coalitional presidentialism project report

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1 January 2015 The Coalitional Presidentialism Project Research Report, January 2015: How MPs Understand Coalitional Politics in Presidential Systems www.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/presidentialism www.politics.ox.ac.uk Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power (University of Oxford) 1 This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Grant Reference: RES-062-23-2892. 1 Data included in this report were collected with the assistance of a large group of researchers. In particular, the authors wish to thank the project manager and research fellow, Svitlana Chernykh, and research consultants in Armenia (Alexander Markarov, Apig Gasparyan, Hamo Danielyan, Narek S. Galstyan), Benin (Azizou Chabi Imorou, Michaela Collord), Brazil (Wladimir Gramacho), Chile (Germán Bidegain Ponte), Ecuador (Santiago Basabe-Serrano), Kenya (Dominic Burbidge, Daniel Paget), Malawi (Emmanuel Desiderio Liwimbi), Russia (Andrei Kulikov) and Ukraine (Olexiy Haran, Petro Burkovskyy). Executive summary Motivating Research Questions +RZ GR PLQRULW\ SUHVLGHQWV JRYHUQ ZLWK IUDJPHQWHG PXOWLSDUW\ OHJLVODWXUHV" +RZ GRHV WKLV YDU\ DFURVV WKH ZRUOG DQG EHWZHHQ SUHVLGHQWV" :KDW VWUDWHJLHV KDYH SURYHG WR EH WKH PRVW VXFFHVVIXO" 'R WKHVH VWUDWHJLHV SURPRWH RU XQGHUPLQH SURFHVVHV RI GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ" Key Findings The ability of presidents to form coalitions has meant WKDW WKH DQWLFLSDWHG ³GLI¿FXOW FRPELQDWLRQ´ RI PXOWLSDUW\ politics and presidential systems has not proved detrimental to political stability. Coalitional presidentialism enables governments to VHFXUH WKH SDVVDJH RI WKHLU OHJLVODWLYH DJHQGD EXW DW WKH cost of entering into a set of political bargains that place constraints (whether large or small) on their activity. 3UHVLGHQWV XVH ¿YH PDLQ WRROV WR EXLOG DQG PDLQWDLQ FRDOLWLRQV FDELQHW DXWKRULW\ EXGJHWDU\ SRZHU SDUWLVDQ SRZHU OHJLVODWLYH SRZHU DQG WKH H[FKDQJH RI IDYRXUV 03V DJUHH WKDW FDELQHW DXWKRULW\ LV WKH PRVW HIIHFWLYH WRRO SUHVLGHQWV KDYH WR PDLQWDLQ FRDOLWLRQV EXW WKH YDOXH SODFHG RQ RWKHU WRROV YDULHV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ DFURVV FDVHV Most legislators agree that coalitional presidentialism has EHHQ EHQH¿FLDO WR SROLWLFDO VWDELOLW\ DQG WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of diverse interests within government. +RZHYHU PRVW 03V DOVR EHOLHYH WKDW FRDOLWLRQDO SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP KDV OHG WR RSSRUWXQLVWLF VXSSRUW RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW RI WKH GD\ WKDW LW KDV XQGHUPLQHG WKH DELOLW\ RI WKH OHJLVODWXUH WR KROG WKH SUHVLGHQW WR DFFRXQW DQG WKDW LW has promoted a clientelistic style of politics. School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies SOCIAL SCIENCES DIvISION Brazilian National Congress, Brasília. Credit: Eurico Zimbres License: Creative Commons 2.5

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Final version of comparative preliminary findings of the project on presidential coalitions in "new democracies".

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

1

January 2015

The Coalitional Presidentialism ProjectResearch Report, January 2015:

How MPs Understand Coalitional Politics in Presidential Systems

www.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/presidentialism www.politics.ox.ac.uk

Paul Chaisty, Nic Cheeseman, Timothy Power (University of Oxford)

1

This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, Grant Reference: RES-062-23-2892.

1 Data included in this report were collected with the assistance of a large group of researchers. In particular, the authors wish to thank the project manager and research fellow, Svitlana Chernykh, and research consultants in Armenia (Alexander Markarov, Apig Gasparyan, Hamo Danielyan, Narek S. Galstyan), Benin (Azizou Chabi Imorou, Michaela Collord), Brazil (Wladimir Gramacho), Chile (Germán Bidegain Ponte), Ecuador (Santiago Basabe-Serrano), Kenya (Dominic Burbidge, Daniel Paget), Malawi (Emmanuel Desiderio Liwimbi), Russia (Andrei Kulikov) and Ukraine (Olexiy Haran, Petro Burkovskyy).

Executive summary

Motivating Research Questions

���+RZ�GR�PLQRULW\�SUHVLGHQWV�JRYHUQ�ZLWK�IUDJPHQWHG�PXOWLSDUW\�OHJLVODWXUHV"

���+RZ�GRHV�WKLV�YDU\�DFURVV�WKH�ZRUOG�DQG�EHWZHHQ�SUHVLGHQWV"�

���:KDW�VWUDWHJLHV�KDYH�SURYHG�WR�EH�WKH�PRVW�VXFFHVVIXO"����'R�WKHVH�VWUDWHJLHV�SURPRWH��RU�XQGHUPLQH��SURFHVVHV�RI�GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ"�

Key Findings

���The ability of presidents to form coalitions has meant

WKDW�WKH�DQWLFLSDWHG�³GLI¿FXOW�FRPELQDWLRQ´�RI�PXOWLSDUW\�politics and presidential systems has not proved detrimental

to political stability.

