the Army, based on monthlyrpts from PE's to OCT, Outbound and InboundCargo, SPTOW 22.

47 Conf, author with D. J. McKenzie, 1 May 50,and attached statistics, OCT HB PE Gen Stevedor-ing; WD TM 55-310, 20 May 44, p. 100. Lostspace, or broken stowage, is space which cannot beused because of the character of the cargo whichis being shipped and the structure of the ship'scargo spaces.

48 Discussed in Ch. VI. See also Ltr, CofT toAustralian Legation, 14 Apr 42, and Memo, CofTfor International Div SOS, 6 Mar 43, OCT HBGross Day File.

TIGHT STOWAGE OF PACKAGED FREIGHT in and around vehicles was em-ployed to reduce loss of cargo space in shipping assembled trucks.


and lend-lease packaged or bagged com-modities were accumulated at the ports tobe stowed in and around trucks, tanks, andartillery when that equipment was loadedbelow deck.49 Deck spaces were utilized tothe fullest and deep tanks were filled withcargo whenever practicable. As experienceaccumulated, better methods of stowing themore difficult items were developed bywhich space was economized withoutsacrificing safety. The more compact pack-ing of vehicles and the reduction in thepercentage of assembled vehicles shippedto the theaters effected a considerablesaving of space.50 The conversion of shipsfor the special purpose of carrying tanks andassembled aircraft and the shipment of air-craft and vehicles on false decks constructedon tankers relieved the cargo fleet of thenecessity of carrying so many of these space-consuming machines. Careful cargo plan-ning, practiced at all ports, involvednot only getting the best possible balancefrom matériel which was on the pierwhen loading began but also anticipatingthis factor when calling cargo to theports.

The extent to which the full weight andcubic capacities of cargo ships were utilizedwas adversely affected by a number of cir-cumstances for which there was no remedy.Urgent theater requirements sometimesdictated the items which were to move incertain ships or certain convoys, thus limit-ing the opportunity for the inclusion of items

of lower priority to give balance to thecargoes.51 When ships arrived late on berthand had to be loaded hastily to avoid miss-ing a convoy, they could not be stowed ascarefully as otherwise would have been thecase. Special types of stowage, devised tomeet peculiar theater requirements pertain-ing to the discharge or ultimate destinationof the matériel, were found to produce lessefficient stowage in most cases.52 Occasion-ally high priority cargo for which spacehad been reserved failed to arrive at theport before sailing time, with the result thatsome or all of the space could not be used.53

In view of the fact that most War ShippingAdministration freighters allocated to theArmy for outward voyages returned fromoverseas with only small quantities of cargo,and since the obtaining of ballast to insuretheir stability was difficult at certain over-sea ports, or involved long delays, WSAhad ballast placed in some vessels at theirhome ports, thus reducing space availableto the Army.54

The over-all effect of the many factorswhich influenced the loading of cargo ships

49 Memo, ACofT for Gen Deane, 6 Jan 43, OCTHB Wylie Staybacks; Min of Port Loading ComSFPE, 8 Jan 45, par. 6(b), OCT HB PE GenOverseas Supply.

50 Study, Statistics and Progress Br, Contl Div,OCT, Army Cargo Loading, Aug 44, p. 20, OCTHB PE Gen Stevedoring: Memo, CofT for CGASF, 4 Dec 43, sub: Shipment of Boxed Vehicles,OCT HB Wylie Shipping and Cargo for UK(1943-44).

51 Study of early cargo convoys to North Africashowed that only 66.1 percent of below-deck cargospace of UGS-1 was used, because of the largepercentage of vehicles and other organizationalequipment and because some vessels were combatloaded; on UGS-2 the percentage was 78.8, onUGS-3 it was 78.1, and on UGS-4 it was 77.7.ASF MPR, Sec. 3, May 43, pp. 82, 83.

52 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Aug 44, p. 55. Studycovered 10 "prestowed" and 49 "commodityloaded" vessels dispatched from NYPE to ETO.Special types of stowage will be discussed in anothervolume of TC history.

53 Memo, Dir NTS USN for CofT, 28 Sep 42,sub: Voyage Rpt of USS West Point; Memo, CofTfor CG SOS, pars. 2, 3, 5, 3 Jan 43, sub: Loadingof UGF-3. Both in OCT HB Meyer Staybacks.

54 Memo, C of Water Div OCT for ACofT(Wylie), 27 May 43; Rad WSA to WSA Repre-sentative Algiers, 28 May 43 (WD CM-OUT12478, 29 May 43). Both in OCT 563.51-565.1Africa 1943.


CHART 5—UTILIZATION OF DEADWEIGHT AND BALE CUBIC CAPACITIES OF SHIPS LOADEDBY THE ARMY AT U.S. PORTS: DECEMBER 1941—AUGUST 1945*

*Only dry-cargo ships on which the Army loaded the entire cargo are included.Source: Final Rpt of CofT, ASF, WW II, 30 Nov. 45, p. 54.

at U.S. ports by the Transportation Corpsis reflected in Chart 5, which shows thepercentage of the deadweight and balecubic capacities actually utilized on vesselssailing each month throughout the war.After the poor results of the first six orseven months—results attributable chieflyto the great number of unboxed vehiclesshipped, the lack of bottom (especiallyheavy and dense) cargo, and the difficultyof cargo planning due to the uncertainavailability of many types of Army matériel—the deadweight curve attained a generallevel of about 74 percent.55 The rathersharp fluctuations in the deadweight curve

were due principally to developments in thestrategic situation, which resulted inchanges in the types of cargo required over-seas. For example, toward the end of 1944when shipments of relatively heavy am-munition to Europe became extraordinarilylarge the deadweight curve turned upward;during the first two months of 1945, whenthe movement of ammunition was drastic-ally cut, it turned downward; during suc-ceeding months, with German resistancecrumbling, shipments of vehicles and otherbulky equipment were curtailed and alarger percentage of the cargoes was madeup of relatively heavy subsistence stores, andthe deadweight curve again turned up-ward.56 The bale cubic curve, after a tem-

55 For analysis of loading Jan-May 42, vesselby vessel, with port averages, see Ships Loadedby Army Transport Service, OCT HB PE GenStevedoring. 56 Gross final rpt, p. 50.

CRATED AND UNCRATED EQUIPMENT STOWED ON DECK. All availabledeck areas were utilized in order to achieve the maximum cargo lift.


porary rise to 94 percent at the end of 1942,leveled off to an average of about 90 per-cent, where it remained until the last halfof 1944; it then dropped somewhat, chieflybecause of special types of loading employedin connection with the campaign in Europe,which involved an unusual amount of lostspace. It is to be noted, however, that thebale cubic curve represents a comparison ofhold cubic capacity with the cubic measure-ment of cargo carried in the hold and ondeck. Since deck cargo averaged about 10percent of hold cubic capacity, hold cargorepresented about 80 percent.57

There was considerable variation in thepercentage of utilization of deadweight andbale cubic capacities at the several ports,because of variations in the factors affect-ing loading. For the war period as a wholethe Atlantic coast ports and Pacific coastports had the same percentage of dead-weight capacity utilization (74 percent), butthe Pacific coast ports had an average of 95percent of bale cubic utilization whereasthe east coast ports had only 85 percent.58

The west coast loadings were not subjectto pressure because of convoy sailing dates,as was the case on the east coast. The westcoast ports were able to put more cargo ondeck because of the generally better weatherconditions in the South Pacific, and the factthat many of the vessels moving fromSeattle and Prince Rupert to Alaska usedthe inside passage. The east coast portsincluded deep tank spaces in computingthe bale cubic capacity of the ships whichthey loaded, but the west coast ports didnot, since deep tanks were required more

frequently for fresh water on the longvoyages in the Pacific. The east coast portshandled a greater number of speciallystowed ships, involving unusual amounts oflost space.

Studies of the turnaround of cargo shipsin Army service during various periodswere made in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, in order to determinewhether and how the turnaround cyclescould be shortened. The cycles for theseveral routes differed considerably fromtime to time, depending on convoy arrange-ments, the extent of diversions, and portconditions. The subjoined tabulation givesthe results of one of the studies insofar as itrelated to the principal routes. Althoughthe data cannot be considered complete nortypical of the war period, they illustratethe importance of days spent in port inrelation to the turnaround cycle as a whole.The exceptionally long periods spent in theMediterranean, South Pacific, and South-west Pacific Areas were due to port con-gestion and other circumstances which willbe discussed in some detail in the nextsection of this chapter. The greater numberof days spent in U.S. ports by ships sailingto the United Kingdom may be attributedto the fact that the period covered by thisstudy was just prior to the invasion of Nor-mandy when the activity in U.S. Atlanticports was increasingly heavy. The follow-ing data include dry-cargo vessels whichsailed in Army service and completed roundvoyages at U.S. ports during the periodJanuary-June 1944:59

57 See Study, Army Cargo Loading, cited n. 50,pp. 9, 10.

58 Data prepared for transportation section ofthe statistical history of the Army, based on monthlyrpts from PE's to OCT, Cargo Analysis Rpt.

59 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Aug 44, p. 11. Most vesselswere in Army service on the outward voyage only.Days in U.S. ports include days under WSA con-trol before vessels were delivered to Army for load-ing.


The turnaround data shown below,which were compiled by the War ShippingAdministration and include cargo vesselsin both Army and non-Army services, illus-trate several noteworthy points. Comparisonof the length of round voyages to the Per-sian Gulf and the Red Sea via South Africaand via the Mediterranean discloses thegreat saving of time achieved for vesselsproceeding to the Middle East when theMediterranean route was opened to Alliedtraffic in the summer of 1943. Comparisonof the days spent in Persian Gulf portsduring the earlier part of the period (i.e.,when vessels were routed via South Africa)and the latter part (i.e., when vessels pro-ceeded via the Mediterranean) shows thegreat improvement in the dispatch of ships

effected by the U.S. Army after it took overthe operation of Persian Gulf ports in 1943.In considering the fact that the vessels inmost instances spent more days in "U. S.waters" than in oversea ports, it is to beborne in mind that ships often called atmore than one U.S. port, that repairs wereperformed almost entirely at home ports,and that a large proportion of the cargoships which loaded at North Atlantic portshad to wait for convoy sailings. The follow-ing tabulation covers a representative num-ber of War Shipping Administration vessels,sailing under Army, Navy, and WSA aus-pices, which completed round voyages atU. S. east coast ports during the periodJanuary 1943-March 1944:60

60 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, May 44, p. 14.


Cargo vessels which the War ShippingAdministration allocated to the Army forthe outward voyage were under WSA con-trol while they were being discharged andserviced at U.S. ports, prior to delivery tothe Army for loading. The Chief of Trans-portation made an intensive study of theoperation of such vessels after they hadbeen taken over by his ports of embarka-tion, and worked with the port commandersin an effort to reduce the number of "Armydays." The data for such studies were sub-mitted by the ports daily, and the analyseswere prepared by the Water Division andthe Control Division.61

In the spring of 1944, when every effortwas being made to get quick dispatch forthe vessels destined to Europe because ofthe impending invasion of Normandy,General Wylie, the Assistant Chief of Trans-portation for Operations, reported to Gen-eral Gross that the Army record at the portsserving the European theater was "notgood," but was improving. He found thatthe number of days on berth for vesselsloaded by the Army compared favorablywith that for vessels loaded by agents ofthe War Shipping Administration. Althoughthe average Army days had been reducedfrom 13.5 in January 1944 to 10.5 forFebruary, and again to 9.5 for March, hedoubted that the average over a longperiod would be better than 10 or 11 days,because of the number of specially stowedvessels required by the theater and theinadequacy of stevedore labor for the heavyjob to be done. Labor was a critical item,Wylie indicated, and he stated that a specialeffort was being made to improve thatsituation.62 General Franklin, Assistant

Chief of Transportation for Water, re-ported that there were not sufficient long-shoremen at New York for continuous dayand night operations, that the longshore-men were contending that the amount ofovertime worked already had reduced theirefficiency, and that the adoption of anover-all manpower utilization policy by allship operators was urgently needed to assuremaximum results from the labor available.63

An analysis of "Army days" in homeports, for more than 4,000 cargo vesselswhich sailed during 1944, as given in Table8, affords an opportunity for comparison ofthe records of the several Army ports. Thefigures for the ports of embarkation atBoston, New York, and Hampton Roads,which include sailings from the cargo portsat Searsport, Philadelphia, and Baltimore,respectively, show that an average of morethan thirty-two hours per ship was lostawaiting convoy departures; the averageswere low for other ports because they dis-patched few ships in convoy. At San Fran-cisco and Seattle (the data for the latterport embracing also the subports of Port-land and Prince Rupert), the amount oftime lost on account of repairs was largebecause of the numerous merchant andnaval vessels requiring repairs after long voy-ages in the Pacific and the inadequacy of re-pair facilities and labor at those ports.64 Timelost on account of repairs was exceptionallyhigh at Seattle, because most of the vessels inthe Alaska service were old and subjected

61 OCT Cir 59, 1 May 43, sub: Daily TeletypeRpt.

62 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 5 May 44, OCT HBWylie Staybacks.

63 Memo, Franklin for Gross, 28 April 44, OCTHB Wylie Port Capacity Studies.

64 SFPE Quarterly Progress Reports, Jan-Mar45, p. 15, and Apr-Jun 45, p. 14, OCT HB SFPE,show that on an average about 2 of 3 ships in portunder Army control were undergoing repair.


TABLE 8—TIME SPENT AT U.S. LOADING PORTS BY DRY CARGO VESSELS LOADED ATARMY PORTS OF EMBARKATION AND SAILED DURING THE PERIOD

FEBRUARY-DECEMBER 1944 a

a Subports and cargo ports are combined with the ports of embarkation to which they were subordinate.b Difference between total days and Army days represents time vessels allocated to Army by War Shipping Administration

spent in port under WSA control before being delivered to Army.

Source: ASF Monthly Progress Report, February 1945, Sec. 3, Transportation, p. 56. (Based on data compiled by the VesselOperations Analysis Branch, Water Division, OCT.)

to unusually hard usage in northern waters.65

The Seattle column also indicates ex-ceptional loss of time for other reasons. Theloss awaiting labor was due to the scarcityof longshoremen and the preference givento the loading of vessels under Soviet con-trol.66 The loss awaiting cargo resulted fromthe limited facilities of most of the Seattleship terminals, which prevented the assem-bling of sufficient cargo in advance ofthe vessels going on berth, and the con-gestion of the water front, which delayed

truck deliveries from storage. The loss ofloading time while the vessels were dis-charging also was due to the inadequatework space on the piers and bulkheads,which made it difficult to carry on dis-charging and loading operations at thesame time.

Control of Skip Utilization in the Theaters

While the enforcement of economy in theutilization of shipping at home portssuffered many handicaps, it was an evenmore difficult problem with respect to theoversea theaters. This was due in part toadverse conditions which prevailed in thetheaters and in part to the fact that eachoversea commander was concerned pri-marily with his own supply and transport

65 Conf, author with Col Thomas J. Weed, 21Jun 48, OCT HB Water Div Vessel Days in Port.Col Weed was Supt ATS at Seattle in 1942. Re-mainder of this paragraph is based on Col Weed'sremarks.

66 See also Ltr, Brig Gen Wylie to Brig Gen JohnF. York, Jr., The President's Soviet Protocol Com,5 Jul 44, AG 563.5 West Coast.


requirements, rather than with the over-allshipping situation, and the Army Chief ofTransportation had no direct control ofvessels after they arrived at oversea ports.Ships held in the theaters fell into threebroad categories: (1) those detained be-yond the normal period because of inabilityto discharge them promptly or uncertaintyas to when or where they should be dis-charged, (2) those retained temporarily forservice within the theaters, and (3) thoseassigned more or less permanently to thetheater commanders. The Chief of Trans-portation used the means at his disposal toreduce waste in theater shipping operations,but eventually action by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff was necessary.

The problem of ship detention in over-sea ports because of discharge difficultieswas encountered first in the Southwest andSouth Pacific during the 1942 effort tostrengthen the Allied position in those areasand to begin an offensive against theJapanese. Even at the well-developed portsof Melbourne and Sydney the discharge ofU.S. Army cargo was slow, because of theshortage of labor and equipment and therestrictive influence of the Australian laborunions.67 The situation was made moredifficult at the lesser Australian ports, suchas Brisbane and Townsville, by theirlimited docking facilities. The small port ofNoumea in New Caledonia was wholly in-adequate to handle the heavy traffic whichthe Army and the Navy concentrated therein connection with the defense of the NewHebrides and the offensive in the Solomons,

and a heavy backlog of undischarged vesselssoon developed. A similar experience wasencountered at Espiritu Santo when theuse of that port was begun as a means ofrelieving Noumea. The problem was ac-centuated at Noumea and Espiritu Santoby lack of co-ordination between the Armyand the Navy until joint port operation wasestablished.68 The Army Chief of Trans-portation provided equipment and trooplabor to the extent of his resources, and theNavy did likewise, but the supply fell farshort of meeting the requirements in thePacific. Those requirements were neverstatic but expanded constantly as the Alliedcampaign moved northward and westwardand one primitive port after another wasset up as a base for further offensive action.

The retention of vessels by oversea com-manders for intratheater use affected themovement of troops and supplies from thezone of interior to the theaters, since therewas an over-all shortage of shipping. Ifmade without approval of the War De-partment such retentions upset the move-ment plans of the General Staff, whichwere based on the Chief of Transportation'sestimate of available vessels. Accordingly, itwas agreed between the War Departmentand the War Shipping Administration thatarrangements between theater commandersand the oversea representatives of WSA re-garding retentions would not be permittedexcept in emergencies and that theater re-quests for vessels would be directed to theChief of Transportation, who would make

67 Memo, C of Trans Sv USAFIA for G-4USAFIA, 24 Apr 42, quoted as reference 11 (a)in history of TG in Australia, Vol. I, 1942, OCTHB SWPA; Memo, Lt Col Alfred W. Parry and LtCol Rudolph G. Lehnau for Gen Robinson, ContlDiv ASF, 12 May 43, sub: Rpt on Insp Trip, OCTHB Gross Pacific Theater.

68 Memo, CG SvC Noumea for CG SOS SPA,19 Dec 42, sub: Congestion of Shipping atNoumea, OCT HB SPA New Caledonia; Rad, CGSOS WD for CG SOS SPA, 24 Jan 43, OCT HBMeyer Staybacks; Memo, CG SOS WD for VCNOUSN, 12 Mar 43, sub: Congestion at Noumea andEspiritu Santo, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Memo,Gross for Styer, 11 Mar 43, OCT HB Gross PacificTheater.


the necessary arrangements with WSAheadquarters.69

The vessel requirements for intratheatershipments were especially heavy in theSouthwest Pacific where each advanceagainst the enemy was dependent on theavailability of bottoms.70 The early needsof this theater were met principally withBritish, Dutch, and Norwegian vessels,although a limited number of Americanships were used.71 A call by General Mac-Arthur for additional vessels in September1942 found all available shipping com-mitted to the support of the impendinginvasion of North Africa.72 During thefollowing spring the progress of the cam-paign in the Mediterranean and the build-up of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom,which were the major undertakings of thatperiod, placed a heavy strain on U.S. ship-ping resources and severely limited thenumber of vessels that could be assigned tothe Southwest Pacific.73 When in August1943 General MacArthur indicated that alarge additional permanent assignment ofshipping was absolutely necessary to thelaunching of a sustained drive against the

Japanese, the problem was placed beforethe Combined Chiefs of Staff, then in ses-sion at Quebec, and the maximum assign-ment was worked out.74 It was made clearto General MacArthur, however, that abil-ity to permanently assign additional vesselsto him and still maintain an adequateschedule of transpacific sailings dependedon his early release of vessels which he hadtemporarily retained under emergency ar-rangements with the representative of theWar Shipping Administration in Australia.75

While theater retentions could be regu-lated in Washington, theoretically at least,the problem of slow oversea discharge wasless amenable to control. Early in 1943 theSan Francisco Port of Embarkation ex-pressed the view that too many ports stillwere operating at peacetime tempo andproposed measures to correct the situation.The proposed measures were not adopted,no doubt because of the Chief of Trans-portation's lack of authority in the overseacommands, but the discussion of them ledto the institution of semimonthly radio re-ports, to be submitted by all oversea theatersand bases, giving data regarding the num-ber of ships in each port and the progressmade in their discharge.76 While the detailsof this plan were being worked out, the de-sirability of such reports was emphasizedby General Somervell, who had visited theNorth African ports after the Casablanca

69 Rad, CG SOS to CG USAFIA, 27 Jul 42,OCT HB Meyer Staybacks; Rad, CG SOS toETOUSA, 30 Sep 42, OCT HB Meyer Staybacks;Ltr, CG ASF to CofS AFHQ North Africa, 17Apr 43, OCT HB Gross Day File.

70 See Rad, MacArthur to Somervell, 12 Jun 42,CM-IN 7259. In addition to transoceanic vessels,SWPA needed great numbers of smaller craft forcoastwise and interisland operation.

71 Ltr, WSA to Trans Sv SOS, 3 Jul 42, OCTHB Wylie Australia Mar 42-Jul 44. This file in-cludes correspondence indicating numerous prob-lems of control in connection with foreign flagvessels used in SWPA.

72 Ltr, MacArthur to Somervell, 9 Sep 42; Hand-written Memo, Wylie for Gross, 26 Sep 42. Bothin OCT HB Wylie Australia, Mar 42-Jul 44.

73 Memo, Somervell for Douglas (WSA), 10 Mar43, sub: Shipping Requirements for U.S. ArmyForces, OCT 563.5 Misc.

74 Rad, MacArthur to CG ASF, 14 Aug 43(CM-IN 10721, 15 Aug 43); Rad from Quebec,Somervell to MacArthur, 18 Aug 43 (WDCM-IN 13773, 19 Aug 43).

75 Rad, MacArthur to WD, 19 Aug 43, CM-IN14061; Rad from Quebec, Somervell to Mac-Arthur, 23 Aug 43 (WD CM-IN 17632, 24 Aug43); Rad, Quebec to MacArthur, 24 Aug 43, WDCM-IN 18280.

76 Telg, SFPE to CofT, 8 Jan 43 (CM-IN 3679,9 Jan 43); Memo, Brig Gen Wylie for Lt ColMeyer, 17 Jan 43, OCT HB Wylie Urgent Mat-ters 1943.


Conference.77 From the data contained inthese radiograms the Control Division inthe Office of the Chief of Transportationprepared semimonthly summaries whichcompared the records of the several overseacommands and the individual overseaports.78

Copies of the summaries of port per-formance were sent to the oversea com-manders, and the rivalry which they createdproved stimulating and soon was evidencedin improved dispatch of vessels in certainareas.79 In the beginning they were con-fined to statistics, but later comments onthe performances of the several ports andsuggestions for the improvement of cargohandling were included. During a visit tothe Pacific in the fall of 1943, General Grossobserved that many port commanders werenot receiving the summaries from theirtheater headquarters, and he instructed thatthereafter copies be sent directly fromWashington to the oversea ports.80

A study of the number of ships held inoversea ports more than ten days, duringthe period February 1943-July 1944, ispresented graphically in Chart 6. The study,which excluded ships authorized for reten-tion by or on permanent assignment to thetheaters, showed that improvement tookplace in most areas during 1943, but thatthe number of 10-day vessels increasedgreatly in the North African theater in con-

nection with the invasions of Sicily andItaly. The latter development was due tothe limited port facilities, the necessity ofholding ships for westbound convoys, andthe theater's policy of accumulating largequantities of supplies in North Africa wherethey were sorted and reloaded for move-ment to the invasion areas—a plan whichGeneral Gross considered wasteful in viewof the possibility of direct shipment fromU.S. ports to the invasion areas.81 Duringthe first half of 1944 the number of 10-dayvessels in the Mediterranean declinedsharply but there were increases in thePacific and European theaters in connectionwith actual or impending combat opera-tions.

Consideration of Chart 6 must take intoaccount the fact that during the periodunder review the total number of vessels inArmy service was almost trebled. The studydisclosed that, in proportion to the totalnumber of cargo ships in Army service, thenumber of 10-day ships in oversea ports wasless at the end of the period than at thebeginning; also that the average days spentin port beyond 10 days decreased from 18to 7. Nevertheless, the number of vesselsheld in the theaters for abnormally longperiods was greater than could be sanc-tioned, in view of the over-all shortage ofshipping. The study gave a clear emphasisto the fact that intensified combat activity

77 Memo for Gen Gross, 19 Feb 43, OCT HBWylie Urgent Matters 1943; Memo, C of ContlDiv OCT for Col Stone, 10 Apr 43, OCT 565.2Turnaround.

78 Preparation of summaries later was transferredto Water Div, OCT. Beginning Jan 45 they wereissued monthly instead of semimonthly. Incompleteset is in OCT HB Water Div Vessel UtilizationRpts.

79 Memo, Gen Somervell for Admiral King, 26May 43, ASF Hq Navy 1942-44.

80 Ltr, Gross to Wylie, par. 10, 26 Sep 43, OCTHB Wylie Ltrs from Gross.

81 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 18 Apr 43, sub:Early Date, HUSKY, OCT HB Wylie Shipping Re-quirements and Allocations 1943. The peak of theMediterranean congestion was reached on 11 Oct43, when there were 394 Allied ocean-goingvessels in African, Sicilian, and Italian ports, ofwhich 73 were known to be awaiting berths and100 were not accounted for. See Memo, Col Stokesfor Col Bathurst, 9 Nov 43, sub: JCS 569, OCTHB Plng Div Gen; see also Ltr, CofT ASF toCofT AFHQ North Africa, 25 Nov 43, ASF HqTrans 1943.


CHART 6—U.S. DRY-CARGO SHIPS EMPLOYED IN TRANSOCEANIC SERVICE FOR THEARMY HELD IN OVERSEA PORTS MORE THAN TEN DAYS: FEBRUARY 1943-JULY 1944.*

*Based on number of ships in ports more than ten days at the time reports were made.Source: ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Transportation, Aug 44, p. 48.

in a theater involves increased shippingschedules and is very likely to result inslower dispatch for cargo vessels in the portsof that theater.

The delays suffered by shipping in thePacific and the Mediterranean during 1942and 1943 foreshadowed an even more ser-ious situation which developed in 1944 inconnection with the invasion of France andthe accentuated drive against the Japanese.In compliance with requests from Armycommanders of the European and Pacifictheaters, an increasing number of ships wasdispatched from the zone of interior, withthe full realization that all could not bedischarged promptly, but with no anticipa-tion of the excessive delays which actuallywould be experienced. By August 1944 the

number of ships being detained in thoseareas had reached a point where it adverselyaffected the over-all movement of suppliesfrom United States ports.82 At that timeGeneral Wylie informed General Gross thatall possible pressure was being placed on thetheaters to bring about a speedier return ofvessels. That pressure did not accomplishthe desired results, however, and the situa-tion went from bad to worse until moredrastic means were employed. Since thedevelopments in the several theaters in-volved different circumstances, separateconsideration is necessary.

In approaching the subject with referenceto northern France, it is necessary to bear

82 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 12 Aug 44, sub: TrMvmt Trends, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.


in mind that the year 1944 witnessed themost intensive and at the same time themost critical invasion operation of the war.83

The influence of the invasion on the move-ment of Army cargo to the European thea-ter is seen in the fact that whereas duringthe six-month period, October 1943-March1944, a monthly average of 85 fully loadeddry-cargo vessels was dispatched from U.S.ports, 133 were dispatched in the followingApril, and the number had increased to 194by August.84

During August 1944 the War Depart-ment became deeply concerned because ofthe European theater's continued demandfor more sailings from the United States,the small number of vessels actually dis-charged at Continental ports, the growingbacklog of undischarged vessels, and theapparent desire of theater officials to havea bank of 100 to 150 vessels on hand at alltimes.85 As a corrective measure, the theaterwas informed that each of the next six con-voys would be reduced by ten ships. Butearly October found the situation worserather than better. The theater then wasadvised, on recommendation of the Chiefof Transportation, that sailings for October,November, and December would be pro-grammed on the basis of its demonstratedability to unload the ships, with the objectof reducing the number of cargo vessels in

Continental waters to between 75 and 85.86

The theater expressed great alarm at thisaction, and stated that it expected to dis-charge 150 ships in October, 200 in Novem-ber, and 270 in December.87 But the Chiefof Transportation adhered to his plan andconvoy program, and in a further exchangeof messages again explained to the theaterthat the continued use of so many vesselsfor storage purposes could not be permittedin view of the world-wide critical shippingshortage.88 Meantime, the War Depart-ment had proposed and the theater hadagreed that General Franklin, AssistantChief of Transportation for Water Activi-ties, should be detailed to the theater forabout two months to assist in clearing upthe shipping situation.89

General Franklin arrived in Europe on28 October. In order to facilitate theaccomplishment of his mission he was ap-pointed Assistant Chief of Transportation,Communications Zone, European Theaterof Operations, U.S. Army (COMZONE,ETOUSA), in charge of the Marine Op-erations Division. His early reports con-firmed the suspicion which had existed inWashington that, in addition to the insuf-ficiency of available port facilities for theprompt discharge of so many vessels, therewas a necessity in the theater of using shipsfor storage because of the lack of adequate

83 A more extensive account of the shipping crisisin ETO than can be given here is presented inOCT HB Monograph 29, pp. 361-88.

84 Statistical table, Number of Cargo Ships Sail-ing to United Kingdom, prepared by Vessel OpnsAnalysis Br Water Div OCT, 8 Oct 45, OCT HBWater Div Vessel Opns Analysis.

85 Rad, to ETOUSA, WAR 76034, 4 Aug 44;Rad, from ETOUSA, 42044 (CM-IN 15642, 17Aug 44); Rad, personal Gross to Somervell (thenin ETO), WAR 81787, 16 Aug 44; Rad, toETOUSA, WAR 81853, 16 Aug 44; Rad, toETOUSA, WAR 89859, 31 Aug 44; Rad, fromETOUSA, 46204 (CM-IN 13093, 14 Sep 44).

86 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 5 Oct 44, OCTHB Gross ETOUSA Ship Situation; Rad, toETOUSA, WARX 42318, 5 Oct 44.

87 Rad, from ETOUSA, 8 Oct 44 (CM-IN 8626,9 Oct 44).

88 Rad, to ETOUSA, WARX 43793, 9 Oct 44;Rad, from ETOUSA, 26 Oct 44 (CM-IN 25856,27 Oct 44); Rad, to ETOUSA, WARX 53834, 28Oct 44.

89 Rad, Marshall to Eisenhower, WAR 49595, 20Oct 44; Rad, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Oct 44(CM-IN 20423, 22 Oct 44) ; Ltr, CofT ASF toCofT COMZONE ETOUSA, 24 Oct 44, OCT HBGross Day File.


depots and dumps.90 Franklin reported thatG-4, COMZONE, ETOUSA, had com-pletely controlled the theater supply pro-gram, with only nominal co-ordination withthe theater Chief of Transportation, Maj.Gen. Frank S. Ross; that the G-4 requestsfor more shiploads of supplies were basedon unrealistic estimates of the theater's ca-pacity to discharge; that in G-4 the result-ant backlog of undischarged ships was con-sidered unavoidable, and even beneficial inthat it allowed a high degree of selectivity inputting supplies ashore.91

From his discussion of the subject withGeneral Eisenhower, Franklin gained theimpression that the Supreme Commanderhad not been kept fully informed regardingthe shipping backlog. But an exchange ofradiograms between Generals Somervelland Eisenhower in early November dis-closed that the latter, despite the fact thatthere then were over 240 cargo vessels in thetheater for Continental discharge, of whichonly about 60 actually were being dis-charged, believed that the increased use ofRouen and Le Havre and the prospectiveopening of Antwerp would enable thetheater to meet its discharge estimates.92

The Chief of Transportation again stoodfirm in his determination to reduce the sail-ings from U.S. ports until the rate of dis-charge in the theater actually had been in-creased. He also requested the theater toreturn some of the 61 vessels which it had

retained for use in moving motor vehiclesand stores from the United Kingdom tothe Continent.93

It was evident up to this point that littleprogress had been made in harmonizing theWar Department and the theater points ofview. Recognizing this, and recognizing alsothe seriousness of the shipping situation,particularly as it related to his ammunitionsupply, General Eisenhower arranged latein November for three of his high-rankingofficers, together with General Franklin, toproceed to Washington for a full discussionof the matter.94

After the return of these officers to thetheater on 5 December, concrete steps weretaken to regulate the shipping situation.95

A Shipping Control Committee was set up,consisting of Maj. Gen. Royal B. Lord,Chief of Staff, COMZONE, Brig. Gen.James H. Stratton, Assistant Chief of Staff,G-4, COMZONE, and General Franklin,to study port conditions and bring thetheater's requests for supplies within thequantities that could be landed. Procedureswere established in the office of the theaterchief of transportation whereby scheduleddischarge and actual performance werecompared daily, and estimates of future op-erations and shipping schedules were

90 Rad, to ETOUSA, WARX 56447, 2 Nov 44.91 Ltr, Franklin to Gross, 5 Nov 44, OCT HB

Gross ETO; Memo, Franklin for CofT ASF, par.3c, 19 Jan 45, OCT HB Gross ETO; History ofG-4, COMZONE, ETOUSA, Sec. I, p. 83, OCMH.

92 Rad, Eisenhower to Somervell (CM-IN4960, 5 Nov 44); Memo, Franklin for CofT ASF,par. 3b, 19 Jan 45, OCT HB Gross ETO. Thetotal of 243 cargo vessels in ETO for Continentaldischarge on 30 Oct 44 consisted mostly of vesselsloaded in U.S. but included some loaded in UK.

93 Rad, to ETOUSA, WARX 58388, 6 Nov 44;Memo, C of Ship Contl Br Contl Div OCT forCol Meyer, 21 Nov 44, OCT HB Water Div VesselOpns Analysis; Rad to ETOUSA, WARX 66841,22 Nov 44. Authorized retentions in ETO alreadyhad been reduced from 152 on D Day. See statisti-cal table, Vessels Retained in Theaters, OCT HBWater Div Vessel Opns Analysis.

94 Memo, CofT for ACofS OPD WDGS, 11 Nov44, sub: Cargo Shipping for ETO, OCT HB WylieStaybacks; Ltr, CofS USA for Mr. James F. Byrnes,Dir Office of War Mobilization, 22 Nov 44; Memo,ACofS OPD for CG ASF, etc., 25 Nov 44. Last twoin OCT HB Gross ETO.

95 Ltrs, Franklin to Gross, 11 Dec 44 and 31Dec 44; Memo, Franklin for CofT ASF, par. 5,19 Jan 45. All in OCT HB Gross ETO.


reviewed and revised when necessary. ADiversion Committee was established to ar-range the allocation of vessels to dischargeports and assure their prompt assignmentto berths.

The opening of Antwerp to Allied trafficon 28 November brought general relief tothe shipping situation in northern Europe.The difficulty of making full use of thislarge port, because of the limited capacityof forward dumps to receive supplies, waspartially overcome by storing the cargoesin the port area. This procedure, which wasapplied also at Le Havre, naturally resultedin a rapid accumulation of matériel incovered and open storage at the ports andtherefore interfered with operations in gen-eral. Because of this situation, GeneralGross, who visited the theater briefly inDecember, arranged to detail Col. Leo J.Coughlin, chief of his Transit Storage Divi-sion, to ETOUSA to aid the theater chiefof transportation in working out a plan toimprove port fluidity.96

General Franklin returned to the UnitedStates on 13 January 1945 and reportedthat the primary purpose of his mission,which was to bring the theater shippingprogram and its capacity to receive cargointo balance, had been accomplished.97 Hebelieved that the procedures established andthe control responsibility assigned to thetheater Chief of Transportation wouldassure the maintenance of that balance.Franklin remarked, however, that the estab-lishment of intermediate depots with suffi-cient capacity to accommodate supplieswhich the forward dumps could not receive—a development considered necessary as a

means of relieving the ports of congestion—remained to be accomplished, although ac-tion in that direction had been initiated.In mid-February Lt. Gen. John C. H.Lee, Commanding General, COMZONE,ETOUSA, stated that the discharge rateand the movement forward from the portswere at last showing signs of consistent im-provement.98

The status of the cargo ships which hadbeen loaded in the United States for dis-charge in northern Continental ports, from1 September 1944 to 31 March 1945, isshown in Chart 7. The large accumulationof idle vessels in Europe during October andNovember and the effect of that backlog onthe number of vessels permitted to sail toEurope are clearly evident. As soon as thenumber of vessels awaiting call to dischargeports and waiting at the ports to begin dis-charge was substantially reduced, the num-ber en route from the United States in-creased.

Appraisal of the theater's responsibilityfor this shipping crisis must take into ac-count a number of facts. The military op-eration, as General Eisenhower pointed out,was of unprecedented scope and character,and the logistical problems involved werenot solvable merely by the application ofexisting rules.99 After the break-through atSt. Lo, the campaign progressed with un-foreseen rapidity, and it was not unnaturalthat theater personnel responsible for thesupply of the forces should have concernedthemselves first with the avoidance of maté-riel shortages, rather than with the world-wide shipping situation. In COMZONE,action was dominated by supply considera-tions, and, acting without due advice from

96 See Rpt, Col Coughlin to Maj Gen Frank S.Ross, CofT COMZONE ETOUSA, 19 Feb 45,OCT HB ETO France Ports.

97 Memo for CofT ASF, par. 6, 19 Jan 45,OCT HB Gross ETO.

98 Ltr, Lee to Somervell, 17 Feb 45, OCT HBGross ETO.

99 Rad to Somervell, 5 Nov 44, CM-IN 4960.


CHART 7—STATUS OF DRY-CARGO VESSELS LOADED BY THE U.S. ARMY AT U.S. PORTSFOR DISCHARGE IN NORTHERN CONTINENTAL EUROPE:

1 SEPTEMBER 1944-31 MARCH 1945.

*Separate data not available for September 1944.

Source: Data compiled by Vessel Opns Analysis Branch, Water Div, OCT; published in ASF MPR, Sec. 3, issued duringthe period, or on file in Statistics and Progress Branch, Management Div, OCT.

the theater Chief of Transportation, G-4failed to allow for contingencies and tooktoo optimistic a view of the capacity of theports to discharge and forward cargo.100 Anumber of French ports which had beenincluded in the early planning were notcaptured or were not usable when captured,and other French and Belgian ports did notbecome available until much later than hadbeen anticipated. The large number oftrucks required for the support of theArmies in their drive across France reducedthe number of vehicles available for mov-

ing cargoes out of the ports.101 The swiftmilitary developments and the possibility ofan early termination of hostilities for a timeleft room for doubt as to the need for anextensive intermediate depot system to func-tion between the ports and the forwarddumps.102 A large proportion of the vesselsdispatched from U.S. ports were so-calledcommodity-loaders, each containing sup-plies of the same type or related types and

100 See Rpt, ACofS G-4 COMZONE ETOUSA,Shipping Situation and Supply Requirements, 1Dec 44, p. 2, OCT HB ETO France Ports.

101 Ltr, Gen Ross to Dr. H. Larson, Trans SecOCMH, 26 Apr 50, OCT HB ETO France Ports.

102 See Rpt, Gen Bd ETO, sub: Supply andMaintenance on the European Continent (Study130), pp. 65, 116, OCT HB ETO Gen Bd Rpts;Rpt, Maj Gen LeR. Lutes to Gen Somervell, 24Jan 45, sub: Mission to ETO, 4 Dec 44-13 Jan45, pp. 3, 248, AG Hist Rec Sec.


loaded well in advance of the actual needfor the supplies; therefore a strict observ-ance of priorities was not possible and muchmatériel not currently needed arrived inEuropean waters.103

In the Mediterranean the accumulationof shipping, which had developed in con-nection with the invasion of Sicily and Italyand then had subsided, again appeared asthe time approached for the invasion ofsouthern France in August 1944. Whilemany ports were used in mounting this in-vasion the chief burden fell on Naples,which also was the principal port of entryfor supplies used in the campaign up theItalian boot.104 As in the case of northernFrance, pressure was exerted by the Chiefof Transportation to speed up the dischargeof vessels and to hasten the return of shipswhich had been temporarily assigned forintratheater operation. In this instancebetter results were obtained.105 The openingof the port of Marseille to Allied vesselsearly in September was followed by a closeregulation of traffic within the Mediter-ranean, and a judicious restraint was exer-cised in calling for more supplies from thezone of interior. In late July, just prior tothe assault, there were 138 cargo vessels inthe Mediterranean theater earmarked foruse in the invasion.106 On 30 October there

were 62 U.S.-loaded cargo vessels discharg-ing or awaiting discharge in southern France,25 vessels were en route from the UnitedStates, and an undetermined number of the62 retentions which were charged to theMediterranean theater were being used tomove intratheater cargo to southernFrance.107 By late November the danger ofserious ship congestion in the south ofFrance had passed and it was found expedi-ent to divert to Marseille a limited numberof vessels originally planned for discharge atnorthern French ports.108

The fact that shipping was handled moresuccessfully in southern France than in thenorth was due in part to the promptnesswith which Marseille and other southernports were brought under U.S. control,but an additional factor was the position ofauthority awarded to Brig. Gen. GeorgeC. Stewart, first as Chief of Transportation,Services of Supply, Mediterranean Theaterof Operations (SOS, MTOUSA), and lateras Transportation Officer, Southern Linesof Communication (SOLOC), ETOUSA,and the consequent closer co-ordination be-tween supply requisitions and port dischargeand clearance capabilities.109

The port congestion in the SouthwestPacific Area, which had disturbed the Chiefof Transportation from 1942, took on amuch more serious aspect in the fall of1944 in connection with the invasion ofLeyte. Its significance from the standpoint ofthe general shipping shortage was heightened

103 See Rad, Somervell to Eisenhower, WARX56447, p. 3, 2 Nov 44.

104 Memo, Gen Lutes ACofS ASF for CofT, 25Jul 44; Memo, ACofT for Gen Lutes, 12 Aug 44.Both in OCT HB Wylie Staybacks.

105 Rad, CG AFHQ Caserta to WD, 16 Jul 44(CM-IN 13484, 17 Jul 44), OCT HB WylieShipping for Med Opns 1944; Ltr, CofT ASF toBrig Gen George C. Stewart CofT MTOUSA,9 Sep 44, OCT HB Gross Med Theater; Rad to CGMTOUSA, 23 Nov 44, OCT HB Wylie Staybacks;Ltr, CofT ASF to Gen Stewart Trans Off SOLOCETO, 5 Dec 44, OCT HB Gross ETO.

106 Summary of Med Cargo Activity, based onCM-IN 16875, 20 Jul 44, OCT HB Wylie Shippingfor Med Opns 1944.

107 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 44, pp. 56, 60.108 Rad to CG ETOUSA, 24 Nov 44, OCT HB

Wylie Staybacks; Memo, Wylie for Somervell, 1Jan 45, sub: ETO Shipping Situation, OCT HBWylie Staybacks; Ltr, Lt Gen J. C. G. Lee, CGCOMZONE ETOUSA, to Gen Somervell, 17 Feb45, OCT HB Gross ETO.

109 See Ltr, Stewart to Gross, 23 Aug 44, OCTHB Gross ETO. SOLOC was established in ETOin Nov 44. OCT HB Monograph 29, p. 301.


by the concurrent immobilization of a greatnumber of cargo vessels in Europeanwaters. In SWPA the problem involved notonly the shipping engaged in transpacificservice but also the large number of shipstemporarily retained in the theater or per-manently assigned to it. Between early Sep-tember 1944 and mid-November the num-ber of transpacific vessels en route to orarrived in SWPA increased from 110 to197, and the number of ocean-going vesselsemployed within the theater increased from235 to 279.110 During this period the num-ber of vessels of both categories which wereidle waiting to discharge or load mountedsteadily.

Beginning early in November the Chiefof Transportation adopted aggressive meas-ures in his effort to improve the situationin the Southwest Pacific.111 Although thetheater promised improved discharge, Gen-eral Gross and his staff foresaw that thismeasure alone would not solve the problemand that a reduction of sailings from theUnited States and a curtailment of theaterretentions were necessary. On 4 November,according to Washington records, 180 ves-sels were committed to the Leyte operation,including those already at Leyte, those inthe theater loaded or scheduled to load forLeyte, and those en route from U.S. ports.112

It was obvious to the Washington author-ities, in view of the limited facilities at Leyteand interruptions caused by suicide planesand other enemy activities, that the dis-charge of so many ships could not be ac-

complished without long delays. The theaterwas urged, therefore, to "tailor" its ship-ping program to a "realistic discharge capa-bility."

On 22 November 1944 the War Depart-ment informed General MacArthur that theworld-wide shipping situation had been pre-sented to the President, who had instructedthe Joint Chiefs of Staff to take immediatesteps to reduce the number of idle cargovessels overseas.113 He was urged at thattime to limit the number of retentions in theSouthwest Pacific to 170, despite the factthat a larger number had been authorized.On 8 December SWPA was instructed toreduce its retentions to 100 by 15 January1945 and also was informed that the num-ber of sailings from the United Stateswould be reduced. 114

The theater vigorously protested these ac-tions. It stated that the shipping backlogwas the result of adverse weather, enemyinterference, and a major change in opera-tional plans which had advanced the cam-paign by two months. General MacArthur,in a personal message to General Somervell,recommended that the contemplated cur-tailment of shipping be postponed for twomonths until success was assured for thecampaign, which was then approaching thecritical phase.115 He had in mind, of course,the invasion of Luzon, which began 9 Janu-ary 1945. The War Department insisted,however, that its program made generousprovision for all contingencies and pointedout that supplies could be delivered to thetheater at a faster rate when the shipping

110 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 44, p. 63.111 Rad to SWPA, WARX 58097, 5 Nov 44;

Rad from SWPA, 9 Nov 44, CM-IN 8563; Rad toSWPA, WARX 61746, 11 Nov 44.

112 Rad to SWPA, WARX 64641, 17 Nov 44.The theater reported 141 ships committed to Leyteas of 15 Nov 44, according to its records.

113 Rad, WAR 67064.114 Rad, WAR 74552.115 Rad from SWPA, 23 Nov 44 (CM-IN

23048, 24 Nov 44); Rad, MacArthur to Somervell,11 Dec 44 (CM-IN 12436, 13 Dec 44).


congestion had been reduced and vesselturnaround improved.116

The measures by the War Department,together with actions taken concurrently bythe Joint Chiefs of Staff, brought results. Adetailed study of the shipping situation inthe Philippine area, made by theater offi-cials in January 1945 at the request of theChief of Transportation, indicated that thetheater, although still somewhat too op-timistic in its estimate of discharge cap-ability, was nevertheless approaching thesubject with a new point of view and under-stood the War Department's position.117

The number of ocean-going vessels en-gaged in moving cargo to and within theSouthwest Pacific Area prior to the Germansurrender reached a peak of approximately500 on 20 January 1945, of which about200 were in transpacific service and about300 employed within the theater.118 DuringFebruary the number of vessels in servicewithin the theater leveled off to about 200,near which figure it remained until V-JDay.119 The number of transpacific vesselsen route to or arrived in SWPA also de-clined, and on V-E Day it stood at 118.After V-E Day the number of transpacificvessels mounted rapidly and reached a peakof about 450 in mid-August 1945. The lastfigure included about 300 vessels whichwere in service between the United Statesand the theater and about 150 which werebeing redeployed from Europe. The situa-tion arising from this new influx of shippingwill be discussed later.

The circumstances cited by the theaterin explanation of the congestion whichexisted in the Southwest Pacific during late1944 and early 1945—particularly thechanges in strategic plans and their disturb-ing effect on the program for "rolling up"supplies, equipment, and troops from rearbases to forward areas—unquestionablyhad much to do with the developmentof the unhealthy shipping situation. Thenecessity of utilizing primitive ports, such asHollandia and Finschhafen, in support oflarge combat operations, and the lack ofadequate floating equipment, warehouses,dumps, trucks, and labor at such ports, con-stituted serious handicaps. 120 The inabilityto enforce a program of priorities becauseof uncertainty as to when and where spe-cific supplies would be needed and the lackof adequate facilities for unloading, storing,and sorting such supplies resulted in a prac-tice of "selective discharge" which keptmany vessels out of active service. Thispractice involved unloading only the itemswhich were needed immediately and leav-ing the balance of the cargoes in the shipsfor future discharge. An order issued inOctober by the Chief Regulating Officer,GHQ, SWPA, that selective dischargeshould be confined to cases of absolute ne-cessity had only limited effect, because thedecision as to when absolute necessityexisted rested entirely with local officialswhose views were governed by local con-siderations.121

While physical conditions and strategicdevelopments were unfavorable to the ex-

116 Rad, Somervell to MacArthur, WARX 76544,13 Dec 44.

117 Memo, Wylie for Gross, 22 Jan 45, sub:Southwest Pacific Situation, OCT HB Wylie Ship-ping in Pacific 1944-45.

118 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Feb 45, p. 50.119 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Mar 45, p. 46; Aug 45, p.

48.

120 See Ltrs, Mr. H. L. Schage, WSA RegionalDir for Forward Areas, SWPA, to WSA officers inU.S., 24 Nov 44, 27 Nov 44, 28 Nov 44, 9 Dec 44,9 Jan 45, OCT HB Wylie Shipping in Pacific1944-45.

121 Order to all Regulating Officers, 20 Oct 44,OCT HB Wylie Shipping in Pacific 1944-45.


peditious dispatch of ships, administrationalso had a bearing on the problem in theSouthwest Pacific Area. The preparationand execution of theater shipping programswere controlled, from November 1943, bythe Chief Regulating Officer, who was at-tached to General Headquarters. The func-tion of this officer was to assign priorities tomovements of troops and matériel by water,rail, and air, and to co-ordinate movementsso as to obtain the maximum service fromall transportation resources. His attachmentto the theater GHQ is explained by the factthat his task involved the traffic and themeans of transport of all forces operatingin the theater—the U.S. Army, the U.S.Navy, and the forces of our Allies.122

Reference was made in Chapter III tothe fact that the Chief of Transportation,U.S. Army Services of Supply (USASOS),was not given the recognition and authorityin SWPA which General Gross believed heshould have had. This was true before theestablishment of a chief regulating officerand it was increasingly so thereafter. Thechief regulating officer placed representa-tives at the important bases in the theaterand exercised his prerogatives broadly. Ac-cording to Maj. Gen. James L. Frink, Com-mander of USASOS, the CRO organiza-tion had "complete control of all vessels"and what amounted to "the managementof the transportation system of the thea-

ter."123 Col. William W. Wanamaker,Chief of Transportation, USASOS, re-ported to General Gross that the GHQRegulating System was "on record as run-ning shipping" and that it was proud ofits control; in late November 1944 he statedthat he had just had his first opportunityto attend a GHQ meeting with regard toshipping and to present his views.124 TheDeputy Chief Regulating Officer, on theother hand, asserted that the responsibleofficers of G-4 and USASOS insisted onmoving supplies forward regardless of hisrecommendation that they be retarded,were ineffective in their planning, andfailed to supervise the loading of vesselsadequately. He stated also that after shipshad been loaded at rear bases in the theatertheir movement forward was controlled bythe commander of the port of destinationand the Navy, not by the CRO.125

Whatever the merits of the respectivepositions, there evidently was a lack of un-derstanding and co-operation within thetheater regarding the use of shipping. Inthe Office of the Chief of Transportation inWashington it was felt that, had the chief oftransportation for the U.S. Army in SWPA,as technical transportation officer of theforce which moved the bulk of the suppliesto and within the theater and provided thebulk of the shipping, been given a greatervoice in the control of movements and the

122 History of the General Headquarters Regu-lating System, prepared in the Office of the ChiefRegulating Officer, GHQ, SWPA, 31 Aug 45,OCMH; Rpt, Col H. Bennett Whipple, DeputyCRO, GHQ Regulating System, 15 Jan 45, OCTHB SWPA CRO; Monograph, U.S. Army Trans-portation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947,by James R. Masterson, Ch. XV, OCT HB Mono-graphs.

123 Memo for COMINCH SWPA, 19 May 44,sub: GHQ Regulating System, and atchd Memo,same date and title, OCT HB Exec Trans OpnsSWPA.

124 Ltr to CofT ASF, 27 Nov 44, last par., OCTHB SWPA Philippines Misc.

125 Ltrs, Col. H. Bennett Whipple to Col. LukeW. Finlay, 24 Oct 44, 26 Oct 44, 23 Nov 44, 26 Dec44, OCT HB Exec Trans Opns SWPA; Rpt, Col.H. Bennett Whipple, 21 Nov 44; Ltrs, Whipple toFinlay, Exec OCT ASF, 3 Dec 44, 12 Jan 45, 22Jan 45. Last four in OCT HB Wylie Shipping inPacific 1944-45.


utilization of vessels, the congestion whichdeveloped could have been at least ameli-orated. In the Southwest Pacific, as inNorthern Europe, the co-ordination be-tween supply movements and the capabil-ities of the ports to receive and distributethe cargoes appears to have been inade-quate, with supply considerations dominat-ing.126

When General Wylie visited GeneralMacArthur in Manila in April 1945, thelatter took full responsibility for the ship-ping congestion which had developed dur-ing the campaign to recapture the Philip-pines. He believed that the hastening of themilitary advance justified the logistical con-fusion which resulted. But it is doubtful thatGeneral MacArthur, concerned primarilywith the success of his own combat opera-tions, was fully aware of the seriousness ofthe world-wide shipping situation until itwas forcefully brought to his notice by thePresident's intervention, or that he realizedthat the congestion in SWPA might havebeen relieved, without jeopardy to his mili-tary plans, by concerted action within hisown command.127

The intervention of the President in theshipping crisis and the actions taken there-after by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were pre-cipitated by an urgent plea by the WarShipping Administrator for vigorous andco-ordinated action. The administrator wasunder constant pressure to provide morevessels for the military programs and to cur-tail the lend-lease and other nonmilitary

programs to that end. Under these circum-stances it seemed inexcusable, from his pointof view, that so many cargo ships should beimmobilized in the theaters and that thearmed forces should not have taken effectiveaction to rectify that situation. The WarShipping Administrator stated that on 15November 1944 there were nearly 400WSA-controlled vessels retained in the thea-ters for local use and that about 350 vesselswhich had been allocated to the Army andthe Navy for transoceanic service werelying idle overseas.128

The fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staffpresented this matter to the President indi-cates that the military authorities in Wash-ington were well aware of the difficulties ofthe problem and that they believed the au-thority of the Chief Executive was neededin support of any drastic action to regulatethe use of vessels in the theaters. The Presi-dent's response to JCS was prompt and ex-plicit. He stated that he regarded the ship-ping situation secondary in importance onlyto the military operations. He indicated theextent to which nonmilitary shipping pro-grams could be cut, instructed the Navy, theWar Shipping Administrator, and the Di-rector of War Mobilization to take certainactions with a view to speeding up the com-pletion of new ships, and directed the Chiefsof Staff to make urgent representations tothe theater commanders to improve theirutilization of vessels.129 JCS took immediatesteps to carry out the President's instructions,and, in accord with recommendations sub-mitted by the Joint Military Transportation

126 Memo, Gen Wylie for Gen Wood ASF Hq,19 Dec 44, sub: SWPA Shipping Situation, OCTHB Wylie Shipping in Pacific 1944-45.

127 Gen Wylie, Notes on Trip to POA and SWPA,19 March to 22 April 1945, p. 10, OCT HB WyliePacific—Rpts of Visits; Ltr, Whipple to Finlay,26 Dec 44, OCT HB Exec Trans Opns SWPA.

128 JMTC 88th Mtg, 14 Nov 44; JCS 1173, 17Nov 44; JCS 1173/1, 18 Nov 44; Memo, AdmiralLand WSA for JCS, 22 Nov 44, ASF Hq Shipping1944.

129 JCS 1173/2, 21 Nov 44.


Committee, adopted a definitive course ofaction.130

The basic action by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff was taken on 9 December 1944, wheninstructions were dispatched by radio toArmy and Navy commanders in the thea-ters, with information copies to representa-tives of the War Shipping Administrationoverseas and to the appropriate Army andNavy officials at U.S. ports.131 The mes-sage stated that the critical shortage of shipswas due primarily to the retention oflarge numbers of vessels in the four majortheaters and that the inability of the theatersto release the vessels promptly was duelargely to their overestimation of dischargecapability.132 It announced certain policiesto be applied in remedying the situation. Theuse of ocean-going ships for storage pur-poses was prohibited. A realistic estimateof port capacity was declared imperative.Factors of safety applied to supply require-ments, which resulted in ships being heldidle awaiting calls to operational areas, wereto be reviewed and scaled down. Selectivedischarge, or the partial unloading of ships,was to be discontinued. The diversion ordelay of large vessels to load or dischargesmall tonnages was prohibited, except incases of emergency. Detailed ship positionand employment reports, as prescribed bythe War and Navy Departments, were tobe submitted expeditiously. The designationof a single theater agency to control ship-ping was considered the most effective wayto implement these policies. The War De-

partment was made responsible for supervis-ing the utilization of shipping in the Euro-pean, Mediterranean, and Southwest Pa-cific theaters, and the Navy Departmentwas given similar responsibility for the Pa-cific Ocean Areas.133

Other steps were taken toward the sameobjective. In order to standardize ship ac-tivity reports from the theaters and at thesame time reduce the load on communica-tions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prescribeda form of weekly radiogram which was toconstitute the joint report of the militaryauthority and the War Shipping Adminis-tration representative in the respectiveoversea areas.134 These ship activity reportsassured prompt and uniform informationreaching all interested agencies in Washing-ton and facilitated joint action when suchaction became necessary. In order to estab-lish a more satisfactory distribution of ship-ping in the Pacific Ocean Areas, where theNavy had the superior authority but wherethe Army had large forces and hence largeshipping requirements, a detailed procedurewas adopted by JCS to govern the establish-ment of shipping requirements and the al-location and control of cargo vessels in thatarea.135 Since the ceilings previously estab-lished by the Joint Military TransportationCommittee to control ship retentions in thetheaters had been largely vitiated by the

130 Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Somervell, 22Nov 44, ASF Hq Shipping 1944; Memo, CG ASFfor CofS USA, 23 Nov 44, ASF Hq Shipping 1944;JCS 1173/4, 25 Nov 44; JCS 1173/7, 5 Dec 44;JCS 1173/8, 8 Dec 44.

131 WARX 74985.132 The four major theaters were ETO, MTO,

and SWPA (under Army commanders), and POA(under Navy commander).

133 These instructions were published in JCSPolicy Memo 7, 10 Dec 44. According to ACofT,the Navy Department had not intervened in POAshipping matters prior to this JCS action. SeeMemo, Gen Wylie to Gen Wood ASF Hq, 19 Dec44, OCT HB Wylie Shipping in Pacific 1944-45.

134 Rad to Army theater Comdrs, WARX 78668,16 Dec 44; Rad, CNO USN to CINCPOA, 16 Dec44 (WP CM-IN 17710, 18 Dec 44); OCT 565.2,Ship Activity Rpts, contains some theater reportssent in response. Ship activity reports were knownby the short title, ACTREP.

135 JCS 762/10, 20 Dec 44; JCS Policy Memo 8,26 Dec 44.


indefinite detention of vessels which os-tensibly were engaged in transoceanic serv-ice, it was stipulated that any ocean-goingvessel not already charged as a temporary(rotational) retention, or as a permanentassignment (local fleet ship), automaticallywould be charged as a retention if it re-mained in the theater more than 30 days.136

The operation of the new ship control planwas facilitated by a glossary of terms toassure correct interpretation by the overseacommanders of joint instructions issuedfrom Washington.

Although, as already indicated, the meas-ures prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staffbrought about general improvement in theoversea shipping situation during the springand early summer of 1945, the problemreappeared before the summer was over.After the termination of hostilities inEurope attention was centered on the build-up of personnel and matériel in the westernPacific for the final assault on Japan. InAugust 237 ocean-going vessels arrived inthe Philippines, and September brought 216arrivals.137 Manila was the principal basefor the operation and had a heavy influxof shipping from the United States, Europe,and from other Pacific bases. After Septem-ber the cargo ship arrivals fell off sharply,but the number of vessels on hand remainedhigh for several months.

The reasons for the rapid increase in thenumber of vessels at Manila were several.138

The facilities of the port had suffered severedamage during the Japanese occupationand evacuation, so that unloading opera-tions were handicapped. After the Japanesesurrender there was a period of uncertaintyas to what matériel should be discharged,what should be returned to the UnitedStates, what should be forwarded to otherbases in the western Pacific, and whatwould be required in the occupation ofJapan.139 In order to provide ships to movethe occupation forces and their matériel toJapan, cargoes were unloaded which, to-gether with other cargoes, had to remainon the Manila docks indefinitely becausethere were no rail connections and the num-ber of trucks available for dock clearancewas inadequate. Although the Chief ofTransportation exerted such pressure as hecould to get the idle ships at Manila re-leased, full results had to wait upon logisti-cal plans and policy decisions which hadnot been formulated when the enemycapitulated.

