1. EP04 Neuromyths in educa1on

2. Introduc1on Basic research on human learning and memory, especially research on metacogni1on, much of it carried out in the last 20 years or so, has demonstrated that our intui1ons and beliefs about how we learn are o>en wrong in serious ways. We do not, apparently, gain an understanding of the complexi1es of human learning and memory from the trials and errors of everyday living and learning. (Pashler et al. 2009) 3. Introduc1on There is growing evidence that people hold beliefs how they learn that are faulty in various ways, which frequently lead people to manage their own learning and teach others in non-op1mal ways. This fact makes it clear that research not intui1on or standard prac1ces needs to be the founda1on for upgrading teaching and learning. If educa1on is to be transformed into an evidence-based eld, it is important not only to iden1fy teaching techniques that have experimental support but also to iden1fy widely held beliefs that aect the choices made by educa1onal prac11oners but that lack empirical support. (Pashler et al. 2009) 4. WHAT ARE NEUROMYTHS? WHY ARE NEUROMYTHS INTERESTING? WHY DO NEUROMYTHS EXIST AND RESIST? 5. What are neuromyths? Beliefs about the brain and mind False Diused Resilient to available informa1on 6. Neuromyths proliferate 7. Why are neuromyths interesBng? Mind and brain sciences have raised the interest of the general public E.g. educators policy makers E.g. domain of educa1on 8. Neuromyths go ethical Misconcep1ons can give rise to misapplica1ons 9. Neuromyths go ethical Misconcep1ons can give rise to misapplica1ons VAK & other learning styles = Individuals dier in regard to the most eec1ve mode of instruc1on for them Individuals dier in regard to the form of informa1on presenta1on they prefer Individuals dier in regard to the mental ac1vity they nd most congenial The best form of instruc1on is the matching one (meshing hypothesis) (Pashler et al 2009) 10. Learning styles? The appropriate form of evidence : Students must be classied according to their learning style Students from each group must be randomly assigned to receive to or more forms of instruc1on A specic interac1on between learning style and method must be demonstrated: students with Learning style 1 achieve be_er results with Method 1 AND students with Learning style 2 achieve be_er results with Method 2 Studies on par1cular classica1ons of learning styles and methods only provide support for the classica1on/method that is evaluated 11. Learning styles? There is a lot of literature, but not such an evidence that the learning styles hypothesis is correct (Pashler et al. 2009) People express preferences about a certain style of presenta1on These preferences are not necessarily consistent with abili1es The interac1on with instruc1onal methods is rarely tested and not demonstrated (opposite evidence exists as well) 12. Big issues in learning styles debate Personaliza1on vs. same instruc1on for all Do op1mal instruc1on methods vary with disciplines? Do par1cular students benet from having a par1cular content presented in a dierent way? How nely grained should personalized instruc1on be? Individual cogni1ve proling? And what should be done with them: mesh or unbalance? How great is the benet as compared to the cost? (When one does something, one does not do something else) The heterogeneity paradigm risks to draw a_en1on away from principles and prac1ces that can upgrade everybodys learning (Pashler et al. 2009) All humans are astounding learners There are prac1ces that benet to all (i..e. memory enhanced through tes1ng) 13. Neuromyths go ethical Misconcep1ons can give rise to misapplica1ons When dierent parts of the brain and body do not work in a coordinated manner they block learning Brain Gym: specic body exercises that integrate brain func1ons and make the en1re brain work as a whole (whole brain learning) Equilibrate le>-right hemispheres (laterality) -> reading, wri1ng, maths, .. Coordinate front-back (focusing) -> ADHD Integrate top-bo_om (centering) -> emo1ons and ra1onality 14. Brain Gym? There is no evidence US: whenever possible, that