cognitive dysfunction underlying auditory …

286
COGNITIVE DYSFUNCTION UNDERLYING AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: A COMBINED-DEFICITS MODEL. Flavie Waters BSc (Hons), MSc This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and as a partial requirement for the degree of Master of Psychology (Clinical Neuropsychology) of the University of Western Australia School of Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences and School of Psychology University of Western Australia 2004

Upload: others

Post on 25-Feb-2022

3 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

COGNITIVE DYSFUNCTION UNDERLYING

AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: A COMBINED-DEFICITS MODEL.

Flavie Waters BSc (Hons), MSc

This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and as

a partial requirement for the degree of Master of Psychology (Clinical Neuropsychology) of the University of Western Australia

School of Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences and School of Psychology University of Western Australia

2004

iii

ABSTRACT

Auditory hallucinations are some of the most distressing and disabling symptoms of

schizophrenia. However very little is known about the exact processes responsible for

auditory hallucinations. The aim of this thesis is to provide a new perspective on the nature

of the cognitive deficits underlying auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia.

As a preliminary study to the investigation of auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia, a factor analysis of a measure of hallucinatory predisposition, the Launay-

Slade Hallucination Scale-Revised (Bentall & Slade, 1985), was carried out on data from a

large sample of undergraduate students (N = 562). An overlap in characteristics between

hallucinatory-like experiences in normal individuals and auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia should draw attention to factors that are important to the hallucinatory

experience in general. One of the findings from this study was that intrusiveness is a

commonly reported characteristic of hallucinatory-like experiences in normal individuals.

Intrusiveness is also one of the defining features of auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia. Since the process of inhibition is essential for suppressing unwanted

thoughts, the first set of two studies using patients with schizophrenia (N = 43) investigated

the presence of an (intentional) inhibition failure in auditory hallucinations using the

Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT; Burgess & Shallice, 1996) and the Inhibition of

Currently Irrelevant Memories Task (ICIM; Schnider & Ptak, 1999). It was found that

auditory hallucinations were linked to a deficit in intentional inhibition as measured by

these tasks. The process of inhibition was further investigated using the Affective Shifting

task, but auditory hallucinations were not associated with a deficit on this task. Possible

differences in the inhibitory demands of the HSCT, ICIM and Affective Shifting tasks are

discussed.

In addition to the notion of intrusiveness, healthy individuals vulnerable to

hallucinations identified experiences that are referred to an external agency. Similarly,

schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations fail to recognize mental events as being

self-generated. A recent theory suggests that the patients’ failure to identify the origins of

auditory hallucinations results from a fundamental deficit in context memory (Nayani &

David, 1996). The second set of studies in patients with schizophrenia (N = 43)

investigated the proposal that auditory hallucinations are linked to an impairment in context

memory. A task that assessed memory for events, the source of these events (self/other)

iv

and their location in time (session 1/2) was utilized. The results showed that significantly

more patients with auditory hallucinations had a deficit in some form of memory for

context compared to patients without auditory hallucinations, although this deficit was not

found to be specific to those with auditory hallucinations.

A new model of auditory hallucinations was then developed. It was suggested that at

least two cognitive deficits, in intentional inhibition and context memory, must be present

to explain auditory hallucinations. As a result of these combined deficits, mental events are

experienced as involuntary and intrusive and are not recognized because the contextual

cues that would allow them to be identified correctly are missing or incomplete. In support

of this proposal, nearly all patients currently experiencing auditory hallucinations showed

the combination of deficits. However, critical consideration of the findings suggests that

additional cognitive processes may be necessary for auditory hallucinations to occur.

Finally, one prediction of the model is that nonhallucinating individuals (with or

without schizophrenia) may show a deficit on either, but not both, intentional inhibition or

context memory processes. As a formal test of the model, the last study tested this

prediction on a group of patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD; N = 14).

OCD patients also report intrusive and unwanted thoughts, although they do not mistake

the origins of these thoughts. The results showed that only one of the 14 OCD patients

showed the combination of deficits, providing strong support for our model of auditory

hallucinations. The OCD patient who showed the combined deficits was found to

experience frequent hypnopompic hallucinations, perhaps suggesting similar cognitive

processes between hallucination-like experiences in non-psychotic states and auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Together, the studies suggest that a combination of deficits in intentional inhibition

and contextual memory is necessary for auditory hallucinations to occur in schizophrenia.

However, a critical analysis of the results indicated that additional cognitive processes are

likely to be important for the expression of this symptom. The power in our model comes

from its ability to explain a broad range of phenomena that previous models cannot account

for.

v

References Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards

hallucination: a brief report. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(4), 527-529.

Burgess, P., & Shallice, T. (1996). Response suppression, initiation and strategy use

following frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 34(4), 263-273.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & B. T. R. E (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 : John Wiley & Sons

Ltd.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract…………………………………………………………………………. iii Manuscripts and publications generated from this thesis…………………… xiii Acknowledgments……………………………..……………………………….. xv Preamble……………………………..…………………………………………. xvii INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………. 1 Chapter 1. An overview of schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations, inhibition and context memory………………………………………………..

3

Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 3 Schizophrenia……………………………………………………………………. 4

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry……………………………………………… 6 Auditory hallucinations………………………………………………………….. 7

Definition………………………………………………………………… 7 Auditory hallucinations in individuals other than with schizophrenia….. 8 Main descriptive features of auditory hallucinations……….…………… 8

Theories of auditory hallucinations……………………………………… 11 Inner speech..….………………………………………………… 11 Mental imagery….…..….……………………………………….. 13 Context memory deficit...……………………………………….. 14 Social-psychological theories….………………………………… 16 Neuropathology of auditory hallucinations……………………………… 17

Key cognitive processes under investigations…………………………………… 20 Inhibition………………………………………………………………… 20 Context memory……………………………………………………….… 23 Aims and organization of the thesis……………………………………………… 25 References……..…………………………………..…………………………….. 28 PREDISPOSITION TO HALLUCINATIONS IN THE NORMAL POPULATION………………………………………………………………….

45

Foreword to Chapter 2…………………………………………………………… 47 Chapter 2. Revision of the factor structure of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) …………………………………………………

49

Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 49 Introduction……..…………………………………..…………………………… 50 Method……..…………………………………..………………………………… 51 Results……..…………………………………..………………………………… 51 Discussion……..…………………………………..…………………………….. 55 References……..…………………………………..…………………………….. 57

viii

INTENTIONAL INHIBITION AND AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS… 59 Foreword to Chapter 3, 4 and 5…………………………………………………. 61 Chapter 3. Inhibition in schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations……………………………………………………………………

63

Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 63 Introduction……………………………..……………………………………….. 64 Method……………………………..……………………………………………. 65 Participants..…………………………………………………………….. 65 Clinical ratings..………………………….……………………………... 65 Tasks and questionnaires……………………………..…………………. 66 Results……………………………..…………………………………………….. 67 Comparisons of patients and controls……………………………..…….. 67 Correlations with hallucinations severity..………………………………. 68 Association of variables with severity of other symptom groups.………. 69 Effects of antipsychotic medication……..………………………………. 70 Discussion……………………………..………………………………………… 70 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………… 71 References……………………………..………………………………………… 72 Chapter 4. Auditory hallucinations: failure to inhibit irrelevant memories 75 Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 75 Introduction……………………………..……………………………………….. 76 Method……………………………..……………………………………………. 77 Participants.……………………………..………………………………. 77 Clinical ratings………………………..………………………………… 77 Cognitive assessment.……………………………..…………………….. 78 Results……………………………..…………………………………………….. 79 Analysis of target hits.……………………………..……………………. 79 Analysis of false alarms.……………………………..………………….. 80 Discussion……………………………..………………………………………… 81 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………… 84 References……………………………..………………………………………… 85 Chapter 5. Inhibitory and affective processes in schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations……………………………………………………………………

87

Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 87 Introduction……………………………..………………………………………. 88 Inhibitory processes……………………………..………………………. 88

ix

Inhibition in schizophrenia………………………………………... 88 Inhibition in auditory hallucinations..…………………………….. 90 Affective Processes.……………………………..………………………. 90 Affective processes in schizophrenia……..………………………. 90 Affective processes in auditory hallucinations……..…………….. 92 Summary of goals.……………………………..………………………... 93 Method……………………………..……………………………………………. 94 Participants.……………………………..………………………………. 94 Clinical ratings………………………………….……………………….. 94 Tasks and questionnaires………………………………….…………….. 95 Results…………………………..……………………………………………….. 99 Affective Shifting task…………………………..………………………. 99 Patients versus controls comparisons………………..…….……… 99 Analyses of patients with and without hallucinations……..……... 100 Questionnaire Results…………………………..……………………….. 101 BDI-II and BAI……………………………..…………………….. 101 Performance on Affective Shifting task and depression/anxiety… 102 Negative voice content: Auditory Hallucinations Questionnaire…. 104 BAVQ-R……………………………..……………………………. 104 Relationship between BDI-II, negative content and BAVQ-R…… 106 Performance on Affective Shifting task - negative voice content 106 Discussion…………………………..…………………………………………… 106 Inhibitory processes……………………………..………………………. 107 Inhibition in schizophrenia………………………………………... 107 Inhibition in auditory hallucinations..…………………………….. 108 Affective Processes.……………………………..………………………. 110 Affective processes in schizophrenia……..………………………. 110 Affective processes in auditory hallucinations……..…………….. 112 Theoretical developments……..………………………………………… 114 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 117 CONTEXT MEMORY AND AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS…………. 125 Foreword to Chapters 6 and 7……………………………………………………. 127 Chapter 6. Context memory and binding in schizophrenia…………………. 129 Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 129 Introduction……..…………………………………..…………………………… 130 Method……..…………………………………..………………………………… 131 Participants……………………………..……………………………….. 131 Memory for Context task……..…………………………………………. 132

x

Data analysis……..…………………………………..………………….. 132 Results……..…………………………………..……………………………….. 133 Intact versus rearranged object pair recognition.……………………….. 133 Source and temporal judgements……..………………………………… 135 Low-functioning controls……..………………………………………… 136 Binding of source and temporal information……..…………………….. 137 Demographic and clinical factors……..………………………………… 138 Discussion……..…………………………………..……………………………. 138 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………… 140 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 141 Chapter 7. Context memory and auditory hallucinations………………….. 145 Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 145 Introduction……..…………………………………..…………………………… 146 Method……..…………………………………..………………………………… 147 Participants……………………………..……………………………….. 147 Tasks……..……………………………………………………………… 147 Results……..…………………………………..………………………………… 148 Intact versus rearranged object pair recognition………………………… 150 Source and temporal judgements……..…………………………………. 150 Binding of source and temporal information……..……………………... 151 Specificity of deficits in auditory hallucinations..…………………….…. 154 Discussion……..…………………………………..……………………………. 155 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 161 AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS: A COMBINATION OF DEFICITS IN INTENTIONAL INHIBITION AND CONTEXT MEMORY………………

165

Foreword to Chapter 8…………………………………………………………… 167 Chapter 8. Auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia: intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories…………………………………………………….…

169

Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 169 Introduction……..…………………………………..…………………………… 170 A deficit in intentional inhibition……..…………………………………………. 171 Inhibition: definition and taxonomy……..……………………………….. 171 Inhibition deficits in auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia…………… 172 New empirical support for a failure in intentional inhibition……..………. 173 A deficit in memory for context……..………………………………………….. 177 Context memory: definition……..………………………………………... 178 Context memory deficits in auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia…… 179

xi

New empirical support for a context memory failure…………………….. 180 A combined deficit in intentional inhibition and context memory……..……….. 182 Assessment of the model……..………………………………………………….. 183 Potential empirical and theoretical developments………………………………. 186 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………… 188 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 189 INHIBITION AND CONTEXT MEMORY IN OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER (OCD)………………………………………….

201

Foreword to Chapters 9 and 10………………………………………………….. 203 Chapter 9. OCD: similarities with auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. A literature review……………………………………………………………..

205

Abstract……………………………..…………………………………………… 205 Introduction……..…………………………………..…………………………… 206 Epidemiological and clinical features of OCD. ………………………………… 206 Neuropathology of OCD……..………………………………………………….. 208 Neuropsychological findings……..……………………………………………… 208 Maintenance theories of OCD……..……………………………………………. 211 Conclusion and direction……..………………………………………………….. 212 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 213 Chapter 10. OCD: Intentional inhibition and context memory processes…. 221 Abstract……………………………..………………………………………….. 221 Introduction……..…………………………………..…………………………… 222 Method……..…………………………………..……………………………….. 224 Participants……..…………………………………..…………………… 224 Clinical ratings……..……………………………………………………. 224 Tasks and questionnaires……..…………………………………………. 225 Results……..…………………………………..………………………………… 227 Intentional inhibition..…………………………………………………… 227 Context memory……..………………………………………………….. 230 Combined deficits in inhibition and context memory…………………... 232 Discussion……..…………………………………..…………………………….. 233 Intentional inhibition processes……..………………………………….. 233 Context memory processes……..………………………………………. 236 A combination of deficits in inhibition and context memory…………… 237 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 240

xii

GENERAL DISCUSSION…………………………………………………….. 245 Chapter 11. General Discussion………………………………………………. 247 Hallucinatory predisposition in healthy individuals..……………………………. 247 Summary of results of Chapter 2……..…………………………………… 247 Intentional inhibition and auditory hallucinations..……………………………… 248 Summary of results of Chapter 3……..…………………………………… 248 Summary of results of Chapter 4……..…………………………………… 249 Summary of results of Chapter 5……..…………………………………… 249 Summary of results of Chapter 8……..…………………………………… 250 General comments regarding the role of intentional inhibition processes... 251 Context memory and auditory hallucinations..…………………………………... 252 Summary of results of Chapter 6……..…………………………………… 252 Summary of results of Chapter 7……..…………………………………… 253 General comments regarding the role of context memory processes.……. 255 Issues of affect..…………………………….. ..…………………………………. 257 Summary of results of Chapter 5……..…………………………………… 257 General comments regarding issues of affect and auditory hallucinations.. 259 A combination of deficits in intentional inhibition and context memory……….. 260 Intentional inhibition and context memory in OCD..……………………………. 262 Summary of results and comments regarding inhibition and OCD.……… 263 Summary of results and comments regarding context memory and OCD.. 264 Summary of results and comments regarding combined deficits in inhibition and context memory and OCD...……………………………….

265

Final comments..…………………………….. ..……………………………….. 270 References……..…………………………………..……………………………. 273 APPENDIX Appendix A: An analysis of the main clinical features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia…………...……………………………………...

277

Appendix B: Words used in the Affective Shifting task………………………... 285

xiii

MANUSCRIPTS AND PUBLICATIONS GENERATED FROM THIS THESIS

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., & Maybery, M.T. (2003) Revision of the factor structure of

the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R). Personality and Individual

Differences, 35, 1351-1357 (Chapter 2).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T., & Michie, P.T. (2003) Inhibition in

schizophrenia: Association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research. 62,

275-280. (Chapter 3).

Badcock, J.C., Waters, F.A.V., & Maybery, M.T. (in press) Auditory hallucinations: failure

to inhibit irrelevant memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (Chapter 4).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T., & Michie, P.T. (2004) Inhibitory and

affective processes in schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations. Unpublished

manuscript, University of Western Australia. (Chapter 5).

Waters, F.A.V., Maybery, M.T., Badcock, J.C., & Michie, P.T. (2004) Context memory

and binding in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 68(2-3), 119-125 (Chapter 6).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T., & Michie, P.T. (2004) Context memory

and auditory hallucinations. Unpublished manuscript, University of Western

Australia. (Chapter 7).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Michie, P.T. & Maybery, M.T. (2004) Auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia: intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories.

Manuscript submitted for publication (Chapter 8).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T., & Michie, P.T. (2004) OCD: Intentional

inhibition and memory for context. Unpublished manuscript, University of Western

Australia. (Chapter 10).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C. & Maybery, M.T. (2004). An analysis of the main clinical

features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Unpublished manuscript,

University of Western Australia. (Appendix A).

Contribution of the Candidate to Publications

Please note: In regard to Regulation 31 (points 2 and 3) from the Regulations Governing

Research Higher Degrees, all study design, task development, participant recruitment and

testing, data entry, analysis, interpretation, preparation of manuscripts and revisions were

xiv

conducted by the candidate. One exception concerns the manuscript presented in Chapter

4. This chapter entails a reanalysis of one of the tasks presented in Chapter 3 (Waters,

Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003). The manuscript was prepared by one of the

candidate’s supervisors, Dr Johanna Badcock, however the candidate contributed to the

form and design of the analysis and made corrections to the text prior to publication.

xv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have been very fortunate to have two great supervisors. Johanna Badcock has

been a remarkable mentor and guide throughout my candidature. Her focus and passion for

neuropsychiatric research have greatly stimulated my career aspiration to remain in this

field of research. I have also come to know her as a friend and I could not have done

without her support of the important decisions I have made during my PhD. I am also

greatly indebted to Murray Maybery. His opinions, advice and patience have been

invaluable. I am also very grateful for his guidance and knowledge, and I could not have

reached this point without his help. The contribution of Patricia Michie must also be

acknowledged. Together with Jo Badcock, Pat contributed to the original proposal that

gave rise to this PhD. Although she now works at another university, I have really valued

the time I spent in her company and she has inspired me more than she will ever know.

I could not have carried out this research without the assistance of Danny Rock and

Sarah Howell who helped me with the recruitment of patients. Many thanks also to David

Castle and Helen Stain for many hours of psychiatric interviewing training. Much

appreciation to Matt Huitson who developed some of the tasks used in this thesis, and to

Andrew Heathcote for his helpful statistical advice in one of the manuscripts. Professor

Aaron Beck also provided valued assistance and thoughtful comments in the early stages of

this thesis.

My best appreciation also to the patients and other participants who gave their time

and effort so generously to this project. This research was genuinely carried out in the hope

that it will lead to a better understanding of auditory hallucinations. Any step forward,

however small, is a step closer towards some relief for affected patients.

Thanks also to Kate Frencham, Keira Thomson and Dana Wong for the memorable

Thursday evening sessions.

Finally, but most importantly, many important life events have happened during this

PhD. My Father, Jean-Francois Aubert, passed away suddenly. He was a very unique,

vibrant and loving person whom I continue to miss every day. I also miss dearly my

grandparents who passed away shortly before my Father. My son Luke was born during

this difficult time and is my little happy ray of sunshine. Everlasting thanks to Mike, my

life companion, who has been a pillar of strength during all these events. I have found

great comfort in his advice that a PhD is all about surviving whatever life throws at you.

xvii

PREAMBLE

Schizophrenia is a severe psychiatric disorder where sufferers commonly have

widespread neuropsychological impairment, very low levels of occupational and social

functioning, a poor quality of life and reduced life expectancy (Elvevag & Goldberg, 2000;

Lehman, 1996). Individuals with schizophrenia are often tormented by “voices” and other

nonverbal sounds over which they have little control. These auditory hallucinations are

experienced by most patients with schizophrenia and are one of the most pervasive,

disabling and distressing of all symptoms. Research into this symptom is motivated by the

belief that understanding the factors that are responsible for auditory hallucinations will

lead to better treatment and services, and ultimately outcome, for sufferers. Auditory

hallucinations are also reported in other clinical groups and in the “normal” population.

However, it cannot be assumed that the mechanisms responsible for auditory hallucinations

are the same for all conditions. Consequently, this thesis focuses primarily on the cognitive

processes underlying auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia.

A number of influential theories, essentially single-deficit accounts, have been

developed in the search for cognitive abnormalities associated with auditory hallucinations

(e.g. Aleman & de Haan, 2000; Frith, 1996). Although significant progress has been made,

still very little is known about the exact cognitive processes underlying auditory

hallucinations. There is a growing concern that a single deficit is unlikely to result in such

a complex event (Nayani & David, 1996). Furthermore, the diverse phenomenology of

auditory hallucinations suggests that a combination of deficits might be needed to explain

this mental phenomenon.

The essence of this thesis is that a specific combination of cognitive deficits in

intentional inhibition and context memory is essential for auditory hallucinations to occur.

Chapters 1 to 10 report a series of studies that describe the steps that have led to this

proposal. As a preliminary study, Chapter 2 examines the characteristics of factors

underlying predisposition to hallucinations in healthy individuals, with the aim of

identifying some experiences that are common in both hallucinatory-like experiences in

normal individuals and auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Chapters 3-8 investigate

the proposal that the processes of intentional inhibition and context memory are impaired in

schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations, and particularly that a specific

xviii

combination of deficits in both cognitive domains is necessary for auditory hallucinations

to occur. As a test of the specificity of this particular combination of deficits to patients

with auditory hallucinations, Chapter 10 investigates the performance of a group of

individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) on tasks of intentional inhibition

and context memory.

Chapters 1 and 9 provide overviews of research findings pertinent to the current

investigations. In particular, Chapter 1 presents a review of the literature in the areas of

schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations and the cognitive processes of inhibition and context

memory. Chapter 9 reviews literature in the area of OCD.

This thesis is presented as a collection of papers in a format suitable for publication.

At the time of submission, Chapters 2, 3 and 6 have been published, Chapter 4 is in press

and Chapter 8 has been submitted for publication. Because of restrictions on the length of

the manuscripts imposed by some journals, a detailed overview of pertinent previous

research is not presented in the empirical chapters, but a literature review of issues covered

in Chapters 2-8 is presented in Chapter 1. For the same reason, some manuscripts were

necessarily restricted to specific issues, consequently, where appropriate, different analyses

of the same task are presented in separate chapters, as is the case with Chapters 3 and 4 and

with Chapters 6 and 7.

Although 42 patients with schizophrenia participated in the study presented in

Chapter 3, another patient was recruited following the write-up of this study as a

manuscript for publication. Consequently, all studies subsequent to Chapter 3 report the

results of analyses comprising 43 patients with schizophrenia. The addition of this

participant did not result in any difference in statistical outcomes.

