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Co-ordinating education duringemergencies and reconstruction:challenges and responsibilities

Marc Sommers

International Institute for Educational Planning

International Institute for Educational Planning www.unesco.org/iiep

http://www.unesco.org/iiep

Co-ordinating education during emergenciesand reconstruction: challenges and responsibilities



The views and opinions expressed in this booklet are those of the authorsand do not necessarily represent the views of UNESCO or of the IIEP. Thedesignations employed and the presentation of material throughout this reviewdo not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCOor IIEP concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or itsauthorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

The publication costs of this study have been covered through acontribution from the UK Department for International Development, a grant-in-aid offered by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions made by several MemberStates of UNESCO, the list of which will be found at the end of the volume.

Published by:International Institute for Educational Planning7-9 rue Eugène Delacroix, 75116 Parise-mail: [email protected] web site: www.unesco.org/iiep

Cover design: Corinne HayworthCover photo: Marc SommersComposition: Linéale Production

ISBN: 92-803-1256-1© UNESCO 2004

This volume has been printed in IIEP’s printshop


mailto:[email protected]://www.unesco.org/iiephttp://www.unesco.org/iiep

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To the memory of Giles Whitcomb,a truly kind friend and former research colleague,

who shared his deep wisdom on humanitarianism, the United Nationsand co-ordination challenges.

The humanitarian world has lost a fine friend and advocate.



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Acknowledgements

This monograph was carried out with the generous support andcontributions of many friends and associates. Grateful acknowledgementis due to Christopher Talbot, for his support, consideration and editorialinsights, Connie Barker, for her adept and valuable bibliographiccontributions as research assistant, and all of those who made time to beinterviewed, or took time to gather up and share documents. This wouldinclude, as always, Margaret Sinclair, who has shared with me so much ofher wealth of knowledge on education in emergencies over many years.

I would also like to extend special thanks to Larry Minear, Directorof the Humanitarianism and War Project at Tufts University’s FeinsteinFamine Center, Thomas G. Weiss, his former Co-Director and currentprofessor at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, and thelate Giles Whitcomb, a former Humanitarianism and War Project colleague,for the opportunity to contribute to their already vast work onhumanitarianism and co-ordination. Their insights, suggestions andsupport, and the knowledge gained through the writing of The dynamicsof co-ordination, a Humanitarianism and War Project publication(Sommers, 2000), have helped inform the writing in this monograph.



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Foreword to the series

UNESCO is increasingly requested to provide an educational response inemergency and reconstruction settings. The organization is in the processof developing expertise in this field in order to be able to provide promptand relevant assistance. It will offer guidance, practical tools and specifictraining for education policy-makers, officials and planners.

The fifth of the eleven objectives adopted by the Dakar WorldEducation Forum in 2000 explicitly focuses on the rights of children inemergencies. It stresses the importance of meeting “... the needs ofeducation systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instabilityand conduct[ing] educational programmes in ways that promote mutualunderstanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence andconflict”. The Dakar framework for action (UNESCO, 2000: 9) calls fornational Education for All (EFA) plans to include provision for educationin emergency situations. Governments, particularly education ministries,have an important role to play in an area that has often been dominated bythe actions of NGOs and United Nations agencies.

Moreover, the field of educational planning in emergencies andreconstruction is still young. It has to be organized into a manageablediscipline, through further documentation and analysis, before trainingprogrammes can be designed. Accumulated institutional memories andknowledge in governments, agencies and NGOs on education inemergencies, are in danger of being lost due both to the dispersion anddisappearance of documents, and to high staff turnover in both nationaland international contexts. Most of the expertise is still in the heads ofpractitioners and needs to be collected, since memories fade fast. Diverseexperiences of educational reconstruction must now be more thoroughlydocumented and analysed before they disappear.

This task includes the publication in this series of four thematic policyanalyses being conducted on the planning and management of educationin emergencies and reconstruction. They are global in scope, covering:(a) co-ordination; (b) validation and certification of learners’ attainments;(c) teacher management; and (d) integration of youth-at-risk. They havebeen initiated and sponsored by IIEP, in close collaboration with the Divisionof Educational Policies and Strategies in UNESCO Headquarters.



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Co-ordinating education during emergencies and reconstruction:challenges and responsibilities

The objectives of the thematic policy studies are: (a) to contribute tothe process of developing knowledge in the discipline of education inemergencies; (b) to provide focused input for future IIEP trainingprogrammes targeting government officials and others in education inemergencies; (c) to identify and collect dispersed documentation and tocapture some of the undocumented memories of practitioners; and (d) toincrease dissemination of information and analysis on education inemergencies.

IIEP’s larger programme on education in emergencies andreconstruction involves not only these global thematic policy-related studies,but also a series of seven country specific analyses. They concern therestoration of the education system in countries as diverse as Burundi,Timor Leste, Kosovo, Palestine, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Inaddition, IIEP is producing a handbook for education authority officialsand the agencies assisting them, and developing training materials for asimilar audience. Through this programme, IIEP will make a modest butsignificant contribution to the discipline of education in emergencies andreconstruction. Its hope is to enrich the quality of the planning processesapplied in this crucial field.

Gudmund HernesDirector, IIEP



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Contents

Acknowledgements 6

Foreword to the series 7

List of abbreviations 10

Executive summary 11

Prologue 13

Introduction 17Methods and constraints 19

Chapter 1. Background to the study 23Definitions and implications 23Lessons from peace-time contexts 29Implications of the education challenge during wars 35

Chapter 2. Key actors and co-ordination frameworks 39Co-ordination actors and their roles 39Humanitarian co-ordination structures:efforts to mainstream emergency education 53

Chapter 3. Field co-ordination perspectives 59Field co-ordination issues 59Field co-ordination challenges 63

Chapter 4. Conclusion: the significance of co-ordinatingeducation efforts 79Discouraging realities 79The case for co-ordinating education 80The bottom line 82Donor power 85Enhancing co-ordination: a look ahead 87

References and supplementary bibliography 97References 97Supplementary bibliography 105



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List of abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

EFA Education for All

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

GINIE Global Information Networks in Education

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IDP internally displaced person

IIEP International Institute for Educational Planning

IMF International Monetary Fund

INEE Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies

IRC International Rescue Committee

MOEYS Cambodia’s Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports

MSF Médecins sans Frontières

NGO non-governmental organization

OCHA United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of HumanitarianAffairs

RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

Sida Swedish International Development Agency

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WFP United Nations World Food Programme



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Executive summary

Co-ordinating emergencies during emergencies and reconstruction:challenges and responsibilities demonstrates why the co-ordination ofhumanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction activities is so difficult toaccomplish in the education sector. The book also suggests ways toovercome barriers to effective co-ordination.

The study is divided into four parts:

1. Background to the study: key themes and contexts.2. Key actors and co-ordination frameworks.3. Field co-ordination perspectives.4. Conclusion: The significance of co-ordinating education efforts.

Background to the study

In establishing the implications of co-ordination, three contextualquestions must be posed. First, what is the exact meaning of co-ordination?Second, what should the co-ordination of an education sector look like?Third, what are the specific co-ordination issues for education duringemergencies and early reconstruction? Described as examples of co-ordination during peace-time, the cases of Mongolia and Cambodia suggestthat responsibility for the co-ordination of the education sector is oftenshared among many parties, since national governments do not alwaysdemonstrate or exert the necessary capacity to co-ordinate the activities offoreign actors. The co-ordination discussion in this section revolves aroundthe issue of power and its direct connection to wealth. The author describesthe implications of the education challenge during wars, while highlightingthe role of the fragmented state in relation to the international community.