The end of the fighting and consequentlogistical readjustments resulted in the de-tention of ships not only at Manila but else-where in the Pacific, including Japaneseports. In November 1945 General Mac-Arthur was urged to use all possible means toreturn to the United States cargo vesselswhich had been in his command undulylong, since the War Shipping Administra-tion still was critically short of fast shipsfor military and commercial uses and the

136 Memo, TAG WD for Comdrs of all Theaters,5 Feb 45, sub: JMTC Memos, and Incl Memos,AG 334 JMTC, 13 Feb 45 ( 1 ) .

137 Monthly History of TC AFWESPAC, p. 5,Sep 46, OCT HB SWPA Philippines; Chart, ShipPosition—WESPAC, 23 Nov 45, OCT HB WaterDiv Vessel Opns Analysis.

138 Confs, author with Col Thomas Fuller,Deputy CofT OCT AFWESPAC and Lt ColThomas R. Palmerlee, Dir Mvmts Div OCTAFWESPAC, 14 Jul 48, OCT HB SWPA Philip-pines.

139 Memo, Maj Rau, G-4 Requirements, for LtCol Fernandez, 17 Oct 45, sub: Vessels Returnedto U.S. and Diverted to Occupational Area, infolder, Col Stokes' Pacific Trip, OCT HB SWPAPhilippines Misc; Rads to Army Forces PacificAdministration Manila, WARX 12884, 12 Oct 45and WARX 77121, 19 Oct 45.


slower vessels were required for the civilianaid programs.140

The subjoined tabulation, showing thecargo discharge performances of the severaloversea areas during the period from April1943 through August 1945, is of interest in

the light of the foregoing discussion.141 Thenet discharge rates are based on the time theships were actually worked, and the grossdischarge rates on time elapsed from ar-rival at discharge ports to completion ofdischarge. A high percentage relationshipof gross rate to net rate indicates that theproportion of idle ship time in the area waslow; conversely, a low percentage relation-ship of gross rate to net rate indicates a highproportion of idle ship time. The followingrates represent average measurement tonsof cargo discharged per ship per day:

The India—Burma area, which turned inthe best average discharge performance forthe period, had the advantage of good portfacilities, plentiful labor, and freedom fromthe disturbing influence of enemy interfer-ence or radical changes in strategy. Thesouthwest and western Pacific area, whichgave the poorest average performance, hadnone of these advantages and suffered moreor less throughout the period from the ad-verse conditions which were discussedearlier in this section. Although conditionsin Europe were bad during the latter partof 1944 following the invasion of the Con-tinent, before and after that period thedispatch of vessels was favored by the exist-ence of numerous well-developed ports, an

adequate supply of labor, and a close co-ordination between cargo movements andport capacities. The area record in themiddle Pacific, although adversely affectedby conditions at many small ports, washelped by the good performance at the im-portant and well-equipped port of Hono-lulu.142

While recognizing that conditions in someof the theaters were unfavorable to the quickdispatch of cargo vessels, General Gross be-lieved that the waste of shipping overseascould have been reduced by better manage-ment. In March 1944 he referred to the

140 Ltr, WSA to ACofT, 26 Oct 45, OCT HBWylie Staybacks; Rad to Army Forces PacificCommand Tokyo, WARX 80943, 2 Nov 45.

141 Monthly Vessel Utilization Summary, Aug45, OCT HB Water Div Vessel Utilization Rpts.Data are based on rpts from theaters to OCT upto Dec 44 and thereafter on ACTREP. Onlyvessels carrying Army cargo into the areas areincluded, not those carrying intra-area cargo.

142 For this study the central Pacific ports west ofHawaii were excluded because they were servedchiefly by cargo ships under Navy control.


heavy requisitions for ships in connectionwith forthcoming military actions, statedthat he feared serious congestion at the over-sea ports, and remarked that "fewer shipswith less congestion might actually transportmore tonnage to support the operations." 143

In his final report, among the conclusions,he referred to the requisition of excessivequantities of supplies by the oversea com-mands, a course of action which resulted inlarger stocks being accumulated in the thea-ters than could be properly administered,ships being held idle for excessive periodsbecause of congestion at the ports, and un-necessarily large numbers of ships beingrequired to roll up supplies from rear toforward bases.144 Elsewhere in his reportGeneral Gross termed this one of the logis-tical mistakes of the war and remarked that,since it had been demonstrated that suppliescould be furnished promptly and reliablyfrom the zone of interior to forces fightingon the opposite side of the globe, the mis-take ought not to be repeated.

Ship Conversions

The heavy burden imposed on the facil-ities available for ship repair and conversionwork was discussed in Chapter V, and alsothe measures adopted by the Army, theNavy, and the War Shipping Administrationto co-ordinate their activities and obtainmaximum results from those facilities. Thepurpose of this section is to present some-what more detailed information regarding

the Army's activities in connection with theprogram of ship conversion. Early in thewar numerous prewar passenger vesselswere altered to prepare them for service astroopships, troop accommodations were in-stalled on a limited number of prewarfreighters, and many vessels were providedwith hatches of greater size and gear ofgreater strength so that they could handlethe bulky and heavy items of Army equip-ment.145 By special arrangement with theNavy, the Army converted one cargo vesseland six troopships to combat loaders foruse in the invasion of North Africa in thefall of 1942.146 The principal conversionprogram did not get under way until 1943,however. It involved the alteration of bothnew and old cargo and passenger vesselsinto troopships, hospital ships, and varioustypes of special-purpose ships which thescope and character of the war made neces-sary.147

A proposal for converting new cargoships, built by the Maritime Commission,into troopships was approved by the JointChiefs of Staff in the fall of 1942.148 With

143 Ltr to Brig Gen G. C. Stewart, 18 Mar 44,OCT 319.1 Italy 1945 Geog.

144 Gross final rpt, pp. 59, 125. See also Maj GenC. P. Gross, "Some Lessons from World War II,"Army Transportation Journal (November—December1947), p. 38.

145 Regarding cargo ship alterations see addressby Brig Gen Robt. H. Wylie ACofT before NationalMaritime Conf, pp. 5-7, 16 Oct 46, OCT HB PEGen Transport Equip and Supplies.

146 Memo, Water Div OCT for Supt ATS NYPE,10 Aug 42, sub: Conversion of Vessels to ModifiedCombat Loaders, OCT 000-900 Combat Loaders;Conf, author with Geo. A. Anthony, Naval Archi-tect Water Div OCT, 26 Jan 48, OCT HB WaterDiv Ship Repair and Conv.

147 Col M. B. Stokes, Jr., Shipping in War, pp.17, 21-23, OCT HB Topic Logistics; Memo, C ofWater Div OCT to Maj Cooper, 13 Sep 45, sub:Lessons Learned World War II, OCT HB WaterDiv Ship Repair and Conv.

148 See Ltr, WSA for Admiral Leahy, WhiteHouse, 24 Sep 42, OCT 564 Army Vessels. Allmajor conversion projects were authorized by JCS,usually on recommendation of JMTC.


the existing troop lift being utilized to theutmost, it became apparent that plannedoversea military operations would be de-layed if they had to await the completionof new troopships. Cargo vessels on theother hand were being delivered morerapidly than had been anticipated, and thetime required for their construction andconversion was relatively short. Accordingly,JCS decided to meet the demand for in-creased troop lift by installing troop accom-modations on several types of new cargovessels. This project was greatly expandedduring 1943 as strategic requirements in-creased, and it was continued to the end ofthe war and into the repatriation period.

In some cases the conversion of cargoships to troopships was made while the ves-sels were under construction, in accordancewith Maritime Commission contracts; insome cases the alterations were made on ves-sels already delivered, under War ShippingAdministration contracts; in a limited num-ber of instances WSA vessels were convertedunder contracts placed by the Transporta-tion Corps. In all cases, however, the altera-tions were in accordance with Army require-ments and plans approved by the Trans-portation Corps. In order to avoid unneces-sary expense and delay resulting from hastilyconsidered requests for departures fromthe basic conversion plans, WSA stipulatedthat such changes, if they involved an ex-penditure of $50,000 or more, would notbe undertaken until the plans and specifica-tions had been approved in writing by anauthorized representative of the Chief ofTransportation.149 Since the primary objectof the program was to make additional

troop lift available with the least possibledelay, it was arranged that certain tech-nical requirements of the U.S. Coast Guardcould be waived upon request of theArmy.150

This program to convert cargo vessels totroopships involved all the basic cargo types.Early in 1943 the Maritime Commission'sstandard designs (G-1, C-2, G-3, andC-4) were favored, because of their struc-tural suitability and their speed. Altogetherabout 160 vessels of these types were con-verted or partially converted for troop serv-ice, with capacities ranging from 450 to3,800.151 Of this total, 83 were convertedby the Maritime Commission during con-struction and the remainder by the WarShipping Administration and the Armyafter their delivery as cargo vessels. Afterthe Allied success in North Africa, the lessdesirable but more readily available Libertyship was brought into service as a personnelcarrier. First, approximately 250 Libertieswere fitted in the 'tween decks with tem-porary bunks for 308 or 504 persons andwere used to transport prisoners of warfrom the Mediterranean to the UnitedStates. Later, because of the pressure forthe more rapid dispatch of troops to thetheaters, temporary but somewhat im-proved passenger quarters for 350 menwere installed in the 'tween decks of 224of these Liberties, and they were used forthe transportation of U.S. soldiers, princi-

149 Ltr, Admiral E. S. Land WSA for Gen. J. M.Franklin OCT, 13 Sep 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels.

150 Memo, Commandant USCG for districtoffices, 21 Sep 43, sub: Military Pool Vessels Conv,OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv.

151 List, Geo. A. Anthony, Maintenance and Re-pair Br OCT, Mar Com C-Type Vessels Convertedfor Use as Troopships Carrying Army Pers, 12 Aug48; Final Rpt of Troopship Conv Program, cover-ing period Sep 43-Jan 46, prepared in Maintenanceand Repair Br, 30 Jan 46. Both in OCT HB WaterDiv Ship Repair and Conv.


pally to the Mediterranean.152 In the springof 1945, in order to provide additional liftfor the redeployment of troops from Europeto the Pacific and for their eventual repatri-ation, a further conversion program wasundertaken, which resulted in 201 Libertiesbeing equipped to carry 550 troops eachand 97 Victories being equipped to carryabout 1,500 troops each.153 In this project,also, the work was of a temporary natureand the bunks were removable, but morespace was allotted for troop quarters, andthe messes, galleys, and hospitals were con-siderably improved. All the temporary troopquarters on the Liberties and Victories wereinstalled by the War Shipping Administra-tion. During the war 33 Liberties were con-verted to carry as many as 1,600 troops onthe shorter routes, that is, to Alaska andHawaii and in the Caribbean.154

While the troop lift was being thus in-creased, requirements arose for numerousspecialized types of ships. Sixteen passengerand eight cargo vessels were converted intohospital ships to be operated by the Trans-portation Corps, and work on two addi-tional hospital ships was begun. Six cargo

ships were converted into aircraft repairships, to be operated by the Army AirForces in forward areas where there werenot adequate shore facilities for servicingdamaged aircraft. Ten cargo ships wereconverted into engineer port repair ships,to be utilized by the Corps of Engineers inrehabilitating devastated port facilities over-seas. Six cargo ships were converted intomarine repair ships, to be operated by theTransportation Corps in the Pacific wherethere were not sufficient shore facilities forthe repair of floating equipment. Sevencargo vessels were converted to spare partsdepot ships—three to be utilized by theOrdnance Department, two by the Trans-portation Corps, one by the Corps of En-gineers, and one jointly by the ChemicalWarfare Service, the Signal Corps, and theMedical Corps—which were to facilitatethe maintenance of military equipment inoversea areas. One cargo ship was con-verted into a news transmission ship, to beutilized in connection with the invasion ofJapan. In addition to the above ocean-going vessels, numerous smaller boats andbarges were converted to provide floatingrefrigeration facilities, floating warehouses,floating maintenance shops, and trainingvessels for oversea use.155

During the early part of the war, theports of embarkation, acting under the gen-eral supervision of the Office of the Chiefof Transportation, carried the chief respon-sibility for conversions in which the Armywas interested. The staff of the superintend-ent of the Army Transport Service (later

152 The number of Liberties converted for troopsand PW's has been variously stated but abovefigures prepared in Maintenance and Repair BrOCT after V-J Day are considered reliable. SeeMemo, Geo. A. Anthony, 6 Nov 45, OCT HBWater Div Ship Repair and Conv; also, Roland W.Charles, Troopships of World War II (Washington1947), pp. 358-60. The temporary bunks wereremovable so that 'tween-deck spaces could be usedfor cargo.

153 The Liberties converted for this program wereselected from among those previously converted tocarry 350 troops.

154 Charles, Troopships of World War II, p.. 355.A more extensive program of similar conversionswas considered but was not carried out because ofthe slowness of the Liberties. JMT 9, par. 7 (a)( 1 ) , 12 Nov 42; JMTC 26th Meeting, Sec. 2, 21Jan 43; Ltr, Secy JCS to Chm WPB, 16 Feb 43,OCT 564 Cargo Vessels.

155 Annual Rpt Water Div OCT FY 1945, OCTHB Water Div Rpts; Memo, Maintenance and Re-pair Br Water Div OCT for Hist Unit OCT, 14Jun 45; List, Status of Hospital Ships, preparedin Water Div, 3 Jul 45; Comment 2, G. A. Anthonyto C. C. Wardlow, 22 Sep 48. Last three in OCTHB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv.

ARMY HOSPITAL SHIPS. The Frances Y. Slanger (top), a former Italian pas-senger liner, and the St. Olaf (bottom), a Liberty ship, were converted by the

Transportation Corps and operated under The Hague Convention.


Water Division) at each port surveyed thevessels to be converted in his area, rec-ommended the alterations to be made, pre-pared detailed arrangement plans and speci-fications, determined what work could beaccomplished at the Army's marine repairshops, let contracts for Army transports tobe altered at commercial yards, inspectedand supervised the work during progress,and controlled the expenses involved.156

The several ports functioned entirely in-dependently in these matters until Septem-ber 1943, when, in order to utilize to bestadvantage the services of his more expe-rienced officers and to provide greater con-tinuity in the work, the Chief of Transpor-tation divided the seaboard into four sec-tors and placed each sector under the jur-isdiction of a single port commander.157 Inaccordance with this plan, Col. John H.Holder of the New York Port of Embarka-tion was designated to supervise all conver-sion work performed on the Atlantic coastnorth of Cape Hatteras; Col. Duval C.Watkins of the New Orleans Port of Em-barkation was designated to supervise allwork performed south of Cape Hatterasand on the Gulf; Lt. Col. John H. Reillyof the San Francisco Port of Embarkationwas designated to supervise all work per-formed in the San Francisco area and south-ern California; and Lt. Col. John A. Barth-rop of the Seattle Port of Embarkation wasdesignated to supervise all work performedon the north Pacific coast. The other portsand subports continued to make inspectionsand otherwise assist in supervising conver-sions accomplished in their respective areas.

In addition to this regional supervision,the Chief of Transportation undertook amore active supervision of the conversionwork as the war progressed. In June 1943,when a master ship repair contract wasadopted jointly by the Army, the Navy, andWSA, he established an Army War ShipRepair Contract Agency in New York tolet and administer all contracts to whichthe Army was a party.158 The agency placedvirtually all ship conversion orders for theArmy until near the end of the war, when,in view of the fact that the pressure on theeast coast yards had eased somewhat, theArmy ports of embarkation were authorizedto negotiate lump sum contracts wheneverthat method was considered the more eco-nomical.159 In January 1944 the Chief ofTransportation set up a Ship ConversionUnit in New York to control certain techni-cal aspects of the work.160 The new unit wascharged with supervision of the drawing ofall plans and layouts for troop transportsand hospital ships, co-ordination with theWar Shipping Administration and theMaritime Commission in connection withtheir conversion of ships for Army use,survey of ships to be converted on the eastcoast, inspection of conversion work onsuch ships and preparation of progress re-ports. The respective Army ports continuedto supervise the actual physical work ofship conversion, and they were requestedto scrutinize and criticize conversion plans

156 See Org Manual NYPE, Sec. 12, par. 9, 19May 43, NYPE Org.

157 See Ltrs, ACofT to port comdrs, 23 Sep 43,sub: Conv of Vessels, OCT 564 Army Vessels.

158 ASF Memo S55-15-43, 7 Jun 43, sub: Estabof AWSRCA; Hist rec of AWSRCA, 30 Jun 44.Both in OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair andConv.

159 TC Cir 160-5, Supp. 17, 3 Apr 45, sub:Purchasing and Contracting.

160 TC Cir 5-6, 12 Jan 44; OCT Info Bull 102,30 Dec 44. Colonel Holder served as chief of thisunit during its first year.


in the light of their experience with thetransportation of troops.161

In the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tion responsibility for ship conversions andrepairs rested with the Chief of the WaterDivision. The extent of his supervision waslimited on the one hand by the pressureunder which the work had to be accom-plished and the necessity of avoiding delays,and on the other hand by the small tech-nical staff which he was able to maintainin view of the personnel ceiling. In July1944, speaking at a meeting of port repre-sentatives, Col. Raymond M. Hicks, Chiefof the Water Division, deplored the in-adequacy of the control which his office hadbeen able to exercise.162 To give point to hisstatement, he cited the fact that sometimeswork done at one port had been redone atanother simply because of the differentideas held by different individuals regard-ing requirements. He announced that newregulations were being placed in effect toinsure better central supervision.163 Theseregulations stipulated that major repairsand alterations to be accomplished by theports of embarkation would not be startedwithout prior approval by the Chief ofTransportation, and that specifications,work orders, and plans would be submittedto his office "on the day they were issuedto the contractor." Similar instructions hadbeen in effect previously, but the new regu-lations made them more emphatic and setup procedures to facilitate their observance.An important new feature was the limita-tion placed on voyage repairs which the

ports could accomplish on their own initi-ative and the stipulation that when a proj-ect included both voyage repairs and majorrepairs or alterations authority for the en-tire project would be obtained in advancefrom the Chief of Transportation.

The Maintenance and Repair Branch ofthe Water Division dealt with the technicalaspects of this work. It prepared generalarrangement plans based on Army require-ments, from which the Army ports of em-barkation, the Ship Conversion Unit, theMaritime Commission, and the War Ship-ping Administration developed their moredetailed plans and specifications. It re-viewed the detailed arrangement plans andthe specifications for work to be performedunder Army contracts to the extent thatthis could be done without delaying thework, and also reviewed the charges in-curred. It negotiated with the MaritimeCommission and WSA regarding the plansfor conversion work to be accomplished bythose agencies on vessels intended for Armyuse.164 Occasionally it sent inspectors to therepair yards to check important aspects ofwork in progress. From periodical reportsprepared by the ports of embarkation, theShip Conversion Unit, the Maritime Com-mission, and WSA, it followed the progressof each job in order to determine whethercompletion schedules were being main-tained, and, if not, what action might betaken. It prepared a "Weekly Report Show-ing Status of Conversion and Repairs of

161 See Memo, NYPE for CofT, 20 Oct 43, sub:Survey of C-3 Plans, OCT 564 Troopships1943-45; Memo, NYPE for CofT, 18 Apr 45, sub:Victory Ships, OCT 000-900 Tr Transports.

162 Proceedings, Mtg of Supts of Water Divs, p.6, Chicago, 7 Jul 44, OCT HB Water Div Gen.

163 Consolidated in TC Pamphlet 34, 1 Apr 45.

164 Ltr, WSA to OCT, 1 Oct 43, sub: C-1BConvs, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv;Ltr, WSA to OCT, 14 Oct 43, OCT 564 ArmyVessels; Ltr, C of Water Div OCT to WSA, 21Oct 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels (EC-2 Type);Memo, Col J. H. Holder for Gen J. M. Franklin,8 Dec 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels (C-4 Type) ;Ltr, Mar Com to Gen Franklin, 28 Jan 44, OCT564 Army Vessels (AK type).


Army Scheduled Transports, etc.," whichincluded the jobs that were being accom-plished or were scheduled for accomplish-ment by both the Army and WSA.165 FromOctober 1942 until the spring of 1946 theMaintenance and Repair Branch was incharge of Col. Otey Y. Warren. The chiefnaval architect was Mr. George A. Anthony,who had served the War Department inthat capacity during the period 1898-1918,and again from 1935 onward.

During the first year of the war, whenthe problem was to convert the older pas-senger and cargo vessels to troop carriers, nostandard arrangement plans were possiblebecause of the vessels' dissimilarity, but theTransportation Corps formulated standardsto govern the installation of the variousfacilities.166 When the program was initiatedfor converting certain types of new cargoships to troop carriers, it became possible toprepare standard plans for each type. Sincethe Navy required certain features whichthe Army did not, especially in crew accom-modations and operating officers' quarters,vessels converted to Army standards re-quired additional alterations when reallo-cated to the Navy, a process which usuallyinvolved loss of time.167 During the summerof 1944 an effort was made to correct thissituation by the adoption of standards ac-ceptable to both services. General Grossagreed to the addition of certain Navyfeatures to the standard plans, but, sincehe considered them desirable rather than

essential, he requested that the installationof such features on ships already in servicebe delayed until the vessels had to be laidup for necessary repairs, thus avoiding need-less interruption of their service.168

In September 1943 Mr. James F. Byrnes,Director of War Mobilization, expressedconcern regarding the slow progress thusfar made with the heavy troopship and hos-pital ship conversion programs which hadbeen launched earlier that year and at-tributed the delay to the inability of theChief of Transportation to supply the nec-essary plans and specifications. While ad-mitting that the task had been a heavy one,because of the many types of vessels nomi-nated for conversion, the Army denied thatlack of plans had been the cause of delay inmore than a few instances.169 There were,on the other hand, serious bottlenecks inthe procurement of raw materials and themanufacture of important items of equip-ment, such as blowers, evaporators, andgenerators. The Army urged the Directorof War Mobilization to bend every effortto have these causes of delay eliminated.

Mr. Byrnes apparently felt that his criti-cism had not received the careful consider-ation which it deserved, for he soon pre-sented additional facts to support his con-tention that the conversion programs hadbeen "slow and expensive." The Secretaryof War in reply stated that in view of the

165 Rpt of 10 Jul 44, in OCT HB Water Div ShipRepair and Conv, is typical.

166 Memo, Maj R. D. Meyer for Col Wylie, 5 Jul42, sub: Conv Standards, OCT HB Meyer Stay-backs.

167 Memo, CG ASF for USW, 21 Sep 43, OCT161 Fed Shipbuilding Co; Contl Div ASF, Reportto the Secretary of War on Common Activities ofthe Army and Navy, 12 Dec 45, p. 66, AGA49-212, RG 114.

168 Conf at Fort Mason, 13 May 44; Memo,SFPE for OCT, 18 Jun 44; Memo, Gross forSomervell, 23 Jun 44; Memo, Somervell for Ad-miral Home, 24 Jun 44; Ltr, ACofT for WSA, 24Jul 44. All in OCT 564 Troopships 1943-45.

169 Ltr, Byrnes to SW, 11 Sep 43, OCT 564Troopships 1943-45; Ltr, SW to Byrnes, 27 Sep43, OCS 570. Concerning delays in early monthsof war due to lack of plans and specifications forconverting vessels, see Memo, Col Hicks for MajCooper, 13 Sep 45, sub: Lessons Learned, OCTHB Water Div Ship Repair and Conv.


criticism offered he had caused a com-plete survey of the troopship and hospitalship conversion programs to be made. Hereported that the Chief of Transportation'sMaintenance and Repair Branch thus farhad prepared plans for converting 95 cargovessels to troopships, with a total capacityof over 166,000; that some of the con-versions had been made wholly by the ma-rine repair shops at Army ports of embarka-tion and that those accomplished at privaterepair yards had been supervised by theTransportation Corps; that concurrentlythe Transportation Corps had drawn plansfor and supervised the reconditioning ofmore than 60 other ocean-going vessels, aswell as many interisland and harbor craft.170

The Secretary of War contended that thisrecord compared favorably with the re-sults achieved by other agencies.

Following this exchange of letters theDirector of War Mobilization appointed acommittee, consisting of representatives ofhis own office, the Transportation Corps,and the War Shipping Administration, toexpedite the conversion program. His plancontemplated that the committee wouldengage the services of an experienced firmof naval architects, at WSA expense, forthe purpose of speeding up the adaptationof designs and specifications for troop andhospital ship conversions; also that the com-mittee would freeze designs, including thosefor vessels already undergoing conversion,so that changes would be reduced to a mini-mum. Mr. Byrnes further proposed that theTransportation Corps and the War Ship-ping Administration should exchange scarceitems of equipment in order to expediteconversions. The Secretary of War, afterobtaining the opinion of the Chief of Trans-

portation, expressed his satisfaction withthis arrangement.171 There is no evidence,however, that the committee took specificaction along the lines indicated.172 Thepreparation of designs and specifications, asthe War Department had stated, alreadywas well advanced. The stabilization ofdesigns was a matter which dependedlargely on Army-Navy co-ordination. Theexchange of scarce equipment and materialswas a natural feature of the close co-operation which the Transportation Corpsand the War Shipping Administrationmaintained throughout the conversion pro-gram.173

The supply of critical materials andequipment continued to be a problem tillthe end of the war.174 Early in 1943, shortlyafter the establishment of the ControlledMaterials Plan, the War Production Boarddesignated the Maritime Commission to actas claimant agent on behalf of the Army,the Navy, and the War Shipping Adminis-tration for all controlled materials requiredfor ship repair and conversion work in pri-vate yards.175 The WSA Coordinator ofShip Repair and Conversion, workingthrough the Maritime Commission, was re-sponsible for maintaining a suitable inven-tory of controlled materials and also of Class

170 Ltr, Byrnes to SW, 3 Nov 43, OCS 570; Ltr,SW to Byrnes, 23 Nov 43, OCT 564 Army Vessels.

171 Ltr, Byrnes to SW, 27 Nov 43; Ltr, SW toByrnes, 13 Dec 43. Both in OCS 570.

172 See Ltr, R. M. Hicks to C. C. Wardlow, 4Aug 48, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repair andConv.

173 An exchange arrangement was in effect alsowith the Navy. See Memo, CofT for CG NYPE, 1Jul 43, sub: Transfer of Conv Equip, OCT 564Cargo Vessels.

174 Memo, C of Water Div for Dir of SupplyOCT, 7 Jun 45, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repairand Conv.

175 Memo, F. Eberstadt to USW, 14 Jan 43, OCT564 Army Vessels; Memo, Water Div for CMPDiv OCT, 20 Jan 43; Memo, ACofT for Supplyfor CofT, 18 Feb 43. Last two in OCT 564 Jul42-Dec 43.


A products which were manufactured fromcontrolled materials. This arrangementavoided the necessity of each contractormaintaining an inventory of all materialsand equipment likely to be required. Othersupplies were procured by the contractors,except in unusual cases where it was ad-vantageous for the government to furnishthem.176 All uncontrolled supplies requiredby Army marine repair shops, as well asthose supplied to private contractors by theTransportation Corps, were requisitionedby the Army ports of embarkation on thebasis of six-month estimates.177 When suchrequisitions had been approved by theWater Division, the supplies were purchasedby the Chief of Transportation's Procure-ment Division. The ports, however, hadauthority to make emergency purchases.

The passenger facilities on vessels con-verted for wartime and repatriation serv-ices were not suitable for peacetime Armyuse. In order to be ready for the postwartask of supporting the U.S. forces in the

occupied areas and at other oversea bases,the Chief of Transportation began late in1945 to crystallize plans for the creation ofa permanent fleet of Army transports.178

These preparations took into account thefact that the War Shipping Administrationsoon would cease to exist and that the Armythereafter would be unable to draw uponthat source for vessels to meet its require-ments. The Army's proposal, put forwardin February 1946, was that the MaritimeCommission transfer to it a total of 91ocean-going vessels, including 46 troop-ships which it would convert to peacetimestandards.179 The plan for a permanentArmy transport fleet subsequently under-went considerable modification, but that isa development outside the scope of thiswartime history.180

176 Memos, Water Div for CG NYPE, 9 Aug 43and 11 Apr 45, OCT HB Water Div Ship Repairand Conv.

177 Memo, OCT for NYPE, 16 Jul 43, OCT HBWater Div Ship Repair and Conv.

178 Memo, ACofT for CG ASF, 29 Dec 45, sub:WD Postwar Plans re Merchant Type Mil AuxiliaryShip; Memo, Gen Wylie for Col Elliott, 20 Jan 46.Both in OCT HB Water Div Postwar Fleet.

179 Ltr, SW to Chm Mar Com, 18 Feb 46, OCT561.1 Army Vessels; Ltr, Chm Mar Com to SW, 7May 46, OCT 561.22 Army Vessels.

180 For review of postwar troopship conversionsee Statement, Charles E. Hoch, 27 Feb 47, OCTHB Water Div Postwar Fleet.

CHAPTER IX

Utilization of Domestic

Commercial Carriers

The traditional policy of the Army wasto rely on the commercial carriers for trans-portation in the zone of interior rather thanto establish an extensive inland transporta-tion system of its own, and this practice wasmaintained during World War II.1 Sucha policy necessitated the Army's developingextensive working arrangements with thecarriers and maintaining close relationshipswith the several governmental agencieswhich were established to regulate domestictransportation in the national interest.

Certain digressions from this policy,which were made on military grounds or forthe relief of the commercial carriers, are tobe noted. Utility railroads had been oper-ated by the Army at many of its installa-tions in peacetime because on-post trafficcould be handled more economically in thismanner than by contracting with commer-cial carriers, and the practice was continuedand naturally extended during the war.Since most of the tank cars in the countrywere owned by concerns other than com-mon carriers, the Army maintained a tankcar fleet of its own in peacetime and ex-panded it with the coming of hostilities.Specialized hospital cars were built andplaced in service by the Army during the

war to insure proper care of the seriouslyill while they were being moved from portsto hospitals or between hospitals. Whencommercial bus operators found it im-possible to maintain adequate services forthe transportation of passengers in thevicinity of certain military installations andwar industries, the Army provided vehiclesfor operation on such routes.

Notwithstanding these direct Army op-erations, the great bulk of military trafficwas transported by the commercial railway,highway, and inland waterway operators.Since the Army was so largely dependenton the commercial carriers for the move-ment of its personnel and matériel, the Chiefof Transportation considered it his respon-sibility not only to work out effective trafficarrangements with them but also to helpthem deal with difficulties encountered inthe maintenance of services adequate to liftthe heavy wartime traffic load—difficultiesresulting mainly from shortages of man-power and equipment.

Distribution and Control of Inland Traffic

Considerable change had taken place inthe domestic transportation industry of theUnited States between the first and secondWorld Wars. The railroads, which had car-ried almost the entire load in the earlierconflict, still handled the bulk of the traffic,

1 Statement, Chm Trans Advisory Gp OQMG,Annual Mtg of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.,Washington, Apr 41; WD Memo 55-130-2, 22Oct 46, par. 1.

UTILIZATION OF DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL CARRIERS 309

TABLE 9—PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INTERCITY PASSENGER AND FREIGHT TRAFFIC INTHE UNITED STATES, BY TYPE OF CARRIER: 1940-1945.

a Steam and electric railways. Freight figures include express and mail.b Includes traffic on rivers, canals, Great Lakes, and coastal barge routes, but not coastwise or intercoastal ocean routes.c Includes certificated air carriers.d Does not include gas pipelines.e Estimated as 0.01 percent of total in 1944 and 1945, and less than 0.01 percent in earlier years; including express and mail.

Source: ICC Annual Reports.

but great progress had been made in trans-portation by highway, waterway, pipeline,and air. This wider distribution of trafficprovided a certain amount of insuranceagainst a repetition of the grave difficultiesin the movement of military supplies whichhad been encountered in 1917-18 becauseof congestion on the railroads.2

A further redistribution of traffic tookplace during World War II as the resultof wartime conditions. The rationing ofgasoline and tires and the scarcity of re-placement parts necessitated the withdrawalfrom service of many private automobilesand restricted the use of others, forcing

upon the common carriers the traffic whichthose vehicles had handled. The withdrawalof ships from intercoastal and coastwiseservices, because they were more urgentlyneeded on the transoceanic routes and be-cause of the heavy losses inflicted by sub-marines operating off our Atlantic and Gulfcoasts, meant that most of the domestictraffic previously moved by such vessels hadto be taken over by the railroads, the high-way carriers, the barge lines, and the pipe-lines. The influence of these conditions onthe percentages of the total traffic handledby the several types of transport may beseen in Table 9. The wartime growth ofthe traffic in the respective transportationfields is shown in Table 10. Although bothcompilations involve a certain amount of

2 Interstate Commerce Commission, 56th AnnualReport (Washington, November 1, 1942), pp. 1, 2;ICC, 57th Annual Report, pp. 2-5.


TABLE 10—INDEXES OF PASSENGER AND FREIGHT TRAFFIC IN THE UNITED STATES:1940-1945

(1935-39 average = 100)

a Based on passenger-miles except for local transit which is based on number of passengers.b Class I steam railroads.c Public intercity motorbus lines.d Public motor and electric local transit lines.e Certificated air carriers, including express and mail.f Class I motor common and contract carriers of property.g Inland waterways, Great Lakes, coastal and intercoastal domestic ocean routes.h Crude and refined petroleum and natural gas.

Source: Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce. For method of computing indexes see Survey of CurrentBusiness, February 1946, p. 21.

estimation and their bases are not entirelycomparable, each within itself is indicativeof the changes which the war brought about.

Because of the limitation on the expan-sion of transportation plant and equipment,increased carrying capacity had to beachieved largely by improved efficiency inthe use of existing facilities. One meansto that end was greater co-ordination inthe operations of the transportation industryand the elimination of wasteful competitionand useless duplication of services. Earlyin the war arrangements were made withthe Department of Justice for the postpone-ment of actions against the carriers under

the antitrust laws, on certification that theprosecution of such actions would interferewith the wartime transportation job.3 Therewere substantial accomplishments in thedirection of co-ordination within the several

3 Joseph B. Eastman, Selected Papers andAddresses, 1942-1944 (New York, 1948), pp. 35,156; Civilian War Transport, a Record of theControl of Domestic Traffic Operations by theOffice of Defense Transportation, 1941-1946(Washington, 1948), pp. 122-23; Memo, GenGross for Mr. Julius H. Amberg Sp Asst to SW, 3Apr 44, sub: Antitrust Suit Against RR's Partiesto Western Agreement, OCT 013.3 Antitrust Pro-secution; Ltr, Dir ODT to Dir OWM, 10 Aug44; Ltr, Atty Gen to SW, 18 Oct 44. Last two inOCT HB Gross Rail.


branches of the industry, sometimes on thecarriers' own initiative and sometimes incompliance with directives of the Office ofDefense Transportation. As regards the in-dustry as a whole, however, little progresstoward integration was in evidence, espe-cially as between rail and motor carriers.Although there was considerable discussionof the subject and some specific steps wereundertaken by ODT, in general the carrierslooked askance at the proposal and no prac-ticable and acceptable plan for extensiveintegration could be placed in effect.4

Early in the war the possibility of havingto restrict nonessential traffic through someform of priority was discussed. The Directorof Defense Transportation, whose functionit was to impose restrictions when neces-sary, desired to avoid such action insofaras possible.5 Generally speaking, he wassuccessful in adhering to that policy. Someof the ODT regulations had the effect oflimiting certain types of traffic in the interestof the whole. Strong appeals were madeto the public to travel and ship onlywhen necessary. Special trains for conven-tions, sporting events, and resort travel wereruled out. The generally accepted doctrinethat traffic essential to the armed servicesand the war industries must not be delayedindirectly limited the amount of transporta-tion equipment available for other purposesand had the effect of making nonmilitary

travel less comfortable and nonmilitaryfreight movements less expeditious. But sofar as inland surface transportation wasconcerned, no system of priorities was im-posed and the public was free to use theservices which the common carriers offered.6

In preparation for a somewhat detaileddiscussion of the Army's utilization ofdomestic carriers it is helpful to note thedistribution of Army traffic among theseveral types of surface transportation. Thebulk of it was handled by the railroads,although increased and substantial use ofthe highways and the inland waterways wasmade as the war progressed. During the45-month period, December 1941-August1945, the freight tonnage moving on WarDepartment bills of lading was distributed90.5 percent to the railways, 8.2 percent tothe highway carriers, and 1.3 percent tothe inland waterways.7 Equally completedata for Army passenger traffic are notavailable, but during the same period pas-sengers traveling in groups of 40 or more,all of which were routed by the Officeof the Chief of Transportation, weredistributed 97.6 percent to the railways and2.4 percent to the highways.8 The volumeof the Army's passenger and freight trafficon the commercial airlines was relativelyso small that it is omitted from this com-parison.

4 Eastman, Selected Papers, p. 218; "Rail-TruckCoordination," Traffic World, April 3, 1943; "Rail,Trucks to Study Coordination," Transport Topics,September 6, 1943; ODT press releases 368, 22Sep 43, and 376, 1 Oct 43; "TransportationCoordination," Traffic World, January 13, 1945.

5 Eastman, Selected Papers, p. 85, address given9 Jun 42; "ODT is Confident Freight Priorities areUnnecessary," Journal of Commerce (New York),October 14, 1943.

6 Consideration was given to a priority system toreduce nonessential travel but AAR estimated thatthe requirement of personnel to administer such asystem would be prohibitive. See Memo, CG ASFfor USW, 8 Feb 44, ASF Hq Trans 1944. Thelimited aircraft capacity was utilized under strictpriorities for both passengers and freight.

7 Gross final rpt, p. 26.8 Ibid., p. 20. If smaller parties and individuals

traveling on WD orders were included, it is prob-able that the percentage moved by highway wouldbe slightly larger.


Basic Relations with the Railroads

The experiences of World War I demon-strated the need for centralized control inwartime transportation and traffic opera-tions. That principle was found to be validfor both the carriers and the Army. In1917 the railroads had a general organiza-tion, the American Railway Association,but it lacked the authority necessary to co-ordinate fully the operations of the memberlines. This fact was in a large measure re-sponsible for the seizure of the railroadsby the federal government in December ofthat year and the establishment of theUnited States Railroad Administration.9 Sofar as the Army was concerned, during theearly months of the first world war thecontrol of freight traffic was distributedamong the several supply services, whichshipped when they were ready and byroutes of their own choosing and competedwith each other in an effort to move theirown supplies with the least possible delay.10

The confusion, congestion, and shortage ofcars which resulted from this decentraliza-tion led to the establishment of a divisionin the General Staff to exercise over-all con-trol of traffic movements. The difficultiesresulting from the initial weaknesses indomestic transportation and traffic arrange-ments, and the dislocations caused by sub-sequent reorganizations, persisted in ameasure to the Armistice.

World War II found the railroads muchbetter organized to cope with emergencyconditions. The principal factor in this im-provement was the Association of AmericanRailroads, which had been established in

1934 by merging the American RailwayAssociation, the Association of RailwayExecutives, and several other associationswithin the industry.11 The AAR, of whichall Class I railroads were members, wasestablished at a time when the carriers werein serious straits because of the generaldepression and the resulting dearth oftraffic; a concerted effort to reduce com-petitive waste and improve operating effi-ciency was mandatory.12 It had broadpowers to deal with problems common tothe industry, including operations, mainte-nance, research, and railway economics. Ofspecial importance from the standpoint ofmilitary traffic were the powers vested inits Car Service Division. Under a prewaragreement among the railroads, that divi-sion had authority to suspend the rulesgoverning the use and distribution of freightcars and to transfer freight equipment fromone railroad or territory to another whenthis became necessary to meet traffic re-quirements.13 It had authority to placeembargoes on shipments to critical pointswith a view to preventing or alleviating con-gestion. In July 1945 the Office of DefenseTransportation appointed the chairman ofthe Car Service Division to act as its agentin controlling the use and distribution of allpassenger, baggage, and express cars ownedby the railroads, in order to meet the ex-


10 Report of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Armyto the Secretary of War, 1919, pp. 147-67.

11 The Association of American Railroads, itsOrganization and Activities (Washington, n.d.,Library of Congress Card No. A-39-643), p. 1.

12 Statement by J. J. Pelley, Pres AAR, beforeSpecial Master Lloyd K. Garrison representing U.S.Supreme Court in state of Georgia suit against therailroads, 14-15 August 1946.

13 Association of American Railroads, AmericanRailroads and the War (Washington, November1943), p. 22. The interchangeability of rollingstock between the rail lines was possible becauseof the general adoption of standard gauge and alarge degree of uniformity in equipment.


ceedingly heavy military requirements forsuch equipment during the repatriation anddemobilization period.14 Although the CarService Division never had control of equip-ment owned by the Pullman Company, thetwo organizations worked in close co-ordination, as will be seen when themechanics of troop movements are dis-cussed.

The Car Service Division was quick toadapt its machinery to the requirements ofwar. In November 1939 it designated oneof its officials, Mr. George C. Randall, toserve as manager of port traffic, with head-quarters at New York, to give specific at-tention to the maintenance of fluid trafficconditions on the Atlantic seaboard. Hisfunctions included the maintenance ofrecords regarding the volume of exporttraffic and the condition of railway ter-minals at the ports, and the maintenance ofdaily contact with the railroads, the steam-ship lines, the warehouse operators, the portauthorities, and the federal governmentagencies concerned with export traffic, inorder to be in a position to initiate what-ever measures might be necessary to fore-stall or reduce an excessive accumulation ofloaded cars on port trackage or of exportfreight in port storage. In October 1941 anassistant manager of port traffic was placedat San Francisco to function in a similarmanner with regard to Pacific coast ports.15

Throughout the war these agencies per-formed valuable service in the over-all effortto keep the ports free of congestion.

The Car Service Division also col-laborated closely with The QuartermasterGeneral, who was responsible for Army

transportation during the period of prepara-tory arming, to improve the machinery forhandling military traffic. Since World WarI the railroads had maintained a troopmovement bureau in the Office of theQuartermaster General.16 During peacetimethat bureau had been operated on a verymodest scale, but early in 1940 plans wereinitiated to extend its scope to cover bothfreight and troop traffic and to provideexplicit rules of procedure. In June 1940an Outline of Relations Between Represen-tatives of the Rail Carriers of the UnitedStates and the Military Authorities wasagreed on, which included provision for theestablishment of a Military TransportationSection by the Car Service Division, withheadquarters in the Office of the Quarter-master General.17 The basic purpose of thenew section was to assist The QuartermasterGeneral in arranging for and controlling themovement of troops and supplies and toplace representatives in the field to act asliaison between the local military authoritiesand the carriers. The Military Transporta-tion Section began functioning on 1 August1940, with Mr. Arthur H. Gass as man-ager.18 AAR instructed its district managersto respect the instructions of MTS and in-formed the operating officers and committeesof the member lines regarding the newagency's activities. Thus was established,sixteen months before the United Statesentered the war, the machinery for closeco-operation between the railroads and the

14 Civilian War Transport, p. 83; ODT GO 55,17 Jul 45.

15 AAR press releases, 7 Nov 39 and 31 Oct 41,OCT HB Topic RR AAR Port Traf Mgr.

16 Crowell and Wilson, The Road to France,pp. 41-50.

17 Outline of Relations, promulgated by OQMG,24 Jun 40, Secs. II-2 and III-2, OCT HB TopicAAR MTS.

18 AAR press release, 24 Jul 40; AAR, Memos toDist Mgrs, Interterritorial Mil Com, and ChiefOperating Offs, 17 Jul 40, OCT HB Topic RRAAR MTS.


Army which accounted in large measure forthe smoothness and promptness with whichtroops and matériel were moved throughoutthe period of hostilities.19

For the handling of matters relating torailway passenger rates, routing, andscheduling, the railroads were organizedinto seven territorial passenger associations,which were designated, respectively, NewEngland, Trunk Line, Central, Southern,Southwestern, Western, and Transconti-nental. The last three associations actedjointly in regard to military traffic underthe name of Western Military Bureau, sothat there were in effect five territorialgroups. The activities of these groups wereco-ordinated through the InterterritorialMilitary Committee, on which each groupwas represented. Mr. H. W. Siddall, whoserved as chairman of the InterterritorialMilitary Committee, with headquarters inChicago, was a key figure in the relationsbetween the Army and the railroads per-taining to passenger traffic. He was a signa-tory to the Outline of Relations referred toabove, along with J. J. Pelley, president ofthe Association of American Railroads, andThe Quartermaster General. The Inter-territorial Military Committee and each ofthe five territorial groups placed representa-tives in the office of the Military Transpor-tation Section to facilitate the arrangementof routings for troop movements. They alsohad representatives at military camps andother stations where the troop traffic wasconsiderable.

As regards the Army's management ofits inland traffic, the principle of centraliza-tion which had been developed during

World War I was continued in effect. Dur-ing the peace period and the early monthsof World War II The Quartermaster Gen-eral was responsible for the supervision anddirection of all matters connected with thetransportation of the personnel and propertyof the Army, including rates, routings, andmethods of shipment.20 The execution ofthis responsibility was delegated very largelyto the Commercial Traffic Branch, Trans-portation Division, OQMG, whose chiefwas Capt. (later Col.) Edmund C. R.Lasher.21 Transportation officers in the fieldwere permitted to route only small partiesof passengers and small quantities of freight.During 1940 and 1941, when shipments ofArmy freight were expanding rapidly, pro-tests were filed by some of the larger in-stallations and some of the supply serviceheadquarters in Washington because theybelieved that obtaining routings from acentral source involved unnecessary delaysto shipments.22 But although wartime con-ditions necessitated some adjustments in therouting regulations pertaining to bothpassenger and freight traffic, the principleof centralization was retained, and in somerespects extended, under The Quarter-master General and later under the Chief ofTransportation.

The co-operative arrangements betweenthe Army and the railroads were testedsomewhat during the emergency period inthe handling of the increased traffic whichresulted from the expansion of the Army,the holding of extensive field maneuvers,and the implementation of the Lend-Lease

19 MTS also aided Navy, Marine Corps, andCoast Guard in moving personnel and stores.

20 AR 30-905, 1 Aug 29, par. 2.21 See review of activities of Coml Traf Br,

atchd to Memo for C of Trans Div OQMG, 16 Mar40, OCT HB OQMG Coml Traf Br.

22 See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 117-22.


Act. The real test, however, came duringthe weeks immediately after the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbor. Our precipitateinvolvement in a two-ocean war necessitatedthe immediate movement of a large numberof troop units and their impedimenta tocoastal points which required additionalprotection against possible enemy action andto the ports of embarkation for shipment tooversea bases.23 Hastily made military plansfrequently had to be changed, with corre-sponding changes in transportation arrange-ments and sometimes changes in the destina-tion of troops and supplies already en route.The situation was complicated further bythe decision to divert certain shipments oflend-lease goods which were already at theports to the use of our own underequippedforces. Although the period was a tumultu-ous one, requiring day and night serviceon the part of key officials in the Armytransportation organization, the MilitaryTransportation Section, and the territorialpassenger associations, and resulting in somemistakes and delays due to haste and lackof experience, the task as a whole was per-formed in what General Marshall termedan "extremely efficient manner." 24

An important contribution to railroadoperating efficiency was made by the thirteenshippers' regional advisory boards, whichhad been established in 1923 to aid the rail-

roads in the proper distribution and eco-nomical utilization of freight equipment.25

Among the services performed by theseboards, which represented the leadingshippers of the respective regions, was thepreparation of quarterly forecasts of freightcar requirements on the basis of which theCar Service Division could plan in advancefor meeting the requirements for particulartypes of cars in particular areas. Such fore-casts were of especially great value after weentered the war, because of the increasedvolume and changed character of industrialproduction.

Since the Army, because of its many newmanufacturing plants and depots, had be-come a large shipper, it was evident that ifthe forecasts were to be reasonably accuratethey should include data regarding militarycar requirements. Beginning in 1941 effortswere made to consummate such an arrange-ment, but difficulties were encountered be-cause of security considerations.26 After anextended period of conferences betweenrepresentatives of the Chief of Transporta-tion and the Army technical services, a planwas evolved in the summer of 1942 underwhich the technical service depots andmanufacturing plants and the commercialplants manufacturing equipment and sup-plies on Army contracts submitted quarterlyforecasts to the Chief of Transportation.His Traffic Control Division consolidatedthese reports and forwarded them to theAssociation of American Railroads, where

23 For example, on 8 Dec 41 arrangements weremade with AAR for prompt movement of 13 anti-aircraft regiments to east coast stations and 11 towest coast stations. See Memo, CPG (Col C. P.Gross, C of Trans Br G-4) for Col Hodson, 8 Dec41, OCT HB Gross Day File; Ltr, A. H. Gass toQMG, 15 Dec 41, OCT 511 Rail and MotorMvmts.

24 Biennial Rpt, CofS USA, 1943, p. 8. GeneralMarshall referred particularly to movement ofalmost 600,000 troops and their impedimenta dur-ing first five weeks of war.

25 L. M. Betts, "The Shippers' Advisory BoardMovement," The Journal of Business (Chicago),February 1941.

26 Draft Memo for record, Capt W. H. Schmidt,Historian for Traf Contl Div OCT, sub: Est ofCarloadings, OCT HB Topic RR Car LoadingForecasts, summarizing correspondence in privatefile (subsequently destroyed), 1941-43.


they in turn were consolidated with the fore-casts of the shippers' advisory boards.27

The Army's effort to make its car loadingforecasts reasonably accurate met with nu-merous obstacles. Difficulty was experiencedin getting forecasts from many commercialplants, and especially in getting thempromptly. The forecasts submitted by manyof the technical service installations provedto be far over or far under actual require-ments.28 The Traffic Control Division wasnot permitted to submit detailed informa-tion to the Association of American Rail-roads in regard to certain types of com-modities which were under especially strongsecurity control, and this restriction lessenedthe value of the Army data. Also, it wasfound impossible to estimate three monthsin advance the quantity of equipment andsupplies that would move from trainingcamps with troop units. Despite the slowprogress made in overcoming these difficul-ties, Brig. Gen. William J. Williamson,Chief of the Traffic Control Division, con-tinued to the end of the war his effort toimprove the quality of the forecasts, whichhe believed served a very useful purpose.The national forecasts of total freight carloading proved to be remarkably close toactual loadings, the variations during theeight quarters of 1943-44 ranging from .02percent to 6.7 percent. There were widevariations as regards particular districts andparticular types of cars, but the AAR never-

theless found the data helpful in its effortto distribute freight equipment to bestadvantage.29

In matters relating to railroad service atits installations the Army elected to negoti-ate directly with the railroads, rather thanthrough the Association of American Rail-roads.30 Such matters included the provisionof adequate main-line service and switchingservice, and the construction and mainte-nance of access tracks. In 1940 and 1941 thebuilding of new installations to serve therapidly growing Army brought this subjectinto prominence. At that time the responsi-bility for conducting negotiations on behalfof the Army was not clearly denned in theregulations, but the Commercial TrafficBranch undertook such negotiations as partof its general responsibility for transporta-tion arrangements with the carriers. Thebranch met with considerable difficulty ingetting advance information from TheQuartermaster General's Construction Divi-sion regarding proposed installations, be-cause of the extreme pressure under whichthat division was working and its desire toavoid delay.31 The Commercial TrafficBranch desired this information at theearliest possible moment, not only in orderto get service commitments from the rail-roads before the installation sites werechosen and the competitive element thus

27 Ltr, CofT to AAR, 29 Jun 42, OCT HB TopicRR Car Loading Forecasts; Memo, Col William-son for Gen Dillon, 27 Sep 42, OCT 504 QuarterlyFreight Car Requirements. Concerning forecastsprepared by ODT see Civilian War Transport, pp.87-93.

28 Memo, CofT for CofCWS, 11 Jan 44, andatchd comparison of estimated with actual carloadings, OCT 531.5 CWS; Memo, CofT forOQMG, 13 Jan 45, OCT 504 WD Car Require-ments.

29 Memo, Williamson to SGO, 19 Sep 45, sub:Car Requirements; Memo within AAR (Stringerfor Kelley), 30 Oct 48. Both in OCT HB TopicRR Car Loading Forecasts.

30 Negotiations usually were with individualcarriers, but sometimes with committees represent-ing groups of carriers. Conf, author with Col E. C.R. Lasher, 12 Nov 48, OCT HB Traf Contl DivMisc. Lasher served as Chief of the CommercialTraffic Branch OQMG and also as Deputy Chiefof the Traffic Control Division OCT.

31 On this subject see OCT HB Monograph 6,pp. 354-66; also Conf with Lasher cited n. 30.


removed, but also in order that it mightpass on the practicability of the sites fromthe standpoint of accessibility and adequacyof rail line haul capacity.32

Soon after the United States entered thewar, responsibility for the construction ofinstallations was transferred from TheQuartermaster General to the Chief ofEngineers. This action was followed shortlyby a War Department directive whichspecifically assigned to The QuartermasterGeneral the function of negotiating agree-ments covering the operations of rail carriersto and from military establishments.33 Thisfunction was transferred to the Chief ofTransportation when his office was estab-lished in March 1942. Although co-ordina-tion between the transportation and con-struction agencies of the Army was greatlyimproved thereafter, the difficulty evidentlywas not entirely overcome, for in November1942 General Gross found it necessary torequest that further instructions be issuedto insure that pending plans for new instal-lations, or for the extension of existing instal-lations, should always be referred to him forreview.34 At that time the Chief of Trans-portation was confronted with a problemwhich was just becoming troublesome—theapproach to capacity operation on some ofthe important railroads, particularly in the

southeastern states. Ill-considered action tolocate Army camps or other large installa-tions on certain of these lines had increasedtheir traffic to a point where their abilityto carry the even greater load which thefuture would impose upon them was indoubt.

Since many Army installations werelocated some distance from the rail lines, thequestion as to who should pay for the con-struction and maintenance of the connect-ing trackage was one of considerable mone-tary importance. Initially the Associationof American Railroads took the positionthat the government was responsible forall trackage beyond the carriers' right-of-ways. The Army on the other hand con-tended that the government basically wasresponsible only for trackage within themilitary reservations and that trackage be-tween the reservations and the carriers'right-of-ways should be worked out bynegotiation between the Army and theindividual carriers.35 This view determinedthe practice which was followed throughoutthe war. The result was that in a consider-able number of instances where the distancewas not great the railroads agreed to installand maintain tracks beyond their right-of-ways at their own expense, in considerationof the traffic expected to accrue to them as aresult of the connection.36 Usually accesstracks installed at government expense wereconstructed and maintained by the Corps ofEngineers, but sometimes the Army con-

32 The Senate Special Committee Investigatingthe National Defense Program criticized the lackof regard for transportation considerations inlocating certain camps. See Rpt, Camp and Canton-ment Investigation (Washington, August 14,1941), pp. 32, 35.

33 WD Cir 28, Sec. V, 30 Jan 42. Such arrange-ments were subject to concurrence of the Chiefof Engineers with respect to construction, main-tenance, and repairs. AR 55-105, par. 2i (1) ( 2 ) ,29 Dec 42.

34 Memo, CofT for CG SOS, 7 Nov 42; 1st Indby CofS SOS to CofEngrs, 7 Nov 42; 2d Ind,ACofEngrs for SOS Hq, 6 Dec 42. All in OCT323.3 Location of WD Installations.

35 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to USW, 9Apr 41; Ltr, USW to Buford, 19 Apr 41. Bothin OCT 617 RR Facilities.

36 The Army always insisted that the railroadsbuild access tracks at least to the borders of theirright-of-ways. 6th Ind, OCofEngrs to Div EngrPacific Div, 20 Sep 43, CE 161 (W869 Eng 8665) ;Ltr, C of Traf Contl Div OCT to Vice Pres Bostonand Maine RR, 2 Apr 44, OCT HB Topic RRAccess Tracks and Switching.


tracted with the connecting railroads fortheir construction or maintenance, or both.

The situation with regard to switchingcharges differed as between passenger andfreight traffic. Passenger fares committedthe carriers to provide transportation onlybetween their own terminals, and theswitching of troop cars into and out ofArmy installations therefore was at govern-ment expense.37 Freight rates, on the otherhand, included switching to and from thesidings of the shippers or consignees, if theywere within the recognized switching limits.When installations were established outsidethe switching limits, the Army endeavoredto have the limits extended if that could bedone equitably.38 Otherwise it was arrangedthat the railroad would switch without extracharge to an agreed interchange point,which might be on its own right-of-way, onthe military reservation, or along the accesstrack, according to local circumstances.

Negotiations with the railroads regardingservices at installations and access trackswere conducted informally by the TrafficControl Division on behalf of the Chief ofTransportation. Clauses relating to thesematters were included in formal contractswhich the Corps of Engineers made withthe railroads regarding real estate and theconstruction and maintenance of tracksand other facilities. Such contracts weresubmitted to the Chief of Transportationfor concurrence before being executed for

the Army. They then were checked againstthe commitments which the Traffic ControlDivision had obtained, or in the absence ofcommitments, with the Division's policiesregarding such matters.39

The indispensability of the railroads tothe functioning of the military establish-ment and their vulnerability to sabotagemade the protection of critical structuressuch as bridges and tunnels a matter of highimportance. At a meeting of the com-manders of the service commands held inDecember 1942, the opinion was expressedthat sufficient protection was not being pro-vided and that the railroads should do morein that direction. The Association of Ameri-can Railroads took the position that thestaff of over 12,000 guards already suppliedby the carriers fulfilled their obligation andthat they should be exempt from additionalrequirements. The Chief of Transportation,however, insisted that the protection of rail-way property was solely a responsibility ofthe carriers and that in view of the addedrevenue which the railroads derived frommilitary traffic this responsibility was notan undue hardship.40

In matters of policy, such as those affect-ing the expansion of railroad facilities, themeeting of the railroads' manpower require-ments, the training of troops for the Mili-tary Railway Service, the protection of criti-cal railroad structures from sabotage, theprevention of congestion at important in-land gateways and ports, and the operationof the railroads in case of strikes, negotia-

37 This paragraph based on conf with Lashercited n. 30.

38 See 2d Ind, CofT for CofEngrs, 3 Dec 43,OCT 601.53 Framingham Mass Gen Hospital; Ltr,Traf Contl Div OCT to Ga. and Fla. RR, 30 Apr43, OCT 508 Moody Field; 3d Ind, CofT forCofEngrs, 25 Oct 43, OCT 161 AT&SF RR(W957 Eng 1879); Memo, CofT for CofEngrs, 11May 43, sub: Contract—Texas and New OrleansRR Co, OCT 161 T&NO RR Co.

39 Memo, CofEngrs for CofT, 4 Jun 42, sub:Negotiation of Contracts; 1st Ind, CofT forCofEngrs, 29 Jun 42. Both in OCT 617 RRFacilities.

40 Ltr, CG SOS to Pres AAR, 21 Dec 42, OCTHB Gross Rail; Ltr, Pres AAR to CG SOS, 24Dec 42; Ltr, CofT to Pres AAR, 6 Jan 43. Lasttwo in OCT 080 AAR 1942.


tions with executives of the Association ofAmerican Railroads were usually conductedby the Chief of Transportation or hisprincipal assistants. General Gross con-sidered such matters to be of primary im-portance and gave them his personal at-tention when the circumstances warranted.General Somervell occasionally took a handwhen negotiations of special significancewere under way. In the day-to-day handlingof traffic and operating matters, the TrafficControl Division and the Rail Division ofthe Office of the Chief of Transportationdealt directly with the Car Service Divisionand its various agencies.