���Coalitional presidentialism enables governments to

VHFXUH�WKH�SDVVDJH�RI�WKHLU�OHJLVODWLYH�DJHQGD��EXW�DW�WKH�cost of entering into a set of political bargains that place

constraints (whether large or small) on their activity.

���3UHVLGHQWV�XVH�¿YH�PDLQ�WRROV�WR�EXLOG�DQG�PDLQWDLQ�FRDOLWLRQV��FDELQHW�DXWKRULW\��EXGJHWDU\�SRZHU��SDUWLVDQ�SRZHU��OHJLVODWLYH�SRZHU��DQG�WKH�H[FKDQJH�RI�IDYRXUV�

���03V�DJUHH�WKDW�FDELQHW�DXWKRULW\�LV�WKH�PRVW�HIIHFWLYH�WRRO�SUHVLGHQWV�KDYH�WR�PDLQWDLQ�FRDOLWLRQV��EXW�WKH�YDOXH�SODFHG�RQ�RWKHU�WRROV�YDULHV�VLJQL¿FDQWO\�DFURVV�FDVHV�

���Most legislators agree that coalitional presidentialism has

EHHQ�EHQH¿FLDO�WR�SROLWLFDO�VWDELOLW\�DQG�WKH�UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ�of diverse interests within government.

���+RZHYHU��PRVW�03V�DOVR�EHOLHYH�WKDW�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�KDV�OHG�WR�RSSRUWXQLVWLF�VXSSRUW�RI�WKH�JRYHUQPHQW�RI�WKH�GD\��WKDW�LW�KDV�XQGHUPLQHG�WKH�DELOLW\�RI�WKH�OHJLVODWXUH�WR�KROG�WKH�SUHVLGHQW�WR�DFFRXQW��DQG�WKDW�LW�has promoted a clientelistic style of politics.

School of Interdisciplinary Area StudiesSOCIAL SCIENCES DIvISION

Brazilian National Congress, Brasília.

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Page 2: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

2

Definitions

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Cases and Method

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CPP Research Report

How MPs Understand Coalitional

Politics in Presidential Systems

Introduction

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PHDQV�WR�HQVXUH�GLVFLSOLQH��2YHUDOO��03V�UDQNHG�WKH�president’s own legislative powers as the second most

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These variations demonstrate the great variety of strategies

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Page 3: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

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legislators agree that coalitional presidentialism has been

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This report begins by providing a short overview of

the case selection research methodology employed by

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Researching coalitional presidentialism

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the lead in the formation and maintenance of coalitions.

This means that we do consider cases that are sometimes

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2 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm and www.freedomhouse.org.

3 The ICN is calculated by multiplying the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of (parliamentary) parties by the complement of the percentage of seats held by the president’s own party, then dividing by 10 for ease of interpretation.

4 Strictly speaking coalitional necessity is a property of presidential terms, not countries, yet the values on this variable are indicative of notable cross-country differences.

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4

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5 This table presents a reasonably typical presidential term from each of our nine countries for illustrative purposes. In each country we look at all relevant instances of coalitional presidentialism, as our unit of analysis is the presidential term, not the country.

Page 5: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

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6 We are still collecting the final Kenyan interviews.

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Page 6: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

6

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Many theoretical and empirical advances in recent years

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landscapes of legislative fragmentation.

7 On Brazil, see for example Figueiredo and Limongi 1999, 2000. Important doctoral dissertations in this vein were completed by Deheza 1997; Amorim Neto 1998; Altman 2001; Zelaznik 2001; Mejía-Acosta 2004; Martínez-Gallardo 2005; Martorelli Hernández 2007; and Zucco Jr. 2007.

8 The coining of the phrase is usually attributed to a Brazilian scholar, Sérgio Abranches (1988), who introduced the term presidencialismo de coalizão. The term quickly gained traction in Brazil, where it is both a descriptor of political practice (used by journalists and politicians) and an analytical paradigm for the study of democratic governability (used by political scientists). For a review see Power (2010).