Key actors and co-ordination frameworks

This chapter reviews the roles and responsibilities that key playerssuch as national or host governments, non-state actors, United Nationsagencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and donors hold inthe co-ordination of education during emergencies and early reconstructionperiods. It also examines humanitarian co-ordination structures and the



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problem of the education sector remaining largely on the sidelines of suchactivity. A brief review of some major humanitarian co-ordinationorganizations, networks and associations is presented, together with anoverview of the international co-ordination mechanisms that advocate theestablishment of education as a featured component of humanitarian work.

Field co-ordination perspectives

In this chapter, the co-ordination concerns that tend to emerge atboth community and national levels are discussed in relation to three cases:Afghanistan, southern Sudan, and Sierra Leone. Each case demonstratesparticular dimensions of co-ordination and responsibility concerns.Afghanistan provides a particularly revealing example of co-ordinationchallenges during and following war. The example of southern Sudanillustrates the lack of co-ordination between local education systems indifferent geographic areas. The Sierra Leone case focuses on the complexchallenge of co-ordinating appropriate salaries for teachers. This issuearises in every education situation during and after war.

Conclusion: the significance of co-ordinating educationefforts

The final chapter sets forward ideas for enhancing co-ordination andsuggests the ways in which the roles and responsibilities of variousinstitutions can contribute to the co-ordination of the education sector. Inhis conclusion, the author highlights the rising trend of national or de factogovernment education authorities asserting their co-ordination andleadership roles. While this new development may represent the only wayto ensure that an education system is truly co-ordinated, it is essential thatgovernment education authorities develop appropriate emergencyeducational priorities and plans, so as to be prepared for co-ordination ofthe education sector in times of crisis.



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Prologue

In Liberia in the late 1990s, when refugees were returning to their homesfrom nearby countries, a foreign visitor noted how school officials wererecording attendance in three different ways. They typically submittedhigh attendance figures to the United Nations World Food Programme(WFP) as a way to increase their allotment of food from the WFP’sschool feeding programme. Low attendance figures were given to localgovernment officials; this would allow schools to pay lower taxes to thestate (taxes being linked to student attendance). The third attendancefigure was precise, and went to the international NGO working in theirregion. This information, the foreigner reported, helped the NGO supportschools. But the accurate information never made its way either to theLiberian Government or WFP. In fact, “there was no centralized placefor school data” in Liberia.

During this same period, in Freetown – the capital of neighbouringSierra Leone – the government had largely failed to assert its co-ordinationrole over large, experienced, well-equipped, and active internationalorganizations. It actually had little chance to do so. The government sufferedfrom a general lack of funding and expertise: it is difficult if not nearlyimpossible to collect taxes from citizens during conflicts, and many of thebetter qualified and experienced civil servants worked for internationalhumanitarian organizations. There, they were generally paid far betterand with much greater regularity. Working with foreigners also held adegree of cachet that government work could not provide.

The paucity of support and personnel were only the beginning of thegovernment’s problems. What made it worse was that funding was indeedrolling into Sierra Leone for education, health, food, water, infrastructureand many other concerns – just not, for the most part, through governmenthands. Even though Sierra Leone’s government had been widely hailed asrepresentative and democratic following elections in 1996, it none the lesslacked the ability to co-ordinate services that would naturally fall into therealm of government responsibility during peace-time. Most of the majorinternational donors were not about to funnel humanitarian funding throughgovernment institutions when, in their view, lifesaving measures wererequired. To them, it made no sense. “We fund the [international] NGOs”,



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officials from the United States Agency for International Development(USAID) and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office1

(ECHO) related, because they are “the big guys, the professionals. [They]get things done” (cited in Sommers, 2000: 30). The government had alsodeveloped a poor reputation for public service. One international officialrecalled that, just before and during the early civil war years: “You couldhardly find anyone working for the government who was sitting in theiroffice. It was so frustrating. Capacity building was literally impossible.”Suspicions of corruption within the government appeared to be widespreadas well.

Accordingly, international NGOs and some United Nations agenciescharged into the countryside with funding, supplies, expertise, andhumanitarian mandates to serve people in dire need. Sierra LeoneanGovernment officials who were interviewed in turn felt left in the dust.For the most part, they were – a health ministry official noted how hecould only visit clinics and hospitals if he were given a ride by a UnitedNations or NGO official in one of their four-wheel drive vehicles.

A number of international humanitarian officials interviewed inFreetown late in 1998 made reference to a solitary Sierra LeoneanGovernment official who was praised for his capability, reliability,professionalism and integrity. Although he was overwhelmed withresponsibilities, it appeared that some humanitarian organizations soughtto work through this lone official to minimize or avoid working withgovernment ministries that were responsible for the particular sectors theyworked in (such as health, local government, or education). The decisionto focus on a particular government official was made by internationalagency officials, not the Sierra Leonean Government. One internationalNGO official described this phenomenon in the following way (Sommers,2000: 28):

“The ‘good’ people [in the government] are earmarked as points ofentry [by international agencies]. Then everybody goes to them witheverything, and soon they can’t do anything properly. It’s a potentialvicious cycle, and [soon] their [government] peers will call them a‘donor baby’ – beholden to foreign interests [and] not a true patriot.”

1. Formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Office.



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Prologue

When international officials characterize their national governmentcounterparts as inefficient or worse, the possibility that they may becontributing to the problem may not be part of their analysis.

In terms of co-ordination, humanitarian and early post-conflict epochsin a country’s experience stand as asterisks. The familiar ground of peace-time development has washed away, replaced by new actors with newmandates and tendencies. From the outset of this new phase, disconnectionsbetween locals and internationals are often apparent. The typicalinternational humanitarian official might be described as young, single,well paid (particularly when compared to local salaries), well-equipped,and forever in a rush. Their government counterparts might be consideredolder, overburdened by family and other concerns, seriously under-resourced and underpaid (sometimes not paid at all), and unable to movequickly even when they want to. From the outset, it is a bad match; a clashof cultures, backgrounds, expectations and degrees of patience. Theirinteractions may also eventually generate stereotypes about members ofthe opposite group: local officials viewing the internationals as disrespectfulupstarts, and international officials considering the locals as uncommittedand perhaps corrupt. Both sides might agree on only one thing: that theother side does not really appreciate the problems caused by conflict.

While co-ordination is essentially a method or rationale for gettinginstitutions to work together, it is clearly not synonymous with togetherness.Undercurrents of suspicion and distrust between individuals andinstitutional actors can affect important relationships and give rise toenduring misunderstandings and perplexing challenges. Sometimes co-ordination works, but in other situations, humanitarian or post-war actionsmight best be described as distinctly uncoordinated. In this monograph,co-ordination for education during both emergencies and earlyreconstruction periods will be examined both where it does and does notexist, and where it works well and seems to be stuck. It will also reviewthe anticipated and actual responsibilities of those involved with theprovision of education during the confounding and uniquely challengingcircumstances caused by armed conflict.



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Introduction

Why is the act of co-ordinating humanitarian and post-conflictreconstruction activities so difficult? In principle, it should be simple andstraightforward: the work by different actors in sectors such as educationshould fit together and complement each other. It does not make sense forthem to overlap or leave gaps in service. Working as a team to address thecollective needs of people recovering from tragedy and disaster seems theappropriate, logical and humanitarian thing to do.

But co-ordinating education, or any other humanitarian and post-conflict sector, is never easy to accomplish and sometimes unsuccessful.In the poor, war-torn countries where most humanitarian catastrophes takeplace, education work largely depends on contributions from wealthy donornations. These powerful actors have the potential to enforce co-ordination,but they may also have significant philosophical and policy constraintsthat limit their ability to do so.

Conflicts between United Nations agencies can begin long beforethey arrive on the scene, since their mandates overlap. Exactly whichorganization should become the lead United Nations agency for educationduring a crisis? Should it be UNESCO, whose mandate is education?How about the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), whose mandateis child protection? Why not the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP), whose mandate is to eradicate poverty? What of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose mandate isto protect and assist refugees? The conflict over United Nations mandateshas never been resolved, and can be the starting-point for unhelpful, andseemingly avoidable, power struggles.