Although the Chief of Transportationkept the power of decision regarding rail-road matters well centralized in his ownoffice, his field organization, notably thezone and district transportation officers,maintained close contact with the carriersin their respective localities. They reportedto the Chief of Transportation any condi-tions or developments which might affectArmy traffic, and. frequently matters werereferred to them by headquarters for investi-gation and recommendation. Among thematters receiving their particular attentionwere the need for increased trackage andother facilities, proposals to abandon little-used trackage in order that the materialsmight be used more advantageously else-where, the rerouting of traffic to avoid orrelieve congestion at heavily used points, theprompt unloading and release of cars byconsignees, and manpower shortages whichaffected or were likely to affect the carriers'ability to render adequate service. Whilethe principal responsibility of these fieldofficers was to study local conditions, recom-mend action to the Chief of Transportation,and act on his behalf when so instructed,they had authority to co-operate with local

railroad officials in meeting emergencyconditions without his prior approval.41

Wartime Expansion of Railroad Traffic

Two months after the outbreak of war inEurope, the Interstate Commerce Com-mission noted that as a result of this war-fare there already was a tendency towardincreased traffic on the domestic carriersof the United States.42 From that point on-ward the expansion gathered momentumrapidly. The amendment to the NeutralityAct, approved 4 November 1939, whichpermitted belligerents to procure munitionsin the United States on a "cash and carry"basis, was followed by the placing of largeBritish and French orders with Americanindustries.43 The President's declaration ofa full emergency and the stepping up ofthe American rearmament program, follow-ing the German successes in Europe duringthe spring and early summer of 1940, addedto the production program and hence to thetransportation requirements for moving rawand finished materials. The federalizationof the National Guard and the passage ofthe Selective Service Act in September1940, together with the consummation inthe same month of an agreement with theBritish under which the United Statesacquired new bases in the Atlantic, fore-shadowed heavy increases in both thepassenger and the freight traffic of theArmy.44 The Lend-Lease Act of March1941 forecast a still further increase in thevolume of production and the domestic

41 Zone and District Transportation Officers'Guide, Nov 43, par. 100.4, OCT HB TZ Gen.

42 ICC, 53d Annual Report, November 1, 1939,p. 20.

43 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weaponfor Victory (New York, 1944), Ch. II.

44 See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 55-66.


transportation load. The expanding in-dustrial activity called for more businesstravel, and the accompanying increase inearnings stimulated travel for pleasure andthe demand for consumer goods.

During this early period, spokesmen forthe Association of American Railroads ex-pressed confidence that the carriers couldcope successfully with any demands thatmight be made on them.45 Such opinionswere predicated on two conditions: co-operation of shippers in utilizing railroadequipment economically, and effective con-trol of traffic movement to avoid port con-gestion such as had been experienced inWorld War I. The confidence which AARfelt stemmed from the fact that the rail-roads were better organized than in 1917,individually and as an industry, and thatrailroad equipment, while less when meas-

ured by number of units, was larger, moreefficient, and capable of performing muchmore work. Expressions of optimism wereheard even after we entered the war.46 Itsoon became apparent, however, that withthe rapid increase in traffic, the limitationon the production of new equipment, andthe shortage of labor, the carriers had adifficult time ahead of them.

There are several methods of measuringthe growth of traffic during the war period,but the most accurate is by comparison oftotal revenue miles of freight and passengertransportation accomplished.47 The follow-ing data afford a basis for comparing therailroads' freight traffic in 1944, which wasthe peak year, with that in 1929, which pro-duced the greatest ton-mileage prior toWorld War II, and that in 1938, the yearjust preceding the outbreak of hostilitiesin Europe:

Corresponding data are given below regard-ing passenger traffic on the railroads during1944, the peak war year, 1920 which was

the peak year before World War II, and1938:

45 Address, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR atannual dinner of Medical and Surgical Section,New York, 10 Jun 40; Addresses by M. J. Gorm-ley Exec Asst AAR before Northwest Shippers'Advisory Bd, Duluth, 25 Jul 40, and AmericanWarehousemen's Assn, Chicago, 12 Feb 41. All inOCT HB Topic RR Gen Info.

46 Address by Gormley before Great Lakes Ship-pers' Advisory Board, Toledo, 16 Sep 42, OCT HBTopic RR Gen Info.

47 Data in this paragraph based on Associationof American Railroads, Railroads in This Century,(Washington, July 1947), pp. 13, 16.


It is to be noted that, while the averagefreight haul represents the distance fromorigin to destination, under the railroads'method of computation the averagepassenger haul represents the distancetraveled on each rail line and several suchhauls may have resulted from one continu-ous trip. This fact, and the inclusion ofcommuter traffic, account for the shortaverage passenger haul compared with theaverage freight haul.

The marked wartime increase in theaverage length of haul for both passengersand freight may be attributed to the fact thatnew industrial plants and military campsand depots were widely distributed through-out the country, and to the heavy shipmentsof military personnel and supplies frommany points of origin to Atlantic, Gulf,and Pacific ports for movement overseas.These circumstances also account for theaverage Army haul being greater than thegeneral average.48

The Army's traffic was a substantialthough minor part of the total traffichandled by the rail lines. Freight shippedon War Department bills of ladingamounted to 5.1 percent of the total ton-miles of revenue freight during 1942, 7.6percent in 1943, 9.3 percent in 1944, and12 percent during the first half of 1945.49

These percentages, of course, do not takeinto account the shipments of raw and semi-finished materials and finished productswhich moved on commercial bills of ladingto and from the war industries. Figures for

total Army passenger traffic are not avail-able, but the organized groups routed inWashington accounted for 14.8 percent ofthe total revenue passenger-miles accom-plished by the railroads in 1942, 12.7 per-cent in 1943, 9.5 percent in 1944, and 10.8percent in 1945.50 It has been estimatedthat this type of traffic represented between50 and 60 percent of the total traffic movedon War Department transportation re-quests. There was no basis for computingthe volume of travel by servicemen onfurlough, since it was arranged individually.

Statistical comparisons do not correctlyshow the relative significance of militarytraffic as part of the total traffic. The largenumber of special trains required for themovement of troops and war matérielcreated additional problems for the carriers.Special loading techniques were requiredfor the various types of explosives and themany large items of equipment, such asartillery, tanks, boats, locomotives, and air-craft assemblies. The bulky items oftencreated clearance problems and necessitatedspecial routings. An unusually large pro-portion of military shipments requiredopen-top cars, which were scarce from thebeginning of the war. Special controlmeasures were necessary in connection withport-bound traffic, and diversions fromoriginal destinations frequently becamenecessary because of changed military plansor unforeseen traffic conditions. In brief,military movements absorbed a far greatershare of the railroads' attention than thefigures for volume would indicate.

Granting the readiness of the railroadsfrom an organizational standpoint to deal

48 Data compiled by the Transport EconomicsSection, Traffic Control Division, OCT, indicatethat in 1944 the average haul for Army freightwas 735 miles; for troops moving in organizedgroups of 40 or more it was 1,096 miles.

49 Based on AAR report cited n. 47, and datacompiled by Transport Economics Section, TrafficControl Division, OCT. Army freight shipmentsfell off sharply after the end of hostilities.

50 Up to January 1943 groups of 50 or morewere routed by the Traffic Control Division, OCT;thereafter, groups of 40 or more. The increasedpercentage in 1945 was due to troops being re-patriated.

FLATCARS FOR MOVING BULKY MILITARY EQUIPMENT, in heavy de-mand throughout the war. Trainloads of trucks and tanks were a common sight

along railroad right of ways.


with wartime requirements, the ability oftheir plant and equipment to handle thevastly increased traffic gave rise to concernearly in the war. The trackage and otherfixed facilities of the railroads in the eastwere considered adequate, but the capacityof the lines serving the Pacific coast fully tosupport the war against Japan was held indoubt. The supply of cars and locomotiveswas believed by some to be the railroads'chief weakness, and the possibility of obtain-ing a substantial amount of new equipmentwas seen to be limited by competingdemands upon the supply of steel and otherbasic materials. The loss of skilled man-power by the railroads, due to the operationof the Selective Service Act and the at-tractive opportunities for other employ-ment, was recognized as a major problem.These aspects of the vital railroad situation,to which the Army Chief of Transportationgave careful attention, provide the subjectmatter for the sections which follow im-mediately.

As background for the discussion of theseproblems it may be said that the railroadsmet military requirements during thehostilities with relatively few delays anddid so despite the fact that the civilians'right to travel and to ship was not drastic-ally curtailed. Army officials gave warmpraise to the railroads on numerous occasionsin recognition of their excellent perform-ance.51 In accomplishing this result, how-ever, the carriers were forced to operateunder a heavy strain during the latter partof the war, which could not have continuedindefinitely without deleterious effects.52 Itis to be considered, also, that the American

railroads never were confronted with theproblem of handling mass evacuations frombombed or invaded areas, nor were theiroperations ever disrupted by enemy airattack. In these respects they enjoyed aunique position among the transportationsystems of the major participants in WorldWar II.

Limited Capacity of the Western Railroads

As already indicated, concern over theability of the American railroads to meet themilitary requirements involved chiefly thelines serving the Pacific coast. The easternseaboard was supported by a heavy networkof trunk lines which, with the addition ofsome yard capacity, seemed capable ofhandling any export traffic that the warmight throw upon them. The capacity of thetranscontinental and western lines, on theother hand, was limited by reason of therelatively small westbound traffic whichthey had been required to handle in peace-time, a limitation that applied to both linehaul and port facilities. The fact that theNavy's chief effort was in the Pacific, thatafter the defeat of Germany the bulk of theArmy's strength would be shifted to thePacific theaters, and that a considerablequantity of Russian and British lend-leasesupplies moved through the west coast portsforecast the heavy tonnage which the rail-roads west of the Mississippi would becalled on to lift. The longer voyages in-volved in shipping to Pacific bases fromGulf and Atlantic coast ports and thenecessity of getting the utmost service outof the available bottoms emphasized theimportance of moving as much of thistraffic as possible through Pacific coastports.

The inadequacy of the western railwayplant was felt first at the ports. The flood of

51 See Ltr, SW to J. J. Pelley Pres AAR, 18 Oct45; Ltr, Gen Gross to Mr. Pelley, 28 Nov 45. Bothin OCT 080 AAR.

52 See "Miracles Have Limits Says ColonelJohnson," Railway Age, March 24, 1945.


supplies and equipment which the Armyand the Navy moved into San Franciscoafter the Japanese attack on our Pacificoutposts convinced both the armed servicesand the railroads that additional storagetracks were needed in that area. Within afew days after Pearl Harbor the San Fran-cisco Port of Embarkation recommendedthe addition of from 350 to 400 car lengthsof new trackage, and approval was givenpromptly.53 During the next year 3,000additional car lengths were authorized forthat area, and the need was recognized formore trackage at Los Angeles and Portland,which were beginning to play a larger partin the Pacific war.54 During the years1942-44 the new holding tracks installed inthe San Francisco area totaled 7,200 carlengths, in the Los Angeles area 2,433 carlengths, and in the Portland area 1,350 carlengths. All of this new trackage wasprovided at government expense.55 Addi-tional holding tracks, as well as other plantfacilities, were installed by the railroads attheir own expense.

Evidences of congestion at points alongthe lines of the transcontinental railroadswere reported during the summer of 1942.56

Up to that time, however, the Army hadencountered no serious delays, and it wasknown that the carriers were taking stepsto increase their line haul capacity; there-fore, when Mr. Gustav Metzman, then

Chief of the Rail Division, called on theAssociation of American Railroads to makea survey of the potential capacity of itsmember lines no special mention was madeof the lines west of the Mississippi.57 ByMay 1943 the magnitude of the Pacific warhad become more apparent, and GeneralGross then specifically requested that an in-vestigation of the transcontinental lines bemade to determine the extent to which thewestbound freight movement of the armedforces could be increased. This request wasdirected to both the Office of DefenseTransportation and the Association ofAmerican Railroads, but ODT arrangedthat the investigation in the field should beundertaken by AAR.58

As a first step in this investigation, Mr.J. J. Pelley and Mr. C. H. Buford, Presi-dent and Vice President, respectively, ofthe Association of American Railroads,visited the western states and arranged forthe carriers and the AAR representatives inthat area to submit data and recommenda-tions. On the basis of the reports received,AAR presented a detailed analysis to Gen-eral Gross late in July 1943.59 The reportsindicated that many of the western railroadswere installing additional yard tracks, pass-ing tracks, and other facilities, and hadordered additional locomotives. The generalconclusions drawn by AAR from the in-formation received from the field were asfollows: (1) that no additional facilitiesbeyond those already contemplated shouldbe provided unless a way could be found

53 Memo, SFPE for QMG, 11 Dec 41; DFACofS G-4 for CofEngrs, 20 Jan 42. Both inG-4/30105-11.

54 Ltr, CG SFPE to Gen Gross, 1 Jan 43, andatchd data on problems of SFPE, p.3, OCT HBGross San Francisco.

55 Handwritten Memo, McIntyre for Gross, 31May 44, OCT HB Gross Rail Capacity of Ports;Memo, C of Eng Br Rail Div OCT for C of RailDiv, 29 Nov 43, sub: Army-Constructed RR Yardson West Coast, OCT HB Rail Div Misc.

56 Memo, Mgr Mil Trans Sec AAR for ColWilliamson OCT, 10 Aug 42, OCT 080 AAR.

57 Ltr, Metzman to C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR,30 Jun 42, OCT 080 AAR.

58 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to Gross, 28Jun 43; Ltr, V. V. Boatner Dir Div of RR TransODT to Gross, 31 Jul 43. Both in OCT HB GrossRail.

59 Ltr, 27 Jul 43, and atchmts, OCT HB GrossRail Capacity of Western RR's.


to insure adequate personnel to operatethose facilities; (2) that the governmentagencies involved should take steps to deter-mine what the load on the western lineswould be; and (3) that if additional capac-ity should be found necessary, the govern-ment agencies should determine where andby whom it should be provided. The Officeof Defense Transportation informed Gen-eral Gross that the AAR conclusions weresubstantially in accordance with its under-standing of the situation and expressed theview that with the planned expansion offacilities and the additional equipmentwhich the railroads might expect to receive,they would be able to handle the forth-coming traffic "with reasonable dispatchand efficiency." In his reply to ODT Gen-eral Gross observed that his study of thereports submitted by the individual rail-roads had given him the impression thatthe field was more aware of the problemthan were the agencies in Washington, andhe expressed the fear that ODT and AARwere inclined to hold the railroads backrather than to urge them on in the expan-sion of their capacity.60

The Office of Defense Transportationthen requested the Association of AmericanRailroads to call a meeting of the executivesof the transcontinental lines to considerwhat projects were most necessary to enablethem to handle the anticipated increase intraffic.61 General Gross attended this meet-ing, which was held in Chicago on 12August 1943, and presented his viewsstrongly. He urged that the western linesincrease their capacity as much as possible.He stated that although the government

was helping with the improvement of railfacilities at the ports and would assist thecarriers with their manpower problems, therailroads themselves would have to assumeresponsibility for the increase in their linehaul capacity. He asserted that it was theresponsibility of ODT to give the railroadswhatever assistance they needed for theprompt procurement of new equipment andfacilities. Following the meeting, Gross ex-pressed the belief that the carriers were"entirely justified" in their complaints re-garding the delays encountered by theirrequests for additional facilities, and he tooksteps to obtain lists of the requested facili-ties from ODT in order that the Armymight approach the War Production Boardregarding them.62

General Gross got prompt reactions tohis Chicago remarks from the War Pro-duction Board and the Office of DefenseTransportation. A representative of theformer agency submitted a copy of a recentreport of its Railroad Industry AdvisoryCommittee, which indicated that the proj-ects for fixed facilities which had been filedfor 1943 had been double those for theprevious year, that the amount of rail onhand but unlaid was high, and that laborsupply was considered the crux of the prob-lem.63 The Office of Defense Transporta-tion, referring particularly to Gross's ob-jection to the slow progress in the procure-ment of new railroad equipment and facili-ties, pointed out that the Army itself hadopposed the assignment of a higher priorityto railroad equipment and had objected to

60 Ltr, V. V. Boatner ODT to Gross, 31 Jul 43;Ltr, Gross to Boatner, 3 Aug 43. Both in OCT 617RR Facilities.

61 Ltr, Boatner to Gross, 6 Aug 43, OCT HBGross Rail.

62 Gross's pencil notes for Chicago address, OCTHB Gross Rail Capacity of Western RR's; Ltr,Gross to F. C. Curley Vice Pres AT&SF RySystem, 20 Aug 43, OCT HB Gross Rail.

63 Ltr from Andrew Stevenson Dir Trans Equip-ment Div WPB, 14 Aug 43, and atchd rpt, OCTHB Gross Rail.


the approval of certain new railroad facili-ties because the materials were needed formilitary projects.64 During the preparationof a reply to the latter communication, Gen-eral Gross commented that he already hadtaken steps to reduce the delays attributedto the Army, and he wanted ODT assuredthat the Army had no hostility to its pro-grams for additional railway equipment andfacilities; he felt, on the other hand, thatODT had been too cautious in pressingthese programs and directed Col. John A.Appleton, then chief of the Rail Division,to urge upon ODT the "necessity for takingboth speedy and decisive action." 65

The concern over the capacity of thewestern railroads was based on estimatesof freight shipments to the Pacific preparedin the Office of the Chief of Transportationby the combined efforts of the Planning,Rail, and Traffic Control Divisions. A studysubmitted in August 1943 estimated thatthe crest of the movement would be reachedduring the last quarter of 1945, when thepeak day for deliveries of export freight atwest coast ports would approximate 4,443cars, or almost three times the anticipatedpeak day for the third quarter of 1943.66

On this basis there was real cause for con-cern, especially in view of the limited im-provement so far achieved in the transcon-tinental line haul.

A review of the situation which was sub-mitted to the Office of Defense Transporta-tion by Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes of the ArmyService Forces in August 1944 displayedgreater optimism. It took into account the

increase in western railway facilities whichhad been accomplished during the pastyear, and a general acceptance of the neces-sity of using eastern ports for part of thePacific supply movement. The transcon-tinental lines were expected to reach adaily average capacity of 5,195 westboundcars by October 1944 and to sustain thataverage thereafter. Requirements for thecivil population and industry on the westcoast were placed at 2,794 carloads daily,leaving 2,401 carloads available for exportfreight, including Army, Navy, lend-lease,and commercial shipments. In the light ofcurrent planning by the Army and theNavy, General Lutes believed that the trans-continental railroads would be capable ofhandling the load which would be placedon them.67

General Gross, who had just completedhis second inspection tour of the Pacificcoast, was in agreement with that view. Hebelieved that while the line haul and portcapacities of the western railroads would beheavily taxed, they would be able to meetthe requirements of the armed forces in thefinal stages of the war against Japan.Although not pleased with the prospect thatthe Army would have to load a considerableamount of freight for the Pacific at Atlanticand Gulf ports, Gross pointed out that thedisadvantage of this procedure would belessened by the fact that some of this cargowould be lifted by ships which would betransferred from the Atlantic to the Pacificafter the defeat of Germany.68

64 Ltr, Joseph B. Eastman Dir ODT to Robert A.Lovett, Actg SW, 24 Aug 43, pars. 1 and 2, OCTHB Gross Rail.

65 Memo for Appleton, 26 Aug 43, OCT HBGross Rail.

66 Memo, C of Plng Div OCT for Gross, 10 Aug43, OCT HB Gross Rail Capacity of Western RR's.

67 Ltr, Gen Lutes to J. M. Johnson Dir ODT,10 Aug 44, OCT HB Gross Rail Capacity ofWestern RR's. It is to be noted that this estimatedeals with daily averages, whereas the estimatereferred to in the preceding paragraph was for apeak day.

68 Ltr, Gross to J. M. Johnson ODT, 11 Aug44, OCT HB Gross Rail Capacity of Ports.


Shortly after the German surrender theAssociation of American Railroads statedthat the transcontinental lines then had apractical capacity of 5,200 loaded cars ofwestbound freight daily and that theyalready were moving about 5,000 carsdaily.69 AAR indicated that if the railroadswere given adequate manpower and repairmaterials this capacity could be increasedto about 5,615 daily. The westbound linehaul had to accommodate both domesticand export freight. The rail facilities at thewest coast ports, according to the AARstatement, were capable of handling 3,100cars of dry cargo for export daily, which waswell in excess of what they were handlingcurrently.70

Because of the early end of the war inthe Pacific, the actual capacity of thewestern railroads was not proved in prac-tice. The above facts indicate, however,that if the war had continued, the limit onthe movement of military supplies to thePacific by that route would have been im-posed by the line haul capacity of the trans-continental lines, rather than the railcapacity at the ports. Building up the trans-continental capacity naturally was a muchmore difficult task than adding to the railfacilities at the ports.

Under Section 124 of the InternalRevenue Code the railroads were permittedto apply for special amortization privileges,

for tax purposes, in connection with facili-ties and equipment procured to meet warrequirements.71 Initially such applicationsrequired certification by the Secretary ofWar or the Secretary of the Navy withrespect to the necessity for the projects, butin December 1943 the responsibility forcertification was transferred to the WarProduction Board by Executive Order.72

The Association of American Railroadsexpressed concern regarding this transferwhile it was pending, on the ground that itwould have a retarding effect on the rail-roads' program, but General Gross saweither no opportunity or no necessity foraction on his part.73

Both before and after this proceduralchange the applications for certificates ofnecessity, the majority of which were fromthe western railroads, were investigated bythe Chief of Transportation and recom-mendations were made to Army ServiceForces headquarters for approval or dis-approval.74 The peak period for such ap-plications was the fiscal year 1943, whenover 1,500 were received. During themonths of March, April, and May 1943 atotal of 557 applications were consideredby the Chief of Transportation and allwere approved. Thereafter, the number ofapplications filed by the railroads declined,

69 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to RearAdm W. J. Carter, BUSANDA, 23 May 45, andatchd rpt, sub: Sustainable Capacity of WesternTranscontinental RR's, OCT 511 Capacity ofTranscontinental RR's.

70 June 1945 produced the peak daily averageof 2,226 cars of dry export cargo delivered to westcoast ports. The capacity of those ports for petro-leum export was about 700 cars daily, and in June1945 the daily average was 454 cars. See Conf,author with W. F. Betts of AAR, 2 Dec 48, OCTHB RR Western Lines Capacity.

71 See Civilian War Transport, pp. 213-16 forgeneral discussion.

72 Memo, Dir of Matériel ASF Hq for Dir ProdDiv ASF Hq, 21 Dec 43, sub: Liaison with WPBon Applications for Necessity Certificates, OCTHB Rail Div Misc. The amortization periodusually allowed was five years.

73 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to Gross,6 Nov 43; Ltr, Gross to Buford, 9 Nov 43; Ltr,Buford to Gross, 17 Nov 43, with pencil notationby Gross, "no other action." All in OCT HB GrossRail.

74 See Memo, CofT for Dir Req Div ASF, 20Aug 43, sub: Coml RR Expansion Projects beforeWPB, OCT 617 RR Facilities 1942-44.


and beginning in November 1943 there wasa marked increase in the percentage of dis-approvals.75 During the fiscal year 1944,845 applications were considered, of which612 were approved, 190 were disapproved,and 43 were referred to other agencies.Since throughout this period General Grosscontinued to press for maximum rail capac-ity, it is evident that his efforts in thatdirection brought forth projects from therailroads which could not be justified fromthe standpoint of war necessity.

Procurement of New Railroad Equipment

In considering the condition of theAmerican railroads at the outbreak ofWorld War II, the effect of the generalbusiness recession of the 1930's must betaken into account. Traffic during thisperiod had been relatively light and theincome of the carriers had been correspond-ingly low. In consequence, orders for newequipment and plant improvements hadbeen kept at a minimum, and an unusualamount of old rolling stock had beenretired.76 But while the number of cars andlocomotives was much smaller, the unitswere larger and their work capacity washigher.

Between the end of 1917 and the end of1941 the number of locomotives owned bythe American railroads had decreased from66,070 to 44,375, but the aggregate tractiveeffort was approximately the same.77 Be-tween these dates the number of freight cars

owned by the railroads had decreased from2,379,472 to 1,732,673, but the averagecapacity had increased from 41.5 tons to50.3 tons. The number of passenger traincars owned by the Class I railroads and thePullman Company (sleepers, coaches,parlor cars, club cars, dining cars, expresscars, and baggage cars) had decreased from60,710 to 44,948 but their average capacitywas greater.78 Despite the reduced numberof units of equipment, the expenditure ofmore than ten billion dollars between thetwo wars for better locomotives and carsand improved plant facilities, together withimproved arrangements for co-ordinatedaction, had given the railroads the abilityto haul longer trains faster and to utilizetheir equipment more intensively.

In the early summer of 1940, followingthe German military successes in westernEurope and the expansion of the Americanrearmament program, concern over theadequacy of our railroad equipment wasexpressed in various quarters. Mr. RalphBudd, who had just taken office as Trans-portation Commissioner in the AdvisoryCommission to the Council of NationalDefense, almost immediately launched acampaign to improve the equipment situa-tion.79 Finding that the Class I railroadsowned only 1,645,896 freight cars and thatonly about 15,000 new cars were on order,he advocated that the orders be increasedso as to provide a total of 1,700,000 carsby 1 October 1941. In support of this plan,the Association of American Railroads

75 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Nov 43, p. 57; AnnualRpts, Rail Div OCT FY 1943 and 1944, OCT HBRail Div Rpts.

76 Compared with $872,608,000 spent for equip-ment, roadway, and structures in 1930, the ClassI railroads spent a yearly average of $259,102,000during the 9-year period 1931-39. See AAR, Rail-roads in This Century, p. 11.

77 AAR, Railroads in This Century, pp. 4, 6.

78 Association of American Railroads, Railroadsand Defense (Washington, 1941), p. 11; AAR,American Railroads and the War, p. 20.

79 Memo for record by author, sub: Rail Equip-ment, 1 Jul 43, prepared following consultation ofmanuscript then being prepared under Mr. Budd'sdirection entitled, History of the Office of theTransportation Commissioner, OCT HB TopicBudd.


recommended to its members that 100,000new freight cars be provided by the end of1941.80 The Army strongly supported theseproposals and urged a review of the entireequipment situation, including locomo-tives.81 The Transportation Commissioneralso suggested the advisability of the govern-ment's procuring several thousand sleepingcars for troop use, but found AAR satisfiedthat the railroads could handle the pros-pective troop traffic without additional carsand the Army opposed in principle to thegovernment ownership of such equipment.82

The year 1941 brought a reappraisal ofthe need for additional railroad equipment.The rapid growth of freight traffic duringnine months of intensive rearming, and thepassage of the Lend-Lease Act of March1941, gave a new aspect to the situation. InApril 1941, on the basis of estimates offreight traffic for the next three years, theAssociation of American Railroads informedits members that freight car ownership,which then was expected to reach 1,680,000by the end of that year, should be increasedto 1,800,000 during 1942 and to 1,950,000during 1943.83 In August The Quarter-

master General expressed satisfaction withthe AAR program for new freight cars buturged that the carriers take early steps toadvance their passenger car programs, inview of "recent instances of tightness in thepassenger car situation" and prospectiveincreases in troop movements and furloughtravel.84 The AAR reply stated that thematter was being followed up with themember lines but pointed out that con-struction of passenger cars already on orderwas being delayed by inability to obtainadequate steel in competition with the mili-tary and shipbuilding programs.

By this time it was evident that thecontrolling factor in the railroad procure-ment program was not the extent of theorders placed but the ability to obtain thematerials required by the builders. TheTransportation Commissioner informed theFederal Loan Administrator, who had ex-pressed willingness to make loans to facili-tate the placing of freight car orders, thathis most useful service would be the exerciseof his influence to make the needed mate-rials available.85 In September 1941 theTransportation Commissioner informed thechairman of the Supply Priorities and Allo-cations Board that the A-3 preference ratingwhich had been given to the freight car andlocomotive builders in June was not highenough to overcome the lag in productionand that the situation had become worserather than better during recent months.86

80 Ltr, W. T. Faricy Pres AAR to C. C. Ward-low, 6 Nov 48, and attached AAR press release of12 May 41, OCT HB Topic RR Equip. Associationof American Railroads, Annual Report of the CarService Division (Washington, 1945), indicatesthat freight cars on order increased from 18,456on 1 Sep 40 to 92,033 on 1 Sep 41.

81 Memo, CofEngrs for CofS USA, 24 Jul 40;Memo, QMG for ACofS G-4 USA, 6 Aug 40;Ltrs, SW to Ralph Budd, 7 Aug 40 and 21 Oct40. All in AG 453 (7-24-40) Shortage of RREquip.

82 Memo by author, 1 Jul 43, cited n. 79; Memo,ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 15 Aug 40,G-4/29717-41; Ltr, Ralph Budd to Edward G.Budd, 16 Sep 40, OCT HB Topic Budd; Memo,ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 19 Sep 40, par. 3,AG 453 (7-24-40) Shortage of RR Equip.

83 Personal Memo, Pres AAR for Execs of Mem-ber Lines, 30 Apr 41, OCT HB Topic Budd.

84 Ltr, QMG to C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR,15 Aug 41; Ltr, Buford to QMG, 16 Aug 41. Bothin OCT 080 AAR.

85 Ltr to Jesse H. Jones, 25 Jul 41, OCT HBTopic Budd.

86 Ltr to Henry A. Wallace, 25 Sep 41, OCT HBTopic Budd. Preference ratings were given toinsure that materials were allocated to manufac-turers in accordance with the urgency of the needfor their products. The highest preference ratingat that time was A-1-a.


After the entry of the United States intothe war the need for additional railroadequipment grew more pressing and thedifficulty of obtaining it became greater.The competition for materials, between themilitary and shipbuilding programs on theone hand and domestic transportation onthe other, had many ramifications whichcannot be discussed here. Fundamentally itwas a problem of utilizing the availablematerials, which were not sufficient to meetall requirements fully, in the manner thatwould best promote the war effort, andnaturally there were differences of opinionon this vital issue.87 The Office of DefenseTransportation, which had been establishedin December 1941 with over-all responsi-bility for the adequacy of the carriers' serv-ices, requested the allocation of materialsfor new railroad equipment in accordancewith programs worked out in collaborationwith the carriers. Generally speaking, theArmy supported these plans and urged theWar Production Board to provide for theirfulfillment—but not at the expense of theArmy supply program. The Army policy ofprotecting its program did not allow theamount of rail equipment to be built whichGeneral Gross, as Chief of Transportation,believed the carriers should have, but mili-tary considerations were overriding.88 Themilitary program, it will be recalled, in-cluded considerable equipment for theArmy's utility railroads in the zone of in-terior and the military railways overseas.

The quantity of materials allocated to theequipment programs of the commercial rail-

roads consistently fell short of the amountssought, and the War Production Board wassubject to considerable criticism, since it hadnot given top priority rating to such equip-ment.89 The War Production Board, on theother hand, considered the armed servicesbasically responsible since their heavy andinsistent demands for military equipmentand ships limited the materials availablefor other purposes. In the winter of 1945,when the railroad situation was critical, theDirector of Defense Transportation statedthat from the beginning of the war he hadbelieved that the carriers should bestrengthened with added equipment andby the protection of their manpower, butthat he had been unsuccessful in getting thatidea adopted.90 He pointed out the ap-parent inconsistency of the armed servicesin procuring and expending great quanti-ties of munitions to destroy the enemy'stransportation facilities while allowing ourown to deteriorate. The attitude of theArmy may be attributed to the doctrine thatthe paramount requirement for waging

87 See Civilian Production Administration, In-dustrial Mobilization for War, History of the WarProduction Board and Predecessor Agencies1940-1945 (Washington, 1947), Vol. 1, pp.273-305, 549-62; also Logistics in World War II,Final Report of the Army Service Forces (Wash-ington, 1947), pp. 207-08.

88 Pencil Memo, Gross for Gen Lucius D. Clay,DCofS for Requirements SOS Hq, 19 May 42, withproposed letter to Donald Nelson Chm WPB, OCT453 Rail Equip Program; Memo, Clay for Gross,22 May 42, OCT 453 Rail Equip Program; Memo,Clay for CG SOS, 11 Aug 42; Memo, Gross forSomervell, 12 Aug 42, with draft of memo forNelson; Ltr, USW to Nelson (revision of Grossdraft), 18 Aug 42; Ltr, Somervell to Nelson, 13Nov 42. Last four in OCT HB Gross Rail AAREquip Program.

89 Eastman, Selected Papers, pp. 47, 91; ODT,Annual Report to the President for the Year 1942,p. 11, OCT HB Topic ODT; Hearing Before theSubcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,on the Military Establishment Appropriation Billfor 1944 (Washington, 1943), pp. 252-53; CivilianWar Transport, pp. 193-98.

90 General Statement of Transportation Situation,Feb 45, atchd to Study VE-9 prepared for OWMR,sub: Trans V-E Day to V-J Day, OCT HB TC GenRedeployment.


successful warfare is a well-equipped fight-ing force in the field and to the realizationthat a considerable reduction of the load ontransportation could be accomplished bycurtailing nonessential civilian traffic.91

Until late 1943 railroad equipment, and infact all the programs of the Office of DefenseTransportation, had a preference rating ofAA-2X, while military equipment and shipshad the higher rating AA-1.92 Then, withthe production of materials steadily increas-ing, the War Production Board was able toraise the ratings applicable to many trans-portation items, and the allotment of ma-terials to the domestic transportation in-dustry accordingly increased.93 The ensuingincrease in orders for cars and locomotivesdid not meet expectations, however. TheSenate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, which hadrecommended the improved rating, at-tributed the reluctance of the railroads toplace additional orders to financial reasons,but took cognizance of the tremendous in-crease in the carriers' earnings on accountof war traffic.94 The Director of DefenseTransportation stated that he could under-stand the railroads' hesitation to purchaseadditional freight cars wholly for "war in-surance," but that he did not regard as suchthe cars which the railroads then were beingurged to order, in view of the advanced age

of existing equipment.95 He much pre-ferred that the railroads should not forcethe government to purchase the additionalfreight cars which his office considerednecessary. As it developed, the governmentdid not procure freight cars or locomotivesfor the use of the common carriers, but didacquire troop train equipment, hospitalcars, and tank cars which were neededspecifically for military purposes.

Bearing in mind the fact that after theextent of the need for railroad equipmenthad been determined by the Office ofDefense Transportation it was also neces-sary for the individual carriers to placeorders and for the War Production Board toallocate the required materials, it is ofinterest to note what part of the estimatedrequirements actually was produced. Datafor the critical years 1942, 1943, and 1944are presented in Table 11. It also will beof value to review separately the wartimeexperience with respect to locomotives,freight cars, and passenger train cars, sincethe circumstances were different in eachcase.

Among the several types of railroadequipment, locomotives were the first tobecome critical.96 Many of those on handwere old and of uncertain dependability.During the 10-year period, 1932-41, thenumber of new locomotives put in serviceannually by the Class I railroads averagedonly 245.97 A longer time was required forbuilding locomotives than for building cars.The problem was further complicated by

91 See Ltr, Gen Gross to J. J. Pelley Pres AAR,22 May 42, OCT HB Gross Rail AAR EquipProgram.

92 Office of Defense Transportation, Annual Re-port to the President, 1943, p. 45. For backgroundof priority problem, see D. W. Odiome, "TheMaterial Situation and its Effect on Freight Cars,"Railway Age, June 5, 1943.

93 Civilian War Transport, p. 198; ODT pressrelease, 16 Feb 44, OCT HB RR Equip.

94 The Senate Special Committee Investigatingthe National Defense Program, Third Annual Re-port (Washington, March 4, 1944), p. 114.

95 Eastman, Selected Papers, p. 360, addressdelivered, 3 Feb 44.

96 ODT, Annual Report to the President, 1942,p. 11.

97 AAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Divi-sion, 1945, p. 24. In contrast, 2,399 new loco-motives were put in service in 1926, 1,955 in 1927,1,390 in 1928.


TABLE 11—EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE AMERICAN RAILROADS (ALL CLASSES)AS STATED BY THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION, AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION:

1942-1944.

a Passenger train cars produced in 1942 were those for which materials had been allotted previously. Cars produced in 1943and 1944 were the 1,200 special troop sleepers and 400 troop kitchen cars ordered by the government, requirements for whichare shown for 1943. No cars were produced in 1944 against requirements shown for that year.

Source: Civilian War Transport, p. 195.

the fact that the railroads wanted a largepercentage of diesel locomotives, and dieselengines were in great demand for naval andmerchant vessels and also for locomotives forthe Military Railway Service in the theatersand for our allies.98 Because of the urgencyof the need, however, 92 percent of the esti-mated locomotive requirements actuallywas produced in 1943 and 85 percent in1944 (Table 11). Of the total of 3,066 new

locomotives put in service by the Class Irailroads in the 4-year period, 1942-45,1,891 were diesels or diesel electrics and1,175 were steam.99 Whereas the railroads(all classes) owned 44,375 locomotives on31 December. 1941 they owned 46,253 on31 December 1945, an increase of 1,878,taking into account necessary retirements.100

Although locomotives were less critical thancars during the latter part of the war, itnevertheless was necessary for the railroadsto use them to utmost capacity.

98 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to Brig GenT. H. Dillon, DCofT, 2 Feb 43, OCT 080 AAR;Ltr, Gen Gross for Brig Gen C. D. Young ODT,31 May 43; Ltr, Young for Gross, 5 Jul 43; Ltr,Gross for Young, 14 Jul 43. Last three in OCTHB Gross Day File.

99 AAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Divi-sion, 1946, p. 25.

100 AAR, Railroads in This Century, p. 4.


Tightness in the supply of some types offreight cars appeared early in the war,but the over-all situation did not becomethreatening until later. During 1943,despite heavier loading and other measuresto utilize the cars with utmost efficiency, thenumber of cars reported as surplus in theseveral areas steadily decreased and the re-ported shortages steadily increased.101 Thepresident of the Association of AmericanRailroads had stated late in 1942 that thecarriers were "close to the bottom of thebarrel" in their effort to increase the utiliza-tion of existing equipment.102 Because of thelow preference rating, the number of freightcars produced in 1942 was only 34 percent ofthe requirements estimated by the Office ofDefense Transportation, and in 1943 it wasonly 39 percent; in 1944, despite a higherrating, production was only 67 percent ofestimated requirements (Table 11). Mean-time, wear and tear had forced many carsinto retirement. As a consequence, the netincrease in the number of freight cars ownedby the railroads (all classes) between theend of 1941 and the end of 1944 was only64,339 cars, or 3.7 percent.103 Against this,the ton-miles of revenue freight increased 55percent between the years 1941 and 1944.Thus the stage was set for the freight carcrisis which developed early in 1945.

This crisis was precipitated by unusuallysevere snow and ice in the northeastern partof the United States, but more basic causeslay in the limited supply of freight equip-ment and the lack of labor reserves. The

situation necessitated a series of embargoeson civilian shipments into the area affected.Military shipments were exempted from theembargoes, but the Army voluntarily cur-tailed the movement of supplies that werenot urgently needed in order to lighten thecarriers' burden.104 Generally speaking,essential military shipments, which wereheavy on account of the critical operationsin Europe, were put through promptly, butsome were delayed because of the inabilityof the railroads to provide the cars im-mediately.105 The immobilization of equip-ment in the northeast, together with thelimited supply of cars, adversely affectedtransportation throughout the country. Theboxcar situation was particularly serious inrelation to the movement of grain and flour,including the Army's program for the ship-ment of civilian supplies to the liberatedareas of Europe, a program that was attain-ing large proportions in the spring of 1945.As much as two years later the civilian aidmovement still was handicapped by the in-adequate supply of boxcars.106

During the early part of the war the needfor additional passenger train equipmentwas less urgent than the need for loco-motives and freight cars, and very little wasbuilt. As a result, the railroads and thePullman Company owned less serviceableequipment of this type at the end of 1943than at the end of 1939.107 The restrainton the construction of passenger equipment

101 C. B. Peck, "Freight-Car Needs ExceedSupply," Railway Age, January 1, 1944; ASFMPR, Sec 3, Jan 44, p. 83; AAR, Annual Reportof the Car Service Division, 1945, p. 21.

102 Address by J. J. Pelley, Chicago, 16 Oct 42,OCT HB Topic RR Equip.

103 AAR, Railroads in This Century, p. 6, shows1,732,673 cars owned on 31 Dec 41 and 1,797,012on 31 Dec 44.

104 Memo, Lt Gen W. D. Styer, CofS ASF forC's of Tech Svs, sub: Rail Embargo, OCT 617.

105 Conf, author with Col H. G. Randall C ofContl Br Traf Contl Div OCT, 20 Mar 45, OCTHB Topic RR Crisis 1945.

106 Rpt of Opns Mtg OCT, 16 Apr 45, OCT HBDir of Opns, Opns Council Mtgs; "Crisis ThreatensTransportation," The New York Times, March 3,1947.

107 Ltr, AAR for C. C. Wardlow, 13 Nov 44, andatchd statistics, OCT HB Topic RR Equip.

754-915 O-64—23


continued throughout the war, except forthe specially designed troop train and hospi-tal train cars which were procured by thegovernment.108

In April 1942 the Association of Ameri-can Railroads proposed that the Army pro-cure 2,500 coaches and 500 "head-endcars" (baggage cars for temporary use astroop kitchen cars), and rent them to therailroads on a mileage basis, but the Armybelieved that the existing passenger equip-ment would be adequate in view of thepossibility of limiting civilian traffic.109 Also,the Army still was opposed to governmentownership of such equipment. AAR tookthe matter up again in February 1943, thistime proposing the construction of troopsleepers and troop kitchen cars of simplifieddesigns which would require a minimum ofscarce materials and a minimum of pro-duction time, but the Army still was un-receptive.110 The Army, however, found theproposed designs acceptable, and, anticipat-ing an increase of 50 percent in troop trafficin 1943 over 1942, it endeavored to impressupon the railroads their responsibility forprocuring such additional passenger equip-ment as might be needed. At this point theOffice of Defense Transportation took ahand in the matter and arranged for the

Defense Plant Corporation to finance theconstruction of 1,200 troop sleepers and 400troop kitchen cars.111 The last units of thisequipment were not delivered until well into1944.

Soon after V-E Day the Office of DefenseTransportation proposed that the govern-ment place a further order for 1,200 troopsleepers and 400 troop kitchen cars to aidin the heavy movement of military person-nel during the period of redeployment andrepatriation.112 The Army offered neitheractive opposition to nor active support ofthe project. General Gross informed ODTthat he was "somewhat disturbed by thelate and rather hastily considered proposal"to have the Defense Plant Corporationbuild this additional equipment "for aload of such short duration," rather thanenforce a "firm denial" of transportationto the public.113 Since the cars were to bebuilt, however, the Army urged that this bedone as quickly as possible in order thatthey might be available during the periodof greatest need. Unfortunately, industrialstrikes delayed the completion of the secondlot of 1,200 sleepers and fewer than 400 hadbeen delivered up to 31 December 1945,by which time the peak of the repatriationmovement was past.

The Army placed orders for a total of200 new hospital cars and 60 new hospitalkitchen cars in 1944 and 1945 to transportpatients in the zone of interior. These were

108 ODT press release, 18 May 45, OCT HBTopic RR Equip; Ltr, J. J. Pelley Pres AAR toGen Somervell, 5 Jun 45, OCT 531.2 TroopSleepers and Kitchen Cars.

109 Ltr, J. J. Pelley Pres AAR to Gen Somervell,13 Apr 42; Ltr, Somervell to Pelley, 13 May 42.Both in OCT HB Gross Troop Sleepers andKitchen Cars. An ODT survey late in 1942 showedthat about one out of every three persons usingtrains and buses was traveling for social or amuse-ment purposes. See "The Huge Task of the Rail-roads," Magazine Section, The New York Times,January 31, 1943.

110 Ltr, Pelley to Somervell, 12 Feb 43; Ltr,Gross to Pelley, 20 Feb 43. Both in OCT 617 RRGen.

111 Ltr, Dir ODT to Fed Loan Adm, 16 Mar 43,and Reply, 19 Mar 43, OCT HB Gross TroopSleepers and Kitchen Cars.

112 Ltr, Dir ODT to Fed Loan Adm, 25 May 45;Memo, C of Traf Contl Div OCT for CofT, 29May 45; Ltr, Dir ODT to Fed Loan Adm, 29May 45. All in OCT HB Gross Troop Sleepers andKitchen Cars.

113 Ltr, Gross to Dir ODT, 30 May 45; Ltr,CG ASF for Chm WPB, 6 Jun 45. Both in OCTHB Gross Troop Sleepers and Kitchen Cars.


specialized types of cars which the railroadscould not be expected to procure. Theorders for this new equipment obviated thenecessity of withdrawing additional Pull-man cars from general use for conversion tohospital cars, and at the same time gaveThe Surgeon General a more satisfactorytype of mobile hospital unit.114

Although in the early part of the war theprocurement of new equipment was limitedby the low preference rating given suchprojects by the War Production Board,repair and maintenance work on existingequipment had an AA-1 rating from thebeginning. This enabled the railroads toplace most of their old equipment, of whichan unusually large percentage had been inbad order, in serviceable condition. Between1 September 1939 and 1 September 1943freight cars laid up for repairs were reducedfrom 13.8 percent of the total ownership to2.8 percent, and steam locomotives awaitingrepairs were reduced from 20.0 percent to5.3 percent.115 The railroads and the Pull-man Company were also enabled to con-vert many units of passenger equipment tomake them better serve the war need. InJanuary 1943 the Office of Defense Trans-portation announced that approximately800 lounge, parlor, and chair cars had beenor were being converted into sleepers orcoaches.116

Railroad Manpower

Throughout the war, shortage of man-power was the most serious problem con-fronting the rail carriers. The number ofpersons employed by the Class I railroads

gradually increased from an average of987,675 in 1939 to an average of 1,419,505in 1945.117 This increase was not propor-tionate to the increase in traffic, however,and at times there were as many as 100,000unfilled positions in the industry.118 Thislack of workers prevented the railroads fromgetting maximum service from their limitedequipment and added to the operatinghazards.

An appreciation of the carriers' problemsin connection with manpower requires thatthey be viewed in the light of the generalemployment situation. Between February1942 and February 1945, a period of ex-panding industrial activity, the total civilianlabor force in the country decreased from53,200,000 to 51,400,000.119 This decreaseoccurred despite the addition of approxi-mately 4,400,000 women workers. Thenumber of male workers decreased betweenthose dates from 39,900,000 to 33,700,000.The pool of unemployed, which had ex-ceeded 15,000,000 a decade earlier, for allpractical purposes had disappeared.

In the competition for workers amongthe wartime industries the railroads wereat a disadvantage for several reasons. Manytransportation wage contracts based onpeacetime wage scales were in effect at thetime wages were frozen, so that, particularlyin the less skilled and unskilled categories,the railroads were a low-wage industry. This

114 Hospital train equipment is discussed in thenext chapter.

115 AAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Divi-sion, 1945, pp. 23, 25.

116 OCT HB Monograph 22, p. 71.

117 Association of American Railroads, RailroadTransportation (Washington, November 1948), p.22. The railroads had more than 2,000,000 em-ployees in 1920, and 1,660,000 in 1929.

118 Railroad Retirement Board, Annual Report(Washington, June 30, 1944), p. 50. In September1944 more than 55 percent of the unfilled jobscalled for unskilled labor. See Railroad RetirementBoard, Rpt, Personnel Needs and Surpluses in theRailroad Industry, September 1, 1944.

119 Quarterly Report of the Director of WarMobilization and Reconversion, April 2, 1945, p. 4.


increased their difficulty not only in attract-ing additional workers but also in holdingthose they had.120 In contrast with the massproduction industries, the railroads had rel-atively few jobs that could be broken downinto routine operations performable bywomen or other inexperienced workers.Safety considerations related to train op-erations limited the extent to which over-agepersons, students, vacationists, soldiers onfurlough, and other untrained personnelcould be used. Nevertheless, the industrydrew heavily on these classes for permanentand short-term employees.121 The numberof women employed by the railroads in-creased during the war from about 30,000to about 116,000.122 About 125,000 un-skilled Mexican laborers were imported intothe country on six-month renewable con-tracts, under arrangements made with theMexican Government through the U.S.Department of State, for employment astrack workers, principally by the westernlines.

There were long but unproductive nego-tiations regarding the use of prisoners ofwar for maintenance of way.123 The rail-roads were willing to employ about 10,000of these men and the Army indicated its

willingness to provide them. Numerous ob-stacles stood in the way, however, includ-ing the fear of sabotage, and only a fewhundred laborers from this potentially largesupply actually were used by the railroads.They were employed chiefly on snow re-moval and car-cleaning jobs.124

With transportation, as with industry ingeneral, selective service was at the root ofthe manpower problem. Toward the closeof hostilities the Office of Defense Trans-portation estimated that 300,000 railroadworkers were in the armed services.125 Forthe most part these were common laborersor men of lesser skills. The more skilled rail-road employees—those engaged in so-calledcritical occupations—were eligible for occu-pational deferment from the beginning. Inthe winter of 1945 deferments were in effectfor approximately 55,000 railroad em-ployees under thirty years of age.126 Al-though repeated efforts had been made bythe carriers to obtain more liberal treatmentunder the draft, they had not been success-ful, and the deferment policy was tightenedrather than relaxed as the war progressed.127

120 Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Third Annual Report,p. 443; "Manpower Shortage Menaces Transporta-tion," Railway Age, March 4, 1944.

121 Railroad Retirement Board, Annual Report,(Washington, June 30, 1945), p. 42, states thatduring FY 1945 the board effected 646,073 regu-lar placements and 542,729 one-day placements;of latter figure 179,831 were servicemen.

122 Association of American Railroads, Interest-ing Facts About the Railroads, August 31, 1945;Railroad Retirement Board, Annual Report, June30, 1945, p. 44.

123 See Memo, AAR, Use of Prisoners of Warfor Railroad Track Labor, 23 Jun 44, OCT HBTopic RR Manpower; Ltr, CofT for Dir ODT,1 Jun 44, OCT HB Gross Rail Manpower andEquip Shortage.

124 Memo, DCofS for SvC's ASF for CG ASF,11 Feb 44, sub: PW Labor on RR's, ASF Hq RR1943-1944; Memo, C of Rail Div OCT for CofT,22 Jan 45, OCT 617; Conv, author with Mr.Arthur H. Gass, Mgr Car Sv Dir AAR, 30 Dec 48,OCT HB Topic RR Manpower.

125 Railway Age, April 28, 1945, p. 757; SelectiveService System Occupational Bull 5, 2 May 42,OCT 322 Ry Bns; Civilian War Transport, pp.220-21.

126 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to BrigGen A. F. McIntyre C of Rail Div OCT, 8 Mar45, and atchd statement, OCT HB Gross Rail Man-power and Equip Shortage.

127 In February 1944 Joseph B. Eastman, Directorof ODT, took issue with the railroads on question ofexemption from draft, contending that they werein no different position in this respect from otherwar industries, and were less vulnerable than otherforms of transportation because the average ageof railroad employees was higher. See Eastman,Selected Papers, pp. 361-63.


Early in 1945, with the most critical partof the war just ahead and with extraordin-arily bad weather harassing them, the rail-roads were confronted with the loss of manyof their highly skilled men to the armedforces, as well as with further inroads byselective service into the less skilled ranks.Under these circumstances a last effort wasmade to obtain relief from the draft, butthis relief was not realized until after V-EDay.128

The Army was in the same difficult posi-tion regarding railroad labor that it was re-garding railroad equipment. It recognizedthe carriers' need and it recognized also theindispensability of efficient railroad serviceto the war effort. There were competingdemands for manpower, however, whichwere equally or more important to the mili-tary authorities. The armed services had tobe kept at sufficient strength to perform thetasks outlined for them in approved stra-tegic plans. The huge industries which wereproducing weapons and supplies for thearmies in the field required adequate laborforces to keep their production schedulesfrom lagging. The Military Railway Serv-ice required troops trained in all the rail-road skills to enable it to serve the theatercommanders properly. Consequently, untillate in the war the Chief of Transportationrefrained from recommending any broadrelief for the carriers under the draft. InFebruary 1944 General Gross, reporting toGeneral Somervell regarding the railroads'

situation, said: "These [personnel] prob-lems can be solved by vigorous efforts ofrailroad management augmented by ener-getic and sympathetic assistance of the fed-eral agency charged with responsibility forthe railroads' well-being—the Office of De-fense Transportation." 129 A few weeks laterhe wrote to the president of the Associationof American Railroads: "I urge, therefore,that the railroads take every step possibleto meet the situation ahead by obtainingall the men that can be obtained and byeliminating, as far as practicable, laborturnover . . . ." 130 In March 1945, how-ever, Gross was convinced that broad draftrelief was necessary. At that time he tooknote of the railroad industry's vigorous ef-fort to recruit additional labor and of themeager help given it by the government,and said: "Many signs show that it [theindustry] has reached the elastic limit, thatdisintegration is threatened if its appealscontinue to be met [on the part of the gov-ernment] by the same lack of response andwillingness to gamble . . . ." 131 As indi-cated, his change of attitude on the ques-tion of draft relief for the railroads was notat that time reflected in higher militaryechelons which were concerned with draftpolicy.

Since up to V-E Day the railroad man-power problem was not met by any broadpolicy of draft deferment or exemption, itis of interest to note the measures actuallytaken by government agencies to help thecarriers. The number of agencies involvedadded to the complexity of the problem.

128 J. M. Johnson, who succeeded Eastman asDirector of ODT, following death of latter inMarch 1944, vigorously supported the railroads'effort for draft relief. See his statement, 5 Jan44, as member of ICC, before subcommittee ofSenate Committee on Interstate Commerce, inOCT HB Gross Rail Manpower and Equip Short-age. See also his Ltr to Dir OWM, 12 Feb 45, andArmy comment thereon in Ltr, SW to Johnson, 6Mar 45, AG 327. 22 (12 Feb 45).

129 Memo, 7 Feb 44, sub: Opng Condition ofComl RR's, OCT HB Gross Rail Manpower andEquip Shortage.

130 Ltr, 11 Mar 44, OCT 080 AAR.131 Memo for Somervell, 23 Mar 45, OCT HB

Gross Rail Manpower and Equip Shortage.


The probability of a labor shortage onthe railroads was foreseen in Army circlesearly in the war, and in the summer of1942 the Chief of Transportation put for-ward a proposal designed to forestall it,for a period at least. His plan called forinducting forty to sixty thousand railroademployees into the Army, training them asunits for the Military Railway Service, andthen returning them on furlough to therailroads until such time as they might beneeded for the military railways overseas.132

The plan would have helped the railroadstemporarily by preventing this skilled per-sonnel from drifting to other industries orbeing drafted into the armed forces andassigned to services where their railroadexperience would have been lost. It wasuncertain, of course, how long these unitscould be retained in the zone of interior,but since they were to be considered areserve their early assignment overseas wasnot anticipated. The proposal was discussedwith officials of the Association of AmericanRailroads before General Gross presentedit officially. General Somervell approved theplan, but it was not concurred in by theG-1 of the War Department General Staff,primarily because at that time it was notconsidered advisable to furlough militarypersonnel to commercial employment.133

After the conference in Chicago on 12August 1943, at which the problems of thetranscontinental railroads relating to man-power and equipment were discussed, Gen-eral Gross prepared letters for the signatureof the Acting Secretary of War to the Office

of Defense Transportation and the WarManpower Commission, urging action tostrengthen the carriers' personnel situa-tion.134 The letter to ODT dealt particularlywith the need for relaxing the full crewlaws and other provisions in the contractsbetween the railroads and the unions (theso-called featherbed rules) which preventedthe utilization of labor to its full capacity.135

The letter to the War Manpower Com-mission recommended that arrangementsbe made for the more extensive employ-ment of Mexican labor and the utilizationof prisoners of war, that draft deferment beextended to railroad employees in criticaloccupations until replacements could be pro-vided, and that steps be taken to discouragethe migration of railroad workers to otherindustries which seemed to offer better op-portunity for draft deferment. The ODTresponse to this appeal included the promul-gation of a "13-point program" which in-cluded concrete proposals for dealing withmany aspects of the problem.136 Concur-rently the Office of War Mobilization estab-lished in critical western areas productionurgency committees and manpower prioritycommittees, which included representativesof the Office of Defense Transportation.

The ODT 13-point program called for aspecial recruiting drive to increase the rail-roads' labor force. This drive did not get

132 Memo for Somervell, 29 Jun 42, ASF HqTrans 1941-42; Memo for CG SOS, 3 Oct 42, sub:Ry Pers, and atchd memos to CofS USA andCofEngrs SOS for signature, OCT 322 Ry Bn (Tngand Deferment).

133 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 18 Nov 42, sub:Ry Reserve Pers, ASF Hq Trans 1941-42.

134 Ltrs, Robert A. Lovett to Joseph B. EastmanDir ODT and Paul V. McNutt Chm WMC, 19Aug 43, OCT HB Gross Rail.

135 Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Third Annual Report,pp. 444-45, stated that average weekly hours ofwork on railroads had increased from 48.6 inJune 1942 to 50.9 in July 1943, and were equaledby few other industries; that some progress hadbeen made in overcoming effect of featherbed rules,but not enough.

136 ODT press release, 5 Sep 43, and atchd pro-gram, OCT HB RR Manpower; ODT, AnnualReport to the President, 1943, p. 42.


under way fully until the following spring(1944), after the Association of AmericanRailroads had made a further futile attemptto obtain relief from the draft, this time byappeal to the Director of War Mobiliza-tion.137 The drive was a concerted effort inwhich the War Manpower Commission, theWar Production Board, the Office of WarInformation, the Office of Defense Trans-portation, the Army, the Navy, the Mari-time Commission, the Railroad RetirementBoard, and railroad management and laborcollaborated, working through local railwayurgency committees. General Gross fol-lowed the results of this undertaking closelyand found them disappointing. After thespecial recruiting effort had been under wayfor ten weeks, he noted that the shortagesreported by the carriers were greater thanwhen it began.138 The sources from whichit was hoped to obtain added railroad per-sonnel, particularly workers released fromindustries affected by cutbacks and veteransdischarged from the armed services, didnot yield the numbers expected. On theother hand, the number of persons leavingrailroad employ was large and the totalrequirements were on the increase. Duringa period of 18 weeks, the drive resulted in330,782 recruitments, but meanwhile 269,-992 workers were lost to the railroads, sothat the net gain was only 60,790 and theshortages still were large.139

In the fall of 1944, with the war goingwell in both Europe and the Pacific, itseemed for a time that the manpower crisis

might have been passed. In December,however, the German Army counterattackedin the Ardennes region. This was followedby appeals from General Eisenhower formore troops and more matériel. The rate ofinduction under selective service wasstepped up and the war industries calledfor more workers. On top of this came theworst winter in many years, with resultingsluggishness in railroad operations, whichthreatened to slow down the movement ofmilitary supplies to Europe. This situationcalled for renewed efforts to build up therailroads' personnel, and to these effortsthe Army made a more direct thoughlimited contribution.

During this critical winter the Army,despite its need for additional soldiers andincreased draft calls, found it expedient tofurlough men with certain skills so that theycould fill vacancies in important indus-tries.140 Accordingly the TransportationCorps arranged in the middle of January1945 for 300 soldiers with railroad expe-rience to be furloughed so that they couldhelp the carriers relieve the congestion inthe Buffalo area where snow conditionswere especially bad.141 Requests from theAssociation of American Railroads and theOffice of Defense Transportation resulted inthe authorized maximum being increasedto 600 and the area of employment beingextended to other upstate New York dis-tricts. But pleas for the extension of theplan to New York City were rejected by the

137 Ltr, J. J. Pelley to J. F. Byrnes, 24 Feb 44,OCT HB Gross Rail; Memos, C of Rail Div OCTfor CofT, 7 and 8 Mar 44, OCT HB Gross RailManpower and Equip Shortage.

138 Ltr to J. J. Pelley Pres AAR, 2 Jun 44, OCT320.2 Manpower.

139 Memo, Col A. F. McIntyre for Gen Gross, 22Jul 44, OCT 320.2 Manpower.

140 Ltr, SW to the President, 15 Jan 45, statedthat six industries were using 16,500 furlougheesand that plan might be extended to others, butemphasized that it was a stopgap arrangementwhich could not be continued. See ASF Hq ContlDiv 220.41. For policies and procedures see WDCir 105, 4 Apr 45.

141 Memo, Col L. W. Finlay Exec OCT for GenGross, 23 Jan 45, sub: Rail Situation at Buffalo,OCT 617.


Army because the situation there was notfound sufficiently critical to warrant therelease of more soldiers.142

After the defeat of Germany the Armywas able to take a somewhat more liberalattitude, and in June agreed to furlough4,000 experienced railroaders from unitsthen in the zone of interior, in order thatthey might work on the western lines.143

Originally the furloughs were for 30 days,but subsequently were extended to 60 days.The railroads' request for 2,000 additionalmen was not favorably considered becausenot enough skilled railroaders had beenfound in the zone of interior to completethe original allotment. Up to 4 August 1945only 3,100 skilled men actually had beenput to work by the carriers, and the re-mainder of the allotment of 4,000 was filledwith soldiers having no railroad experi-ence.144 The arrangement was discontinuedpromptly after the surrender of Japan.

