Pardell vs. Bartolome [L-4656 November 18, 1912]Facts:Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without an judicial authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house inWashington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;parcelsof rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; andparcelsof land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.

Vicenta filed anactionin court asking thatthe judgementbe rendered in restoring and returning to them one half of the total value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the aforementioned properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.

Issue:Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said property

Held:No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owners right of use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.

RESUENA vs. CACASE DOCTRINES: Co-owners right to file an action for ejectment; occupation by tolerance. Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondents right under Article 487, clearly settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587.Time and again, this Court hasruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.FACTS:Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.Juanito Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land located in Pooc, Talisay,Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-Manglanilla Estate. He owned six-eighths (6/8) of LotNo. 2587 while the Sps. Bascon owned two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned incommon by Borromeo and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their undivided shareswas not determined a quo. Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and Unisima Resuena resided in theupper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592, allegedly with thepermission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Borromeo claimed thatthey have occupied portions of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality.Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a resort known as theBorromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on thesubject properties, respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused tovacate their homes.On 16 February 1994, Borromeo filed a Complaint for ejectment with the MTC against the petitioners.MTC decision (summary proceeding): dismissed the complaint. Borromeo had no right to evict thepetitioners because the area was owned in common and there was no partition yet.RTC decision: reversed the MTC decision. It held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which allows any oneof the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment, may successfully be invoked by the respondent because, in asense, a co-owner is the owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to beinstituted for the benefit of all co-owners.CA decision: affirmed the RTC decision.IISSUE: WON Borromeo can lawfully evict the petitioners.RULING: Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that *a+ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment, is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot. No. 2587.This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondents right under Article 487,clearly settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587.Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.HELD: Petition is DENIED.ACABAL vs. ACABALFACTS: Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel of land situated in Barrio Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, containing an area of 18.15 hectares more or less, described in Tax Declaration No. 15856. By a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 6, 1971, his parents transferred for P2,000.00 ownership of the said land to [Villaner Acabal], who was then married to Justiniana Lipajan. On April 19, 1990, Villaner executed the deed in question, by which the lot was transferred to his nephew and godson Leonardo Acabal, who later sold it to Ramon Nicolas. On October 11, 1993 Villaner filed a case for annulment of the sale to Leonardo and to Nicolas. Villaner claimed that he did not know the contents of the deed he signed, which he claimed was a Deed of Sale (earlier in the proceedings he said it was a Lease Contract). The RTC dismissed the complaint. Villaner appealed to the CA, who reversed the RTC and held that the deed in question was simulated and fictitious. Leonardo and Ramon thus appealed to the SC on certiorari.ISSUE: 1) W/N the deed is valid2) W/N the property in question is conjugal propertyHELD/RATIO: 1) YES. The failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel, and want of consideration. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove it by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. Villaner failed to prove his allegations for he failed to adduce evidence to support his claims of simulation and lack of knowledge as to the nature of the deed. Leonardos witness (the drafter of the actual deed) on the other hand was able to prove that the deed was duly drafted, read and signed by Villaner.Even assuming that the disposition of the property by Villaner was contrary to law, he would still have no remedy under the law as he and Leonardo were in pari delicto, hence, he is not entitled to afirmative relief one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. 2) YES. The issue arose when Villaners co-heirs denied the validity of the transfer as to their shares because they did not consent to such transfer. Art. 160 of the Civil Code gives rise to a presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal. In this case it was clear that Villaner was married when he acquired the land. A tax declaration or [r]egistration of the properties in the name of the husband does not destroy the conjugal nature of the properties. What is material is the time when the land was acquired by Villaner, and that was during the lawful existence of his marriage to Justiniana. Upon his wifes death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved and Villaner became entitled to a undivided share. The other share accrued to Justinianas heirs: Villaner and their 8 children. They are now the co-owners of the lot in question. With respect to Justinianas one-half share in the conjugal partnership which her heirs inherited, applying the provisions on the law of succession, her eight children and Villaner each receives one-ninth (1/9) thereof. Having inherited one-ninth (1/9) of his wifes share in the conjugal partnership or one eighteenth (1/18) of the entire conjugal partnership and is himself already the owner of one half (1/2) or nine-eighteenths (9/18), Villaners total interest amounts to ten-eighteenths (10/18) or five-ninths (5/9). While Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title to any definite portion of the community property until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the property. Villaner, however, as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his undivided share thereof, by virtue of NCC 493; but such sale will only be valid as to the portion pertaining to Villaner. In effect, the buyer becomes a co-owner of the property. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. The proper action is partition under Rule 69. The rule in Cruz v. Leis, which held that [w]here a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse does not apply because the land subject of that case was unregistered. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land.DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.LAVADIA v. COSMEObject of litigation: a gold crown, choker, belt, bracelet, necklace, all made of gold and encrusted with diamonds and precious gems in the possession and custody of 6 religious ladies of the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna all surnamed Lavadia. By agreement, they decided to entrust the safekeeping of the jewelry to Pia Lavadia (depositary). From Pia, to Paula, to her husband Pedro, to their daughter Paz, and to her husband Baldomero. Jewelry is kept at a BPI safety deposit box in the name of Rosario Cosme de Mendoza (defendant). the 6 ladies used their own money to have the jewelry made specifically to adorn the image of the Lady of Guadalupe, the patron saint of the municipality. In effect, they are the co- owners of the jewelry. Rosario, in her capacity as administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme, announced that she would be making a formal delivery of the jewelry to the Bishop of Lipa, but the plaintiffs objected and filed a suit to retain possession and custody of the same."There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the co- owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of the co- ownership." In this case, the plaintiffs constituted the majority, since they represent 4/6 of the original owners. Defendants only represent 2/6. Thus CFI ruling that Rosario return the jewelry as an obligation of a depositary holds. DOCTRINE:1. Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the depository, and when he is, he is subject to the same obligations imposed by law on all depository with respect to the preservation of the thing with the care, diligence and interest of a good father.2. For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article 398 of the Civil Code, it is mandatory that there be an agreement of the majority of the participants (owners).ISSUES:1) Whether Ramona was a depositary and therefore obligated to return the jewelries to the owners even if she is a co-owner? (YES)2) Whether the plaintiffs constitute the majority of the co-owners and therefore can elect who has custody of the property owned in common? (YES) 3) Whether, assuming that Ramona is a depositary, the property cannot be withdrawn as she has complied faithfully in performing their duties as repository? (NO, it can be withdrawn)RATIO:1) The contract which existed between the first owners of the jewels at issue and the first person who had their custody, was a contract of deposit.According to this contract as defined in Articles 1758 and following the Civil Code, Pia Lavadia first, and afterwards Paula Lavadia and then her descendants, one being Rosario, received and possessed, one after the other, the said jewels, only for purposes of custody or such that they must not use them for their own benefit.If it was under a deposit agreement, it is clear that to those who received the jewelry has an obligation to return them to their owners as soon as claimed by the latter.Article 1766 of the Civil Code: "The, depositary is obliged to keep the thing and restore it, when so requested, to the depositor, or his successors, or the person who has been designated in the contract. Their responsibility for the care and the loss of the thing, is governed by the provisions of title I of this book. "The restitution must be made with all the fruits and accessions of the thing deposited, if any, without it being given to the depositary who may not withhold, as Sanchez says Roman, (IV Sanchez Roman, 885), even under the pretext of obtaining compensation for other credits or compensated for expenses incurred for preservation.ROSARIO AND OTHERS: Contract is not that of a deposit because the jewels cannot be considered as belonging to other persons with respect to Rosario as she is also a co-owner as descendant of one of its early owners.SC:The first owners of the jewelry concerned who came to entrust the custody of the same to some of them, expressly reserved them to their property.Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the depository, and thus it is subject to the same obligations imposed by law on all depository with respect to the conservation of the thing with the care, diligence and interest of a good father. "Joint owner. The fact that the depositary is a joint owner of the res does not alter the degree of diligence required of him." (C. J. 18, 570).2) Appellees are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry, and appellants only own the remaining portion (2/6). Therefore, EngraciaLavadia must have the custody and administration of constituting the majority of the primitive ownersAs there is no evidence of the contribution of the six primitive owners in the making or acquisition of the jewels often mentioned in the same proportion, the conclusion, as reasonable as it is - and this is supported by a presumption of law (Art. 393, Civil Code) -is that the cost is the same and as such the portions corresponding to the participants of the community shall be presumed of an equal share. For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article 398 of the Civil Code, it is mandatory that there be an agreement of the majority of the participants 3) The deposit agreement is such that allows the depositor to withdraw from the depository, the thing deposited, any time he wanted, especially, when the latter, as in the case of Rosario Cosme Mendoza, has executed an act against the order received intrying to entrust to another's custody and administration the thing deposited, on their own without the consent of depositors or their heirs.MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija was originally owned by one Julain Melencio who died before the 1905, leaving his widow Ruperta Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta held nothing but a widow's usufruct in the land. Contract of lease in favor of Yap Kui Chin. Term of Lease: 20 years, for the establishment of a rice mill with necessary buildings for warehouses and quarters for employees. Document evidencing lease acknowledged but never recorded with the Register of Deeds. Lessee took possession of the land and erected the mill and other necessary buildings. lease was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who transferred it to Uy Eng Jui & Co.