Similarly, tensions between international NGOs are common. Oftenthe prize for implementing education during an emergency goes to thefirst NGO on the scene, which may not necessarily be the NGO with thebest qualifications and capacity to carry out the job. It is also assumedthat, once the United Nations lead agency for education for a particularcontext is sorted out, the lead agency will co-ordinate all NGOs workingin education. But often international NGOs have other ideas. NGOs mayhave their own funding streams and mandates, and may compete for ahigh public relations profile with other NGOs and United Nations agencies.



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Every international agency on the scene – from donor governments toUnited Nations agencies to NGOs – knows that positive media attentionenhances fund-raising opportunities. Sheer competition for accolades andfunds can severely undermine efforts to co-ordinate from the outset.

Turf battles involving huge international institutions can demonstratethe African adage that: “When elephants fight, the grass suffers.” In termsof co-ordination, war-affected, displaced, disempowered, and traumatizedcommunities are unquestionably the grass. Even though affectedcommunities are nearly always in the first line of emergency educators,they seldom receive direct funding for education beyond communitydonations (Sommers, 1999). Rarely do education systems arising duringemergencies even approximate a decentralized format. Whichever largeagency ends up being responsible for education tends to assumemanagement responsibilities. And while relations between war-affectedcommunities and agencies supporting education may grow to be excellent,the power relations are usually quite clear. In general, communities arenot ultimately in charge of the schooling of their own children. Theterminology that pervades humanitarian work confirms this relationship:People receiving assistance from humanitarian agencies are normallylabelled beneficiaries or recipients, not partners.

Strangely, of all the actors that may be involved in education duringemergency or post-war reconstruction periods, it is the role of the nationalgovernment that is most uncertain, from the central government down tothe regional/provincial and district/local levels. In peace-time situations,governments are formally responsible for education within their owncountries. But during wars, national governments may be under siege,struggling for legitimacy and sheer survival. Often such governments garnerreputations for corruption or low capacity, or both.

Either way, humanitarian organizations may view co-ordination withgovernments as unnecessary, at least in the short term. Working or co-ordinating with governments threatens to slow down humanitarian work:while humanitarian action is generally thought to be swift, governmentwork tends to be methodical. In addition, governments hosting refugeesmay be unsure or reluctant of their refugee education role. And when warsdie down and people begin to return home, the national government maybe far too weak to co-ordinate education activities effectively. It is thusnot surprising that resentments and misunderstandings can thrive and



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Introduction

negatively impact relations between internationals and nationals. Suchdifficulties often contain, in some way or another, issues about respect fornational sovereignty and commitments to building local capacity and civilsociety within the debate – in addition to, almost inevitably, fundingconcerns.

This monograph will address this co-ordination conundrum, withparticular reference to the education sector. It will document lessons thatcan be learned from experience about co-ordinating education inemergencies and post-conflict reconstruction. It will also use the optic ofco-ordination to describe the roles and responsibilities of key actors. Sincethe lessons documented here are partly designed to contribute to a guidebookand training materials targeted primarily for education officials fromgovernments either threatened by, engulfed by, or emerging from conflict,special attention will be paid to the role of national government units orministries responsible for the education of conflict-affected populations.A second objective will be to identify measures needed to increase theeffectiveness of international action in this field.

Methods and constraints

The limits of writing this study are considerable because little aboutco-ordinating education in humanitarian and post-conflict situations hasbeen written down. Not only is there no general work on co-ordinating theeducation sector during emergencies and reconstruction. There has alsobeen scant attention paid to co-ordination activities in this field in articles,documents, or reports. Part of the problem arises from the fact that theeducation sector, as will shortly be described, is rarely accorded aparticularly high priority during humanitarian situations (even when itinvolves a vast proportion of children in educational programming). Butthere are other reasons as well. Education in refugee camps is thought tobe fairly pro forma (even when it is not), making it appear unnecessary toconsistently document co-ordination arrangements. In addition, curriculumand accreditation issues for displaced persons, which often require carefulco-ordination between the ministries of education and aid agencies, maybe put off for the day when peace appears to be on the horizon. That daymay turn out to be years or even decades away.

But possibly most important, co-ordination about education and othersocial sectors tends to be organic and evolving, revolving around, perhaps,



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a series of meetings, documents and contracts concerning the roles,responsibilities, priorities and service gaps of involved institutions.Participating in activities aimed at enhancing co-ordination, moreover,may be optional. In addition, over time, the key players may change, andthose who are excluded from or choose not to contribute to the work ofbuilding and maintaining co-ordinated action may become nearly assignificant as those who participate.

Given that the subject of this study has proven so elusive, severalcomplementary research methods have been applied to the task. The firstsurfaces from a recognition that, while this endeavour has been envisionedas a desk study, specific documentation on the subject-matter is thin, andusually integrated within larger discussions. Accordingly, the documentgathering, review and synthesis and analysis processes have had to besupplemented with telephone interviews. The interviews have generallyincorporated both views of general themes and concerns as well asdescriptions and analyses of specific co-ordination cases. Considering thedifficulties of communication in many parts of the war-torn world, theratio of interviews with officials based outside of and within emergencyand post-conflict situations remains unbalanced in favour of those basedin safer and more stable areas of the world. There is one primary reasonfor this: communication links are far better. In an attempt to help addressthis unavoidable deficiency, the author has also referred to interviews,where relevant, recorded during previous field research in emergency andreconstruction contexts over the past decade. Some of these interviewswere originally carried out in preparation for an earlier monograph onhumanitarian co-ordination (Sommers, 2000).

This monograph will introduce important contextual themes and issuesin Chapter 1.

Chapter 2 reviews the roles and responsibilities that key playerstend to assume in the co-ordination of education during emergencies andearly reconstruction periods. It also briefly examines humanitarian co-ordination structures, and how the education sector remains largely onthe sidelines of such activity.

Chapter 3 shifts the perspective to field co-ordination. It first looksat co-ordination concerns that tend to emerge at both the community andnational levels. It then looks at aspects of three field co-ordination cases:



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Introduction

Afghanistan, southern Sudan, and Sierra Leone. Even when taken together,these case descriptions cannot possibly provide a comprehensive pictureof co-ordination in the field. Instead, each will be used to illuminateparticular dimensions of the broad and varied co-ordination and responsibilitychallenge.

Chapter 4 will introduce concluding themes and ideas for enhancingco-ordination and briefly suggest how the roles and responsibilities ofvarious institutions involved in education during emergencies andreconstruction might be usefully clarified.



22International Institute for Educational Planning www.unesco.org/iiep


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Chapter 1

Background to the study:key themes and contexts

The starting-point for this consideration of co-ordination and responsibilityfor education will be to consider three contextual questions:

First, what exactly does co-ordination mean?

Second, what is co-ordination for an education sector supposed tolook like? Assuming that the concept of ‘reconstruction’, as applied in thistext, refers to reconstructing an education system to resemble, to somedegree at least, its pre-conflict predecessor, it is useful to gain a sense ofco-ordination for education systems in developing countries that have notrecently been plagued by war. Since no generic model exists, two cases offunctioning education systems during peace-time will be reviewed.

Finally, what implications can be drawn from the two peace-timeexamples, and what kinds of co-ordination issues should we be aware ofwhen considering education during emergencies and early reconstruction?

It is hoped that reviewing the meanings of co-ordination, andexamining both the educational development and humanitarian contexts,will provide a foundation for reviewing ideas about key co-ordination actorsduring humanitarian crises in Chapter 2 and then examining illuminatingco-ordination cases in Chapter 3.