It was obvious after V-E Day that, al-though the demand on the railroads wouldcontinue high until after the end of the warin the Pacific, the carriers could expect aconsiderable increment of manpower as theresult of reduced activity in the war in-dustries and the increased release of menfrom the armed forces. On 15 May it wasannounced that the entire railroad industryhad been placed on a par with the mosturgent war production on the NationalProduction Urgency List, a classificationpreviously accorded only to brakemen, fire-men, and switchmen for railroads serving

the west coast.145 In order to insure that fulladvantage be taken of all opportunitiesfor increased recruitment for the westernlines, the Chief of Transportation set upspecial committees at Chicago, Omaha, andSalt Lake City, headed by the zone trans-portation officers at those points and includ-ing representatives of the Office of DefenseTransportation, the War Production Board,the War Manpower Commission, the Rail-road Retirement Board, the railroads, andlocal civic organizations.146 The Command-ing General, Army Service Forces, also des-ignated officers at the principal westernrailroad centers to "spearhead an aggres-sive attack on the manpower shortages" andrequested the technical services to lend theseofficers such additional personnel as mightbe needed.147

In July 1945 the Director of DefenseTransportation urged that railroaders withthe forces overseas, who were eligible forearly release under the point system, be re-turned to the zone of interior and dis-charged at the earliest possible date.148 TheArmy at first opposed this procedure, on thegrounds that such preference in the order ofrepatriation would be bad for troop moraleand that little time actually would be saved.The problem was complicated by the factthat not only transportation but many otherindustrial and professional groups had filed

142 Memo, Finlay for Gross, 10 Feb 45, sub: Useof Troops on RR's, OCT HB Topic RR Manpower.

143 WD press release, 29 Jun 45, OCT HB TopicRR Manpower.

144 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 9 Aug 45, sub:Release of Skilled RR Workers, OCT 220.711 RR.

145 Ltr, C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR to C. C.Wardlow OCT, 1 7 Nov 44; ODT press release, 29Sep 44 and 15 May 45. All in OCT HB Topic RRManpower.

146 Ltr, Gross to J. J. Pelley Pres AAR, 15 Jun45, OCT 320.2 Activity in RR's; Ltr, Gross to C.D. Young ODT, 27 Jun 45, OCT HB Gross ODT.

147 Memo, for Col W. J. Brennan Jr., et al, 4 Jul45, sub: Western RR Manpower Project, ASF HqContl Div 220.41; Memos, for C's of Tech Svs, 4Jul 45, ASF Hq Contl Div 531.

148 Ltr, Dir ODT to USW, 4 Jul 45; Ltr, USWto Dir ODT, 6 Jul 45. Both in OCT HB GrossRR Manpower and Equip Shortage.


similar requests with the Army, involvinga total of at least a million men.149 In re-sponse to an appeal for more manpower forthe western railroads by President Truman,then attending the Potsdam Conference,and efforts by the Senate Special Commit-tee Investigating the National Defense Pro-gram to have the Army release more rail-roaders to the western lines, the Europeanand Mediterranean theaters were instructedto expedite the return of high-point per-sonnel of the Military Railway Service, andarrangements were made to speed up thedischarge of these men after their arrivalin the United States.150

The dilemma in which the Army wasplaced, by being forced to choose betweenmaintaining its armed strength at theplanned level and sacrificing some of itspersonnel to the railroads and other hard-pressed industries, gave point to its attitudeon the question of universal service. InJanuary 1945, when soldiers were beingfurloughed reluctantly and for short periodsto some of the key industries, the Secretaryof War stated to the President: "We cannotafford to deplete our military strength inthis fashion simply because our civilianmanpower controls are inadequate . . . .In my mind, this demonstrates clearly theurgent necessity of enacting a National

Service Law at once." 151 Whatever weightmay be given to the other considerations in-volved, the conclusion is inescapable that,had the nation's entire manpower beenmobilized, distributed, and controlled in amore effective manner, the personnel short-ages which beset the vital industries, includ-ing transportation, and which remained amatter of deep concern to the armed serv-ices throughout the war, could have beenrelieved substantially.

Efficient Utilization of Railroad Equipment

The limitation on the amount of newequipment that could be placed in serviceduring the war necessitated more intensiveuse of that which was available. This wasaccomplished by eliminating or reducinginefficient practices which had developedin peacetime as the result of carelessness onthe part of shippers and of competitionbetween the carriers. The drive for im-proved efficiency began early in the emer-gency, and as the war progressed it was con-tinued with increasing effectiveness by theconcerted efforts of all concerned—theAssociation of American Railroads, the in-dividual carriers, the shippers' advisoryboards, the Office of Defense Transporta-tion which was expressly charged with thisresponsibility by the President, and thearmed services.152 The War TransportationEfficiency Committee, organized under

149 WD press release, 19 Jul 45, OCT HB TopicRR Manpower; Ltr, Acting SW to Sen Carl Hay-den, 26 Jul 45, OCT 220 Release of Soldiers forRR's.

150 "Truman Appeals for Rail Workers," Journalof Commerce (New York), July 17, 1945; "SenateAppeals to Army to Send Railroads Help," Times-Herald (Washington), July 25, 1946; Memo, GenLutes ASF for Gen Craig OPD WDGS, 3 Aug45, sub: Return of RR Workers for Discharge,OCT 200.711 Furlough of Soldiers for RR In-dustry; Msg, CofT to CO's of ports of embarkation,service commands, reception stations, and separa-tion centers in U.S., 8 Aug 45, OCT HB Gross RailManpower and Equip Shortages.

151 Ltr, 15 Jan 45, ASF Hq Contl Div 220.41.See also Rpt of Committee on Military Affairs,Mobilization of Civilian Manpower, HR 36, Janu-ary 24, 1945.

152 For outline of principles see statement byJoseph B. Eastman, Director of ODT, in proceed-ings of Pacific Coast Shippers' Advisory Board, 9Dec 43. For outline of Army practices see statementby Col. W. J. Williamson OCT in proceedings ofNational Association of Shippers' Advisory Boards,15 Oct 43. Both in OCT HB Topic RR Equip.


ODT auspices, served as a central agencyin which the carriers and the civilian ship-pers collaborated.153 About six hundredlocal car efficiency committees were set upby the shippers' advisory boards to carryon an educational campaign and police thesituation in their respective areas.154 TheArmy instructed its supply services and itstransportation officers at field installationsin great detail regarding their responsibili-ties, and charged the zone transportationofficers with the duty of assisting the instal-lations in the fulfillment of those respon-sibilities.

Before undertaking a brief survey of themethods by which more efficient use ofrailroad equipment was achieved, it is ofinterest to note some of the results of thisundertaking. The following comparisons be-tween the years 1939 and 1944 are indica-tive.155 Between those years the averagedaily operating mileage for freight loco-motives increased from 104.0 to 122.8; forpassenger locomotives, from 184.2 to 222.9.The average net tons of carload freight percar increased from 36.8 to 40.3. The av-erage number of passengers per car in-creased from 13.4 to 32.2. The averagemiles operated per day by freight cars (in-cluding those loading, unloading, awaitingrepairs, or otherwise idle) increased from31.7 to 49.3. The percentage of emptymileage for freight cars decreased from 37.7to 34.3. Because of the greater number oftrains on the rails, the average train speeddecreased slightly—from 16.7 to 15.7 miles

per hour in the case of freight trains andfrom 36.9 to 35.8 in the case of passengertrains.

One of the more serious of the wastefulpractices against which a continuous cam-paign was waged was the unnecessary hold-ing of freight cars by consignees who forone reason or another did not unload thempromptly.156 Equally wasteful was the ten-dency of shippers to call in empty carsbefore they could be loaded or in greaternumbers than were needed. In order to pro-mote the prompt loading and unloadingof types of cars which were in especiallyheavy demand, the free period was reducedand demurrage charges were increased ascircumstances required, through serviceorders issued by the Interstate CommerceCommission on request of the Office ofDefense Transportation. The result of theseefforts was that the over-all turnaroundtime of freight cars (time from placementfor one load to placement for the next load)increased only slightly between 1941 and1944 (from 13.6 days to 14.3 days), de-spite the heavier traffic, the shortage oflabor, and the greater length of the averagehaul.157

The Army made a consistent effort toenforce the prompt release of freight carsat its installations. From the early days ofthe emergency, reports were received twiceweekly from the Association of AmericanRailroads regarding the number of freightcars under load at the installations, and incases where the number was considered ex-cessive immediate steps were taken to ascer-tain the cause and to effect a prompt reduc-153 ODT press release, 30 Dec 43, OCT HB

Topic RR Equip.154 AAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Divi-

sion, 1946, p. 16.155 Association of American Railroads, A Review

of Railway Operations in 1945, pp. 26, 27, andAAR, Annual Report of the Car Service Division,1945, p. 26.

156 See Ltr to shippers and receivers of freightissued jointly by ODT, ICC, AAR, and the NatlAssn of Shippers' Advisory Eds, 2 Sep 43, OCT HBTopic RR Equip.

157 Civilian War Transport, p. 314.


tion of the backlog.158 Beginning in October1942, the principal Army installations wererequired to make daily teletype reports tothe Chief of Transportation, giving infor-mation regarding the status of all freightcars on hand.159 Also, the commandingofficers of installations were required tojustify to the Chief of Transportation thedetention of cars beyond the free time andthe resultant demurrage charges.160 GeneralGross personally took the matter up withthe chiefs of technical services when in-stallations under their control were foundto be consistently slow in releasing cars.

Comparative data regarding perform-ance at the various types of installations andin the various areas were compiled monthlyby the Chief of Transportation and pro-mulgated in order to stimulate increasedefforts on the part of those installationshaving the less satisfactory records.161 Dur-ing November and December 1943, thefirst months for which over-all data wereassembled for cars unloaded and releasedat Army installations, 63 percent were re-leased within 24 hours after arrival, 24 per-cent were released between 24 and 48 hoursafter arrival, and 13 percent were not re-

leased until the 48-hour free period hadexpired. In May 1945 the correspondingfigures for Army installations were 67 per-cent, 25 percent, and 8 percent.162

The Army took full advantage of permis-sible agreements with the carriers regardingweighing freight and demurrage credits,which contributed substantially to the con-servation of car time. The Traffic WeightAgreement dispensed with track scaling andprovided that charges would be based onweights inserted on the bills of lading byArmy transportation officers, the weights tobe either those authorized by existing tariffsand classifications, or those established bytest weighing.163 Such weights were subjectto challenge by the carriers, who also hadthe privilege of inspecting the Army's rec-ords for purposes of verification. This agree-ment avoided the delay to equipment andfreight involved in weighing shipments inthe cars; it also saved manpower.

Average demurrage agreements, underwhich credits earned within the free timecould be set off against debits incurredbeyond the free time, initially were ar-ranged between the transportation officersat the installations and the individual car-riers.164 Such agreements offered an in-ducement to the installations to release carsas promptly as possible, rather than holdingthem until the free time was about to expire.Later the Traffic Control Division negoti-ated a master average demurrage agree-ment with the Association of AmericanRailroads, which embraced the individualagreements already in force and provided

158 Ltr, OQMG (Lasher) to AAR (Kendall), 9Oct 40, OCT 080 AAR. For occasional AAR rptssee file OCT HB Topic RR Govt Cons Projects.Reports initially dealt with car accumulation atArmy construction projects where temptation tohold cars was especially great.

159 Memo, CofT to CG's of SvC's, etc., 21 Oct42. sub: Daily Car Situation Rpt, OCT HB TrafContl Div Freight; WD Memo W55-1-43, 12 Jan43.

160 WD Memo, W55-23-43, 5 Jun 43, sub:Detention of RR Cars; Memo, CofT for CofOrd,26 Feb 44, sub: Delays to Rail Equip, OCT 504.

161 See study, Speed Achieved in Release ofFreight Cars, in ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Aug 44, p. 71,and subsequent issues. Also, Monthly Car Situa-tion, Jul 44-Apr 45, and Inland TransportationReport, from May 45, in OCT HB Traf Contl DivInland Trans Rpt.

162 For entire country, percentage of cars heldover 48 hours was 23.2 in May 43, 17.1 in May 44,and about 15 in May 45. See AAR, The NationalTransportation Situation, 11 Jun 45, OCT HBTopic RR Equip.

163 WD Cir 284, 25 Aug 42.

164 AR 55-175, par. 4, 28 Aug 42.


a simple process for extending the masteragreement to cover additional installa-tions.165 The Army proposed that where tworailroads served an installation a surplus ofcredits on one line should be used to offsetdebits on the other, but AAR rejected thisproposal.166

An unworkable accumulation of freightcars at railroad terminals inevitably resultedin loss of car time, and various measureswere taken to forestall this condition. Theports were especially susceptible to conges-tion, as demonstrated in World War I, andelaborate machinery was established to con-trol portbound traffic, a matter discussedmore fully in another volume of Transporta-tion Corps history. In order to insure liquidconditions on the transcontinental rail linesand at the gateways through which west-bound shipments flowed, the InterstateCommerce Commission and the Office ofDefense Transportation jointly placed anagent at Chicago with authority to reroutetraffic as conditions might warrant.167 TheCar Service Division of the Association ofAmerican Railroads utilized its embargopower to check the movement of freightcars to points where congestion or the threatof congestion existed. The Traffic ControlDivision in the Office of the Chief of Trans-portation took such conditions into accountwhen selecting routes and authorizing ship-ping dates for Army freight.

In order that Army installations receiv-ing freight might prepare in advance for

the prompt unloading and release of cars,Army installations and Army contractorsoriginating shipments were required to giveadvance notice to the consignees by teletypeor telegram. This requirement, which wasinitiated in March 1941, was considerablymoderated as the war progressed and theneed for such local control was reduced bythe effective central control exercised by theOffice of the Chief of Transportation. Inorder to give depots which were consigneesof large and continuing shipments oppor-tunity to request delay of movements whichthey could not handle promptly, shippersforwarding twenty-five or more carloads tosuch installations were required to obtainfrom them advance clearance on shippingschedules.168 The railway operations atArmy installations were kept under con-stant observation by the Chief of Trans-portation in order that any inadequacy oftrackage or loading facilities might be cor-rected.169

Loss of car time through unnecessarycross-hauling and back-hauling of mater-ials, parts, and assemblies in the processesof production and distribution was attackedby a number of agencies. The War Produc-tion Board and the Office of Defense Trans-portation studied the problem on a nationalscale and various remedies were proposed.Because of the high degree of specializationin industry, however, no general remedycould be applied, and the only appreciableresults were achieved by bringing specificinstances of wasteful transportation to theattention of the procuring or distributing165 Memo, C of Traf Contl Div for Gen Gross, 22

Apr 44, OCT 502 Demurrage Agreement.166 Ltr, AAR to CofT, 26 May 44, sub: Average

Agreement—Pasco, Wash, OCT 520 Pasco H&RPoint.

167 Civilian War Transport, pp. 21-25. Expeditedcarload shipments of the armed services and mili-tary impedimenta were exempted from this control,on request of the Army.

168 AR 55-105, par. 7, 29 Dec 42; WD Cir 419,Sec. IV, 26 Dec 42; WD Cir 63, Sec. V, 1 Mar 43;OCT HB Monograph 24, pp. 68-72.

169 See Memo, C of Rail Div OCT for CofTASF, 12 Mar 43, sub: RR Facilities for Emer-gency Mvmt, OCT 617 RR Facilities.


agencies involved.170 As regards the Army,the Services of Supply undertook an activecampaign against cross-hauling early in thewar and made the chiefs of the supply(technical) service responsible for minimiz-ing the practice within their respectivefields.171 The Chief of Transportation, how-ever, since he was so vitally concerned withthe problem because of its bearing on theover-all supply of cars, considered the entirefield within his purview and directed hisTraffic Control Division to make the subjecta matter of continuing study. In December1942 he recommended that each technicalservice be required to set up a board ofofficers to give the problem specific atten-tion, and distribution planning boards wereestablished soon thereafter.172 These boardswere discontinued in August 1943, and thefunctions which had been assigned to themwere assumed by the Stock Control Divi-sion of the Army Service Forces.

In August 1944 General Gross's handwas strengthened in dealing with this prob-lem by a War Department directive re-quiring transportation officers at depots andother stations to report to him all instancesof wasteful transportation that came to theirattention.173 When investigations of suchreports by zone transportation officers, or

independent studies conducted by membersof his own staff, indicated that avoidablecross-hauling or back-hauling was beingpracticed, the Chief of Transportationbrought the facts to the attention of thetechnical services concerned and urged thatremedial measures be adopted. Further pur-suance of the matter rested with the tech-nical services. Toward the end of the waran officer of the Transport Review Sectionof the Traffic Control Division, withinwhose purview. this matter fell, expressedthe opinion that while this method of deal-ing with cross-hauling and back-haulinghad brought improvement in only a smallpercentage of the cases, the improvementwas sufficient to justify the attention whichthe Chief of Transportation had given thesubject.174

The peacetime practice of moving partlyfilled freight cars was attacked vigorously.The Office of Defense Transportationordered that closed cars used for less-than-carload shipments be loaded to a minimumweight, which eventually was fixed at20,000 pounds, and that carload shipmentsutilize the practical capacity of the cars.175

The problem of capacity loading was givenconstant attention by the local car efficiencycommittees of the shippers' advisory boards.The Army, while exempt from the ODTorders, gave full support to the principleunderlying them, and the pertinent Armyregulation required that cars be loaded tothe specified load limit or physical capac-

170 Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Third Annual Report,pp. 423-26.

171 OCT Cir Ltr 10, 17 Jun 42, sub: Cross-hauling Supplies and Materials; Memo, CG SOSfor ACofS for Opns SOS and CG's of AAF, AGF,service commands, and supply services, 22 Oct 42,ASF Hq Trans 1941-42.

172 WD Cir 12, Sec. VII, 7 Jan 43; WD Cir177, Sec. IV, 3 Aug 43; Rpt, Transport EconomicsSec Traf Contl Div OCT, Crosshauling and Back-hauling, Sep 42; Memo, CofT for ACofS forMatériel SOS, 12 Dec 42, sub: Cross-Hauling ofWD Freight. Last two in OCT HB Traf ContlDiv Freight.

173 WD Cir 338, Sec. VII, 18 Aug 44.

174 Memo of remarks by Maj W. P. Guiler atconf of zone and port trans officers, 23-25 Apr 45.For discussion of problems involved see First GroupMtg of Distribution Plng Bds, 21 Apr 43, and Pro-ceedings of Second Group Mtg and Trans Confof Tech Svs, 28 Mar 44, OCT HB Traf Contl DivFreight.

175 For discussion of purpose and results of ODTGeneral Orders 1 and 18, see Civilian War Trans-port, pp. 11-15.

THE BRACING AND LASHING OF LARGE EQUIPMENT was carefully studiedby the Transportation Corps and the railroads in order to facilitate handling and at

the same time insure safe transit.


ity.176 Reports of light loading whichreached the Chief of Transportation werereferred to the zone transportation officersfor investigation, and upon confirmationthe facts were brought to the attention ofthe technical services and the local trans-portation officers concerned.177 Studies weremade by the Army and the railroads inorder to improve the loading of artillery,vehicles, and other bulky and irregularlyshaped equipment with a view to economyof space as well as safe transit. The largeproportion of such equipment in militaryshipments, the absence of heavy bulk com-modities such as constitute a substantial partof commercial freight, and the necessitywhich the Army often encountered of load-ing cars hastily in order to meet deliveryschedules accounted for the fact that theaverage weight of Army carload freightwas less than the general average.178

In keeping with the campaign to obtainfull utilization of freight car capacity, aneffort was made by the railroads to restrictthe use of the several types of cars to thecommodities for which they were bestsuited. The Army fully supported this under-taking. For example, Army transportationofficers were instructed not to use flat carsand gondolas, for which there was a grow-ing demand, if the freight could be loaded

without great disadvantage in closed cars.179

Certain types of box cars were especiallysuitable for the shipment of military vehiclesand their use for other purposes was limited.The sizes of cars which would accommodateparticular types of equipment with the leastwaste of space were determined for theguidance of officers in the field, and Armytechnical services and local transportationofficers were taken to task by the Chief ofTransportation when improper sizes wereordered.180

The heavy increase in passenger trafficand the small number of new cars addedduring the war necessitated various meas-ures by the Office of Defense Transporta-tion to insure economical utilization ofequipment on hand. In October 1942 rail-road passenger schedules were "frozen" andthe carriers were restrained from runningspecial trains or extra sections. The rail-roads' voluntary revision of existing sched-ules also released a considerable quantity ofpassenger equipment from services where itwas not being used fully or to best ad-vantage.181 Early in 1945 the carriers wereordered by ODT to discontinue seasonalservices to resort areas and were forbiddento operate passenger trains on which theoccupancy of space had not averaged 35percent. Soon after V-E Day the practicesrelating to the reservation of berths andseats were brought under control to preventspace being unoccupied at time of depar-ture. And in July 1945 ODT took addi-tional steps to withdraw sleeping cars fromregular services in order that they might

176 AR 55-155 par. 6, 27 Nov 42; Ltr, TrafContl Div OCT to AAR, 27 Oct 43, OCT 080AAR; Memo, CofT for QMG, 3 Apr 43, sub:Heavier Per Car Loading (similar letters to othertechnical services), OCT 505 QMG Heavier Load-ing.

177 See 2d Ind, CofT to ZTO 5th Zone, 28 Jul43, OCT HB Topic Traf Contl Div Freight.

178 The Army average for carload freight im-proved from 24 tons in December 1941 to 28 tonsin 1942, 29 tons in 1943, and 30 tons in 1944.See statistical table, Avg Tons per Car of CarloadFreight, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight. Thegeneral average for 1944 was 40.3 tons.

179 OCT Cir 29, 13 Jul 42; OCT Cir 63, 22 Oct42.

180 See 1st Ind, CofT for ZTO 3d Zone, 15 Feb43. OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight.

181 See AAR press release, Chicago, 29 May 42,OCT HB Topic RR Gen Info.


be available for troops returning from over-seas.182

The Army, on its part, utilized the pas-senger equipment employed for organizedtroop movements to practical capacity, re-quiring that three enlisted men be assignedto each sleeping car section, and three toeach two coach seats when the journey didnot exceed twenty-four hours.183 Soon afterPearl Harbor, in order to insure that thecorrect equipment was ordered and thatentrainments were accomplished withoutconfusion and delay, troop units were in-structed to have equipment requirementsand entrainment plans ready at all times;also, entrainment exercises were encour-aged, and investigations were made to de-termine that troop-loading facilities at mili-tary reservations were adequate.184 In 1943the Chief of Transportation sought and ob-tained authority to vary the dates or hoursof departure shown in troop movementorders, except those for units destined over-seas, when by so doing he could avoid thedeadheading of cars or reduce the idle timeof cars between movements, and he was ableby this procedure to effect a very substantialimprovement in the efficiency with whichpassenger equipment was used.185

There was persistent complaint, bothofficial and unofficial, that the Army waswasting passenger equipment by unneces-sary troop moves. Commissioner J. Monroe

Johnson of the Interstate Commerce Com-mission referred to such complaints in aletter to General Somervell in October1942, and while acknowledging that he didnot have sufficient information upon whichto base an opinion he requested that thesubject be given consideration.186 GeneralSomervell replied that the matter had re-ceived careful attention and that everyeffort consistent with military necessity wasbeing made to limit troop movements. Soonthereafter, in answer to an inquiry from theAssistant Secretary of War, Somervell ex-pressed the view that such criticisms camefrom uninformed persons who did notunderstand the purpose of the movementsand said that while he knew there was cross-hauling of troops he was not aware of anycase which did not have proper justifica-tion.187 Later, however, both Somervell andGross were convinced that troop movescould be reduced by careful management,and the responsible officers of the Armywere requested to give the matter closeattention. Gross nevertheless pointed outthe inconsistency of criticizing the Army onthis score when pleasure travel by civilianswas unrestricted.188

The endeavor to get maximum serviceout of railroad motive power and rollingstock was hindered in the early stages ofthe emergency by laws which existed in afew states—Arizona, Oklahoma, Louisiana,Texas—variously limiting the length andcomposition of freight and passenger

182 Civilian War Transport, pp. 81-86.183 AR 55-130, par. 6b, 28 Dec 42. The Navy

assigned only two enlisted men to a sleeping carsection until July 1945 when an ODT order fixedthree as the minimum.

184 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 220-25, 233;Memo, TAG for CG's all Armies, et al, 19 Dec 41,sub: Troop Movements Rail, AG 370.5 (12-18-41)MO-D-M; Memo, TAG for CG Field Forces, 24Dec 41, AG 370.5 (9-10-41) (1) Sec 1.

185 WD Cir 102, par. 2, 15 Apr 43; WD Cir358, Sec. IV, 4 Sep 44; OCT HB Monograph 22,pp. 76-79.

186 Ltr, Johnson to Somervell, 20 Oct 42; Ltr,Somervell to Johnson, 23 Oct 42. Both in OCT HBGross Rail.

187 Memo for John J. McCloy, 18 Nov 42, OCTHB Gross Rail.

188 Ltr, Gross to ODT, 29 Jan 44, OCT 511 Railand Motor Mvmts; Memo, Somervell for GensArnold, McNair, etc., 3 Jul 43; Ltr, Gross to AAR,5 Aug 43. Last two in OCT HB Gross Day File.


trains.189 Upon entering these states, trainswhich did not conform to the laws weredetained and broken up, with resultingdelay to the traffic and waste of car time.The Army was of the opinion that its trafficwas not subject to state regulation and an-nounced that it would disregard suchrestrictions whenever necessary in the in-terest of military expediency.190 For theprotection of the carriers in case of prosecu-tion by state authorities, the responsibleArmy officers were directed to furnish theappropriate railroad representatives withcertificates setting forth the necessity for thelength and make-up of trains which contra-vened state laws. In September 1942 theInterstate Commerce Commission issued anorder suspending for the period of the emer-gency all rules, regulations, practices, orlaws affecting the length or composition ofinterstate trains. A suit brought against oneof the railroads by the state of Arizonaended in an opinion by the Supreme Courtof the United States, rendered in June 1945,that the Arizona law was unconstitutionalas affecting interstate commerce.191

In May 1942 the Acting Secretary ofWar, writing to the majority leader in theHouse of Representatives, indicated that theArmy so far had been able to avoid delayin the delivery of military personnel and

supplies on account of state laws regulatingthe length and composition of trains, butpointed out that the full crew laws whichexisted in a number of western states werea potential source of difficulty.192 As themanpower situation became more acute, thefull crew laws did cause substantial delayin the movement of traffic since the rail-roads often had difficulty in completingcrew complements.193 Relief from thishandicap was afforded only by the State ofCalifornia, which in 1943 authorized sus-pension of the full crew law when necessaryto meet war requirements.

Temporary Government Control of theRailroads

During a period of about three weeks,from 27 December 1943 to 18 January1944, the railroads were in the possessionand under the control of the federal govern-ment, and responsibility for their operationwas vested in the Army Chief of Transpor-tation. The seizure was ordered by thePresident after efforts to bring managementand labor to agreement had failed.194 Strikeshad been called to commence on 30 Decem-ber, and seizure was ordered as the soleremaining means of preventing an inter-ruption of railroad operation that mighthave had disastrous effects on the nation'smilitary effort, then at a critical stage, andon its civilian economy.

The President's executive order directedthe Secretary of War to "manage and op-erate or arrange for the management and

189 See summary of state laws and federal actionsin Ltr, Wm T. Faricy Pres AAR to C. C. Ward-low, 17 Jul 47, OCT HB Topic RR State Laws.Army Regulation which in peacetime limitedlength of mixed trains in interest of troop safetywas rescinded in 1940 (AR 30-945, 1 June 23; WDCir 130, Sec. II, 5 Nov 40). Texas law wasamended in July 1941 to exempt military move-ments.

190 Ltr, SW to Gov of Calif., 3 Jun 41, OSWC&R Railroads; DF, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 8 Dec41 (G-4/14935-1), AG 511 AR 30-945.

191 WD Cir 269, Sec. II, 26 Dec 41; ICC ServiceOrder 85, 11 Sep 42; Southern Pacific Company v.Arizona, 325 U.S. 761.

192 Ltr to Hon John W. McCormack, 7 May 42,OSW C&W Trans 501-800.

193 Ltr, Wm T. Faricy Pres AAR to C. C. Ward-low, 17 Jul 47, OCT HB Topic RR State Laws.

194 EO 9412, 27 Dec 43. For summary of eventsand procedures see ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 43, pp.2-3, and Jan 44, pp. 2-9.


operation of the carriers" in such manneras he deemed necessary "to assure to thefullest possible extent continuous and un-interrupted transportation service." TheSecretary of War delegated his authorityto the Commanding General, Army ServiceForces, who in turn delegated responsibilityfor the operation of the railroads to theChief of Transportation.195 The notice ofseizure sent to each railroad over the signa-ture of the Secretary of War, following theissuance of the President's order, indicatedthat only the carriers' transportation facili-ties, as distinguished from their nontrans-portation property and assets, were beingseized.

The fact that the seizure of the railroadsand the assumption of control of their op-erations were accomplished with speed andsmoothness was due in large part to theadvance preparation of a complete plan forthe undertaking.196 Preparation of the planwas begun in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation on 23 December, when thedanger of breakdown in the negotiations toforestall the threatened strikes no longercould be ignored. Col. Luke W. Finlay, alawyer by profession and executive to Gen-eral Gross, and Col. Andrew F. McIntyre,a railroad executive by profession and chiefof the Rail Division, took leading parts inthe work of preparation, guided by GeneralsSomervell and Gross in matters of policyand aided by other elements of the Armyand the railroad industry in matters ofadministrative and technical detail. The

plan included drafts of thirty separate docu-ments, including the President's executiveorder, delegations of authority by the Secre-tary of War and the commanding general ofthe Army Service Forces, public statementsby the President and the Secretary of War,and orders defining the scope of the seizure,the Army's organization for the control ofoperations, the duties of the several elementsof the Army which were involved, and thecourses to be followed under indicated cir-cumstances. The entire plan was approvedby the President before his seizure order wasissued.

The Chief of Transportation was aidedin the fulfillment of his operating responsi-bilities by advisers drawn from the rail in-dustry. Mr. Martin W. Clement, presidentof the Pennsylvania Railroad, was desig-nated principal adviser.197 Officials of theAssociation of American Railroads, includ-ing John J. Pelley, President, Charles H.Buford, Vice President in charge of opera-tions, and Warren C. Kendall, Chairmanof the Car Service Division, acted as expertconsultants, and J. M. Hood of the Ameri-can Short Line Railroad Association servedin a similar capacity. Alvanley Johnston ofthe Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineersand A. F. Whitney of the Brotherhood ofRailroad Trainmen served as consultants inlabor relations. The Chief of Transporta-tion also arranged for representatives ofother government agencies which were largeshippers, including the Navy, the TreasuryDepartment, and the War Food Adminis-tration, to give assistance as needed.

The field organization established for thecontrol of operations was headed by seven195 WD Opn of RR's Gen Order 1, by CG ASF,

27 Dec 43, OCT 004.01 RR's.196 Rpt, CG ASF to SW, 27 Dec 43, Plan for the

Possession, Control, and Operations of the Rail-roads by the Army. Concerning preparation of plansee Ltr, L. W. Finlay to C. C. Wardlow, 3 Mar 49,OCT HB Rail Div Seizure of RR's 1943.

197 Memo, CofT for C's of Divs OCT, 31 Dec43, sub: WDORR (War Department Operationof the Railroads) Appointments, OCT HB RailDiv Seizure of RR's 1943.


regional directors. These directors, who hadbeen executives of large railroads and were

commissioned colonels for the period oftheir service in the Army, were as follows:

Region

EasternAlleghenyPocahontasSoutheasternCentral WesternNorthwesternSouthwestern

Director

F. E. WilliamsonR. B. WhiteW. J. JenksE. E. NorrisRalph BuddC. E. DenneyL. W. Baldwin

Railroad

New York CentralBaltimore & OhioNorfolk and WesternSouthernBurlingtonNorthern PacificMissouri Pacific

Military personnel to staff the regionaloffices was provided from the organizationsof the service commanders and the zonetransportation officers. Commissioned offi-cers were stationed at the principal officesof the railroads as representatives of theregional directors. The service commandswere made responsible for the administra-tion of the regional offices and for thesecurity of the railroads and railroad prop-erty under Army control. Responsibility forthe management and operation of the car-riers, however, rested entirely with the Chiefof Transportation and the regional directorswho were responsible to him in such mat-ters.198

The executive order provided that theSecretary of War should permit the manage-ment of seized railroads "to continue theirrespective managerial functions to themaximum degree possible" consistent withthe purpose of the order. The Army's basicdirective stated: "Whenever the co-opera-tion of the carrier and its personnel isassured, the existing management and or-ganization of the carrier will be utilized, andthe carrier will continue operations in theusual and orderly course of business

. . ." 199 As matters developed, the Armydid not find it necessary to take a directhand in the management and operation ofany railroad. The strike notices were with-drawn by the several unions, some of thembefore the seizure took place.200 Daily re-ports received by the Chief of Transporta-tion from the regional officers indicated fullco-operation by both management andlabor.201

The President's order stated that, exceptwhen the order specified otherwise or theSecretary of War directed otherwise, theoperation of the carriers should continue tobe in conformity with the Interstate Com-merce Act, the Railway Labor Act, otherapplicable federal and state laws, localordinances, and rules and regulations issuedin accordance with such laws and ordi-nances. It also provided that, except asotherwise ordered by the Secretary of War,all contracts and agreements to which thecarriers were party should remain in full

198 Memo, CG ASF for CG's of SvC's, 28 Dec 43,OCT 004.01 RR's.

199 WD Operation of RR's Gen Order 1, 27 Dec43, par. 5.

200 Memo, C of Rail Div OCT for CofT, 30 Dec43, OCT HB Gross Rail WD Opn; "Army ControlContinues as Wage Settlements are Stalled," Rail-way Age, January 8, 1944.

201 For digest of these rpts see daily Memos, C ofRail Div OCT for CofT, 29 Dec 43-19 Jan 44,OCT HB Gross Rail WD Opn.


force and effect. The Secretary of War wasexpressly authorized to prescribe the com-pensation to be received by employees ofthe railroads, subject to the applicable lawsand regulations relating to economic stabili-zation. He was expressly directed to recog-nize the right of the workers to continuemembership in labor organizations and tobargain collectively through representativesof their own choosing with the manage-ments of the railroads. In accordance withthese stipulations the Army scrupulouslyavoided interference in the relations be-tween carriers, the relations between rail-road management and labor organizations,and the relations between the industry andgovernmental agencies concerned therewith.The Interstate Commerce Commission andthe Office of Defense Transportation wererequested to continue to function in theusual manner, unless developments shouldforce the Army to exercise its overridingauthority, and similar requests were sent toregulatory bodies in the several states.202

Only four general orders relating to therailroads were issued by the Army. The first,referred to above, gave operational effectto the President's directive regarding seizureof the carriers. The second and third gaveeffect to wage agreements concluded be-tween the carriers and certain of the unionsduring the period of government possession.The fourth specified the form of ratificationand release to be obtained from the indi-vidual carriers on termination of govern-ment possession.203 The latter order wasissued on 18 January 1944, after notifica-tion had been received from the President

that the last of the labor unions had reachedagreement with the carriers and that theagreement had been approved by theDirector of Economic Stabilization.204 Re-turn of the railroads to the possession andcontrol of their owners was begun the sameday, releases being taken from each carrierto protect the government against claims.

Although they proved to be unnecessary,the Army made extensive preparations forthe continued operation of the railroads incase the workers should strike.200 The serv-ice commands were directed to make inven-tories of troop strength and motor equip-ment under their control or available fromthe Army Ground Forces. Each post com-mander was directed to report the numberof enlisted men with specified skills assignedto him. The actual strength of activatedunits of the Military Railway Service under-going training in the zone of interior and theextent of their training were determined,and the units were alerted for change ofstation. It was contemplated that, if thenecessity should arise, all Army personnelavailable would be organized into provi-sional military railway units, to functionunder the command of the Chief of Trans-portation. Since it was anticipated thatwidespread strikes would necessitate a sharpcurtailment of railroad service, prioritieswere established for the movement of troopsand supplies.

202 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 28 Dec 43, ASFHq RR's.

203 Ltr, Julius H. Amberg Sp Asst to SW toGeorge Meader Asst Counsel to Senate SpecialCommittee Investigating the National Defense Pro-gram, 20 Jan 44, OCT 004.01 RR's.

204 Ltr, the President to SW, 18 Jan 44, ASF HqRR's.

205 Rpt, Plan for the Possession, Control, andOperation of the Railroads by the Army, 27 Dec43, tabs G, H, I, J, X, Z, BB, DD (Situation II) ;Memo, CG ASF for CG's SvC's, 28 Dec 43, OCTHB Rail Div Seizure of RR's 1943; Memo, C ofLegal Div OCT for Exec OCT, 4 Jan 44, sub:Tel Conv, OCT 322 RR's; Memo, C of TrafContl Div OCT for Exec OCT, 4 Jan 44, sub:Priorities, OCT 523.07 RR's.


The effect of the government's seizure ofthe railroads was to remove the immediatethreat of strikes, and that threat did notrecur during the war. The Army's handlingof its responsibilities during the seizure metwith general approval. The Association ofAmerican Railroads informed PresidentRoosevelt that the facility with which theArmy had assumed control and eventuallyrelinquished it, and the smoothness of op-eration during the period of possession,"had called forth universal commenda-tion." 206 The Office of Defense Transporta-tion thought the Chief of Transportationhad "handled the difficult and delicate taskexceedingly well." 207 Some of the railroadlabor unions expressed satisfaction over theArmy's role in reopening the conferenceswhich led to final agreements between theunions and the carriers.208 A leading publi-cation for the railroad industry, expressingsatisfaction with the self-restraint displayedby the Army in the exercise of the greatauthority which had been given it, said: "Itmoved in far enough to secure the necessarycontacts within the industry to enable it toact swiftly in the event that untowardoccurrences should make necessary the useof military force, but it stopped short of anyinterference whatsoever with operations." 209

The Highway Carriers

Highway transportation in the UnitedStates came to maturity between the firstand the second world wars. This fact was

reflected in the great increase in the numberof commercial and private motor vehiclesin use and the improvement in the extentand quality of the highways.210 Also duringthis period motor vehicles became an essen-tial part of the Army's organic equipment.Consequently as the Army grew in strengthduring 1940 and 1941 and undertook moreextensive training and field exercises, it wasconfronted with the dual problem ofmaking more systematic use of the commer-cial highway carriers and of improving ar-rangements for over-the-road movements ofits own vehicles. The first-mentioned aspectis the one with which this section is con-cerned primarily. With regard to the latter,it will suffice to say that in 1940 the WarDepartment was well aware of the need fordeveloping better techniques for controllingthe movement of military motor convoysand co-ordinating such movements with thecivilian authorities, and that the Transpor-tation Branch of G-4 did extensive spadework in that field.211

Despite the growth of the highway trans-portation industry, the Army made little useof commercial motor carriers prior to 1941.An Army regulation, adopted before motorcarriers handling interstate traffic werebrought under the regulation of the Inter-state Commerce Commission by the MotorCarrier Act of 1935, required that truckservices be obtained "by means of an

206 Ltr, 19 Jan 44, OCT HB Gross Rail WD Opn.207 Ltr, V. V. Boatner to Gen Gross, 19 Jan 44,

Gross Day File.208 Joint Ltr, Pres Brotherhood of Locomotive

Firemen and Enginemen, Pres Order of RailwayConductors, Pres Switchmen's Union of NorthAmerica to Gen Somervell, 4 Feb 44, ASF Hq RR's.

209 "Salute to the Army," Railway Age, 29 Janu-ary 1944.

210 Between 1920 and 1940 registered auto-mobiles and buses increased from 8,226,000 to 27,-435,000 and trucks from 1,006,000 to 4,590,000.Automobile Manufacturers Association, AutomobileFacts and Figures (Detroit, 1943), p. 48. In 1920common carrier bus and truck services were intheir infancy.

211 Memo, G-4 WDGS for CofS USA, 9 Jul 40,sub: Army Trans, G-4/31344-1; Ltr, SW to SenSherman Minton, 21 Oct 40, G-4/32120; WD TngCir 11, 1 Mar 41; OCT HB Monograph 3, pp.43-45.


agreement," and prohibited the use ofthe standard government bill of ladingfor such shipments.212 The negotiation ofan agreement or contract for each shipment,although it afforded means of assuringreasonable charges and of otherwise pro-tecting the government's interests, was aslow and cumbersome procedure thatvirtually constituted a prohibition againstthe day-to-day use of commercial trucks forthe movement of Army freight. Neverthe-less, the Army, "for cogent reasons" whichwill be explained below, continued to pre-scribe this procedure until September 1940.Then concurrently with the passage of theTransportation Act of 1940, which tightenedfederal control over the motor carriers andmade it clear that the procurement of motortransportation was not governed by thestatutory requirement that the procurementof supplies and services be preceded by ad-vertising for bids, the use of governmentbills of lading in shipping public propertyby commercial trucks was authorized.213

The use of commercial buses for Armypersonnel was severely restricted up to mid-1941 by reason of a clause in the JointMilitary Passenger Agreement, negotiatedannually between the armed services andthe rail and domestic water carriers, whichprovided that bus lines (also the airlines)would not be considered in routing mili-tary passengers except in cases where theservices of the rail and water carriers were"inadequate to meet the military neces-sities." 214 In the strict enforcement of this

provision local Army transportation officerssometimes made routings by rail which wereimpractical, and as a result considerablecriticism was directed at the Army. Conse-quently, in the Joint Military PassengerAgreement which became effective 1 July1941, this clause was changed to providethat other available commercial transpor-tation agencies could be used when, in thejudgment of the officers arranging the trans-portation, they could "provide more satis-factory service to meet the military require-ments" than could the rail and water car-riers.215

The limited use which the Army made ofcommercial motor trucks and buses duringthe early part of the emergency must beviewed in the light of certain conditionspeculiar to the industry. Of a total of ap-proximately 4,600,000 registered trucks, lessthan 15 percent were engaged in service forrevenue.216 Out of something less than150,000 registered motor buses, more than90,000 were used for school purposes.217

Common and contract carrier trucks andbuses were distributed among a large num-ber of owners and operators, many of whomcontrolled only a few vehicles. Although themembers of the American Trucking Associ-ations and the National Association ofMotor Bus Operators collectively controlleda large percentage of this equipment, these

212 AR 30-905, par. 11, 1 Aug 29.213 Memo, QMG for TAG, 3 Sep 40, sub: Trans

of Public Property by Highway Freight Carriers,OCT 552.02 (AR 30-950) ; WD Cir 108, Sec. I, 30Sep 40.

214 JMPA 17, effective to 30 June 41. Theseagreements gave reduced rates and other advan-tages to the armed services, as well as advantagesto the rail and water carriers.

215 JMPA 18, Sec. 6, par. (3 ) , OCT HB TopicMil Passenger Agreements. For discussion of cir-cumstances leading to change in agreement seeOCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 183-93.

216 Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Third Annual Report,p. 427, indicated that in January 1943 there were170,000 intercity common carrier trucks, 120,000local common carrier trucks, 365,000 contractcarrier trucks, the remainder being in agricultural,private business, or government services.

217 Automobile Facts and Figures, p. 46; East-man, Selected Papers, p. 235, address delivered 25Feb. 43.


associations, unlike the Association ofAmerican Railroads, had no authority overthe distribution and utilization of the vehi-cles and were dependent on negotiationswith the several operators when endeavor-ing to assemble equipment for a specialmovement. The operators themselves werelimited in the utilization of their equipmentto routes specified in the certificates issuedto them by the Interstate Commerce Com-mission and state regulatory bodies.

At this period interstate motor operatorswere considerably handicapped by varia-tions in state laws and regulations relatingto motor vehicles, particularly those limit-ing the sizes and weights of vehicles per-mitted to use the highways.218 Trucks andbuses frequently were stopped at state bor-ders, were detained by formalities incidentto enforcement of the laws of the states intowhich they were entering, and sometimeswere required to transship their cargoes orpassengers. The more severe state limita-tions on sizes and weights were ostensiblydictated by highway and bridge capacities,but Army and other engineers found someof the limitations unnecessarily low and un-justifiable in wartime. The Interstate Com-merce Commission, in accordance with di-rections contained in the TransportationAct of 1940, made a thorough study of thissubject and in the summer of 1941 recom-mended legislation to ameliorate the hard-ship, but the recommendation was not fol-

lowed by Congress.219 Later, after theUnited States had entered the war, theArmy took the position that these staterestrictions would have to give way "be-fore the over-ruling necessity of prosecutingthe war," and arranged for its local trans-portation officers, with the assistance oflocal representatives of the Interstate Com-merce Commission, to obtain waivers fromthe state authorities in favor of specificshipments.220 Also, some relaxation of statelaws and regulations was worked outthrough the Council of State Govern-ments.221

As early as the fall of 1940 the Armyforesaw that it would need the active co-operation of state and federal highwayauthorities and took steps to secure suchsupport. Its endeavor resulted some monthslater in the activation of a Highway TrafficAdvisory Committee to the War Depart-ment, with Thomas H. MacDonald, Com-missioner, Public Roads Administration, aschairman, and in the establishment of StateHighway Traffic Advisory Committees con-sisting of officials designated by the re-spective governors.222 A year of experiencewith these committees proved them veryhelpful instruments in dealing with mat-ters which were under the control of civilianauthorities, and they continued to function

218 For analyses of restrictions see press release ofAmerican Trucking Associations, sub: Summaryof Testimony Submitted to the TemporaryNational Economic Committee at hearings onInterstate Trade Barriers, 20 Mar 40; Ltr, NatiAssn of Motor Bus Operators to C. C. Wardlow,18 Mar 41, and inclosed statement, sub: InterstateTrade Barriers, For Hire Trans of Persons. All inOCT HB Topic Hwy Trans Gen.

219 Eastman, Selected Papers, p. 58.220 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 144-46; Ltr,

SW to Chm ICC, 21 Jun 42, OSW C&R Trans501-800.

221 WD Cir 190, 15 Jun 42; WD Coml TrafBull 27, 24 Aug 44, OCT HB Topic Hwy TransGen. For general discussion see Civilian War Trans-port, pp. 143-47.

222 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 26 Nov40, G-4/32212; Ltr, SW to MacDonald, 6 Dec40, G-4/32212; WD press release, 9 Mar 41, sub:Regional Sessions of State Traffic Committees,OCT HB Topic HTAC.


throughout the war.223 Originally their pur-pose was to assist in the planning and exe-cution of military movements so as to mini-mize conflict with civilian traffic, to aid inthe completion of a nation-wide inventoryof motor vehicles to facilitate their mobiliza-tion should they be required for militarypurposes or for civilian evacuation, to pro-vide information from civilian driver rec-ords regarding men under consideration forassignment as military motor vehicle opera-tors, and to assist the commanders of Armyinstallations with their local traffic prob-lems. Later the state committees were re-quested to assist in establishing adequatetransportation arrangements for workers inwar industries, in expediting the movementof important shipments in which the Armywas interested, in improving the highways,and in overcoming the hardships imposedby unduly restrictive state laws and regula-tions.224

After the change of regulation in Septem-ber 1940 that permitted the use of govern-ment bills of lading for shipments by motortruck, the Commercial Traffic Branch inthe Office of the Quartermaster Generalset up a special section to deal with highwaytraffic and undertook a comprehensivesurvey of available truck services and theaccumulation of a complete set of trucktariffs. As experience with highway ship-ments accumulated, however, a variety ofconditions, in addition to those mentionedabove, were found to militate against therapid expansion of motor freight.225 Aftershipments had been routed by truck it fre-quently developed that the carriers couldnot accept them because of limited capacity

and other commitments. It was difficult toascertain what space would be available tothe Army on a specific route at a specifictime. It was difficult to ascertain from thegreat number of large and small truck op-erators what limitations as to routes andcommodities had been placed on them byfederal and state regulatory bodies. Therewere types of Army matériel which becauseof size or character could not be loaded intrucks advantageously. Although in thesummer of 1941 the motor carriers wereinvited to equalize their rates with the landgrant rates of competing railroads, this re-quired an agreement between the WarDepartment and each operator; since manyoperators found the Army's business un-profitable at the reduced rates, they eitherdeclined to sign equalization agreements ordesired to be released after signing.226

Despite these conditions, shipments bytruck became more frequent as the Army'straffic expanded. The Commercial TrafficBranch routed approximately 400 truck-loads during the first quarter of 1941, 1,600truckloads during the second quarter, and3,100 truckloads during the third quarter.227

Transportation officers in the field wereauthorized to route shipments of less thantwo truckloads without reference to theCommercial Traffic Branch, and thoughthere is no comprehensive record of the vol-ume of that traffic the records of the severalinstallations indicate that it increased dur-ing this period. The transportation officersin the field were urged to use the highway

223 Ltr, SW to Thomas H. MacDonald, 10 Mar42, AG 334 HTAC (2-9-42).

224 Memo, CofT for Thomas H. MacDonald, 12Mar 43, AG 334 HTAC (2-9-42).

225 Memo, C of Coml Traf Br for C of TransDiv OQMG, 24 Jun 41, sub: Gen Use of MotorCarriers; Draft of press release prepared in ComlTraf Br, 6 Aug 41; Statement by Maj E. C. R.Lasher, C of Coml Traf Br, prepared November1941, sub: WD and Motor Carrier Industry. Allin OCT HB OQMG Coml Traf Br.

226 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 158-60.227 Statement by Lasher cited n. 225.


carriers in lieu of railway express for ship-ment of less than 400 miles, in order to takeadvantage of the expeditious service andavoid the premium rates charged for rail-way express.228

The Army also encountered limiting fac-tors in the extension of its use of commercialbuses. Here again the capacity of the indi-vidual carriers was limited, and their op-erations were restricted to authorized routes.They did not provide satisfactory messing,sleeping, and sanitary facilities for massmovements, nor were they equipped tohandle the impedimenta of troop units. Be-cause of these circumstances, the bus op-erators were not in a position to bid on allor the major portion of the traffic of thearmed services, as were the railroads. Never-theless, the advantages which the bus servicesoffered for certain types of military trafficwere recognized, as evidenced by the above-mentioned change in the Joint MilitaryPassenger Agreement, effective 1 July 1941.Concurrently the Army's instructions werealtered, removing the requirement that bustravel be limited to trips not exceeding sixhours and specifying only that the travelfrom point of origin to destination should bebetween 6:00 A.M. and the following mid-night.229 The effect of these changes wassoon apparent in the number of Army pas-sengers moved by bus, particularly thoserouted by transportation officers at field in-stallations who were authorized to routegroups of less than fifty.230

In addition to developing its regulartraffic by highway, the Army during1940-41 endeavored to establish by actualexperience the extent to which commercialmotor bus and truck equipment could beutilized in organic troop movements. InOctober 1940 the motor carriers were re-quested to submit a plan for the movementof the 106th Cavalry, a National Guardunit embracing 1,193 men and 472 horses,with a limited amount of motor equipment,from three points in Illinois and Michiganto a maneuver area near Alexandria, La.A satisfactory plan was not worked out bythe motor carriers and the project wasdropped.231 The first such movement actu-ally carried out was in January 1941, whenthe 153d Infantry Regiment, Arkansas Na-tional Guard, was transported from fifteenarmories to Camp Robinson, over distancesranging from 24 to 200 miles, by 31 busesand 21 trucks. Since this was a nonmechan-ized unit of 1,457 men, with only about 200tons of baggage and other impedimenta,and the routes were entirely within onestate, the carriers were not severely tested.232

Accordingly it was proposed to use motortransport for the movement of a division toan August maneuver, on a trip that wouldcross state borders and involve problems ofbivouac, sleeping, and messing en route.This undertaking had to be postponed,however, because GHQ, to which the taskof preparing a movement plan had beenassigned, reported that sufficient trucks andbuses could not be obtained in the respective

228 OQMG Cir Ltr 186, 1 Aug 41, OCT HBOQMG Coml Traf Br.

229 OQMG Cir Ltr 103, 5 Jun 41, and Supp. 1,26 Jun 41, OCT HB Topic Mil Passenger Agree-ments.

230 Statement based on general information.Actual data for bus routings in 1941 are availableonly for groups routed by the Commercial TrafficBranch, OQMG. OCT HB Monograph 6, p. 409.

231 1st Ind, QMG to TAG, 28 Jan 41,G-4/25958-31.

232 Memo, Capt C. R. Weaver (G-4 Observer)for Gen Reybold ACofS G-4, 8 Jan 41; Memo,ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 23 Jan 41, sub:Utilization of Van and Bus Sv. Both in AG 511.1(10-9-40) (1) Mvmt of Org by Bus and MotorVan.


areas to move any division of the Third orFourth Armies.233

A substitute plan then was initiated formoving a division of the First Army bymotor. This project was carried out inSeptember 1941 with the 28th Division. Atthat time 2,462 troops with their impedi-menta were transported in 143 commercialvehicles from Indiantown Gap, Pa., to amaneuver area near Lisleville, N. C.; theremainder of the division was transportedin organic vehicles. The trip of 530 milesbegan on the evening of 24 September andended at midnight on 28 September. Threeovernight bivouacs were made, and therewere stops during the daytime for messingthe troops and for resting.234 The generalplan for the use of commercial vehicles wasworked out between the CommercialTraffic Branch, the American TruckingAssociations, and the National Associationof Motor Bus Operators, but the assignmentof vehicles and the control of their move-ments were arranged between the trans-portation officer of the 28th Division andthe individual carriers.

While the two organic movements whichwere executed by motor were successful inmany respects, they emphasized the prob-lems already mentioned and called atten-tion to others. The necessity of dealing withtwo groups of carriers—bus operators andtruck operators—presented certain dis-advantages. More time was consumed inobtaining the required amount of motorequipment by negotiation with several op-erators than would have been needed tomobilize an equivalent amount of rail

equipment. In the case of the 28th Division,the troops were longer en route than wouldhave been the case if rail had been used, andthey were more fatigued on arrival at desti-nation. It was apparent that both militarypersonnel and civilian drivers requiredspecial training for the proper execution ofmovements of this type. The charges formotor transportation, which were based onspecial contracts between the Army and thecarriers, were greater than the rail chargeswould have been.233

During the years 1940 and 1941 the co-operation between The Quartermaster Gen-eral's Transportation Division on the onehand and the National Association of MotorBus Operators and the American TruckingAssociations on the other became progress-ively more active. Although these organiza-tions did not represent all the commercialoperators in their respective fields, they ex-ercised a wide influence and they were nat-urally desirous of stimulating expansion ofthe Army's highway traffic and of aidingin the removal of the obstacles to such ex-pansion. Mr. Arthur M. Hill, President ofNAMBO, and Mr. Ted V. Rodgers, Presi-dent of ATA, were members of the Trans-portation Advisory Group which TheQuartermaster General appointed in Janu-ary 1941, and they also worked closely withthe Commercial Traffic Branch.

After the United States entered the warthe increase in the Army's use of motor car-riers was accelerated. No further attemptwas made to employ commercial trucksand buses in organic movements, since thevehicles were of great value to the wareffort in their regular services and becausethe expanding output of military trucksmade it possible to assign more organic

233 Memo, ACofS G-4 for CofS USA, 24 Apr41 ; Memo, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 4 Sep 41, withnote "for record only." Both in G-4/25958-31.

234 See draft of article prepared in Coml TrafBr, 3 Nov 41, sub: Troops Moved by Bus andTruck, OCT HB OQMG Coml Traf Br.

235 For fuller discussion see OCT HB Mono-graph 6, pp. 196-204.


motor equipment to troop units in training.But the wider utilization of the highwaycarriers in the day-to-day movement ofpersonnel and matériel was encouraged fortwo basic reasons. First, it was desired totake full advantage of the greater flexibilityof motor transportation that arose from thefact that the operators were not limited tofixed terminals, and of the more expeditiousdelivery on the shorter routes. Secondly,there was an obvious advantage in relievingthe hard-pressed railroads of traffic whichcould be handled equally well by the high-way carriers. Although cost generally was aparamount consideration in determining thetype of transportation to be used for particu-lar shipments, that consideration sometimeswas subordinated to military expediencywith regard to movements for which motortransport was especially well suited.236

The volume of Army freight moved bycommercial motor trucks increased from44,000 short tons in December 1941 to1,068,000 tons in June 1945 and totaledover 26,000,000 tons during the 45 warmonths.237 The Traffic Control Division inthe Office of the Chief of Transportation,which took over the responsibilities of TheQuartermaster General's Commercial Traf-fic Branch in March 1942, continually em-phasized the desirability of using trucks forsmall shipments and short hauls and forspeedy deliveries.238 It opposed a plan which

was put forward in the summer of 1942 tolimit all truck hauls to 300 miles, but main-tained the general policy that Army ship-ments for greater distances should be routedby truck only when there was some specialadvantage in so doing.239 An analysis oftruck traffic during the first half of 1944revealed that 52 percent of the total ton-nage had been shipped to points within thestates where the shipments originated.240

Contract motor carriers were used whencommon carriers were not available, pro-vided that reasonable contract rates couldbe arranged.

Complete data on Army passengersmoved by commercial buses are availableonly through May 1943. The number ofsuch passengers increased from 17,905 inDecember 1941 to a monthly average ofabout 200,000 in 1942 and an average ofabout 290,000 during the first five monthsof 1943.241 The Traffic Control Division inthe Office of the Chief of Transportationrouted 7.3 percent of the 1942 total and5.8 percent of the total for the first fivemonths of 1943.242 As indicated above, theTraffic Control Division routed only thelarger groups, which for the most parttraveled the longer distances, and for suchmovements rail transportation was preferred.Most of the Army's bus traffic consisted ofthe smaller groups routed by field installa-tions, and such groups usually traveled onlyshort distances. An analysis of military andother tax exempt tickets sold by 35 Class Iintercity bus operators during a period of

236 Memo, C of Traf Contl Div OCT for CofT,22 Jun 43, sub: Rate Differentials Presently Main-tained by Rail and Motor Carriers, OCT 500 (AR55-105).

237 ASF, Statistical Review, World War II, p.115.

238 See remarks of Lt Col Richard M. Boyd, Cof Freight Br Traf Contl Div OCT, Port and ZoneConf, Chicago, 6-9 Jul 44, session of 7 Jul, pp.26-31, OCT HB PE Gen Port Comdrs Conf; seealso WD TM 55-205, Transportation in the Zoneof Interior, par. 34, 25 Aug 44.

239 Remarks by Col W. J. Williamson, C of TrafContl Div OCT, ZTO's Conf, 24-26 Sep 43, p.67, OCT HB Zones Gen.

240 Study by Transport Economics Br Traf ContlDiv OCT, 4 Aug 44, sub: Growth of WD Freight,Motor, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Freight.

241 OCT HB Monograph 20, App. I.242 Based on a comparison of data in OCT HB

Monograph 20, App. I, and Monograph 22, App. I.

MOTOR TRANSPORT FOR SHORT HAULS. Commercial buses were used ex-tensively for transporting selectees to induction stations (top). Trucks delivering

freight to the Army consolidating station at Chicago (bottom).


two weeks in December 1942 disclosed that73.1 percent of such passengers traveled 25miles or less and only 11.6 percent traveledover 100 miles.243 The average distancetraveled by all passengers on the linesstudied was 52.2 miles.

In addition to the above-mentioned Na-tional Association of Motor Bus Operatorswhich had its headquarters in Washington,two organizations of bus operators main-tained headquarters in Chicago. They werethe National Bus Traffic Association andthe National Bus Military Bureau, whosefunctions roughly paralleled those of theterritorial passenger associations of the rail-roads and the Military Transportation Sec-tion of the Association of American Rail-roads. These agencies did not represent allthe bus operators, however, and their au-thority was limited.244 The nature andextent of the military traffic by commercialbus did not require organizations in thatbranch of the transportation industry withscope and authority equal to that of theorganizations which represented the trafficand operating interests of the railroads, butat times the officers responsible for Armytransportation felt that stronger integrationamong the bus operators would have beenhelpful.

The commercial motor carriers, unlikethe railroads, had no surplus equipmentwhen the emergency came, yet like therailroads they were able to obtain only alimited amount of new equipment duringthe war. The wartime expansion of theirtraffic would have been far greater than it

was except for this limiting factor. The pro-duction of trucks and tractors for civilianuse was discontinued by the War Produc-tion Board within a few months after PearlHarbor—light trucks on 31 December 1941,medium trucks on 28 February 1942, andheavy trucks on 31 March 1942.245 Re-sumption of production was not authorizeduntil May 1943 and then on a very limitedbasis. The production of buses for commoncarrier use was continued throughout thewar at a substantial rate, since they wereneeded to supplement the railroads andprivate automobiles in local and intercityservices, but the number of new vehiclesmade available fell far short of the numberthat could have been used to advantage.246

The output of buses and trucks during theyears immediately preceding the war andduring the war years is shown in Table 12.