Finally, there is a common approach throughout this thesis regarding the group

assignment of patients with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia patients currently

experiencing hallucinations were selected on the basis of having experienced auditory

hallucinations on at least half of the days during the preceding four weeks, as assessed by

self-reports and case note reviews. Other schizophrenia patients who did not fit this

criterion, or who did not report experiencing auditory hallucinations, were assigned to the

"non-hallucinating group". This criterion was especially chosen so that patients with very

infrequent hallucinations were not categorized as having auditory hallucinations present.

One exception to this approach is in the manuscript presented in Chapter 4. This chapter

xix

was specifically oriented to answer a precise question regarding whether patients who have

had no auditory hallucinations in the past four weeks also showed the specified cognitive

deficit; consequently, an even more conservative approach to group selection (i.e. absence

vs. presence) was adopted.

References

Aleman, A., & de Haan, E. (2000). Nonlanguage cognitive deficits and hallucinations in

schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(3), 487.

Elvevag, B., & Goldberg, T. E. (2000). Cognitive impairment in schizophrenia is the core

of the disorder. Critical Reviews in Neurobiology, 14(1), 1-21.

Frith, C. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: the case of auditory

hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: B, 351,

1505-1512.

Lehman, A. F. (1996). Quality of life issues and assessment among persons with

schizophrenia. In M. Moscarelli, A. Rupp, & N. Sartorius (Eds.), Handbook of Mental

Health Economics and Health Policy (Vol. 1. Schizophrenia). New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

- 3 -

Chapter 1

An overview of schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations, inhibition and context memory

Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to provide the theoretical background underpinning our

investigations of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. In the first section, the main

epidemiological, cognitive and clinical features of schizophrenia are briefly reviewed.

The second section provides a review of the current literature on auditory

hallucinations. Besides providing a general introduction to hallucinations in

schizophrenia, and in other clinical and normal populations, this section summarizes 1)

the primary features of auditory hallucinations, as delineated in published

phenomenological surveys and data from our own group, 2) current theories about the

nature of the cognitive and socio-psychological processes that result in the hallucinatory

experience, and 3) brain systems thought to be involved in the pathogenesis of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Since the cognitive domains of inhibition and context

memory are key mechanisms investigated in this thesis, the third section provides an

overview of the main theories about those processes in the normal population. The

fourth and final section presents an outline, and the aims, of the next chapters.

Chapter 1

- 4 -

Schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is a common psychiatric illness, being present in all populations

and cultures with a prevalence between 1.4 and 4.6 per 1000, and incidence rate in the

range of 0.16 and 0.42 per 1000 population (Jablensky, 2000). There is a strong genetic

influence in the aetiology of schizophrenia, although environmental factors remain very

important (Andreasen, 2000; Jablensky, 2000). Typically, individuals develop the

disorder in their early to mid-20s, although an early or late onset is possible. Some

studies have shown that males and females are affected in roughly equal numbers, with

little evidence of significant sex differences in symptom profile (Jablensky, 2000). The

course of the illness may be variable, with some patients remaining chronically ill while

others display exacerbations and remissions. Antipsychotic medications have been

successful in managing the symptoms but unpleasant side effects frequently occur,

especially with typical antipsychotic medications (see reviews by Schultz & Andreasen,

1999; Wong & Van Tol, 2003). In conjunction with medications, psychosocial

rehabilitation (targeting the importance of psychological support, family interventions,

vocational rehabilitation and community support) has been very useful in reducing

acute-care needs, shortening recovery after an acute episode and managing some of the

prominent psychotic symptoms, although ongoing intervention is required to maintain

treatment gains (Penn & Mueser, 1996; Rector & Beck, 2001; Schultz & Andreasen,

1999).

The health care costs, treatment issues and other economic costs attributable to

schizophrenia are very substantial (Schultz & Andreasen, 1999; Wong & Van Tol,

2003). The personal cost to the individual is also high, with a significant percentage of

patients having a poor quality of life, significant economic burden and a loss of

supportive social network (Lehman, 1996). Cognitive, affective, social and

occupational functioning is usually severely disrupted following the onset of the

disorder. In particular, schizophrenia is associated with widespread neuropsychological

impairment, specifically in attention, memory and executive functioning (e.g. Aleman,

Hijman, de Haan & Kahn, 1999; Crider, 1997; Elliott & Sahakian, 1995; Elvevag &

Goldberg, 2000; Gur, Moelter & Ragland, 2000; Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998;

Nathaniel-James, Brown & Ron, 1996; Tollefson, 1996). A recent review of the

evidence, based on 204 studies, concluded that schizophrenia is characterized by a

broad range of cognitive deficits with varying degrees of impairment in many domains

(Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998). Tollefson (1996) also observed that cognitive deficits

Chapter 1

- 5 -

are not limited to a small subset of patients, but are a frequent feature of the disorder

and are independent of the patient’s clinical state or of the subtype of the illness. Based

on this type of evidence, it is now commonly believed that cognitive deficits are a

central feature of schizophrenia and are at the very core of the dysfunction of this

disease (e.g. Elvevag & Goldberg, 2000). Other supporting evidence for the suggestion

of cognitive deficits as a primary characteristic of the disorder is the finding that such

impairments appear before a first episode and reflect a drop-off from an individual’s

previous level of functioning (Tollefson, 1996).

Widespread structural and functional brain abnormalities have also been

consistently demonstrated in individuals with schizophrenia. Most notable are an

enlargement of the ventricular system, prominent sulci, reduced cerebral size, decreased

temporal, hippocampal and frontal lobe size and disruptions in the prefrontal cortex and

distributed functional circuits (e.g. Andreasen, Paradiso & O’Leary, 1998; Arnold,

1997; Fletcher, McKenna, Friston, Frith & Dolan, 1999; Lewis & Anderson, 1995;

McCarley, Shenton, O’Donnell & Nester, 1993; Nelson, Saykin, Flashman & Riordan,

1998; Pantelis et al, 1997; Schultz & Andreasen, 1999; Weinberger, Aloia, Goldberg &

Berman, 1994).

Schizophrenia has come to be understood as having multiple symptom dimensions

(e.g. Bentall, 1997; Haier, 1980; Klimidis, Stuart, Minas, Copolov & Singh, 1993;

Lenzenweger, 1999; Liddle et al, 1992, Seaton, Goldstein & Allen, 2001). In terms of

the commonly accepted description of the disorder as expressed in the Diagnostic

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-4th Edition (DSM-IV, 1995), there are two main

groups of symptoms: positive symptoms, which can be described as normal functions

that are distorted or exaggerated, such as abnormalities in perception (hallucinations), in

inferential thinking (delusions), in language (disorganized speech) and in behavioural

monitoring / control (disorganized behaviour); and negative symptoms, where there is a

diminution or absence of mental functions that are normally present, such as in the case

of alogia (decrease in fluency of ideas and language), affective blunting (diminution in

the ability to express emotion), avolition (decrease in the ability to initiate and pursue

goal-directed activity), anhedonia (decrease in the ability to seek out and experience

pleasure), and attentional impairment (decrease in the ability to focus attention). The

DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia include at least one month of active phase

symptoms (i.e. two or more of the following; delusions, hallucinations, disorganized

speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behaviour, negative symptoms) with some

signs of the disorder persisting for at least 6 months, and a substantial decline in

Chapter 1

- 6 -

functioning in one or more major areas of functioning. The clinical diversity of

schizophrenia has led to many attempts to identify syndromes of the illness. Briefly,

one formulation proposes a distinction between positive and negative symptomatology

(e.g. Crowe, 1980), but more recent evidence suggests that three distinguishable

syndromes, reality distortion (delusions and hallucinations), disorganisation (disorders

of the form of thought and inappropriate affect) and psychomotor poverty (including

poverty of speech, flatness of affect and decreased spontaneous movement symptoms)

may better describe the illness (e.g. Harris, Gordon, Bahramali & Slewa-Younan, 1999;

Liddle, 1987; Liddle et al, 1992).

The value of the concept of schizophrenia as a unitary disease, however, is

increasingly being questioned. For example, concerns regarding the heterogeneity of

symptom presentation, course, prognosis and cognitive profile have led researchers to

question the validity of schizophrenia as representing a homogeneous entity (e.g.

Bentall, 1997; Elliott & Sahakian, 1995; McGlashan, 1998; Mojtabai, 1999; Seaton,

Golstein & Allen, 2001). In addition, although some symptoms have been given greater

weight in current classification systems, a poor correlation has been found between

presentation of any particular symptom and diagnosis, or outcome (Bentall, 1997). This

has raised doubts with regard to the scientific validity of the current diagnostic system,

and many researchers now support the view that schizophrenia may best be explored by

examining patients who share the same symptoms (e.g. Baxter & Liddle, 1998; Bentall,

1997, Bentall, Baker & Havers, 1991).

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

Since diagnosis is based upon the presence of symptoms, it has been proposed that

a better approach to understanding the mechanisms of this disorder is to investigate

individual symptoms, an approach which has recently been referred to as “Cognitive

Neuropsychiatry” (David & Halligan, 2000). This approach begins with the assumption

that psychiatric disorders are predominantly brain disorders. It then applies methods

from Cognitive Neuropsychology in an attempt to understand how disruptions to

specific brain regions or networks give rise to symptoms that characterise and define

these disorders (Pantelis & Maruff, 2002). In particular, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

aims to offer a cognitive explanation for a disorder by investigating patterns of impaired

and intact cognitive performance. Functional models of individual symptoms can then

be developed, with the secondary gain of being able to contribute to current

understanding of models of normal cognitive functioning (David & Halligan, 2000).

Chapter 1

- 7 -

Advantages to this approach include the ability to scrutinize individual symptoms in

isolation from other confounding factors, and avoiding potential misclassification

problems associated with diagnostic disorders. The Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

approach has led to an increasing understanding that different symptoms, such as

auditory hallucinations and delusions, have a distinct neuropsychological and

neuropathological profile (e.g. Baxter & Liddle, 1998; Blackwood, Howard, Bentall &

Murray, 2001; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen, 2001; Frith & Done, 1988;

Kurachi, 2003; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Liddle et al, 1992). As a consequence, it is

hoped that one day it will be possible to identify factors that may predispose an

individual to show these symptoms.

Given the appeal of the Cognitive Neuropsychiatry approach, the current thesis

takes this symptom-oriented focus. In particular, given the importance of auditory

hallucinations in the diagnosis of schizophrenia, the aim of this thesis is to identify

some of the cognitive processes that are responsible for the hallucinatory experience, in

order to develop a model that will lead to a better understanding of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Auditory Hallucinations

Description

David (2004) has recently proposed the following definition of hallucinations: ‘A

sensory experience which occurs in the absence of corresponding external stimulation

of the relevant sense organ, has sufficient sense of reality to resemble a veridical

perception, over which the subject does not feel s/he has direct and voluntary control,

and which occurs in the awake state’ (p. 110).

Auditory hallucinations occur in approximately 74% of individuals with

schizophrenia (Mueser, Bellack & Brady, 1989; Sartorius, Shapiro & Jablensky, 1974).

These hallucinations, referred to as voices by patients themselves, usually consist of

spoken speech, but can also include nonverbal sounds. Auditory hallucinations are

experienced as being highly distressing. In extreme cases, they can result in suicide and

other dangerous behaviours (Falloon & Talbot, 1981, Walsh et al, 1999). In about 25%

of cases, voices respond only partially or not at all to currently available drug therapy

(Shergill, Murray & McGuire, 1998).

Chapter 1

- 8 -

Auditory hallucinations in individuals other than with schizophrenia

While auditory hallucinations are of singular importance in schizophrenia, they

are not restricted to this disorder. They have been found to occur in organic states such

as focal brain lesions of the temporal lobes, fever, delirium, Wernicke's encephalopathy

and dementia (Alpert & Silvers, 1970; Asaad & Shapiro, 1986; Slade & Bentall, 1988)

and they have also been reported in patients with severe affective disorders (Bentall,

1990, Bliss, Larson & Nakashima, 1983; Honig et al, 1998; Lowe, 1973; Mueser et al,

1990). The characteristics of auditory hallucinations in those groups have been found to

be similar to that of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia (Junginger & Frame,

1985), although differences in the frequency, emotional quality and perceived level of

control have been noted (Alpert & Silvers, 1970; Bentall, 2000; Davies, Griffin & Vice,

2001; Honig et al, 1998, Johns, Hemsley & Kuipers, 2002; Lowe, 1973). Some

experiences akin to auditory hallucinations also occur in the realm of “normal”

experiences, and a number of studies have shown that between 10 to 38% of the normal,

healthy, population report some type of hallucinatory experience (Bentall & Slade,

1985a; Davies, Griffin & Vice, 2001; Ohayon, 2000; Young, Bentall, Slade & Dewey,

1987). The experience has been described as being qualitatively different from auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia – with higher perceived control and predominantly

positive (rather than negative) content (Honig et al, 1998). Another commonly reported

auditory hallucination-like experience in healthy people occurs when falling asleep

(hypnagogic) and on waking (hypnopompic). Finally, hallucinations are also

experienced under the influence of drugs such as LSD (Aggernaes, 1972, Asaad &

Shapiro, 1986) although, again, the characteristics of these experiences are different

from the hallucinatory experience in schizophrenia.

The main focus of this thesis is concerned with understanding the cognitive

processes that underlie the experience of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. The

reasons are twofold. Firstly, it cannot be assumed that the mechanisms responsible for

auditory hallucinations are the same in different populations (Frith & Dolan, 1997) and,

secondly, focussing exclusively on auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia eliminates

possible confounding factors associated with other pathologies and is therefore more

likely to lead to an explanation of this symptom.

Main descriptive features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia

Auditory hallucinations are complex mental events often described as comprising

a mixture of different phenomenological features, which combine to produce a highly

Chapter 1

- 9 -

individualized experience. One of the most comprehensive published phenomenological

surveys of auditory hallucinations was carried out by Nayani and David (1996b) on 100

psychotic patients. Although only 61% of their patients had a diagnosis of

schizophrenia, this study provides an interesting insight into the complexity and multi-

facetedness of auditory hallucinations. However, given the singular importance of

auditory hallucinations in the diagnosis of schizophrenia, there are surprisingly few

detailed surveys of the main phenomenological features of auditory hallucinations in

this patient group alone. We conducted our own investigation of the clinical features of

auditory hallucinations, using 35 patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia

(Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2004, see Appendix A). These patients completed a

questionnaire comprising selected items from the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales

(PSYRAT; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher, 1999) and the Mental Health

Research Institute Unusual Perceptions Schedule (MUPS; Carter, Mackinnon, Howard,

Zeegers & Copolov, 1995).

The phenomenology of auditory hallucinations, as delineated in published surveys

and data from our own group, can be categorized using a number of characteristics.

Although there is still debate whether these parameters are valuable diagnostically (e.g.

Honig et al, 1998; Junginger & Frame, 1985) they provide a useful preliminary

framework for research purposes and are relevant to the investigation of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Frequency

The frequency of auditory hallucinations may vary from once or twice weekly to

continuously (Nayani & David, 1996b). Intriguingly, a small group of patients with

schizophrenia never experience auditory hallucinations during the course of their

illness.

Content

In schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations are usually experienced as voices

although they can also take the form of other, nonverbal sounds (e.g. bangs, animal

sounds). Although the majority of research on auditory hallucinations focuses on the

experience of verbal hallucinations, approximately 60% of patients admit to hearing

sounds in addition to voices (Nayani & David, 1996b; Waters, Badcock & Maybery,

2004). Nayani and David also reported that the most frequently reported types of

hallucinated voices are commands, personal insults and abuse, although the content of

voices are sometimes reported to be positive or neutral. The message carried by the

hallucinated voices is often interpreted as being very personal, with patients reporting

Chapter 1

- 10 -

that the voices have access to highly private details (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997).

This knowledge of personal information, together with commentaries on the patient’s

actions or thoughts, may contribute to the feeling that the voice is omnipotent and

powerful (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997).

Form

Form refers to the characteristic, often perceptual, features by which the content is

carried. For example, Nayani and David's (1996b) survey showed that male voices are

most likely to be heard and hallucinated voices often speak with accents different to the

region or social class of the patient. The tone of voices is predominantly perceived as

being negative and critical, although pleasant voices are also common. In our sample,

the voices were predominantly experienced as being of the same loudness as the

patient’s own voice or quieter, confirming the results obtained by Nayani and David.

In verbal hallucinations, different types of grammatical speech have been identified.

Second or third person hallucinations (e.g. 'you are going to die' and 'he's going to bed'

respectively) and purely descriptive non-personal sentences ('the grass is green') are the

most common. The results from our own investigations confirmed that verbal

hallucinations are not restricted to any one type of grammatical speech but rather

include a mixture of grammatical types. Auditory hallucinations are traditionally

reported as being distinct from one's own thoughts, and may be perceived to originate

from inside or outside the head, or both (Copolov, Trauer & MacKinnon, in press;

Hunter, 2004; Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2004).

External attribution

A distinguishing feature of schizophrenic hallucinations is that the experience is

perceived to originate from an external agent. Nayani and David (1996b) and David

(2004) observed that the person experiencing auditory hallucinations usually assigns an

identity to the hallucinated voices, the most commonly reported being persons known to

the patients in real life, and a minority being assigned a delusional interpretation (e.g.

Satan). Our investigations showed that close to half of all patients believed that their

voices were familiar and similar to voices of people who had spoken to them in the past.

Perceived Intrusiveness

Verbal, and nonverbal, hallucinations are reported to be intrusive because they are

unintended, persistent, beyond the control of the voice-hearer and because the patients

are often unable to escape from the experience (Oulis, Mavreas, Mamounas & Stefanis,

1995; Slade & Bentall, 1988). The feeling of lack of control has been perceived as

Chapter 1

- 11 -

being a crucial factor in the development of distress and other affective responses linked

to auditory hallucinations (e.g. Close & Garety, 1998).

Affect

There is often considerable distress associated with auditory hallucinations. Our

survey showed that most patients (82.9%) admitted that at least some of their voices

were distressing. This percentage is higher than that reported by Nayani and David

(1996b) but is consistent with Honig et al’s (1998) findings. Half of our patient sample

reported that their hallucinated voices caused them moderate to severe disruption in

everyday life. Consistent with these findings, auditory hallucinations have often been

found to co-occur with depression, anger, fear, anxiousness and low self-esteem (Alpert

& Silvers, 1970; Carter, Mackinnon & Copolov, 1996; Close & Garety, 1998;

Delespaul, deVries, van Os, 2002; Hustig & Hafner, 1990; Johns, Hemsley & Kuipers,

2002).

This brief review of the main phenomenological features of auditory

hallucinations reveals the striking complexity of the hallucinatory experience and

indicates the broad range of features that potentially contribute to a highly

individualized experience. The results of our survey were similar to the findings of

Nayani and David, with the exception of a higher rate of distress, confirming that the

results of their survey of psychotic patients provides an accurate indication of the main

features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia specifically. Importantly, it also

suggests that our sample of hallucinating patients was not unusual and therefore that the

empirical findings presented in the next few chapters are not limited to an atypical

sample of patients.

Theories of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia

Both cognitive and socio-psychological theories have been put forward to explain

auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. With regard to cognitive theories of auditory

hallucinations, there are three contemporary influential classes of theories which are

essentially single-deficit accounts: Inner Speech theories, Mental Imagery theories and a

Context Memory deficit account. These will be addressed in turn.

Inner speech accounts

The first group of cognitive theories is characterised by the proposal that auditory

hallucinations consist of inner speech that is misattributed to an external source due to

defective reality- or self-monitoring (e.g. Bentall, Kaney & Dewey, 1991; Frith, 1996).

One version (e.g. Frith, 1996; Frith & Dolan, 1997) suggests that this is due to

Chapter 1

- 12 -

difficulties in distinguishing sensations caused by one’s own actions from those that

arise from external influences because of a deficit in forward modelling or 'corollary

discharge', a failure of prior knowledge about motor intentions. In support, there is a

large body of evidence indicating that patients with auditory hallucinations have

difficulties recognizing their own actions or thoughts (e.g. Blakemore, Smith, Steel,

Johnstone & Frith, 2000; Brébion, Smith, Amador, Malaspina & Gorman, 1998; Cahill

& Frith, 1994) and are more likely than those without hallucinations to misattribute self-

generated items to an external source (e.g. Baker & Morrison, 1998; Johns & McGuire,

1999). Findings from functional brain imaging techniques have also been presented as

evidence that inner speech is involved in auditory hallucinations. For example,

McGuire, Shah and Murray (1993) observed greater activity in Broca’s area when

patients were hallucinating, a region shown to be active during internal speech. In

addition, imaging studies have presented some evidence for defective self-monitoring,

showing attenuation of activation in regions concerned with the monitoring of inner

speech (McGuire et al, 1995).

This class of theories has been very influential in the search for cognitive

abnormalities associated with auditory hallucinations. One criticism, however, has been

that the relationship between monitoring and auditory hallucinations may be more

complex than it has been proposed. Goldberg, Gold, Coppola and Weinberger (1997),

for instance, tested the forward modelling proposal in a sample of patients with

schizophrenia with a delayed auditory feedback task and failed to find a link between

corollary discharge and monitoring failures. Recently, Allen et al (2004) also

demonstrated that a self-monitoring deficit alone cannot account for the presence of

hallucinations. A group of hallucinating and nonhallucinating patients and a healthy

control group made recordings of their own voice and were subsequently asked to make

self/nonself judgements about the source of the pre-recorded speech. Patients with

hallucinations tended to misidentify their own recorded material. Since the task did not

require self-monitoring, the authors concluded that hallucinations were not solely a

function of defective self-monitoring. Further criticism of the claim of monitoring as a

central cognitive deficit in auditory hallucinations arises from evidence that this deficit

lacks specificity. A range of studies have shown a deficit in source monitoring in

delusional and thought disordered patients independent of the presence of auditory

hallucinations (e.g. Brébion, Smith, Gorman & Amador, 1997), in schizophrenia

patients regardless of symptomatology (e.g. Aleman et al, 2003; Keefe, Arnold, Bayen

& Harvey, 1999) and in non-schizophrenic confabulators (Nathaniel-James & Frith,

Chapter 1

- 13 -

1996), suggesting that the monitoring impairment, on its own, has little predictive value

for auditory hallucinations.