Introducing the “toolbox”

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dynamic ways: tracking one tool therefore provides only

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Legislative powers

Legislative tools cover the powers that presidents command

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Partisan powers

3DUWLVDQ�SRZHUV�UHIHUV�WR�WKH�LQÀXHQFH�WKDW�WKH�SUHVLGHQW�FDQ�ZLHOG�RYHU�WKHLU�RZQ�SDUW\��RU�LQ�VRPH�FDVHV��DOOLHG�SDUWLHV�ZLWKLQ�WKH�FRDOLWLRQ��IRU�H[DPSOH��SDUWLHV�ZKR�FDPSDLJQ�IRU�SDUOLDPHQW�EXW�GLG�QRW�UXQ�WKHLU�RZQ�FDQGLGDWH�LQ�WKH�SUHVLGHQWLDO�HOHFWLRQ���:H�H[SHFW�WKDW�WKH�JUHDWHU�FRQWURO�WKDW�D�SUHVLGHQW�LV�DEOH�WR�H[HUW�RYHU�KLV�KHU�RZQ�SDUW\�WKH�EHWWHU�DEOH�KH�VKH�ZLOO�EH�WR�HQVXUH�FRDOLWLRQ�GLVFLSOLQH��3UHVLGHQWV�ZLWK�VWURQJ�FRQWURO�RYHU�D�YHU\�VPDOO�QXPEHU�of MPs and presidents with weak control over a very large

SDUW\�DUH�OLNHO\�WR�¿QG�WKHPVHOYHV�LQ�D�VLPLODU�SRVLWLRQ��LQ�ERWK�FDVHV��WKH�SUHVLGHQW�ZLOO�EH�IRUFHG�WR�PDNH�JUHDWHU�XVH�of alternative tools in order to marshal the coalition.

Cabinet allocation

:H�DVVXPH�WKDW�SUHVLGHQWV�KDYH�EURDG�SRZHUV�RI�DSSRLQWPHQW�DQG�WKDW�WKH\�XVH�WKHVH�DSSRLQWPHQWV�WR�

9 For elaboration of the concept with application to three tools, see Raile, Pereira and Power (2011).

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7

VHFXUH�SROLWLFDO�VXSSRUW��³3RZHUV�RI�DSSRLQWPHQW´�YDU\�VLJQL¿FDQWO\�DFURVV�FDVHV�ERWK�LQ�WHUPV�RI�WKH�QXPEHU�RI�patronage positions available and in terms of the prestige

RI�HDFK��$OWKRXJK�DSSRLQWPHQWV�WR�D�QXPEHU�RI�GLIIHUHQW�SRVLWLRQV�RIWHQ�FDUU\�SROLWLFDO�VLJQL¿FDQFH��IRU�RSHUDWLRQDO�UHDVRQV�ZH�IRFXV�RQ�DSSRLQWPHQWV�WR�WKH�QDWLRQDO�FDELQHW��ZKLFK�LV�RI�SULPDU\�LPSRUW�DFURVV�RXU�UHJLRQV��

Budgetary Powers

7KLV�WRRO�LV�GH¿QHG�DV�WKH�SUHVLGHQW¶V�DELOLW\�WR�GLUHFW�WKH�IRUPXODWLRQ�DQG�H[HFXWLRQ�RI�SXEOLF�VSHQGLQJ�SULRULWLHV�ZLWK�D�YLHZ�WR�REWDLQLQJ�WDUJHWHG�SROLWLFDO�VXSSRUW��7KLV�KDV�YDULRXV�VXE�GLPHQVLRQV��LQFOXGLQJ�LQÀXHQFH�LQ�WKH�GUDIWLQJ�RI�WKH�QDWLRQDO�EXGJHW��QRUPDOO\�GRQH�E\�WKH�H[HFXWLYH�EUDQFK�DORQH��DXWKRULW\�WR�DFFHSW�RU�UHMHFW�OHJLVODWLYH�DPHQGPHQWV�WR�WKH�QDWLRQDO�EXGJHW��ZKLFK�IRUPDOO\�LV�D�³OHJLVODWLYH�SRZHU�RI�WKH�SUHVLGHQW´���DELOLW\�WR�DFFHOHUDWH��GHOD\��RU�VXVSHQG�WKH�H[HFXWLRQ�RI�GLVFUHWH�OLQH�LWHPV�LQ�WKH�EXGJHW��DQG��WKH�DELOLW\�WR�GHSOR\�QRQ�HDUPDUNHG�GLVFUHWLRQDU\�IXQGV�XQGHU�WKH�FRQWURO�RI�WKH�H[HFXWLYH�branch.

Exchange of favours

7KH�H[FKDQJH�RI�IDYRXUV�UHIHUV�WR�GHDOV�EHWZHHQ�WKH�SUHVLGHQW�DQG�OHJLVODWRUV�LQ�ZKLFK�SROLWLFDO�VXSSRUW�LV�LQIRUPDOO\�H[FKDQJHG�IRU�HFRQRPLF�VXSSRUW��SULYDWH�

EHQH¿WV��RU�RWKHU�IRUPV�RI�SHUVRQDO�DVVLVWDQFH��7KH�LQIRUPDO�QDWXUH�RI�WKHVH�WUDQVDFWLRQV�GLVWLQJXLVK�WKHP�IURP�SRUN�EDUUHO�EXGJHW�SROLWLFV��ZKHUH�¿QDQFLDO�LQGXFHPHQWV�DUH�SURYLGHG�LQ�UHWXUQ�IRU�HOHFWRUDO�VXSSRUW�ZLWKLQ�WKH�IRUPDO�UXOHV�RI�WKH�SROLWLFDO�JDPH��&ODVVLF�H[DPSOHV�RI�WKH�H[FKDQJH�RI�IDYRXUV�DUH�ZKHQ�WKH�VLWWLQJ�SUHVLGHQW�EULEHV�03V�WR�YRWH�D�FHUWDLQ�ZD\��RU�VHFXUHV�WKH�VXSSRUW�RI�OHJLVODWRUV�E\�SURPLVLQJ�WR�¿QDQFH�WKHLU�QH[W�HOHFWLRQ�FDPSDLJQ��+RZHYHU��LW�LV�LPSRUWDQW�WR�QRWH�WKDW�WKH�H[FKDQJH�RI�IDYRXUV�GRHV�QRW�DOZD\V�HTXDWH�WR�FRUUXSWLRQ��and may not always have normatively bad connotations