The limitation on the production of newmotor vehicles for commercial services re-sulted, of course, from the enormous com-peting requirements for raw materials formilitary supplies and equipment, includingthe trucks needed by our own forces and byour allies.247 The year 1943 marked the lowpoint in the output of civilian vehicles. InJuly of that year the Director of DefenseTransportation forwarded to the Secretaryof War and the Chief of Transportation a

243 The National Association of Motor Bus Op-erators, The Intercity Bus Industry at War (Wash-ington, April 1943), pp. 9, 12, Table VII. Thispublication states that on 30 Nov 42 there wereabout 21,480 buses of all classes operating in in-tercity service, with about 630,000 seats.

244 See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 102, 203.

245 Rpt, Bureau of Transport Economics andStatistics ICC, Motor Carrier Facilities—War Useand Postwar Needs, Jun 46, p. 1.

246 Ibid., p. 4. Substitutes for scarce materialswere used in constructing buses for wartime serv-ice, and also for the special troop sleepers built bythe government, but the extensive use of substitutesin building long-lived passenger cars was not fav-ored by the railroads.

247 Output of unarmored trucks for the armedservices, mostly Army and including lend-lease, was186,462 in 1941, 647,342 in 1942, 648,404 in 1943,and 620,532 in 1944. See Civilian Production Adm,Munitions Production of the United States, 1 May47, p. 233, OCT HB Topic WPB.


TABLE 12—PRODUCTION OF NONMILITARY TRUCKS, TRAILERS, AND BUSES INTHE UNITED STATES: 1936-1944

Source: Motor Carrier Facilities—War Use and Postwar Needs, prepared by Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics,Interstate Commerce Commission, June 1946, pp. 2, 4. These data agree in some instances and disagree in others with datagiven by ODT in Civilian War Transport, p. 125.

statement setting forth the seriousness of themotor carriers' situation, which he believedwas not fully understood.248 In his responseGeneral Gross concurred in the ODT viewregarding the importance of the motor car-riers in the war effort, and shortly thereafterrecommended that the Army support theODT truck production program for 1944,which his office had studied and found rea-sonable.249 But although the Army trimmedits motor vehicle requirements for militaryand lend-lease purposes in order that theoutput of vehicles for civilian operatorsmight be increased, the cut was not suffi-cient to enable the ODT program to be

fully realized.250 Neither General Somervellnor his Assistant Chief of Staff for Matériel,Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, could fullyaccept the point of view of the Chief ofTransportation, military operational plansbeing as they were.251 General Clay pointedout that some of the trucks included in theODT program were not types that wouldaid the Army or the war industries in thesolution of their transportation problems;he doubted that the situation was as critical

248 Ltr, 13 Jul 43, AG 537 (13 Jul 43) ( 1 ) .249 Ltr, Gross to ODT, 24 Jul 43, OCT 537

Domestic Motor Transport; Memo, Gross forACofS for Matériel ASF HQ, 30 Jul 43, OCT451.2 Truck Prod Program.

250 Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Third Annual Report,p. 112. The committee refrained from requestingreduction of the military truck program butrecommended that the Army "subject its estimatesto the most rigorous scrutiny" to make certainthat they were not excessive. Ibid., p. 432.

251 Memo, Clay for Somervell, 13 Feb 44; Memo,Somervell for USW, 13 Feb 44. Both in ASF HqTrans 1944.


as some believed, but indicated that if acrisis should occur in domestic motor trans-portation the over-all production capacitywas so great that the deficiency could bemade up quickly.

Collateral to the problem of getting addi-tional equipment was that of getting thegasoline, tires, and replacement parts neededto keep the available equipment in full op-eration. Here again it was basically a mat-ter of balancing military against civilianneeds, and here again the military took pre-cedence and civilian supplies were limitedto the minimum with which the industrycould carry on. The most troublesomeshortage was that of replacement parts, andmany vehicles had to be deadlined becauseof inability to procure the required itemspromptly. The Senate Special CommitteeInvestigating the National Defense Programconcluded that sufficient foresight had notbeen used by the government agencies con-cerned in setting up a balanced program ofreplacement parts for the highway car-riers, whose maintenance requirements wereheavy because of their intensive operationsand the employment of many vehicles whichunder normal circumstances would havebeen retired.252

The Office of Defense Transportationrepresented the interests of the civilianmotor carriers before the War ProductionBoard, the Petroleum Administrator forWar, and the Rubber Director and was alsoresponsible for rationing within the indus-try.253 The Army Chief of Transportation,however, kept these matters under close ob-servation, made constructive proposals to

protect the carriers' interests, and took suchsteps as he considered feasible to assist in-dividual operators to obtain the vehicles,gasoline, and tires which they needed andto meet their difficult maintenance prob-lems. This assistance was given first in thefield, where the highway officers in thetransportation zones were in constant touchwith the operators and the local representa-tives of ODT. Problems not solved in thefield were referred to the Chief of Trans-portation, whose Highway Division pursuedthem further, working through appropriateArmy liaison officers with ODT and theother federal agencies concerned.254

Manpower was considered the most acuteproblem by many of the highway carriers.In order to keep their vehicles in operatingcondition, skilled maintenance mechanicswere needed. In order to provide efficientand safe service on the highways, competentdrivers were required. These employees ofthe motor carriers were on the averageyounger than the skilled workers on therailroads and somewhat less firmly attachedto their employers by tradition and senti-ment. Their skills were greatly sought byother booming war industries which were ina position to offer higher compensation. Thedraft took its inevitable toll despite the pro-vision for deferment of indispensable em-ployees. The carriers' plea that sufficienttime be allowed to train replacements be-fore experienced workmen were inductedoften was disregarded by local draft boards.With manpower, as with equipment short-ages, the Office of Defense Transportationwas the agency responsible for finding solu-tions insofar as solutions were possible. The

252 Senate Special Committee Investigating theNational Defense Program, Third Annual Report,pp. 427-29.

253 Civilian War Transport, pp. 200-12, gives ageneral account of ODT's difficulties and accom-plishments.

254 OCT Office Order 25-6, 29 Jan 43; Memo,Hwy Div OCT for Exec Asst OCT, 18 Jan 45,pp. 6-8, sub: Liaison with Other Govt Agencies;Annual Rpt Hwy Div FY 1945, p. 14. Last twoin OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.


Chief of Transportation, through his high-way officers in the transportation zones,aided the operators in finding replacementsfor employees who had left their service andsupported their requests for deferment whenthey were considered justifiable.

Many operating controls were imposedon the motor carriers by the Office of De-fense Transportation with a view to con-serving equipment and insuring maximumutilization of its capacity.255 Through theissuance of certificates of war necessity,ODT endeavored to insure that commercialvehicles were employed on the routes wherethey were most needed and also to providea sanction for use in enforcing its operatingregulations. Through orders promulgatedfrom time to time, ODT undertook to con-trol such wasteful practices as underloading,circuitous routing, special deliveries, andduplicating services.256 A limit of thirty-fivemiles per hour was placed on over-the-roaddriving on the theory that this would aid inthe conservation of rubber and gasoline.Provision was made for both general andspecial exemptions from these regulationswhen circumstances warranted. Extensiveexemptions were granted in favor of Armyfreight traffic and also that of the Navy, theMaritime Commission, and the War Ship-ping Administration.257

The number of trucks and tractor-trailercombinations registered in the United Statesdecreased slightly between 1940 and

1944.258 This decrease was the result of thelimited number of new vehicles made avail-able to the industry and the necessary re-tirement of old vehicles. Although a valianteffort was made to keep old vehicles in op-eration, abnormal attrition and inadequatemaintenance took a heavy toll. The regis-tration of commercial buses, on the otherhand, increased about 50 percent between1940 and 1944, the number produced beingconsiderably in excess of the number thathad to be retired.

The highway freight carriers were in-volved in numerous strikes. Fortunatelymost of them were local in scope and ofbrief duration. If the carriers involved inlabor disputes served Army installations orwar industries which were producing Trans-portation Corps equipment, the highwayofficers in the transportation zones endeav-ored by informal means to bring the partiesto an understanding and encouraged thepublic agencies expressly charged withhandling such disputes to perform theirfunctions promptly. Where strikes were inprogress, the zone officers took the stepsnecessary to insure that essential Army ma-tériel was moved without delay. Labor rela-tions in the field were under the supervisionof the Industrial Personnel Division in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation, whichalso maintained active liaison with the head-quarters of the other federal agencies con-cerned and with the appropriate labor or-

255 For discussion of regulatory measures see Ci-vilian War Transport, pp. 102-30, 149-56, 161-64.

256 A study of selected Class I common carriertrucks showed that the average load (tons) in-creased 30.4 percent between 1941 and 1944: astudy of Class I intercity buses showed that theaverage load (passengers) increased 46.5 percentbetween these years. See Rpt, by Bureau of Trans-port Economics and Statistics ICC, Motor CarrierFacilities—War Use and Postwar Needs, Jun46, pp. 14, 17.

257 See CofT, Direction for Use of Certificate ofExemption and V-Emergency Pennants; also,Revised Procedure Concerning ODT Certificatesof Exemption and V-Emergency Pennants, 1 Mar43, source not indicated but apparently issued inconnection with ODT Exemption Order 23-2A, 3Mar 43. Both in OCT HB Topic Hwy Trans Gen.

258 P. 7 of report cited in n. 256 shows 1943 regi-stration as 98 percent of 1940, and 1944 registrationas 98.4 percent of 1940. Data include private aswell as commercial vehicles.


ganization headquarters in Washington.259

A brief review of actions taken by repre-sentatives of the Chief of Transportationin connection with two strikes that were ofspecial significance will serve to illustratetheir methods of operation.

On 4 August 1944 intercity truck opera-tions between the Mississippi River and theRocky Mountains virtually ceased as theresult of strikes. After a week of unsuccess-ful effort to resolve the difficulty, 103 truck-ing concerns were seized by the Office ofDefense Transportation, acting under anexecutive order, and normal operations thenwere restored gradually. The interim taskof keeping war freight moving was assumedby the zone transportation officer at Omaha,aided by the district transportation officersat St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, andDenver.260 The first step was to determinewhat freight it was essential to move with-out delay, and an inventory of such freightwas prepared with the aid of transportationofficers and technical service officers atArmy installations. Agreements were madewith the labor unions to furnish dockworkers and drivers to move this freight andwith the carriers to furnish equipment. Acertificate was issued for each shipment,signed by an Army transportation officerand a union representative. In some cases,under agreements with the unions, con-signees were permitted to call for and pickup shipments with their own vehicles. Inareas not wholly tied up by the strike an

effort was made to have freight transferredfrom struck carriers to truck lines that werenot struck, or failing that, to have it di-verted to railroads. At terminals where thecarriers refused to allow the entrance ofunion drivers or to transfer the freight toother carriers, agreements were made per-mitting government vehicles operated bymilitary personnel to remove the freight anddeliver it either to local consignees or torail terminals. Approximately 2,000,000pounds of essential freight were moved bythese methods.

During May and June 1945 truck opera-tions in Chicago were seriously affected bystrikes, the more critical phase beginning on16 June. Again acting under Presidentialauthority the director of Defense Trans-portation seized the plants and facilities ofthe carriers having agreements with thelabor unions involved. In accordance withthe executive order, issued 23 May, hecalled on the Secretary of War to provideprotection for persons employed or seekingemployment with the struck carriers and forthe seized plants and facilities and to fur-nish equipment and manpower necessaryto carry out the purpose of the order. TheSecretary of War delegated the authorityto perform these functions to the Com-manding General, Sixth Service Command,whose headquarters were in Chicago.261

The service commander in turn appointedthe Sixth Zone Transportation Officer asdirector of transportation for the emergency.Working in co-operation, the Zone Trans-portation Officer and the federal managerappointed by ODT prepared a list of motorcarriers, showing the importance of eachin the war effort. The city was divided intodistricts and an Army officer was placed in

259 For summary of actions taken in connectionwith strikes between 1 Jan 45 and V-J Day seeMemo 9, sub: Labor Disputes in Trucking In-dustry, in series of reports prepared by Labor Brof Ind Pers Div entitled, Labor Relations, OCTHB Ind Pers Div Labor Br.

260 Memo, C of Hwy Br ZTO 7th zone, sub:Strike of Truck Drivers, in App. to Hist Rec 7thTZ, 1 Jul-30 Sep 1944, OCT HB 7th Zone. Seealso Civilian War Transport, pp. 283-85.

261 Ltr, SW to Dir ODT, 6 Jun 45, AG 004.01(23 May 45). I


charge of each. The requirements of theseveral carriers for military personnel toserve as drivers, dockmen, and guards weredetermined, and more than 9,000 soldierswere assigned to duty in these capacities.About 100 commercial buses were leasedto transport the soldiers to and from thetruck terminals. About 100 Army truckswere used to handle especially importantshipments. By these methods essential warfreight was kept moving up to the end of thestrike on 27 June.262

The Chief of Transportation took an ac-tive interest in the condition of the high-ways, which affected the efficiency of bothArmy vehicles and commercial vehicleshauling military traffic. Early in the warhis Highway Division established an En-gineering Branch to deal with these mattersin an advisory capacity.263 After the estab-lishment of transportation zones in Decem-ber 1942 the highway officers in the zonestook over such activities in their respectiveareas and dealt with the state and localhighway officials, while the Highway Divi-sion in Washington handled only matterswhich called for liaison with federal agen-cies or involved federal aid.264

Highway improvement projects comingwithin the purview of the Public Roads Ad-ministration were referred to the War De-partment for consideration from the stand-point of military requirements and thereforewere subject to review by the Chief ofTransportation's Highway Division. Under

wartime conditions only the most necessaryprojects were approved. During the lasteight months of 1943, for example, theHighway Division endorsed 29 projects,totaling 199.5 miles of highway, and disap-proved 24 projects, totaling 94.6 miles.265

In July 1944 the Public Roads Administra-tion requested the recommendations of theWar Department regarding six highwayprojects in Pacific coast states, of which onlyone was endorsed after investigation by thezone highway officers and the HighwayDivision.266 During the fiscal year 1945,under a new procedure, the War Produc-tion Board reviewed 568 highway projects,of which only ten were submitted to theWar Department for consideration from thestandpoint of military importance, and onlytwo were certified.267

The Federal Highway Act of 1944 pro-vided for federal aid in the postwar develop-ment of highways and the designation of aNational System of Interstate Highways toconnect the principal industrial areas andto connect at border points with importanthighways in Canada and Mexico.268 Sinceone of the objects of the act was the devel-opment of a highway system adequate fornational defense under conditions of mod-ern warfare, the Public Roads Administra-tion called on the Secretary of War for hisrecommendations regarding a report of theNational Inter-regional Highway Commit-tee which had been appointed by the Presi-dent in 1941 and also regarding secondary

262 Hist Rpt, 6th TZ, 2d quarter 1945, Hwy Sec,OCT HB 6th Zone: Civilian War Transport, pp.285-86.

263 Hwy Div Cir 2, Sec. VIII, 21 Nov 42, OCTHB Hwy Div Cirs.

264 See TC Cir 50-57, 19 Feb 45, sub: Statusof Hwy Improvement Projects and Adverse HwyConditions; OCT Misc Ltr 83, 10 Mar 45, sub:Natl Def Hwys.

265 ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Dec 43, p. 69.266 Memo, Hwy Div OCT for Exec Asst OCT,

18 Jan 45, p. 5, OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.267 Annual Rpt, Hwy Div FY 1945, p. 21, OCT

HB Hwy Div Rpts.268 PL 521, 78th Cong., approved 20 Dec 44;

OCT Misc Ltr 83, 10 Mar 45, sub: Natl Def Hwys,OCT Hwy Div Hwy Network.


roads serving Army installations.269 Afterabout six months of study, in collaborationwith the Corps of Engineers and with theaid of the zone highway officers and thestate highway traffic advisory committees,the Chief of Transportation rendered a re-port on the subject in October 1945.270 Heproposed certain additions to the routes rec-ommended by the National Inter-regionalHighway Committee and submitted a listof access roads, serving Army installations,whose maintenance in serviceable conditionby state and local authorities he consideredessential.

Inland Waterways and Airways

During the years just prior to WorldWar II, domestic freight traffic moving bywater was almost as great, measured in tonmiles, as that moving by rail.271 The totalof water-borne traffic decreased during thewar because of the withdrawal of ships fromcoastwise and intercoastal routes, but thetraffic on the rivers, canals, and Great Lakesincreased. Consistent effort was made bythe Office of Defense Transportation to en-courage the use of inland waterways as ameans of lightening the load on the rail-roads. This effort included the constructionof tugs, tow boats, and barges with fundsprovided by the Defense Plant Corporationand the charter of these vessels to privateoperators.272 The principal objective was toincrease the movement of bulk commodi-

ties by barge, particularly petroleum, whichbecame a heavy additional burden on therailroads after the tanker fleet was with-drawn from service between Gulf andNorth Atlantic ports.

The Army had used the inland waterwaysonly sparingly during the pre-emergencyperiod, and the years 1940-41 broughtscant increase in this traffic. Army regula-tions required shipping officers to give con-sideration to the water carriers, since theirrates frequently were lower than those ofthe railroads.273 There were other considera-tions, however, which militated against themovement of military supplies by barge.The principal factor was that of deliverytime. The construction of Army camps,depots, and manufacturing plants and thedelivery of supplies and equipment to troopsin training were often behind schedule, sothat the use of slow-moving river craft sel-dom was viewed with favor by either ship-pers or consignees. Shipments by bargenearly always involved transshipment to railor truck, since few Army installations hadfacilities for direct delivery by water.Through billing for rail-water shipmentswas permissible only on a limited number ofroutes. Water rates on nonbulk commoditiesfrequently were higher than land-grant railrates. Information regarding inland water-way services and tariffs was not readilyavailable, since this form of transportationdid not come under the regulation of theInterstate Commerce Commission untilafter the passage of the Transportation Actof 1940.

Early in 1941 Mr. Alexander Dann, amember of The Quartermaster General'sTransportation Advisory Group, pointedout that some of the Ordnance plants thenunder construction were located near nav-

269 Ltr, 23 Apr 45, OCT 611 Natl Def Hwys1945.

270 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 19 Oct 45; Ltr,SW to PRA, 6 Nov 45. Both in OCT 611 Natl DefHwys 1945.

271 Industry Report, Transportation Div, Bureauof Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept of Com-merce, Domestic Transportation, Dec 45-Jan 46,p. 8.

272 Civilian War Transport, p. 182. 273 AR 30-905, par. 8a, 1 Aug 29.


igable rivers but that apparently no facili-ties were being provided to enable them toutilize river transportation.274 The Ord-nance Department, after a study of theproblem at the Indiana Ordnance Works,reported that the use of river transportationwould involve the installation of extensivewater-front facilities and a multiple con-veyer system to handle the different typesof bulk materials, as well as some additionalrail trackage, all of which would add tothe transportation cost.275 The report fur-ther stated that the plant was adequatelyserved by rail, which it characterized as"flexible, efficient, and dependable trans-portation." Other supply services, infor-mally consulted, also indicated their prefer-ence for rail service because of its greaterconvenience and speed.276

The increasing pressure on the railroadsduring the fall of 1941 led to positive meas-ures on the part of The QuartermasterGeneral's Commercial Traffic Branch toroute a larger amount of traffic by the bargelines.277 Also, the branch cast its influencein favor of locating new installations on ornear waterways whenever that appeared tobe a practical possibility. Soon after theestablishment of a chief of transportation inMarch 1942, an Inland Waterway Branchwas created in the Traffic Control Division,staffed by experts whose primary functionwas to build up information regarding serv-ices, terminals, and rates, and otherwise toencourage the use of barge routes for Army

freight.278 Cognizance was taken of the factthat in many fields the necessity for the de-livery of supplies by the fastest possiblemeans no longer existed. This was trueespecially of matériel being shipped to stor-age installations. Transportation officers inthe field, when requesting routings of car-load shipments from the Traffic ControlDivision, were directed to indicate the re-quired delivery dates so that the possibilityof water routing could be considered.279

When the pioneering work for which theInland Waterway Branch had been estab-lished was completed, it then became asection of the Freight Traffic Branch whichdealt with all forms of transportation. Find-ing that its effort to route Army traffic bywater frequently was handicapped by lackof barges or power vessels, the section under-took a survey to ascertain what marineequipment, commercial or government-owned, was not being used to best advan-tage and to arrange for the transfer of anysuch equipment to more essential work. Oneresult of this undertaking was the transferof eighteen large Army-owned tank barges,which had been used primarily for storagepurposes at Army installations, to the GulfIntracoastal Waterway where they wereemployed for the transportation of gasolineto installations of the Army Air Forces.280

When it was found that opportunities touse water routes were being overlooked bybranches of the Army or other government

274 Ltr to Chm Trans Advisory Gp OQMG, 27Jan 41, OCT HB Topic Dann.

275 Rpt by Maj A. C. Welsh, 14 Aug 41, sub:Advisability of Utilizing Water Trans at IndianaOrdnance Works, OCT HB Topic Dann.

276 Memo, C. C. Wardlow for Col Dillon, 30Apr 41, OCT HB Topic Dann.

277 OQMG Cir Ltr 275, par. 8, 14 Oct 41.

278 OCT HB Monograph 24, pp. 49, 50. Foranalysis of traffic by commodities and ports seeMemo, Col W. J. Williamson for Col F. B.Hodson, 13 Oct 42, OCT 560 Gen.

279 Memo, TAG for ACofS Opns Div WDGS,CG AGF, etc., 9 Nov 42, sub: Relief of Strain onRR Facilities, OCT HB Topic Inland Waterways.

280 Memo, Maj H. R. Hendricks for Brig GenW. J. Williamson, 24 Sep 45, sub: Accomplish-ments and Handicaps—Freight Traffic Branch,OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts.


agencies, such opportunities were pointedout, always with the explanation that therailroads should be relieved of traffic whichreasonably could be diverted to other car-riers, in order that they might more expedi-tiously handle the essential military move-ments for which they were peculiarlysuited.281 Barge lines which had not agreedto equalize the rail land-grant rates wereencouraged to do so, in order that theirservices might be more freely used.

The volume of Army freight moved ondomestic waterway routes increased from18,185 short tons in December 1941 to amonthly average of 157,642 tons in 1944,and it totaled 4,046,177 tons during theforty-five war months. The preponderantpart of this traffic consisted of bulk ship-ments of petroleum products, principallyaviation gasoline.282 The remainder, esti-mated at about 12 percent, consisted ofgeneral supplies and equipment. An impor-tant item in the latter category was motorvehicles, which moved by both river bargeand Great Lakes steamer. During the latterpart of the war considerable bulk grain wasshipped down the Mississippi for transship-ment to Europe, under the civilian aid pro-gram.

The quantity of matériel shipped by com-mercial aircraft on domestic routes wasslight. During the years 1942-45 the annualaverage was 1,268 short tons, and the

monthly shipments exceeded 200 tons inonly one instance.283 On the one hand, spacewas limited because the commercial airlinesdid not then operate special cargo servicesand in 1942 had surrendered approximatelyhalf of their planes to the Army. On theother hand, in view of the higher cost, airexpress was utilized only when railway ex-press was too slow.284 The above tonnagefigures do not include shipments effected bymilitary aircraft, under arrangements be-tween the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tion and the Army Air Forces. Military air-craft were used for Army Service Forces'supplies chiefly to enable emergency ship-ments to reach ports of embarkation in timefor loading in specific vessels or convoys,and the weight of such shipments is notavailable. All airfreight movements, wheth-er by military or civil aircraft, were con-trolled by the Air Transport Command,AAF, under a priorities system.285

Priorities for passenger travel by air alsowere under the control of the Air Trans-port Command. Such travel naturally waslimited to individuals, as distinguished fromunits. Following revision of the Joint Mili-tary Passenger Agreement with the rail car-riers in July 1941, which has been discussedin connection with highway traffic, theArmy had greater latitude in the use ofair transport so far as its commitments tothe railroads were concerned. Also, for theperiod of the emergency the greater cost ofair travel could be disregarded "when timeor other exigencies of the service" did notpermit the use of "the usual modes of trans-

281 Ltr, DCofT to ODT, 20 Jul 42; Memos, CofTfor CofOrd, 21 Aug 42 and 6 Oct 42; Memo, Cof Traf Contl Div OCT for DCofT, 16 Jan 43;Ltr, CofT to Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 9 Sep42. All in OCT 544.2 Use of Barge Line Trans.

282 Summary by author, 18 May 1950, sub: ArmyTraf by Domestic Water Carriers and Air, OCTHB Traf Contl Div Freight; ASF MPR, Sec. 3,Aug 45, p. 11. Figures in summary are for actualshipments, those in MPR are for routings and arehigher than actual shipments.

283 Summary cited n. 282.284 AR 55-155, par. 34, 27 Nov 42, provided

that air express should be used only in "extremeemergencies."

285 WD Cir 385, Sec. II, 27 Nov 42.


portation." 286 But limited capacity, to-gether with the fact that an increasingnumber of military aircraft was available,operated as an effective check on the growthof travel by commercial airlines up to V-EDay. During the redeployment and repatria-tion periods the use of commercial air trans-port for Army personnel was expandedgreatly, for the dual purpose of relieving theovertaxed railroads and affording quickerdispatch for men who had just returnedfrom service overseas.

Relations with Federal Regulating Agencies

As representative of the nation's largestshipper, General Gross and his staff neces-sarily maintained close contact with the twofederal agencies which were concerned withthe regulation of domestic surface trans-portation—the Interstate Commerce Com-mission and the Office of Defense Trans-portation. ICC, functioning since 1887 witha gradual increase in statutory authority,had extensive peacetime powers to regulatethe carriers' services and rates in the publicinterest, and it had certain emergencypowers to enable it to deal more effectivelywith transportation problems in time ofwar.287 ODT, created in December 1941as a purely wartime agency under thedirectorship of Joseph B. Eastman, hadbroad authority to co-ordinate transporta-tion services, control movements, enforceefficiency, and assist the carriers in main-

taining facilities adequate for the needs of anation at war.288

There was an area of overlapping be-tween the powers of the Interstate Com-merce Commission and the Office ofDefense Transportation pertaining to serv-ices and movements, but conflicts wereavoided through close co-ordination. ICCcontinued to regulate the carriers' opera-tions through the issuance of service ordersand the placement of embargoes, sometimeson its own initiative and sometimes at therequest of ODT.289 In October 1942 Com-missioner J. Monroe Johnson, in charge ofthe ICC Bureau of Service, gave notice tothe Army that he did not consider militarymovements outside his purview. Followingup a letter which he had written to GeneralSomervell concerning reports of unneces-sary troop travel on the railroads, the replyto which he evidently did not considersatisfactory, Johnson stated that the emer-gency powers vested in his organization hadnot been impaired by the creation of ODT,and suggested that those responsible forArmy transportation should familiarizethemselves with the ICC prerogatives andwith the relation of ICC to "all movementsof every nature by rail or motor." 290

After the receipt of Commissioner John-son's letter, General Somervell requested theChief of Transportation to make a study ofthe powers and limitations of the InterstateCommerce Commission and the Office of

286 AR 55-120, par. 3, 26 Apr 43. In addition toArmy personnel traveling on official business, airpriorities could be granted to personnel on leavein the U.S. prior to departure for oversea service,under WD Cir 39, Sec. III, 4 Feb 43.

287 See ICC, 56th Annual Report, November 1,1942, pp. 2-5.

288 EO 8989, 18 Dec 41, and EO 9156, 2 May 42,give the basic ODT powers. See Eastman, SelectedPapers, pp. 6-11, for statement of policy byDirector of ODT. Eastman, a member of ICC, wasloaned to ODT when the latter agency was created.

289 ICC, 56th Annual Report, November 1, 1942,pp. 15-21, outlines the emergency service ordersissued during the first ten months of war.

290 Ltrs, Johnson to Somervell, 20 Oct 42; Som-ervell to Johnson, 23 Oct 42; Johnson to Somervell,27 Oct 42. All in OCT HB Gross Rail.


Defense Transportation under the law.291

He explained his request by saying that thePresident had authority to place all railtransportation under the Secretary of Warand that if the two civilian agencies felt theywere in control of transportation to theextent of interfering with military move-ments, this attitude created an "intolerablesituation" which should be presented to thePresident by the Secretary of War. Theanalysis of the powers of these agenciesindicated that they were indeed broad, butit also indicated that the President hadoverriding powers with respect to priorityof movement and that the executive orderestablishing ODT expressly enjoined collab-oration of that agency with the Army andthe Navy with respect to the strategicalmovement of troops and supplies.292 Intransmitting this report to Somervell, Grossstated that he had talked with both John-son and Eastman; he believed that Johnson,while stressing the ICC authority, wantedto be helpful; he considered the relationsbetween the Transportation Corps andEastman good; and he feared no interfer-ence with military movements from eithersource.293

Section 1 (15) of the Interstate Com-merce Act provided: "In time of war orthreatened war the President may certifyto the Commission that it is essential tothe national defense and security that cer-tain traffic shall have preference or priorityin transportation, and the Commissionshall, under the power herein conferred,direct that such preference or priority be

afforded." Section 6 (8) of the Act pro-vided: "In time of war or threatened warpreference and precedence shall, upondemand of the President of the UnitedStates, be given over all other traffic forthe transportation of troops and materialof war, and carriers shall adopt every meanswithin their control to facilitate and expe-dite the military traffic." In the summer of1943 the Office of Defense Transportationproposed the adoption of a procedure underwhich ODT, with Presidential authority,would issue a certificate of preference toICC covering shipments considered essen-tial to the national defense.294 Although theinitial discussion of this proposal had indi-cated that a general certification was con-templated, the form of certificate proposedby ODT caused the Army to fear that inpractice the plan would involve issuanceof a certificate for each shipment and thefiling of a request by the Army in eachinstance. The War Department saw noneed for adding this complication to thealready heavy task of moving troops andimpedimenta. It pointed out that from thebeginning of the emergency the carriers hadsystematically granted precedence to mili-tary movements and that this arrangementhad worked "efficiently and satisfactorily."The War Department, accordingly, declinedto concur in the proposal and did not re-quest the issuance of certificates for itsmovements.

During the winter of 1942, when theOffice of Defense Transportation was estab-lishing its organization and procedures,Gross had taken a wary attitude toward itscourse of development and had resistedsome of its moves which he thought might

291 Memo, 1 Nov 42, OCT HB Gross Rail.292 Memo, Maj Luke W. Finlay for Gen Gross, 6

Nov 42, sub: Relationship of ICC, ODT, and WD,ASF Hq Trans 1942.

293 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 12 Nov 42, sub:Legal Status and Powers of ODT and ICC, ASFHq Trans 1942.

294 Memo, James H. Graham for USW, 8 Jul 43;Ltr, USW to Dir ODT, 9 Jul 43. Both in OCT HBGross ODT.


lead to encroachments on the Army's trans-portation functions.295 This watchful defen-sive policy was continued, and on severalsubsequent occasions ODT proposals wereopposed as involving activities outside itsproper sphere.296 Gross recognized neverthe-less that such an agency was necessary toinsure that the carriers got the equipmentthey needed and that the transportationresources of the nation were used to bestadvantage; he regarded that type of regula-tion a desirable alternative to outright gov-ernment operation. He therefore was readyto give ODT a full measure of co-operationin the accomplishment of these objectives.In accordance with the executive orderunder which ODT functioned, he ap-pointed the chief of his Rail Division asformal liaison officer in matters relating torail equipment and service and the chiefof his Highway Division as liaison officer inconnection with highway transportation.The Chief of Transportation himself, andhis director of operations, had frequent con-tact with the key officials of ODT regard-ing important matters of policy and proce-dure.

Many orders, issued by the Office ofDefense Transportation and the InterstateCommerce Commission to govern transpor-tation and traffic in general, could not beapplied equally to military traffic withoutimpairment of the war effort. Since delayand confusion were involved in workingout amendments to orders which already

had been issued, the Chief of Transporta-tion requested that such orders be submittedto his office for review in advance of issu-ance. Under Eastman's direction, ODTfollowed this procedure, with the result thatits orders when published were attuned tomilitary requirements. On the other hand,ICC refused to permit its service orders tobe reviewed by the Army before they wereissued, and while in some instances it sub-sequently agreed to modifications proposedby the Army, in other instances it definitelyrefused to make such adjustments.297

The problem of adapting general regula-tions to military needs is illustrated by thecase of ICC Service Order 99, issued on 3February 1943. Under this order an agencywas established at Chicago, upon request ofthe Office of Defense Transportation, withauthority to divert transcontinental freighttraffic in order to relieve lines or terminalswhich were congested or threatened withcongestion. The order was applied to allWar Department freight traffic except im-pedimenta moving with troops. The Chiefof Transportation was in agreement withthe general purpose of the order, but heforesaw that it would involve delays to im-portant shipments of Army supplies andwould interfere with the system of move-ment regulation operated jointly by theArmy and the Association of AmericanRailroads. A request for the exemption ofArmy shipments was made to the InterstateCommerce Commission soon after the orderwas issued, but it was not allowed. Inrefusing the request, Commissioner Johnsonstated that while every effort would bemade to avoid delaying important ship-

295 See Ch. II, p. 45.296 See Memo, Col McIntyre for C of Rail Div

OCT, 7 Nov 43, and Ltr, C of Rail Div to ODT,12 Nov 43, OCT 617 Rail Facilities, limiting ODTinvestigation of rail operations at Army installationsto cases where commanding officers requested sur-vey. See also Ltrs, USW to ODT, 7 Nov 43 and29 Mar 44, OCT HB Gross ODT, rejecting ODTproposal to join with Army, Navy, and WSA instudy and control of port facilities.

297 Memo, Brig Gen W. J. Williamson for HistUnit OCT, 22 Jan 45, and atchd Report of Rela-tions between the Traffic Control Division andCivilian Agencies, pp. 3-35, OCT HB Traf ContlDiv Rpts.


ments by diversions, Army traffic could notbe exempted from this control because ofits volume; he added that while the ICCconsidered its orders carefully before issuingthem, it did not "submit its contemplatedactions for approval." After about a year ofexperience under the order, General Grossappealed personally to Mr. Eastman, Direc-tor of Defense Transportation, with theresult that symbol (expedited) shipmentswere exempted from the Chicago agency'sdiversion orders.298

A very significant working arrangementbetween the Chief of Transportation andthe Office of Defense Transportation wasthat pertaining to the control of portboundfreight traffic. The Army considered it im-perative that a control system be establishedthat would apply to all freight destined tothe ports and would provide adequate in-surance against congestion at the seaboardsuch as had seriously affected oversea mili-tary operations in 1917-18. Under theexecutive order by which ODT was created,it had the authority to exercise such con-trol.299 Moreover, ODT was responsible forco-ordinating inland traffic movements withocean shipping in co-operation with thefederal agency having control of shipping.After extensive conferences during Januaryand February 1942, a system was agreedon by the Army, ODT, and the War Ship-ping Administrator, which satisfied themilitary requirements. A TransportationControl Committee was established, com-posed of representatives of these three agen-

cies, the Navy, and the British Ministry ofWar Transport, to which ODT delegatedover-all authority to regulate portboundmovements. The carriers were forbidden toaccept individual shipments to the portsunless they were covered by ODT permits,and the Traffic Control Division in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation wasauthorized to issue such permits for Armyshipments and all lend-lease shipments. Thiscontrol plan, which will be more fully dis-cussed in another volume of TransportationCorps history, proved highly effective andliquid conditions were maintained at theports to the end of the war.

After the death of Joseph B. Eastman inMarch 1944 Commissioner Johnson wasdesignated Director of Defense Transporta-tion. The Under Secretary of War requestedthe Chief of Transportation to keep himadvised if any difficulties should arise in thewake of this change of ODT leadership.300

As it developed, there were no importantchanges in procedure, nor was there anylessening in the co-operative effort. Therewere nevertheless sharp differences ofopinion between the new Director of De-fense Transportation and the Army on somematters affecting military traffic.

The most difficult phase of the relation-ship between the Army and the Office ofDefense Transportation came after V-EDay. As had been foreseen, the period ofredeployment and repatriation placed anunprecedented strain on the passengerfacilities of the railroads. There were delaysin moving troops from the debarkation portsbecause of lack of equipment, and manysoldiers made long trips in day coachesbecause sleepers were not provided. TheChief of Transportation, on the one hand,pointed to the desirability of effecting re-

298 Ltrs, Gross to Eastman, 11 Jan 44 and East-man to Gross, 17 Jan 44, OCT 040 ICC Sv Orders;Ltrs, Gross to Johnson, 13 Feb 43; Johnson toGross, 19 Feb 43; Gross to Johnson, 13 Mar 43;Johnson to Gross, 25 Mar 43; Ltr, W. F. KirkICC Bureau of Sv Chicago to Col W. J. William-son OCT, 5 Oct 43. Last five items in OCT 040ICC Sv Order 99.

299 EO 8989, 18 Dec 41, pars. 3c and d. 300 Memo, 6 Apr 44, OCT HB Gross ODT.


deployment, and later repatriation, asquickly as possible, and protested the failureof ODT to withdraw more rail equipmentfrom regular services so that it could be usedin troop trains. The Director of DefenseTransportation, on the other hand, com-plained that he was not adequately in-formed of the Army's fluctuating schedulefor bringing troops back to the UnitedStates and pointed out that regular serviceson the railroads had been severely cut inorder to meet the military demand for cars.There were many angles to the controversywhich need not be cited here, since they willbe dealt with when troop movements arediscussed. For the present purpose it willsuffice to say that despite the misunder-

standings with which the redeploymentmovement was launched and the intensifiedproblems encountered after repatriationfrom both European and Pacific theaterswas begun, the numbers of returning troopscleared from U.S. ports during the latemonths of 1945 set a remarkable record.301

301 Without attempting here a full documentationof this subject, the following key letters are cited:Gross to Johnson, 30 May 45; Johnson to Gross,11 Jun 45; Johnson to USW, 6 Jul 45; USW toJohnson, 9 Jul 45; Dir War Mobilization and Re-conversion to SW, 18 Jul 45; USW to Dir WM&R,30 Jul 45; Johnson to Brig Gen R. H. WylieACofT, 19 Dec 45. All in OCT HB Gross ODT.See also Johnson to Army and Navy, 6 Dec 45;Wylie to Johnson, 12 Dec 45, OCT HB WylieStaybacks.

CHAPTER X

The Army's Railwayand Highway Operations

Although the Army relied mainly oncommercial carriers for transportation inthe zone of interior, for practical reasons itowned certain transportation equipmentand facilities and engaged directly in theoperation of certain transportation services.These activities pertained to utility railroadsat Army installations, hospital cars for themovement of patients from ports to hospi-tals and between hospitals, tank cars tosupply Army installations with petroleumproducts and other liquids, railroad repairshops for the performance of heavy repairson Army railroad equipment, buses to pro-vide local transportation in the vicinity ofmilitary reservations and war industries, andadministrative vehicles for the use of Armyposts, camps, and stations.

The Chief of Transportation had an in-terest in and certain responsibilities relatingto all such equipment and services. Insome instances his responsibilities were notacquired until the war was well advanced.In certain fields his authority was not socomplete as he considered desirable fromthe standpoint of efficient operation.

Utility Railroads

Many Army installations covered largeareas and embraced numerous facilities.Aside from the switching that was necessaryin connection with the receipt and dispatchof freight and personnel, there were exten-

sive transfer activities within the militaryreservations. The trackage on the reserva-tions and that joining them with the tracksof the commercial carriers, the locomotivesand rolling stock utilized on the reserva-tions, and the facilities and personnel re-quired for the operation and maintenanceof such equipment constituted the utilityrailroad establishment. Except in a rela-tively few instances in which utility railroadoperations were performed under contractby connecting commercial railroads, theequipment was owned by the Army and theoperating and maintenance personnel wasemployed by it.

Responsibility for the utility railroadscannot be stated simply. Beginning early in1942 it went through a series of adjust-ments which was not completed until latein the war. Broadly speaking, and withcertain qualifications which will be ex-plained later, the Chief of Transportationultimately was responsible for the deter-mination of requirements for plant andequipment, the procurement and assign-ment of locomotives and rolling stock, andthe operation and maintenance of railroadequipment, except at installations wherethese functions were assigned to the serv-ices operating the installations. The con-struction and maintenance of track andother plant facilities were responsibilitiesof the Chief of Engineers.


The Chief of Transportation, like TheQuartermaster General before him, en-deavored to see that the utility railroadplants at posts, camps, and stations wereadequate for the traffic which they wouldbe expected to handle and that they wereefficiently laid out. This was best accom-plished when his railroad experts were givenan opportunity to review the plans for newinstallations before construction was begun.Frequently that opportunity was notafforded, particularly in the early stages ofthe emergency when pressure on the Army'sconstruction agency was heavy, with theresult that many faults had to be correctedlater. Sometimes proposals for improve-ments originated with the installation com-manders, and sometimes they originatedwith representatives of the TransportationCorps or the Corps of Engineers. In anycase they were passed on by the Chief ofTransportation, whose Rail Division re-viewed them from an operating standpointand whose Traffic Control Division con-sidered them from the standpoint of capac-ity and traffic flow. Reports of the RailDivision indicate that 41 improvementprojects were investigated and approvedduring the fiscal year 1944, and 45 duringthe fiscal year 1945.1

Before April 1942 responsibility for thedesign and procurement of equipment forthe utility railroads was distributed amongthe several supply services which operatedthe installations.2 At that time, because ofthe increasing shortage of materials and thedesirability of avoiding competition between

the several elements of the Army in con-tracting for equipment, Services of Supplyheadquarters decreed that all general motivepower and rolling stock should be designedand procured by the Corps of Engineers.3

The design and procurement of special roll-ing stock required in connection with rail-road artillery was to continue an OrdnanceDepartment responsibility, but the designof such equipment was subject to approvalby the Corps of Engineers with respect totrucks, couplings, and other strictly railroadfeatures. When the above responsibilities ofthe Chief of Engineers were transferred tothe Chief of Transportation in November1942, separate responsibility for railwayartillery remained with the Ordnance De-partment.4 The importance of such equip-ment was on the decline, however, becauseof the development of motorized artilleryand air coastal defenses.

On 1 July 1938 the Army-owned utilityrailway equipment included 100 loco-motives, 67 locomotive cranes, 24 box cars,236 flat cars, 141 gondola cars, 43 passengercars, and 121 smaller types of cars, totaling732 units.5 The expansion of the Armywhich began in 1940 called for the con-struction of new installations and the en-largement of others, and the requirementsfor utility railroad equipment expandedaccordingly. There was particular need fornew and more suitable types of locomotives,and the orders placed during this periodincluded diesels as well as the customarygasoline and steam units. On 1 July 1942the equipment in service included 227 loco-motives, 106 locomotive cranes, 12 box

1 Rpts, FY 1944, pp. 16, 17, and FY 1945, pp.12, 13, OCT HB Rail Div Rpts.

2 AR 100-50, pars. 4 and 5, 20 Sep 35. QMG,who procured most such equipment, placed con-tracts through the CofEngrs but provided thefunds and established the designs. See OCT HBMonograph 6, pp. 374-78.

3 Memos, CG SOS for C's of Supply Svs, 18 Apr42, and 26 Jun 42, OCT 453 Procurement of RREquip; AR 100-50, par. 4b(2) , 1 Sep 42.

4 WD GO 60, 4 Nov 42.5 List, Government-Owned Railroad Equipment

as of July 1, 1938, OCT HB OQMG Coml Traf Br.

LOCOMOTIVES FOR UTILITY RAILROADS. Prewar 20-ton gasoline switcher,used for light work (top). An 80-ton diesel-electric, introduced during the war for

the heavier switching jobs at Army installations (bottom).


cars, 252 flat cars, 147 gondolas, and 179other types of rolling stock—a total of 923units.6 As of 30 June 1945 more than tentimes that number were in service at 365installations, classified as follows:7

The control which the Chief of Trans-portation exercised over the employmentand operation of railroad equipment, afterhe had assigned it to the several services,was subject to considerable qualification. AnArmy regulation issued in September 1942gave him this responsibility, except whenthe equipment was "assigned to and op-erated in installations pertaining exclusivelyto another service."8 Regulations issuedsubsequently made no provision for ex-ceptions. Nevertheless, exceptions continued

in the case of installations of the Army AirForces, the Ordnance Department, and theChemical Warfare Service, which assumedfull responsibility for the employment andoperation of the equipment assigned tothem.9 Although representatives of theChief of Transportation visited these in-stallations, they did so in a purely advisorycapacity. Even where he had operatingresponsibility, the Chief of Transportationcould give only such supervision as waspossible through the occasional visits of hisinspectors. Direct control was exercised bythe commanding officers of the installations,who engaged the crews and governed theemployment of the equipment.10

In the spring of 1943 General Gross, notconvinced that utility railroad equipmentwas being utilized to best advantage, pro-posed that he be authorized to make in-vestigations at all Army installations, in-cluding those of the Army Air Forces, andreassign the equipment if he should find itdesirable.11 This proposal was rejected byArmy Service Forces headquarters insofaras it applied to AAF installations, and theChief of Ordnance withheld concurrence inrespect to installations under his control.With regard to the latter's position, GeneralClay, ASF Director of Matériel, pointed out

6 Memo, Rail Div for C. C. Wardlow, 27 Nov42, OCT HB Rail Div Rpts.

7 Rpt, Rail Div, FY 1945, pp. 19, 20, OCT HBRail Div Rpts. In addition to above types whichwere used for on-post work, 1,082 tank cars wereassigned to installations which they supplied regu-larly with petroleum products, acids, and otherliquids. Tank cars are discussed in next section ofthis chapter.

8 AR 100-50, par. 4b(1), 1 Sep 42.

9 AR 55-5, par. 3d, 5 Oct 42; AR 55-650, par.4b(1), 27 Feb 43; 4th Ind, CofT for CofCWS, 12Aug 43, OCT 020 Transfer of Functions; AnnualRpt, Rail Div FY 1945, p. 20, OCT HB Rail DivRpts.

10 Utility railroads were not subject to state lawsprescribing minimum crews, and installations weredirected to provide only enough personnel to insureefficiency and safety. See WD Cir 423, Sec. III,27 Oct 44.

11 Memo, ACofS for Matériel ASF for CofT, 13May 43, sub: Proposed Revision of AR 55-650;Memo, CofT for ACofS for Matériel ASF, 18 May43, sub: Survey of Trans Facilities; Memo, DirProd Div for Dir Matériel ASF. All in ASF Hq DirMatériel RR Equip.

THE ARMY'S RAILWAY AND HIGHWAY OPERATIONS 379

that while the Ordnance Department wasrecognized as qualified to determine its ownneed for utility railroad equipment, thereremained a staff responsibility to insure thatequipment was equitably distributed amongthe several services and installations.12 Anorder then was issued by the CommandingGeneral, Army Service Forces, stating thatperiodical surveys would be made by repre-sentatives of the Chief of Transportation atall ASF installations and that the findingsand recommendations would be submittedto the ASF Director of Matériel in the caseof arsenals, Army-owned ordnance pro-duction plants, and proving grounds, and tothe ASF Deputy Chief of Staff for ServiceCommands in all other cases.13 In additionto making the reassignment of equipment astaff matter for ASF headquarters ratherthan one on which the Chief of Transporta-tion could act directly, the order emphasizedthat the surveys would not "reflect uponor detract from" the responsibilities of thechiefs of technical services.

In accordance with the terms of thisorder, the Chief of Transportation notifiedthe other technical services in advance ofmaking periodical surveys. In so doing, hestated that the investigations would coverthe assignment of utility railroad equipmentand manpower and the extent of car utiliza-tion.14 Determined to make the best possibleuse of the opportunity to visit the installa-tions, he offered the services of his repre-sentatives, whom he described as experi-enced professional railroad operating men, tomake special surveys of operating methods

on request of the chiefs of the technical serv-ices.15 During the fiscal year 1944 surveyswere made at 49 Ordnance installations and111 other installations—a total of 160.During the fiscal year 1945, 119 Ordnanceinstallations and 123 other installations weresurveyed—a total of 242. As a result of thesurveys during the latter period, 60 loco-motives were declared in excess of needs, 40at Ordnance and 20 at other installations;recommendations were made that 201 per-sons employed in railroad crews be released,148 at Ordnance installations and 53 atother installations.16

During the early part of the war theChief of Transportation's responsibilitieswith regard to the employment and opera-tion of equipment were performed throughinspectors sent out by his Rail Division inWashington. Later this function was as-signed to trainmasters who were attached tothe nine zone transportation offices. Underthe circumstances outlined above, theeffectiveness of the trainmasters in im-proving operations depended largely on thereceptivity of installation commanders totheir advice. After the end of the war thezone transportation officer of the importantsixth zone,, with headquarters at Chicago,stated that although his trainmaster hadaccomplished fine results he had beenhandicapped in dealing with some installa-tions by the fact that his duties had notbeen set forth officially in the War Depart-ment directives.17 The Rail Division, on thebasis of its experience during the war, wasconvinced that in order to insure optimum

12 Memo for CofOrd, 14 Jun 43, ASF Hq Dir ofMatériel RR Equip.

13 Memo for C's of Tech Svs, 25 Jun 43, sub:Survey of Trans Facilities, ASF Hq Dir of MatérielTrans.

14 See Memo to CofOrd, 27 Sep 44, OCT 617RR Facilities.

15 Memo for CofEngrs, 8 Oct 43, and similarmemos to other tech services, OCT 617 RR Facili-ties.

16 Rpt, Rail Div FY 1945, p. 14, OCT HB RailDiv Rpts.

17 Ltr to OCT, 18 Sep 45, pp. 1, 9, 10, OCTHB 6th Zone.


utilization the Chief of Transportationshould have "complete and final assignmentjurisdiction over all railroad equipment atall War Department installations." 18

With regard to the maintenance of utilityrailroad equipment, the Chief of Transpor-tation attained a somewhat stronger posi-tion, though not until late in the war.Before November 1944 the maintenance ofequipment employed at Ordnance, Chemi-cal Warfare, and Air Forces installationswas not subject to his supervision, thoughthe installation commanders might beguided by his advice. In that month hismaintenance responsibility was extended toinclude all installations except those of theOrdnance Department which were oper-ated by contractors who had been given fullcontrol of the plant facilities under theircontracts.19 It had become clearly evidentthat careful and authoritative supervisionof the maintenance and repair of loco-motives by expert technicians was necessary,because of the lack of experienced operatingand maintenance personnel at the installa-tions and the intensive utilization to whichthe equipment was subjected. Since theChiefs of Ordnance and Chemical War-fare Service had authority to transfer equip-ment from one installation to another asthey saw fit, they were required to notifythe Chief of Transportation of such trans-fers in order that he might have this in-formation when planning his maintenanceactivities. No similar requirement was madeof the Army Air Forces.

The supervision of maintenance wasexercised initially through civilian inspectorssent out from Washington. Beginning in the

spring of 1943 the inspection function wasdecentralized to the transportation zones,and Army officers known as master me-chanics were assigned to the zone offices.Their duties were clearly defined by theWar Department directive of November1944, referred to above. It stated thatmaster mechanics were authorized to visitWar Department installations periodicallyto inspect railroad equipment and repairfacilities and to advise operating and main-tenance personnel regarding proper methodsof mechanical operation and care of equip-ment. Under this directive the mastermechanics gave attention to all echelons ofmaintenance. Actual performance of thefirst and second echelons, which includedall measures of preventive maintenance, wasa responsibility of the commanding officersof the installations. The third, fourth, andfifth echelons (heavy maintenance) werethe direct responsibility of the mastermechanics, who determined when andwhere they were to be performed. Some in-stallations had repair facilities adequate toperform the heavier work; otherwise suchwork was done at railroad repair shops op-erated by the Chief of Transportation, orat commercial shops. The Army's railroadrepair shops were the parent stations forthe supply of maintenance parts and mate-rials required by the installations.

The sixth zone transportation officer, ina report rendered at the close of hostilities,indicated that his master mechanic had ac-complished several important results, in-cluding the establishment of standard main-tenance procedures at the installations, theestablishment of a uniform system of in-struction and supervision for operating andmaintenance personnel, reduction of thetime required for repair work, reduction ofmaintenance and operating costs, and a

18 Memo for Exec Off OCT, 14 Sep 45, sub:Problems, Their Solution, and Lessons Learned, p.4, OCT HB Rail Div Rpts.

19 WD Cir 447, Sec. VII, 24 Nov. 44.


general improvement in the condition ofequipment. Because of his technical quali-fications, the master mechanic was able toestablish close working relations with thecommanders of installations, who frequentlysought his advice. The exclusion of con-tractor-operated ordnance plants from themaster mechanic's jurisdiction was con-sidered unfortunate, since the personnel atsuch plants often lacked the experiencenecessary to efficient operation and main-tenance.20 Some of these plants voluntarilyrequested the aid of the master mechanics,and this was given promptly.

In order to promote uniform and efficientmethods of operation and maintenancethroughout the service, the Chief of Trans-portation issued technical manuals whichwere applicable to both utility railroads andmilitary railroads. At the close of hostilitiesfive such manuals were in circulation, deal-ing with the inspection and maintenance oflocomotives and locomotive cranes; in-spection and maintenance of rolling stock;maintenance of way; standard plans forroadways, tracks, and structures; and thepainting and numbering of railroad equip-ment. These, and other manuals which werethen in preparation, were based on experi-ence in both commercial and military rail-roading.

Army Tank Cars

In June 1940 the Army owned or leased598 tank cars which, with the exception oftwo helium cars, were used to supply gaso-line and lubricants to Army installationsand to troops during field exercises.21 Since

tank cars at that time frequently were usedfor storage purposes by the installations, theArmy found it financially advantageous tooperate its own equipment, which did notincur demurrage charges while on govern-ment-owned tracks. The railroads overwhose lines the cars moved paid the Armya mileage rate which appreciably reducedthe freight charges paid by the Army on thecontents of the cars. At that time the tankcar fleet was under the control of the Com-mercial Traffic Branch of The Quarter-master General's Transportation Division.That branch assigned cars to the respectiveinstallations, supervised their operation andmaintenance, supplied routings wheneverthey were employed in line haul operations,and negotiated all arrangements with therailroads.

The enlargement of the Army whichbegan in 1940 foreshadowed the need for amuch larger tank car fleet. In particularit was foreseen that new Air Corps installa-tions would require great quantities ofpetroleum products and that new Ordnanceand Chemical Warfare plants would haveheavy requirements of acids and otherchemicals. Several hundred old Army carswhich had been deadlined were availablefor rehabilitation, but were not sufficient tomeet the need. The question then arosewhether to purchase or lease additionalequipment. For short periods leasing wascheaper, but over longer periods it wasmore economical to own the cars.22 Therewas a difference of opinion as to the propercourse to follow under the circumstances,but eventually the Commercial TrafficBranch obtained authority to purchase 500cars for delivery during the last half of 1941.20 Ltr, 6th ZTO to C. C. Wardlow, 2 Nov 45,

p. 2 of attached statement on relationships withinstallations, OCT HB 6th Zone.

21 See OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 366-72 fordiscussion of tank cars in 1940-41.

22 See Data in Defense of Request for AdditionalTank Cars, 6 Sep 40, OCT HB OQMG Coml TrafBr.


The clinching argument in favor of pur-chase was that the Army always could counton the services of equipment which itowned, whereas the railroads owned a verylimited number of tank cars and the com-panies which controlled the bulk of thisequipment were heavily committed toprivate industry.23 This decision, and sub-sequent purchases of tank cars which by 1July 1945 had increased the fleet to 4,100,assured the Army of adequate service dur-ing the nation-wide shortage of tank trans-portation which developed during the war.At the height of its activity the tank carfleet transported between 30 and 40 per-cent of the Army's total liquid shipments.24

In March 1942 the Commercial TrafficBranch became the Traffic Control Divisionin the office of the newly established Chiefof Transportation. For a period the TankCar Branch of the Traffic Control Divisiongave direct supervision to tank car opera-tions throughout the country, but in 1943this function was partially decentralized.During that year representatives of thebranch were stationed in the eighth andninth transportation zones, where a largepart of the gasoline and oil shipments orig-inated, and in the fourth zone, to whichmany of the shipments were destined. Theserepresentatives made their headquarters inHouston, Tex., Los Angeles, Calif., andJacksonville, Fla. They were men of expe-rience in handling petroleum traffic, andtheir function was to see that the Army tankcars were utilized with utmost efficiency.They maintained liaison with the oil com-panies and with Army installations and

were authorized to reassign and to diverttank cars as might be found desirable. Theyperformed a valuable service, since theyrelieved the Tank Car Branch in Washing-ton of many details, provided direct super-vision of operations in their respective areas,accelerated the turnaround of cars, andfacilitated the shifting of cars to meetchanging requirements.25

The Chief of Transportation procured alltank cars for the Army and had varyingdegrees of responsibility for their employ-ment. He directly controlled the employ-ment of cars engaged in the transportationof petroleum products, except that certaincars assigned to the Army Air Forces werecontrolled by the Air Service Command.The employment of certain chemical andacid cars, assigned to Ordnance and Chemi-cal Warfare Service installations, was con-trolled by the Chief of Ordnance and theChief of Chemical Warfare, respectively.The regulations required, however, thatroutings for all tank cars should be providedby the Chief of Transportation and thattheir movements should be reported to himpromptly, in order that he might be in-formed of the tank car situation at eachinstallation and be in a position to tracecars and verify mileage earnings.26

In the early part of the war contractorsfor the Ordnance Department and theChemical Warfare Service, whose contractsgave them full control over the plantsand facilities which they had agreed to op-erate, acquired a considerable number oftank cars. The great majority was leasedby Ordnance contractors, who at one timecontrolled between 1,200 and 1,300; only

23 Of 145,433 tank cars owned in U.S. in 1941only 9,000 were owned by RR's. See AAR, Ameri-can Railroads and the War, p. 49.

24 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, sub: Accomplishmentsand Handicaps, Sep 45, Freight Br, p. 3, OCT HBTraf Contl Div Rpts.

25 Statement by Col W. J. Williamson, C of TrafContl Div, in Proceedings of Zone TransportationOfficers' Conference, Washington, 24-26 Sep 43, p.75, OCT HB Zones Gen.

26 AR 55-105, par. 13, 29 Dec 42.


a small number was purchased.27 When theChief of Transportation learned of suchacquisitions he took steps to obtain full in-formation regarding the cars and bringthem under his cognizance, so that he mightarrange reassignments when surpluses de-veloped at certain plants and shortageswere found to exist at others.28 As the initialleases made by contractors came up forrenewal the Tank Car Branch undertookto consolidate them on its standard contractform, which was more favorable to thegovernment.

The tank cars designed to transportchemicals and acids were used in supplyingOrdnance and Chemical Warfare installa-tions with products which they regularlyrequired, and consequently the cars wereassigned to those installations for indefiniteperiods. Generally speaking, such carsmoved in shuttle services between certainpoints and their movements were coveredby blanket or standing route orders issuedby the Chief of Transportation, changedonly when traffic conditions necessitated.29

The cars designed for petroleum products,on the other hand, were operated in a largeflexible pool under the direct control of theTank Gar Branch and its field offices. Theywere routed in the manner that wouldproduce the greatest amount of service, andclose control was exercised over their opera-tion and maintenance.

About 350 petroleum cars which hadbeen carried forward from World War Ihad a capacity of 7,000 gallons each. Newpetroleum cars held 10,000 gallons. Theacid and chemical cars varied in capacityfrom 6,000 to 11,000 gallons, depending onthe commodity for which they were de-signed. The assignment of tank cars to thetransportation of the principal commodities,as of 1 July 1945, was as follows:

The mileage rate paid to the Army bythe railroads over which the tank carsmoved was uniformly 1½ cents per mileduring the early part of the war, but laterit was reduced to 1¼ cents for certain typesof cars. These rates were paid on bothloaded and empty mileage, provided thelatter did not exceed the former. During thefiscal year 1944 the mileage earnings onArmy tank cars were $1,134,489, and dur-ing the fiscal year 1945 they were $1,269,-227.30

In view of the heavy demands made onthe tank car fleet, the cars were kept movingas much of the time as possible. An effortmade to minimize the number used forintraplant purposes was aided by the addi-tion of fixed storage tanks and pipelines atthe installations, which were short on suchfacilities in the early part of the emergency.The improved utilization is evidenced by

27 Conf, author with A. L. Heimer, C of BulkLiquids Sec Mvmts Div OCT, 7 Mar 49, OCT HBTraf Contl Div Tank Cars.

28 See Memo, CofT for CofCWS, 13 Jul 43, sub:CWSX Tank Cars, OCT 531.4 N. Y.; Memo, TrafContl Div for Hanford Engineer Works, 7 Apr 44,sub: Nitric Acid Tank Cars; 2d Ind, CofT forWashington Office of Manhattan Dist, 31 Oct 44.Last two in OCT 534 Manhattan Engr Dist Han-ford Works.