Brain Gym schools must provide methods work students with academic (Spaulding, 2010; instruc1on using Hya_, 2007) scien1c, research-based methods (Hya_, 2007) 5 peer reviewed Sputnik 1957 papers ; 4 acceptable A Na1on at Risk 1983 3 of which published No Child Le> Behind on journals that ask 2004 to pay for publica1on Individuals with Many aws in the Disabili1es Educa1on experimental senngs Improvement Act 2004 15. Neuromyths go ethical The very same person who tells your child that blood is pumped around the lungs and then the body by the heart, is also telling them that when they do the Energizer exercise then this backward and forward movement of the head increases the circula1on to the frontal lobe for greater comprehension and ra1onal thinking. (Goldacre, 2008) 16. How can we know if it is a myth? Scien1c knowledge Clinical research Control groups Placebo Dierent treatment Randomiza1on Double blindness Meta-analyses and reviews of the l1erature 17. WHY do neuromyths exist and resist? 18. 1. Bridge too far What if the bridge is too far? Oversimplica1on Commercial programs 19. 2. Sub-op1mal scien1c communica1on Sensa1onalism Covering of new, provoca1ve, counter-intui1ve results (Simons, 2010) Rare explana1ons of (fMRI) techniques capabili1es and limita1ons (Racine, et al., 2006) 20. 2. Sub-op1mal scien1c communica1on Neuro-realism: uncri1cal use of brain imaging to validate/invalidate our ordinary views Neuro-essen1alism: brain used as shortcut for more global concepts, as the person, the individual, the self Neuro-policy: a_empts to use brain imaging to promote poli1cal and personal agendas 21. 3. Sub-op1mal scien1c literacy/images Brain images are expert images (Dumit, 1999) They are dicult to interpret Brain images are not pictures, but maps Brain images are maps of sta1s1cal ac1va1on Brain images are subtrac1ve ( Brain images are one possible form of representa1on of the data obtained through fMRI, PET, 22. 3. Sub-op1mal scien1c literacy/ images Images are dierently used by dierent sciences Graphs (physical sciences) Tables (social sciences) Tables and/or graphs (cogni1ve science) Images (cogni1ve neuroscience) 23. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Brain images are seducing and persuasive (McCabe & Castel, 2008): Ra1ngs of scien1c reasoning for arguments made in neuroscien1c ar1cles are higher when the ar1cle is accompanied by brain images as compared to brain graphs, topographical maps of brain ac1va1on and even worst no image at all 24. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs 25. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Neuroscien1c jargon is persuasive: An explana1on for a cogni1ve func1on is perceived as being more convincing (good explana1on) when associated to placebo neuroscien1c jargon Bad explana1ons (circular) tend to be perceived as good when associated with non explanatory brain areas ac1va1on bla-bla Good explana1ons are less aected (not at all for lay people, a bit for neuroscience students) Neuroscience young students are vic1ms of the bias; neurosciences experts are not and tend to judge nega1vely the good explana1ons that are associated to placebo neuroscience bla bla IN any case, scien1c literacy does not seem to help (only exper1se in the domain does) (Weisberg, 2008) 26. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Neuroscience bias (What is the added value of neuroscience?) We read neuroscience studies with a biases eye We nd them interes1ng We nd them explanatory We nd them persuasive Even when we have other methods at hand and the where informa1on does not add valuable explanatory or causal informa1on We consider neural evidence as sucient and necessary to support claims about cogni1ve processes the simple presence of neural evidence supports claims/we need neural evidence to support claims (Skolnick Weisberg, 2008) 27. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs The counter-intui1ve nature of neuroscience could explain (at least in part) its fascina1on (Skolnick Weisberg, 2008; Bloom, 2004, 2006) Mind/brain Dualism Neuroscien1c reports are perceived as interes1ng because we are intui1vely dualists We are fascinated by the counter- intui1ve idea that our body is involved in our mental processes But we are also wronged by the confusion between correla1on and causa1on (knowing where = knowing why) 28. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Where/why problem in neuroscience Neuroimaging tells us where, and expand our knowledge But where is dierent from why and how Knowing where is not necessarily informing We do not need a brain scan for knowing that smoking is addic1ve (Smoking changes brain) And o>en brain imaging data are correla1onal, not causal Press covering of the where problem is not that informing because taking place somewhere in the brain is the only possibility for cogni1ve processes 29. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Illusory causaBon i.e. Micho_es launching eect Could be behind jargon bias and related to mind/brain dualism 30. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Length eect: People tend to rate longer explana1ons as being more similar to expert explana1ons DistracBng details eect: Presen1ng related but irrelevant details to people as part of an argument makes the argument more dicult to encode and recall People respond posi1vely more o>en to requests with uninforma1ve placebo informa1on in the, like Can I use the photocopier? I need to make some copies works be_er than Can I use the photocopier? (Goldacre, 2008) 31. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Illusory sense of uency: Weisbergs experiments show that neuroscien1c informa1on provides a sense of uency = a sense of understanding that an explana1on conveys a cue to a good explana1on, a feeling of intellectual sa1sfac1on But uency or sense of understanding is not the same as accuracy or good explana1on (Trout, 2008) The sense of understanding has not an epistemic virtue Fluency derives from a sense of tractability which is provided by reduc1onist explana1ons The sense of understanding is the eect of non- epistemic forces (Trout, 2008) 32. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Illusory sense of uency: Fluency is the consequence of (or at least is inuenced by) 2 cogni1ve biases Hindisight = I knew it all along So, it is so evident Overcondence = I am 100% sure If I feel it is evident, then it is (Trout, 2002) CogniBve dissonance (Fes1nger, 1957) 33. 4. Cogni1ve biases/intui1ve beliefs Source amnesia Conrma1on bias Desire for be_ering Other fears, desires, Like in other forms of urban legends (Beyerstein, 2010) (Brunvand, 1981) 34. What can we do against neuromyths? Scien1c educa1on Not enough: even students in neuroscience are vic1ms of the neuroscience jargon bias (only full-formed neuroscien1sts dont: Weisberg, et al., 2008) Be_er scien1c media1on (Racine, et al., 2008) Neuroscien1sts more involved in it (Racine, et al., 2008; Weisberg, 2008) New professions (Racine, et al., 2008) Ac1ve informa1on McDonnel Founda1on bad neuro-journalism h_p://www.jsmf.org/neuromill/calmji_eryneurons.htm SFN neuromyths busters OCDE neuromyths Public topographic maps of ac1va1on rather than images (McBace & Castel, 2008) Develop the ethics of scien1c research and of scien1c communica1on Raise skep1cism (without reducing the interest for sciences) Make cogni1ve biases and common beliefs widely known, at least by scien1sts and science media1on professionals 35. Timothe Behra Finalement, je ne crois pas que les neurosciences aient rellement quelque chose apporter lduca1on. Aujourdhui, cela ne semble pas tre le cas ; mais mme en principe, cest la psychologie qui tudie le niveau per1nent pour fonder les mthodes de lduca1on. Les enseignants sont, comme beaucoup, sduits par la_rait des images de cerveau. Pourtant, savoir que telle ou telle zone crbrale est implique pour telle tche ne sert strictement rien dans la pra1que ! Ce qui sert, cest davoir un modle dcrivant les direntes tapes ncessaires la ralisa1on dune tche. Pour faire une mtaphore qui ne sera sans doute pas au got de tout le monde : quand on apprend conduire une voiture, on napprend pas la mcanique. Jai donc limpression quon mlange les niveaux. 