Definitions and implications

Definitions of co-ordination will be drawn from the fairly voluminousliterature on co-ordination in humanitarian contexts. Drawing from thisliterature not only is relevant to the emergency and reconstruction contextof this work. It also provides an immediate indication of how difficult andfractious the co-ordination endeavour can be. Simply put, definitions ofhumanitarian co-ordination are uncoordinated and conflicted. Instead ofan agreed-upon definition, or perhaps a small handful of definitions from



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which to choose, there is instead “a plethora” (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001: 5).The overabundance of ways to delineate a single field of endeavour standsas a clear indication that co-ordinating humanitarian actors (or, perhaps,humanitarian actors co-ordinating themselves), is rarely easy: If it is notclear to those involved just what co-ordination means, it will be even moredifficult to co-ordinate the work they do.

With this in mind, the starting-point for defining co-ordination herewill be two English-language dictionaries. Definitions in one dictionarysuggest that co-ordination implies equality and harmony among thoseinvolved. In Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1999: 248), the noun‘co-ordinate’ is defined as “one that is equal in rank, importance, ordegree”. This definition presents an immediate problem, because differentsorts of actors – wealthy and influential donor governments versusbeleaguered national governments, for instance – are, in terms of power,capacity and influence, decidedly unequal. Moreover, assuming that somesort of harmony might exist between, for example, United Nations agenciesand international NGOs competing for the same donor funds and mediaattention, is hardly a recipe for successful co-ordination.

Since gaining harmony among competitive and distinctly unequalactors is bound to be challenging, another set of definitions, from a seconddictionary, will be considered here as well. The Cambridge internationaldictionary of English (1995: 303) contains suggestions that co-ordinationis not necessarily about harmony or equality at all. Here, the verb ‘to co-ordinate’ implies a measure of coercion: “to make (various different things)work effectively as a whole”. Making different things work together impliesa power relationship: some actor is in charge, and that actor has the abilityto get, or force, others to work together. It is notable that among thesentences used to exemplify this kind of action is “A number of majorcharities are co-ordinating their efforts to send out food to the areas worstaffected by the famine” (Cambridge international dictionary of English,1995: 303). Regarding the noun, ‘co-ordination’, the following sentenceis used to illuminate its meaning: “There’s absolutely no co-ordinationbetween the different groups”, which is taken to mean both “They are notworking together” and “Nobody knows what anyone else is doing”. Takentogether, the ideas of co-ordinating and co-ordination derived from theCambridge international dictionary of English generally involve one entitycharged with getting others to work together in a transparent way.



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Background to the study: key themes and contexts

The differentiation between the conflicting dictionary definitions –one suggesting harmony and equality, the other implying a bit of coercionor enforcement – is reflected in the two primary ways that Donini (1996: 14)envisions co-ordination. In his view, “co-ordination by consensus” entailsleadership by orchestration, which is “achieved without any direct assertionof authority by the co-ordinator” in charge. “Co-ordination by command”,on the other hand, calls for “strong leadership” that is “accompanied bysome sort of authority, whether carrot or stick.” Donini includes a thirdco-ordination situation, “co-ordination by default”, in which there is an“absence of a formal co-ordination entity”, which results in “the mostrudimentary exchange of information and division of labour among theactors”. Donini’s vision of three kinds of co-ordination is useful in partbecause it considers how co-ordination is realized. Will there be a powerfulactor or set of actors directing and enforcing co-ordination, or will thereinstead be a co-ordinator with a softer, more suggestive touch?Alternatively, will co-ordination be a low priority activity with minimalsignificance?

Definitions of humanitarian co-ordination tend to be both technicaland expansive. One definition, which Reindorp and Wiles (2001: 5) consider“one of the definitions used repeatedly in past studies” that “stood out asone that could prove useful to the UN”, is the following:

“Co-ordination is the systematic use of policy instruments to deliverhumanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Suchinstruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managinginformation, mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability,orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating andmaintaining a serviceable framework with host political authoritiesand providing leadership” (Minear et al., 1992: 3).

Three implications entailed in this definition and its context are usefulto note, as they will surface as themes in subsequent discussions in thismonograph. First, the definition lays out six specific duties or aspects ofco-ordination. The expanse is broad, and largely has to do with managementand supervisory chores. It may be rare when co-ordination contains everyaspect suggested here. For example, one mobilization of resources effort,the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), also known as the ConsolidatedInter-Agency Appeal, tends to assemble information and calls for supportfrom United Nations agencies, and may not include non-United Nationsagencies in the process.



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Second, the reference of Reindorp and Wiles to the utility of a co-ordination definition for the United Nations, and exemplified by the CAPbeing a largely United Nations focused activity, calls attention to theprominence of United Nations agencies in co-ordination work. Most co-ordination committees, task forces, etc., are dominated by United Nationsagencies. Some non-United Nations actors may not feel obligated toparticipate in, or may choose to distance themselves from United Nations-led co-ordination efforts.

Third, working with the national government (‘host politicalauthorities’) is defined as a component of co-ordination. This is significantbecause the definition makes clear that the national government is notnecessarily a participant and certainly not a leader in co-ordinatedhumanitarian action. Instead, they are conceived as a co-ordinationresponsibility: those who co-ordinate are obliged, under this definition, tomaintain a ‘serviceable framework’ with government. This separationbetween humanitarian actors and the government of the country wherehumanitarian work takes place – the host country effectively becoming akind of playing field for humanitarian action – continually surfaces as apoint of debate. A country’s sovereignty may be challenged as a result ofhumanitarian actions, and it is not something that is easily resolved. AsBrown (2003: 21) has observed: “When a state cannot provide for thesecurity of its citizens international humanitarian assistance becomesessential.” At the same time, the presence of humanitarian operations withinits territory may not sit well with the national government. The role ofnational governments in co-ordinated action, in short, is frequentlycontested.

Some other themes arising from this consideration of humanitarianco-ordination are worth noting. Minear (2002: 19) mentions several broadconcerns, most prominent among them the fact that “co-ordination is easierto advocate than to achieve” because “the political economy of thehumanitarian enterprise – that is, the perceived institutional needs of donorsand operational agencies and the power-based dynamics of their interaction– work against it”. Minear considers this inherent weakness in humanitarianwork – that it is so difficult for the work to be co-ordinated – to be “thesoft underbelly of the humanitarian enterprise” (Minear, 2002: 20). It is aserious weakness, and Minear (2002: 22) lists a number of dimensions tothis problem. The first is power: Who has the power to pull “the entire



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operation together”? The second is that co-ordination threatens individualagency profiles, which are critical to agency reputations – and fund-raisingabilities. As a result, “Co-ordination is perceived as reducing the profile ofindividual aid groups” (Minear, 2002: 26). The third is cost: “Co-ordinationis an expensive proposition.” Even badly co-ordinated humanitarian workrequires a sequence of regular meetings (and the drafting of guidingdocuments), often taking place at many levels in the field, in agencyheadquarters, and in large gatherings in European or North Americancapitals. This makes it expensive in terms of time, travel, and providingsupport. At the same time, it is hard to raise money for co-ordinationwork. As Minear notes (2002: 27, 29), “Rare is the public appeal thatrequests funds to help underwrite the co-ordination machinery.” Fourth isthe failure to “devise effective co-ordination structures” because of a“lack of consensus about how they should be designed.” While this problemmay have been “most pronounced within the United Nations” (Minear,2002: 29), Minear also notes (2002: 31) that “government donors andNGOs are no more willing than United Nations agencies to acceptdirection.” Disputes within the United Nations system have left the Officefor the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is taskedto co-ordinate humanitarian action for the United Nations, with a highstatus within the United Nations but limited staff, budget and authority(2002: 29). Fifth is the problem of leadership. It is common to hear frominternational humanitarian officials that effective leaders are the key tosuccessful co-ordination work. And yet, “experience ... confirms that theleadership of individuals, however indispensable, requires institutionalsupport in order to realize its full potential” (Minear, 2002: 32). Withoutthe buy-in of the actors involved, strong leaders will ultimately be unableto co-ordinate humanitarian actions.