29 1st Ind, C of Traf Contl Div OCT for CWSProcurement Dist N. Y., 17 Oct 42, OCT 531.4New York.

30 Annual Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, p. 56,OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts.


the fact that whereas the average daily mile-age for cars was 14.2 in 1941, it was 81.9 in1943. The average mileage fell somewhatin 1944, when increased pipeline deliveriesto the east coast resulted in many petroleumcars being taken out of high speed longhaul service, and when changes in ordnanceproduction temporarily reduced the de-mand for certain types of chemical cars.The results of the operation of the tank

car fleet during 1942, 1943, and 1944 aresummarized below:31

In its effort to obtain optimum utilizationof petroleum tank cars the Tank CarBranch of the Traffic Control Divisionworked closely with the Petroleum Admini-strator for War. On the basis of advancenotices received from PAW regarding allo-cations of petroleum products, the branchcarefully worked out its plans for the sched-uling and routing of cars in order to avoiddelays in loading and to minimize deadheadmileage.32 The chief of the branch was amember of the Tank Car Advisory Com-mittee which was appointed by the Directorof Defense Transportation in February1944 to co-ordinate the utilization of equip-ment and devise plans for getting the utmostservice out of the units available. Duringthe winter of 1944, because of a temporaryreduction in the requirements of certainOrdnance plants, the Army was able toloan about three hundred tank cars to ODTto assist in relieving the shortage of fuel oil

in the northeastern states. Army tank carswere also used to a limited extent to delivergasoline and fuel oil to Navy installations.33

Repairs to Army tank cars were of twotypes. Those required by the tanks and theirfittings were performed by contractors inshops equipped to do this specialized work.Such repairs were especially heavy duringthe fiscal year 1945, because of the con-version of 300 petroleum cars to acid carsin order to meet the growing need in thatfield, the conversion of 100 nitric acid carsto carry other acids and chemicals, and thecomplete overhauling of 165 cars which,because of age and intensive use, had deteri-orated greatly. Except in case of emergencythe Tank Car Branch designated the con-tractors to perform such work. When emer-gencies arose, the installations to which thecars were assigned or the railroads overwhich they were moving made the necessaryarrangements. Repairs to trucks, frames,

31 Data compiled from records of Tank CarSec, Freight Traf Br, Traf Contl Div, for statisticalhistory of World War II in preparation. These datavary from those given in annual rpts of Traf ContlDiv, and those published in ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Sep44, p. 63, although compiled from the same records.Average miles per day is computed on basis of allArmy-owned cars, whether in active service orundergoing repair or conversion. The Tank Car Brbecame a section of the Freight Traf Br in Oct 44.

32 Rpt, Relations Between the Traf Contl Divand Civ Agencies, 22 Jan 45, p. 44, Exhibits B, D,and E, OCT HB Traf Contl Div Rpts.

33 Memo, CofT for CG ASF, 1 Apr 43, sub:Trans of Aviation Gasoline, OCT 463.7.


brakes, and other strictly railroad featureswere performed generally by the railroadswhose inspectors discovered the need, butin some instances they were performed byArmy railroad repair shops. Expendituresfor repairs during the fiscal years 1943,1944, and 1945 were as follows:34

Army Hospital Cars

As instrumentalities of the Medical De-partment, hospital cars were under thesupervision of The Surgeon General; asrailroad equipment they were under thesupervision of the Chief of Transportation.The close co-ordination which existed be-tween The Surgeon General and the Chiefof Transportation with respect to the utiliza-tion of this equipment will be discussed inthe section of this history which deals withthe movement of patients. The present dis-cussion is concerned with the design, pro-curement, operation, and maintenance ofhospital cars.

Prior to the emergency, patients movedby rail had been accommodated in regularPullman cars. As the Army expanded, how-ever, it was foreseen that special types ofcars would be needed for the more seriouslyill and that the government would have toprovide these cars since they were neededsolely for military purposes. Accordingly,The Surgeon General obtained approval forthe procurement of two unit cars in 1940and the procurement of four ward cars in

1941.35 The unit car had a kitchen capableof providing food for 500 patients, a surgi-cal operating room, and staff accommoda-tions, but no beds for patients. The wardcar contained 32 beds in two tiers, and hadstraight aisles and wide side doors to facili-tate the handling of litter patients. Bothunit and ward cars were obtained by con-verting existing Pullman sleepers. TheQuartermaster General's Commercial Traf-fic Branch collaborated with The SurgeonGeneral in planning the conversions andarranged with the Pullman Company forthe sale and alteration of the cars.36 TheSurgeon General intended that one unit carand two ward cars should be used witheach hospital train, together with suchPullman cars as might be required.

After Pearl Harbor it was evident thatmore hospital cars would be needed. Thetwo unit cars had not proved satisfactoryto The Surgeon General, since their kitchenfacilities were excessive except on trainscarrying large numbers of patients, andthere was little need for the surgical facili-ties. Consequently, no more such cars wereordered and the two which had been pro-cured in 1940 eventually were used as pilotmodels in developing an improved type. InMarch 1942 orders were placed for 12 addi-tional ward cars and 6 ward dressing cars,the latter differing from the former mainlyin that a dressing table was added in spacemade available by the omission of twobeds.37 These cars, obtained by converting

34 Rpt, Traf Contl Div, FY 1945, pp. 9, 10, OCTHB Traf Contl Div Rpts.

35 Memo, SG for TAG, 6 May 40, sub: HospUnit Car; DF, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 31 May 41,sub: Hosp Ward Cars; DF, ACofS G-4 for TAG, 17Jul 41, sub: Provision of Hosp Ward Cars. All inAG 453 (5-6-40) (2).

36 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 274-76.37 Ltr, Pullman Co to SGO, 26 Jan 42, SGO

453.1. Floor plans were prepared by Pullman Coin consultation with SG.


Pullman sleepers, were delivered to theArmy in the summer of 1942. The SurgeonGeneral planned to use a unit car or a warddressing car with 2 ward cars in each train,thus providing for 8 trains.38

In view of anticipated heavy casualtiesin the North African campaign the 24 hos-pital cars in service when the invasion wasplanned obviously were inadequate, andmeasures were initiated in July 1942 to in-crease the fleet.39 The Corps of Engineers,which at that time was responsible for rail-way equipment design and procurement,prepared plans for an "ambulance car,"which, in addition to accommodations forstaff personnel and 30 patients in three-tierbeds, had messing and hospital facilities.The Surgeon General at once registeredobjection, contending that the utilization ofspace in the proposed car was uneconomi-cal, that it required too much personnel,that three-tier beds were undesirable, andthat kitchen facilities were not required ineach car. He considered the types of hospitalcars already in use the more practical.40

The Chief of Transportation, viewing thematter from a railway operating standpoint,liked the proposed ambulance car, since itwas self-contained and could be used singlyor in full hospital trains.41 The Command-ing General, Army Service Forces, also fav-ored the new type of car. The Surgeon Gen-eral held to his position, however, and latein November the Chief of Transportation,

who earlier in that month had taken overfrom the Chief of Engineers the responsibil-ity for design and procurement of railequipment, was directed to obtain 96 wardand ward dressing cars by the conversionprocess.42 This provided for a total of 120Army hospital cars. Since The SurgeonGeneral planned to use one ward dressingcar and two ward cars with each train, therewere sufficient hospital cars for 40 hospitaltrains.

While this increment of the hospital carfleet was under consideration, the Chief ofTransportation proposed that the conver-sions be made on lounge cars and otherluxury types, instead of withdrawing addi-tional sleepers from regular services wherethey were sorely needed.43 Since a broadprogram for the conversion of so-called lux-ury cars to standard sleepers was alreadyunder way it was not a simple matter to find96 that could be used for hospital cars, butthe task was eventually accomplished.44 TheChief of Transportation also suggested thatbaggage cars and superior type boxcars,such as those designed for transporting auto-mobiles, might be improved and equippedto meet the requirements of The SurgeonGeneral. The latter did not favor this pro-posal, however, unless it should eventuatethat no other cars were available.45

The decision not to build more unit carsmeant that meals on hospital trains wouldhave to be provided from the carriers' regu-lar dining cars, or from baggage cars con-

38 Ltr, SGO to Development Br RequirementsDiv SOS, 10 May 42, SGO 453.1.

39 Memo, ACofS for Opns SOS for CofEngrs, 23Jul 42, sub: Proposed Rail Ambulance Car; 2dInd, CofEngrs for CG SOS, 24 Aug 42; 3d Ind,SG for CG SOS, 29 Aug 42. All in SGO 322.2-5.

40 Rpt of Conf in SGO, 9 Oct 42, sub: Adequacyof Hosp Train Equip, SGO 453.1.

41 Memo, CofT for ACofS for Opns SOS, 30 Oct42, sub: Rail Ambulance Car, OCT 531.4 (Hos-pital).

42 Memo, ACofS SOS for CofT, 24 Nov 42, sub:Ward Cars (Medical), OCT 531.4 (Hospital).

43 Ltr, CofT to C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR, 10Oct 42, OCT 531.4 Hosp Train; Memo, C ofMvmts Div OCT for CofT, 29 Oct 42, sub: RailHosp Trains, OCT 531.4 (Hospital).

44 Memo, CofT for C. H. Buford Vice Pres AAR,17 Dec 42, OCT 531.4 (Hospital).

45 Rpt of Conf in SGO, 9 Oct 42, sub: Adequacyof Hosp Train Equip, pars. 6 and 8, SGO 453.1.


verted to kitchen cars. The converted bag-gage cars did not prove satisfactory from asanitary standpoint, however, and even thefood served from regular dining cars didnot meet The Surgeon General's standards.Furthermore, dining cars operated by therailroads were closed between meal hoursand were likely to be cut out of hospitaltrains overnight.46 In July 1943 it was there-fore decided to construct 40 hospital kitchencars, using the basic boxcar design whichwas being used in the construction of 400troop kitchen cars, with improvements es-sential to the proper feeding of patients.47

The contract for the construction of thesecars was let by the Chief of Transportationin August and delivery began early in 1944.The plan then was to use one kitchen carand three ward or ward dressing cars ineach hospital train.

The cars so far provided were suitableprimarily for service in hospital trains whereward cars could be complemented withkitchen or dining cars. In the fall of 1943The Surgeon General found that there wasneed for self-contained hospital cars whichcould be used independently in handlingsmall movements.48 The Chief of Trans-portation and The Surgeon General thendeveloped a design which included beds for36 patients in tiers of three, dressing table,kitchen facilities, and staff quarters. InMarch 1944 The Surgeon General recom-mended that 105 of this new type unit carbe procured and that buffet kitchens be

installed in the hospital cars already inservice.49 The Chief of Transportation rec-ommended that 200 new cars be authorized,in view of the prospective great increase inthe movement of patients, but Army Serv-ice Forces headquarters followed The Sur-geon General's program and sanctionedonly 100, together with the installation ofkitchens in the existing cars.50 Although ithad been proposed that the additional carsbe obtained by conversion, existing pass-enger equipment was so urgently needed forregular and troop traffic that orders wereplaced for entirely new cars.

The Chief of Transportation's estimateof the future need was borne out by ex-perience, and early in January 1945 a fur-ther order for 100 new type unit cars wasapproved. Contracts were placed immedi-ately, with the instruction that they be givenspecial attention in order to obtain quickestpossible delivery.51 Soon thereafter The Sur-geon General informed the Chief of Trans-portation that 20 more kitchen cars wouldbe required.52 The troop kitchen cars pro-cured to fill this order were delivered duringFebruary and March. Since the need wasso urgent, they were placed in service with-out undergoing as extensive conversion as

46 Memo, SG for CofT, 7 May 43, sub: KitchenCars for Hosp Trains; Memo, Lt Col Edwin N.Berry for CG 2d SvC, 22 May 43, sub: Evacuationof Patients from Halifax; 4th Ind, 2d SvC to CGASF, 5 Jun 43. All in SGO 453.1.

47 Memo, SG for CofT, 29 Jul 43, sub: KitchenCars, SGO 453.1.

48 Memo, SG for CofT, 15 Oct 43, sub: UnitCar, New Type, OCT 531.4 Hosp Train.

49 Memo, SG for CG ASF, 30 Mar 44, OCT453.9 Hosp Cars. SG's opposition to three-tier bedswas relaxed, although it was realized that upperberths could not be used for many patients. Theyfrequently were used by medical staff members.

50 2d Ind to CG ASF, 10 Apr 44, OCT 453.9Hosp Cars; 4th Ind, CG ASF for CofT, 24 Apr44, OCT 453.9 Hosp Cars; Memo, Rail Div OCTfor Dir of Supply OCT, 27 Apr 44, OCT 531.4Hosp Train.

51 Memo, Exec for Supply OCT for C of Pro-curement Div OCT, 4 Jan 45; Memo, C of ProdExpediting Stf for Deputy Dir of Supply OCT, 5Jan 45. Both in OCT 453.9 Hosp Cars.

52 Memo, 22 Jan 45, sub: Med Kitchen Cars; 2dInd, SG for CofT, 26 Mar 45. Both in SGO 453.

ARMY HOSPITAL CAR. Exterior and interior views of a new type self-containedunit hospital car, 200 of which were built during the war.


that previously applied to the hospitalkitchen cars.

Thus, at the close of the emergency, theArmy had 120 ward and ward dressingcars with buffet kitchens, 200 new typeself-contained unit cars, and 60 hospitalkitchen cars—a total of 380 cars.53 Duringthe latter part of the war all ward, warddressing, and unit cars were air-conditioned.The first 24, which were procured duringthe period 1940-42, did not have air-conditioning equipment initially, but it wasinstalled later.54

In addition to the equipment mentionedabove, 10 lightweight hospital cars designedfor service in Europe were operated for atime in the zone of interior. The designs forthese cars had been developed by the Corpsof Engineers during 1942 when the pro-curement of railroad equipment was its re-sponsibility.55 Early in 1943, on request ofThe Surgeon General, the Chief of Trans-portation included 325 such cars in theArmy supply program for that year and 105in the program for 1944. With a view tosaving shipping space, however, it wasdecided that hospital trains for use inEurope would be procured in the UnitedKingdom.56 Accordingly, procurement inthe United States was limited to one experi-

mental train, consisting of one hospitalkitchen-dining car, one officer personnel car,one orderly car, one utility car, and six wardcars. This equipment was standard gauge,but because of its light construction it wasnot altogether suitable for use on Americanrailroads. After being exhibited at manypoints across the continent, the train servedbriefly in the California-Arizona maneuverarea and in the Third and Fourth ServiceCommands. It was shipped to France inOctober 1944.57

It was the policy of the Services of Supply,and later of the Army Service Forces, thathospital cars should be attached to theservice commands, but the Chief of Trans-portation had extensive responsibilities inconnection with their operation.58 He as-signed and reassigned the cars to the respec-tive service commands in accordance withadvice from The Surgeon General regard-ing prospective movements of patients. Theservice commands staffed, supplied, andcleaned the cars while they were in theirpossession. The service commands allocatedthe cars to movements originating withintheir respective areas, except when themovements originated at ports of embarka-tion, in which case the port commanderscalled on the service commands for thenumber of cars needed. The Chief of Trans-portation made all arrangements with therailroads relating to the movement of Armyhospital cars over their lines and for repairs

53 Memo, Med Regulating Off for Dir Hosp DivSGO, 24 Oct 45, sub: Hosp Car Equip, SGO 453;Statistical Table, Rail Div OCT, sub: Hosp Carsin Interchange Sv, OCT HB Rail Div Hosp Cars,gives contract numbers of all cars, contractors,initial and final costs.

54 Memo, CofT for CG's of SvC's, 10 Feb 43,sub: Air Conditioning of Hosp Cars, OCT 531.4Hampton Roads.

55 Memo, Engr Bd for CofT, 30 Nov 42; Memo,CofT for SG, 8 Jul 43. Both in OCT 531.4 HospTrain.

56 Memo, C of Rail Div OCT for ACofT forSupply OCT, 28 Jun 43, sub: Trans Shortages,OCT 531.4 (Hospital).

57 Rpts, Rail Div, FY 1944, p. 25; FY 1945, p.21. Both in OCT HB Rail Div Rpts.

58 Memo, ACofS for Opns SOS for CG's ofSvC's, CofT, and SG, 18 Aug 42, sub: Locationand Contl of Hosp Trains, OCT 322.15; Pamphlet,ACofS for Opns SOS, sub: Military Hospitaliza-tion and Evacuation Opns, pars. 2 and 3, 15 Sep42, OCT HB Rail Div Hosp Cars; WD Cir 316,6 Dec 43, pars. 9 and 10, sub: Hospitalization andEvacuation of Pers.


and other services to be performed while thecars were en route.

Initially, because of the absence of ex-plicit directives, the Chief of Transporta-tion, The Surgeon General, and the servicecommands were not wholly clear as to theirrespective responsibilities in connection withthe maintenance of hospital cars. The Chiefof Transportation, however, exercised closesupervision over the maintenance of thecars as railroad equipment from the begin-ning, and in May 1943 he was made solelyresponsible for maintenance except as re-gards medical equipment, which was theresponsibility of The Surgeon General.59 Thisarrangement was necessary to insure thathospital cars, which moved throughout thenation, conformed to the operating stand-ards of the rail lines and received uniformtreatment wherever they were. In additionto supervising the maintenance work per-formed in shops of the service commands,the Chief of Transportation's Rail Divisionutilized its contacts with the railroad in-dustry to obtain spare parts that were inshort supply, arranged for repairs to be per-formed at Army or other railroad shopswhen this would expedite the return of thecars to service, and arranged with the rail-roads that any repairs found necessary whilethe cars were in their possession would beperformed as promptly as possible for theaccount of the Army.60 Similarly, the Chiefof Transportation arranged for the railroadsto furnish supplies for which need developedwhile the cars were away from their servicecommand bases.

Soon after the Services of Supply an-

nounced that hospital cars would be at-tached to the service commands, the opinionwas put forward that they should be at-tached to the ports of embarkation instead.General Wylie, Assistant Chief of Trans-portation for Operations, did not concurin that view.61 He pointed out that whilehospital cars would be used extensively inthe evacuation of patients from the ports, alarge part of their employment would be inconnection with movements from one gen-eral hospital to another. He considered theservice commanders in the better position toprovide medical personnel for hospitaltrains, since they could draw on the generalhospitals which were under their control. Inhis opinion it would be unwise to add tothe already broad responsibilities of the portcommanders by making them responsiblefor the evacuation of patients by train. TheChief of Transportation agreed, and recom-mended that no change be made in the SOSplan in this respect.62

The movement of hospital cars and hospi-tal kitchen cars over the commercial raillines was governed by an agreement be-tween the carriers and the Army, concludedin July 1943.63 Extensive negotiations pre-ceded the Army's approval of this agree-ment, and the railroads' tender as finallyaccepted was not satisfactory to the Chief ofTransportation insofar as it related to thehospital cars.64 He was unsuccessful, how-

59 Memo, CG ASF for CofT and SG, 13 May 43,sub: Ward Cars and Med Equip Therefor; Memo,Dir of Opns ASF for SG and CofT, 20 May 43,sub: Ward Cars. Both in SGO 453.1.

60 Rpt, Rail Div, FY 1945, p. 21, OCT HB RailDiv Rpts.

61 Memo for CofT, 22 Dec 42, OCT 531.4 Hosp.Train.

62 Memo, CofT for C of Adm Svs SOS, 15 Jan43, OCT 531.4 Hosp. Train.

63 Ltr, Interterritorial Mil Com to CofT andcorresponding officers of other armed forces, 5 Apr43; Ltr, DC of Traf Contl Div OCT to IMG, 31Jul 43. Both in OCT 531.4 Hosp Train.

64 Ltr, DC of Traf Contl Div OCT to W. C.Kendall, Chm Car Sv Div AAR, 31 Jul 43, OCT080 AAR; Ltr, CofT to J. J. Pelley Pres AAR, 10May 45, OCT 531.4 Hosp Train.


ever, in his efforts to induce the railroadseither to pay the government a mileageallowance on these cars or to lower thecharges for military patients transported inthem. Toward the end of the war the rail-roads agreed to absorb, retroactively, cer-tain of the costs of servicing the cars whilethey were en route.65

Railroad Repair Shops

When the war began the Army was op-erating two shops for the performance ofheavy maintenance on its railroad equip-ment. Two such shops were added duringthe hostilities. Peacetime experience haddemonstrated that the overhauling of loco-motives and locomotive cranes could beaccomplished "in a more satisfactory andeconomical manner" by the Army itselfthan at shops operated by the locomotivebuilders or the common carriers.66 Duringthe war period it was found advantageousto have shops which handled Army workexclusively, since priorities at such shopswere entirely under Army control, and itwas difficult to get work performed promptlyat commercial shops because of their heavybacklog and the shortage of skilled personnel.

Prior to 1937 railroad repair shops hadbeen operated at Fort Benning, Ga.,. aninfantry post, and Fort Monroe, Va., acoast artillery station. These shops wereunder the direct control of the postcommanders, but the technical aspects oftheir work were supervised by The Quarter-

master General's Commercial Traf f icBranch.67 That branch controlled the fundsand decided when and where repair workwas to be done. Early in 1937 the Armydecided to transfer the Fort Monroe shopto the Holabird Quartermaster Depot,Baltimore, and make that the main installa-tion for railroad repairs. Several factors con-tributed to the decision. Holabird was nearlarge commercial railroad shops, whichwould facilitate the procurement of spareparts and technical personnel; it was rela-tively near the large eastern military postswhich employed a considerable part of theArmy's railroad equipment; it was a quarter-master post, and The Quartermaster Gen-eral saw advantages in having control ofthe housing, equipment, and operation ofthe shop, in addition to supervision of thework it performed. The shop at Fort Ben-ning was continued on a limited basis.

During 1940 and 1941, with the growthof the military establishment and the addi-tion of many units of utility railroad equip-ment, the shops at Holabird and Benningtook on added importance and requiredconsiderable expansion. In March 1942they came under the supervision of theChief of Transportation, who at that timesucceeded to the transportation responsibili-ties of The Quartermaster General.68 Earlyin 1944, in view of the large amount ofArmy railroad equipment employed in thearea, the railroad repair shop at the OgdenArsenal, Utah, which had been operated bythe Ordnance Department, was placedunder the supervision of the Chief of Trans-portation. Effective 1 June 1944, a shopof the New York Central Railroad atBucyrus, Ohio, which had been used by the

65 Ltrs, C of Rail Div OCT to C. H. BufordVice Pres AAR, 16 and 30 May 45, OCT 080AAR; Ltr, AAR to C of Rail Div, 30 Jun 45, OCTHB Rail Div Hosp Cars.

66 Memo, Middleton for C of Trans Div OQMG,2 Nov 36, sub: Transfer of Locomotive Shops, QM635 T-R (Holabird), OCT HB Zones Gen RRRepair Shops.

67 OCT HB Monograph 6, pp. 47-48.68 Rpt, Rail Div OCT, FY 1943, p. 12, OCT HB

Rail Div Rpts; AR 55-105, par. 2h, 29 Dec 42.


Fifth Service Command under contract forthe training of shop battalions for the Mili-tary Railway Service, was transferred to theChief of Transportation, to be operated forthe dual purpose of repairing Army railroadequipment and training railway troops.69

Just as The Quartermaster General hadfound it advantageous to control the facili-ties and personnel of the railroad repairshops rather than have them under thecontrol of other services, so the Chief ofTransportation concluded that divided re-sponsibility was not a good arrangement. Arepresentative of the Director of Supply,Army Service Forces, who inspected theshops reported that they were not beingutilized to capacity and recommended thatthey be placed under the sole direction ofthe Chief of Transportation, who thenwould be in a position to work out ascheduling plan that would assure maxi-mum results.70 This was done, effective 1May 1944. The Chief of Transportationbecame a tenant of the stations where theshops were located. To avoid duplication ofpersonnel and effort, the station com-manders retained responsibility for adminis-trative functions which were common tothe stations as a whole, including generalhousekeeping. Thenceforward the Chief ofTransportation issued all instructions neces-sary to the operation of the shops, as wellas those relating to the maintenance and re-pair of equipment. The designation of thefacilities then was changed from Army rail-road repair shops to Transportation Corpsrailroad repair shops.

Although the Rail Division in Washing-

ton exercised broad supervision over thepolicies and procedures affecting the rail-road repair shops, direct control of theirorganization and operation was assigned tothe zone transportation officers in whoseterritories they were located.71 The staff ofeach zone included a railroad officer anda master mechanic, who gave these matterstheir special attention. In addition to per-forming third, fourth, and fifth echelon(heavy) maintenance on Army-owned rail-road equipment employed within a radiusof 400 miles, the shops were expected toperform first and second echelon (light)maintenance for equipment domiciled atthe stations where they were located. Theywere under the supervision of commissionedofficers, but the operating personnel wascivilian, except at Bucyrus where use wasmade of enlisted men who were undergoingtraining there.

Installations operating railroad equip-ment were expected to perform heavy main-tenance to the extent of their capacity.72

Few of them, however, had the facilities andpersonnel necessary for such work, and itremained for the Chief of Transportationto determine whether the equipment wouldbe sent to Transportation Corps repairshops or commercial shops. The zone trans-portation officers submitted recommenda-tions in this regard, and decisions weremade by the Rail Division which controlledthe funds. The location of the equipmentand the cost of deadheading it to a distantArmy shop were important considerations indetermining where the repairs would bemade. Although the limited capacity of theArmy shops necessitated the allocation ofsome jobs to commercial shops, by virtue of

69 ASF Cir 133, Sec. III, 10 May 44.70 Memo, CofT for 3d, 4th, and 5th ZTO's, 10

Feb 44, sub: Adm of RR Repair Shops, OCT 635;Memo, Dir of Supply ASF for TAG, 8 Apr 44, AG635 (8 Apr 44) ( 1 ) ; ASF Cir 100, Sec. III, 12Apr 44.

71 TC Cir 5-13, 28 Apr 44, sub: Opn of ArmyRR Repair Shops.

72 WD Cir 447, Sec. VII-3, 24 Nov 44.


careful scheduling they were able to handlethe larger part of the Army's repair workoriginating within an economical radius.

The most important task of the Trans-portation Corps shops was the performanceof heavy repairs on locomotives and loco-motive cranes. They also rehabilitatedvarious types of cars which were used onthe utility railroads. Although during theearly part of the war tank cars frequentlywere sent to the Army shops for the repairof frames, trucks, and other railroadfeatures, this type of equipment was laterallocated consistently to commercial shops.Hospital cars also were assigned to the rail-roads or to the car builders for heavy re-pairs. During the fiscal year 1945 the Trans-portation Corps shops repaired 239 units ofequipment, at a total cost for labor andmaterials of $376,160.73

In order to get better control of stocksand reduce inventories, the four railroadrepair shops were designated as parentstations for the distribution of spare partsand maintenance supplies.74 Army installa-tions throughout the continental UnitedStates were required to requisition suchmatériel from the shops to which they wereassigned as "satellites." The parent stationsestablished stock levels, originally deter-mined by the zone master mechanics andlater based on experience. The satellite sta-tions were directed to order replacementparts as they were needed for immediate useor for the replenishment of the model stockswhich accompanied each locomotive. Othersupplies were to be requisitioned accordingto allowances established by the Chief ofTransportation, or to meet actual needs

when the allowances proved inadequate.Local purchases were permissible only incases of emergency, and then only with theapproval of the zone master mechanics.

Late in 1944 a mobile repair unit wasattached to the Holabird shop. Although itimmediately proved its value, requisitionsfor additional units were not promptlyallowed and the other shops did not acquirethem until after V-J Day.75 The mobileunits were small but well-equipped machineshops mounted on trucks. Each had anormal crew of six men. Their justificationlay in the fact that frequently it was cheaperto dispatch a mobile unit to the installationwhere repairs were needed than to dead-head the locomotive or car to the parentshop and back again. This procedure alsorelieved the overburdened rail lines of non-productive traffic. The mobile shops werefound especially valuable in the mainte-nance of diesel locomotives assigned to postswhich lacked the facilities or the experi-enced personnel for this work.

The Holabird repair shop, in additionto the work outlined above, was used forthe inspection and repair of railroad equip-ment returned from overseas. Because of itslocation at the seaboard, this shop was wellsuited for the purpose. Late in 1944 a ship-ment of knocked-down cars, returned fromEurope because of damage, was inspectedat the Holabird shop prior to being for-warded to the manufacturers for rehabilita-tion.76 After the war, locomotives shippedback from the Persian Gulf Command andthe European theater were inspected atHolabird, and some of the necessary recon-

73 For details of repairs accomplished see annualreports of Rail Div FY 1943, 1944, 1945, OCT HBRail Div Rpts.

74 WD Cir 447, Sec VII-6, 24 Nov 44.

75 Rpt, Rail Div, FY 1945, incl 7, OCT HB RailDiv Rpts; Memo, CofMRS Div OCT for ACofT,25 Jul 46, sub: Opn of RR Repair Shops, OCT HBWylie Rail Trans.

76 Rpt, 3d TZ, 4th Quarter 1944, OCT HB 3dZone.


ditioning was done there. Most of theselocomotives were reshipped to Korea andAlaska.

Motor Buses for Local Transportation

Early in the war it was foreseen that theprovision of adequate local transportation tomeet the needs of workers at Army installa-tions and war plants would become a seriousproblem. It was anticipated that shortages ofgasoline, tires, and replacement parts wouldprevent the daily operation of many privateautomobiles on which a large percentageof industrial workers relied.77 The localpassenger services of the railroads were ex-pected to undergo curtailment rather thanexpansion, because of the need for theirequipment in intercity service. It was un-certain to what extent additional com-mercial motor bus service could be pro-vided, because of the scarcity of equipmentand personnel. With these considerations inmind, the Director of Defense Transporta-tion established a Division of Local Trans-port in February 1942 and to assist the newdivision formed an advisory committee,which included representatives of the Army,the Navy, and other federal agencies.78

The Army soon encountered this problemat some of its more isolated posts, camps,and stations where the public transporta-tion services were inadequate. The move-ment of military personnel to and from suchinstallations was wastefully slow, and civil-

ian workers were tempted to seek new jobsif they were required to spend long periodsen route each morning and evening. Inorder to have a complete and accuratepicture of the situation, corps area com-manders were directed in March 1942 tohave surveys made at all installationsaffected and to submit detailed reports re-garding each case.79 The task of analyzingthese reports was assigned to the Chief ofTransportation. His Highway Divisionengaged a number of experts for the work,and soon established a Transportation ofPersons Branch to deal with all aspects ofthe problem. By 20 June 1942 reportscovering 373 installations had been con-sidered, and 41 posts had been visited inorder to deal with conditions requiringimmediate correction.80 The solution mostpromptly available was to work out a betterutilization of equipment already in servicein the respective localities, but it was fore-seen that the need for additional equip-ment was imminent. The chiefs of the tech-nical services were requested to bring suchproblems to the attention of the Chief ofTransportation as early as possible, inorder that action might be taken before thesituation became critical.81

Prompt steps were taken by the Chief ofTransportation to build up a pool of Army-owned buses to meet what was expected todevelop into a heavy demand from Armyinstallations. Since the discontinuance ofautomobile production had left a large part

77 A test check late in 1942 covering 94 plantsin 10 states with 140,000 employees, showed that73 percent traveled to and from work in privateautomobiles. Ltr, Chm Hwy Traf Advisory Comto SW, 27 Jan 43, OCT 510 Furnishing Trans toGovt and Other Pers.

78 Ltr, ODT to Col Gross, 9 Feb 42, and Reply,10 Feb 42, OCT 000.900 Def Trans.

79 Ltr, CG SOS for corps areas, 18 Mar 42, sub:Survey of Trans Facilities, OCT 510 FurnishingTrans.

80 Rpt, Hwy Div, 1 Jul 41 to 20 Jun 42, pp. 3-4,OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.

81 Memo, C of Hwy Div OCT for C's of TechSvs, 1 Jul 42, sub: Trans Facilities for Def Work-ers, OCT 510 Furnishing Trans.


of the fleet of two-deck auto haulers withoutimmediate employment, the Highway Divi-sion developed a plan for the conversion ofthese vehicles into passenger carriers and inJune 1942 obtained authority for the pro-curement of 1,500 for that purpose.82 Con-currently the Services of Supply announceda policy to govern the utilization of thisequipment. The buses were not to be usedexclusively for intrapost service. They wereto be provided only when existing trans-portation facilities were inadequate andcould not be augmented by other means.Allocations were to be made by the Chiefof Transportation only after the need hadbeen established by a field survey. In viewof the shortage of construction materials,new buses were not to be ordered until ithad been clearly determined that the 1,500converted vehicles would not meet the re-quirements.

While the impact of this problem was feltfirst at Army posts and contractor-operatedplants, similar conditions existed at manyprivate plants which were engaged in themanufacture of war matériel. Although theArmy had no authority to provide buses insuch cases, the Chief of Transportation con-sidered the problem within this field of in-terest. The first step in meeting it, his high-way experts believed, was to stop the waste-ful use of existing resources, particularlytires, through unnecessary driving of privateautomobiles. They were of the opinion thatthe Office of Defense Transportation hadthe necessary authority, but this agencyshowed no disposition to undertake the con-

trol of private driving.83 Accordingly, amemorandum for the President was drafted,which emphasized the importance of con-serving tires, advocated nation-wide gaso-line rationing as the best means of accom-plishing that result, and proposed that theOffice of Defense Transportation assumethe task.84 The memorandum was notsigned, however, and General Somervell re-turned it to General Gross with the notationthat the matter was "being handled other-wise." Emergency gasoline rationing hadbeen introduced in seventeen eastern stateson 15 May because of the reduction of gaso-line stocks caused by submarine actionagainst coastwise tankers, and a permanentcoupon system was placed in effect in thatarea by the Office of Price Administrationon 22 July; nation-wide rationing with theavowed purpose of conserving rubber didnot begin until December 1942.85

The Chief of Transportation attacked theproblem also from the standpoint of rubberoutput. Regardless of how well tire con-servation might be practiced, replacementswould be needed. There were many otherdemands for synthetic rubber, and Col.Frederick C. Horner, chief of the HighwayDivision, lost no opportunity to keep thetransportation need clearly before the au-thorities. The unhappy situation which hadexisted in the field of synthetic rubber pro-duction, because of competing demands forbasic materials and the absence of clearly

82 Memo, CG SOS for QMG, 15 Jun 42, sub:Purchase and Conversion of Auto Truck Carriers;Memos, DCofS for Requirements and ResourcesSOS for CG SOS, 27 Jun 42, and for CofT, 29Jun 42, sub: WD Policy for Purchase of Buses. Allin OCT 451.1 Buses.

83 EO 9156, 2 May 42, expressly directed ODTto include within its authority and responsibility"all rubber-borne transportation facilities, includ-ing passenger cars . . . ."

84 Memo, Gross for Somervell, 9 Jul 42, sub:Trans of War Plant Employees, with draft ofMemo, SW for the President; Pencil Memo inreply, Somervell for Gross. Both in OCT 510Furnishing Trans.

85 2d and 5th Quarterly Rpts, OPA. Rationingof new tires had begun in December 1941.


defined responsibilities, led to the appoint-ment by the President of the Rubber Sur-vey Committee, under the chairmanship ofBernard M. Baruch, on 6 August 1942.Colonel Horner immediately placed thetransportation aspects of the rubber prob-lem before that committee.86 The supportof the Army and Navy Munitions Boardwas sought in an effort to make sure thatthe tire problem was fully understood in itsrelationship to the manufacture of muni-tions.87 The committee, it may be noted, ina report rendered on 10 September 1942,took generous cognizance of the transporta-tion need in relation to both rubber con-servation and new production. On 17 Sep-tember, in accordance with a Presidentialdirective, the chairman of the War Pro-duction Board appointed Mr. William M.Jeffers to serve as Rubber Director, andbroad attack on the problem of syntheticrubber output was begun.88

Concurrently the Chief of Transporta-tion inaugurated a plan to enlist the assist-ance of private plant operators in the tireconservation project. In August 1942, inorder to obtain experience on which to basea permanent arrangement, the Chief ofOrdnance was requested, through Servicesof Supply headquarters, to select fifty manu-facturers and The Quartermaster Generalto select twenty-five, at whose plants theplan would be tested.89 Under the plan each

manufacturer first surveyed all conditionsaffecting the transportation of employees toand from his establishment. From the datadeveloped, the manufacturer and a rep-resentative of the Army prepared a programto facilitate pool riding, to assist employeesin obtaining gasoline, tire recaps, and otherservices, and to encourage the economicaluse of automobiles by any other means.This program then was incorporated in acontract under which the manufactureragreed to establish a transportation depart-ment to administer the program and theArmy agreed to pay its pro rata share ofthe cost of the survey and the operation ofthe plan, based on the distribution of themanufacturer's business between the WarDepartment and others.90 The trial provedsatisfactory, and early in 1943 the plan waselaborated and made available on a volun-tary basis to all private contractors who hadone hundred or more employees and whomanufactured matériel for the Army Serv-ice Forces and the Army Air Forces.91

During the fall of 1942 small numbers ofused buses which became available fromvarious sources were acquired by the Armyto supplement the 1,500 auto haulers al-ready authorized. A study of future require-ments, however, indicated that a consider-able expansion of the bus pool would benecessary in order to meet the needs of WarDepartment installations for local trans-portation. The Chief of Transportationtherefore recommended that approval be

86 Memo, Somervell for USW, 17 Aug 42, OCT510 Furnishing Trans.

87 Memo, USW for Chm ANMB, 17 Aug 42,sub: Highway Trans and the Rubber Problem,OCT 510 Furnishing Trans.

88 Office of Rubber Director, Prog Rpt 1, 30 Sep42.

89 Memo, CG SOS for CofOrd and QMG, 22Aug 42, sub: Trans of Employees to and from WarPlants, Incl 3a in Documentation of Operationsand Liaison Activities with Federal Agencies Re-lated to the Transportation of Persons, OCT HBHwy Div Trans of Persons.

90 ODT and WPB approved of the plan andrecommended that it be tried also by Navy andMaritime Commission. See Memo, DCofT forCofT, 23 Sep 42, OCT 510 Furnishing Trans.

91 Rpt, Hwy Div, FY 1943, p. 3, OCT HB HwyDiv Rpts; Memo, CG SOS for C's of Supply Svs,16 Dec 42, sub: Trans of Employees, OCT 510Furnishing Trans; ASF Memo, S5-84-43, 7 May43, sub: Ride Sharing Insurance Covering Transof Employees to and from War Plants.


given for the procurement, as the needmight arise, of used and new equipment toprovide 4,000 additional buses.92 The com-manding general of the Services of Supplyauthorized the Ordnance Department toprocure this equipment, upon indication bythe Chief of Transportation that the needexisted. Provision of funds for the purchaseand conversion of this equipment was anOrdnance responsibility; the Chief ofTransportation provided the operatingfunds.

The War Department had no authorityto incur expense in providing local trans-portation for civilian workers at private warplants, and its authority to incur expense inconnection with the transportation of mili-tary personnel and civilian employees be-tween their homes and Army installationswas in doubt.93 Consequently the War De-partment took active interest in a bill, pro-posed by the Navy for introduction in theUnited States Senate, which expresslygranted such authority.94 This bill waspassed by Congress and approved by thePresident, 1 December 1942. It authorizedthe Secretary of War, the Secretary of theNavy, and the Chairman of the MaritimeCommission to provide means of transpor-tation for persons employed by such agen-cies or by private plants engaged in themanufacture of war matériel, when suchaction was considered necessary in the

prosecution of the war. Equipment for thispurpose might be leased or chartered toprivate or public carriers, to be operatedunder terms prescribed by the federalagency concerned. In each instance a de-termination of the Office of Defense Trans-portation was required, to the effect thatthe existing facilities were not and couldnot be rendered adequate by other means.Each agency was required to make a re-port to Congress annually, summarizing theoperations undertaken in accordance withthe law.95

In addition to the powers conferred uponit by the Act of 1 December 1942, the au-thority of the Office of Defense Transporta-tion in connection with local passengertransportation was broadened by an execu-tive order issued early in January 1943.96

This order designated ODT as the agencyto advise and assist federal departments andagencies, state and local governments, andprivate organizations in surveying the needfor and planning the provision of trans-portation for the movement of personnel toand from war plants and establishments.ODT was also given authority to reviewall contracts or arrangements made by fed-eral departments or other agencies, exceptcommon carriers, for the purchase, lease,requisition, or use of new or used local pass-enger transportation equipment.97 An ODTgeneral order then was issued to implementthe act and the executive order, which fullyoutlined the authority of that agency andthe procedures to be followed in providing

92 Memos, CofT for CofS SOS, 1 Sep 42 and 2Nov 42, sub: Acquisition of Buses, Trucks, andPassenger Cars; Memo, CofS SOS for CG SOS, 5Nov 42, with latter's endorsed approval; WD MemoW55-10-42, 10 Dec 42, sub: Approval of Requestsfor and Allocations of Buses. All in OCT 451.1Buses.

93 Memo, Legal and Fiscal Div OCT for HwyDiv, 20 Sep 42, OCT 510 Furnishing Trans; seealso WD Cir 80, par. 2, 20 Mar 43.

94 S 2740, 27 Aug 42; Ltrs, SW to Dir Bureauof the Budget, 23 Jul 42 and 27 Nov 42, OCT 510Furnishing Trans; PL 779, 77th Cong.

95 See WD Rpts for 1943, 1944, 1945, OCT HBHwy Div Trans of Persons. Rpts deal only withClass A operations, to be denned later.

96 EO 9294, 4 Jan 43.97 Equipment required for the movement of mili-

tary and naval personnel when on maneuvers, ontrips made under orders, or on other special opera-tions necessary for the prosecution of the war wasexempted from this order.


federal-controlled transportation equipmentfor local passenger services.98

The War Department established itsbasic procedures under the act and theODT order in two directives.99 Four gen-eral situations were recognized, in whichtransportation aid might be furnished: (1)when only a shortage of equipment was in-volved transportation might be furnishedby the lease or charter of Army-controlledequipment to public or private carriers, tothe Army exchange, or to other persons orconcerns capable of rendering the requiredservice; (2) when there was adequateequipment but the local conditions necessi-tated some form of government assistance,this assistance might be furnished by agree-ment with a public or private carrier; (3)when both a shortage of equipment and un-favorable local conditions were involved,either or both of the above methods of assist-ance might be applied; (4) when the abovearrangements could not be made satisfac-torily, direct government operation of trans-portation equipment might be introduced.Two general classes of service were recog-nized: Class A, to provide transportationbetween employees' homes and places ofemployment (Army installations or privateplants) under the provisions of the act;Class B, to provide official transportationwithin or between Army installations, orbetween installations and near-by towns orareas, as authorized by the ODT generalorder but not by the act. The Chief ofTransportation was made responsible fordeveloping the specifications of buses to beprocured and for allocating them to private

operators or Army installations accordingto the need. He was designated representa-tive of the War Department to deal withthe Office of Defense Transportation insuch matters and also was vested withauthority to issue any additional rules orregulations that might be found necessary.The commanders of the service commandswere delegated authority to sign contractswith bus operators on behalf of the Chiefof Transportation when the plans of opera-tion were in accordance with standard plansapproved by him.

The Chief of Transportation aimed tobuild up the bus pool from existing equip-ment insofar as possible, in order to avoidadding unnecessarily to the heavy burdenof the automotive production facilities.100

When it was necessary to procure newvehicles, he favored ordering types thatwould require a minimum of critical ma-terials, and his Highway Division developedseveral designs with this object in view.101

Because of the heavy demand for all typesof motor equipment, the number of usedvehicles that could be acquired by transferwas limited, and most of those obtained bythis method were the auto haulers referredto above.

The number of Army-controlled busesactually in service reached a peak of 7,244in August 1945. Of that number 7,050 wereowned by the Army and 194 were char-tered.102 Of the Army-owned vehicles, the

98 ODT GO 35, 17 Mar 43.99 WD Cir 80, 20 Mar 43; WD Memo

W55-15-43, 27 Apr 43. Slight revisions were intro-duced by WD Cir 397, Sec. IX, 9 Oct 44; TM55-705, July 1945, sub: Furnishing Bus Trans;and AR 55-90, 10 Aug 45, sub: Bus Trans.

100 Ltr, SW to ODT, 20 Oct 42; Memo, C ofHwy Div for DCofT, 29 Dec 42, sub: Need forClarification of Policy. Both in OCT 451.1 Buses.

101 Memo, CofT for CofS for Matériel SOS, 10Feb 43, OCT 451.1 Buses.

102 Tabulation, Highway Transport Sv Div, OCT,Number and Types of Buses Used in Class A andClass B During the Period December 1942-June1947, OCT HB Hwy Div Trans of Persons. Thedata are as of the end of the month.

ARMY BUSES FOR LOCAL TRANSPORTATION. Tractor-trailer buses takingworkers home from the Edgewood Arsenal, Md. (top). Enlisted men boarding Army-

owned buses at Fort Hamilton,, N. Y. (bottom).


following three types predominated:103 Thetractor-trailer bus was the converted autohauler. The reconstruction of the body wasaccomplished largely with wood and non-critical metals, so that each vehicle yieldeda net of 1,420 pounds of steel to the na-tion's salvage drive. After conversion eachtrailer seated 45 passengers and couldaccommodate almost an equal numberstanding. Although the procurement of1,500 units was authorized, only about1,200 trailers could be obtained. In August1945 there were 998 of this type in service.The body-on-chassis bus was obtained byinstalling a bus body, constructed chiefly ofwood and noncritical metal, on a truckchassis. Only 1,500 pounds of steel wereused, compared with 4,000 pounds used ina similar prewar bus. This vehicle was builtin two sizes, seating 29 and 37 passengers.There were 5,142 in service in August 1945.The war-worker coach was obtained by in-stalling a small bus body on a sedan chassis.In this manner the seating capacity of theunit was increased from 5 to 15, with theaddition of only 400 pounds of critical ma-terial. There were 910 buses of this type inservice in August 1945.

In providing bus service to meet varyinglocal conditions, under terms as favorableas possible to the government, seven dif-ferent arrangements were worked out.104

(1) Government-owned buses were leasedto private operators, at rates of 2 cents or3½ cents per bus mile, according to thevehicle. The operator was responsible foroperating and maintenance costs and re-tained all fares collected. (2) Government-owned buses were leased to private opera-tors on the above terms, but a subsidy was

paid to insure the operator a reasonableprofit. This arrangement applied where alow fare was necessary in order to avoid aheavy turnover of employees at isolatedplants and installations. Sometimes a sub-sidy was paid to operators on services main-tained with their own vehicles. (3) Govern-ment-owned buses were leased to Army postexchanges on the terms indicated above.(4) Government-owned buses were op-erated in public service by Army personnel,when other satisfactory operators could notbe found. In this case the operating rev-enues were deposited to the account of theUnited States Treasury, and the cost ofoperation and maintenance was paid fromfunds provided by the Chief of Transporta-tion. (5) Government-owned buses wereoperated by Army installations solely forthe use of personnel traveling on officialbusiness within, between, or around suchinstallations. No fares were charged in thisinstance, and operating funds were providedby the installations. (6) Government-ownedbuses were operated by Army personnel forthe use of Army personnel moving underofficial orders, as in the case of movementsto maneuver areas, general hospitals, re-habilitation camps, and redistribution cen-ters. No fares were charged and funds foroperating and maintaining the vehicles wereprovided by the posts to which they wereassigned. (7) Privately owned and op-erated buses were chartered by the gov-ernment at a rate per mile or per trip,based on the operator's costs. This was ineffect a subsidy arrangement, made whenprivately owned equipment was availablebut when local conditions made it impos-sible to charge fares that would justify com-mercial operation.

Requests for relief of transportation de-ficiencies in the vicinity of Army installa-

103 Descriptions based on Rpt, Hwy Div, Develop-ment of Special Vehicles, 23 Mar 44, OCT HBHwy Div Rpts.

104 Rpt, Hwy Div, FY 1945, pp. 5-6.


tions were originated by the commandersof the installations. Requests on behalf ofprivate war plants were originated by thetechnical services principally concerned. Ineither case the request was submitted tothe commander of the appropriate servicecommand, who had the local conditions in-vestigated, and, if the need for governmentbuses were established, had a plan drawnfor the operation of such buses.105 The in-vestigation was made by a member of thestaff of the zone transportation officer, ex-cept when an Army Air Forces' installationwas concerned, in which case it was madeby a representative of the AAF trafficorganization. After approval by the servicecommander, the plan was reviewed by thezone transportation officer, who made suchfurther investigation as seemed necessaryand obtained concurrence of the local repre-sentative of the Office of Defense Trans-portation. The entire case then was for-warded to the Chief of Transportation,who obtained final approval of ODT head-quarters and the issuance of an ODT certifi-cate of authority. Upon receipt of this au-thority, the" Chief of Transportation re-quested the Chief of Ordnance to assignvehicles from the Army pool, and, in caseit was to be a contract operation, requestedthe zone transportation officer to have theappropriate contract form executed.106

The Chief of Transportation was guidedlargely by the judgment of the zone trans-portation officers in allocating buses andcontrolling operations. He issued instruc-tions for their guidance in determining theneed of a locality and the extent to which

commercial services could be relied on forsatisfaction of the need, and he prescribedcontract forms for their use in establishingservices with Army-owned equipment, butthe zone transportation officers were thejudges of local conditions and their recom-mendations usually governed.107 They alsopoliced the operations, ascertained that theagreed fares were being charged and thatproper maintenance was being provided.They arranged for the return of vehicles tothe pool when they no longer were requiredin the services to which they were allocated.The location of buses was changing contin-ually, as evidenced by the fact that duringthe fiscal year 1945 a total of 2,624 was re-turned to the pool and most of them werereallocated promptly.108 The zone transpor-tation officers were responsible for obtainingdetailed monthly reports from contract op-erators of Army-owned vehicles, showingthe nature and extent of each service andgiving a financial accounting. It was part oftheir task to see that buses allocated to Armyinstallations for operation by their person-nel were kept in the services for which theallocations were made.109

The demand for Army buses was fluctu-ating, and reallocations were frequent. Dur-ing the fiscal year 1945, for example, of atotal of 5,282 buses placed in the pool,2,658 were newly acquired and 2,624 werereturned from previous assignments. Inadding new vehicles to the pool the High-way Division had to take this turnover intoaccount, while at the same time allowing for

105 Memo, C of Hwy Div for Exec Asst OCT, 18Jan 45, OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.

106 For these standard contract forms, see at-tachments to Memo, C of Hwy Div for Exec Asstto OCofT, 16 Dec 42, OCT HB Hwy Div Transof Persons.

107 See WD Memo W55-15-43, 27 Apr 43, Apps.A, B, C. For example of ZTO investigation andrecommendation, see Memo, 9th ZTO for CofT, 13Mar 43, sub: Utah QM Depot, OCT 532 9th Zone.

108 Rpt, Hwy Div, FY 1945, p. 4, OCT HB HwyDiv Rpts.

109 See Memo, CofT for CofOrd, 26 Jun 43, sub:Redistribution of Buses, OCT 451.1 Buses; Memo,CofT for 5th ZTO, 12 Feb 44, OCT 532 5th Zone.


exceptional demands which might arise be-cause of severe weather or other unforeseencircumstances. At the end of August 1945,when there were 7,050 Army-owned busesin.service, there were 473 in the pool await-ing allocation.110

The majority of the buses were allocatedfor Class B services, which provided officialtransportation in connection with Armyinstallations. The Class A services werehighly important, however, since they oftenenabled isolated war plants to hold theiremployees. To illustrate: the Badger Ord-nance Plant, at Baraboo, Wis., utilized 126Army buses to assemble its peak force ofabout 14,000 employees from 103 com-munities, which were scattered over a radiusof 75 miles.111 Of the 7,050 Army buses inservice at the end of the war, 1,746 werein Class A services and 5,304 in Class B.

The zone transportation officers werenot basically responsible for the mainte-nance of Army buses, but they were in-structed to report any cases of neglect thatmight come to their attention.112 As regardsbuses operated by Army installations, re-sponsibility for maintenance rested with thecommanding officers of the installations,who were governed by Army regulationspertaining to motor vehicles and were re-quired to make regular inspections of theequipment. As regards buses leased topublic carriers, the responsibility restedwith the carriers, who were required tomaintain the vehicles according to thestandards of the industry. Commanders of

the service commands were instructed tohave such vehicles inspected periodicallyand to notify the appropriate Army con-tracting officer of any instance of neglectedmaintenance in order that corrective meas-ures might be taken under the contract.When lack of proper maintenance was dueto inability of the carrier to obtain replace-ment parts, tires, or labor, a supplementalcontract could be made, under which serv-ice command facilities would perform allthird, fourth, and fifth echelon maintenanceat a mutually agreed rate.113

Administrative Vehicles

In addition to the tactical motor vehiclesassigned to troop units and Army installa-tions in the zone of interior, and the busesdealt with in the preceding section, manytrucks, trailers, semitrailers, passenger cars,ambulances, motorcycles, bicycles, andmotor scooters were used by posts, camps,and stations in carrying out their responsi-bilities. These were designated administra-tive vehicles. The Chief of Transportationhad no responsibility for such vehicles untilJune 1945. At that time he was given ex-tensive functions in connection with equip-ment assigned to Class I, II, and IV instal-lations, which numbered more than 120,000units of 29 types. Administrative vehiclesassigned to the Army Air Forces (Class IIIinstallations) remained exclusively underAAF control.

Prior to June 1945 the Army ServiceForces had exercised only a loose controlover administrative vehicles.114 Issuance of

110 Annual Rpt, Hwy Div, FY 1945, p. 4, OCTHB Hwy Div Rpts; ASF MPR, Sec. 3, Aug 45, p.12.

111 Memo, 6th ZTO for OCT, 18 Sep 45, p. 5,sub: Accomplishments and Handicaps, OCT HB6th Zone.

112 Memos, CofT for ZTO's, 1 Oct 43, sub:Maintenance of TC Buses, and 3 Jan 44, sub: ASFCir 154, OCT 451.1 Buses—Maintenance.

113 ASF Cir 154, Sec. II, 18 Dec 43.114 Conf, author with Lt Col John Bergmann

Exec of Hwy Div OCT, 3 Aug 45, OCT HB HwyDiv Adm Vehicles; Memo, C of Hwy Div for CofT,9 Oct 45, sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handi-caps, OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.


vehicles by the Ordnance Department wasauthorized by the Distribution Division,ASF, in accordance with requisitions fromthe service commands, which distributed thevehicles to the installations within their re-spective areas. There were no ceilings forindividual installations, and when demandexceeded supply horizontal cuts were made,which, although of no consequence to someinstallations, worked a serious hardship onothers. Since no complete central recordwas maintained, redistribution of vehiclesin accordance with actual requirements en-tailed special surveys.

Even when the Chief of Transportationwas without specific responsibility in con-nection with administrative vehicles, hisHighway Division, because of its generalinterest in the conservation of motor equip-ment, had proposed measures to improvethe situation. At its suggestion a system ofidentification was adopted in May 1944 toaid inventory control.115 In March 1945 thedivision made a study of administrativevehicle problems at ports of embarkation,which at that time were operating morethan 10,000 units.116 It reported that underthe existing system the service commandsfrequently were not able to assign to theports the types of vehicles requested, withthe result that many vehicles were misfitsand could not be used with maximum effec-tiveness. Also, since a large number of vehi-cles were in bad condition when received,repairs were necessary before they could beput into service and the vehicle disabilityrate of the ports was raised accordingly. TheHighway Division recommended that ad-ministrative vehicles for use at ports of em-

barkation be standardized to seven types;that the Highway Division be authorized todetermine the requirements of the ports foreach type; that the Chief of Transporta-tion endeavor to obtain exemption fromthe plan of allocating vehicles through theservice commands and to secure authorityto set up a pool of administrative vehiclesunder his direct control; and that the High-way Division be designated the agent of theChief of Transportation to control the as-signment and utilization of such equipment.

The improvements which the HighwayDivision had visualized as desirable for theTransportation Corps were placed in effectfor all Army Service Forces installationssoon after the rendition of its report. InMay 1945 the War Department listed thetypes of vehicles to be considered in theadministrative fleet, pointed out that thenumber then available was not adequateto meet all requirements, and charged thecommanding general of the Army ServiceForces (also the commanding general ofthe Army Air Forces) with establishing asuitable allowance for each installation oractivity under his control, making quarterlyproposals for the revision of allocations, andenforcing all practical measures for conser-vation and effective utilization.117 This wasfollowed by an ASF directive which out-lined in detail the responsibilities for theallocation and control of administrativevehicles under the jurisdiction of that head-quarters.118

Under the latter directive the Chief ofTransportation was given staff supervisionover the allocation of vehicles by the servicecommands to Class I, II, and IV installa-tions. The service commands established therequirements of such installations, ordered

115 Rpt Hwy Div, FY 1944, p. 4, OCT HB HwyDiv Rpts; ASF Cir 127, Sec. III, 6 May 44.

116 Memo, C of Hwy Div for CofT, 19 Mar 45,sub: Adm Vehicles Assigned to PE's, OCT HBHwy Div Adm Vehicles.

117 WD Cir 139, Sec. III, 10 May 45.118 ASF Cir 178, Sec. III, 21 May 45.


vehicles assigned to them, and determinedthe extent to which the equipment was be-ing utilized, but they were required to sub-mit monthly reports on these matters tothe Chief of Transportation and such spe-cial reports as he might require. The Chiefof Transportation established allowancesfor the respective service commands, de-termined when such allowances should beincreased or decreased, and prescribedpolicies and procedures to be followed bythe service commands in making allocationsto individual installations. In addition tothis supervision of the service commands,the Chief of Transportation was given di-rect control of the allocation and utilizationof administrative vehicles required by gov-ernment-owned contractor-operated plants,military construction projects, and otherspecial projects which were exempt fromservice command jurisdiction. In thesecases, the Chief of Transportation workedin direct co-ordination with the technicalservices concerned.

With respect to the plants and projectsunder the direct control of the Chief ofTransportation, responsibilities were dividedbetween his Highway Division and the zonetransportation officers.119 Separate instruc-tions were issued with respect to Corps ofEngineers construction projects, ammuni-tion manufacturing plants, Ordnance instal-lations, and Chemical Warfare installations,but the following arrangements applied inall cases: Requests for administrative vehi-cles were made by the commanding officersof the installations, projects, or plants to thetechnical services concerned, by which theywere transmitted to the appropriate zonetransportation officers. The zone transporta-tion officers then had field surveys made to

verify the need, both as to quantity and typeof equipment. If the recommendations ofthe surveying officers did not satisfy theofficers making the requests, the differenceswere referred to the Highway Division. Thezone transportation officers were directedto make periodical inspections to determinewhether vehicles were being fully and prop-erly utilized and to report their findings tothe Highway Division. For security reasonsthe Manhattan District was excepted fromthe above arrangement, and all allocationsand inspections were made directly by theHighway Division.

At the outset the task of bringing betterorder into the handling of administrativevehicles was a complicated one, because ofthe number of units, the variety of types,the lack of adequate central records, andthe changing requirements of installationsafter V-E Day.120 As soon as possible, surveyteams representing the Chief of Transporta-tion and the service commands visited theinstallations, investigated the utilization ofthe equipment on hand, and recommendedchanges in the numbers and types of vehi-cles assigned. A system of reporting andrecording was established, including tabu-lating machines, which made available tothe Highway Division on short notice com-plete information regarding the vehiclesassigned to each installation and the loca-tions of the vehicles of a given type. Theserecords, together with the utilization reportsreceived from the survey teams, made possi-ble the allocation, reallocation, and with-drawal of vehicles in accordance with soundtransportation policies based on experience.Through the surveys many vehicles which

119 OCT Misc Ltrs 196 and 197, 13 Jun 45; TCCir 65-5, 28 Jul 45, and C 1, 12 Aug 45.

120 Memo, C of Hwy Div for CofT, 9 Oct 45,sub: Rpt on Accomplishments and Handicaps, p.3; Hist Rpt, Hwy Div OCT, 1 Jul 45-15 Aug 46,pp. 2-3. Both in OCT HB Hwy Div Rpts.


previously were not included in the WarDepartment record were brought undercentral control. From 92,674 vehicles in therecord received by the Chief of Transporta-tion in July 1945, the number increased to122,367 in October when the new recordswere completed. Thereafter, the number ofvehicles in service steadily declined.