A variant on the proposal of auditory hallucinations as inner speech proposes that

hallucinations reflect a disruption in the brain’s language processing circuitry (Hoffman,

1986; Hoffman & McGlashan, 1997, 1998). In an earlier model, these authors proposed

disruptions in language planning processes whereby there is a breakdown of

anticipatory pre-representations of motor plans, contributing to unintended verbal

speech. In a more recent version, Hoffman and McGlashan (1997, 1998; Hoffman,

Rapaport, Mazure & Quinlan, 1999) moved on from this position and proposed a model

of exaggerated linguistic expectation resulting from a faulty verbal working memory

system. However, from an empirical point of view, there is little evidence that working

memory is especially impaired in individuals with hallucinations (Bagner, Melinder &

Barch, 2003; David & Lucas, 1993; Haddock, Slade, Prasaad & Bentall, 1996).

Although the proposal of auditory hallucinations as consisting of inner speech is a

compelling one, it does not encompass, in its current form, some of the more prominent

characteristic features of auditory hallucinations. It cannot explain, for example, why

patients experience nonverbal auditory hallucinations. An explanation for the voices'

social identity and why the voices are often recognised as belonging to people that the

patients know is also lacking. In addition, it is difficult to reconcile the proposal of

inner speech with some of the more perceptual characteristics of auditory hallucinations,

such as variations in loudness or voices with an accent or gender different from that of

the patient. Furthermore, while inner speech is mainly experienced in the first person,

auditory hallucinations often consist of descriptive comments or occur in the second or

third person. Finally, it is not clear how inner speech may be experienced as coming

from outside the head. In sum, although the idea that auditory hallucinations involve

the misattribution of inner speech has been very productive in terms of understanding

possible mechanisms underlying auditory hallucinations, it cannot, on its own, account

for many of the distinctive features of auditory hallucinations. This is not to deny the

importance of its contribution; rather, our view is that this account is not sufficient, as it

is currently conceptualised, to explain auditory hallucinations.

Mental imagery account

The second prominent theory of auditory hallucinations proposes an abnormality

of mental imagery (Aleman & de Haan, 2000, Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, Kahn & De

Haan, 2002; Mintz & Alpert, 1972). Proponents of this view suggest that individuals

who experience hallucinations have very vivid mental imagery which would result in

Chapter 1

- 14 -

confusion as to whether the hallucinated voices were imagined or heard. In a recent

development of this theory, Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de Haan and Kahn (2003)

propose that, in individuals susceptible to auditory hallucinations, top-down factors are

given higher priority than bottom-up processes resulting in an imbalance between

sensory and mental elements and an increasing influence of imagery on perception.

Evidence for this group of theories primarily rests on the basis of studies that have

shown particularly vivid imagery in patients with auditory hallucinations (e.g. Mintz &

Alpert, 1972; Young, Bentall, Slade & Dewey, 1987) and in healthy individuals who

score high on scales designed to measure predisposition to hallucinations (Aleman,

Böcker & de Haan, 1999; Barrett & Etheridge, 1992). However, this view has not

always consistently been supported by empirical evidence (see Bentall, 1997). For

example, some studies have failed to find particularly vivid imagery in those with

auditory hallucinations, in fact suggesting a decrease in the vividness of auditory images

in these individuals (e.g. Starker & Jolin, 1982). Others have failed to find differences

in either auditory or visual imagery between hallucinating and nonhallucinating groups

of patients (Aleman et al, 2003; Böcker, Hijman, Kahn & de Haan, 2000; Evans,

McGuire & David, 2000). Furthermore, the theoretical basis of this class of theories has

been criticized on the grounds that there is no evidence that vividness of an imagined

event is enough to believe that it is real and that healthy individuals who report vivid

mental events do not necessarily interpret them as being real (Bentall, 1997). Finally,

there are also fundamental problems in making direct comparisons between results of

studies on imagery tasks and the experience of auditory hallucinations, since imagery

involves volitational behaviour whereas auditory hallucinations are, by definition,

unintended. The strength of this theory however relies on its ability to account for the

perceptual features of hallucinations since imagery is thought to share important

characteristics with perception (Aleman et al, 2003). In addition it is able to provide an

explanation for nonverbal hallucinations and a range of social identities for verbal

hallucinations. However, the uncontrollable nature of auditory hallucinations, the

characteristic feelings of intrusiveness that many patients experience and the complex

role of affect in hallucinations still remain to be explicitly outlined, indicating that this

group of theories still has some way to go before being able to explain all of the

phenomenological features of auditory hallucinations.

Context memory deficit account

The third, and recently emerging, cognitive theory concerns context memory and

auditory hallucinations. It is now a consistent view that schizophrenia is linked to a

Chapter 1

- 15 -

deficit in integrating contextual information in memory, and several authors have

proposed that many of the cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia result from an

impairment in the ability to process contextual information (e.g. Bazin, Perruchet,

Hardy-Bayle, & Feline, 2000; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Rizzo, Danion, Van

der Linden, & Grange, 1996; Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, & Steingard, 1996).

There are also increasing suggestions that a deficit in context memory may be

linked to positive symptoms, and in particular to auditory hallucinations (Brébion et al,

1999; Brébion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina & Sharif, 2002; Guillem et al, 2003;

Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, & Steingard, 1996). A context memory theory of auditory

hallucinations has been proposed by Nayani and David (1996a), who suggested that

auditory hallucinations result from a disturbance of the processes that serve to bind the

contextual components of memories together. In particular, they suggested that

auditory hallucinations consist of memories of speech fragments which are not

recognized because of a deficit in context memory, resulting in an incomplete

representation of memories and consequently a failure to identify their origins.

Support for the proposal of a context memory deficit in auditory hallucinations

comes primarily from studies that have shown a failure to identify the source of actions

and thoughts among schizophrenia patients currently experiencing auditory

hallucinations, as described in the previous section on Inner Speech (e.g. Baker &

Morrison, 1998; Bentall, Baker & Havers, 1991; Brébion, Smith, Gorman, Amador,

1996; Brébion et al, 2000, 2002; Franck et al, 2000; John & McGuire, 1999). Brébion

et al (2000), for instance, showed that patients with hallucinations made false

recognition of non-produced items in a memory task and misattributed self-produced

items. A number of other studies have replicated the finding that patients with

hallucinations have difficulties discriminating between self-generated and other-

generated actions and distinguishing between internal and external events (e.g. Baker &

Morrison, 1998; Brébion, Smith, Gorman & Amador, 1996; Brébion, Gorman, Amador,

Malaspina & Sharif, 2002; Franck et al, 2000). A deficit in identifying the origins of

mental events has also been demonstrated in normal individuals who score high on a

predisposition to hallucinations scale (Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995). Interestingly, a

number of studies have also shown that patients with hallucinations are more likely to

make errors when words are derogatory, rather than when words are neutral or

complimentary (e.g. John & McGuire, 1999; Morrison & Haddock, 1997). The only

study that considered a loss of context information other than source in patients with

auditory hallucinations is Brébion et al (2002). In this study, patients with

Chapter 1

- 16 -

schizophrenia attempted a task of free recall in which four lists of words were

presented. The authors noted that auditory hallucinations severity was correlated with

the erroneous recall of words presented in different lists, and interpreted this deficit as

an impairment in the ability to remember temporal context during production of the

words.

The appeal of Nayani and David's theory is that it can address some of the

criticisms directed to Inner Speech theories regarding the characteristic features of

hallucinations. The proposal of auditory hallucinations as memories can account for the

broad variations in form and content of auditory hallucinations. It can also explain why

patients experience nonverbal auditory hallucinations and why the voices’ social

identity can be different from that of the patients, although it is not clear how it explains

the characteristic feature of intrusiveness.

However, there is still insufficient evidence to fully support Nayani and David's

theory. The only empirical evidence supporting their theory is the finding of a deficit in

source monitoring in auditory hallucinations and there is indict evidence of a deficit in

retaining the temporal context of memories, suggesting that the exact nature of the

contextual memory deficit in auditory hallucinations has not yet been clearly

established. One of the aims of the current thesis is to test Nayani and David’s proposal

of an association between auditory hallucinations and a context memory deficit, with a

new task that directly assesses memory for the content of events in conjunction with

memory for the source and the temporal context of these events.

Another important criticism of this theory as a single-deficit explanation of

hallucinations is that its only directly supporting evidence, a deficit in source memory,

occurs in schizophrenia patients independently of the presence of auditory

hallucinations, as reviewed earlier (e.g. Brébion, Smith, Gorman et al, 1997; Keefe,

Arnold, Bayen & Harvey, 1999). Consequently, a context memory deficit, on its own,

does not directly predict the presence of auditory hallucinations. The only way this

deficit may be convincingly incorporated into a model of auditory hallucinations is if it

is only one of at least two deficits that are essential for hallucinations. In this thesis, we

will propose a new theory of auditory hallucinations which suggests that a deficit in

context memory is critically relevant to the aetiology of auditory hallucinations when

combined with another cognitive deficit.

Socio-psychological theories

Although this thesis has mostly a cognitive focus, it is important to be aware that

some explanations of hallucinatory experiences have been developed independently of

Chapter 1

- 17 -

cognitive theories. Proponents of these accounts have emphasized the “reflexive”

relationship between the person and the person’s experience of voices (e.g. Davies,

Thomas & Leudar, 1999; Leudar, Thomas, McNally & Glinski, 1997; Thomas, Bracken

& Leudar, 2004). In particular, it has been suggested that the idiosyncratic ways in

which individuals respond to an abnormal perceptual experience affect their perception

of the experience, which influences their coping strategies and emotional response

(Baker & Morrison, 1998; Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick & Birchwood,

1994; Close & Garety, 1998; Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier, 1995). Chadwick and

Birchwood (1994), for instance, proposed that a person's belief about his or her voices is

a mediating factor between hallucinations and the distress that is experienced, and that

these beliefs may develop as a result of an attempt to explain unusual experiences.

Birchwood and Chadwick (1997) identified two different constructs relevant to these

issues: (a) the belief about the voices' intent to do harm or good and (b) the beliefs about

the voices' omnipotence, and the reaction to these beliefs in terms of engagement or

resistance. Morrison and colleagues (Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier, 1995; Baker &

Morrison, 1998; Morrison, 2001) have emphasized the role of exaggerated significance

about the meaning of auditory hallucinations and metacognitive beliefs, or cognitive

biases, in the development of hallucinations. Metacognitive beliefs are thought to occur

when an individual experiences something that is incompatible with the beliefs about

his/her thinking; hallucinations are therefore experienced when intrusive thoughts are

attributed to an external source in order to reduce cognitive dissonance (e.g. the

interpretation that auditory hallucinations threaten the integrity of the individual).

Langdon and Coltheart (2000) have also recently explained how individual differences

in cognitive bias, and in particular in the various motives that patients ascribe to their

voices, result in different types of hallucinatory experiences. These socio-psychological

theories are important because they incorporate the role of the relationship between the

patient and his/her hallucinations as a crucial component to understanding

hallucinations. However, although these theories are useful models of the maintenance

of auditory hallucinations, they do not explain so well the onset of hallucinations.

Neuropathology of auditory hallucinations

It is important to have a clear understanding of the neuropathological processes

involved in this symptom as they set the boundaries in which models of cognitive

processes must occur. One approach to understanding auditory hallucinations has been

to investigate neurochemical mechanisms, on the basis that neurotransmitters are

Chapter 1

- 18 -

responsible for information transmission in the central nervous system (see David,

1999; David & Busatto, 1998 for reviews). Dopamine D2 receptors have been linked to

auditory hallucinations based on findings that drugs that increase dopamine activity

produce psychotic-like symptoms (which include auditory hallucinations) in normal

individuals. GABA receptors have also been implicated because of their interaction

with dopamine receptors (see David, 1999; David & Busatto, 1998; Gray, 1998 for

recent reviews).

Another approach has been to examine the anatomical and functional brain

mechanisms associated with auditory hallucinations, mostly with the help of brain

imaging tools. A few brain regions appear to have been consistently associated with

auditory hallucinations. Given the auditory nature of the experience, it is not surprising

that the left temporal and parietal auditory-language association areas have often been

implicated in auditory hallucinations. For example, post-mortem and structural

neuroimaging studies have found that the auditory cortex bilaterally and the left superior

temporal gyrus (STG) are reduced in volume bilaterally in hallucinating patients

compared to psychiatric control groups (e.g. Weiss & Heckers, 1999). In a review of

the literature, Stephane, Barton and Boutros (2001) identified that 5 out of 10 studies

found some association between size of the STG and auditory hallucinations. Imaging

studies have also found activation of the left superior temporal regions during auditory

hallucinations (e.g. Ait Bentaleb, Beauregard, Liddle & Stip, 2002; Cleghorn et al,

1992; Copolov et al, 2003; David et al, 1996; Lennox, Bert, Park, Jones & Morris,

1999; Levitan & Ward, 1999; Stephane et al, 2001; Woodruff et al, 1997). Finally,

Hoffman et al (2003) have found that repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation

(rTMS) in the left superior region of the temporal cortex produced a reduction in

frequency of auditory hallucinations, indicating that this region may participate in the

hallucinatory experience. Others have found activation of the right, but not the left,

temporal cortex (Lennox et al, 1999; McGuire et al, 1996). Involvement of the right

temporal regions is not unusual since they, too, are activated during normal auditory

speech perception (Silbersweig & Stern, 1996). Temporal cortical areas are usually

activated during auditory-verbal perception and during auditory-verbal imagery

(McGuire et al, 1995, 1996; McGuire, Silbersweig & Frith, 1996) and such findings

have been used to support the suggestion that auditory hallucinations occur as a result of

a disturbance in unintended inner speech and imagery.

Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and positron emission

tomography (PET) studies of patients with auditory hallucinations have supported the

Chapter 1

- 19 -

involvement of areas usually associated with the production of language, such as

activation of Broca's area (Cleghorn et al, 1992; McGuire et al, 1993, 1995). This

evidence has led to the suggestion that speech generation pathology is a fundamental

mechanism for auditory hallucinations, and has been cited as support for the hypothesis

that auditory hallucinations arise from misidentified internal speech. However, Broca's

area has not been implicated in all fMRI and PET studies of patients' auditory

hallucinations (Ait Bentaleb et al, 2002; Copolov et al, 2003; McGuire et al, 1995;

Woodruff et al, 1997), raising doubts about the proposal of misidentified inner speech in

auditory hallucinations. Furthermore, Silbersweig et al (1996) also explain that Broca’s

area may be activated during cognitive tasks that do not entail inner speech, so the

activation of this region does not necessarily mean that inner speech is involved.

Other regions of the frontal cortex which have been found to be activated in

auditory hallucinations include the left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Silbersweig et al,

1995) and the anterior (Lennox et al, 1999; McGuire et al, 1993; Silbersweig et al,

1995) and posterior (Copolov et al, 2003) cingulate gyrus. Other cerebral regions

implicated include the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, bilateral thalamus and

ventral striatum (Copolov et al, 2003; Silbersweig et al, 1995; Takebayashi, Takei &

Mori, 2002; Woodruff & Murray, 1994). Activation of the hippocampus in particular

suggests that memories may play a role in the hallucinatory experience.

There are also suggestions that abnormal interconnections between the prefrontal

cortex and the temporal lobes could be responsible for auditory hallucinations (e.g.

Frith, 1995). In normal individuals, the left superior temporal regions are inhibited

during speech (McGuire, Silbersweig & Frith, 1996). However, such inhibition has not

been found in patients with schizophrenia (e.g. Fletcher et al, 1999) and it has been

suggested that this inhibitory system is impaired as a result of reduced frontal-temporal

connections (Fletcher, 1998; Ford et al, 2002; Friston, 1999; Frith, 1995, 1996).

Abnormal interactions between these two centres have been thought to be responsible

for auditory hallucinations (Frith, 1995, 1996) and recent electrophysiological and

imaging evidence has been found to support this suggestion (Ford et al, 2002; Lawrie et

al, 2002; Shergill, Brammer, Williams, Murray & McGuire, 2000).

In sum, numerous brain regions have been found to be associated with auditory

hallucinations. Although the finding that so many different neural regions are involved

in the experience of auditory hallucinations has not been integrated into a cohesive

explanation of hallucinatory phenomenon, it is consistent with the heterogenous and

complex nature of this mental phenomenon.

Chapter 1

- 20 -

Key cognitive processes under investigation

Inhibition

One of the cognitive domains discussed in this thesis in relation to auditory

hallucinations is inhibition. Inhibition is a basic cognitive mechanism which has been

defined as a collection of processes which allows the suppression of previously

activated cognitive contents, the clearing of irrelevant actions or attention from

consciousness, the control of overt behaviour and motor movements and the resistance

to interference from potentially attention-capturing stimuli (Harnishfeger, 1995).

Failure to maintain control through inhibitory efficiency is thought to result in less than

optimal processing of task-relevant stimuli to the detriment of task performance. There

is general agreement that inhibition is not a unitary construct, but that it is better

described as a family of processes, each with its own distinct operating characteristics.

Support for this suggestion includes (a) a number of studies that have shown that

correlations between different measures of inhibitory functions are generally low (e.g.

Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Kramer, Humphreys, Larish, Logan & Stager, 1994;

Spinella, 2002, Stuss et al, 1999), (b) divergent findings in the same population sample

when inhibition is measured by different tasks (e.g. Kramer et al, 1994, Stuss et al,

1999), and (c) evidence of different operating characteristics between tasks of inhibition

(namely different levels of working memory involvement) (e.g. Kramer, 1994). As a

result, there have been various attempts at producing a workable taxonomy of the main

types of inhibition (eg. Clark, 1996; Dempster, 1993; Kok, 1999; Nigg, 2000;

Harnishfeger, 1995; Wilson & Kipp, 1998).

A number of theories have been proposed, based on research about the different

developmental rates of various forms of inhibition (Dempster & Corkill, 1999;

Harnishfeger, 1995; Nigg, 2000). Different models use different terminology but

generally agree on the major conceptual distinctions of inhibitory processes. One

influential classification has been suggested by Harnishfeger and colleagues

(Harnishfeger, 1995; Wilson & Kipp, 1998). Their model is one that will be referred to

in this thesis because it incorporates recent empirical findings, and also because the

distinction it proposes concurs relatively well with the dissociation in performance

between tasks discussed in this thesis.

Harnishfeger and colleagues make a distinction between inhibitory processes that

are automatic (or unintentional) and those that are intentional. Automatic inhibition

occurs when an individual automatically suppresses an item and is unaware that the

Chapter 1

- 21 -

suppression is taking place. By contrast, intentional inhibition occurs when an

individual deliberately suppresses the activation of an item after deciding it is irrelevant.

Whereas automatic inhibition is unconscious, intentional inhibition is effortful,

available to conscious reflection and available for strategic interventions (Nigg, 2000).

Experimental paradigms used to assess automatic inhibition include the inhibition of

return task and Negative Priming (NP), because the inhibitory processes take place

below awareness. Tasks used to assess intentional inhibition include directed forgetting

tasks and antisaccade tasks because the stimulus is consciously and deliberately

inhibited.

In support for the distinction between automatic and intentional processes, Nigg et

al (2002), for instance, showed that participants with Attention Deficit Disorder,

compared to controls, showed an impairment on an antisaccade task but not on a NP

task. This selective impairment suggests that these two processes are supported by

different operating mechanisms. In addition, Amieva, Phillips, Della Sala and Henry

(2004) recently reviewed studies assessing inhibitory functioning in Alzheimer’s

disease, and found that patients with Alzheimer’s disease were particularly affected on

tasks requiring controlled and effortful inhibition processes but that performance on

tasks requiring more automatic inhibition was relatively preserved.

In addition, Harnishfeger (1995) proposed that inhibitory processes should be

categorized according to whether they involve (a) behavioural inhibition, involving the

control of overt behaviour or (b) cognitive inhibition, concerning the control of mental

contents. Tasks of behavioural inhibition tend to involve intentional inhibition

processes, but cognitive tasks of inhibition can be either automatic or intentional.

Friedman and Miyake (2004) have recently provided evidence that behavioural and

cognitive inhibition load on different factors, as assessed by latent-variable analysis.

Finally, any discussion about inhibitory processes is not complete without

mention of the process of interference control. Although the terms are often used

interchangeably in the literature, there is general agreement that interference control

should be separated from other domains of inhibition (e.g. Dempster, 1991, 1993,

1995). Interference control refers primarily to the ability to maintain performance in the

presence of competing and distracting stimuli. One paradigm used to assess

interference control is the Stroop colour-word interference test. The relationship

between interference control and other inhibition constructs is complex because,

although the mechanisms underlying these processes are thought to be different (Stuss

et al, 1999), interference control uses processes of inhibition for resisting interference

Chapter 1

- 22 -

(Dempster, 1995; Joormann, 2004). In addition, Wilson and Kipp (1998) stated that

inhibition and interference control may be controlled by similar neurological substrates.

This thesis comprises investigations of the association between auditory

hallucinations and inhibition. In order to examine whether brain regions commonly

associated with auditory hallucinations are also activated during the process of

inhibition, a short review of the neural processes involved in inhibitory control is now

presented. The neuropsychological literature proposes that inhibitory processes require

some degree of executive control, which is purported to involve the frontal cortices and

their connections (e.g. Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995; Conway & Fthenaki, 2003;

Diaz, Robins & Roberts, 1997; Fuster, 1999; Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Metzler & Parkin,

2000; Rogers, Andres, Grasby, Brooks, Robbins, 2000; Stuss et al, 1999; West, 1996).