�/HYLWVN\�DQG�+HOPNH���������

7KH�IROORZLQJ�VHFWLRQ�SURYLGHV�D�VXPPDU\�RI�RXU�¿QGLQJV�UHJDUGLQJ�OHJLVODWRUV¶�SHUFHSWLRQV�RI�WKH�YDOXH�RI�WKHVH�¿YH�tools.

Legislators’ perceptions of tool usage

2QH�RI�WKH�PDLQ�UHVHDUFK�TXHVWLRQV�RI�RXU�SURMHFW�UHODWHV�to the most effective tools available to presidents to

PDQDJH�WKHLU�FRDOLWLRQV��:H�DVNHG�DOO�RI�RXU�LQWHUYLHZHHV�WR�UDQN�WKH�¿YH�WRROV�LQ�RUGHU�RI�WKHLU�HIIHFWLYHQHVV��7DEOH���UHSRUWV�WKH�UHVSRQVHV�E\�FRXQWU\��2QH�WKLQJ�WKDW�LV�LPPHGLDWHO\�DSSDUHQW�LV�WKH�EURDG�FRQVHQVXV�RQ�WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�RI�FDELQHW�DSSRLQWPHQWV��,Q�WRWDO������RI�DOO�03V�UDQNHG�FDELQHW�DXWKRULW\�DV�WKH�PRVW�LPSRUWDQW�

7DEOH����03V�2SLQLRQV�RQ�WKH�0RVW�(IIHFWLYH�7RRO�LQ�&RDOLWLRQ�)RUPDWLRQ/HJLVODWLYH�3RZHUV

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Page 8: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

8

IDFWRU��LQFOXGLQJ�DQ�DEVROXWH�PDMRULW\�RI�03V�LQ�&KLOH��0DODZL�DQG�8NUDLQH��2QO\�LQ�(FXDGRU�DQG�GLG�5XVVLD�GLG�OHJLVODWRUV�UDQN�DQRWKHU�WRRO�¿UVW��,Q�WKH�5XVVLDQ�FDVH��03V�SULRULWL]HG�SDUWLVDQ�SRZHUV��SHUKDSV�FRJQL]DQW�RI�WKH�ZD\�LQ�ZKLFK�WKH�FRQVWUXFWLRQ�RI�D�YLDEOH�SROLWLFDO�RUJDQL]DWLRQ�XQGHU�9ODGLPLU�3XWLQ�LQ�WKH���������SHULRG�ERRVWHG�KLV�FDSDFLW\�WR�FRQWURO�SDUOLDPHQW��,Q�(FXDGRU��OHJLVODWRUV�DOVR�VDZ�SDUWLVDQ�SRZHUV�DV�LPSRUWDQW��EXW�FRQVLGHUHG�WKH�FRQVLGHUDEOH�OHJLVODWLYH�SRZHUV�WKDW�SUHVLGHQWV�HQMR\�WR�EH�PRUH�VLJQL¿FDQW�RYHUDOO�

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$OWKRXJK�WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�RI�FDELQHW�DSSRLQWPHQWV�VWDQGV�RXW�LQ�ERWK�WKH�VWDQGDUGL]HG�DQG�RSHQ�HQGHG�VXUYH\�UHVSRQVHV��EH\RQG�WKLV�WKHUH�LV�YHU\�OLWWOH�DJUHHPHQW�RQ�WKH�PRVW�HIIHFWLYH�WRRO�DYDLODEOH�WR�SUHVLGHQWV��7KLV�GLVVHQVXV�LV�DQ�LPSRUWDQW�¿QGLQJ�LQ�LWVHOI��EHFDXVH�LW�GHPRQVWUDWHV�WKH�FRQVLGHUDEOH�YDULDWLRQV�WKDW�H[LVW�LQ�WKH�ZD\�WKDW�coalitional presidentialism is practiced across cases.

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10 Legislators were asked a number of questions about the practice of coalitional politics in their country. We subsequently hand-coded the answers to these open-ended questions.