As previous discussion has indicated, thezone transportation officer had an importantrole in the control of administrative vehicles,and that was especially true because heserved not only as field representative ofthe Chief of Transportation but also astransportation officer for the service com-mand. The zone transportation officer ofthe sixth zone, in a report rendered at theclose of the war, pointed out that this dualrole was a difficult one.121 He served twosuperiors whose policies differed in some

respects because one viewed the problemprimarily from the standpoint of the instal-lations under his jurisdiction while the otherviewed it from the standpoint of the over-allneed and what appeared to be an economi-cal use of transportation equipment. Underthese circumstances the zone transportationofficer sometimes found it difficult to func-tion with complete consistency and fullefficiency. It would be reasonable to assumethat the Chief of Transportation, if he hadbeen vested with the entire responsibility,could have been relied on to provide ad-ministrative vehicles to the various installa-tions with the same regard for requirements,priorities, and emergency situations that hedisplayed in providing other forms of trans-portation to all branches of the Army.

121 Ltr to Exec Asst OCT, 2 Nov 45, OCT HB6th Zone Gen.

CHAPTER XI

Observations and Conclusions

An attempt has been made in the fore-going chapters to set forth the more signifi-cant circumstances and developments inconnection with the administration of Armytransportation during World War II—circumstances and developments relatedchiefly to the organization, functions, op-erations, and operating relationships of theTransportation Corps. From the detailspresented, certain generalizations may beformulated and certain conclusions drawn,which will give emphasis to the major prob-lems already discussed and at the same timewill establish more clearly the backgroundagainst which the remaining two volumesof Transportation Corps history are beingprepared.

In considering the general subject ofArmy transportation and the work of theTransportation Corps in particular, twofacts are to be borne in mind. First, thetask of moving the Army's personnel andmateriel was the heaviest transportationassignment that ever fell to a single organi-zation. It was heavy because the volume ofthe traffic was large, the movements werescattered over the greater part of the globe,and the means of transport were barelysufficient to meet the requirements. The sec-ond fact which must not be overlooked isthe lack of preparedness on the part of theArmy to fulfill its wartime transportationresponsibilities. There was lack of physicalpreparation, which was a common experi-ence among the arms and services. There

also was lack of preparation for the manage-ment of so large an undertaking, and in thatrespect the Transportation Corps was in apeculiarly unfavorable position because ofthe fact that it was not established untilafter the United States had entered the war.

To say that the Army had not prepareditself to handle the gigantic wartime trans-portation task is not to discredit the workdone by the offices which were responsiblefor transportation before Pearl Harbor. TheTransportation Branch of G-4 and TheQuartermaster General's TransportationDivision undertook to develop the meanswith which to handle the increasing trafficload, and in most respects they met the re-quirements adequately. The Chief of En-gineers took steps to improve the organiza-tion and equipment of the Military RailwayService. Yet all through the prewar periodit was recognized that the existing arrange-ments would be unsuitable if the UnitedStates should become a belligerent. Trans-portation obviously did not have the statuswhich the experience of World War I haddemonstrated it should have—that of anindependent and integrated service. Thestaff and operating functions were in sep-arate offices and the dividing line betweentheir respective responsibilities was notclearly drawn. Other branches of the WarDepartment had traffic organizations whoseactivities sometimes were at cross purposeswith those of G-4 and The QuartermasterGeneral. Probably the greatest weakness

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 407

was the lack of a comprehensive programof forward planning, embracing all aspectsof transportation and covering all probablecontingencies.

It is surprising that this situation shouldhave existed, for it meant that the trans-portation lessons of World War I had beenlargely lost from view. They had not beenforgotten by the individual officers whohad observed the failures of Army trans-portation during the earlier hostilities, butthey had ceased to be a vital force in theaffairs of the Army. Although those mostclosely concerned with transportation in1917-18 had strongly recommended theestablishment of a permanent, independent,and thoroughly integrated transportationservice, that recommendation was not fol-lowed. A widespread feeling in the nationthat the responsibility of the United Statesin world affairs had been fulfilled with thedefeat of the Central Powers, and the post-war urge for economy which dominatedCongress, were largely responsible for thedecision. The consequence was that as thestorm clouds gathered over Europe in 1939the transportation responsibilities of theArmy were scattered and forward planningwas at low ebb. As the emergency deepenedand it became more and more probable thatthe United States would be drawn into thefray, there was no possibility that these con-ditions might be rectified quickly. With thelimited funds and personnel available, itwas a struggle to keep abreast of currentrequirements. Pearl Harbor, therefore,found the Army preparing but not preparedfor the performance of its transportationtask.

In modern, fast-moving, technologicalwarfare thorough and imaginative forwardplanning constitutes a great advantage.Such planning cannot be expected when the

functions of a service are scattered and sub-ordinated to other services, as was the casewith Army transportation between the wars.The inspiration for this type of preparationcomes with the realization of undivided andundiluted responsibility. It must include adetermination to carry on the preparatorywork despite the discouragements of person-nel ceilings and budgetary limitations. Armytransportation clearly was lacking in theserespects when World War II overtook it.

The late establishment of an integratedand independent transportation service andthe lack of adequate planning contributeddirectly to certain weaknesses which besetthe administration of Army transportationduring the early part of the war, and theycontinued to plague the Chief of Trans-portation long after his office had beenestablished. The more basic weaknesses canbe summarized briefly.

The organization of a service in peace-time should provide the foundation uponwhich the wartime structure can be builtspeedily and with a minimum of disruption.This patently was not the situation withrespect to Army transportation in December1941. The developments which had takenplace in the organization of The Quarter-master General's Transportation Divisionand the Transportation Branch of G-4 dur-ing the preceding years were along soundfunctional lines, but they were designed tomeet current needs rather than ultimatewartime requirements. When war came,the merging of the Transportation Divisionand the Transportation Branch into a head-quarters organization was accomplishedsmoothly and with few maladjustments, butthe situation in the field was far less feli-citous. It was a full year after Pearl Harborbefore a satisfactory field organization wasestablished in the zone of interior. Further-


more, many new types of troop organiza-tions for service in the oversea theaters hadto be developed during the war because theneed of them had not been visualizedearlier.

The late establishment of his office greatlyincreased the personnel problems whichconfronted the Chief of Transportation. Be-cause of the limited peacetime transporta-tion operations, there was a very smallnucleus of Army officers with experience inthat field when the expansion began in1940. Moreover, as officers of the Quarter-master Corps and the Corps of Engineers,these men had devoted only part of theirArmy careers to transportation, and fewcould have been called specialists in thathighly technical industry. While the servicesof many competent men from the trans-portation industry were acquired by theArmy during the prewar emergency, bothas commissioned officers and as civilian ex-perts, these men were few in number com-pared with the size of the task which theChief of Transportation ultimately wascalled on to perform. Most of his personnelexpansion took place after the war was wellunder way and the competition for man-power, both in and out of the Army, hadbecome keen. This expansion had notcaught up with the need when the War De-partment began to impose personnel ceil-ings, and the burden of meeting the situa-tion therefore fell upon the Chief of Trans-portation with exceptional severity.

Lack of comprehensive planning fortransportation equipment, particularly thatneeded by the Army in the oversea theaters,also handicapped the Chief of Transporta-tion during the early part of the war. Re-search and development for rail and marineequipment had been carried on in the Corpsof Engineers and the Quartermaster Corps,

but this work was limited by lack of fundsand by the general failure to foresee thescope of the war and the many new types ofequipment that would be required. In thefield of motor transport, the developmentof proper cargo-hauling vehicles for high-way services in the theaters was completelyoverlooked. The Chief of Transportationconsequently was confronted with a Her-culean task in these fields, and it was notuntil 1944 that he began to catch up withthe requirements.

Standard procedures to insure the smoothand timely execution of troop and supplymovements to the oversea theaters had tobe extensively revamped during the war.The execution and control of these heavymovements required co-ordination not onlybetween the headquarters and field officesof the Army transportation organization,but also co-ordination with other branchesof the Army, with the Navy, with the severalcivilian agencies of the federal governmentwhich were charged with the regulation oftransportation, and with the carriers them-selves. Although the development of ade-quate procedures received a great deal ofattention in the Office of the Chief ofTransportation and in Army Service Forcesheadquarters, progress was gradual. Excel-lent results were achieved, but some of themdid not come until late in the war.

Another untoward result of the late crea-tion of the Transportation Corps was itslack of a well established and uniformlyrecognized place in the Army scheme ofthings. Army doctrine on this point had tobe developed during the war. In conse-quence, the Chief of Transportation foundit necessary repeatedly to take a vigorousstand to prevent functions which were as-signed to his headquarters or his field estab-lishment in the zone of interior from being


absorbed or encroached on by other ele-ments of the Army Service Forces. In someof the oversea theaters, because at the timeof their establishment there were no direc-tives clearly defining the position and re-sponsibility of the theater Chief of Trans-portation, that official did not have properrecognition and authority, and was handi-capped in the performance of his mission.This situation not only affected the effi-ciency of transportation operations withinthe theaters, but it made co-ordination be-tween the Chief of Transportation in Wash-ington and theater commanders more dif-ficult.

In part at least the late creation of theTransportation Corps was responsible forthe fact that during the war the Chief ofTransportation did not have control of someArmy transportation activities. He was notrecognized as the proper agency to estab-lish the organization of troop units and thedesign of equipment for highway transportin the theaters until after the war. Author-ity to regulate Army traffic by air in thezone of interior, which was taken from himearly in the war, was not restored to theTransportation Corps until after hostilitieswere over. The newness of the Chief ofTransportation's field organization in 1942weakened his ability to resist a demand ofthe Army Air Forces for delegation ofauthority to control its own freight trafficby surface carriers in the zone of interior—adelegation which the Chief of Transporta-tion subsequently regretted. He did not havesufficient authority over the transportationofficers at some classes of Army installationsto enable him to direct their activities effec-tively. His control of utility railways at someinstallations was not as complete as he con-sidered desirable from the standpoint ofefficiency.

It is not to be assumed that if there hadbeen a Chief of Transportation and an inte-grated transportation service before the war,all the difficulties which General Gross en-countered with respect to organization, per-sonnel, equipment, procedures, and doc-trine would have been avoided. It is mostunlikely that the extent and nature of thetransportation problems and requirementswould have been adequately visualized, orthat, if visualized, sufficient funds couldhave been obtained to accomplish anythingapproaching thorough preparedness. It isreasonable to believe, however, that hadthere been a Transportation Corps in theprewar years, headed by a Chief of Trans-portation with vision and drive, the Armywould have been much better preparedthan it was to fulfill its transportation mis-sion when war came.

Despite its late start and its lack of con-trol over certain aspects of Army transporta-tion, the Transportation Corps occupied astrong position in the military establishment.In its execution of troop and supply move-ments in the zone of interior and betweenthe zone of interior and the theaters, itserved the entire Army directly and con-stantly, and the successful performance ofits service was recognized as an essentialelement in the success of the military effort.Because of this fact, and because of theheavy role which long-range transportationplanning and movement co-ordinationplayed in the achievement of strategic ob-jectives, the Chief of Transportation per-formed an important staff function as well asa technical service for the Army, and there-fore maintained an exceptionally close rela-tionship with the headquarters of the ArmyService Forces and with the OperationsDivision of the General Staff. The closecontact which the commanding general of


the Army Service Forces maintained withTransportation Corps activities, and hissupport of the Chief of Transportation inmost of his controversies with other ele-ments of the Army Service Forces, reflectedhis estimate of the importance of the Trans-portation Corps' role.

The success of the Transportation Corpsin carrying out its mission was generally rec-ognized. There were local failures and therewere delays, but the record of over-allachievement leaves no doubt that the largeand complex task which fell to the corpswas performed with a high average of effi-ciency. This was due not alone to technicalproficiency but also to the strong sense ofresponsibility which General Gross felt andimparted to his staff, and his readiness tofight for the policies which he consideredessential to the fulfillment of that responsi-bility. This sense of responsibility sprangfrom the fact that the war had to be wonin the oversea theaters, and it found pointedexpression in the emphasis which the Chiefof Transportation placed on the mainte-nance of close relations between his officeand the oversea commanders and on in-stant responsiveness by his staff to theaterneeds for men and materiel.

The maintenance of smooth working re-lations with the transportation industriesand with the governmental agencies con-cerned with transportation was an essentialpart of the Army transportation task. Thegreat bulk of the Army's traffic in the zoneof interior and on the high seas moved oncarriers which were under civilian manage-ment—the railways, the trucks, the buses,and the steamships. The domestic trans-portation lines were regulated and con-trolled by the Interstate Commerce Com-mission and the Office of Defense Trans-portation. The construction of new ships

was a responsibility of the Maritime Com-mission, and the operation of all U.S. ship-ping, except the small amount which wasunder the direct control of the armed serv-ices, was controlled by the War ShippingAdministration. The construction of addi-tional railway, highway, and marine equip-ment was subject to the overriding controlof the War Production Board. Co-operationwith those industries and agencies was aday-to-day requirement in the Transporta-tion Corps, and the success of that co-operation measured the efficiency withwhich troops and military supplies weremoved.

Just as Pearl Harbor found the Armywithout adequate provision for meeting itswartime transportation requirements, so thecountry as a whole was without adequatemachinery for the regulation of transporta-tion in the national interest. The office ofDefense Transportation and the War Ship-ping Administration were not set up untilafter the United States had entered the war.Both were confronted with tremendoustasks. Fortunately some regulation of ship-ping already had been undertaken by theMaritime Commission, and a measure ofregulation over the inland carriers had beenexercised by the Interstate Commerce Com-mission. From these agencies the War Ship-ping Administration and the Office of De-fense Transportation derived considerableexperienced personnel. But the new officeshad far greater problems to meet than theirpredecessors had dealt with — problemswhich had to be tackled with the war al-ready in progress. In addition to develop-ing regulations and procedures for control-ling operations, WSA and ODT had to workout methods for dealing with the transporta-tion requirements of the armed services andfor balancing them against other require-


ments in determining how the nation'stransportation resources should be em-ployed. It is worth repeating that thesethings had to be accomplished largely afterwe entered the war.

The competition of military with otherrequirements for shipping was keen fromthe beginning. There were not enough bot-toms to meet all needs fully, and frequentlythe programs had to be curtailed. The con-tention of the armed services that their re-quirements should in all cases have firstpriority was largely but never completelyrecognized by the War Shipping Admini-stration. To put it another way, while WSArefused to recognize the right of the armedservices to dictate the amount of shippingthey should get from the national pool, itgave them as much as it could after meetingrequirements imposed by the President. ThePresident's requirements related chiefly tothe movement of lend-lease goods to otherof the United Nations and the assignmentof American vessels to the accomplishmentof the British and Soviet import programs.Since these undertakings were motivated bythe desire to keep our European allies effec-tively fighting the Axis, they were in essencemilitary measures and they were rated assuch in the thinking of the Commander inChief.

Although the domestic carriers werehard-pressed from the early days of the warto meet the expanding requirements, andhad to adopt all possible measures to in-crease their efficiency and to improve andconserve their resources, military traffic wasnot seriously affected by equipment andmanpower shortages until toward the closeof hostilities. Such shortages were mostacutely felt in the redeployment and re-patriation of troops from the time of Ger-many's capitulation to the end of 1945. The

Office of Defense Transportation, althougheventually it cut heavily into commercialservices in order to provide railway cars formoving troops, did not act as promptly inthat matter as the Army thought it should.The Office of Defense Transportation be-lieved that the Army should have supportedthe new equipment and manpower pro-grams more effectively than it did, but theArmy was confronted with the necessity ofweighing the needs of the transportationindustry against the military needs for ma-terial and soldiers with which to fight theenemy, and its decisions always were madein the light of the possibility that civiliantraffic could be reduced to whatever extentmight become necessary in order to properlyaccommodate military movements.

The impression existed in some quarters,and it has been presented in an official pub-lished statement, that the Army tried to gaincontrol of all inland transportation andshipping early in the war.1 Justification forso broad an assertion was not disclosed bythe research performed in the preparationof this volume. The Army had a tremendoustransportation task to perform, and the offi-cers responsible for performing it had to relylargely on nonmilitary means. They believedthat certain transportation policies and ar-rangements were necessary to insure thatthe Army's requirements for troop and sup-ply movements were met, and they wereaggressive in trying to bring those policiesand arrangements into effect. It does notfollow, however, that the Army desired tocontrol all transportation. This point de-serves further examination.

As regards inland transportation, theArmy jealously guarded the recognizedright of military traffic to priority over other

1 Bureau of the Budget, The United States atWar (Washington, 1946), p. 152.


traffic, but this affected only a small part ofthe total transportation capacity. Duringthe weeks immediately following PearlHarbor, the Army insisted that a generalsystem of traffic control should be estab-lished to prevent the development of freightcar congestion at the seaboard such as hadseriously handicapped the military effort in1917. Since the Army already had ma-chinery in operation for controlling its owntraffic and since no other agency was soprepared, the Army was willing to take overthe regulation of all portbound freightmovements. The military authorities never-theless went along with a proposal to setup a Transportation Control Committee toact under authority delegated by the Officeof Defense Transportation, and it gave thatcommittee its full support. Acting under aPresidential order, the Army took control ofthe railways for a few weeks during thewinter of 1943-44, while there was dangerof the carriers being tied up by strikes, butit refrained from interfering with the func-tions of the railway managements, the Of-fice of Defense Transportation, or the Inter-state Commerce Commission during thisperiod, and when the strike threat waspassed the Army relinquished its controlinstantly. Nothing has been found in therecord to indicate that the Army covetedcomplete control of the inland carriers.

With respect to ocean transportation, theArmy pressed its contention that the armedforces should have first claim on the avail-able shipping to the extent that it wasneeded for the execution of approved stra-tegic programs. The Army maintained that,from the standpoint of efficient control andsecurity, the bulk of its supplies for thetheaters should be loaded at Army ports ofembarkation rather than at commercialpiers, notwithstanding the fact that most

of the vessels were operated by War Ship-ping Administration agents. Late in 1942,in an effort to achieve greater co-ordina-tion and economy in their logistical opera-tions, the Army and the Navy considereda comprehensive plan which included theestablishment of a joint transportationservice and the placing of all vessels usedby the armed services under naval opera-tion. The proposal for a joint ocean trans-portation service was not new, but wasrather a revival of a feature of the jointwar plan which had been agreed on beforethe United States entered the conflict. Thisproposal, along with some other featuresof the plan, never got beyond the stageof preliminary consideration. Even if it hadbeen agreed on by the Army and the Navy,and they had been able to get the Presidentto approve it, only the operation of vesselswhich were in military service would havebeen affected. Here again, the record hasnot disclosed any desire or attempt on thepart of the Army to get over-all control ofAmerican shipping.

The efforts toward greater co-ordinationbetween the Army and the Navy in regardto transportation brought a mixture ofsuccesses and failures. The proposal for acompletely unified transportation servicefailed, basically because of the differinglogistic systems which the two services haddeveloped and the unwillingness of eachto surrender control to the other. The Armyand the Navy also disagreed on the methodof controlling shipping assigned to thePacific theaters. Against these conspicuousfailures there were some noteworthy achieve-ments in the way of greater co-ordination—joint planning for the procurement and em-ployment of ships, joint use of ship space,joint control of port operations and shiprepairs, co-ordination of oversea supply op-


erations, and the adoption of joint shippingprocedures. All of these improvements cameafter the United States had entered the warand were achieved against a backgroundof almost complete independence in theprewar transportation activities of the twoservices.

The wartime experience convinced Gen-erals Somervell and Gross that a jointArmy-Navy transportation service wasdesirable. Such a service, they believed,would insure greater operating economy byeliminating duplicating activities, personnel,and facilities.2 They also believed that ajoint transportation service would provemore efficient from an operating stand-point. While recognizing that the JointChiefs of Staff and the Joint MilitaryTransportation Committee were effectiveinstruments for joint planning and over-allcontrol, they did not consider a board orcommittee well suited for the day-to-dayhandling of operating matters. Such mat-ters, they pointed out, require prompt andtechnically correct decisions. Committeeactions, which often involve discussions andsometimes end in compromises, do not meetthat requirement.3

The discussion of shipping matters by theCombined Chiefs of Staff and the Com-bined Military Transportation Committee,where the entire range of Allied require-

ments for ocean transport were considered,disclosed a greater unity between the mili-tary and civilian points of view on theBritish side than on the American. Thebasic reason probably was that British mili-tary success and British national survivalwere more dependent on oversea trade, par-ticularly the import program, than was thecase with the United States. Britain hadpassed through and had been disciplined bysevere national crises during two world warsin which the greatest danger was that shewould be unable to offset the enemy's attackon her shipping and to maintain anadequate flow of essential imports. In bothwars British shipping was administered bya cabinet member, and in World War IIthe Ministry of War Transport controllednot only all aspects of shipping but inlandtransportation as well. In the absence ofsuch a disciplined attitude toward shippingand such a centralized control over all themeans of transport, the United States hadto endeavor to achieve comparable resultsby co-operation among agencies—co-opera-tion between the Army and the Navy, andco-operation between the armed forces andthe several civilian offices concerned.

Wartime transportation was a co-opera-tive endeavor on both the international andthe American levels. There were differencesbetween the British and American points ofview regarding some of the shipping prob-lems, but practical adjustments were workedout and a remarkable degree of teamworkwas achieved. There were disputes betweenthe U.S. armed forces and the civiliantransportation authorities, but these dis-putes were overshadowed by the broadcollaboration which was practiced. TheArmy and the Navy failed to achieve ajoint transportation service and so lost someof the economy and efficiency which such

2 Concerning duplications, see Contl Div ASF,Report to the Secretary of War on CommonActivities of the Army and Navy, 12 Dec 45, pp.58-72, AGO Hist Rec Sec, A 49-212 RG 114.

3 Statement, Gen Somervell before Select Com-mittee on Postwar Military Policy, HR, 78th Cong.,2d Sess., Hearings pursuant to H. Res. 465, Pro-posal to Establish a Single Department of ArmedForces, Part 1, pp. 100-102; Memo, CofT for GenScott, 19 Oct 45, and attached statement favoringa joint transportation service, OCT HB WylieStaybacks.


a service would have effected, but theydeveloped close co-ordination in manyphases of their logistics. In the stress of war,the Army Chief of Transportation some-times felt keen disappointment because ofwhat he considered shortcomings in theco-operative effort. Yet looking backward

after the hostilities were over, it must havebeen the accomplishments rather than thefailures which seemed significant. Theirgreatest significance, of course, lay in thepromise which they gave of even fullerco-ordination in the future—co-ordinationplanned and perfected in peacetime.

Appendix A*

Principal Functions of theSupervisory Officers and the

Divisions of theOffice of the Chief of

Transportation, as of 1 July 1945

Executive Officer

Act on executive matters which in hisjudgment do not require the personal at-tention of the Chief of Transportation; acton or arrange for action on matters whichrequire co-ordination between two or moredivisions and which do not come under thejurisdiction of a single director; relieve theChief of Transportation of administrativeburdens insofar as possible; supervise theactivities of the Technical Information Unit,the Demobilization Planning Unit, and theHistorical Unit.

Director of Operations

Co-ordinate the operating activities ofthe Office of the Chief of Transportation,the ports of embarkation, and the other TCfield agencies; maintain liaison with theOperations Division of the General Staffand the Army Service Forces headquartersregarding the movement of troops and

materiel; prepare estimates of the futureavailability of transportation resources andthe capabilities of the ports to handle Armytraffic; ascertain current and future Armyrequirements for transportation and takemeasures to insure that they will be met;keep the appropriate TC agencies informedregarding priorities of movement; arrangewith the War Shipping Administration andthe Navy for the joint use of transportationfacilities; supervise the activities of theArmy delegate to the interdepartmentalTransportation Control Committee; super-vise the work of the Planning, Movements,International, and Port and Field AgenciesDivisions.

* This summary is based on Transportation CorpsPamphlet No. 1, Organizational Manual, and com-plements Chart 2 of this volume. Its purpose is togive a general indication of the distribution offunctions in the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tion rather than a complete analysis of functionsand relationships. Except as otherwise stated, thefunctions described relate to the zone of interior.

415


Director of Water Transportation

Supervise all TC water transportationactivities; co-ordinate the activities of theWater Division of the Office of the Chiefof Transportation and the ports of embarka-tion; represent the War Department innegotiations with the War Shipping Ad-ministration and the Navy regarding theallocation and utilization of vessels; repre-sent the War Department in negotiationswith the Maritime Commission regardingtypes and designs of vessels to be constructedfor Army use; represent the War Depart-ment in technical matters relating to theconversion of merchant vessels to meet re-quirements of the Joint and CombinedChiefs of Staff; deal with such other techni-cal marine matters as may be assigned tohim by the Chief of Transportation.

Director of Materiel and Supply

Co-ordinate and exercise technical super-vision over the design and development ofTC equipment; supervise the compilation ofrequirements for TC equipment and sup-plies, including those for international aid;control the procurement and production ofall TC materiel; supervise the operation ofTC depots; establish standards and issueinstructions for the maintenance of TCequipment; direct the redistribution, sal-vage, and disposal of TC materiel; main-tain liaison with ASF headquarters onsupply matters; direct the work of the Re-search and Development Division, Require-ments and Distribution Division, Procure-ment Division, Maintenance Division, andProperty Disposal Division.

Director of Military Training

Supervise the military training of all TCunits and individuals, and the training of

units of other technical services attachedto TC installations for training or functionalduties; establish policies, doctrines, andstandards for training TC troops; establishtables of organization and equipment andtables of allowances for TC troop units;estimate requirements for TC troops andestablish training programs to meet thoserequirements; designate TC troop units tofill theater requisitions; supervise inspectionsto determine the progress of units in train-ing; maintain liaison with the Director ofMilitary Training, ASF headquarters; sup-ervise the work of the Military TrainingDivision.

Director of Personnel

Formulate policies for the employmentand utilization of TC military and civilianpersonnel; control personnel authorizationsand strength reports for TC installations;supervise the utilization of TC personnel;supervise the execution of morale programsin the Transportation Corps; supervise theactivities of the TC Employees' SuggestionCommittee; represent the Chief of Trans-portation in efforts to maintain an adequatesupply of labor in the industries concernedwith the operation of ships and the pro-duction of TC equipment and supplies;maintain liaison with the Director ofPersonnel, ASF headquarters; direct thework of the Military Personnel and theIndustrial Personnel Divisions.

Control Division

Assist the Chief of Transportation incontrolling and improving the organizationand administration of the TransportationCorps; develop statistical data as a basisfor judging the efficiency of TC operationsand the effectiveness of TC procedures;

APPENDIX A 417

recommend adjustments in policies, or-ganization, procedures, and methods wheresuch adjustments seem requisite; advise andassist control officers at TC field installa-tions; maintain liaison with the ControlDivision, ASF headquarters.

Planning Division

Assist the Chief of Transportation andthe Director of Operations in all phases oftransportation planning; prepare long-range estimates of transportation require-ments and the availability of transportationresources; study the implications and esti-mate the practicability of proposed warplans from the standpoint of transportationcapabilities; estimate the transportation re-quirements for the supply of civilian popula-tions in liberated areas; co-ordinate plan-ning by the operating divisions in theOffice of the Chief of Transportation withregard to oversea requirements for TCpersonnel and materiel; co-ordinate theplanning of the several OCT divisions forthe redeployment of U.S. troops andmateriel.

Port and Field Agencies Division

Act in a staff capacity in regard to house-keeping activities at TC field installations,the acquisition and release of real propertyand facilities, and food service; review andrecommend disposition of proposals for theactivation or inactivation of field installa-tions and facilities; supervise the activitiesof the oversea supply divisions at ports ofembarkation; supervise stock control andsupply operations at ports of embarkation;supervise the handling of baggage returnedfrom overseas; supervise the handling ofmail passing through ports of embarkation.

Movements Division

Maintain liaison with other branches ofthe War Department and with agencies ofUnited States and foreign governments re-garding personnel movements; supervise themovement of troops to port staging areasand their processing at the staging areas;schedule Army-controlled troopships on thevarious routes in accordance with theaterrequirements and War Department priori-ties; negotiate with the War Shipping Ad-ministration and the Navy regarding Armyuse of troopships under the control of thoseagencies; maintain liaison with the NavyDepartment regarding troopship convoysand unescorted sailings; schedule the move-ment of hospital ships and co-ordinate thedisposition of returning patients with theOffice of the Surgeon General; supervisethe activities of permanent military staffson transports.

International Division

Co-ordinate the activities of the Trans-portation Corps in regard to lend-lease (ex-cept procurement), and the supply of thecivilian populations of liberated areas;maintain liaison with the InternationalDivision, ASF headquarters, the inter-national divisions of other technical serv-ices, and the appropriate officers of otherAmerican and foreign government agenciesin regard to international aid; representthe Chief of Transportation in matters per-taining to customs regulations and pro-cedures affecting the War Department;co-ordinate arrangements relating to thefurnishing of supplies and services by foreigngovernments to the Transportation Corpsunder reverse lend-lease.


Intelligence and Security Division

Represent the Chief of Transportation inliaison with the Military Intelligence Divi-sion, WDGS, the Provost Marshal General,the Director of Intelligence, ASF, and othergovernmental agencies concerned with in-telligence and security matters; collect anddisseminate technical information of valueto the Transportation Corps; supervise TCcounterintelligence activities including theinvestigation of espionage, subversion, anddisloyalty; supervise all TC internal securityactivities and the enforcement of measuresfor the protection of vessels; establishstandards and supervise the activities of TCfield installations in regard to safety of em-ployees; establish the loyalty of military andcivilian personnel assigned to the Chief ofTransportation; supervise TC activitiesrelating to the safeguarding of military in-formation.

Legal Division

Advise and act for the Chief of Trans-portation in legal and legislative matters;counsel TC contracting officers regardingthe legal aspects of procurement and con-tracting; review TC contracts and bondswith reference to their legality and compli-ance with approved policies, and assist inthe negotiation, amendment, and termina-tion of such agreements when necessary;review and recommend disposition of claimsfor or against the government, arising fromTC contracts or TC activities; act on behalfof the Secretary of War in regard to claimsunder builders' risk insurance policies onvessels being constructed for the War De-partment; review proposed legislation affect-ing TC activities and recommend changeswhich seem advisable; handle all patentmatters affecting the Transportation Corps.

Fiscal Division

Prepare budget estimates for TC require-ments and justification for such estimates;allot available funds to the various TCactivities and maintain accounts showingthe current status of such funds; adapt TCfiscal policies and procedures to the policiesand procedures established by the War De-partment and the Army Service Forces;supervise the fiscal activities of TC fieldinstallations and conduct special audits atsuch installations when necessary; analyzeTC contracts, and subcontracts thereunder,with respect to costs and profits; act forthe Chief of Transportation in connectionwith the renegotiation of contracts; main-tain property accountability records.

Administrative Division

Establish simplified methods of adminis-trative procedure for the Office of the Chiefof Transportation and TC field installa-tions; control and authenticate OCT cor-respondence; process communications forthe signature of the Chief of Transportationand higher authority; receive and distributeincoming communications; maintain recordfiles; control the purchase and distributionof office supplies; control office arrange-ments such as allocations of space, tele-phones, and dictaphones; supervise print-ing, binding, and reproduction work; edit,publish, and distribute TC orders, circulars,and similar directives.

Military Training Division

Formulate doctrine for the organizationand training of TC units and replacements;formulate tables of organization and equip-ment and tables of allowances for TC units;prepare mobilization and advance training

APPENDIX A 419

programs; prepare publications relating toTC troop organizations and training; ar-range for the technical training of TCofficers and enlisted men at industrialplants; inspect training installations toestablish that TC training plans and poli-cies are being followed and to determinethe status of TC units in training; maintaincontact with training installations wheredeficiencies in training have been found toinsure that such deficiencies are corrected;review reports and films from overseatheaters and reports from officers returningfrom overseas to obtain information for usein revising TC troop organizations, trainingmethods, and publications.

Military Personnel Division

Develop policies, plans, and proceduresfor the administration of TC militarypersonnel in accordance with War Depart-ment regulations; appoint, assign, promote,transfer, and separate TC military person-nel, and maintain the records necessary forthese purposes; review and process throughthe Office of the the Chief of Transporta-tion requests for military personnel frominstallations in the zone of interior andfrom oversea commands; review duty as-signments of TC military personnel in thezone of interior and recommend reassign-ments when necessary to assure full utiliza-tion of individual skills; co-ordinate mattersrelating to the promotion and transfer ofmilitary personnel to assure uniform prac-tices.

Industrial Personnel Division

Develop policies, plans, and proceduresrelating to the administration of TC civilianpersonnel; provide civilian personnel for theOffice of the Chief of Transportation;

maintain recruiting services for ship andshore personnel on behalf of TC field in-stallations, when necessary; develop andconduct training and morale programs toimprove the efficiency of TC civilian em-ployees; process grievances filed by OCTemployees; make preliminary surveys forthe classification of positions under theregulations of the Civil Service Com-mission; supervise the placement and pro-motion of civilian personnel to assure uni-form standards; collaborate with the WaterDivision in the formulation and publicationof marine personnel regulations for civilianseamen on Army-operated vessels; proposepolicies and co-ordinate TC activities inregard to labor supply and labor relationsat industrial plants executing TC contractsand in the transportation industry; repre-sent the War Department on the Shipbuild-ing Stabilization Committee of the WarProduction Board, and maintain liaisonwith the Shipbuilding Commission of theWar Labor Board, to assure proper con-sideration for TC interests.

Research and Development Division

Exercise technical supervision over thedesign, development, and testing of TCequipment, and experimental work in con-nection therewith; obtain clearance for allchanges in designs and specifications forTC equipment affecting military charac-teristics ; maintain liaison with other govern-mental agencies on technical matters affect-ing TC materiel; serve as point of contactfor the Chief of Transportation with theTransportation Corps Board on matters re-lating to TC materiel; study foreign dataand foreign transportation equipment witha view to improving the quality and suit-ability of TC materiel.


Maintenance Division

Co-ordinate communications and reportspertaining to maintenance policies, pro-cedures, and problems affecting railwayequipment, vessels, Army railroad repairshops, marine repair shops, and combinedmaintenance shops; co-ordinate TC activi-ties relating to the repair, reclamation, andreconditioning of equipment and supplies tobe placed in depot stock; co-ordinate thepreparation of TC manuals, bulletins, andother publications relating to the repair,reconditioning, reclamation, and mainte-nance of TC equipment and supplies; bringTC maintenance policies and practices intoaccord with ASF policies and practices.

Procurement Division

Serve as control agency for construction,production, and purchasing in connectionwith all TC equipment, spare parts, andsupplies; prepare engineering plans, speci-fications, bills of materials, and cost esti-mates for all items to be procured; call forbids and award contracts for all major itemsof TC materiel; allocate to TC procure-ment offices the procurement responsibilityfor specific classes of supply items; establishrequirements for and allocate controlledmaterials; direct production scheduling andestablish and maintain master productionschedules; exercise staff supervision overthe inspection activities of TC field procure-ment offices; take necessary actions in con-nection with the readjustment and termina-tion of contracts, and exercise staff super-vision over the activities of TC field pro-curement offices relating to such matters.

Requirements and Distribution Division

Supervise the compilation of require-ments for TC equipment, spare parts, and

supplies, including the requirements ofother governmental agencies and the re-quirements for international aid; superviseactivities directly related to the receipt, pro-cessing, storage, issue, packing, marking, andshipment of TC materiel, except floatingequipment in wet storage; serve as centralsupply control agency for all principalitems, and as the initial source of supply forall restricted items of dry storage equip-ment; supervise TC depot operations andmaintain necessary supply records and con-trols; prepare specifications for articledescriptions and maintain a dictionary ofarticle names for all items of TC supply;determine the need for and prepare manu-scripts for TC supply catalogs and relatedpublications.

Property Disposal Division

Maintain records of property declaredexcess to TC and property reported to dis-posal agencies as surplus to the War De-partment; supervise activities at TC installa-tions in connection with the redistributionand disposal of property declared excess orsurplus; co-ordinate TC action on propertyresulting from the termination of contracts,so as to obtain prompt clearance from con-tractors' plants; co-ordinate action on re-ports of theater commanders relating to ex-cess TC materiel; supervise salvage activi-ties at TC installations.

Water Division

Establish operating and maintenance poli-cies and standards for and supervise the op-eration, maintenance, and alteration ofocean-going vessels owned by or under bare-boat charter to the Army; assign harborboats and other small floating equipmentowned by or chartered to the Army, and

APPENDIX A 421

supervise the operation and maintenance ofsuch equipment to the extent authorized byArmy regulations; supervise terminal andstevedoring operations at ports of embarka-tion, and contracting for such services, andmaintain cost and efficiency records; ex-ercise administrative control of TC marinerepair shops and wet storage basins;co-ordinate with the Maritime Commissionand the War Shipping Administration re-garding plans for the conversion of vesselsunder the jurisdiction of those agencies foruse by the Army; obtain ships and shipspace from the War Shipping Administra-tion to lift Army cargo; maintain liaisonwith the War Shipping Administration andthe Naval Transportation Service with re-gard to the exchange of cargo; co-operatewith the Traffic Control Division in regu-lating the flow of cargo to ports of embarka-tion; study the facilities and labor supply atU.S. and oversea ports to be used by theArmy, and determine their capacities tohandle shipping; analyze the operation ofvessels in Army service to determine theefficiency with which ship time and spaceare used; supervise investigations andactions in connection with marine casualtiesand salvage operations in which the WarDepartment has an interest.

Traffic Control Division

Provide routing for all passenger move-ments involving groups of forty persons ormore, and for carload freight, by rail, high-way, or water; deal with all matters re-lating to passenger and freight rates onbehalf of the War Department; negotiatewith the carriers regarding freight classifi-cation ratings and descriptions, transit ar-rangements, demurrage, weight agreements,loading rules, switching and other acces-

sorial charges; arrange for special trainsfor the movement of troops and impedi-menta and control such movements enroute; control the flow of War Departmentand lend-lease freight destined to the portsby issuing permits for each shipment; ar-range for and control expedited movementsof freight; direct the operation, mainte-nance, and distribution of War Departmenttank cars; technically supervise the opera-tion of consolidating stations and distribut-ing agencies, and all arrangements in con-nection with the consolidated freight serv-ice; prepare instructions for transportationofficers at Army installations regardingtraffic matters; analyze proposed sites forArmy installations with reference to trafficfactors and arrange for adequate trans-portation services for such installations;study Army traffic with a view to eliminat-ing wasteful practices and improving theutilization of equipment; study the effectof proposed abandonments of commoncarrier services on Army traffic.

Rail Division

Establish policies and procedures in re-gard to the Military Railway Service; co-ordinate with the director of militarytraining in establishing training doctrine,tables of organization and equipment, andtables of allowances for units of the MRS,and in the preparation of manuals relatingto MRS; co-ordinate with the director ofsupply and materiel in establishing thedesign of rail equipment to be procured forArmy use in the zone of interior and inoversea theaters; act as rear echelon forMilitary Railway Services in the theaters inregard to personnel, equipment, and sup-plies; supervise the operation and mainte-nance of Army hospital cars as railway


equipment; assign utility railroad equipmentto Army installations in the zone of interior,and exercise technical supervision over theoperation and maintenance of such equip-ment; advise railway officers in the zonetransportation offices on technical railwaymatters; evaluate from an operating stand-point the plans for additional railroad facili-ties at Army installations; study the linehaul and terminal capacities of railroads inrelation to prospective movements of Armytraffic; assemble information regarding thefacilities of and operating conditions onforeign rail lines, for use in preparinglogistical plans for the U.S. Army.

Highway Division

Consider requests for Army buses to serveArmy installations and war industries, ap-prove contracts for the operation of suchbuses, and supervise the administration ofsuch contracts; assist commercial motorcarriers to obtain needed equipment, spareparts, and personnel, and to obtain addi-tional operating authority to enable them toproperly serve the Army; study highway op-erations in the zone of interior to ascertainwhether equipment and manpower are be-ing used economically, and develop plansfor improvements; review proposed high-way construction projects to determinewhether they are essential to the war effort;study highway facilities and traffic inforeign areas for purposes of strategic plan-ning; recommend types and quantities ofvehicles for military highway services in

oversea areas; advise highway officers in thezone transportation offices on technicalhighway matters; administer the responsi-bilities of the Chief of Transportation withregard to the assignment of administrativevehicles to ASF installations, and their op-eration; maintain liaison on behalf of theChief of Transportation with highwaytraffic advisory committees, trade associ-ations in the highway transportation field,and governmental agencies concerned withhighway transportation.

Transit Storage Division

Establish policies for warehousing andstorage at TC installations, except depots;supervise the allotment of space and thestorage methods used at holding and recon-signment points; maintain general recordsof materials stored at holding and recon-signment points; arrange with the technicalservices for the removal of supplies whichhave remained at holding and reconsign-ment points beyond the permissible time;supervise the allotment of space at railroadopen storage yards and arrange for inspec-tions to determine that Army materiel is be-ing properly stored and safeguarded in ac-cordance with contracts between the Armyand the railroads; control the utilization ofstorage and warehouse space at ports ofembarkation, and evaluate requests fromthe ports for additional space; assignmaterials-handling equipment to TC instal-lations, and supervise the utilization of suchequipment.

Appendix B

Wartime Commanders of thePorts of Embarkation

in the Zone of Interior

Ports

Boston

New York

Hampton Roads

Charleston

New Orleans

Los Angeles

San Francisco

Seattle

Commanders

Carlin C. StokelyClarence H. KellsCalvin De Witt, Jr.James C. Marshall

Homer M. GroningerClarence H. Kells

John R. Kilpatrick

James E. SlackJames T. Duke

George B. HunterFremont B. Hodson

William A. Aird *Abbott BooneJames K. Herbert

Frederick GilbreathClarence H. KellsHomer M. Groninger

Rufus F. Maddux *Eley P. Denson

Rank

ColCol-Brig GenBrig GenBrig Gen

Brig Gen-Maj GenMaj Gen

Col-Brig Gen

Lt ColCol-Brig Gen

Col-Brig GenCol-Brig Gen

ColColCol-Brig Gen

Col-Maj GenBrig Gen-Maj Gen

Maj Gen

ColCol-Brig Gen

AssumedCommand

Jan 1942Oct 1942Jun 1944Jul 1945

Oct 1940Jul 1945

Jun 1942

Jul 1941May 1942

Jul 1941Sep 1943

Jan 1942Apr 1943Nov 1943

Nov 1941Jun 1944Jun 1945

Aug 1941Dec 1941

* Installation was a subport throughout this officer's incumbency.Source: Reports from the ports of embarkation, in the records of the Historical Branch, Office of

the Chief of Transportation.

423

Appendix C

Transportation Zone Territoriesand Zone Transportation Officers

ZoneNumber

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

Headquartersand Territory

Hq—Boston, Mass.Ter—Maine, New Hampshire,

Vermont, Massachusetts,Rhode Island, Connecticut

Hq—New York, N. Y.Ter—New Jersey,

Delaware, New YorkHq—Baltimore, Md.Ter—Pennsylvania,

Maryland, VirginiaHq—Atlanta, Ga.Ter—North Carolina,

South Carolina, Georgia,Florida, Alabama, Tennessee,Mississippi

Hq—Columbus, OhioTer—Ohio, West Virginia,

Indiana, KentuckyHq—Chicago, Ill.Ter—Illinois, Michigan,

WisconsinHq—Omaha, Nebr.Ter—Missouri, Kansas,

Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota,North Dakota, South Dakota,Wyoming, Colorado

Hq—Dallas, Tex.Ter—Texas, Oklahoma,

New Mexico, Arkansas,Louisiana

Hq—Salt Lake City, UtahTer—Washington, Oregon,

Idaho, Montana, Utah,Nevada, California, Arizona

Zone TransportationOfficers

Col Marcel GarsaudCol Harry G. WilliamsCol Henry D. BagnallCol Richard F. AndersonCol E. B. GrayCol E. C. R. Lasher

Col M. A. McFaddenCol R. H. SartorCol Marsden V. BatesCol Henry L. GreenCol Calvin L. WhittleLt Col Osborn Palmer (Actg)Col Harry G. Williams

Col H. A. BooneCol Lincoln Martin

Col Dan A. HardtCol I. Sewell Morris

Col Edward A. McTamaneyCol Harry G. WilliamsCol Charles F. Perry

Col William H. NobleCol Raymond C. Stone

Col John C. P. HanleyCol Wallace H. HastingsCol Stewart F. Miller

AssumedOffice

Dec 1942Jun 1943Sep 1943Mar 1944Dec 1942Dec 1944

Dec 1942Aug 1944May 1945Dec 1942Sep 1943Jun 1944Aug 1944

Dec 1942Jun 1944

Dec 1942May 1945

Dec 1942Oct 1943Aug 1944

Dec 1942Jun 1943

Dec 1942May 1944Aug 1945

Source: SOS Cir 91, 1 Dec 42, sub: Reorganization of TC Field Agencies; reports from the zones,in the records of the Historical Branch, Office of the Chief of Transportation.

424

Appendix D*

Installations Subordinate to theZone Transportation Offices

in August 1945

Branch Zone Offices: Asheville, N. C.; Cleveland, Ohio; Louisville, Ky.; Detroit,Mich.; Hot Springs, Ark.; Little Rock, Ark.; Fort Worth, Tex.; OklahomaCity, Okla.; Shreveport, La.

District Transportation Offices: Cincinnati, Ohio; Denver, Colo.; Edmonton,Alberta; El Paso, Tex.; Houston, Tex.; Jacksonville, Fla.; Kansas City, Mo.;Los Angeles, Calif.; Memphis, Tenn.; Miami, Fla.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Mobile,Ala.; New Orleans, La.; Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Port-land, Oreg.; Portland, Me.; San Antonio, Tex.; San Francisco, Calif.; Savannah,Ga.; Seattle, Wash.; Spokane, Wash.; St. Louis, Mo.

Branch District Offices: Charleston, S. C.; Colorado Springs, Colo.; Laredo,Tex.; Tampa, Fla.; Wilmington, N. C.

Holding and Re consignment Points: Auburn, Wash.; Elmira, N. Y.; Lathrop,Calif.; Marietta, Pa.; Montgomery, Ala.; Pasco, Wash.; Richmond, Va.; Shreve-port, La.; Voorheesville, N. Y.; Yermo, Calif.

Freight Consolidating Stations: Chicago, Ill.; New York, N. Y.; Philadelphia,Pa.; San Antonio, Tex.; St. Louis, Mo.; Cleveland, Ohio.

Freight Distributing Agencies: Atlanta, Ga.; El Paso, Tex.; Los Angeles, Calif.;Oakland, Calif.; Portland, Oreg.; San Francisco, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.; Spokane,Wash.; Tacoma, Wash.

Railroad Repair Shops: Bucyrus, Ohio; Fort Benning, Ga.; Holabird SignalDepot, Md.; Ogden Arsenal, Utah.

Source: WD Coml Traf Bul 42, 20 Aug 45, OCT HB TZ Gen; WD Coml Traf Bull 44, Sec.IV, 10 Sep 45, OCT HB TZ Gen Port Agencies.

* Zone Transportation Offices and territories are shown in App. C. Army Reservation Bureausare not included above because they were attached to other TC installations. Railroad openstorage yards are not included because they were not operated by TC but by the railroads undercontract with TC.

425

Bibliographical Note

The principal sources of information inthe preparation of this volume were the cor-respondence and reports found in the rec-ords of The Adjutant General, the ArmyService Forces, the Office of the Chief ofTransportation, and other elements of theArmy; the directives issued by the War De-partment, the Army Service Forces, and theTransportation Corps; and the minutes andpapers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and theCombined Chiefs of Staff. Files of TheQuartermaster General which dealt withtransportation were transferred to the Chiefof Transportation when the transportationfunction was transferred in March 1942.The locations of the various record groupsare given in the Guide to Footnotes.

Frequent reference is made in the foot-notes to the records of the Historical Branchof the Office of the Chief of Transportation(OCT HB), and since these records are un-usual in composition and organization aword of explanation is desirable. They werebegun informally in 1942 as a means offacilitating the eventual preparation of ahistory of the Transportation Corps. Theprincipal constitutents are as follows:

1. Copies of significant letters, memo-randa, and reports obtained during andsince the war. These documents have beenof special value in initiating research intoparticular topics.

2. Periodical reports of the divisions ofthe Office of the Chief of Transportation,the field installations of the TransportationCorps in the zone of interior, and trans-portation officers with the forces overseas.Some of these reports reflect significant

activities and problems, while others arepurely routine.

3. Records assembled for the personaluse of the Chief of Transportation, theDirector of Operations, the Executive, theChiefs of the Planning, Movements, and In-ternational Divisions, and other officers ofthe Transportation Corps, which wereturned over, wholly or in part, to the His-torical Branch after the war. These recordsembrace (a) topical files relating to mat-ters with which the individual officers weredirectly concerned, and (b) day files(staybacks) consisting of copies of corres-pondence originated in the respective offices,arranged chronologically. Such records, es-pecially those of the Chief of Transporta-tion, the Director of Operations, and theExecutive, have been found exceedinglyhelpful, since they contain many documentsnot found in other records.

Since the Historical Branch records arecomposite, containing files derived fromseveral sources, their organization leavessomething to be desired. They consist ofa number of series of files, topically or-ganized as follows:

Transportation Corps GeneralOffice of the Chief of Transportation

(by divisions)Ports of EmbarkationTransportation ZonesOversea TheatersG-4, Transportation BranchOQMG, Transportation DivisionTopical files (miscellaneous subjects)General Gross's files (including his

Day File)

426

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 427

General Wylie's files (including thestaybacks of his office)

Executive's files (including his stay-backs)

Planning Division filesMovements Division files (mostly stay-

backs)International Division files (mostly

staybacks)Transportation Control Committee filesDemobilization Planning Unit filesTraffic Control Division Historian's

working fileWater Division Historian's working fileArmy Service Forces Monthly Progress

Report, Sec. 3Historical Branch MonographsPhotographs

All but two of the monographs referred toabove were prepared by members of theHistorical Branch, Office of the Chief ofTransportation, during the years 1943-46,as part of the wartime historical programof the Army Service Forces. They are inthe nature of interim reports based on in-formation then available. In many respectsthe sources of information were inadequateat the time the monographs were written,but in other respects they present usefulhistorical data. Although not all of thethirty wartime monographs are cited in thisvolume, they all bear on the subjects dis-cussed and accordingly the full list is givenbelow:

1. The Transportation AdvisoryGroup in the Office of theQuartermaster General, 1941—1942.

2. Organization and Activities of theTraffic Control Branch, Office ofthe Quartermaster General,1941-1942.

3. Supervision of Transportation bythe Supply Division of the WarDepartment General S ta f f ,1940-1942.

4. Administration of Transportationin the United States Army, April1917-March 1942.

5. Water Transportation for theUnited States Army, 1939-1942.

6. The Commercial Traffic Branchin the Office of the QuartermasterGeneral, July 1940-March 1942.

7. Army Hospital Ships in WorldWar II.

8. Expansion of Army Transporta-tion Facilities in the Zone of theInterior, 1941-1944.

9. U.S. Army Transportation and theConquest of North Africa,1942-1943.

10. Operating Relationships of theOffice of the Chief of Transporta-tion with Civilian GovernmentAgencies.

11. Transportation and the Green-land Bases, 1941-1944.

12. Troop Transports in World WarII.

13. U.S. Army Transportation andthe Conquest of Sicily, 1943.

14. Transportation of the U.S. Forcesin the Occupation of Iceland,1941-1944.

15. The Army-Navy ConsolidatedCar Service, 1942-1945.

16. Army Transportation Zones inthe Second World War.

17. U.S. Army Transportation andthe Italian Campaign.

18. The Army's Cargo Fleet in WorldWar II.

19. Handling Army Cargo in theSecond World War.


20. Inland Transportation of Indi-viduals for the Army DuringWorld War II.

21. Negotiation of Rates and Servicesfor Inland Army Passenger TravelDuring World War II.

22. Inland Movement of Troops inOrganized Parties During WorldWar II.

23. Control of Port-bound FreightDuring World War II.

24. Inland Freight Routing Practicesof the Army in World War II.

25. U.S. Army Transportation in thePersian Corridor, 1941-1945.

26. The Military Training Programof the Transportation Corps inWorld War II.

27. Role of the Transportation Corpsin Oversea Supply.

28. Supply Program and Operationsof the Transportation Corps inWorld War II.

29. U.S. Army Transportation in theEuropean Theater of Operations,1942-1945.

30. The Army's Overseas PassengerTraffic in World War II.

Two unnumbered monographs, entitledU.S. Army Transportation in the South-west Pacific Area, 1941-1947, and Historyof Transportation Service in China, Burma,and India in World War II, were writtenin 1949 and 1950, respectively. The authorshad access to much more complete recordsthan did the authors of the wartime mono-graphs.

Secondary sources—books, magazine andnewspaper articles, and published reports—have been cited chiefly to document state-ments on the general aspects of transporta-tion, and on activities other than those ofthe Transportation Corps, which did notseem to require more extensive research. Anotable exception is the Gross final report,which has been repeatedly referred to inconnection with Army transportation. Thisreport was prepared in November 1945, atthe end of General Gross's tour of duty asChief of Transportation. It was carefullyreviewed by him before publication andmay be taken as a responsible expression ofhis views on many of the problems whichconfronted his office.

Guide to Footnotes

Since so much of the source material forthis volume consists of communications ofvarious types filed in various records, anexplanation of how the footnotes have beenformulated and where the documents maybe consulted is necessary. In citing com-munications the general plan has been toindicate the form of the communication, thesender, the addressee, the date, and thesubject. Certain definitions and qualifica-tions are to be noted.

The communications most frequentlycited are of the following forms: the letter(Ltr) , which was used chiefly though notexclusively for correspondence between theWar Department and other departmentsand agencies; the memorandum (Memo),which was used chiefly for correspondencewithin the War Department, and some-times for correspondence with other govern-mental agencies, notably the Navy; theindorsement (Ind), used extensively withinthe War Department as a substitute forseparate memoranda; the disposition form(DF), primarily a transmittal form, butalso used for comments and instructions; thereport (Rpt) , which reviewed a specificsubject or the developments during a givenperiod; the radiogram (Rad); the telegram(Telg); and the teletype message (TWX).When it is not clear by what means anelectrically transmitted message was sent,it is cited simply as a message (Msg).

When the text indicates the sender or theaddressee of a communication, this informa-tion is omitted from the footnote. The sameplan has been followed when the text givesthe date of the document.

The subjects given on communicationshave been included in the footnotes in manyinstances, but they have been omitted fre-quently in the interest of brevity. This hasseemed feasible when the text indicates thegeneral subject matter of the documentcited, and the omission of the exact subjectshould not impair the ability to locate it.The subjects given on communications fre-quently are long, and they have beenabbreviated in the footnotes when practi-cable.

The symbols on communications, indi-cating the office of origin and the con-templated file number, have been given ina few instances in parentheses, but morefrequently they have been omitted. Omissionwas decided on because so frequently,particularly with communications originat-ing in the Office of the Chief of Transporta-tion, the symbol did not correspond to thenumber of the file in which the documentwas found.

Each citation identifies the agency inwhose records the cited document is located,and gives the numerical or subject designa-tion of the file, or both. This information isthe last item in each citation. When asingle location applies to several cited docu-ments, it is clearly indicated after the lastcitation to which it applies. The principalrecords given as the locations of files are asfollows:

OCT—Records of the Office of the Chiefof Transportation, at present in custody ofthe Departmental Records Branch, AGO.

OCT HB—Records of the HistoricalBranch (at one time called Historical Unit)of the Office of the Chief of Transportation,

429


at present in custody of the Office of theChief of Military History, U.S. Army.

AG—Records of The Adjutant General'sOffice, in custody of the DepartmentalRecords Branch, AGO.

ASF—Records of Army Service Forcesheadquarters, now in custody of the De-partmental Records Branch, AGO.

G-4—Records of the Supply Division(G-4) of the General Staff, now in custodyof the Departmental Records Branch, AGO.

Trans Br G-4—Records of the Trans-portation Branch of G-4, prior to March1942, now in custody of the Office of theChief of Transportation.

P&O—Records of the War Plans Divi-sion of the General Staff, and its successors,the Operations Division and the Plans andOperations Division, now in custody of theDepartmental Records Branch, AGO.

Occasional references will be found inthe footnotes to other records: OSW, Officeof the Secretary of War; USW, UnderSecretary of War; WDCSA, Chief of Staff;OCS, Office of the Chief of Staff; WDGAP,Personnel Division of the General Staff;WDGDS, Supply Division of the GeneralStaff; WPD, War Plans Division of theGeneral Staff; WDMB, War DepartmentManpower Board. All of these records arenow in custody of the DepartmentalRecords Branch, AGO.

War Department directives, such asArmy Regulations (AR), Circulars (WDCir), General Orders (WD GO), Techni-cal Manuals (TM), and Field Manuals(FM) have been cited without location,because complete sets are available in ArmyPublications Service Branch, AGO, andfairly complete sets are in the Departmentof Defense Library. The same is true ofArmy Service Forces circulars and manuals.Similar publications of the Office of the

Chief of Transportation will be found inthe records of that office. Copies of manysuch directives will be found also in therecords of the Historical Branch, OCT,filed either serially or in appropriate subjectfiles.

Numerous references will be found to theArmy Service Forces Monthly Progress Re-port (ASF MPR), particularly when statis-tics are involved. This report was issuedin a number of sections, but Section 3,Transportation, is the one usually cited inthis volume. It was prepared in the Statisticsand Progress Branch of the Control Divi-sion, OCT, beginning October 1942, fromdata assembled by that branch. A completeset is in the records of the Historical Branch,OCT, together with a less comprehensivemonthly report, Statistical Summary, Trans-portation Service, which was issued by OCTbefore the ASF MPR was started.

Minutes and papers of the Joint Board,the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CombinedChiefs of Staff, and their various com-mittees also have been cited without loca-tion. They will be found in the Joint Chiefsof Staff, Research and Records AnalysisSection.

A number of published reports, whichhave been cited repeatedly, have been givenabbreviated titles. Final Report of the Chiefof Transportation, Army Service Forces,World War II, 30 November 1945, hasbeen cited as Gross final rpt. Civilian WarTransport, a Record of the Control ofDomestic Traffic Operations by the Officeof Defense Transportation, 1941-1946, hasbeen cited as Civilian War Transport. Thetwo biennial reports rendered by the Chiefof Staff, U.S. Army, during the war havebeen cited as Biennial Rpt, CofS USA; thepage references to the 1941-1943 report arebased on the Government Printing Office

GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 431

edition; those to the 1943-1945 report arebased on the text published by Simon andSchuster for the War Department, TheWinning of the War in Europe and thePacific.

In citing the monographs which wereprepared in the Historical Branch of theOffice of the Chief of Transportation aspart of its wartime program, only the num-ber of the monograph has been given; thetitles will be found in the BibliographicalNote. These monographs are in the recordsof the Historical Branch, OCT.

As a means of saving space, footnotes

have been combined in many instances,rather than documenting each statementseparately. As a result, the documents citedin a footnote in some instances are applic-able to statements immediately following,as well as those immediately preceding thenote.

Again, as a measure of space economy,when a file contains a number of docu-ments relating to a subject, only the moresignificant documents have been cited. Inmany instances, therefore, reference to thefiles will disclose details which it has notbeen possible to discuss in the text.

Glossary of Technical Terms*

Balanced cargo

Bale cubic

Ballast

Balloon cargo

Bareboat charter

Bottom cargo

Class I installation

Class II installation

Class III installation

Class IV installation

Combat loader

Combat loading

A mixture of heavy and light cargo, which approxi-mately fills the cargo space and weighs the ship downto its legal maximum draft.The space available for cargo, measured in cubic feet,to the inside of the cargo battens on the frames of thevessel and to the underside of the beams.Heavy material, other than cargo, carried in the holdof a vessel to provide stability.Items which occupy an exceptionally large amount ofspace in relation to their weight.A form under which the charterer hires the vessel only,and provides the crew, supplies, fuel, and other operat-ing requisites.Dense and heavy cargo, particularly that stowed in thebottom of a ship's hold to improve stability.One wholly under the command of the service com-mander. (See service command.)One under the command of the service commanderwith certain activities exempted. In general this classincluded the posts, camps, and stations utilized by theArmy Ground Forces.One under the command of the Army Air Forces, atwhich the service command performed limited services.One under the command of a technical service or staffdivision of the Army Service Forces, at which theservice command performed certain functions.A vessel specially equipped for combat loading. TheNavy provided two types — APA (transport, attack),and AKA (cargo ship, attack).Loading a ship with an assortment of equipment andsupplies required by troops entering combat, and stow-ing the various items in such a manner that they canbe unloaded quickly and in the order needed.