Evidence comes from studies that show that damage to brain circuits involving the

prefrontal cortex results in different kinds of inhibition failures in action, cognition,

emotion and personality, such as distractibility, neglect, preservative behaviour,

impulsivity and disinhibition (Dempster, 1993; Fuster, 1999; Goldman Rakic, 1987;

Starkstein & Robinson, 1997). Regions of the prefrontal lobes are thought to provide

inhibitory control for the different domains of inhibition and interference control (Aron,

Robbins & Poldrack, 2004; Konishi et al, 1999; Metzler & Parkin, 2000; West, 1996;

Wyland, Kelley, Macreae, Gordon & Heatherton, 2003). One view suggests that there

are highly localized areas of the frontal lobes, particularly the inferior frontal cortex

alone (which includes the OFC, triangular and opercular regions), which modulate all

types of inhibitory processes (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004). Another view posits

the involvement of specific frontal regions in different domains of inhibition. Friedman

and Miyake (2004) and West (1996), for instance, have proposed that the OFC region of

the prefrontal cortex may be involved in cognitive inhibition whereas the dorsolateral

prefrontal cortex may be involved in more behavioural inhibitory processes. The

cingulate gyrus has also been associated with a number of “conflict monitoring”

functions on tasks involving response competition, interference control and control of

behaviours (Carter et al, 1998; Dolan, Fletcher, McKenna, Friston & Frith, 1999;

Dreher & Berman, 2002; Wyland et al, 2003). Inhibitory processes have also been

associated with more posterior brain structures (Stuss et al, 1999). For example, the

basal ganglia and its connections with the frontal lobes have been implicated on tasks

requiring set shifting and on motor inhibition tasks (e.g. Nigg, Butler, Huang-Pollock,

Henderson, 2002).

Chapter 1

- 23 -

In sum, the involvement of these brain regions in such a wide range of tasks

reflects an overlap of the functional activations associated with these different measures

of inhibition, making it difficult to identify specific networks associated with domains

of inhibition. In any case, the findings of abnormal activations of the prefrontal cortex,

cingulate gyrus and basal ganglia in auditory hallucinations support the proposal that

inhibition may be impaired in those who suffer from this symptom.

Context memory

The second cognitive domain under investigation in this thesis in relation to

auditory hallucinations is context memory. In episodic memory research, a distinction

is made between content and context information. Content information refers to the

event itself, whereas contextual information refers to details which are encoded with the

event, but which are not part of the event itself. Context refers to information such as

the source (“who”), temporal (“when”) or spatial (“where”) characteristics of the

memory event (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). The context of memories are cues that

allow the differentiation of one memory from other memories. Evidence of a distinction

between content and context memory is supported by neuropsychological (Glisky,

Polster & Routhieaux, 1995; Spencer & Raz, 1995; Troyer, Winocur, Craik,

Moscovitch, 1999) and neuropathological evidence (Burgess, Maguire, Spiers &

O’Keefe, 2000; Mayes et al, 2001; Sullivan, Shear, Zipursky, Sagar & Pfefferbaum,

1997). Johnson and colleagues have also proposed that memories require not only the

retention of particular features, but also the cognitive processes for binding the features

together (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). Binding

processes combine different elements into a complete memory representation and

provide the knowledge that certain features belong together (Chalfonte & Johnson,

1996). Contextual memory and binding processes are intrinsically linked as contextual

memory depends on the binding of each contextual cue to the content of the event and

thus impaired binding ability would result in impaired contextual memory.

Some early theories suggested that contextual information was “tagged” to the

memory event, so that every memory carried labels identifying its origins (where, when,

who etc) (see Johnson, Foley & Leach, 1988, for a review). This view proposed that a

failure to identify the context of memories may occur because tags somehow get lost.

However, Johnson, Foley and Leach (1988) have provided evidence against this

proposal when they showed that when sensory characteristics are held constant in a

memory task, there is confusion about the origins of memory. The authors suggested

Chapter 1

- 24 -

that this argues against the ‘tagging’ theory because tagging would produce equal

discrimination of origin, independently of the qualitative characteristics of the original

encoding. Johnson and colleagues subsequently proposed the most influential theory of

how contextual memory is recalled, with their Source-Monitoring Framework (Johnson,

Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson, Kounios & Reeder, 1994). Their central claim is

that memory records are evaluated through a decision process performed during

remembering. During this process, the origins of memories are inferred on the basis of

available cues (perceptual details, contextual information, affect, semantic content and

cognitive operations). Retrieval success depends on the quality of information that was

encoded and on the quality of the decision process. Disruption may occur because the

cues are missing, incomplete or ambiguous and/or because the judgment process

responsible for attributing the context to the memory event is incorrect. Johnson,

Hashtroudi and Linsay (1993) have proposed that a loss of qualitative information, such

as contextual details, would make it difficult to identify correctly the origins of mental

events and would result in confusion with other stimuli. This proposal is relevant for

our purpose, because, in this thesis, we will investigate the proposal that patients with

auditory hallucinations have a deficit in context memory that results in difficulties

forming an intact representation of mental events leading to confusion about their

origins (Nayani and David, 1996).

A review of the neural systems involved in context memory also supports the

involvement of context memory processes in auditory hallucinations. Brain regions

involved in content memory have now been fairly well mapped (see reviews by

Fletcher, Frith & Rugg, 1997; Tulving, 2002). The medial temporal lobes,

hippocampus and prefrontal cortex, play a crucial role in memory formation and

retrieval (e.g. Aggleton & Brown; Fletcher, Shallice & Dolan, 1998; Otten & Rugg,

2002). Less information is known about the exact systems implicated in the retrieval of

context. There is evidence that the frontal lobes are associated with source and

temporal context memory. Studies have found that a large amount of variance in source

memory performance can be explained by neuropsychological tests of frontal lobe

function (e.g. Glisky, Polster & Routhieaux, 1995). Difficulties in recalling the source

or temporal order of events is also a prominent feature of patients with frontal lobe

damage (Glisky, Polster & Routhieaux, 1995; Glisky, Rubin & Davidson, 2001;

Sullivan et al, 1997; Stuss, Eskes & Foster, 1994) and of frontal cortex atrophy in

patients with semantic dementia (Simons et al, 2002). Finally, fMRI (Henson, Shallice

& Dolan, 1999; Rugg, Fletcher, Chua & Dolan, 1999), PET (Cabeza et al, 1997) and

Chapter 1

- 25 -

ERP measures (e.g. Johnson, Kounios & Nolde, 1996) have also supported the

involvement of the prefrontal cortex regions in both source and temporal memory. The

temporal lobes have also been associated with source memory (Spencer & Raz, 1995;

Thaiss & Petrides, 2003) and the medial temporal lobes with temporal memory (Mayes

et al, 2001). Although it is still unclear whether there are brain regions specialized for

source and temporal memory, there is increasing evidence that there are distinct and

functionally domain-specific brain systems in memory (e.g. Halbig, Mecklinger,

Schriefers & Friederici, 1998; Spencer & Raz, 1995; Troyer et al, 1999). With regard to

binding of context memory events, it has been proposed that the frontal lobes may be

involved in the integration of multiple independent features of an experience into a

composite memory trace, and that reduced frontal lobe functions result in impoverished

memory traces that lack rich contextual detail (Fuster, 1999; Stuss & Benson, 1989).

Other studies have linked binding to the frontal lobes and to its connections with the

hippocampus and medial temporal system (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Mitchell,

Johnson, Raye & D’Esposito, 2000). In sum, the frontal and temporal lobes have been

implicated in context memory. These regions have also been thought to be important in

auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia, supporting the proposal that context memory

may be compromised in patients with hallucinations.

Aims and organization of this thesis

Predisposition to hallucinations in the normal population

Hallucinatory experiences are thought to occur on a continuum from normal

mental states to those reported by patients with schizophrenia. As a preliminary study,

Chapter 2 presents an investigation into the defining characteristics of factors

underlying predisposition to hallucinations in normal individuals, as measured by the

Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale-Revised (Bentall & Slade, 1985). An overlap in

characteristics between hallucinatory-like experiences in normal individuals and

auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia should highlight factors that are important to

hallucinatory experiences in general.

Intentional inhibition and auditory hallucinations

The results from Chapter 2 show that the experience of intrusive mental events is

a commonly reported characteristic in healthy individuals with a predisposition to

hallucinations. Interestingly, patients with schizophrenia often describe their auditory

hallucinations as intrusive (Nayani & David, 1996a, b). Chapters 3-5 investigate the

Chapter 1

- 26 -

mechanisms that give rise to this previously ignored feature of auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia.

A failure of inhibition is thought to result in intrusive thoughts, so Chapter 3

investigates whether auditory hallucination severity in schizophrenia is linked to a

deficit in inhibition, and in particular in intentional inhibition. In order to investigate

whether this deficit is specifically associated with the presence of auditory

hallucinations, Chapter 4 compares the performance of patients with and without

auditory hallucinations on a task of intentional inhibition. Chapter 5 uses performance

on the Affective Shifting task (Murphy et al, 1999) to further investigate inhibition

processes and to examine the role of emotional dysfunction in schizophrenia and

auditory hallucinations.

Context memory and auditory hallucinations

The results of Chapter 2 also show that individuals vulnerable to hallucinations

identify experiences that are referred to an external agency. One critical feature of

auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia is that the experience is perceived to originate

from another agency. In order to explain why patients with schizophrenia fail to

identify correctly the origins of this self-generated material, Nayani and David (1996a)

have proposed that patients with auditory hallucinations suffer from disturbance of the

processes that serve to bind the contextual components of memories together. Chapter

6 investigates whether a context memory deficit is present in patients with

schizophrenia using a novel task, the Memory for Context task, in which memory for

events and memory for the source and temporal information about these events could be

tested. Chapter 7 tests Nayani and David’s (1996a) proposal by comparing the

performance of patients with and without auditory hallucinations on the Memory for

Context task.

Auditory hallucinations: a combination of deficits in intentional inhibition and

context memory

Chapter 8 is a theoretical paper which outlines a new cognitive model of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia, building upon the results of the previous chapters. This

chapter proposes that a combination of deficits in at least intentional inhibition and

contextual memory is critical to the experience of auditory hallucinations. The failure

in intentional inhibition produces unwanted and uncontrollable mental events which are

not recognized because they have lost the contextual cues that would facilitate

recognition. Evidence is provided to support this proposal.

Chapter 1

- 27 -

Inhibition and context memory in OCD

A critical prediction of the model of auditory hallucinations is that only those with

auditory hallucinations will show the proposed combination of deficits. Chapter 10

tests this hypothesis by investigating whether another clinical group, namely patients

with OCD, also show the combined deficits. OCD patients also experience intrusive

and uncontrollable mental thoughts but, unlike patients with hallucinations, they do not

report a loss of personal agency. Chapter 10 is preceded by Chapter 9, which presents a

review of the pertinent current literature on OCD.

General discussion

Finally, Chapter 11 presents a summary and discussion of the findings reported in

the thesis.

In sum, this thesis aims to provide a new perspective on the nature of the

cognitive deficits underlying auditory hallucinations. The ideas and empirical work

presented provide a departure from the work that had been carried out in recent years.

The main hypothesis that is being investigated is that a combination of deficits

comprising impairments in both intentional inhibition and context memory is essential

for auditory hallucinations to occur.

Chapter 1

- 28 -

References

Aggernaes, A. (1972). The experienced reality of hallucinations and other psychological

phenomena: an empirical analysis.

Aggleton, J. P., & Brown, M. W. (1999). Episodic memory, amnesia, and the

hippocampal-anterior thalamic axis. Behavioral and brain sciences, 22, 425-489.

Ait Bentaleb, L., Beauregard, M., Liddle, P., & Stip, E. (2002). Cerebral activity

associated with auditory verbal hallucinations: a functional magnetic resonance

imaging case study. Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 27(2), 110-115.

Aleman, A., Böcker, K.B.E., & deHaan, E.H.F. (1999). Disposition towards

hallucination and subjective versus objective vividness of imagery in normal

subjects. Personality and Individual Differences, 27, 707-714.

Aleman, A., Böcker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., de Haan, E. H. F., & Kahn, R. S. (2003).

Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia: role of top-down information

processing. Schizophrenia Research, 1926, 1-11.

Aleman, A., Böcker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R. S., & de Haan, E. H. F. (2002).

Hallucinations in schizophrenia: imbalance between imagery and perception?

Schizophrenia Research, 57(2-3), 315-316.

Aleman, A., & de Haan, E. (2000). Nonlanguage cognitive deficits and hallucinations in

schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(3), 487.

Aleman, A., Hijman, R., de Hann, E. H. F., & Kahn, R. S. (1999). Memory impairment

in schizophrenia: A meta-analysis. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(9),

1358-1366.

Allen, P. P., Johns, L. C., Fu, C. H. Y., Broome, M. R., Vythelingum, G. N., &

McGuire, P. K. (2004). Misattribution of external speech in patients with

hallucinations and delusions. Schizophrenia Research,69(2-3), 277-287.

Alpert, M., & Silvers, K. N. (1970). Perceptual characteristics distinguishing auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia and acute alcoholic psychoses. American Journal

of Psychiatry, 127(3), 298-393.

Amieva, H., Phillips, L. H., Della Sala, S., & Henry, J. D. (2004). Inhibitory functioning

in Alzheimer's disease. Brain, 127, 949-964.

Andreasen, N. C. (2000). Schizophrenia: the fundamental questions. Brain Research

Reviews, 31, 106-112.

Chapter 1

- 29 -

Andreasen, N. C., Paradiso, S., & O'Leary, D. S. (1998). "Cognitive Dysmetria" as an

integrative theory of schizophrenia: a dysfunction in cortical-subcortical-

cerebellar circuitry? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 24(2), 203-218.

Arnold, S. E. (1997). The medial temporal lobe in schizophrenia. The Journal of

Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 9, 460-470.

Aron, A. R., Robbins, R. W., & Poldrack, R. A. (2004). Inhibition and the right inferior

frontal cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 170-177.

Asaad, G., & Shapiro, B. (1986). Hallucinations: theoretical and clinical overview.

American Journal of Psychiatry, 143(9), 1088-1097.

Bagner, D. M., Melinder, M., & Barch, D. M. (2003). Language comprehension and

working memory language comprehension and working memory deficits in

patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 60(2-3), 299-309.

Baker, C. A., & Morrison, A. P. (1998). Cognitive processes in auditory hallucinations:

attributional biases and metacognition. Psychological Medicine, 28, 1199-1208.

Barrett, T., & Etheridge, J. (1992). Verbal hallucinations in normals, I: People who hear

'voices'. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6(5), 379-387.

Baxter, R., & Liddle, P. (1998). Neuropsychological deficits associated with

schizophrenic syndromes. Schizophrenia Research, 30(3), 239-249.

Bazin, N., Perruchet, P., Hardy-Bayle, M., & Feline, A. (2000). Context-dependent

information processing in patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research,

45(1-2), 93-101.

Bentall, R. P. (1990). The illusion of reality: A review and integration of psychological

research on hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin, 107(1), 82-95.

Bentall, R.P. (1997). The syndromes and symptoms of psychosis. Or why you can't play

'twenty questions' with the concept of schizophrenia and hope to win. In R.

Bentall (Ed.), Reconstructing schizophrenia (pp. 23-59). London: Routledge.

Bentall, R. P. (2000). Hallucinatory Experiences. In E. Cadena, S. Lynn, & S. Krippner

(Eds.), Varieties of Anomalous Experience (pp. 85-120). Washington: APA.

Bentall, R. P., Baker, G. A., & Havers, S. (1991). Reality monitoring and psychotic

hallucinations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 213-222.

Bentall, R. P., Kaney, S., & Dewey, M. E. (1991). Paranoia and social reasoning: an

attribution theory analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 13-23.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985a). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition

towards hallucination: a brief report. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(4),

527-529.

Chapter 1

- 30 -

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985b). Reality testing and auditory hallucinations: A

signal detection analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 24, 159-169.

Birchwood, M., & Chadwick, P. (1997). The omnipotence of voices: testing the validity

of a cognitive model. Psychological Medicine, 27, 1345-1353.

Bjorklund, D., & Harnishfeger, K. (1995). The evolution of inhibition mechanisms and

their role in human cognition. In F. Dempster & C. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference

and Inhibition in Cognition (pp. 141-173). San Diego, London: Academic Press,

Inc.

Blackwood, N. J., Howard, R. J., Bentall, R. P., & Murray, R. M. (2001). Cognitive

neuropsychiatric models of persecutory delusions. American Journal of

Psychiatry, 158(4), 527-539.

Blakemore, S., Smith, J., Steel, R., Johnstone, E., & Frith, C. (2000). The perception of

self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and

passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psychological

Medicine, 30, 1131-1139.

Bliss, E., Larson, E., & Nakashima, S. (1983). Auditory hallucinations and

schizophrenia. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 171(1), 30-33.

Böcker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R. S., & De Haan, E. H. F. (2000). Perception,

mental imagery and reality discrimination in hallucinating and nonhallucinating

schizophrenic patients. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 397-406.

Brébion, G., Amador, X., David, A., Malaspina, D., Sharif, Z., & Gorman, J. M. (2000).

Positive symptomatology and source-monitoring failure in schizophrenia - an

analysis of symptom specific effects. Psychiatry Research, 95, 119-131.

Brébion, G., Amador, X., Smith, M., Malaspina, D., Sharif, Z., & Gorman, J. (1999).

Opposite links of positive and negative symptomatology with memory errors in

schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 88, 15-24.

Brébion, G., Gorman, J. M., Amador, X., Malaspina, D., & Sharif, Z. (2002). Source

monitoring impairments in schizophrenia: characterization and association with

positive and negative symptomatology. Psychiatry Research, 112, 27-39.

Brébion, G., Smith, M., Amador, X., Malaspina, D., & Gorman, J. (1998). Word

recognition, discrimination accuracy and decision bias in schizophrenia:

association with positive symptomatology and depressive symptomatology. The

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(10), 604-609.

Chapter 1

- 31 -

Brébion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., & Amador, X. (1996). Reality monitoring failure in

schizophrenia: The role of selective attention. Schizophrenia Research, 22, 173-

180.

Brébion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., & Amador, X. (1997). Discrimination accuracy and

decision biases in different types of reality monitoring in schizophrenia. The

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 185(4), 247-253.

Burgess, N., Maguire, E., Spiers, H., & O'Keefe, J. (2000). A temporoparietal and

prefrontal network for retrieving the spatial context of lifelike events.

NeuroImage, 14(2), 439-453.

Burglen, F., Marczewski, P., Mitchell, K. J., van der Linden, M., Johnson, M. K.,

Danion, J.-M., & Salame, P. (2004). Impaired performance in a working memory

binding task in patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 125, 247-255.

Cabeza, R., Mangels, J., Nyberg, L., Habib, R., Houle, S., McIntosh, A. R., & Tulving,

E. (1997). Brain regions differentially involved in remembering what and when: A

PET study. Neuron, 19, 863-870.

Cahill, C., & Frith, C. (1994). False perceptions or false beliefs? Hallucinations and

delusions in schizophrenia. In A. David & V. Cutting (Eds.), Neuropsychology of

Schizophrenia (Vol. 13, pp. 267-291). Cambridge: Hove, Sussex.

Carter, C. S., Perlsteim, W., Ganguli, R., Brar, J., Mintun, M., & cohen, J. (1998).

Functional hypofrontality and working memory dysfunction in schizophrenia. The

American Journal of Psychiatry, 155(9), 1285-1287.

Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., & Copolov, D. L. (1996). Patients' strategies for coping

with auditory hallucinations. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 184(3),

161-166.

Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., Howard, S., Zeegers, T., & Copolov, D. L. (1995). The

development and reliability of the Mental Health Research Institute Unusual

Perceptions Schedule (MUPS): an instrument to record auditory hallucinatory

experience. Schizophrenia Research, 16, 157-165.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1994). The omnipotence of voices - the cognitive

approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 190-201.

Chalfonte, B. L., & Johnson, M. K. (1996). Feature memory and binding in young and

older adults. Memory and Cognition, 24(4), 403-416.

Clark, J. (1996). Contributions of inhibitory mechanisms to unified theory in

neuroscience and psychology. Brain and Cognition, 30, 127-152.

Chapter 1

- 32 -

Cleghorn, J. M., Franco, S., Szechtman, B., Kaplan, R., Szechtman, H., Brown, G. M.,

Nahmias, C., & Garnett, E. S. (1992). Toward a brain map of auditory

hallucinations. American Journal of Psychiatry, 149(8), 1062-1069.

Close, H., & Garety, P. (1998). Cognitive assessment of voices: further developments in

understanding the emotional impact of voices. British Journal of Clinical

Psychology, 37, 173-188.

Cohen, J. D., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). A neural network model of disturbances in

the processing of context in schizophrenia. Psychiatric Annals, 22(3), 131-136.

Conway, M. A., & Fthenaki, A. (2003). Disruption of inhibitory control of memory

following lesions to the frontal and temporal lobes. Cortex, 39(4-5), 667-686.

Copolov, D. L., Seal, M. L., Maruff, P., Ulusoy, R., Wong, M. T. H., Tochon-Danguy,

H. J., & Egan, G. F. (2003). Cortical activation associated with the experience of

auditory hallucinations and perception of human speech in schizophrenia: a PET

correlation study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 122, 139-152.

Copolov, D. L., Trauer, T., & MacKinnon, A. (in press). On the non-significance of

internal versus external auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research.

Crider, A. (1997). Perseveration in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 23(1), 63-74.

Crow, T. J. (1980). Positive and negative schizophrenic symptoms and the role of

dopamine. British Journal of Psychiatry, 137, 383-386.

David, A. S. (1999). Auditory hallucinations: Phenomenology, neuropsychology and

neuroimaging update. Acta Psychiatr Scand., 99(Suppl 395), 95-104.

David, A. S. (2004). The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations: an

overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 107-123.

David, A. S., & Busatto, G. (1998). The hallucination: a disorder of brain and mind. In

M. A. Ron & A. S. David (Eds.), Disorders of Brain and Mind (pp. 336-362).

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

David, A. S., & Halligan, P. W. (2000). Cognitive neuropsychiatry: potential for

progress. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 12(4), 506-

511.

David, A. S., & Lucas, P. A. (1993). Auditory-verbal hallucinations and the

phonological loop: A cognitive neuropsychological study. British Journal of

Clinical Psychology, 32, 431-441.

David, A. S., Woodruff, P. W. R., Howard, R., Mellers, J. D. C., Brammer, M.,

Bullmore, E., Wright, I., Andrew, C., & Williams, S. (1996). Auditory

Chapter 1

- 33 -

hallucinations inhibit exogenous activation of auditory association cortex.

NeuroReport, 7, 932-936.

Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions:

Towards a two-factor account. In C. Hoerl (Ed.), On understanding and explaining

schizophrenia: Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology .

Davies, M. F., Griffin, M., & Vice, S. (2001). Affective reactions to auditory

hallucinations in psychotic, evangelical and control groups. British Journal of

Clinical Psychology, 40(4), 361-370.

Davies, P., Thomas, P., & Leudar, I. (1999). Dialogical engagement with voices: a

single case study. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 72, 179-187.

Dempster, F. N. (1991). Inhibitory processes: a neglected dimension of intelligence.

Intelligence, 15, 157-173.

Dempster, F. N (1993). Resistance to interference: Developmental changes in a basic

processing mechanism. In M. Howe & R. Pasnak (Eds.), Emerging themes in

cognitive development (Vol. I: Foundations, pp. 3-27). New-York: Springer-

Verlag.

Dempster, F. N. (1995). Interference and inhibition in cognition. In F. Dempster & C.

Brainerd (Eds.), Interference and inhibition in cognition (pp. 4-26). San Diego,

London: Academic Press.

Dempster, F. N & Corkill, A. (1999). Individual differences in susceptibility to

interference and general cognitive ability. Acta Psychologica, 101, 395-416.

Delespaul, P., deVries, M., & van Os, J. (2002). Determinants of occurrence and

recovery from hallucinations in daily life. Society of Psychiatry and Psychiatric

Epidemiology, 37, 97-104.

Dias, R., Robins, A. C., & Roberts, A. C. (1997). Dissociable forms of inhibitory

control within prefrontal cortex with an analog of the Wisconsin Card Sort Test:

Restriction to novel situation and independence from "on line" processing. Journal

of Neuroscience, 17(23).

Dolan, R. J., Fletcher, P. C., McKenna, P., Friston, K. J., & Frith, C. D. (1999).

Abnormal neural intergration related to cognition in schizophrenia. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 99(Suppl. 395), 58-67.

Dreher, J.-C., & Berman, K. F. (2002). Fractionating the neural substrate of cognitive

control processes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA,

99(22), 14595-14600.

Chapter 1

- 34 -

Elliott, R., & Sahakian, B. (1995). The neuropsychology of schizophrenia: Relations

with clinical and neurobiological dimensions. Psychological Medicine, 25, 581-

594.

Elvevag, B., & Goldberg, T. E. (2000). Cognitive impairment in schizophrenia is the

core of the disorder. Critical Reviews in Neurobiology, 14(1), 1-21.

Evans, C. L., McGuire, P. K., & David, A. S. (2000). Is auditory imagery defective in

patients with auditory hallucinations? Psychological Medicine, 30, 137-148.

Falloon, I. R. H., & Talbot, R. E. (1981). Persistent auditory hallucinations: coping

mechanisms and implication for management. Psychological Medicine, 11, 329-

339.

Fletcher, P. C. (1998). The missing link: a failure of fronto-hippocampal integration in

schizophrenia. Nature Neuroscience, 1(4), 266-267.

Fletcher, P. C., Frith, C. D., & Rugg, M. D. (1997). The functional neuroanatomy of

episodic memory. Trends in Neuroscience, 20(5), 217-218.

Fletcher, P.C., McKenna, P. J., Friston, K. J., Frith, C. D., & Dolan, R. J. (1999).

Abnormal cingulate modulation of fronto-temporal connectivity in schizophrenia.

NeuroImage, 9, 337-342.

Fletcher, P.C., Shallice, T., & Dolan, R. (1998). The functional roles of prefrontal

cortex in episodic memory. I. Encoding. Brain, 121, 1239-1248.

Ford, J. M., Mathalon, D. H., Whitfiled, S., Faustman, W. O., & Roth, W. T. (2002).

Reduced communication between frontal and temporal lobes during talking in

schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry, 51, 485-492.

Franck, N., Rouby, P., Daprati, E., Dalery, J., Mari-Cardine, M., & Georgieff, N.

(2000). Confusion between silent and overt reading in schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia Research, 41, 357-364.

Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference

control functions: a latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology:

General, 133(1), 101-135.

Friston, K. J. (1999). Schizophrenia and the disconnection hypothesis. Acta Psychiatrica

Scandinavica, 99(Suppl. 395), 68-79.

Frith, C. (1995). Functional imaging and cognitive abnormalities. The Lancet,

346(8975), 615-620.

Frith, C. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: the case of

auditory hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of

London: B, 351, 1505-1512.

Chapter 1

- 35 -

Frith, C., & Dolan, R. J. (1997). Brain mechanisms associated with top-down processes

in perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B, 352,

1221-1230.

Frith, C., & Done, D. (1988). Towards a neuropsychology of schizophrenia. British

Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 437-443.

Fuster, J. M. (1999). Synopsis of function and dysfunction of the frontal lobe. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 99 (Suppl. 395), 51-57.

Glisky, E. L., Polster, M. R., & Routhieaux, B. C. (1995). Double dissociation between

item and source memory. Neuropsychology, 9(2), 229-235.

Glisky, R. L., Rubin, S. R., & Davidson, P. S. R. (2001). Source memory in older

adults: an encoding or retrieval problem? Journal of Experimental Psychology:

Learning, Memory and Cognition, 27(5), 1131-1146.

Goldberg, T., Gold, J. M., Coppola, R., & Weinberger, D. R. (1997). Unnatural

practices, unspeakable actions: a study of delayed auditory feedback in

schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154(6), 858-860.

Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1987). Circuitry of primate prefrontal cortex and regulation of

behavior by representational memory. In A. P. Society. (Ed.), In Plum F (Ed)

Handbook of Physiology: The Nervous System .

Guillem, F., Bicu, M., Pampoulova, T., Hooper, R., Bloom , D., & Wolf, M.-A. e. a.

(2003). The cognitive and anatomico-functional basis of reality distortion in

schizophrenia: a view from memory event-related potentials. Psychiatry Research,

117, 137-158.

Gray, J. A. (1998). Integrating Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 24(2), 249-266.

Gur, R. C., Moelter, S. T., & Ragland, J. D. (2000). Learning and memory in

schizophrenia. In T. Sharma & P. Harvey (Eds.), Cognition in Schizophrenia:

Impairments, importance and treatment strategies (pp. 73-92). Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Haddock, G., McCarron, J., Tarrier, N., & Faragher, E. B. (1999). Scales to measure

dimensions of hallucinations and delusions: the psychotic symptom rating scales

(PSYRATS). Psychological Medicine, 29, 879-889.

Haddock, G., Slade, P. D., Prasaad, R., & Bentall, R. P. (1996). Functioning of the

phonological loop in auditory hallucinations. Personality and Individual

Differences, 20(6), 753-760.

Haier, R. J. (1980). The diagnosis of schizophrenia: a review of recent developments.

Schizophrenia Bulletin, 6(3), 417-428.

Chapter 1

- 36 -

Halbig, T. D., Mecklinger, A., Schriefers, H., & Friederici, A. D. (1998). Double

dissociation of processing temporal and spatial information in working memory.

Neuropsychologia, 36(4), 305-311.

Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: theories,

definitions and research evidence. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.),

Interference and inhibition in cognition. Chap 6 (pp. 175-205). San Diego:

Academic Press.

Harris, A. W. F., Gordon, L. W., Bahramali, H., & Slewa-Younan, S. (1999). Different

psychopathological models and quantified EEG in schizophrenia. Psychological

Medicine, 29, 1175-1181.

Heinrichs, R. W., & Zakzanis, K. K. (1998). Neurocognitive deficit in schizophrenia: a

quantitative review of the evidence. Neuropsychology, 12(3), 426-445.

Henson, R. N. A., Shallice, T., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). Right prefrontal cortex and

episodic memory retrieval: a functional MRI test of the monitoring hypothesis.

Brain, 122, 1367-1381.

Hoffman, R. E. (1986). Verbal hallucinations and language production processes in

schizophrenia. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 503-548.

Hoffman, R. E., Hawkins, K., Gueorguieva, R., Boutros, N., Rachid, F., Carroll, K., &

Krystal, J. (2003). Transcranial magnetic stimulation of left temporparietal cortex

and medication-resistant auditory hallucinations. Archives of General Psychiatry,

60, 49-56.

Hoffman, R. E., & McGlashan, T. H. (1997). Synaptic elimination, neurodevelopment

and the mechanism of hallucinated 'voices' in schizophrenia. American Journal of

Psychiatry, 154, 1683-1689.

Hoffman, R. E., & McGlashan, T. H. (1998). Reduced corticocortical connectivity can

induce speech perception pathology and hallucinated 'voices'. Schizophrenia

Research, 30, 137-141.

Hoffman, R. E., Rapaport, J., Mazure, C., & Quinlan, D. (1999). Selective speech

perception alternations in schizophrenic patients reporting hallucinated voices.

The American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(3), 393-399.

Honig, A., Romme, M. A. J., Ensink, B. J., Escher, S. D., Pennings, M. H. A., &

Devries, M. W. (1998). Auditory Hallucinations: A comparison between patients

and nonpatients. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(10), 646-651.

Hunter, M. D. (2004). Locating voices in space: a perceptual model for auditory

hallucinations. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 93-105.

Chapter 1

- 37 -

Hustig, H. H., & Hafner, R. J. (1990). Persistent auditory hallucinations and their

relationship to delusions and mood. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,

178(4), 264-267.

Jablensky, A. (2000). Epidemiology of schizophrenia: the global burden of disease and

disability. European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 250, 274-

285.

Johns, L. C., Hemsley, D., & Kuipers, E. (2002). A comparison of auditory

hallucinations in a psychiatric and nonpsychiatric group. British Journal of

Clinical Psychology, 41(1), 81-86.

Johns, L. C., & McGuire, P. K. (1999). Verbal self-monitoring and auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 353(9151), 469-470.

Johnson, M., Foley, M.-A., & Leach, K. (1988). The consequences for memory of

imagining in another person's voice. Memory & Cognition, 16(4), 337-342.

Johnson, M., Kounios, J., & Nolde, S. (1996). Electrophysiological brain activity and

memory source monitoring. NeuroReport, 7, 2929-2932.

Johnson, M., Kounios, J., & Reeder, J. A. (1994). Time-course studies of reality

monitoring and recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,

Memory and Cognition, 20(6), 1409-1419.

Johnson, M., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring.

Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria: the role of inhibitory processes.

Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 125-147.

Junginger, J., & Frame, C. L. (1985). Self-report of the frequency and phenomenology

of verbal hallucinations. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 173(3), 149-

155.

Keefe, R. S. E., Arnold, M. C., Bayen, U. J., & Harvey, P. D. (1999). Source monitoring

deficits in patients with schizophrenia: a multinomial modelling analysis.

Psychological Medicine, 29, 903-914.

Klimidis, S., Stuart, G. W., Minas, H. I., Copolov, D. L., & Singh, B. S. (1993). Positive

and negative symptoms in the psychoses. Reanalysis of published SAPS and

SANS global ratings. Schizophrenia Research, 9, 11-18.

Kok, A. (1999). Varieties of inhibition: manifestations in cognition, event related

potentials and aging. Acta Psychologica, 101, 129-159.

Chapter 1

- 38 -

Konishi, S., Nakajima, K., Uchida, I., Kikyo, H., Kameyama, M., & Miyashita, Y.

(1999). Common inhibitory mechanism in human inferior prefrontal cortex

revealed by event-related functional MRI. Brain, 122(5), 981-991.

Kramer, A., Humphrey, D., Larish, J., Logan, G., & Strager, D. (1994). Aging and

inhibition: Beyond a unitary view of inhibitory processing in attention.

Psychology and Aging, 9(4), 491-512.

Kurachi, M. (2003). Pathogenesis of schizophrenia: Part I. Symptomatology, cognitive

characteristics and brain morphology. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 57,

3-8.

Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions.

Mind & Language, 15(1), 184-218.

Lawrie, S. M., Buechel, C., Whalley, H. C., Frith, C. D., Friston, K. J., & Johnstone, E.

C. (2002). Reduced frontotemporal functional connectivity in schizophrenia

associated with auditory hallucinations. Biological Psychiatry, 51(12), 1008-1011.

Lehman, A. F. (1996). Quality of life issues and assessment among persons with

schizophrenia. In M. Moscarelli, A. Rupp, & N. Sartorius (Eds.), Handbook of

Mental Health Economics and Health Policy (Vol. 1. Schizophrenia, ). New York:

John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Lennox, B. R., Bert, S., Park, G., Jones, P. B., & Morris, P. G. (1999). Spatial and

Temporal mapping of neural activity associated with auditory hallucinations. The

Lancet, 353(9153), 644.

Lenzenweger, M. F. (1999). Schizophrenia: refining the phenotype, resolving

endophenotypes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 281-295.

Leudar, I., Thomas, P., McNally, D., & Glinski, A. (1997). What voices can do with

words: pragmatics of verbal hallucinations. Psychological Medicine, 27, 885-898.

Levitan, C., Ward, P. B., & V, C. S. (1999). Superior temporal gyral volumes and

laterality correlates of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Biological

Psychiatry, 46, 955-962.

Lewis, D., & Anderson, S. (1995). The functional architecture of the prefrontal cortex

and schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 25, 887-894.

Liddle, P. F. (1987). Schizophrenic syndromes, cognitive performance and neurological

dysfunction. Psychological Medicine, 17, 49-57.

Liddle, P. F., Friston, K. J., Frith, C. D., Hirsch, S. R., Jones, T., & Frackowiak, R. S.

(1992). Patterns of Cerebral Blood Flow in Schizophrenia. British Journal of

Psychiatry, 160, 179-186.

Chapter 1

- 39 -

Lowe, G. R. (1973). The phenomenology of hallucinations as an aid to differential

diagnosis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 123, 621-633.

Mayes, A., Isaac, C., Holdstock, J., Hunkin, N., Montaldi, D., Downes, J., MacDonald,

C., Cezayirli, E., & Roberts, J. (2001). Memory for single items, word pairs and

temporal order of different kinds in a patient with selective hippocampal lesion.

Cognitive Neuropsychology, 18(2), 97-123.

McCarley, R. W., Shenton, M. E., O'Donnell, B. F., & Nester, P. G. (1993). Uniting

Kraepelin and Bleuler: the psychology of schizophrenia and the biology of

temporal lobe abnormalities. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 1, 35-56.

McGlashan, T. H. (1998). The profiles of clinical deterioration in schizophrenia. Journal

of Psychiatric Research, 32, 133-141.

McGuire, P., Shah, G., & Murray, R. M. (1993). Increased blood flow in Broca's area

during auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 342, 703-706.

McGuire, P. K., Silbersweig, D. A., & Frith, C. D. (1996). Functional neuroanatomy of

verbal self-monitoring. Brain, 119, 907-917.

McGuire, P. K., Silbersweig, D. A., Murray, R. M., David, A. S., Frackowiak, R. S. J.,

& Frith, C. D. (1996). Functional anatomy of inner speech and auditory verbal

imagery. Psychological Medicine, 26, 29-38.

McGuire, P. K., Silbersweig, D. A., Wright, I., Murray, R. M., David, A. S.,

Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (1995). Abnormal monitoring of inner speech:

a physiological basis for auditory hallucinations. The Lancet, 346(8975), 596-600.

Metzler, C., & Parkin, A. (2000). Reversed negative priming following frontal lobe

lesions. Neuropsychologia, 38, 363-379.

Mintz, S., & Alpert, M. (1972). Imagery vividness, reality testing and schizophrenic

hallucinations. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 79(3), 310-316.

Mitchell, K., Johnson, M., Raye, C., & D'Esposito, M. (2000). fMRI evidence of age-

related hippocampal dysfunction in feature binding in working memory.

Cognitive Brain Research, 10, 197-206.

Mojtabai, R. (1999). Duration of illness and structure of symptoms in schizophrenia.

Psychological Medicine, 29, 915-924.

Morrison, A. P. (2001). The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative

cognitive approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioral and Cognitive

Psychotherapy, 29, 257-276.

Morrison, A. P., & Haddock, G. (1997). Cognitive factors in source monitoring and

auditory hallucinations. Psychological Medicine, 27, 669-679.

Chapter 1

- 40 -

Morrison, A. P., Haddock, G., & Tarrier, N. (1995). Intrusive thoughts and auditory

hallucinations: a cognitive approach. Behavioral and Cognitive Psychotherapy,

23, 265-280.

Mueser, K. T., Bellack, A. A., & Brady, E. U. (1989). Hallucinations in schizophrenia.

Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 82, 26-29.

Murphy, F. C., Sahakian, B. J., Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Rogers, R. D., Robins,

T. W., & Paykel, E. S. (1999). Emotional bias and inhibitory control processes in

mania and depression. Psychological Medicine, 29, 1307-1321.

Nathaniel-James, D., & Frith, C. (1996). Confabulation in schizophrenia: evidence of a

new form? Psychological Medicine, 26, 391-199.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Brown, R., & Ron, M. (1996). Memory impairment in

schizophrenia: its relationship to executive function. Schizophrenia Research, 21,

85-96.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996a). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John

Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996b). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Nelson, M. D., Saykin, A. J., Flashman, L. A., & Riordan, H. J. (1998). Hippocampal

volume reduction in schizophrenia as assessed by magnetic resonance imaging: a

meta-analytic study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55(5), 433-440.

Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology:

Views from cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition

taxonomy. Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 220-246.

Nigg, J. T., Butler, K. M., Huang-Pollock, C. L., & Henderson, J. M. (2002). Inhibitory

processes in adults with persistent childhood onset ADHD. Journal of Consulting

and Clinical Psychology, 70(1), 153-157.

Ohayon, M. M. (2000). Prevalence of hallucinations and their pathological associations

in the general population. Psychiatry Research, 97, 153-164.

Otten, L. J., & Rugg, M. D. (2002). The birth of a memory. Trends in Neurosciences,

25(6).

Oulis, P. G., Mavreas, V. G., Mamounas, J. M., & Stefanis, C. N. (1995). Clinical

characteristics of auditory hallucinations. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 92, 97-

102.

Chapter 1

- 41 -

Pantelis, C., Barnes, T. R. E., Nelson, H. E., Tanner, S., Weatherley, L., Owen, A. M.,

& Robbins, T. W. (1997). Frontal-striatal cognitive deficits in patients with

chronic schizophrenia. Brain, 120, 1823-1843.

Pantelis, C., & Maruff, P. (2002). The cognitive neuropsychiatric approach to

investigating the neurobiology of schizophrenia and other disorders. Journal of

Psychosomatic Research, 53, 655-664.

Penn, D. L., & Mueser, K. T. (1996). Research update on the psychosocial treatment of

schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 607-617.

Rankin, P. M., & O'Carroll, P. J. (1995). Reality discrimination, reality monitoring and

disposition towards hallucination. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 517-

528.

Rector, N. A., & Beck, A. T. (2001). Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for schizophrenia:

An empirical review. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 189(5), 278-

287.

Rizzo, L., Danion, J.-M., Van der Linden, M., & Grange, D. (1996). Patients with

schizophrenia remember that an event has occured, but not when. British Journal

of Psychiatry, 168, 427-431.

Rogers, R. D., Andrews, T. C., Grasby, P. M., Brooks, D. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2000).

Contrasting cortical and subcortical activations produced by attentional-set

shifting and reversal learning in humans. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12,

142-162.

Rugg, M., Fletcher, P., Chua, P., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). The role of the prefrontal cortex

in recognition memory and memory for source: an fMRI study. NeuroImage, 10,

520-529.

Sartorius, N., Shapiro, R., & Jablensky, A. (1974). The international pilot study of

schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11, 21-34.

Schultz, S. K., & Andreasen, N. C. (1999). Schizophrenia. The Lancet, 353(9162),

1425-1430.

Seaton, B. E., Goldstein, G., & Allen, D. N. (2001). Sources of heterogeneity in

schizophrenia: the role of neuropsychological functioning. Neuropsychology

Review, 11(1), 45-73.

Servan-Schreiber, D., Cohen, J., & Steingard, S. (1996). Schizophrenic Deficits in the

processing of context: A test of a theoretical model. Archives of General

Psychiatry, 53(12), 1105-1112.

Chapter 1

- 42 -

Shergill, S., Brammer, M., Williams, S., Murray, R., & McGuire, P. (2000). Mapping

auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia using functional magnetic resonance

imaging. Archives of General Psychiatry, 57(11), 1033-1038.

Shergill, S., Murray, R. M., & McGuire, P. K. (1998). Auditory hallucinations: a review

of psychological treatments. Schizophrenia Research, 32, 137-150.

Silbersweig, D., & Stern, E. (1996). Functional neuroimaging of hallucinations in

schizophrenia: toward an integration of bottom-up and top-down approaches.

Molecular Psychiatry, 1, 367-375.

Silbersweig, D., Stern, E., C, F., et al (1995). A functional neuroanatomy of

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Nature, 378, 176-179.

Simons, J. S., Verfaellie, M., Galton, C. J., Miller, B. L., Hodges, J. R., & Graham, K.

S. (2002). Recollection-based memory in frontotemporal dementia: implications

for theories of long-term memory. Brain, 125(11), 2523-2536.

Slade, P. D., & Bentall, R. P. (1988). Sensory deception: A scientific analysis of

hallucinations. London: Croom Helm.

Spencer, W., & Raz, N. (1995). Differential effects of aging on memory for content and

context: A meta-analysis. Psychology and Aging, 10(4), 527-539.

Spinella, M. (2002). Correlations among behavioral measures of orbitofrontal function.

International Journal of Neuroscience, 112(11), 1359-1369.

Starker, S., & Jolin, A. (1982). Imagery and hallucination in schizophrenic patients. The

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 170(8), 448-451.

Starkstein, S., & Robinson, R. (1997). Mechanism of disinhibition after brain lesions.

The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 185(2), 108-114.

Stephane, M., Barton, S., & Boutros, N. N. (2001). Auditory verbal hallucinations and

dysfunction of the neural substrates of speech. Schizophrenia Research, 50, 61-78.

Stuss, D. T., & Benson, D. F. (1989) The Frontal Lobes.

Stuss, D. T., Eskes, G. A., & Foster, J. K. (1994). Experimental neuropsychological

studies of frontal lobe functions. In F. G. Boller, J (Eds) (Ed.), Handbook of

Neuropsychology (vol 9) .