(unregistered partnership); until the lease finally came to Dy Tiao Lay. Land was registered under the Torrens system in 1913 but the lease was not mentioned in the title, though it was mentioned that one house and 3 warehouses were owned by Yap Kui Chin. 1920 - heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance. After Mrs. Macapagal, wife of one the heirs of Julian, Ramon, demanded an increase of the lease from P20 per mo. to P300/mo., she was informed by Dy Tiao Lay that a written lease existed and that according to its terms, Dy Tiao was entitled to an extension of the lease at the original rental. Plaintiffs insisted they had no knowledge of it and in such case the lease was executed without their consent and was thus void.The power of the majority (of co-owners of an indivisible property) would be confied to decisions touching the management and enjoyment of the common property and would not include acts of ownership, such as a lease of 12 years w/c gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded and which can be performed only by owners of the property leased. Where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in favor of the lessee (constituting a sundering of the ownership which transcends mere management) then the part owners representing the greater portion of the property held in common have no power to lease the property for a period longer than 6 years w/o the consent of all co-owners. In this case, the fact that the lease was for 20 years amounted to an act of rigorous alienation and NOT a mere act of management, thus necessitation the consent of ALL co-owners. MARIANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101522 Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does not terminate the co-ownership and does not vest in him sole ownership.FACTS: Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano.Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for recovery and legal redemption with damages against spouses Mariano.RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.ISSUE: Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership?HELD: No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZFACTS: Jose Ramirez a Filipino, died in Spain leaving only his widow Marcelle Ramirez, a French. In the project partition, the property was divided into 2 parts: 1st part to the widow, and 2nd part to the grandnephews the naked ownership. Furthermore, as to the usufruct of the 2nd part, 1/3 was given to the widow and 2/3 to Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian. The grandnephews opposed on the ground that usufruct to Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.ISSUE: WON the ground for the opposition is correct.HELD: No, it is not correct. The SC held that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. The SC upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda because although it is a real right, it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownershipAny of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.FACTS: Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.ISSUE:A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?RULING: A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they denied it.B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property.BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.456 SCRA 193 Civil Law Law on Sales Elements of a Contract of Sale Consent VitiatedCleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot 2319) to his 11 children. The children never formally divided the property amongst themselves except through hantal-hantal whereby each just occupied a certain portion and developed each.On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in the land so they started buying the portion of land that each of the heirs occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children, Fortunato, entered into a contract of sale with Lumayno. In exchange of his lot, Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She paid in advance P30.00. Fortunato was given a receipt prepared by Lumaynos son in law (Andres Flores). Flores also acted as witness. Lumayno also executed sales transactions with Fortunatos siblings separately.In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the delivery to her of the registrable deed of sale over Fortunatos portion of the Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity of the contract of sale. He also invoked his right to redeem (as a co-owner) the portions of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno. Fortunato died during the pendency of the case.ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale?HELD: No. Fortunato was a no read no write person. It was incumbent for the the other party to prove that details of the contract was fully explained to Fortunato before Fortunato signed the receipt.

A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. It is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the sale and upon the price. Upon its perfection, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee may compel the transfer of the ownership and to deliver the object of the sale while the vendor may demand the vendee to pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of sale, however, the following elements must be present: consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent.For consent to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; spontaneity by fraud.Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the receipt to Fortunato, but Flores testimony belies it. Flores said there was another witness but the other was a maid who also lacked education. Further, Flores himself was not aware that the receipt was to transfer the ownership of Fortunatos land to her mom-in-law. It merely occurred to him to explain the details of the receipt but he never did.