36. Lar1cle de Goswami pose la ques1on : faut il lu_er contre les programmes dduca1on soit disant bass sur les neurosciences ? Ce_e mme ques1on se pose pour d autres domaines, comme les mdecines alterna1ves. Lexemple de lhomopathie me fait dire que laisser ces programmes en libre concurrence ne perme_ra pas den slec1onner les meilleurs. Je suis par1san dune duca1on plutt communiste , cest--dire la mme pour tous, au moins bas niveau. Donc daprs moi, oui, il faut mener des inves1ga1ons scien1ques pour dis1nguer les mthodes, et ne pas laisser prolifrer les mthodes bases sur les neurosciences , qui u1lisent le bon vieux ressort markenng du vu la tl . 37. Ce qui est ennuyeux aujourdhui, cest que la vulgarisa1on scien1que ne prend pas les prcau1ons ncessaires. Je pense au magazine Cerveau & Psycho, que je trouve bien trop sensa1onnaliste des conjectures y sont souvent prsentes comme des faits. Ainsi, des communicateurs reconnus comme crdibles, les journalistes scien1ques, diusent des informa1ons simplies sur des sujets encore trs sensibles. Nest ce pas ainsi que naissent et voyagent les neuromythes ? 38. Voici un pe1t exemple de vulgarisa1on des neurosciences ou comment expliquer limmaturit des adolescents daujourdhui (et de chez nous) comme un fait naturel des neurosciences : h_p://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-VkRzR65fB8 Voil, maintenant vous savez que si les adolescents sont mous, turbulents ou incapables de se concentrer 10 minutes, cest parce quils ne sont pas nis du cortex . On nous prsente ici le cerveau dun adolescent comme un grand chan1er, quil faut rorganiser, et que tout cela se ni dans le cortex prfrontal, qui gre limpulsivit. Ce_e impulsivit ne serait donc pas correctement gre avant Je ne sais pas si cest susamment dius pour tre considr comme un neuromythe. 39. Ocane Le Tarnec En fait, les neurosciences peuvent tre extrmement u1les lduca1on de manire tout fait indirecte, et cest l que je rejoins Timothe sur le fait quon mlange les niveaux . Les neurosciences ont selon moi le rle essen1el de poser les bonnes ques1ons. Cest dire, justement, de casser les mythes et de reposer la problma1que des appren1ssages dans les bons termes. Je crois notamment que les mythes viennent non seulement dtudes neuroscien1ques, mais aussi et surtout de laccepta1on gnrale que ces rsultats ont immdiatement rencontre, notamment parce que ces ides avaient dj leur terreau dans lopinion gnrale. Par exemple, lide de la courte dure du dveloppement cogni1f (plus ou moins 3 ans) a bien pu tre fortement prsente avant mme lexistence des sciences cogni1ves. Mais les rsultats scien1ques ont solidi / prennis ces croyances, les transformant en mythes aujourdhui diciles contester. 40. Les neurosciences peuvent poser les bonnes ques1ons en reprant des dirences ne_es dac1vit du cerveau entre des tches direntes : ces dirences peuvent rpondre aux ques1ons Quoi ? et parfois en par1e Comment ? mais certainement pas Pourquoi ? ( Pourquoi les adolescent sont-ils mous, turbulents ou incapables de se concentrer , etc). Mais sil est vain dy chercher une rponse au pourquoi , il serait dommage de refuser les demi-rponses (ou les trs bonnes ques1ons) que sont le quoi et le comment . Si lon parcourt les travaux de S. Dehaene par exemple, on se rend compte que les rsultats dimagerie peuvent perme_re de faire des hypothses solides notamment sur ltat cogni1f dans lequel lenfant se prsente un appren1ssage , qui correspond ltat ini1al sur lequel doit sappuyer lenseignement pour tre ecace et ne pas demander limpossible au cerveau. Par exemple, une hypothse majeure de S. Dehaene est que notre appren1ssage de la lecture se fait malgr de fortes contraintes biologiques, grce un recyclage ac1f de neurones. Ces neurones, aprs les millnaires de slec1on naturelle qui nous prcdent mais qui nont pas eu le temps de direncier les cultures crites, taient ddis des tches bien plus basiques de la vision et de la reconnaissance. Ces contraintes, si elles existent eec1vement, sont une raison extrmement per1nente de choisir un mode dappren1ssage plutt quun autre, par exemple pour la lecture : la mthode syllabique plutt que la mthode globale.