Stuss, D., Toth, J., Franchi, D., Alexander, M., Tipper, s., & Craig, F. (1999).

Dissociation of attentional processes in patients with focal frontal and posterior

lesions. Neuropsychologia, 37, 1005-1027.

Sullivan, E. V., Shear, P. K., Zipursky, R. B., Sagar, H. J., & Pfefferbaum, A. (1997).

Patterns of content, contextual and working memory impairments in

schizophrenia and nonamnesic alcoholism. Neuropsychology, 11(2), 195-206.

Chapter 1

- 43 -

Takebayashi, H., Takei, N., & Mori, N. (2002). Unilateral auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia after damage to the right hippocampus. Schizophrenia Research.

Thaiss, L., & Petrides, M. (2003). Source and content memory in patients with a

unilateral frontal cortex or a temporal lobe excision. Brain, 126(5), 1112-1126.

Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Leudar, I. (2004). Hearing voices: a phenomenological-

hermeneutic approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 13-23.

Tollefson, G. D. (1996). Cognitive Function in schizophrenic patients. Journal of

Clinical Psychiatry, 57(suppl 11), 31-39.

Troyer, A., Winocur, G., Craik, F., & Moscovitch, M. (1999). Source memory and

divided attention: reciprocal costs to primary and secondary tasks.

Neuropsychology, 13(4), 467-474.

Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic Memory: from mind to brain. Annual Review of

Psychology, 53, 1-25.

Walsh, E., Harvey, K., White, I., Manley, C., Fraser, J., Stanbridge, S., & Murray, R.

M. (1999). Prevalence and predictors of parasuicide in chronic psychosis. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 100(5), 375-382.

Waters, FAV, Badcock, JC & Maybery, MT (2004). An analysis of the main clinical

features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Unpublished manuscript,

University of Western Australia.

Weinberger, D. R., Aloia, M. S., Goldberg, T. E., & Berman, K. F. (1994). The frontal

lobes and schizophrenia. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical

Neurosciences, 6, 419-427.

Weiss, A., & Heckers, S. (1999). Neuroimaging of hallucinations: a review of the

literature. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging Section, 92, 61-74.

West, R. L. (1996). An application of Prefrontal Cortex Function theory to cognitive

ageing. Psychological Bulletin, 120(2), 272-292.

Wilson, S. P., & Kipp, K. (1998). The development of efficient inhibition: Evidence

from directed-forgetting tasks. Developmental Review, 18, 86-123.

Wong, A. H. C., & Van Tol, H. H. M. (2003). Schizophrenia: from phenomenology to

neurobiology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews, 27, 269-306.

Woodruff, P. W. R., & Murray, R. M. (1994). The aetiology of brain abnormalities in

schizophrenia. In R. Ancill (Ed.), Schizophrenia: Exploring the Spectrum of

Psychosis . New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Woodruff, P. W. R., Wright, I., Bullmore, E., Brammer, M., Howard, R. J., Williams,

S., Shapleske, J., Rossell, S., David, A. S., McGuire, P. K., & Murray, R. (1997).

Chapter 1

- 44 -

Auditory hallucinations and the temporal cortical response to speech in

schizophrenia: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. American Journal

of Psychiatry.

Wyland, C. L., Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Gordon, H. L., & Heatherton, T. F.

(2003). Neural correlates of thought suppression. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1863-

1867.

Young, H. F., Bentall, R. P., Slade, P. D., & Dewey, M. E. (1987). The role of brief

instructions and suggestibility in the elicitation of auditory and visual

hallucinations in normal and psychiatric subjects. The Journal of Nervous and

Mental Disease, 175(1), 41-47.

- 45 -

PREDISPOSITION TO HALLUCINATIONS IN THE NORMAL POPULATION

- 47 -

Foreword to Chapter 2

Experiences akin to auditory hallucinations occur spontaneously, and frequently, in

the normal population. In support, between 10-45% of normal, healthy people experience

some type of auditory hallucination (e.g. Barrett & Etheridge, 1992; Posey & Losch, 1983;

Young et al, 1986). In addition, it is commonly believed that auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia exist on a continuum with normal mental events (e.g. Bentall & Slade,

1985b; Chapman , Chapman & Raulin, 1976; Chapman, Edell & Chapman, 1980). The

investigation of hallucinatory experiences in nonpsychiatric individuals is a useful research

strategy as it allows the examination of hallucinations without the possible confound

associated with psychopathology.

As a preliminary study of our investigations of auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia, the defining characteristics of factors underlying predisposition to

hallucinations in normal individuals are investigated in Chapter 2. In particular, the aim

of this study is to examine the factor structure of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale

(Launay & Slade, 1981, modified by Bentall & Slade, 1985). Given that processes are

thought to occur on a continuum, an overlap in characteristics between hallucinatory-like

experiences in normal individuals and auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia should draw

attention to factors that are important to the hallucinatory experience in general. It should

be made clear at this point that this chapter is the only study addressing hallucinatory

experiences in healthy individuals.

- 48 -

References

Barrett, T., & Etheridge, J. (1992). Verbal hallucinations in normals, I: People who hear

'voices'. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6(5), 379-387.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards

hallucination: a brief report. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(4), 527-529.

Chapman, L. J., Edell, W., & Chapman, J. P. (1980). Physical anhedonia, perceptional

aberration and psychosis proneness. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 6(4), 639-653.

Chapman, L. L., Chapman, J. P., & Raulin, M. L. (1976). Scales for physical and social

anhedonia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 85(4), 374-382.

Launay, G., & Slade, P. (1981). The measurement of hallucinatory predisposition in male

and female prisoners. Personality and Individual Differences, 2, 221-234.

Posey, T., & Losch, M. (1983). Auditory hallucinations of hearing voices in 375 normal

subjects. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 3(2), 99-113.

Young, H. F., Bentall, R. P., Slade, P. D., & Dewey, M. E. (1986). Disposition towards

hallucination, gender and EPQ scores: a brief report. Personality and Individual

Differences, 7(2), 247-249

- 49 -

Chapter 2

Revision of the factor structure of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) Abstract

The Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) (Launay & Slade, 1981, modified

by Bentall & Slade, 1985a) is a frequently used measure of predisposition to hallucinations

in normal individuals. The current study administered the LSHS-R to a large sample of

English-speaking undergraduate students (N = 562). Principal Component Analyses

identified three factors characterised as (1) vivid/intrusive mental events, (2) hallucinations

with a religious theme, and (3) auditory and visual hallucinatory experiences. The first

factor refers to mental events where the experience is recognised as one’s own whereas the

other two factors have in common that the experience is attributed to another source. The

current factor structure is similar to the factors obtained by Levitan, Ward, Catts and

Hemsley (1996) for participants with a psychiatric disorder and a history of auditory

hallucinations, supporting the view that hallucinations exist on a continuum with normal

experiences.

Flavie A.V. Waters, Johanna C. Badcock, Murray T. Maybery (2003). Revision of the

factor structure of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R). Personality and

Individual Differences, 35, 1351-1357.

Chapter 2

- 50 -

The Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) (Launay & Slade, 1981, modified

by Bentall & Slade, 1985a) is a scale designed to measure predisposition to hallucinations

in healthy individuals. It was developed on the basis that hallucinatory experiences occur

on a continuum with normal mental states (Launay & Slade, 1981). In support, a

surprisingly large number of individuals in the normal population report a history of

hallucinatory experience. For example, Bentall and Slade (1985a) found that 17.7% of

male undergraduate participants reported that they often heard a voice speaking their

thoughts aloud and 15.4% said that they have had the experience of hearing a person's

voice when no one was present, supporting the idea that hallucinations may occur

spontaneously in the normal population. Although the scale has frequently been utilised in

research as a method for measuring predisposition to auditory hallucinations in healthy

individuals (e.g. Bentall & Slade, 1985b; Feelgood & Rantzen, 1994; Jakes & Hemsley,

1986; Rankin & O'Carroll, 1995), its factor structure has not been well established.

When Launay and Slade (1981) developed the 12-item scale, which required

participants to respond either true or false to each item, a Principal Component Analysis

(PCA) on the scores of 296 participants (200 prisoners, 54 controls and 42 psychiatric

patients with auditory hallucinations) revealed a two-factor solution. The first factor,

characterised as tendency to hallucinatory experience, accounted for 83.1% of the variance

(items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 – see Table 1) and the second factor, negative

response set, accounted for 16.9% of the total variance (items 9 and 11).

In 1985, Bentall and Slade modified the questionnaire by changing the two negative

response items (items 9 and 11) to positive ones and replacing the true/false response

format with a 5-point Likert scale. The factor structure of this revised scale, the LSHS-R,

has been studied in a mixed psychiatric population by Levitan, Ward, Catts and Hemsley

(1996). PCA with varimax rotation on the scores of 169 psychiatric patients with a history

of auditory hallucinations yielded four factors accounting for 65.3% of the variance. The

factors were characterised as vivid dreams (items 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9), clinical auditory

hallucinations (items 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12), intrusive or vivid thoughts (items 1, 3, 4 and 12)

and subclinical auditory hallucinations (items 8 and 9).

To date, the structure of the LSHS-R has been investigated only once in the normal

population. Aleman, Nieuwenstein, Böcker and de Haan (2001) administered a Dutch

translation of the scale to 243 undergraduate participants. The PCA analysis yielded a

Chapter 2

- 51 -

three-factor solution characterised by general hallucinatory tendency (items 1, 2, 7, 8, 10

and 12), subjective externality of thought (items 3, 4 and 11) and vividness of daydreams

(items 5, 6 and 12). Item 9 loaded on the first factor according to the PCA with oblique

rotation on the raw data, or on the third factor after the data were transformed.

The aim of the present study was to administer the LSHS-R to a larger sample of

English speaking healthy participants in order to test the stability of its factor structure.

Method

Five hundred and sixty two first-year undergraduate psychology students (176 males

and 386 females) took part in this study. The mean age of participants was 18.79 years (SD

= 4.03).

The participants completed the 12-item LSHS-R version as described by Bentall and

Slade (1985a). Each item was scored "certainly applies to me" (4), "possibly applies to me"

(3), "unsure" (2), "possibly does not apply to me" (1), "certain does not apply to me" (0).

Total scores can range from 0 to 48.

Results

Examination of the histograms, skewness and kurtosis for participants' responses on

each item indicated positively skewed distributions for items 10, 11 and 12, which

replicates the findings by Aleman et al. (2001). A number of outliers were also identified

for these items (defined as scores more than 3 SD above the mean). These were trimmed to

the score 3 SD above the mean (n = 21 for item 10, n = 8 for item 11 and n = 24 for item

12). The trimmed scores were used in all subsequent analyses.

Total scores ranged from 0 to 43 and the mean total score was 17.72 (SD = 7.49)

(with untrimmed scores), or 17.62 (SD = 7.41) (with trimmed scores). Those means are

comparable to the untrimmed means obtained for similar samples of undergraduates by

Bentall and Slade (1985a) (N = 136, M = 19.35, SD = 7.27), Young, Bentall, Slade and

Dewey (1986) (N = 204, M = 17.60, SD = 8.62), and Feelgood and Rantzen (1994) (N =

136, M = 21.9, SD = 8). Aleman et al. (2001) report a somewhat lower mean of 13.9 (SD =

6.7) in their administration of the Dutch translation to 243 students.

Chapter 2

- 52 -

Table 1

Mean scores, standard deviations, and percentages of students endorsing the positive responses for the Launay-Slade

Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R) items (N = 562)

M SD Possibly applies Certainly applies

1. No matter how hard I try to concentrate, unrelated thoughts always creep 2.56 1.14 295 (52.49 %) 96 (17.08 %)

into my mind

2. In my daydreams I can hear the sound of a tune almost as clearly as if 2.54 1.17 221 (39.39 %) 122 (21.74 %)

I were actually listening to it

3. Sometimes my thoughts seem as real as actual events in my life 2.46 1.13 249 (44.38 %) 89 (15.86 %)

4. Sometimes a passing thought will seem so real that it frightens me 1.97 1.25 184 (32.91 %) 54 (9.66 %)

5. The sounds I hear in my daydreams are generally clear and distinct 2.09 1.13 188 (33.51 %) 49 (8.73 %)

6. The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that sometimes I think 1.71 1.23 135 (24.15 %) 41 (7.33 %)

they are

7. I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud 1.51 1.34 116 (20.75 %) 49 (8.76 %)

8. In the past, I have had the experience of hearing a person's voice and then 1.31 1.37 119 (21.25 %) 41 (7.32 %)

found that no-one was there

9. On occasions, I have seen a person's face in front of me when no-one was .71 1.05 48 (8.60 %) 10 (1.79 %)

in fact there

10. I have heard the voice of the Devil .10 .37 9 (1.60 %) 5 (0.88 %)

11. In the past, I have heard the voice of God speaking to me .37 .84 27 (4.82 %) 8 (1.42 %)

12. I have been troubled by hearing voices in my head .26 .66 17 (3.02 %) 7 (1.24 %)

Chapter 2

- 53 -

There was no gender difference in comparing the means for the total scores [t (560) =

.17, p = .85]. Table 1 presents the mean score and the percentage of students endorsing the

positive response sets for each item on the scale.

Scores on all items correlated significantly with total test score (range of Pearson r

values = .26 to .69, p < .001). The factor structure of the 12 variables was initially

examined by PCA. PCA with an oblique rotation (Oblimin with Kaiser normalization) was

carried out as reported in Aleman et al. (2001). A Keiser-Meyer-Olkin statistic of .79

indicated factorability of items. All factors with eigenvalues greater than one were retained

and compared with Cattel's scree plot to determine the number of factors to retain. On this

basis, three factors accounting for 56.2% of the variance were retained. The rotated factor

loadings above .30 for the three-factor solution are shown in Table 2. The first factor,

which accounted for 32.4% of the variance (items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) contained items that

refer to vivid/intrusive mental events where the experience is recognised as one's own (‘my

daydreams’, ‘my thoughts’). The second and third factors accounted for 13.9% and 9.8%

of the variance respectively and refer to hallucinations with a religious theme (items 10, 11

and 12) and auditory and visual hallucinatory experiences (items 7, 8, 9 and 12). In

contrast to the first factor, these two latter factors have in common that the experience is

directly attributed to another source (God, the Devil) or attribution of the experience to

another source is implied. The same factor structure was obtained when the outliers were

not trimmed.

Of note, item 12 loaded on both Factor II and Factor III and item 7 loaded on Factor I

and Factor III. All the correlations between factors were significant (p < .001), with r = .10

for Factors I and II, r = -.32 for Factors I and III, and r = -.19 for Factors II and III.

Principal factor analysis was subsequently carried out in order to check the fit of the

PCA. It revealed exactly the same factor loadings as the PCA with the only difference

being that item 1 was no longer identified as carrying any loading on any of the three

factors. In addition, in case the use of the oblique rotation on the PCA was not appropriate

because the factors were in fact independent, PCA with Varimax rotation was carried out.

This analysis identified similar factors as those obtained with PCA with oblique rotation

with the only difference being that Factor III now accounted for more of the variance

(13.8%) than Factor II (9.8%). These analyses suggest that the factors identified with the

PCA were fairly robust and that three separate factors may be identified.

Chapter 2

- 54 -

Table 2

Three-factor Oblimin solution showing item loadings above .30 on the LSHS-R Items Factor I Factor II Factor III

5. The sounds I hear in my daydreams are generally clear and distinct .81

2. In my daydreams I can hear the sound of a tune almost as clearly as if .76

I were actually listening to it

3. Sometimes my thoughts seem as real as actual events in my life .74

6. The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that sometimes I think .65

that they are

4. Sometimes a passing thought will seem so real that it frightens me .63

1. No matter how hard I try to concentrate, unrelated thoughts always creep .32

into my mind

10. I have heard the voice of the Devil .84

11. In the past, I have heard the voice of God speaking to me .79

12. I have been troubled by hearing voices in my head .49 -.48

9. On occasions, I have seen a person's face in front of me when no-one was -.82

in fact there

8. In the past, I have had the experience of hearing a person's voice and then -.81

found that no one was there

7. I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud .36 -.46

Chapter 2

- 55 -

Discussion

The current study aimed to extend our knowledge about the factors underpinning the

LSHS-R in a large sample of English speaking students. A factor analysis identified three

factors accounting for 56.2% of the variance. The first factor was characterised by

intrusive or vivid mental events where the self is nominated as the agent and the experience

is still recognised as one’s own (‘my daydreams'). The second and third factors referred to

hallucinations with a religious theme and to the experience of visual and auditory

hallucinations respectively, where in both cases, the experience is described as being

separate and distinct from the self (‘a voice’, ‘voice of God’). The attribution of the

experience separates Factor I from Factors II and III and suggests that this may reflect

different facets of the hallucinatory experience. All the items represented in each of the

three factors appear to be appropriately characterised by the factor labels. An important

argument for the validity of this solution is that repeated factor analyses with different

rotations yielded practically identical solutions.

The contents of the present three-factor solution have little in common with the three

factors previously obtained by Aleman et al. (2001). The reasons for this discrepancy are

not clear although, of particular note, their total mean score was lower than that reported in

previous studies suggesting that their Dutch translation of the scale may be somewhat

different from the original English version. The current results are actually closer to

Levitan et al.'s (1996) factor structure for psychiatric participants with a history of auditory

hallucinations: Factors II and III in the current analysis contain the same items as in Factors

II (clinical auditory hallucinations) and IV (sub-clinical hallucinations) of Levitan et al's

(1996) analysis, suggesting that both analyses may be tapping into similar hallucinatory

processes in different populations. The similarity between Levitan's and the current study

firmly supports the view that hallucinations exist on a continuum with normal experiences.

However, only a small percentage of normal participants in the present study endorsed

items with a religious theme. Yet, misattribution of the hallucinatory experiences to

supernatural forces is a common phenomenon in psychiatric patients with a history of

hallucinations (Nayani & David, 1996). This suggests that a delusional interpretation of the

hallucinatory phenomenon may differentiate the experience of healthy participants from

that of psychiatric patients. In order to identify whether this factor is critical in

differentiating psychiatric patients and healthy participants, future research should obtain

Chapter 2

- 56 -

detailed item endorsement frequencies in a psychiatric sample for comparison with the

current ratings on healthy participants.

What is the relationship between predisposition to hallucinations and schizotypy?

Like schizophrenia, schizotypy is a multi-dimensional construct, of which hallucinatory-

like experiences form a dimension (Venables & Rector, 2000). Falling within the positive

cluster (Bentall, Claridge & Slade, 1989), predisposition to hallucinations does not imply

predisposition to schizotypy in general. Given increasing evidence that hallucinations have

a distinctive cognitive basis in schizophrenia (e.g. Waters, Badcock, Maybery & Michie,

2003) predisposition to hallucinatory experience in schizotypy and in healthy individuals

may share a unique aetiology.

Finally, the experience of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia is frequently

described as intrusive and vivid - the mechanisms underlying the intrusiveness have been

linked to deficits in inhibition (Waters et al, 2003). The first factor in the current analysis

of the LSHS-R suggests that vivid and perhaps intrusive mental events may also be part of

the predisposition to hallucinations in healthy individuals. In addition, the current results

also draw attention to an important distinction between intrusive experiences which are

recognised as belonging to the self and other intrusive experiences which are misattributed.

The attribution of internal mental events to another source is a characteristic feature of

auditory hallucinations in psychopathology, and in particular schizophrenia. The current

results are particularly interesting in view of evidence that show that participants scoring

high on the LSHS-R misattribute internal events to an external source (Bentall & Slade,

1985b, Jakes & Hemsley, 1986, Rankin & O'Carroll, 1995), a deficit commonly attributed

to hallucinating patients with schizophrenia. Our results suggest that a cognitive deficit in

source attribution may be present only in those individuals scoring high on items 7-12 of

the LSHS-R. Further research is needed to investigate this prediction and to attempt to

replicate the current factor structure of the LSHS-R.

Chapter 2

- 57 -

References

Aleman, A., Nieuwenstein, M. R., Böcker, K. B. E., & De Haan, E. H. F. (2001). Multi-

dimensionality of hallucinatory predisposition: factor structure of the Launay-Slade

Hallucination Scale in a normal sample. Personality and Individual Differences, 30,

287-292.

Bentall, R. P., Claridge, G. S., & Slade, P. D. (1989). The multidimensional nature of

schizotypal traits: a factor analytic study with normal subjects. British Journal of

Clinical Psychology, 28, 363-375.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985a). Reality testing and auditory hallucinations: A signal

detection analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 24, 159-169.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985b). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards

hallucination: a brief report. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(4), 527-529.

Feelgood, S. R., & Rantzen, A. J. (1994). Auditory and visual hallucinations in university

students. Personality and Individual Differences, 17(2), 293-296.

Jakes, S., & Hemsley, D. R. (1986). Individual differences in reaction to brief exposure to

unpatterned visual stimulation. Personality and Individual Differences, 7(1), 121-123.

Launay, G., & Slade, P. (1981). The measurement of hallucinatory predisposition in male

and female prisoners. Personality and Individual Differences, 2, 221-234.

Levitan, C., Ward, P. B., Catts, S. V., & Hemsley, D. R. (1996). Predisposition toward

auditory hallucinations: the utility of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale in

psychiatric patients. Personality and Individual Differences, 21(2), 287-289.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Rankin, P. M., & O'Carroll, P. J. (1995). Reality discrimination, reality monitoring and

disposition towards hallucination. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 517-

528.

Venables, P. H., & Rector, N. A. (2000). The content and structure of schizotypy: A study

using confirmatory factor analysis. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 26(3), 587-602.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (2003). Inhibition in

schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 62,

275-280.

Chapter 2

- 58 -

Young, H. F., Bentall, R. P., Slade, P. D., & Dewey, M. E. (1986). Disposition towards

hallucination, gender and EPQ scores: a brief report. Personality and Individual

Differences, 7(2), 247-249.