If co-ordination seems so impossible to obtain, with the entireendeavour fraught with inherent difficulties, why should it be sought? VanBrabant (1999: 13) suggests a potentially useful approach: lower yourexpectations. He argues that co-ordination is an ‘ongoing activity’ and a‘process’, not a ‘blue-print’. The need to be flexible is determined notonly by the need to respond to the fluid, changing nature of conflicts andtheir aftermath. In addition, “striving for consensus among a large numberof agencies” is unrealistic, particularly since most “have no clear policies”.It is more realistic and appropriate to envision co-ordination as a processthat “seeks to create a ‘critical mass’ of leading agencies, whose improved



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analysis and increased effectiveness makes them more influential in thedebates and decisions about interventions” (Van Brabant, 1999: 13). VanBrabant’s focus, as is common in the humanitarian co-ordination literature,is on leading international agencies that tend to dominate humanitarianwork. In this sense, co-ordination is not often envisioned as a particularlyinclusive activity, but an activity dominated by the most powerful actors.

Much of the literature on humanitarian co-ordination, and many ofthe comments provided by humanitarian agency officials during interviews,contain a strong implied feeling that co-ordination is a good thing. AsMinear (2002: 19) notes: “Everyone associated with the humanitarianenterprise touts the value of co-ordination.” Co-ordination promises toyield cost-effectiveness, coherence and improved efficiency in the deliveryof services. It implies action without replication, overlaps or gaps, oravoidable differences in the quality or nature of provision. Even if co-ordination seems to be nearly impossible to achieve, it certainly appearsto be a goal well worth reaching for: the image of everyone getting alongand working collectively towards mutual goals seems a good one. If wework together, we can achieve more and do it better, right?

Perhaps; it may be useful, however, to reflect on what co-ordinationis not about. For one thing, in most cases co-ordination has nothing to dowith achieving equity among providers. On the contrary: the competitiveenvironment that encases humanitarian and reconstruction work can impacton who receives the most prominent and far-reaching roles andresponsibilities. Operational capacity, including the ability to arrive onthe scene early in a humanitarian crisis, can have a considerable impacton who ends up dominating activities in sectors such as education. Forexample, an international NGO or United Nations agency may take overwork in a particular sector because it had moved swiftly to assert its ‘claim’over it. In such situations, where powerful actors may be allowed todominate, co-ordination can help institutionalize that domination.Government ministries and national NGOs, or even international agenciesthat may have had the experience and presence prior to war or disaster,may have no chance to assume their former role.

The extent to which co-ordination is about control and even dominancesurfaced during interviews with veteran humanitarian officials. To one,co-ordination was really about “who has the ability to hand out favoursand provide control.” The idea of asserting one’s stamp over a particular



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activity was taken up by another official. The official’s assessment beganwith a critique of co-ordination during periods of peace-time development:

“I’m opposed to co-ordination during development because itconsolidates power in the hands of the givers, which are all externalagencies, and undermines the local government or other actors. Withno co-ordination, there’s redundancy and waste, but then, nature isredundant and wasteful, yet efficient, too. Streamlining assistanceputs power in the hands of the givers, and since the purpose ofdevelopment is to help people gain power over their own lives, thenco-ordination is anti-developmental.”

This critique essentially turns on its head the argument that supportsco-ordination because it improves the efficiency of service delivery. Ifsuch work is carried out by outsiders, the critique implies, then it ultimatelyundermines local empowerment efforts.

However, in times of war, the same official viewed co-ordinated actionby humanitarian actors as serving an important purpose: keeping aid outof the hands of those involved in the conflict, or the ‘warlords’. “Warlordswill control unco-ordinated humanitarian assistance”, the official explained.“Without co-ordination, the warlords manipulate competition betweenagencies”, using assistance to reward supporters while keeping it awayfrom enemies and thus “reinforcing their political and military agendas”.In the view of this official, the purpose of co-ordination during conflictshas little to do with enhancing efficiency or cost-effectiveness. It is allabout coherence. Humanitarians need to co-ordinate their actions to achievethree objectives: prevent making communities more vulnerable; ensurethat humanitarians are not serving the political and military agendas ofthe warring parties; and save lives.

Lessons from peace-time contexts?

What is the frame of reference for co-ordination in the educationsector during humanitarian crises and early in the post-war reconstructionphase? Does it resemble co-ordination during peace-time? The short answeris: not really, since during situations without war and chaos, education isnormally led by the ministry of education in a particular country. Emergencysituations, on the other hand, tend to shift much of the responsibility foreducation to international agencies.



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At the same time, a consistently critical factor in both war-affectedand reasonably secure peace-time situations in developing countries is therole of international agencies in education sector action. It is this relationshipthat will be considered here.

How does the ministry of education manage funding and activitiesfrom international actors? To what extent are such contributions controlledand co-ordinated by the Ministry of Education? These questions challengeall developing country ministries. Here, examples from two countries willbe briefly considered.

The first is Mongolia. Buluut Nanzaddorj paints a picture ofinternational donor agencies leading the education ministry by the handinto a post-socialist world. In a sense, it could hardly have been otherwise.Once heavily dependent on financial and economic aid from the formerSoviet Union, Mongolia was forced to transition to a market economy anddepend on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its loans, and itsstructural adjustment policies even before the USSR collapsed in 1989.The changes taking place in Mongolia were part of a larger trend beginningin 1991, in which “all countries of the former Soviet Union and Mongoliahave had to copy Western approaches in the organization and managementof their education systems” (Nanzaddorj, 2001: 72). In addition to theIMF, the governments of these countries also received loans from the WorldBank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Among the skills thatgovernments from these post-USSR countries had to learn was how todocument projects, particularly for the IMF and the ADB (Nanzaddorj,2001: 73).

Nanzaddorj (2001: 77) states that the dramatic reforms instituted bythe shift to a market economy and “the IMF-led structural adjustmentprogrammes ... had a ‘shock therapy’ nature and caused severe andprolonged recession and austerity at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s”.Investments in education have steadily declined in real terms. None theless, Mongolia, which “was the first former centrally planned economy inthe region to start education development projects with foreign donors”,has “served as a testing ground for such innovations as tuition and userfees, student loans and private education” (Nanzaddorj, 2001: 15, 78).The predominant donor in the education sector is the ADB.



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Historically poor and dependent, emerging from a socialist world,the Mongolian government has had to negotiate its way ahead with theassistance of its donors (some also serve as its creditors), and largelyaccording to their strategies and policies, structural adjustment policies inparticular. It is thus difficult to characterize the Ministry of Education’srelations with its donor/creditors as ‘co-ordinating’ their work. Nanzaddorjsuggests that relations were collaborative. Still, given the drastic changeswrought by market-based governance, including “the obvious shortage ofreal public funds for provision of education according to past patterns[which] was made worse with the necessity to spend more than beforeon new reforms and innovations” (Nanzaddorj, 2001: 72), it is clear thatthe donor/creditors had considerable power over educational policy andpractice in post-socialist Mongolia. The government’s education ministryhad much to learn in order to survive in the new, competitive, market-oriented world.2 Although the Government of Mongolia may still havebeen responsible for education following the fall of the U.S.S.R (duringthe Soviet-influenced era, “education, as other social sectors, was a statemonopoly” (Nanzaddorj, 2001: 72)), it was hardly able to call the shotswithout foreign assistance and guidance. Illustrative of this is the followingcharacterization of the ADB in Mongolia, which “has taken a lead role inseveral key sectors” including education, and has “provided assistance tostrengthen the Government’s capability to prioritize and co-ordinate projectsproposed for external assistance” (ADB, 1999: 11).