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Page 9: Coalitional Presidentialism Project Report

9

HVSHFLDOO\�HPSKDVL]HG�E\�RXU�OHJLVODWRUV�RYHU�WKH�RWKHU�WRROV��,Q�8NUDLQH��IRU�H[DPSOH��WKH�SUHVLGHQW¶V�OHJLVODWLYH�SRZHUV�DUH�VHHQ�WR�EH�PRUH�VLJQL¿FDQW�WKDQ�KHU�EXGJHWDU\�DXWKRULW\��7KH�VDPH�LV�WUXH�LQ�(FXDGRU��7KLV�VXJJHVWV�WKDW�WKHUH�LV�QR�RQH�FRPPRQ�ZD\�LQ�ZKLFK�WKH�WRROER[�LV�EHLQJ�XVHG��5DWKHU��SUHVLGHQWV�RSHUDWLQJ�LQ�GLIIHUHQW�FRQWH[WV��DQG�ZLWK�GLIIHUHQW�VHWV�RI�H[SHFWDWLRQV�DQG�UHVRXUFHV�DW�WKHLU�GLVSRVDO��DSSHDU�WR�EH�XVLQJ�FRDOLWLRQ�EXLOGLQJ�LQGXFHPHQWV�LQ�YHU\�GLIIHUHQW�ZD\V��$V�D�UHVXOW��ZH�VKRXOG�EH�FDUHIXO�QRW�WR�JHQHUDOL]H�RQ�WKH�EDVLV�RI�D�VPDOO�QXPEHU�RI�FDVHV��DQG�QHHG�WR�EH�DOHUW�WR�WKH�UHDOLW\�WKDW�PRGHOV�WKDW�DFFRXQW�IRU�some presidents may not hold for others.

:H�REVHUYH�IHZ�FRQVLVWHQW�UHJLRQDO�SDWWHUQV��LQ�ODUJH�SDUW�EHFDXVH�HDFK�RI�RXU�WKUHH�UHJLRQV�DOVR�GLVSOD\V�considerable internal heterogeneity. This is not to say there

are no patterns of note: the weakness of political parties

LQ�$IULFD��&DURWKHUV�������PHDQV�WKDW�$IULFDQ�03V�WHQG�WR�UDQN�WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�RI�SDUWLVDQ�SRZHUV�YHU\�ORZ��$W�WKH�VDPH�WLPH��WKHVH�OHJLVODWRUV�WHQGHG�WR�UDQN�EXGJHWDU\�FRQWURO�H[WUHPHO\�KLJK��ZKLFK�PDNHV�VHQVH�JLYHQ�WKH�FHQWUDOLW\�RI�SDWURQDJH�WR�WKHVH�SROLWLFDO�V\VWHPV��%DUNDQ�������%DUNDQ�DQG�2NXPX��������%XW�ZLWKLQ�$IULFD�WKHUH�ZDV�DOVR�FRQVLGHUDEOH�YDULDWLRQ��ZLWK�03V�LQ�0DODZL�SODFLQJ�OHVV�HPSKDVLV�RQ�WKH�EXGJHW��DQG�PRUH�RQ�WKH�FRQVLGHUDEOH�OHJLVODWLYH�SRZHUV�HQMR\HG�E\�SUHVLGHQWV��,QGHHG��WKH�SUR¿OHV�RI�WRROV�VHOHFWHG�E\�03V�LQ�%HQLQ�DQG�%UD]LO�DUH�PRUH�VLPLODU�WKDQ�WKRVH�LGHQWL¿HG�E\�03V�LQ�

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Legislators’ perceptions of coalitional

presidentialism

:KDW�GR�OHJLVODWRUV�WKLQN�RI�FRDOLWLRQDO�SROLWLFV�PRUH�JHQHUDOO\"�'R�WKH\�EHOLHYH�WKDW�FRDOLWLRQV�DUH�D�QHFHVVDU\�HYLO�WR�VWDYH�RII�SROLWLFDO�LQVWDELOLW\��RU�DQ�XQQHFHVVDU\�H[SHGLHQW�WKDW�VHUYHV�WR�HQWUHQFK�SUHVLGHQWLDO�SRZHU�DQG�XQGHUPLQH�OHJLVODWLYH�DFFRXQWDELOLW\"�'LIIHUHQW�03V�LQ�RXU�VDPSOH�DUJXHG�LQ�IDYRXU�RI�ERWK�RI�WKHVH�SURSRVLWLRQV�±�RFFDVLRQDOO\�DW�WKH�VDPH�WLPH��%XW�ZKDW�GRHV�WKLV�PHDQ�IRU�WKH�VXVWDLQDELOLW\�RI�FRDOLWLRQDO�SROLWLFV"

:H�DVNHG�03V�KRZ�WKH\�ZRXOG�HYDOXDWH�WKH�LPSDFW�RI�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�RQ�D�QXPEHU�RI�GLIIHUHQW�DVSHFWV�RI�WKHLU�RZQ�SROLWLFDO�V\VWHP��7DEOH���UHSRUWV�WKH�SURSRUWLRQ�RI�OHJLVODWRUV�ZKR�³VWURQJO\�DJUHHG´�RU�³DJUHHG´�WKDW�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�KDG�WKH�UHOHYDQW�HIIHFW��7KHUH�LV�D�FOHDU�FRQVHQVXV�WKDW�WKH�IRUPDWLRQ�DQG�PDLQWHQDQFH�RI�FRDOLWLRQV�E\�SUHVLGHQWV�KDV�D�QXPEHU�RI�SRVLWLYH�FRQVHTXHQFHV��$�PDMRULW\�RI�03V�EHOLHYH�WKDW�coalitional presidentialism has allowed for more decisive