- 59 -

INTENTIONAL INHIBITION AND

AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS

- 61 -

Foreword to Chapters 3, 4 and 5

The previous chapter has revealed that one of the factors underpinning predisposition

to hallucinations in the normal population is characterised as the experience of intrusive

mental events. Interestingly, intrusiveness is one of the defining features of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia. This characteristic is so common in patients with

schizophrenia that modern definitions include the observation that auditory hallucinations

are not amenable to voluntary control (e.g. David, 2004). However, this characteristic has

mostly been ignored in current cognitive theories of auditory hallucinations and little is

known about the mechanisms that give rise to this particular feature of the hallucinatory

experience in schizophrenia.

The process of inhibition is essential for suppressing unwanted and irrelevant

thoughts. Consequently, the following three chapters investigate the proposal that auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia are associated with a failure in cognitive inhibition, and in

particular a deficit in intentional inhibition.

Chapter 3 investigates whether the severity of auditory hallucinations is associated

with increasingly impaired control of intentional inhibition as measured on the Hayling

Sentence Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) and the Inhibition of Currently

Irrelevant Memories Task (ICIM) (Schnider & Ptak, 1999).

Chapter 4 extends these findings by presenting group comparisons between patients

with and without hallucinations on the ICIM task. For the purpose of this paper only, the

presence of auditory hallucinations is determined using a strict PANSS criterion (a score of

1 means that auditory hallucinations have been totally absent in the past four weeks and

scores 2-7 mean that auditory hallucinations have been present during this time), in order to

answer a specific question regarding the nature of the cognitive deficits in patients with a

total absence of auditory hallucinations in the past four weeks.

Chapter 5 presents an analysis of performance on the Affective Shifting Task

(Murphy et al, 1999) in patients with schizophrenia (with and without auditory

hallucinations) to further investigate inhibition processes and to examine the role of

emotional dysfunction in schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations. In this, and all

subsequent chapters, the presence of auditory hallucinations is categorized according to

whether patients have had auditory hallucinations on more than half of the days during the

- 62 -

past 4 weeks. As explained earlier, this criterion was chosen so that patients with very

infrequent hallucinations were not classified as having auditory hallucinations present.

References

Burgess, P., & Shallice, T. (1996). Response suppression, initiation and strategy use

following frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 34(4), 263-273.

David, A. S. (2004). The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations: an

overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 107-123.

Murphy, F. C., Sahakian, B. J., Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Rogers, R. D., Robins, T.

W., & Paykel, E. S. (1999). Emotional bias and inhibitory control processes in mania

and depression. Psychological Medicine, 29, 1307-1321.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

- 63 -

Chapter 3

Inhibition in schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations

Abstract

The study investigates whether auditory hallucinations (AH) in schizophrenia are

linked to a deficit in inhibition. Two tasks assessing the intentional suppression of

cognitive events - the Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT) (Burgess & Shallice,

1996) and the Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories Task (ICIM) (Schnider & Ptak,

1999) - were administered to 42 patients with schizophrenia and 24 normal controls.

Presence and severity of symptoms in the patient group were examined using the Positive

and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Patients performed significantly worse on the

measures of inhibition compared to controls. More importantly, among patients, significant

positive correlations were obtained between an index of AH severity (defined as an

increase in frequency of AH on PANSS) and the number of type A errors on the HSCT and

errors in the last three runs of the ICIM. An increase in AH severity was, therefore,

associated with increasingly impaired control of intentional inhibition. Furthermore, no

significant correlations were found between these indices of inhibition and either negative,

general or positive symptoms (excluding AH scores).

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T. & Michie, P.T. (2003). Inhibition in

schizophrenia: Association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research. 62, 275-

280.

Chapter 3

- 64 -

Similarities between auditory hallucinations (AH) and unwanted intrusive thoughts

have increasingly been noted and several theories implicate the involvement of intrusive

cognition in AH (e.g. Nayani & David, 1996a; Morrison, 2001). Intrusive thoughts have

been linked to a deficit in inhibition in disorders such as Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

(e.g. Enright & Beech, 1993) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (e.g. Vasterling et al,

1998). There is considerable experimental evidence that schizophrenia is linked to a deficit

in inhibition (e.g. Beech et al, 1989; Brebion et al, 1996) and Frith (1979) also suggested an

association between AH and inhibition. However, the few studies that have investigated

the role of inhibitory processes in AH have failed to demonstrate any such role using

negative priming (Peters et al, 2000) and interference (Brebion et al, 1998) tasks. One of

the reasons why these studies may have failed to find a deficit in inhibition in AH may be

because of the type of inhibitory processes measured by those tasks. Recently, a conceptual

distinction has been made between automatic and intentional forms of inhibition (Kipp

Harnishfeger, 1995). Automatic inhibition occurs below awareness whereas with

intentional inhibition the individual consciously suppresses the activation of an item.

Negative priming and interference control are not categorized as intentional forms of

inhibition so the failure of previous studies to establish a relationship between AH and

inhibition may be because it is a deficit in intentional inhibition that is critical to AH. Since

AH are consciously experienced mental events, it is reasonable to argue that they may

reflect an impairment in intentional inhibition processes.

Given the uncertainly surrounding the role of inhibitory processes in AH, we

examined the link between AH and task performance on relatively new tests thought to

reflect intentional inhibition processes. The Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT)

(Burgess & Shallice, 1996) is a task that requires the ability to voluntarily suppress

currently active mental representations. Patients with schizophrenia have been found to

make more errors than controls on this task (Nathaniel-James & Frith, 1996) however the

study failed to address the relationship between HSCT performance and individual

symptoms. The Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories task (ICIM) (Schnider & Ptak,

1999) measures the ability to suppress memory traces that are not relevant to ongoing

reality. Some theories have suggested that AH may in fact be memories that are not

recognized (e.g. Nayani & David, 1996a), consequently this task was chosen as an index of

whether AH are also linked to a problem in regulating memories. Both tasks assess the

Chapter 3

- 65 -

intentional suppression of conscious cognitive events and the performance of each has been

found to be mediated by the frontal lobes (Nathaniel-James et al, 1997; Schnider et al,

2000). However, they also differ in that the HSCT measures the ability to inhibit currently

active mental events while the ICIM measures the ability to suppress irrelevant memories.

Morrison and Baker (2000) also implicated the role of negative mood in the

maintenance process of AH and predicted that an increase in negative mood should

correlate with an increase in frequency of AH. Therefore, the BDI-II (Beck, 1996) and BAI

(Beck, 1990) were included as measures of depression and anxiety levels respectively.

Method

Participants

Forty-two patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia were selected from a

psychiatric hospital in Perth, Western Australia. Information concerning the patients’

demographic and clinical data is presented in Table 1. All patients were receiving typical,

atypical or a combination of neuroleptics. A control group comprised 24 individuals

recruited from the community. Exclusionary criteria for all participants included a history

of head injury and neurological illness. Controls who reported a personal or first-degree

family history of psychiatric illness were also excluded. The patients and controls did not

differ in premorbid IQ as measured with the National Adult Reading Test (NART, Nelson,

1982), handedness, gender or educational level (see Table 1). The study was approved by

UWA and Graylands Hospital Ethics Committees and signed informed consent was

obtained from all participants.

Clinical ratings

Patients were interviewed using the Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)

(Kay, Opler & Fiszbein, 1987). The PANSS measures both the presence and severity of

Positive (which include AH together with delusions, etc.), Negative (e.g. blunted affect)

and General symptoms (e.g. somatic concerns) on a 7-point scale. AH severity was rated

from the PANSS with higher ratings signalling an increase in AH frequency. The symptom

composition of the patient group is described in Table 1.

Chapter 3

- 66 -

Table 1

Demographic and clinical data for patients with schizophrenia and healthy control

participants (means and standard deviations)

Controls (n = 24) Patients (n = 42) Group

Comparisons p

Age 34.67 (8.81) 36.73 (8.41) t = .95 .34

Gender 20 M, 4 F 35 M, 7 F X2 =.00 .63

Handedness 19 R, 4 L 35 R, 6 L X2 = .25 .88

Years Education 11.75 (1.89) 10.97 (1.97) t = 1.55 .12

NART 103.62 (4.75) 100.21 (9.32) t = 1.66 .10

Age of first hospitalisation - 23.09 (5.80)

Number of admissions - 9.35 (7.79)

Duration of illness (years) - 13.64 (8.14)

Level of positive symptoms1 - 19.19 (5.12)

Level of negative symptoms1 - 12.33 (3.22)

Level of general symptoms1 - 28.85 (5.47)

AH severity1 - 2.95 (2.05)

Chlorpromazine equivalent - 942.78 (445.35) 1 on PANSS

Tasks and questionnaires

Digits Forward (Digit Span subtest, WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997)

This simple measure of memory span (maximum score of 14) was used as a general

measure of cognitive function.

The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, 1996,

1990, respectively)

These tests both have a maximum score of 21.

Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT) (Burgess & Shallice, 1996)

In this test the participant is required to provide single-word completions to

sentences. In the critical inhibition condition, each completion should be unrelated to the

preceding sentence. Two errors types were recorded: A category A error was where the

Chapter 3

- 67 -

supplied word completed the sentence in a plausible fashion (e.g. 'most cats see very well

at...night'), and a category B error was where the response was semantically connected to

the sentence, but was not the most plausible completion (e.g. 'the dough was put in the

hot…kitchen').

Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories (ICIM) (adapted from Schnider & Ptak, 1999)

This task involves the presentation of a series of animal pictures (selected from the

Berkeley Digital Library Project collection) for repeated identification. Four runs were

shown of the same basic set of 52 pictures. Four pictures were repeated 8 times within each

run as described by Schnider and Ptak. These target items were different for the 4 runs.

The pictures were presented for 2000 ms each with an inter-stimulus interval of 1000 ms.

Immediately after the 1st run, the 2nd run was presented. A 3rd run was made 5 minutes after

the 2nd run, and the 4th run was made after a 30-minute delay. For the first run, participants

were told that pictures of animals would be presented and that some would be shown more

than once. The task was to identify which pictures were repeated. For each subsequent run,

participants were instructed to forget that they had already seen the pictures and to indicate

picture reoccurrences only within that run. Performance on the first run depended on new

learning, whereas subsequent runs required active inhibition of memory of pictures seen in

the previous runs (Schnider et al, 2000). Consequently the number of false alarms (FA) in

the last three runs, but not the first, was used to index inability to inhibit irrelevant

memories.

Results

Comparisons of patients and controls

Table 2 shows mean scores and standard deviations on all measures. Parametric and

non-parametric tests revealed no differences in outcomes, so parametric tests are reported

in Table 2. Compared to controls, the patient group had significantly lower spans as

measured by the Digits Forward subtest, and had higher levels of depression and anxiety.

On the HSCT, one-way ANOVAs showed that the patient group made more type A and

type B errors compared to controls. For the ICIM task, one-way ANOVAs showed that

patients did not differ from controls in the number of FA on the first run but made more FA

than controls on the three subsequent runs combined. There were no sex differences for

any experimental measures (p > .25).

Chapter 3

- 68 -

Table 2

Means and standard deviations on Digits Forward, BDI-II, BAI, HSCT (number of Type A

and B errors) and ICIM (number of FA for run 1 and 2-4 combined) for controls and

patients

Controls Patients Group

M SD M SD Comparisons p

Forward Span 8.79 1.61 6.90 1.67 t = 4.30 <.001

BDI-II 2.04 1.98 12.95 12.90 F = 16.79 <.001

BAI 1.54 1.79 9.63 9.33 F = 17.53 <.001

HSCT Type A Errors .12 .44 1.30 2.20 F = 6.73 .01

HSCT Type B Errors 2.75 3.22 6.19 3.12 F = 18.10 <.001

ICIM FA (1) .50 .72 2.04 4.10 F = 3.56 .06

ICIM FA (2-4) 3.66 5.28 12.35 16.45 F = 6.28 .01

Correlations with AH severity in the patient group

Digits Forward, BDI-II and BAI scores were not found to be significantly correlated

with AH severity (p > .09). Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between AH

severity and experimental measures. Spearman Rho correlation coefficients were used

when the distributional assumptions of Pearson correlation coefficients were not met.

On the HSCT, analyses revealed a significant correlation between the number of type

A errors and AH severity suggesting that an increase in frequency of hallucinations was

associated with an increase in failure to inhibit salient and active mental representations.

Type B errors were not found to be correlated with AH severity, demonstrating that an

increase in frequency of AH was selectively associated with an increasing failure to inhibit

the most salient and prepotent responses as measured by type A errors.

Chapter 3

- 69 -

Table 3

Correlations of HSCT (Type A and B errors) and ICIM (FA on run 1 and runs 2-4

combined) with AH severity, Negative, General, Positive and Positive without AH symptom

groups

HSCT HSCT ICIM ICIM

Errors A Errors B FA 1 FA 2-4

AH severity .41** -.04 .02 .42**

Negative Symptoms -.09 .26 -.11 .09

General Symptoms -.19 .08 .01 .09

Positive Symptoms .35* .02 -.11 .35*

Positive Symptoms .26 .06 -.15 .28

without AH

** Significant at the .01 level, * Significant at the .05 level

On the ICIM task, correlations of AH severity with the number of FA responses

revealed no significant relationship for the first run but a significant correlation for the three

subsequent runs combined. The first run consists in identifying picture reoccurrence within

that run, whereas in each of the three subsequent runs, participants need to inhibit the

memory of pictures that had been seen in the previous runs. Therefore FA in the last three

runs, and not the first, represents a failure to inhibit past memory traces. The correlation

between type A errors (HSCT) and FA on runs 2-4 (ICIM) was not significant (rho = .21, p

= .44).

Association of cognitive variables with severity of other symptom groups

In order to test the specificity of the link between inhibitory failure and AH severity,

the correlations above were recomputed utilizing the positive, negative and general

symptom groups scores from the PANSS (see Table 3). No significant correlations were

obtained between any of the inhibition measures and either negative or general symptoms.

Severity of positive symptoms correlated with Type A errors (HSCT), and FA on runs 2-4

(ICIM). However when AH ratings were subtracted from the broader set of positive

symptom ratings, these correlations were no longer significant. This suggests that an

increase in inhibitory failure on these tasks was specifically related to an increase in the

symptoms severity of AH in schizophrenia.

Chapter 3

- 70 -

Effects of antipsychotic medication

The only significant correlation with chlorpromazine dosage equivalents was with

type B errors (HSCT), rho = .36, p = .02. The correlation between AH severity and type B

errors was repeated using chlorpromazine dosage as a covariate and the correlation

remained non significant, r = -.27, p = .10.

Discussion

The current study aimed to clarify the role of inhibition in the experience of AH in

schizophrenia with two new measures targeted at intentional inhibition. Firstly, the results

show that patients with schizophrenia exhibited deficits on all measures of inhibition. This

is consistent with previous findings indicating that schizophrenia is linked to a deficit in

inhibiting irrelevant and distracting stimuli (e.g. Nathaniel-James & Frith, 1996).

Secondly, AH severity was linked to a failure in intentional inhibition. An increase in AH

was associated with an increasing inability to inhibit both currently active mental

associations and memory traces that were no longer relevant - these processes were not

significantly correlated with each other suggesting that they measure different aspects of

inhibition. Furthermore, AH severity was not found to be associated with a decrease in

general cognitive functioning or an initial ability to discriminate targets from distractors

(number of FA in the first run of the ICIM), suggesting that AH frequency was not related

to a widespread cognitive impairment.

Furthermore, impaired intentional inhibition was significantly correlated with AH

severity but was not associated with other positive, general or negative symptoms,

highlighting the utility of a symptoms-based approach in the investigation of cognitive

deficits in schizophrenia. There was also no evidence to support the view that an increase

in negative mood is correlated with an increase in frequency of AH suggesting that,

contrary to Morrison and Baker's (2000) proposal, negative mood may not be directly

implicated in the maintenance of AH.

Altogether, the results clearly implicate the role of an inhibitory impairment in AH.

As both the HSCT and ICIM tasks assess the effortful and conscious suppression of

cognitive contents, the current study was able to identify a deficit in intentional inhibition

associated with AH of schizophrenia. The results further demonstrated that an increase in

AH severity was associated with an increasing difficulty in controlling the contents of

Chapter 3

- 71 -

active mental events and past memory traces. To our knowledge, this is the first

unequivocal demonstration of an association between a failure of inhibition and AH. The

process of inhibition is essential for suppressing irrelevant thoughts and a failure of

inhibition results in information that intrudes into ongoing thinking. This notion of

intrusion is particularly relevant to AH in schizophrenia as patients describe their

hallucinations as disturbing, unbidden and uncontrollable (Nayani & David, 1996b). We

believe that the failure to inhibit current associations and representations in memories is, at

least in part, the cause of the intrusive nature of the hallucinatory experience.

Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank A. T. Beck for his support, David Castle for his helpful

advice, Danny Rock for his invaluable help in recruiting patients and Berkeley Digital

Library Project for permission to use their pictures.

Chapter 3

- 72 -

References

Beck, A. (1990). BAI: The Psychological Corporation.

Beck, A. (1996). BDI-II. San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Beech, A., Powell, T., McWilliam, J., & Claridge, G. (1989). Evidence of reduced

'cognitive inhibition' in schizophrenia. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28,

109-116.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., & Amador, X. (1996). Reality monitoring failure in

schizophrenia: The role of selective attention. Schizophrenia Research, 22, 173-180.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., Malaspina, D., & Amador, X. (1998). Resistance to

interference and positive symptomatology in schizophrenia. Cognitive

Neuropsychiatry, 3, 179-190.

Burgess, P., & Shallice, T. (1996). Response suppression, initiation and strategy use

following frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 34(4), 263-273.

Enright, S. J., & Beech, A. R. (1993). Reduced cognitive inhibition in obsessive-

compulsive disorder. British Jouranl of Clinical Psychology, 32, 67-74.

Frith, C. D. (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophrenia. British

Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 225-235.

Kay, S. R., Fiszbein, A., & Opler, L. A. (1987). The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale

(PANSS) for Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, 261-276.

Kipp Harnishfeger, K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: theories,

definitions and research evidence. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.),

Interference and inhibition in cognition. Chap 6 (pp. 175-205). San Diego: Academic

Press.

Kramer, A., Humphrey, D., Larish, J., Logan, G., & Strager, D. (1994). Aging and

inhibition: Beyond a unitary view of inhibitory processing in attention. Psychology

and Aging, 9(4), 491-512.

Morrison, A. (2001). The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative cognitive

approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy,

29, 257-276.

Morrison, A. P., & Baker, C. A. (2000). Intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations: a

comparative study of intrusions in psychosis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38,

1097-1106.

Chapter 3

- 73 -

Nathaniel-James, D., & Frith, C. (1996). Confabulation in schizophrenia: evidence of a new

form? Psychological Medicine, 26, 391-199.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Fletcher, P., & Frith, C. (1997). The functional anatomy of verbal

initiation and suppression using the Hayling Test. Neuropsychologia, 35(4), 559-566.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996a). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & B. T. R. E (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 : John Wiley & Sons

Ltd.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996b). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Nelson, H. E. (1982). The National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test Manual. Windsor,

Berks: NFER-Nelson.

Peters, E. R., Pickering, A., Kent, A., Glasper, A., Irani, M., David, A., Day, S., &

Hemsley, D. (2000). The relationship between cognitive inhibition and psychotic

symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109(3), 386-395.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

Schnider, A., Treyer, V., & Buck, A. (2000). Selection of currently relevant memories by

the human posterior medial orbital cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 20(15),

5880-5884.

Vasterling, J., Brailey, K., Constans, J., & Sutker, P. (1998). Attention and memory

dysfunction in post-traumatic stress disorder. Neuropsychology, 1998(12), 1, 125-

133.

Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) . New York: The

Psychological Corporation.

- 75 –

Chapter 4

Auditory hallucinations: failure to inhibit irrelevant memories Abstract

Auditory hallucinations are the most common symptom of schizophrenia. The

frequency of auditory hallucinations is significantly associated with the failure to inhibit

memory traces that are no longer relevant (Waters, Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003).

We extend these findings by comparing the performance on a repeated continuous

recognition task1 of two subgroups of schizophrenia patients: (1) patients with auditory

hallucinations present and (2) patients with auditory hallucinations absent (including a

small sample with no history of auditory hallucinations). The results show that patients

with current auditory hallucinations make significantly more inappropriate responses

(false alarms) to distracters seen on previous runs of the task than non-hallucinating

patients. Consistent with our predictions, the presence of auditory hallucinations

involves a failure to suppress memories that are not relevant to ongoing reality. The

results could not simply be explained as being due to impaired encoding in memory

since hallucinators and non-hallucinators did not differ significantly in the number of

correctly identified targets (hits) across repeated runs. An alternative to the “inner

speech” model is proposed which suggests that auditory hallucinations arise from a

combination of deficits in inhibition and (episodic) memory.

Badcock, JC, Waters, FAV, Maybery, MT. (in press) Auditory Hallucinations: failure to

inhibit irrelevant memories, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.

1refered to as the ICIM task (Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories Task, Schnider &

Ptak, 1999) in previous and subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4

- 76 –

Current cognitive theories propose that auditory hallucinations (AH) are based on

inner speech that is misattributed to an external source (Frith & Done, 1989; Frith,

1992; David, 1994; Evans, McGuire & David, 2000). Recent neural imaging of verbal

hallucinations points to activations in inferior frontal cortex, anterior cingulate,

temporal cortex and hippocampal/parahippocampal cortex, regions involved in the

processing of inner speech but also prominently involved in inhibition and memory,

consistent with disturbed connectivity in fronto-temporal cortical circuits (Shergill et

al., 2000).

We have previously employed a repeated continuous recognition task to examine

the cognitive processes underlying AH (Waters, Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003).

This task, adapted from Schnider and Ptak (1999), involves the presentation of a

sequence of meaningful pictures, one at a time, from which the participant must detect

those pictures that are repeated (targets) within a single run. Targets from one run

become distracters on subsequent runs. The number of false positive responses to these

distracters (false alarms) reflects the ability to suppress memories that are no longer

relevant. Furthermore, the increase in false-alarms is assumed to depend on the interval

between runs (which determines the level of activation of memory traces). A marked

increase in false alarms on this task has been shown to be closely associated with

lesions in orbitofrontal cortex (Schnider & Ptak, 1999; Schnider et al., 2000a,b).