Are developing country governments, even those operating duringpeace-time, able to co-ordinate the activities of foreign actors? Oneeducation expert with considerable experience in both emergency anddevelopment contexts did not think so. The expert commented that “Evenin developing country contexts, there is no effort [by the nationalgovernment] to control or co-ordinate NGOs doing work in education.Sometimes, they don’t even know what the NGOs are doing.” Thisviewpoint places the responsibility for the lack of co-ordination in nationaleducation sectors squarely on the shoulders of the developing countrygovernment, not the international actors working in education. It is adifferent perspective than one that surfaces from the Mongolia case; thissuggests that the national government’s role is dependent on its foreignsupporters.

2. One of the many changes that took place during the 1990s was the reduction in the number ofministries from 50 to 11. In 2001, Nanzaddorj (2001: 78) observed that “The currentname of the Ministry in charge of the education sector is the Ministry of Science,Technology, Education and Culture.”



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As in Mongolia, the case of Cambodia suggests that the responsibilityfor co-ordination is likely shared among many parties. The Ministry ofEducation, Youth and Sports (MOEYS) is weak and government investmentin education is low. The Ministry’s ability to control and co-ordinate theactions of schools has been minimal, mainly due to poor communicationsand the large proportion of the education budget being supplied bycommunities and international agencies. The combination is scarcely ablueprint for effectively developing a well co-ordinated education system.

Duy Pheng and his colleagues’ description of the financial andbudgetary side of the education situation in Cambodia suggest a grimstate of affairs for education. Only 8.3 per cent of the 1998 national budgetwas earmarked for education (Pheng et al., 2001: 23), or less than 1 percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is an astonishinglylow figure. In Mongolia in the same year, for example, governmentinvestment in education equalled about 6.2 per cent of the nation’s GDP(Nanzaddorj, 2001: 27). The actual disbursement of government fundsfor education was probably even less, since “actual expenditure is veryoften lower than the budgeted amounts” (Pheng et al., 2001: 26). Withsuch limited government investment, most of the non-salary costs foreducation, particularly in primary schools, are contributed by community-led ‘parents associations’ and ‘school supporting committees’ (Pheng etal., 2001: 22). A survey of 85 primary schools by Bray (1999) estimatedthat the share of community contributions at “60 per cent of resourceinputs to Cambodian primary schools against a government contributionof less than 15 per cent and external agency support of about 18 percent” (Pheng et al., 2001: 27).

Here, it must be said that co-ordinating responsibilities and roles inCambodia would seem to be fairly straightforward, given that thegovernment seeks to address “teacher salaries and examination expenses”while parents and communities are left to “cover all [school-level]operational and maintenance costs” (Pheng et al., 2001: 14). This wouldappear to leave donors and international education agencies to negotiateat least three possible roles for themselves: supporting government andparent/community capacities, strengthening linkages between them, andhelping to address remaining gaps in the education system.

Instead, it is the way that international institutions contribute toCambodia’s education system that most poignantly illuminates the



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Cambodian Government’s challenge to co-ordinate education sectoraction. Pheng and his colleagues are critical of the nature of internationalassistance. “The visible effect of donor intervention”, the authors state,“is seen mostly in the volume of consultants’ contracts” (Pheng et al.,2001: 14). “In most cases, donors themselves are the administrators of ...aid projects and entrust their consultants or certain organizations with themanagement and execution of the project” (Pheng et al., 2001: 23). Inother words, the contributions of the ADB, the World Bank, and bilateraldonors, in addition to United Nations organizations (UNICEF, UNDP,UNESCO and UNFPA), and international NGOs, tend to be project-based,feature the contributions of hired consultants, and operate largely outsidethe sphere of government oversight and co-ordination (Pheng et al., 2001:23).

The thorny problem of apparently significant amounts of foreignassistance to Cambodia’s education sector being earmarked to consultants(most of whom are foreigners) was also highlighted by a veteraninternational education expert based in Cambodia. The CambodianGovernment “is beginning to say ‘you don’t use our money to hire someforeign consultant without going through us.’” Increasingly, MOEYSofficials “are putting strong pressure on donors to hire Cambodianconsultants.” There have been two general responses to this newlyassertive government action, the expert argued. “The pessimists [in theinternational community] say ‘The Ministry is trying to line their ownpockets by getting their friends consulting jobs.’” On the other hand, “Theoptimists [also in the international community] say ‘The ministry is doingit to genuinely build their own capacity.’”

The siphoning of development wealth to international and local elitesis a widespread developing country problem. As Uvin notes, “It has oftenbeen said – and I largely concur – that the prime impact of developmentprojects is to create jobs for the lucky few who manage to obtain them”(1998: 143).3 Yet the squabble over whether donor-funded consultantsshould be Cambodians or foreigners is also instructive of how a weakeducation ministry and powerful donors co-ordinate their work – or donot. The international education expert asserts that MOEYS officials “don’t

3. Uvin (1998: 143) also states, with reference to Rwanda, that “The development enterprisedirectly and actively contributes to inequality and humiliation. The material advantagesaccorded to a small group of people and the lifestyles of foreigners living in Rwandacontribute to greater economic inequality and the devaluation of the life of the majority.”



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have a plan to present and control donor activities.” At the same time,while ministry officials want to co-ordinate donor action, “they are sodependent on donor money that they’re hesitant to be assertive with them.”All of the projects that international agencies support and/or participate inare supposed to be approved by the MOEYS. But Pheng et al. (2001: 36)list a number of problems that limits or prevents proper governmentoversight and co-ordination: “there is no system and no capacity for financialmonitoring” within the ministry; “the administrative bookkeeping system”is insufficient; and the centralized budget management system does notably prioritize activities. A problem contributing to the limited capacity ofthe MOEYS to manage the education system arises from its relationswith the Ministry of Finance that earmarks all funds to MOEYS: “Thereis a lack of flexibility in budget implementation as even minor re-allocationsrequire authorization of the Ministry of Finance” (Pheng et al., 2001: 14).Similarly difficult relations between the two ministries also existed inMongolia (Nanzaddorj, 2001).

Yet another challenge – limited technical capacity in MOEYSpersonnel – is partly due to war and demographics. Cambodia’s long andtragic period of civil war and resistance left between 2 and 3 million peopledead between 1970 and 1993 (Deng, 1993: 95). The most intense periodof death and destruction was 1975-1978, when the Khmer Rouge ruledand carried out, among other things, truly extensive mass executions. Asa result, the expert asserted, “There’s an entire generation missing inCambodia between the ages of 37 and 55. They don’t exist. They’re dead,and it’s exactly the middle management level [which this generation couldhave filled] that the ministry really needs.”

If co-ordination of and responsibility for the education sector in peace-time developing countries can provide a framework or set of lessons thatcan be applied to wartime contexts, the cases of Mongolia and Cambodiamainly suggest that similar difficulties persist, although perhaps at lesserlevels. Given the educational needs before them, government financial andtechnical capacities may well be threadbare. Both the Mongolian andCambodian governments rely on foreign donors for funding and technicalsupport. The Mongolian case strongly suggests that effective government/donor collaboration is possible, even if foreign actors dominate the reformagenda.



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The same cannot yet be said for Cambodia. So near to war and lossitself, Cambodia presents a situation much closer to the wartime andimmediate post-war contexts that will be examined in Chapter 3. Theability of MOEYS to lead the education sector, co-ordinate all actors withinit, and effect reforms is nominal. While it is attempting to rein in donoraction, developing an action plan for all education actors to follow is notits strength. In fact, it may be a definite weakness. As an internationaleducation expert has observed, “The Cambodian attitude is to implementfirst and then plan. They take the money, and then figure out how to use it.They don’t say, ‘Here’s what we want to do, and here’s our budget.’” Insuch a situation, it is probably unreasonable to expect donors to followthe Ministry’s lead. At the same time, the extent to which donor andMinistry activities even mesh, to say nothing of being co-ordinated, appearsto be an open question. And it is probable that the impact of employingmany foreign consultants is a method for developing education whileminimizing local capacity building.