* Like most industries, transportation employs technical terms which are not familiar to thelay reader. Certain Army terms also are not understood outside military circles. The followingbrief nontechnical definitions will save the reader the inconvenience of seeking explanationselsewhere.

432

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 433

Combat zone

Communications zone

Corps area

Deadweight tonnage

Dry cargo ship

Echelons of maintenance

Explosives cargo

Filler cargo

Full and down

General cargo

Gross tonnage

Landing craft

Line haul

Long ton

Measurement ton

Forward area of a theater of operations, where combattroops are actively engaged.

The part of a theater of operations behind the combatzone, where supply, transportation, and other facilitiesare located and services performed.

One of nine commands in the zone of interior prior toJuly 1942, with functions similar to those of the servicecommands. (See service commands.)

The number of long tons (2,240 pounds) that a shipcan transport, including cargo, fuel, water, stores, crew,and passengers.

Any ship, except a tank ship carrying liquids in bulk.As used in World War II the term applied to passengerships as well as freighters.

Categories ranging from the first echelon, which in-cluded the simpler forms of upkeep, to the fifth, whichincluded the heavier types of repairs. (See ASF ManualM 807, Glossary, 25 Oct 44.)

Live ammunition and bulk explosives.

Packaged and bagged supplies which can be stowedin small and irregularly shaped spaces in the hold ofa ship.

Term indicating that a vessel has all cargo space filledand that the cargo is sufficiently heavy to take the shipdown to the legal maximum draft.

Broadly used, the term includes all except bulk cargoes,but in Army usage it may exclude explosives.

The internal cubic capacity of a ship's holds, 'tweendecks, and permanently enclosed spaces on or abovethe upper deck (except certain exempted spaces)measured in tons of 100 cubic feet.

A vessel designed to carry troops and combat equip-ment ashore for a landing attack.

Haul over a railroad line, as distinguished from switch-ing.

Weight ton of 2,240 pounds; customarily used inconnection with ocean freight, whereas the railroadscustomarily use the short ton of 2,000 pounds.

40 cubic feet; sometimes called ship ton, since it isused chiefly in connection with ocean transportation.


Service command

Short ton

Tanker

Theater of operations

Zone of interior

One of nine commands in the zone of interior afterJuly 1942 (replacing corps area); a field agency ofthe Services of Supply, and later of the Army ServiceForces. It furnished certain services to other elementsof the Army within its area, including administrative,legal, financial, medical, construction, and fixed com-munications. (See Class I, II, III, and IV installations.)Weight ton of 2,000 pounds, customarily used by thedomestic carriers.A tank ship for transporting petroleum products andother liquids in bulk.An Army command including the area of actual fight-ing (combat zone) and the adjacent area utilized forsupporting administrative and supply activities (com-munications zone).The area which furnishes manpower and materiel tothe forces in theaters of operations. The United Statesand Canada constituted the zone of interior for theU.S. Army in World War II.

List of Abbreviations*

AAF Army Air ForcesAAR Association of American

RailroadsACofS Assistant Chief of StaffACofT Assistant Chief of

TransportationACTREP Activities Report (shipping)Adm Administration or

AdministrativeAdv AdvisoryAEF American Expeditionary

Forces, World War IAFPAC U.S. Army Forces, PacificAFWESPAC U.S. Army Forces, Western

PacificAGO Adjutant General's OfficeAGF Army Ground ForcesAKA Cargo ship, attackAmph AmphibiousANMB Army and Navy Munitions

BoardAPA Transport, attackAR Army RegulationsASF Army Service ForcesASW Assistant Secretary of WarATA American Trucking

AssociationsATS Army Transport ServiceBAS British Army StaffBMWT British Ministry of War

TransportBn BattalionBPE Boston Port of EmbarkationBd BoardBr BranchBuPers Bureau of Personnel (Navy)BUPERS Chief, Bureau of Personnel

(Navy)

BUSANDA Chief, Bureau of Suppliesand Accounts (Navy)

BuShips Bureau of Ships (Navy)BUSHIPS Chief, Bureau of Ships

(Navy)C ChiefCAC Coast Artillery CorpsCCS Combined Chiefs of StaffCG Commanding GeneralChm ChairmanCINCAFPAC Commander in Chief, U.S.

Army Forces, PacificCINCPAC Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific FleetCINCPOA Commander in Chief,

Pacific Ocean AreasCir CircularCiv CivilianCM-IN Classified message, incomingCM-OUT Classified message, outgoingCMP Controlled Materials PlanCMTC Combined Military

Transportation CommitteeCO Commanding OfficerCofCWS Chief, Chemical Warfare

ServiceCE Corps of EngineersCofEngrs Chief of EngineersCNO Chief of Naval OperationsCofOrd Chief of OrdnanceCofS Chief of Staff

* Abbreviations have been used extensively in thefootnotes in order to save space, and they have beenemployed in a limited way in the text. Insofar aspracticable, these abbreviations conform to WarDepartment Technical Manual, TM 20-205,Dictionary of United States Army Terms, issued 18January 1944. This list will help the reader towhom the meaning of certain abbreviations is notat once apparent.

435


CofT Chief of TransportationCorps

Com Committee or CommissionComdr CommanderComdt CommandantCOMINCH Commander in Chief,

United States FleetComl CommercialCOMZONE Communications zoneConf ConferenceCons ConstructionConv Conversion or ConversationCPE Charleston (S. C.) Port of

EmbarkationCRO Chief Regulating OfficerCSAB Combined Shipping

Adjustment BoardCWS Chemical Warfare ServiceDC Deputy ChiefDCofS Deputy Chief of StaffDCofT Deputy Chief of

TransportationDir DirectorDist Distribution or DistrictDiv DivisionDWT Deadweight tons or tonnageEM Enlisted menEmb EmbarkationEO Executive OrderEquip EquipmentESF Eastern Sea Frontier (Navy)Estab EstablishmentETO European Theater of

OperationsETOUSA European Theater of

Operations, U.S. ArmyExec ExecutiveFM Field ManualFY Fiscal YearG-1 Personnel Division, War

Department General Staff

G-2 Military Intelligence Divi-sion, War DepartmentGeneral Staff

G-3 Organization and TrainingDivision, War DepartmentGeneral Staff

G-4 Supply Division, WarDepartment General Staff

Gen GeneralGeog GeographicalGHQ General HeadquartersGO General OrderGSUSA General Staff, U.S. ArmyGT Gross tons or tonnageHB Historical Branch, Office of

the Chief of TransportationHist HistoricalHosp HospitalHq HeadquartersHR House of RepresentativesH. Res. House ResolutionHRPE Hampton Roads Port of

EmbarkationHTAC Highway Traffic Advisory

CommitteeHwy HighwayICC Interstate Commerce

CommissionIncl InclosureInd Industrial or IndorsementInfo InformationInsp Inspection or InspectorInt IntelligenceJAG Judge Advocate GeneralJAGD Judge Advocate General's

DepartmentJB Joint Board (Army and

Navy)JCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJLC Joint Logistics CommitteeJMPA Joint Military Passenger

Agreement

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 437

JMTC Joint Military Transporta-tion Committee

JPC Joint Planning CommitteeJPS Joint Staff PlannersJSM Joint Staff MissionLAPE Los Angeles Port of

EmbarkationLST Landing ship, tankLT Long ton—2,240 poundsMar Com Maritime CommissionMil MilitaryMPR Monthly Progress ReportMRS Military Railway ServiceMT Measurement ton—40 cubic

feetMtg MeetingMTO Mediterranean Theater of

OperationsMTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of

Operations, U.S. ArmyMTS Military Transportation

Section, Association ofAmerican Railroads

Mvmt MovementNAMBO National Association of

Motor Bus OperatorsNATO North African Theater of

OperationsNATOUSA North African Theater of

Operations, U.S. ArmyNIG Naval Inspector GeneralNOPE New Orleans Port of

EmbarkationNTS Naval Transportation

ServiceNYPE New York Port of

EmbarkationOCofEngrs Office of the Chief of

EngineersOCMH Office of the Chief of

Military HistoryOCS Office of the Chief of Staff

OCT Office of the Chief ofTransportation

Ord Dept Ordnance DepartmentODT Office of Defense

TransportationOff OfficerOPA Office of Price

AdministrationOPD Operations Division, War

Department General StaffOPM Office of Production

ManagementOpn OperationOQMG Office of the Quartermaster

GeneralOrg Organization or

OrganizationalOWM Office of War MobilizationP&O Plans and Operations

Division, General Staff,U.S. Army

PAW Petroleum Administrationfor War

PE Port of EmbarkationPers PersonnelPL Public LawPlng PlanningPOA Pacific Ocean AreasPRA Public Roads

AdministrationProd ProductionProg ProgressQMG The Quartermaster GeneralRec RecordReg RegulationReorg ReorganizationReq RequirementsRR RailroadRy RailwayS SenateSecy SecretarySFPE San Francisco Port of

Embarkation


SGO Surgeon General's OfficeSN Secretary of the NavySOLOG Southern Lines of

CommunicationsSOS Services of SupplySp SpecialSPE Seattle Port of EmbarkationSSUSA Special Staff, U.S. ArmyStor StorageSv ServiceSvC Service CommandSW Secretary of WarSWPA Southwest Pacific AreaTAG The Adjutant GeneralTC Transportation CorpsTech TechnicalTM Technical ManualTng TrainingT/O Tables of OrganizationT/O&E Tables of Organization and

EquipmentTr TroopTraf TrafficTrans TransportationTZ Transportation ZoneUSA United States Army

USAFBI U.S. Army Forces in theBritish Isles

USAFFE U.S. Forces in the Far EastUSASOS U.S. Army, Services of

SupplyUSCG U.S. Coast GuardUSF U.S. FleetUSN U.S. NavyUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist

RepublicsUSW Under Secretary of WarWESPAC Western PacificWDGS War Department General

StaffWDMB War Department Manpower

BoardWMC War Manpower CommissionWPB War Production BoardWPD War Plans Division, War

Department General StaffWSA War Shipping

AdministrationWSF Western Sea Frontier

(Navy)ZI Zone of interiorZTO Zone Transportation Officer

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations DivisionStrategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground ForcesThe Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the PacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First OffensiveVictory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulSeizure of the Gilberts and MarshallsCampaign in the MarianasThe Approach to the PhilippinesLeyte: The Return to the PhilippinesTriumph in the PhilippinesOkinawa: The Last BattleStrategy and Command: The First Two Years

The Mediterranean Theater of OperationsNorthwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the WestSicily and the Surrender of ItalySalerno to CassinoCassino to the Alps

The European Theater of OperationsCross-Channel AttackBreakout and PursuitThe Lorraine CampaignThe Siegfried Line CampaignThe Ardennes: Battle of the BulgeThe Last Offensive


The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against JapanThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against GermanyThe Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor

TheatersThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of OperationsThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against JapanThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for WarThe Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against GermanyThe Signal Corps: The EmergencyThe Signal Corps: The TestThe Signal Corps: The OutcomeThe Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and OperationsThe Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and SupplyThe Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas

Special StudiesChronology: 1941-1945Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945Rearming the FrenchThree Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and SchmidtThe Women's Army CorpsCivil Affairs: Soldiers Become GovernorsBuying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air ForcesThe Employment of Negro TroopsManhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb

Pictorial RecordThe War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent AreasThe War Against Japan

Index

ABC motor express route, 91Accidents. See Safety.Administrative Division, OCT, 418Administrative Supervision of field installations,

126-32Administrative vehicles, 402-05"Admirals" (troopships), 222Advisory Commission to the Council of National

Defense, 39, 328Aerial ports of embarkation, 51-53, 67Africa, 11, 12. See also North Africa.Agreement of enrollment for seamen, 259.Air Corps. See Army Air Forces.Air coverage, for convoys, 214Air express, 369Air Force. See Army Air Forces.Air freight regulating officers, 119, 119nAir officers, port, 106Air Priorities Branch, OCT, 51Air Section, G-4, 48Air Service Command, 106, 382Air Transport Command, 15, 67, 369Aircraft, commercial, 369-70Aircraft carriers, 146-47Aircraft repair ships, 301Aird, Col. William A., 423AKA's. See Combat loaders.Alaska, 8, 9, 12, 200Alaska Barge Service, 250Alaska Railroad, 9Alcan Highway, 8Aliens, employed as civilian crew members, 233-35,

235nAmbulance car, 386America, 146American Railway Association, 30, 312American Trucking Associations, 354, 355, 358Ammunition, loading of, 277. See also Explosives.Amphibian truck companies, 88, 109Amphibious assault, adds to transportation load,

12-14Amphibious operations, preparations for, 144-48Anderson, Col. Richard F., 424Andes, 222Anthony, George A., 305Antisubmarine measures. See Submarines, German.Antitrust laws, 310Antwerp, 288, 289APA's. See Combat loaders.Appleton, Col. John A., 326Aquitania, 6, 222, 226ARCADIA, 6Argentina, 222

Armament for Army vessels, 245-46Army Air Forces, 15, 58, 119, 178, 257, 378, 379,

382, 396, 401, 402-03aerial ports of embarkation, 51-53, 119aircraft and personnel, 14-15delegation of authority to, 59-62demands on land and water transportation, 15field agencies duplicate TC functions, 60-62given control over movements by air, 51rescue and airplane retrieving vessels, 249, 254,

255Army air traffic, control restored to TC, 67-68Army cargoes. See Cargo ships; Loading."Army days" in port, 281Army Embarkation Service, World War I, 31, 32Army hospital cars. See Hospital cars.Army installations, rail services at, 316-17Army and Navy Munitions Board, 40, 45, 177, 396Army-Navy Petroleum Board, 72Army-Navy relations, 200-11

differences in logistical systems, 205effort to co-ordinate activities, 169-72, 182-84,

205-11joint exercises, 1940-41, 144-48Navy manning of Army vessels, 200-02, 206-08unification of transportation operations, 203-05

Army-Navy Shipping Information Agencies, 211Army regulating stations, 46Army Reorganization Act of 1920, 35Army reservation bureaus, 117, 122Army Service Forces, 50, 55

Commanding General, 50, 78-80Director of Matériel, 378Director of Operations, 20, 80-81established, 49-50planning role, 19-20relation of OCT with other ASF elements, 78-82,

103-05Army tank cars. See Tank cars.Army Transport Service, 29, 30, 42, 107-09,

136-44, 145-46, 205-09, 229-39, 262-63. Seealso Water Division.

Army War Ship Repair Contract Agency, 303Asiatic Theater, 253Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, 38, 40, 46, 142Assistant Secretary of War, 38, 39, 177Association of American Railroads, 42, 47, 79,

312-53, passim.confidence in ability to cope with wartime

demands, 320Atlantic Convoy Conference, 212Atlantic. Oversea Service Command, 104Atterbury, Brig. Gen. W. W., 34n


Australia, 5, 7, 11, 283Auto haulers, converted into passenger carriers,

394-95, 400Automobiles, pool riding, 396

Back-hauling, 344, 345Bagnall, Col. Henry D., 424Baldwin, L. W., 351Bale cubic capacities, percentage of utilization,

276-79Baltimore, Md., cargo port, 73, 96, 97n, 99, 110Barthrop, Lt. Col. John A., 303Baruch, Bernard M., 396Base depot companies, 90Basic Logistical Plan, 170-71, 183, 210Bates, Col. Marsden V., 424Bayonne (N.J . ) Terminal, 177Board of Economic Warfare, 196Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, 250Boats, small

acquisition of, 251-53assignment of, 254critical need in Pacific, 251delivery crews for, 257individual contract for crew members, 258-59operation and maintenance, 254-55requirements for, 250-53training of crews, 256-57

Boone, Col. Abbott, 423Boone, Col. H. A.,.424Boston Port of Embarkation, 44, 46, 97, 99, 110Boston Quartermaster Depot, 107Bottom cargo, defined, 194nBrazil, 222British Master Agreement, 220British Ministry of Shipping, 31, 187British Ministry of War Transport, 44, 168, 181,

187, 221, 226, 227, 274British shipbuilding, 154-55British shipping

minimum standards for troopships, 225repairs in U. S., 184requirements of British import program, 222tonnage of, 136use by U. S. Army, 220, 224, 226-27

British-American conferences, 3, 164-65, 165nBrooklyn Army Base, 106Budd, Ralph, 328, 351Buford, Charles H., 324, 350Bunting, Col. Geoffrey C., 71Bureau of the Budget, 139, 154, 188, 190, 198Bureau of Economic Warfare, 167Burma Road, 11Buses, Army pool of

allocation of vehicles, 401-02authority for, 397establishment of, 394fares, 400-01

Buses, Army pool of—Continuedoperating arrangements, 400types of vehicles, 398-400

Buses, commercial, use by Army, 354, 357-59Byrnes, James F., 305-06

Camp Claiborne, La., 124Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., 124, 256Camp Plauché, La., 109Camp Shelby, Miss., 124Camp Stoneman, Calif., 124Canadian National Railways, 8, 9Canadian subports, 97, 97nCanol project, 8Car efficiency committees, 342Car loading forecasts, 315-16Car Service Division, AAR, 312-13Cargo Clearance Committee, 40Cargo discharge performance, oversea areas, 298Cargo loading costs. See Loading costs.Cargo manifests, 86Cargo pallets, 14nCargo pooling, 193-95Cargo ports of embarkation, defined, 96Cargo ships

allocated by WSA, 195-97controversy between Army and WSA over load-

ing of, 190-92efficient utilization of, 273-82effort to maintain balance with troop carriers, 4

Casablanca Conference, 4, 208, 222Central America, 9Central Pacific, 171, 173Certificate of preference, 371Certificates of war necessity, 364Charleston, S. C., Port of Embarkation, 41, 46, 96,

99, 110, 256Chartering of vessels, 139, 143, 189, 198-99Chemical Warfare Service, 301, 378, 380, 381, 382,

383, 404Chemicals, transport of, 381, 383Cherbourg, 12Chief Regulating Officer, GHQ, SWPA, 293, 294Chief of Transportation, Office of. See also Gross,

Maj. Gen. Charles P.creation of, 55delegation of authority to the Army Air Forces,

59-62organization, 68-73personnel, 73-74policies of Chief of Transportation, 73-78relations with other elements of the Army Service

Forces, 78-82relations with the oversea commands, 82-94responsibilities, 57-58, 62-68

China, 7, 9, 26Churchill, Manitoba, 97n

INDEX 443

Churchill, Winston, 4, 5conferences with Roosevelt on utilization of

shipping, 168, 221initiation of American-British planning, 18and the shipbuilding program, 155on U-boat danger, 151and utilization of shipping, 165, 168

CIO maritime unions, 193Civil Aeronautics Administration, 39Civil service, 230, 232-33, 259Civil Service Commission, 232Civil Service Retirement Act, 230Civilian crews, 32, 206. See also Crews.

Army relations with unions, 229-33, 237crew discipline, 238draft deferment, 235grievance procedures, 237manning scales, 233promotion of welfare, 236-37proposals regarding, 260-61recruiting of, 233-36safeguards against subversive activities, 237-38,

237nship transportation agent, 238-39, 239nfor small boats, 255-60troubled relations with enlisted men, 246

Civilian Marine School (New Orleans), 235Civilian passengers, 199Civilian Personnel Division, OCT, 237Civilian population, supplies for, 16Claiborne and Polk Military Railway, 124CLARION, 25nClay, Maj. Gen. Lucius D., 362Clement, Martin W., 350Coast Artillery Corps, 245, 246, 249, 254, 255Coast Guard, 203, 224, 237n, 238, 239, 255, 256,

266, 270, 300Coastwise convoys, establishment of, 217Coastwise Transportation Service, theater of opera-

tions, 83Combat loaders (AKA's and APA's), 158, 160-61

cargo vessels and troopships converted to, 299conversion of Army transports to, 146-47

Combat loading, 144, 144ndefined, 144ndifference of opinion over control of, 144-45lack of preparation for, 1940-41, 144, 144nmethod of, 14

Combined Chiefs of Staff, 19, 413begins functioning, 18planning role, 19relation to American ship construction program,

163role in allocation of shipping, 165, 167works out maximum assignment of ships for Mac-

Arthur, 284Combined Military Transportation Committee, 19,

413

Combined Military Trans. Committee—Continuedand convoys, 217relation to American ship construction program,

163role in allocation of shipping, 167, 168-69

Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, 164-65,168, 221, 222, 225-26, 229

Commercial carriers, utilization of, 308-74Commercial traffic agencies, 41, 53, 111-12Commercial Traffic Branch, OQMG, 35, 37, 42, 47,

49, 111, 356, 358, 359, 368, 381, 382, 385, 391Commercial vessels, use by Army, 140, 142Committee on Standardization for Army Vessels,

242"Commodity loaded" vessels, 276n, 290-91Commodity rates under stevedoring contracts, 270-

71Congress, 34-35, 397, 407Construction Division, OQMG, 316Contracting stevedores, 262-63, 264-66Control

of port utilization, 176-81of portbound freight traffic, 41, 46-47, 373, 412of ship employment, 163-76of ship repair, 181-85of ship utilization in the theaters, 282-99

Control Division, OCT, 86, 101, 129-32, 281, 285,416-17

Controlled Materials Plan, 306Controller of Shipbuilding, 160Conversions, ship. See Ship conversions.Convoys. See also Naval convoy arrangements.

in Atlantic, 214-19early convoy operations, 152, 212-14and North African campaign, 216, 217organization and operation of, 216-17, 219-20to Pacific, 5, 212-13, 214

Coordinator of Ship Repair and Conversion, 182,183-84, 185, 306-07

Cordiner, Col. Douglas C., 37Corey, Col. Alexander, 261Corps of Engineers. See Engineers, Corps of.Coughlin, Col. Leo J., 289Council of National Defense, 39Crane, Lt. Col. Joseph S., 211Crews. See also Naval crews for Army transports;

Civilian crews.discipline, 238for ocean-going vessels, 229-39, 260for small boats, 255-60

Cross-Channel operation. See OVERLORD; ROUNDUP.Cross-hauling, 344-45, 348Cruiser and Transport Force, WWI, 33

Dann, Alexander, 367-68Davis, Col. R. Bramwell, 227


Deadweight capacities, percentage of utilization,276-79

Deck spaces, utilization of, 276Defense Plant Corporation, 334, 367Defense Transportation. See Office of Defense

Transportation.Demobilization planning and adjustments, 132-34Demurrage charges, 342, 343-44Denney, C. E., 351Denson, Brig. Gen. Eley P., 423Depots, general, removed from Army bases at ports,

106-07Depots, intermediate, in ETO, 289Depots, TC, 124-25, 133Deputy Chief Regulating Officer, GHQ, SWPA,

294Deputy Chief of Staff, supports AAF position,

59-61Deputy port commander, 101Design and procurement

of equipment for utility railroads, 376of hospital cars, 385-90of motor vehicles, 37n, 66-67for ship conversions, 305, 306

Destructiveness of modern warfare, 15-16Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 76DeWitt, Brig. Gen. Calvin, Jr., 423Diesel locomotives, shortage of, 332, 376, 378. See

also Locomotives.Dillon, Brig. Gen. Theodore H., 37, 50, 70Director of Defense Transportation, 45Director of Economic Stabilization, 352Director of Matériel and Supply, OCT, 71, 416Director of Military Training, OCT, 22, 71, 416Director of Operations, OCT, 70-71, 101, 126, 162,

219-20, 220n, 415Director of Personnel, OCT, 71, 416Director of Railway Training, 65Director of Supply, OCT, 22, 120, 125, 253, 257,

392Director of Traffic and Transportation, AAF, 59Director of War Mobilization, 253-54, 295, 305,

306, 339Director of Water Transportation, OCT, 71, 162,

416Discharge procedure, of civilian crew members, 231Discipline

of armed guard, 246of crews, 238

Distribution Division, OCT, 125, 403District transportation offices, 114, 120, 425Diversion Committee, ETOUSA, 289Division of Defense Aid Reports, 39, 40, 112Division of Local Transport, ODT, 394Dock labor, 262-63Documentation of shipments, 117Doenitz, Grossadmiral Karl, 153Domestic commercial carriers, utilization of, 308-74

Douglas, Lewis W., 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195,199

Draft. See Selective Service.Duke, Brig. Gen. James T., 423

Eastman, Joseph B., 45, 311, 336n, 337n, 370, 370n,371, 372, 373

Edmund B. Alexander, 222Egypt, 6Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 66, 76, 84, 289, 339

on attack on German transportation system, 25nfavors control of military railways by TC, 63and problem of ship detention, 288

Embarkation Service, WWI, 29-32Empress of Scotland, 222Engineer port repair ships, 301Engineering Branch, Highway Division, OCT, 366Engineers, Corps of, 33-34, 47, 58, 83, 87, 106,

250, 253, 317, 317n, 318, 366, 367, 386, 389,404, 406, 408

and military railroads, 35, 62-65and utility railroads, 375, 376

Escort vessels, 160. See also Convoys.Europa, 226European theater, 253

cargo discharge performance rate in, 298functions of CofT, 84problem of ship detention in, 286-91

Evangeline, 230Excursion Inlet, Alaska, subport at, 97, 100, 250Executive Officer, OCT, functions, 72, 415Explosives, loading of, 100, 266-69. See also Am-

munition.Exports Control Committee, WWI, 31

Fairbanks, Alaska, 8, 9Farr, Col. Donald E., 227Federal Highway Act of 1944, 366Federal Loan Administrator, 329Federal regulating agencies, relations with, 370-74Field establishment of TC, 95-134

demobilization planning and adjustments, 132-34intelligence and security, 128-29miscellaneous field agencies, 123-26ports of embarkation, 95-111supervision by OCT, 126-32transportation zones, 111-23

Field service regulations, revision of, 83Filler cargo, defined, 194nFinlay, Col. Luke W., 72, 350Finschhafen, New Guinea, 293Fiscal Director, ASF, 239Fiscal Division, OCT, 418Fisher, Col. G. J. G., 227Floating maintenance shops, 301Floating refrigeration facilities, 301Floating spare part depots, 90

INDEX 445

Floating warehouses, 301Florida, 230Fog, effect on convoys, 216, 217Food, on transports and hospital ships, 209, 243-45Foreign Economic Administration, 184Foreign ships, 221, 226. See also British shipping.Fort Benning, Ga., 391Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo., 124Fort Mason, Calif., 106Fort Slocum, N. Y., 124Fort Snelling, Minn., 65Fourth Service Command, 124Franklin, Maj. Gen. John M., 71, 140, 281, 287-89Freight cars, 328-29

efficient utilization of, 342-47forecasts of requirements, 315-16shortage, 333

Freight traffic, growth during war period, 319-23Freight Traffic Branch, OCT, 368Frink, Maj. Gen. James L., 294Full crew laws, 349"Full and down" loading, 189, 273Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. C. F., 17nFurloughs to relieve railroad manpower shortage,

339-40, 339n

G-1, WDGS, 338G-4, WDGS, 37, 39, 41, 49, 61, 68, 84, 145, 146,

147, 178, 179, 200, 201, 212-13, 245-46,288, 294, 406. See also Transportation Branchof G-4.

Garsaud, Col. Marcel, 424Gasoline, 8, 394, 395, 396Gass, Arthur H., 313"Generals" (troopships), 222George Washington, 222Germany. See also Submarines.

effect of war on transportation systems, 23-26transportation advantages, 23-26, 27underestimates transportation problems, 18

Gilbreath, Maj. Gen. Frederick, 423Graham, Col. James H., 81Gray, Brig. Gen. Carl R., Jr., 65Gray, Col. E. B., 424Great Britain. See British.Great Lakes, traffic on, 367, 369Green, Col. Henry L., 424Greenland, 12Grening, Paul C., 260-61, 260nGrievance procedures for civilian seamen, 231,

236-37Groninger, Maj. Gen. H. M., 105, 423Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 45-46, 57-68. See also

Chief of Transportation, Office of.designated Chief, Transportation Section,

G-4, 38designated Chief of Transportation, 50personality and policies, 73-78

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P.—Continuedrelations with Somervell, 78-80

Gun crews, and armament, 245-46GYMNAST, 6Halifax, Nova Scotia, subport at, 97Hampton Roads, Va., Port of Embarkation, 53,

96-97, 99, 110Hanley, Col. John C. P., 424Harbor Boat Branch, OCT, 210, 254"Harbor boats." See Boats, small.Harbor craft companies, 256-57Hardt, Col. Dan A., 424Harriman, W. Averell, 165nHastings, Col. Wallace H., 424Hawaii, 7, 11, 47Health and morale of troops, 16-17Herbert, Brig. Gen. J. K., 105Hermitage, 222Hicks, Col. Raymond M., 210, 304Higashi-Kuni, Premier Naruhiko, 26Highway carriers, 353-67

affected by strikes, 364-66highway improvement projects, 366-67manpower problem, 363-64operating controls on, 364shortage of equipment, 361-63state regulation, 355-56used for troop movements, 357-58

Highway Division, OCT, 113, 363, 366, 394-95,398, 401, 403, 404-05, 422

Highway Traffic Advisory Committee, 40, 355-56Highway transport in overseas commands, 91-93Hill, Arthur M., 358Hines, Brig. Gen. Frank T., 34Hodson, Brig. Gen. Fremont B., 70, 423Holabird Quartermaster Depot, 391, 393Holder, Col. John H., 303, 303nHolding and reconsignment points, 41, 46, 53, 112,

114, 116, 118, 425Hollandia, New Guinea, 293Honolulu, convoys to discontinued, 214Hood, J. M., 350Hopkins, Harry, 44, 44n, 163, 168, 188Home, Admiral Frederick J., 162, 172Horner, Col. Frederick C., 395Hospital cars, 385-91

hospital kitchen cars, 387, 390jurisdiction over, 389-90repairs, 393

Hospital shipsconversion of ships into, 301, 305-06food service on, 243-45

Hunter, Brig. Gen. George B., 423

Iceland, 5, 12Ile de France, 222India, 11India-Burma, 298


Indian town Gap Military Reservation, 123Industrial Personnel Division, OCT, 127-28, 233,

235, 257, 258, 364, 419Industrial relations officers, 120Ingersoll, Admiral Royal E., 174Inland traffic

centralized control by Army, 314distribution and control on national scale, 308-11

Inland Traffic Division, WWI, 31Inland Traffic Service, WWI, 31-32Inland Waterway Branch, OCT, 368-69Inspection, 209, 235, 239-40, 241. See also Safety.

of ship conversions, 304of troopships, 224-25, 240of utility railroads, 379, 380, 381

Installations. See also Field establishment of TC.classes of, 119, 244, 402, 403inactivated, 132-33

Insurance, of civilian seamen, 236Insurance costs, and stevedoring contracts, 271Intelligence, at field installations, 128-29Intelligence and Security Division, OCT, 128-29,

418Intercoastal service of Army discontinued, 141Interdepartmental Shipping Priorities Advisory

Committee, 40-41International Division, OCT, 417Interstate Commerce Act, 371Interstate Commerce Commission, 342, 348, 349,

351, 353, 355, 367, 370-71, 372-73, 410increased authority, 370relations with TC and ODT, 370-74

Interterritorial Military Committee, 314Italian Service Units, 56, 110, 264

Japan, 2effect of war on transportation, 26logistic problems, 18steel production, 26transportation advantages, 26-27

Jeffers, William M., 396Jenks, W. J., 351Job classifications at TC field installations, 127-28John Ericsson, 222Johnson, J. Monroe, 337n, 348, 370-71, 372-73Johnston, Alvanley, 350Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, 200Joint Army-Navy-WSA Ship Operations Committee,

171-72Joint Board, 145, 146, 147, 160Joint Chiefs of Staff, 217, 283, 293, 295, 296-97,

299, 300, 413basic tasks of, 19and controversy with WSA over loading of cargo

vessels, 191long-range military planning, 19role in allocation of shipping, 165-68, 169-72,

173, 174-75

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continuedand ship conversion program, 299-300, 299nand shipbuilding programs, 160and theater shipping crisis, 295-97

"Joint Logistics Plan for the Support of UnitedStates Bases in the South Pacific," 170

Joint Logistics Plans Committee, 251Joint Merchant Vessel Board, 211Joint Military Passenger Agreement, 354, 357, 369Joint Military Transportation Committee, 19,

295-97, 413Army representatives on, 162and convoys, 217and merchant shipbuilding programs, 162role in control of employment of shipping,

167-68, 169, 173Joint Planning Committee, 160Joint Production Survey Committee, 251Joint Ship Repair and Conversion Policy Board,

184Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 8Joint U.S.-British Planning Committee, 220Jordan, Brig. Gen. Richard H., 37Judge Advocate General, 54, 141Juneau, Alaska, subport, 53, 97, 99, 100, 250

Kamchatka Peninsula, 9nKells, Maj. Gen. Clarence H., 423Kendall, Warren C., 350Kilpatrick, Brig. Gen. John R., 423King, Admiral Ernest J., 9n, 163n

and assignment of small boats, 251and convoy arrangements, 213, 214, 217, 218and shipbuilding program, 160on war against German submarines, 151, 152

Kitchen cars, 334, 387, 389Knock-for-knock agreement, 221, 221nKojassar, Col. Aram, 127Korea, 394Kunming, 11

Labor policy governing vessels, 231Labor supply, and port utilization, 180Lafayette (ex-Normandie) , 201, 201nLand, Rear Adm. Emory S., 165n, 188, 192, 221

and shipbuilding program, 162and Strategic Shipping Board, 44

Land-based air coverage, 152Landing craft, 144-45, 251, 251nLasher, Col. Edmund C. R., 314, 424Leahy, Admiral William D., 167, 192Leathers, Frederick James, Baron of Purfleet, 165n,

187, 222Leavey, Maj. Gen. Edmond H., 66Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 289Legal Division, OCT, 418Le Havre, 289Lend-lease, 4-5, 111-12, 164

INDEX 447

Lend-Lease Act, 39, 220-21, 225, 314-15, 219-20Lewis, Brig. Gen. Burton O., 71Leyte, 14n, 291-92Liberty ships

converted for troops and PW's, 300-01, 301nloading of, 273production of, 156

Loading. See also Cargo pooling; Pier operations.controversy with WSA, 190-93cost of loading cargo ships, 267-69efficient loading of cargo vessels, 273-79of freight cars, 321, 345-47, 347nof passenger cars, 348

Locomotives, 328repairs on, 393shortage, 331-32, 376

Longshore labor, shortage, 263-64, 281Longshore unions, 268-69Lord, Maj. Gen. Royal B., 288Los Angeles Port of Embarkation, 97, 99, 110Lurline, 222Lutes, Maj. Gen. Le Roy, 326Luzon, 8

MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 77, 256and central control of ship employment, 174-76designated CINCAFPAC, 174pleads for additional vessels, 5, 284takes responsibility for shipping congestion in

SWPA, 295urged to reduce ship retentions, 292, 297-98

McCloy, John J., 199MacDonald, Thomas H., 355McFadden, Col. M. A., 424McGrady, Edward F., 230McIntyre, Col. Andrew F., 350McKenzie, Daniel J., 270McTammaney, Col. Edward A., 424Maddux, Col. Rufus F., 423Maintenance and Repair Branch, OCT, 304-05Maintenance Division, OCT, 420Manchuria, 26Maneuvers, motor vehicles used in, 357-59Manhattan, 146Manila, 12. See also Philippines.

shipping congestion at, 297Manning scales

for small boats, 257for transports, 233

Manpower. See also Crews; Personnel.for highway carriers, 363for railroads, 335-41

Marietta, Pa., 41Marine Design, Construction, and Procurement

Branch, OQMG, 37Marine Officer Cadet School, St. Petersburg, Fla.,

124, 235, 256-57Marine Personnel Regulations, 232, 233, 259

Marine repair ships, 301Mariposa, 222Maritime Commission

and allocation of shipping, 163-64and early shipping requirements, 138-43and shipbuilding achievement, 155-59

Maritime labor unions, 128Maritime War Emergency Board, 230Marseille, port congestion at, 291Marshall, Gen. George C., 1, 3n, 15, 44n, 163, 192,

213, 214, 215n, 315, 315nMarshall, Brig. Gen. James C., 423Martin, Col. Charles E., 71Martin, Col. Lincoln, 424Master mechanics, 380-81Master ship repair contract, 183Mauretania, 222Mechanization of armed forces, 2-3Mediterranean theater, 20

cargo discharge performance, 298port congestion in, 291ship detention in, 285-86

Memorandum on interdepartmental relationship,189-90, 189n, 198-99

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 39, 153, 154Merchant Marine Distinguished Service Medal, 237Metzman, Gustav, 324Mexican laborers, 336, 338Mexico, National Railways of, 9Meyer, Col. Richard D., 220nMiddle East, 4, 11, 22Middle Pacific, 298Military Personnel Division, OCT, 127, 419Military Railway Service, 62, 63, 64, 65, 83, 84, 88,

91, 123, 337, 338, 341, 352Military Training Division, OCT, 65, 418-19Military Transportation Section, AAR, 42, 313,

315, 361Military tribunals, 238Miller, Col. Stewart F., 424Mine laying vessels, 254, 255Mississippi State College, 1 24Mobile, Ala., subport at, 53, 97Mobile ports of embarkation, 96Monterey, 222Monticello, 222Montreal, subport at, 97Moore, Col. Werner W., 199-200Morris, Col. I. Sewell, 424Motor carriers, 117, 310-11, 353-67Motor equipment for the Army, 66-67Motor Transport Branch, OQMG, 37Motor Transport Corps, WWI, 32, 33Motor vehicles. See also Buses; Trucks.

administrative, 402-05state laws affecting, 355-56

Motorization of the Army, 14, 14nMount Vernon, 146, 147, 222


Movements Division, OCT, 126, 219-20, 222, 225,227, 417

Naples, 12, 291National Association of Motor Bus Operators, 354,

358, 361National Bus Military Bureau, 361National Bus Traffic Association, 361National Inter-regional Highway Committee, 366-

67National Production Urgency List, 340National Railways of Mexico, 9National Service Law, 341Naval convoy and routing arrangements, 212-20Naval crews for Army transports, 32-33, 205-09,

245-46Naval Transportation Service, 142, 196, 206, 208,

208n, 210, 211Navigation and inspection laws, 239Navy, U.S.

alterations on Army troopships, 207-08relations with Army, 200-11, 412-13

Neutrality Act, 319New Caledonia, 5New Guinea, 11New Orleans General Depot, 107New Orleans Port of Embarkation, 41, 65, 96, 109,

110, 123, 179, 230, 256New River, N. C., joint exercises at, 147New York General Depot, 106-07New York Port of Embarkation, 29, 29n, 41, 46, 77,

99, 100, 109, 110, 256New Zealand, 5Newport News, Va., primary port in WWI, 29, 29nNews transmission ship, 301Nielsen, Col. Charles F., 61Nieuw Amsterdam, 222Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 174-76Noble, Col. William H., 424Nonessential travel, restriction of, 75, 311Normandie. See Lafayette.Normandy, 11Norris, E. E., 351North Africa, 4, 6, 7, 25-26, 83, 85, 90

convoy problems, 216ship detention in, 285-86

Ocean Shipping Section, ANMB, 1 78-79Ocean Traffic Branch, OCT, 179, 196Office of the Chief Engineer. See Engineers,

Corps of.Office of the Chief of Transportation. See Chief

of Transportation, Office of.Office of Defense Transportation, 47, 179, 181, 187,

311, 312, 324-26, 338, 340, 410-12creation of, 45functions, 370relations with ICC, 370-73relations with TC, 370-74, 410-12

Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 112Office of Production Management, 40-41, 188Office of War Information, 339Office of War Mobilization, 338Officer candidate school, TC, 54-55, 85, 85n, 124Officer personnel, 76, 85, 65nOfficer training schools, TC, 109-10, 124Oil. See Petroleum.Operating personnel index, 127, 127nOperations Division, WDGS, 19, 169, 272, 409Operations Officer. See Director of Operations,

OCT.Ordnance Department, 58, 66-67, 91, 106, 367-68,

376, 378-79, 380, 381, 382-83, 384, 391, 396,397, 401, 403, 404

OVERLORD, 7Oversea Operations Group, OCT, 76Oversea supply, control by port commanders, 101,

104-05, 205Oversea troop movements, 86-87Overseas commands, Gross's relation with, 76-77,

82-94. See also Theaters.Overtime for civilian crews, 230, 231n, 231-32, 258

Pacific Coast Joint Committee for Shipbuilding andRepair, 172n, 183

Pacific Ocean Areas, 75, 173, 174, 251, 296Panama Canal, 9Panama Canal Department, 41Pan-American Highway, 9, 58Pasteur, 222Patrick Henry, 156Patterson, Robert P., 10Pearl Harbor, 35-42, 314-15Pelley, J. J., 314, 324, 350Perry, Col. Charles F., 424Persian Corridor, 11-12Persian Gulf, 12, 20-22, 393Personnel. See also Crews; Marine personnel;

Officer personnel.detailed to theater commanders by CofT, 57-58distribution of, OCT, 73, 74drawn from industry, 47-48employed at port installations, 109-11employed by transportation zones, 122Gen. Gross's personnel policy, 77-78growth in TC, 56, 56nobservations and conclusions, 408survey teams, 127

Petroleum, 72-73, 176, 367, 369, 381-85Petroleum Administrator for War, 363, 384Petroleum Branch, OCT, 72Philadelphia, Pa., cargo port, 96, 99, 110Philippines, 8, 17, 143-44, 293. See also Manila.Pier operations, 262-71

contract vs direct hire labor, 263cost of cargo loading, 267-69draft deferment of workers, 264

INDEX 449

Pier Operations—Continuedefficiency of cargo loading, 264-66negotiation of stevedoring contracts, 270-71relations with labor unions, 268-69shortage of longshore labor, 264troop training for, 264

Planningfor demobilization of field agencies, 132-34effect of late creation of TC, 406-07long-range, role of, 18-23

Planning Division, OCT, 20, 22, 126, 162, 169,326, 417

Plans and specifications, for ship conversions,304-07

Pleasure travel, restricted, 347Pool riding inaugurated, 396-97Pooling of cargo, 193-94, 220-27Port air officers, 106Port commanders

and Army Transport Service, 107-09basic responsibilities of, 95list of, 423proposals to transfer duties from, 103-04relations with service commands, 105relations with technical services, 106responsibilities under Basic Logistical Plan,

170-71responsibility for outports, 109training functions, 109

Port companies, training of, 87Port and Field Agencies Division, OCT, 216, 242,

417Port of New York Authority, 177Port supply catalogs, 242, 243Port surgeon, 224Port utilization, co-ordination of

Army-Navy duplication, 181effort to conserve port facilities for transporta-

tion purposes, 176-78effort to spread traffic, 1 79situation on west coast, 179-80

Port Utilization Committee, 179Port and Water Section, G-4, 48Portland, Ore., subport, 97, 99, 110, 180Ports of Embarkation. See also Port commanders.

defined, 196functions of operating divisions, 101-03general depots removed from, 107organization, 100-03personnel required for, 109-10proposed subordination to service commands, 103representatives of technical services at, 105-07responsibilities of service commands toward, 105selection of port commanders, 110-11traffic handled, 99wartime increase, 96-100

Potsdam Conference, 226Prefabrication of ships, 156, 159

"Prestowed" vessels, 276nPrince Rupert, B. C., subport, 53, 97, 99, 100, 110, 250Prisoners of war, 56, 56n, 110, 300, 301n, 336, 338Procurement

of new railroad equipment, 328-35of small boats, 253-54of vessels, arrangements with WSA, 198-99

Procurement Division, OCT, 307, 420Procurement offices, 125Property Disposal Division, OCT, 125, 420Providence, R. I., subport, 97Public Roads Administrator, 366Pullman Company, 313, 328, 333, 335, 385Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division, WWI,

32, 32n

Quartermaster Corps, 33, 35, 66, 70, 83, 90, 106.See also Quartermaster General, Office of.

Quartermaster General, Office of, 68, 87, 93, 111,138, 140-41, 146, 147, 177, 200-01, 229, 239,244, 313, 314, 316, 358, 406, 407-08. See alsoCommercial Traffic Branch; TransportationDivision, Water Transport Branch,

and army transportation in World War I, 28-35developments preceding Pearl Harbor, 35-42early months of World War II, 42-50and establishment of Transportation Service,

50-54transportation for War Department placed under

jurisdiction of, 35Quebec, subport, 97Queen Elizabeth, 6, 222, 224, 226Queen Mary, 6, 222, 224, 226, 227

Radar, 248-49Radio service on ships, 144, 247-48Rail Division, OCT, 65, 113, 319, 326, 350, 372,

376, 379, 390, 392-93, 421-22Railroad equipment

efficient utilization of, 341-49procurement of, 328-35

Railroad Industry Advisory Committee, 325Railroad manpower, 335-41Railroad open storage yards, 117Railroad repair shops, 391-94Railroad Retirement Board, 340Railroads

Alaska, 9basic relations with, 312-19car loading forecasts, 315-16Car Service Division, AAR, 312-14certificates of necessity, 327-28efficient utilization of equipment, 341-49estimate of performance, 323fares, 314, 318German, 23Japanese, 26, 26nmanpower, 335-41


Railroads—ContinuedMexican, 9passenger schedules frozen, 347percent of Army traffic handled by, 311, 321procurement of new equipment, 328-35proposed integration with motor carriers, 311state regulation of, 348-49survey of capacity of, 324-25temporary government control of, 349-53training of troops by, 123-24utility, 63, 63n, 64, 117, 375-81wartime expansion of traffic, 319-23western, limited capacity of, 323-28in World War I, 312

Railway Labor Act, 351Railway War Board, WWI, 30-31Randall, George C., 313Rationing

gasoline, 395tires, 309, 395-96

Reciprocating engines, for Liberty ships, 156Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 40, 141Recreation of troops, provision for, 16-17Recruitment and Manning Organization of WSA,

233Red Ball motor express route, 91Regulating stations, 90, 112, 114Reilly, Lt. Col. John H., 303Repatriation, ship conversions for, 307Replacement parts, shortage of, 394Requirements and Distribution Branch, G-4, 38Requirements and Distribution Division, OCT, 420Research and development, 125-26Research and Development Division, OCT, 419Research and Review Branch, OQMG, 37Reservation bureaus, 117, 122River transportation. See Waterways, inland.Roderick, Col. W. B. N., 227Rodgers, Ted V., 358Roosevelt, Franklin D., 5, 42, 44, 44n, 141, 155,

190, 191, 192, 194, 319, 351-52, 353conferences with Churchill on utilization of ship-

ping, 221-22creates ODT, 45creates Strategic Shipping Board, 44creates WSA, 44declaration of an unlimited emergency, 139establishes Council of National Defense, 39initiation of American-British planning, 18-19intervention in shipping crisis, 295-96orders seizure of railroads, 349-50and shipbuilding program, 159, 162, 163, 164,

165, 167-68Ross, Maj. Gen. Frank S., 38, 38n, 288ROUNDUP, 6-7Rubber, 141, 363, 364, 395-96. See also Tire

conservation.Rubber Survey Commitee, 396

Sabotage, 231, 318-19, 336Safety, provision for, 129, 235, 239, 240, 266, 336Salter, Sir Arthur, 165n, 229San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 29n, 41, 46,

58, 77, 97, 99, 110, 143, 144, 171, 256Sartor, Col. R. H., 424Schnorkel, 153Scofield, Col. Frank C., 71Searsport, Maine, cargo port, 97, 99, 110Seattle Port of Embarkation, 46, 97, 99, 100, 110,

200, 250Secretary of War, 147, 253-54, 341, 365Security at the ports, 128-29. See also Sabotage.Selective discharge of vessels, 293, 296Selective Service, 10, 259, 264

and civilian crew members, 236and railroad workers, 336-41

Senate Special Committee Investigating the Na-tional Defense Program (Truman Committee),193, 317n, 331, 341, 354n, 362n, 363

Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization, 1Service commands, 103-05, 114-17, 119Services of Supply. See Army Service Forces.Seventh Fleet, 1 74Seward, Edgar C., 270Shakedown cruises for troopships, 208Ship activity reports, standardization of, 296Ship allocations, planning of, 163-76, 195-97Ship construction

balanced program maintained, 161-62basic types built by Maritime Commission,

155-58British concentrate on combatant vessels, 154-55co-ordination between merchant and naval

programs, 160-61relation to ship losses, 149-51wartime achievement, 153-56

Ship conversions, 138-39, 299-307. See also Shiprepair.

of cargo ships, 299-301co-ordination of, 181-85effort to speed up programs, 207-08, 305-06plans and specifications, 304-07for repatriation, 307specialized types, 301supervision of, 301-05survey of troopship and hospital conversion

programs, 305-06Ship Conversion Unit, OCT, 303, 304Ship detention in theaters, 282-99Ship employment, central control of, 163-76Ship failures in convoy, 216Ship losses, 148-53. See also Submarines.Ship repair. See also Ship conversion.

co-ordination of, 181-85foreign vessels, 184-85master ship repair contract, 183

Ship transfers, from Army to Navy, 145-47

INDEX 451

Ship transportation agent, 238-39, 241, 242Ship utilization efficiency

cargo ship turnaround time, 279-80detention of ships in the theaters, 282-99difficulty of "full and down" loading, 273-79loading time in home ports, 281-82summaries of oversea port performance, 284-85,

298troopships turnaround time, 272-73

Shippers' regional advisory boards, 315Shipping

Allied total, 30 June 1945, 165Army-Navy effort for co-ordination, 169-76British-American co-operation, 164-65, 220-27central control of ship employment, 163-76early military requirements, 136-44effort to develop uniform procedures, 130-31,

211Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 153-54Roosevelt seeks to insure maximum utilization of,

139-40submarine threat, 148-53total of all nations at start of World War II,

135-36wartime ship construction, 153-55

Shipping Control Committee, ETOUSA, 288Shipping Control Committee, WWI, 30, 31, 288Shipyards, expansion of, 7, 155, 158-59, 159n. See

also Ship conversion; Ship repair.Ships, operation of

armament and gun crews, 245-46assignment and operation of small boats, 249-55civilian crews on ocean-going vessels, 229-39efficient utilization of, 271-82food service on transports and hospital ships,

243-45maintenance and voyage repairs, 239-40proposals regarding marine personnel, 260-61radio service and radar, 247-49supplies for vessels, 241-43

SICKLE, 7Siddall, H. W., 314Signal Corps, 39, 107, 247, 248, 249, 301Sixth Supplemental National Defense Appropria-

tions Act, 198Skagway, Alaska, subport, 97, 250Slack, Lt. Col. James E., 423Sleeping cars, 329, 334Small boats. See Boats, small.Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 47n, 58, 62, 63, 66,

129, 222, 284-85, 292, 319, 362Army representative on JMTC, 162controversy with WSA over loading of Army

cargo vessels, 190and convoy arrangements, 213, 215n, 218and co-ordination between OCT and ASF

staffs, 72creates a Transportation Division, 50

Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B.—Continuedfavors joint Army-Navy transportation service,

413and Navy crews for Army transports, 207, 207n,

209and powers of ICC and ODT, 370-71and problem of ship detention in ETO, 288and railroad manpower shortage, 337, 338relation of port commanders and service

commands, 103relation of zone transportation officers and service

commands, 116relations with Gross, 78-80and shipbuilding program, 162, 172on submarine sinkings, 1-2

South America, 11South Pacific, 170-71, 173-74, 283Southwest Pacific, 171, 174, 251, 283

cargo discharge performance, 298shipping congestion in, 291-98transportation organization handicaps, 84,

294-95vessel requirements for intratheater shipments,

284Soviet Protocol Committee, 167, 180, 180nSoviet Union, 4, 9, 11-12

Lend-lease supplies loaded at west coast ports,180

loading vessels of, 282transatlantic routes to, 20, 22

Spanish-American War, 29Spare parts depot ships, 301Staging area company, 90Standard tables of allowance, 241-42Standardization

of plans and specifications for ship conversions,305, 306

of port organization, 100-01of stocks for vessels, 241-43of zone organization, 120-22

State Highway Traffic Advisory Committees,355-56

State regulationof motor vehicles, 355-56of railroads, 348-49

Steel shortage, 159, 159n, 163Stevedoring, 262-71. See also Pier operation.Stevedoring and Ship Facilities Branch, OCT, 179,

270Stewart, Brig. Gen. George C., 291Stilwell, Lt. Gen. Joseph W., 76Stilwell Road, 11Stimson, Henry L., 190, 192, 249Stokely, Col. Carlin C., 423Stokes, Col. M. B. Jr., 3n, 168n, 169n, 224n, 285n, 299nStone, Col. Raymond C., 424Storage. See also Transit Storage Division.

at the ports, 95, 100, 192


Storage—Continueduse of ships for, 287, 296

Stowage, 86, 265, 274, 274n, 276, 276nStrategic Shipping Board, 44-45, 164, 187, 253Strategy, transportation as a factor in, 2-10Stratton, Brig. Gen. James H., 288Strikes, 318-19, 334

highway freight carriers, 364-66temporary government control of railroads,

349-53zone industrial relations officers duties, 120

Styer, Maj. Gen. W. D., 51, 80, 104, 232Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the Senate

Committee on Military Affairs, 193Submarines, German, 1, 7, 9, 75, 215-16, 309.

See also Ship losses.Allies unprepared to meet threat, 151-52destruction of, 152number of, 148, 152

Submarines, Italian, 152Submarines, Japanese, 152, 214Subversives, 237-38, 237nSuicide planes, 292Sunderland Tramp, type of ship, 156SUPERGYMNAST, 6

Supply Divisions in Zone Transportation Offices,120, 125

Supply Priorities and Allocations Board, 329Surgeon General, The, 229, 244, 335, 385-90

Tank Car Advisory Committee, 384Tank Car Branch, OCT, 382, 383, 384Tank cars, Army, 381-85Tank landing ships (LST's), 161Tankers, 176Taylor, Lt. Comdr. George E., 211Tehran, 12Territorial passenger associations, 314Theaters of Operations. See also Overseas Com-

mands.CofT's responsibilities toward, 57-58, 84-94control of ship utilization in, 282-99Transportation organization in, 82-84

Third Service Command, 123Tire conservation, 394, 395-96TORCH, 6, 7Toulmin, Col. Harry A., Jr., 70Towing. See Tugs.Track scaling, dispensed with, 343Tracks

access, to Army installations, 317, 318storage, at western ports, 324

Tractor-trailer buses, 400Tractor-trailer combinations for freight, 91Traffic control agencies, 111 - 12Traffic Control Branch, OQMG, 37Traffic Control Division, OCT, 73, 81, 112, 205,

315-16, 318, 319, 343-44, 345, 359, 368, 373,

Traffic Control Division—Continued376, 421

Traffic regulation units, 88, 90Traffic Weight Agreement, 343Training, 86, 87, 88, 128, 133-34. See also Military

Training Division.as function of CofT, 57-58by port commanders, 109of shipyard employees, 159of TC troop units, 66, 87, 88, 123-24TC unit training centers, 54-55, 123-24, 133-34training vessels, 228, 301

Trainmasters, 379Transit Storage Division, OCT, 112, 113, 289, 422Transport Review Section, OCT, 345Transport Surgeon, 243-44Transportation Act of 1940, 354, 355, 367Transportation Advisory Group, 37, 358, 367-68Transportation Annex to the War Department

Basic Plan, 133Transportation Branch of G-4, 38, 40, 48-50, 51,

143, 147, 406, 407Transportation Commissioner, 39, 40, 177Transportation Control Committee, 47, 126, 181,

373, 412Transportation Corps. See also Chief of Trans-

portation, Office of.creation of, 54-55personnel, 56troop units overseas, 90

Transportation Corps School, 109, 124, 134Transportation Division, OQMG, 35, 37, 38, 48,

241, 358, 406, 407.Transportation Division, SOS, 50Transportation of Persons Branch, OCT, 394Transportation Service, SOS

becomes Transportation Corps, 55established, 50-54

Transportation zones. See also Zone transportationofficers.

creation of, 113-14functions of zone transportation officers, 114,

117-20installations included, 425officers in charge, 424opposition to zones, 114-15organization, 120-23relation of zone transportation officers to service

commands, 114-16territories, 424

Transports. See Troopships.TRIDENT Conference, 7Troop kitchen cars. See Kitchen cars.Troop sleeping cars, 334Troop staging areas, service commands seek control

of, 103-04Troopships

allocation of, by WSA, 197-98

INDEX 453

Troopships—ContinuedArmy-Navy competition for, 144-48British vessels used by U.S. Army, 222, 224efficient utilization of, 271-73Navy operation of Army vessels, 205-08new cargo ships converted into, 299-301operated by Navy, WWI, 32-33survey of conversion program, 305-06turnaround cycles, 272-73

Trucks, Army, for oversea operation, 91Trucks, commercial, use by Army, 354-59Truman Committee. See Senate Special Committee

Investigating the National Defense Program.Tugs, agreement with Navy and WSA on use of, 210

Turnaround cyclesof cargo ships, 279-82of troopships, 272-73

Turnaround time of freight cars, 342

U-boats. See Submarines.UGS convoys, 217, 218Under Secretary of War, 38, 45, 48, 50Unit hospital cars, 385, 386, 387"United States Army and Navy Shipping

Procedures," 211United States Railroad Administration, WWI,

31, 312Universal service, 341Uruguay, 222U. S. Employees Compensation Act, 230U. S. Maritime Commission. See Maritime Com-

mission.U.S. Shipping Board, WWI, 32-33USSR. See Soviet Union.Utility Railroads, 63, 63n, 64, 117, 375-81

Vehicles. See Automobiles; Buses; Motor vehicles;Trucks.

Vendor's Shipping Document, 130Victory ships, 156-58, 301Voorheesville, N. Y., 41Vulcania, 226

Wacs, 127Wage administration manual, 128Wakefield, 146, 147, 222Wanamaker, Col. William W., 294Wansbrough-Jones, Col. Llewellyn, 227War Board of the Port of New York, WWI, 30War Department Code Marking Policy Committee,

130War Department General Staff, 19War Department Labor Policy Governing Vessels,

231, 231nWar Department Manpower Board, 61War Department Priorities Committee, 31War Department Shipping Document, 130

War Manpower Commission, 338-39, 340War Overtime Pay Act of 1943, 232War Plans Division, WDGS, 144, 147-48, 200War plants, transportation for workers, 394-402War Production Board, 159-60, 188-89, 306, 325,

327, 330, 331, 335, 339, 340, 344, 361, 363,366, 396, 410

War Shipping Administrationallocation of ships by, 164, 167, 173, 195-97, 198attitude toward Army requests for port facilities,

178-79controversy over control of shiploading, 190-92creation of, 187-88duties of War Shipping Administrator, 188-89financial arrangements with Army, 198-200memorandum on interdepartmental relationships,

189-90, 189n, 198-99and problem of cargo pooling, 193-94proposal to centralize shipping operations under,

193relation of Transportation Corps with, 186-200and shipping congestion in the theaters, 295War Department liaison with, 199

War Transportation Efficiency Committee, 341-42Warren, Col. Otey Y., 305Warwick, Col. Andrew D., 270Washington, 146Water Division, OCT, 73, 86, 179, 195, 196, 210,

211, 219, 224, 228, 231, 233, 237, 240, 241,242, 243, 244, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258, 260,270, 281, 301-03, 304-07, 420-21

Water Transport Branch, OQMG, 29, 30, 31-32,35-37, 42

Waterways, inland, 367-69Watkins, Col. Duval C., 303Weed, Col. Thomas J., 282n.Welding, in ship construction, 156, 159West Point, 146, 147, 222Western Defense Command, 107Western Military Bureau, 314Western railroads, limited capacity of, 323-28White, R. B., 351Whitney, A. F., 350Whittle, Col. Calvin L., 424Wilcox, Col. Herbert B., 71Wilgus, Col. William J., 34nWilliams, Col. Harry G., 424Williamson, F. E., 351Williamson, Brig. Gen. William J., 316Women, employed by railroads, 336Work load index, 127, 127nWork simplification study, 131World War I, Army transportation in, 28-35Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 61, 70, 180n, 390

on "cargo availability picture," 197on Navy crews for Army transports, 206nand problem of ship detention in theaters, 286on relative efficiency of Army loading, 281


Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H.—Continuedvisits MacArthur, 295

XYZ motor express route, 91

Yarmouth, 230

Zone and District Transportation Officers' Guide,122

Zone supply officers, 120Zone transportation officers. See also Transporta-

tion zones.authority delegated by CofT, 114list of, 424personnel employed by, 122-23relations with operating divisions of OCT, 114relations with service commands, 114-16, 119

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1999 445-736