SXEOLF�SROLF\��/HJLVODWRUV�LQ�DOO�RXU�FRXQWULHV�EDU�5XVVLD�also agreed that the practice of coalition making had

enhanced the representation of diverse social interests

7DEOH����/HJLVODWRUV¶�DWWLWXGHV�WRZDUG�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP����DJUHHLQJ�WKDW�FRDOLWLRQ�JRYHUQPHQWV�WHQG�WR�SURGXFH�WKH�RXWFRPH�LQ�TXHVWLRQ�

&RXQWU\ %5$ &+/ (&8 $50 8.5 586 %(1 0:,3RVLWLYH�IDFWRUV(QKDQFH�WKH�TXDOLW\�RI�SXEOLF�SROLFLHV �� �� �� �� �� �� �� ��0DNH�ODZ�PDNLQJ�SURFHVV�PRUH�GHFLVLYH 35 �� �� �� �� �� �� ��Permit the representation of diverse social

interests

�� �� �� �� �� �� �� ��

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�� 30 �� �� �� �� �� ��

8QGHUPLQH�WKH�DELOLW\�RI�WKH�OHJLVODWXUH�WR�KROG�WKH�SUHVLGHQW�DFFRXQWDEOH

�� �� �� �� �� �� �� ��

/HDG�WR�RSSRUWXQLVWLF�VXSSRUW�IRU�WKH� government of the day

�� �� �� �� �� �� �� ��

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ZLWKLQ�WKH�JRYHUQPHQW�±�DQG�HYHQ�5XVVLDQ�03V��ZKR�KDYH�seen the progressive closing off of political space since

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7DNHQ�WRJHWKHU��WKH�WHQGHQF\�IRU�WKH�OHJLVODWXUH�WR�WUDQVIHU�SROLF\�PDNLQJ�DXWKRULW\�WR�WKH�SUHVLGHQW��DQG�WR�HQFRXUDJH�WKH�H[FKDQJH�RI�IDYRXUV��UDLVHV�VHULRXV�TXHVWLRQV�DERXW�WKH�LPSOLFDWLRQV�RI�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�IRU�ORQJ�WHUP�GHPRFUDWLF�FRQVROLGDWLRQ��+HUH��RXU�LQWHUYLHZHHV�DUH�GLYLGHG��03V�LQ�%UD]LO��8NUDLQH�DQG�5XVVLD�DUH�VWURQJO\�opposed to the idea that coalitional presidentialism has

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formation as a driver and retardant of democracy. To some

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have spent their careers in opposition.

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IRUPV�RI�JRYHUQPHQW�KDYH�VWUHQJWKV�DQG�ZHDNQHVVHV��DQG�¿QG�WKH�FRVWV�RI�FRDOLWLRQ�JRYHUQPHQW�DFFHSWDEOH�ZKHQ�FRPSDUHG�WR�WKHLU�H[SHULHQFH�RI�RQH�SDUW\��RU�PLQRULW\��UXOH��,Q�WKLV�ZD\��WKH�DWWLWXGHV�RI�PDQ\�RI�RXU�03V�VHHP�WR�HFKR�:LQVWRQ�&KXUFKLOO¶V�IDPRXV�OLQH�DERXW�democracy: coalitional presidentialism is the worst form

RI�JRYHUQPHQW��H[FHSW�IRU�DOO�RI�WKH�RWKHU�IRUPV�WKDW�KDYH�EHHQ�WULHG��7KLV�FRQ¿UPV�WZR�WKLQJV�WKDW�H[LVWLQJ�VWXGLHV�RI�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�KDYH�DOUHDG\�VXJJHVWHG��)LUVW��WKDW�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�LV�YDOXDEOH�SUHFLVHO\�EHFDXVH�LW�HQDEOHV�WKH�H[HFXWLYH�WR�RYHUFRPH�WKH�³GLI¿FXOW�FRPELQDWLRQ´�RI�PXOWLSDUW\�SROLWLFV�DQG�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP��DQG�DYRLG�GHDGORFN�DQG�GHPRFUDWLF�EUHDNGRZQ��6HFRQG��that coalitional presidentialism is here to stay.

Conclusions and future research

Coalitional presidentialism is an important political

SKHQRPHQRQ�DURXQG�WKH�ZRUOG���)RU�SUHVLGHQWV�ZKRVH�SDUWLHV�ODFN�PDMRULW\�VXSSRUW�LQ�OHJLVODWLYH�DVVHPEOLHV��coalitions have become the preferred way of dealing with

PLQRULW\�VXSSRUW�LQ�OHJLVODWLYH�DVVHPEOLHV��7KLV�WHQGHQF\�RI�presidents to act like prime ministers has enabled them to

RYHUFRPH�WKH�³GLI¿FXOW�FRPELQDWLRQ´�RI�PXOWLSDUW\�SROLWLFV�DQG�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP��$V�D�UHVXOW��WKH�NLQG�RI�OHJLVODWLYH�GHDGORFN�WKDW�/LQ]�IHDUHG�KDV�QRW�RFFXUUHG��+RZHYHU��coalitional presidentialism brings with it an important set