The co-ordination discussion in this section thus ultimately returns tothe issue of power and its direct connection to wealth. In neither Mongolianor Cambodia do we find truly capable and empowered domestic educationauthorities. Dependence on foreign aid and expertise seems to captureboth situations much more accurately. Indeed, the shadow of deep-pocketedand truly influential foreign actors is long in both cases; this is a difficultstarting-point for any government entity seeking to co-ordinate educationactivities. What remains unclear, however, is whether foreign or domesticactors in the education sector are ultimately responsible for education’ssuccesses and failures. For if a government responsible for education hasa demonstrable shortage of cash and skill, does its reliance on foreignersextend the accountability for education’s successes and failures to foreignersas well?

Implications of the education challenge during wars

The accountability and power of international donor and aid agenciesare among the issues that assume a different character during war andearly post-war periods. The accountability of humanitarian agencies ineducation work in many ways increases; this is because the ability orwillingness of local education authorities to be active in education worktends to significantly weaken during times of war and soon after wars end.



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It is not simply that agencies working with refugees in a camp or withinternally displaced persons (IDPs) inside a war-torn country have anincreased role in education because they have the capacity and receivedthe funds to do the work. It is also because the presence and abilities of theeducation authorities, which may have already been weak during peace-time, may well have been reduced to the point of bare existence.

From Somalia and Sri Lanka to Colombia and Kosovo, civil conflicthas been the most prevalent sort of war across the globe. These kinds ofviolent contests over state authority tend to produce a withering of nationalsovereignty. The normal apparatus of a state is under siege, and competingarmed groups may control different parts of the country. It is almostinevitable that such circumstances make the government’s educationcapacity even weaker. Many capable staff may no longer work in theeducation ministry. Funding may have dried up. Education officials maylack access to much of their country. Education sectors during wars, inshort, generally descend into crisis.

Into the vacuum caused by the weakened state come internationalagencies, and their impact over education can be both sudden and broad.In such circumstances, the dynamics of co-ordinating action in the educationsector take on a different context than during normal peace-time situations.Agencies working on education in different parts of the country, or withsignificant populations of the war-affected (such as refugee or IDP camps),may effectively become a sort of local education ministry. Faced withsuch a diverse and uneven education landscape – where some school-agechildren and youth may have access to reasonably good educational serviceswhile others may have minimal or no services at their disposal – co-ordination becomes both more significant and much more difficult. Noeducation authority centre may exist, and it may be replaced by a diversityof smaller, localized education authorities. Some or none of these authoritiesmay be connected to the government. Often a portion of the war-affectedpopulation will perceive its national education ministry as illegitimate andlacking authority over its local education system. This local system maybe run by international agencies, not a government authority.

It is noteworthy that when wars fracture and even atomize an educationsystem, adequate and consistent funding for education may be difficult toacquire. While the funding environment is changing, it remains the casethat support for education during and immediately after wars is generally



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unreliable (Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003; Sinclair, 2001; Sommers, 2003c).While this issue is not at the centre of this discussion, it impacts ourconsideration of co-ordination of and responsibility for education.Managing a co-ordinated system, as Minear noted above, tends to requirea financial investment. This is particularly the case when war has drivenpopulations across a country and a region. Standardizing teachercertification, school and student accreditation, teacher incentive scales, acurriculum, and a language of instruction are among the issues that callattention to the need to negotiate and co-ordinate across a fractured terrainand among a diverse group of education actors. War has the power notonly to destroy an education system. It also confronts local, national andinternational educators with new complexities and challenges that makerunning a school system exceedingly difficult.



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Chapter 2


Wars and the diminished sovereignty of war-affected nations invite adiversity of players into the education field. Their participation can beunregulated as well, and it is almost always infused with competition.With this in mind, it is useful to identify the central participants of educationwork during and after wars, and outline some of their tendencies. Whatfollows is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather a review of who isinvolved and what they do, or seek to do. The concluding section of thischapter will consider some of the humanitarian co-ordination frameworksand approaches that involve officials based in their aid agency headquarteroffices. It will also reflect on why education remains largely on the outsideof such high-level co-ordination discussions.

Co-ordination actors and their roles

The roles of the multitude of actors that may be involved witheducation during emergencies and early reconstruction often do not fittogether well. Overlapping United Nations agency mandates, internationalNGOs insisting on independence, restrictions that earmark donor fundingin a particular direction and to particular recipients, confusion over whicharm of the national government should be involved in education, competitionfor media attention to buttress agency profiles – these are only a handfulof potential problems that can limit, obstruct, or even obliterate chancesfor co-ordinating education sector work effectively. Successful co-ordination usually succeeds when it is able to address at least some ofthese looming concerns.

Understanding the limitations of co-ordination requires an introductionof the key actors, and a review of the roles they may play in the educationfield. The following review is necessarily incomplete – it is simplyimpossible to depict accurately the differences in tendencies and objectiveswithin, for example, the truly diverse array of NGO actors, to say nothingof the smaller number of United Nations agency, donor, nationalgovernment, non-state, and other actors. It also will limit itself to those



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actors who have some direct hand in education work, thus setting theroles of others, such as military actors (peacekeeping and otherwise) aside.

War-affected populations

In many situations, communities begin to organize rudimentaryschools for themselves soon after being displaced by war. These communityefforts can be seen as building blocks for future educational programming.They may initially take place in basements or under trees, and may or maynot have even the most basic school supplies, textbooks, teacher guides,staffing, funding and administrative support. Some seek to continue formaleducation for their children, primary school in particular. At the sametime, there may be ‘courses’ being taught on particular concerns for childrenand adults, such as learning the dominant language of the area to which acommunity has fled. Either way, the teachers and other educators in war-affected communities frequently become the first line of emergencyeducators.

Schools started by refugee, IDP or other war-affected communitiesmay be seen as heroic efforts to claim and assert the right of their childrento access education. As such, they are worthy of energetic and appropriateinternational and national government support. The issue of co-ordinationand support is important because, without it, the schools may find otherbenefactors. The case of Rwandan refugees in former Eastern Zaire isinstructive (Sommers, 1999: 7):

“Left uncontrolled and uncoordinated, the many refugee-led schoolsin Eastern Zaire became sites for sinister teachings. An educationexpert described how ... international humanitarian agency officials‘weren’t interested in education, [so] the government-in-exile ranthe schools’... Reserved for young Rwandan Hutu elites, it was widelyassumed that the schools emphasized the sort of ethnically basedversion of Rwandan history that [had] provided the rationale for ethnicgenocide. The official concluded by declaring that the Eastern Zairecase provided ‘the strongest argument for why we need to [provide]emergency education support that is timely and involved’.”

It should be noted that the situation was eventually addressed byinternational agencies in the area, at least to some degree. As Bird (2003)has noted: “At the early phase of the refugee crisis in [the former Zaire],



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UNHCR refused to support any education activities ... However, by early1995 [perhaps a half year later], UNHCR did start to provide minimalsupport for [refugee education].”