RI�QHJDWLYH�H[WHUQDOLWLHV��(YHQ�OHJLVODWRUV�WKDW�DUH�RYHUDOO�V\PSDWKHWLF�WR�FRDOLWLRQDO�SROLWLFV�LGHQWLI\�D�QXPEHU�RI�ZD\V�LQ�ZKLFK�LW�PD\�XQGHUPLQH�GHPRFUDF\��7KH�W\SLFDO�DVVHVVPHQW�RI�WKH�03V�LQ�RXU�VDPSOH�PLJKW�EH�VXPPDUL]HG�as follows: coalitional presidentialism boosts political

VWDELOLW\��EXW�DW�WKH�FRVW�RI�ZHDNHU�KRUL]RQWDO�DFFRXQWDELOLW\�

,W�LV�FOHDU�IURP�WKH�UHVSRQVHV�WR�RXU�VXUYH\�RI�OHJLVODWRUV�WKDW�03V�LQ�GLIIHUHQW�FRXQWULHV�KDYH�RSHUDWHG�XQGHU�SUHVLGHQWV�ZKR�KDYH�XVHG�YHU\�GLIIHUHQW�FRPELQDWLRQV�RI�WRROV�WR�EXLOG�DQG�PDLQWDLQ�WKHLU�FRDOLWLRQV��$OWKRXJK�WKHUH�LV�D�FOHDU�FRQVHQVXV�RQ�WKH�LPSRUWDQFH�RI�FDELQHW�DXWKRULW\��WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�RI�RWKHU�WRROV�YDULHV�FRQVLGHUDEO\�RYHU�ERWK�WLPH�DQG�VSDFH��7KLV�¿QGLQJ��DQG�WKH�IDFW�WKDW�OHJLVODWRUV�DFURVV�RXU�HLJKW�FRXQWULHV�UHFRJQL]H�WKH�VLJQL¿FDQFH�RI�WKH�¿YH�WRROV�GHVFULEHG�LQ�WKLV�SDSHU��GHPRQVWUDWHV�WKH�LPSRUWDQFH�RI�XQGHUVWDQGLQJ�FRDOLWLRQDO�SUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�WKURXJK�WKH�OHQV�RI�WKH�SUHVLGHQWLDO�³WRROER[´��

:H�QRZ�QHHG�IXUWKHU�UHVHDUFK�WR�FODULI\�ZKLFK�WRROV�SUHVLGHQWV�XVH�XQGHU�GLIIHUHQW�FRQGLWLRQV�DQG�ZK\��:H�DOVR�QHHG�WR�NQRZ�PRUH�DERXW�WKH�LPSOLFDWLRQV�RI�WKHVH�FRPELQDWLRQV�RI�WRROV�IRU�SXEOLF�SROLF\��SROLWLFDO�VWDELOLW\�and democracy. Are some combinations of tools more

HIIHFWLYH�WKDQ�RWKHUV"�'R�VRPH�FRPELQDWLRQV�KDYH�ZRUVH�H[WHUQDOLWLHV��DQG�LI�VR��FDQ�WKHVH�EH�PLWLJDWHG"�7KHVH�DUH�WKH�TXHVWLRQV�WKDW�WKH�&RDOLWLRQDO�3UHVLGHQWLDOLVP�3URMHFW�hopes to develop answers to in the coming years.

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12

The Coalitional Presidentialism Project

The research of the Coalitional Presidentialism project is ongoing, and can be followed via our website: www.area-studies.ox.ac.uk/presidentialism

Project publications

&KDLVW\��3DXO�DQG�6YLWODQD�&KHUQ\NK��������³&RDOLWLRQDO�3UHVLGHQWLDOLVP�DQG�/HJLVODWLYH�&RQWURO�LQ�3RVW�6RYLHW�8NUDLQH�´��Post-Soviet Affairs��SXEOLVKHG�RQOLQH���-DQ��

&KDLVW\��3DXO��������³3UHVLGHQWLDO�G\QDPLFV�DQG�OHJLVODWLYH�YHORFLW\�LQ�5XVVLD������������´�East European Politics 30

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&KDLVW\��3DXO��1LF�&KHHVHPDQ�DQG�7LPRWK\�3RZHU��������³5HWKLQNLQJ�WKH�µSUHVLGHQWLDOLVP�GHEDWH¶��FRQFHSWXDOL]LQJ�FRDOLWLRQDO�SROLWLFV�LQ�FURVV�UHJLRQDO�SHUVSHFWLYH�´�Democratization����������������Winner of the Comparative Area Studies (CAS) Award for the Best Paper awarded by the German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Select bibliography

$EUDQFKHV��6pUJLR��������³3UHVLGHQFLDOLVPR�GH�FRDOL]mR��R�GLOHPD�LQVWLWXFLRQDO�EUDVLOHLUR�´�Dados����������$OWPDQ��'DYLG��������³7KH�3ROLWLFV�RI�&RDOLWLRQ�)RUPDWLRQ�DQG�6XUYLYDO�XQGHU�0XOWLSDUW\�3UHVLGHQWLDO�'HPRFUDFLHV�´�3K�'��GLVVHUWDWLRQ��8QLYHUVLW\�RI�1RWUH�'DPH�$PRULP�1HWR��2FWDYLR��������³2I�3UHVLGHQWV��3DUWLHV��DQG�0LQLVWHUV��&DELQHW�)RUPDWLRQ�DQG�/HJLVODWLYH�'HFLVLRQ�0DNLQJ�8QGHU�6HSDUDWLRQ�RI�3RZHUV�´�3K�'��GLVVHUWDWLRQ��8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&DOLIRUQLD��6DQ�'LHJR�%DUNDQ��-��'��������µ&RPPHQW��)XUWKHU�5HDVVHVVPHQW�RI�³&RQYHQWLRQDO�:LVGRP�´�3ROLWLFDO�.QRZOHGJH�DQG�9RWLQJ�%HKDYLRU�LQ�5XUDO�.HQ\D¶��American Political Science Review������������������%DUNDQ��-��'����2NXPX��-��-��������µ/LQNDJH�ZLWKRXW�SDUWLHV��/HJLVODWRUV�DQG�FRQVWLWXHQWV�LQ�.HQ\D¶��,Q�/DZVRQ��.��Political Parties and Linkage: A Comparative Perspective��/RQGRQ��<DOH�8QLYHUVLW\����������&DURWKHUV��7KRPDV��������Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies��:DVKLQJWRQ��&DUQHJLH�&KDLVW\��3DXO��1LF�&KHHVHPDQ��DQG�7LPRWK\�-��3RZHU��������³5HWKLQNLQJ�WKH�µ3UHVLGHQWLDOLVP�'HEDWH¶��&RDOLWLRQDO�3ROLWLFV�LQ�&URVV�5HJLRQDO�3HUVSHFWLYH�´�Democratization ����QR�����������&KHLEXE��-RVp�$QWRQLR��DQG�)HUQDQGR�/LPRQJL��������³)URP�&RQÀLFW�WR�&RRUGLQDWLRQ��3HUVSHFWLYHV�RQ�WKH�6WXG\�RI�([HFXWLYH�/HJLVODWLYH�5HODWLRQV�´�Revista Iberoamericana de Estudos Legislativos��5,(/�����QR�����SS��������&KHLEXE��-RVp�$QWRQLR��$GDP�3U]HZRUVNL��DQG�6HEDVWLDQ�6DLHJK��������³*RYHUQPHQW�&RDOLWLRQV�DQG�/HJLVODWLYH�6XFFHVV�XQGHU�3UHVLGHQWLDOLVP�DQG�3DUOLDPHQWDULVP�´�British Journal of Political Science�������������'HKH]D��*UDFH�,YDQD��������³*RELHUQRV�GH�FRDOLFLyQ�HQ�HO�VLVWHPD�SUHVLGHQFLDO��$PpULFD�GHO�6XU�´�3K�'��GLVVHUWDWLRQ��(XURSHDQ�8QLYHUVLW\�,QVWLWXWH�(OJLH��5REHUW��������³)URP�/LQ]�WR�7VHEHOLV��7KUHH�:DYHV�RI�3UHVLGHQWLDO�3DUOLDPHQWDU\�6WXGLHV"´�Democratization�����QR�������������

)LJXHLUHGR��$UJHOLQD��DQG�)HUQDQGR�/LPRQJL��������Executivo e legislativo na nova ordem constitucional��6mR�3DXOR��(GLWRUD�)*9�)LJXHLUHGR��$UJHOLQD��DQG�)HUQDQGR�/LPRQJL��������³3UHVLGHQWLDO�3RZHU��/HJLVODWLYH�2UJDQL]DWLRQ��DQG�3DUW\�%HKDYLRU�LQ�WKH�%UD]LOLDQ�/HJLVODWXUH�´�Comparative Politics�����QR�����-DQXDU\�����������+HOPNH��*UHWFKHQ�DQG�6WHSHKQ�/HYLWVN\��HGV��������Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America. %DOWLPRUH��-RKQV�+RSNLQV�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV�/DDNVR��0DUNNX��DQG�5HLQ�7DDJHSHUD��������³(IIHFWLYH�QXPEHU�RI�SDUWLHV��D�PHDVXUH�ZLWK�DSSOLFDWLRQ�WR�:HVWHUQ�(XURSH�´�Comparative Political Studies������������/LQ]��-XDQ�-��������³3UHVLGHQWLDO�RU�3DUOLDPHQWDU\�'HPRFUDF\��'RHV�,W�0DNH�D�'LIIHUHQFH"´�,Q�-XDQ�-��/LQ]�DQG�$UWXUR�9DOHQ]XHOD��HGV���The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America. Baltimore��-RKQV�+RSNLQV�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV�0DLQZDULQJ��6FRWW��������³3UHVLGHQWLDOLVP��0XOWLSDUWLVP��DQG�'HPRFUDF\��7KH�'LI¿FXOW�&RPELQDWLRQ�´�Comparative Political Studies ������������0DUWtQH]�*DOODUGR��&HFLOLD��������³3UHVLGHQWV��3RVWV��DQG�3ROLF\��Ministerial Appointments and Political Strategy in Presidential

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