National or host governments

There appears to be a growing awareness that the co-ordinationrole of national, or host, governments should be enhanced. Considerableroom for improvement exists. As Van Brabant (1999: 5) has noted: “Themost neglected and understudied aspect of the co-ordination ofhumanitarian action must be that by host governments.” Often,governments strive to “screen agencies for integrity and competence” orseek to ensure that international aid flows through government structuresor “is at least in line with national plans and policies”. In some cases, thegovernment will seek to “legislate and supervise an otherwise chaotic andunaccountable NGO sector” (Van Brabant, 1999: 5). This focusedgovernmental concern directed primarily at international NGOs in theirmidst – the numbers may range from a dozen to a hundred or more –appears to be widespread. Often, government officials are resentful ofNGO behaviour, such as in Sierra Leone during much of the civil warperiod. They may also become openly antagonistic. At the same time, andsimilar to the Cambodian case described above, the Sierra Leonean casesuggests that such government critiques may be intentionally selective.While government views of international NGO behaviour could be caustic,the donor agencies that chose to fund international NGOs and minimizeor resist direct funding to the Sierra Leonean Government “were sparedthe [Sierra Leonean Government’s] criticism directed at NGOs, perhapsbecause the government continued to seek access to [donor] funds”(Sommers, 2000: 30).

Possible national government suspicions of international NGOs maynot be tempered by NGO reactions. Van Brabant suggests three reasonsfor the tendency of international agencies, and again, NGOs in particular,“to stay away from host governments” during times of conflict. One reasonis political: agencies “may want to maintain a distance from the governmentthat itself is party to the conflict, to maintain their neutrality.” A secondpertains to “the capacity of the national authorities”. “Even assertivegovernments”, Brabandt continued, “seldom have the administrativecapacity” to adequately digest, review and respond to aid agency reports,provide policy guidelines or carry out assessment work. In addition, however,



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there may be a lack of co-ordination within the government itself. Thisshortcoming can include ‘horizontal’ co-ordination across ministries andother national government units, in addition to ‘vertical’ co-ordinationbetween national, provincial, and other government levels (Van Brabant,1999: 5). A lack of government capacity, in its various forms, can enhance“the temptation among aid agencies to bypass even government structuresthat in principle are supportive” (Van Brabant, 1999: 6).

The issue of government capacities to co-ordinate education isaddressed by an Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE)document, which argues that “building the government’s ability to co-ordinate should be integral to any emergency education programme, becausethe government will be able to better respond to the current crisis andthose in the future” (INEE, 2003b: 2). INEE calls for donor agencies tofund an expansion of government work, including improved staffing, morevehicles, equipment, and technical support that would seem to includetraining as well as technical advisers.

INEE (2003b: 3) also suggests that “A valuable tool for attractingdonor support and guiding United Nations agencies and NGOs’ calls for‘a comprehensive plan’ for enhancing formal education services andexpanding access”. It should also demonstrate how the government will“transition from emergency response to development”. As the Mongolianand Cambodian cases suggest, such work would be a tall order even fordeveloping countries during peace-time. Friction and frustration areunfortunately more common between governments and donor, UnitedNations and NGO officials, while patience during crisis situations is, notsurprisingly, in short supply. Questions about government leadershipcapabilities have become a near-constant concern during emergency andearly post-war reconstruction situations. INEE lists a number of checklistquestions that should be asked during these situations, and they rangefrom the complex (e.g. “Are statistics cross-tabulated to measure theeffectiveness of collaboration?” and “Have standardized reportingstructures been put into place to monitor the educational activities, andthe number of children attending school?”) to the elemental (e.g. “Whochairs [education co-ordination meetings]?” and “Are the United Nationsand NGOs implementing activities in accordance with national law?”)(INEE, 2003b: 4). In both cases, understanding that government capacitiesrequired to carry out such work may be questionable, one gathers a pictureof overwhelmed government officials struggling to address a range of



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concerns merely to know about and attempt to manage all the educationwork going on in their country.

The national government’s role in education may be furthercomplicated by the fact that the government’s focal point for educationmay not be the Ministry of Education. Sinclair (2002: 81-82) notes that“for crisis-affected populations within their own country, emergency co-ordination is normally through the government, assisted by UNICEF”(although “UNHCR may provide support for education in regions receivingreturning refugees”). This sort of co-ordination normally features theinvolvement of the education ministry. However, for refugee situations,where co-ordination normally is led by UNHCR and the government hostingthe refugees (although “UNICEF may undertake [UNHCR’s] role in largeemergencies”), the government’s education ministry may not be involvedor may have a secondary role. Their reduced role is normally derivedfrom the fact that the refugees are citizens of another country, makingtheir education concerns appear to be the responsibility of the refugees’home country government. Refugees, large populations in particular, maypresent serious security concerns for the host government, especially ifthey are encamped in border areas. Accordingly, “refugee affairs oftencome under a home affairs ministry” (Sinclair, 2002: 88). Other governmentsectors that might be involved are the ministry of the interior or even themilitary. Education for refugees may seem to be rather nominal concern.Nonetheless, Sinclair insists that the host government should “establishappropriate and clear structures for dealing with refugee education” inorder to become involved with issues such as teacher training and therefugees’ curriculum (Sinclair, 2002: 88). It also can facilitate thegovernment takeover of the refugees’ education infrastructure followingtheir repatriation, which may well include school facilities that can beabsorbed into the local education system.

Sinclair notes that co-ordination and responsibility issues surroundingthe education of refugees returning to their homes (often known as‘returnees’) is complex and variable. Sinclair (2002: 91) observes that itis ‘unlikely’ for a government that remains hostile to the returnees to carryout “any preparatory work for repatriation until there are moves towardsa peace treaty or something similar.” A willing government can supporteducation work for refugees from its country by “providing textbooks andeducational materials” to refugee schools. It can also arrange for “the



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assessment and certification of refugee students’ achievements and teachertraining”. Ideally, the government should also become familiarized withthe NGOs charged with implementing refugee education, to determinewhether they might be candidates for continuing to support education afterrefugees return to their homes (Sinclair, 2002: 91). All of these measureswould support a central co-ordination concern: ensuring the coherence ofeducation work, particularly in the context of refugees returning to anoften-devastated country and rejoining portions of communities they hadleft behind. Such situations present what is often the most difficult co-ordination challenge of all.

Non-state actors

It is difficult to find a non-state actor that is uninterested in supportingsome sort of education. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, thelargest opposition party, or movement, among the southern Sudaneseopposition, for example, has an established education unit. The unit iswriting its own curriculum, although its reach and impact in SouthernSudan remains limited (Sommers, 2003b). On the other hand, theunsanctioned ‘parallel system’ of education that Kosovar Albanians devisedfollowing severe restrictions in Kosovo by the Serb-dominated Milosevicregime, had broad reach and widespread impact (Bellamy, 2001; Clark,2000; Crighton et al., 2001; Davies, 1999; Nedeva, 1998; Sommers andBuckland, 2003).

While the southern Sudan and Kosovo cases illuminate non-stateactors striving to establish formal education systems, others feature theirown brand of non-formal education. For instance, the Revolutionary UnitedFront (RUF) in Sierra Leone employed a sort of non-formal ‘education’that would more usefully be depicted as indoctrination. During the civilwar in Sierra Leone, the RUF operated largely by raiding villages forproperty and children. Some of the abducted children (to be sure, somechildren and youth did join the RUF of their own accord as well) thenreceived a kind of ‘education’ that featured instruction on the children’sworld view and military tactics. While the purposes that children wereprepared to enact were thoroughly exploitative, abusive and even diabolical,it is also worth noting that some of their ‘coursework’ was remarkablycreative. Richards (1996: 58), for example, noted how the RUF probablyemployed the movie Rambo: first blood, in part, as a kind of instructionvideo. Indeed, Richards noted that “all factions in Liberia and Sierra Leone



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have routinely used First blood and similar videos to inspire, to entertain,and perhaps to orient their young captives towards the ambush skills thatare the staple fare of this kind of low-level jungle warfare.” Thesubsequent use of lyrics from Tupac Shakur songs to cultivate and validatethe RUF’s child and youth-dominated military corps, vividly dramatizedduring the RUF’s ‘Operation no living thing’ in 1999 (Sommers, 2003a),suggests how popular culture can be manipul

co-ordinating education during emergencies and ... · national education for all (efa) plans to...

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