Our research with this task in AH demonstrated that the number of false alarms,

reflecting impaired intentional suppression, was positively associated with the

frequency of AH but not with other positive symptoms (Waters et al., 2003). These

findings suggest that AH are related to a failure to inhibit memory traces that are no

longer relevant to ongoing reality. In other words, it seems that AH arise as a result of

the intrusion of strongly activated representations previously acquired in memory. Since

Waters et al. (2003) adopted a correlational approach it might still be argued that this

impairment in inhibitory control is a general feature of schizophrenia rather than

specifically associated with the presence of AH (Beck & Rector, 2003). A stronger test

of the contribution of the suppression of irrelevant memories to the experience of

hallucinations would be provided by comparing the performance of schizophrenia

patients both with and without AH. Therefore, the aim of this report is to extend these

findings using the repeated continuous recognition task by contrasting the performance

of schizophrenia patients who are (a) currently hallucinating (AH present within the last

4 weeks) and (b) not currently hallucinating (AH absent over the last 4 weeks), and (c)

healthy controls. We predict that patients with no current evidence of AH will not

Chapter 4

- 77 –

display an increase in the number of false alarms across repeated runs of the task

compared with healthy controls, whilst patients with current AH will do so.

Furthermore we examine the ability to correctly identify targets in repeated runs in

order to determine whether the results can be explained in terms of impaired encoding

in memory.

Method

The study protocol was approved by the human research ethics committee of the

University of Western Australia and the institutional ethics committee at Graylands

Hospital. All participants provided signed informed consent prior to their participation

in the study.

Participants

Twenty three patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia who were

currently experiencing auditory hallucinations (Current AH) together with 20 patients

who had not experienced auditory hallucinations within the last four weeks (Non AH)

were selected from a large psychiatric hospital in Perth, Western Australia. The latter

group included four patients whose clinical interview and case histories, indicated that

they had never experienced auditory hallucinations (Never AH). Information concerning

patient demographic and clinical characteristics is presented in Table 1. All patients

were receiving typical, atypical or a combination of antipsychotic medications. The

control group comprised 24 healthy individuals recruited from the community.

Exclusionary criteria for all participants included a history of head injury and

neurological illness. Healthy controls who reported a personal or first-degree family

history of major psychiatric illness were also excluded.

Clinical ratings

Patients were interviewed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale

(PANSS) (Kay, Opler & Fiszbein, 1987). The PANSS measures both the presence and

severity of Positive (which include AH together with delusions, etc.), Negative (e.g.

blunted affect) and General (e.g. somatic concerns) symptoms on a 7-point scale. AH

severity was rated from the PANSS, with higher ratings signalling an increase in AH

frequency. All patients in the Non-AH subgroup had a rating of 1 on AH severity,

indicating that the symptom was absent (see Table 1). In addition, current level of

depression was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, 1996).

Chapter 4

- 78 –

Table 1

Demographic and clinical characteristics (means and S.D.) of controls and patients

with (Current AH) and without (Non AH) current auditory hallucinations

Controls

(n = 24)

Current AH

(n = 23)

Non AH

(n = 20)

Age

(range)

34.7 (8.7)

20-54

34.1 (8.9)

19-54

39.15 (7.3)

24-50

Education 11.75 (1.89) 10.82 (2.06) 11.25 (1.88)

NART 103.6 (4.75) 96.26 (8.40) 105.4 (8.19)

AH severity (PANSS)

(range)

-- 4.56 (1.38)

2-6

1 (0)

--

No. of Admissions -- 10.35 (9.85) 7.8 (4.29)

Duration of illness -- 11.30 (7.38) 15.7 (8.79)

Cognitive assessment

Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories (ICIM)

An adapted version of the continuous recognition task previously described by

Schnider and Ptak (1999) was used. This task consisted of four runs of a continuous

recognition task for meaningful stimuli (animal pictures selected from the Berkeley

Digital Library Project collection with their permission); some of which were repeated.

In each run, 80 pictures were presented, drawn from the same basic set of 52 pictures.

Four pictures recurred throughout each run (7 times following the initial presentation)

yielding 28 targets. The remaining pictures were not repeated (52 distracters). Target

pictures were different for the 4 runs. The pictures were presented using PowerPoint for

approximately 2000 ms each with an inter-stimulus interval of 1000 ms. Immediately

after the 1st run, the 2nd run was presented. A 3rd run was presented 5 minutes after the

2nd run, and the 4th run after a 30-minute delay. For the first run, participants were told

that pictures of animals would be presented and that some of these pictures would be

shown more than once. The participants’ task was to identify which pictures were

repeated. For each subsequent run, participants were instructed to forget that they had

already seen the pictures and to indicate picture re-occurrences only within that run.

Performance on the first run, therefore, depends on new learning, whereas in the

Chapter 4

- 79 –

subsequent runs participants were required to actively inhibit the memory of pictures

that had been seen in the previous runs (Schnider et al, 1996). Both the number of hits

(correct detection of recurring pictures) and the number of false alarms (FA: incorrectly

selecting a distracter) were examined. False alarms for the last three runs were of

particular interest since they would reflect any failure to inhibit memories of target

pictures from previous runs, however, false alarms were also examined for the first run,

since they reflected influences on recognition judgments other than the failure to inhibit

memories of target pictures.

Assessment of general intelligence

Premorbid intelligence was estimated using the National Adult Reading Test-

revised (Nelson & Willison, 1991).

Results

Preliminary analyses of the distributions of the continuous recognition data

indicated that the assumptions of multivariate analyses were not met, hence non-

parametric analyses were performed. One way analysis of variance indicated that the

three participant groups did not differ significantly in age, F(2,66) = 2.27, p = 0.11, or

education, F (2,66) = 1.32, p = 0.27, but did differ in estimated premorbid intelligence,

F (2,66) = 9.96, p < 0.001. The Current AH patients had significantly lower NART

scores than both the Non AH patients (Bonferroni adjusted probability, p < 0.001) and

the healthy controls (Bonferroni adjusted probability, p = 0.003). Comparisons between

the two patient subgroups showed that they did not differ significantly in terms of the

duration of illness, F (1, 41) = 3.17, p = 0.08, number of admissions, F (1,41) = 1.14, p

= 0.29, or level of depression, Mann-Whitney U = 214.5, p = 0.91. Whilst the Current

AH patients, by definition, exhibited more positive symptoms (hallucinations) than the

Non AH patients (see Table 1), analysis of the remaining PANSS scores showed that

the two patient groups did not differ in the average score for Negative symptoms, Mann

Whitney U = 183.5, p = 0.25, or General symptoms, Mann Whitney U = 219.0, p =

0.78.

Analysis of target hits

The ability to correctly detect targets on the ICIM task was assessed by analysing

the number of hits for repeated targets across the four runs of the task. There was a

significant difference in the average number of hits made by the current AH (M = 26.8,

SEM = 0.21), Non AH (M = 26.74, SEM = 0.33) and healthy control (M = 27.54, SEM =

Chapter 4

- 80 –

0.13) groups, Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 6.99, df = 2, p = 0.03. Follow-up

comparisons showed that healthy controls produced significantly more hits than the

current AH group, Mann-Whitney U = 158.0, p = 0.01, and also the Non AH group,

Mann-Whitney U = 161.5, p = 0.05. However, the two patient subgroups did not differ

in the average number of hits made, Mann-Whitney U = 216.00, p = 0.73. Spearman

correlation coefficients were calculated in order to examine the relationship between

NART scores and hit rates. No correlation approached significance with alpha set at

0.05.

Analysis of false alarms

The number of false alarms made on the first run of the ICIM task reflects new

learning, rather than suppression. The number of false alarms on run 1 did not differ

significantly between the three groups, Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 2.37, df = 2, p =

0.30. In contrast the number of false alarms made on subsequent runs (i.e. runs 2-4)

differed significantly between the groups, Kruskal-Wallis chi-square = 13.25, df = 2, p =

0.001. Follow-up comparison between group pairs showed that the current AH patients

made significantly more false alarms than healthy controls, Mann-Whitney U = 111.5, p

< 0.001. The Non AH patients made significantly fewer false alarms than the current

AH group, Mann-Whitney U = 139.5, p = 0.02, and were not significantly different

from healthy controls, Mann-Whitney U = 180.00, p = 0.15. This pattern of results is

shown in Figure 1. In order to check whether the results for the Non AH patients were

unusual due to the inclusion of the 4 patients (Never AH) with no history of AH, the

entire analysis was repeated with these patients excluded. The average performance of

this subgroup alone is shown in Figure 1. The overall pattern of results was unchanged

in this analysis (data not shown). Spearman correlations were used to examine the

relationship between NART scores and false alarms (FA 2-4) within each group. All

correlations were low and non-significant (Current AH rs = 0.09, p = 0.66; Non AH rs =

-0.30, p = 0.18; Healthy controls rs = -0.32, p = 0.12).

Since the increase in FA scores is assumed to depend on the interval between

runs, the number of false alarms was compared between the 3rd and 4th run within the

Current AH subgroup in order to examine whether performance changed following the

30 minute delay (during which the activation level of memory traces is assumed to

decrease). Results from a paired sample t-test showed that the number of FA was

significantly lower following this delay, t(22) = 2.53, p = 0.01.

Chapter 4

- 81 –

Figure 1

Mean number of false alarms (+/- 1 SEM) on each run of the ICIM task in the Current

AH ( solid lines), Non AH ( dotted lines), Never AH (▲dashed lines) schizophrenia

patients and Healthy Controls ( solid lines). (Note: the Never AH subgroup are shown

separately for references purposes only. Analyses were based on comparisons with the

larger Non AH group which includes these cases)

Finally, a critical additional analysis was also conducted on the number of false

alarms to distracters that had been targets in previous runs. These specific false alarms

were significantly greater in Current AH, but not Non AH, patients compared to healthy

controls, Mann Whitney U = 92, p = 0.01.

Discussion

The results of this investigation confirm that patients with auditory hallucinations

fail to suppress recently activated memory traces (Waters et al., 2003). In contrast, when

auditory hallucinations are absent the ability to inhibit such memory traces is not

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1 2 3 4Run

Mea

n nu

mbe

r of f

alse

ala

rms

Chapter 4

- 82 –

significantly different from that of healthy controls. This inhibitory impairment is not,

therefore, a general feature of schizophrenia (Beck & Rector, 2003). These findings

indicate a subtle interplay between inhibition and (episodic) memory in the genesis of

auditory hallucinations. Thus, in patients currently experiencing hallucinations failure to

inhibit memories of prior events allows old memories to intrude into current events (the

“now”) and become confused with ongoing reality.

Several alternative explanations of why hallucinators fail to suppress responses to

irrelevant memory associations may be ruled out by the current data. First it may be

argued that patients who are actively hallucinating are generally more unwell than

patients who are not currently experiencing hallucinations. However, comparison of a

range of clinical indicators including duration of illness, number of admissions, negative

and general (somatic) symptoms and current level of depression revealed no significant

differences between the two patient subgroups, arguing against a significant role of

these variables. Similarly, prior research suggests that older adults show increased

impairment on a range of measures of inhibition (Persad et al., 2002), however, the

Current AH patients were not significantly older than the Non AH group.

The number of hits made on the continuous recognition task was lower in all

schizophrenia patients than in healthy controls. However, this difference in the ability to

encode new targets cannot account for the tendency of patients with hallucinations to

respond to distracters since the number of hits was not significantly different between

patients with and without hallucinations. Similarly the results do not seem to be due to

an overall bias to respond ‘yes’ in the Current AH group since there was no significant

difference between the three participant groups in the number of false alarms on the first

run. Rather the failure to suppress irrelevant memory traces was evident only as

distracters became more familiar (more strongly activated) with repeated presentation.

Failure to suppress currently irrelevant memories has previously been described in

patients with spontaneous confabulations with lesions consistently involving the

orbitofrontal cortex (Schnider et al, 1996; Ptak & Schnider, 1999; Schnider & Ptak,

1999; Schnider et al, 2000a), pointing to a possible role of this region in the occurrence

of auditory hallucinations. However, detailed comparisons of the data also suggest some

significant differences, suggesting that the underlying mechanisms are not identical.

Most notably, the overall rate of false alarm errors made by confabulators increased

markedly from run to run, even though runs were separated by delays of up to 1 hour. In

contrast, the current findings are suggestive of more transitory effects, in this version of

the task, in patients with auditory hallucinations. This is because suppression ability was

Chapter 4

- 83 –

significantly better following the 30-minute delay, during which time the level of

activation of memory representations is assumed to decrease.

The current findings may also indicate that the capacity to suppress irrelevant

memories varies over time in conjunction with the presence or absence of auditory

hallucinations; a finding that has also been observed to parallel the course of

spontaneous confabulations (Schnider et al, 2000b). A limitation of the current study

lies in the between groups nature of the design, which precludes a direct test of this

interpretation. A possible exception to this proposal may exist in patients who never

experience auditory hallucinations. The capacity of this group to suppress irrelevant

memories appears to be all but indistinguishable from that of healthy controls (see

Figure 1). Again, however, the small sample size available in this study is a limitation

of the current research.

Auditory hallucinations are commonly defined as false perceptions in the absence

of external stimulation and with a compelling sense of reality (Gelder et al 1993). The

intersection between perception and memory, however, is well documented (Jacoby,

1983; Roediger 1996; Goldinger et al 1999) including the similarity of underlying

neural networks (Damasio; 1989; Fuster, 1995; Singer, 1998). Based on the current

findings, therefore, auditory hallucinations might best be viewed as another example of

the ‘sins’ of memory (Schacter, 1999). Whilst the strength of activation of memory

traces in this research is experimentally manipulated by means of repeated presentation

of stimuli, the mechanism which induces activation of memory episodes in

schizophrenia is still unknown.

At least two important implications arise from this research. First, electro-

physiological evidence reveals that suppression of memories that are not currently

relevant is distinct from, and occurs much earlier than, processes engaged in monitoring

the source or veridicality of memories (Schnider et al, 2002). This may explain the

compelling sense of reality, and omnipotence, of hallucinatory experiences (Chadwick

& Birchwood, 1995), since they comprise the intrusion of highly familiar information

(from memory) for which specific contextual details have not been recollected.

Second, the presence of auditory hallucinations involves the failure to suppress

memories of previously encountered events. This mechanism may, therefore, also

explain at least two features of auditory hallucination in schizophrenia that are not

accommodated well (if at all) by current cognitive models based on “inner speech”: (1)

the richness of voice features which are reported, including varieties of grammatical

form, tone, dialect etc., and (2) the less frequent, but persistent report of auditory

Chapter 4

- 84 –

hallucinations involving environmental noises rather than voices (Nayani and David,

1996). Recent research, for example, suggests that episodic memory retains traces of

both voice characteristics and words (Goldinger, 1996), which might account for the

complex qualitative features of auditory hallucinations. In sum, we propose that an

alternative model of auditory hallucinations, which involves a combination of deficits in

inhibition and episodic memory, more accurately describes the nature of the cognitive

deficits underpinning this symptom.

Acknowledgements

The research reported in this article was conducted as part of the doctoral studies of one

of the authors (F.A.V. Waters) at the University of Western Australia.

Chapter 4

- 85 –

References

Beck, A.T. and Rector, N.A. 2003. A cognitive model of hallucinations. Cognit. Ther.

Res. 27, 19-52.

Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A., Ball, R. and Ranieri, W.F., 1996. Comparison of Beck

Depression Inventories-IA and -II in psychiatric outpatients. J. Pers. Assess.

67(3), 588-597.

Chadwick, P. and Birchwood, M., 1997. The omnipotence of voices II: The beliefs

about voices questionnaire (BAVQ). Br. J. Psychiatry. 166, 773-776.

David, A.S., 1994. The Neuropsychological Origin of Auditory Hallucinations. In:

Code, C and Müller, D. (Series Eds.), Brain Damage, Behaviour and Cognition:

A.S. David and J.C. Cutting (Eds), The Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia.

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hove (UK), pp. 269-313.

Damasio, A. R., 1989. Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: a systems-level

proposal for the neural substrates of recall and recognition. Cognition. 33, 25-62.

Evans, C.L., McGuire, P.K. and David, A.S., 2000. Is auditory imagery defective in

patients with auditory hallucinations? Psychol. Med. 30, 137-148.

Frith, C.D., 1992. The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia. Lawrence

Erlbaum Associates, Hove (UK).

Frith, C.D. and Done, J.D., 1989. Experiences of alien control in schizophrenia reflect a

disorder in the central monitoring of action. Psychol. Med. Vol 19(2), 359-363.

Fuster, J.M., 1995. Memory in the Cerebral Cortex. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Gelder, M., Gath, D. and Mayou, R.1993. Oxford textbook of psychiatry (2nd

edition). Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Jacoby, L.L., 1983. Perceptual enhancement: persistent effects of an experience. J. Exp.

Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 9, 21-38.

Kay, S.R., Fiszbein, A. and Opler L.A., 1987. The positive and negative syndrome scale

(PANSS) for schizophrenia Schizophr. Bull. 13(2):261-76.

Goldinger, S.D., 1996. Words and voices: episodic traces in spoken word identification

and recognition memory. J. Exp. Psychol.: Learn. Mem. Cogn. 22(5):1166-83.

Goldinger, S.D., Kleider, H.M., Shelley, E., 1999. The marriage of perception and

memory: creating two-way illusions with words and voices. Mem.Cognit.

27(2):328-38.

Nelson, H. and Willison, J. 1991. National Adult Reading Test – Revised: Test Manual.

NFER-Nelson, Windsor.

Chapter 4

- 86 –

Nayani, T.H. and David, A.S., 1996. The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychol. Med. 26(1):177-89.

Persad, C.C., Abeles, N., Zachs, R. and Denburg, N.L. 2002. Inhibitory changes after

age 60 and their relationship to measures of attention and memory. J. Gerontol. B.

Psychol. Sci. Soc. Sci., 57, 223-232.

Roediger, H.L., III, 1996. Memory illusions. J. Memory Lang. 35, 76-100.

Schnider, A., Treyer, V. and Buck, A., 2000. Selection of currently relevant memories

by the human posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex. J. Neurosci. 20(15):5880-4.

Schnider, A. and Ptak, R., 1999. Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nat. Neurosci. 2(7), 677-81.

Schnider, A., Valenza, N., Morand, S. and Michel, C.M., 2002. Early cortical

distinction between memories that pertain to ongoing reality and memories that

don't. Cereb. Cortex. 12(1), 54-61.

Schnider, A., von Daniken, C. and Gutbrod, K., 1996. The mechanisms of spontaneous

and provoked confabulations. Brain. 119, 1365-75.

Schnider, A., Treyer, V. and Buck, A. 2000a. Selection of currently relevant memories

by the human posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex. J. Neurosci. 20, 5880-5884.

Schnider, A., Ptak, R., von Däniken, C. and Remonda, L., 2000b. Recovery from

spontaneous confabulations parallels recovery of temporal confusion in memory.

Neurol. 55, 74-83.

Schacter, D.L. 1999. The seven sins of memory. Insights from psychology and

cognitive neuroscience. Am. Psychol. 54(3), 182-203.

Shergill, S.S., Brammer, M.J., Williams, S.C., Murray, R.M. and McGuire, P.K., 2000.

Mapping auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia using functional magnetic

resonance imaging. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry. 57(11), 1033-8.

Singer, W. 1998. Consciousness and the structure of neuronal representations. Philos.

Trans. R. Soc. Lond., B, Biol. Sci. 353, 1829-1840.

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T. and Michie, P.T., 2003. Inhibition in

schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophr. Res., 62, 275-

280.

- 87 -

Chapter 5

Inhibitory and affective processes in schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations

Abstract

The current study examines, firstly, intentional inhibition performance on a measure

of task shifting in patients with schizophrenia (with and without auditory hallucinations).

In contrast to our predictions, the results show that (a) patients with schizophrenia do not

show a task-shifting deficit compared to healthy controls and (b) a subgroup of patients

with hallucinations do not show an impairment on task shifting abilities compared to

patients without hallucinations. However, the results do show that the severity of auditory

hallucinations is associated with an increase in overall false alarms, confirming prior

findings of a failure to suppress previously relevant but currently inappropriate stimuli (e.g.

Badcock et al, in press; Waters et al, 2003). Secondly, the study investigates the role of

emotional dysfunction in patients with schizophrenia and those with auditory hallucinations

specifically. The results confirm that depression and anxiety are associated with

schizophrenia, but also that emotional dysfunction is not a necessary feature of the illness.

An attentional inhibitory bias for negative information is found in depressed patients with

schizophrenia, but not in patients who showed no sign of depression. Similarly, the results

show that (a) approximately one third of patients with auditory hallucinations have high

levels of depression and anxiety, thus, negative affect is not specifically associated with

auditory hallucinations; (b) depression in patients with auditory hallucinations is associated

with an attentional bias for negative material; finally it was also found that affective voice

content and beliefs about voices are linked to levels of depression but negative voice

content and beliefs about malevolence and/or omnipotence are not always associated with

negative affect.

Chapter 5

- 88 -

Inhibitory processes

The first aim of this study is to investigate inhibitory processes in patients with

schizophrenia and, in particular, in a subgroup of patients with auditory hallucinations.

Inhibition in schizophrenia

There is considerable experimental evidence across a range of paradigms that shows

that schizophrenia is associated with poor inhibitory functioning in the form of: (a)

intentional inhibition, as shown by deficits on the Hayling Sentence Completion Test

(HSCT, Nathaniel-James, Brown & Ron, 1996; Nathaniel-James & Frith, 1996; Waters,

Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003), on antisaccade tasks (Maruff, Danckert, Pantellis &

Currie, 1998; Ross et al, 1998; Schwartz & Evans, 1999) and on motor tasks (Badcock,

Michie, Johnson & Combrinck, 2002; Kopp & Rist, 1994); (b) automatic inhibition as

demonstrated by reduced or reversed negative priming effects (Beech, Powell, McWilliam

& Claridge, 1989; Laplante, Everett & Thomas, 1992), and (c) interference control as

evidenced by increased interference on studies involving the Stroop color/word interference

task (Boucart, Mobarek, Cuervo & Danion, 1999; Brebion, Smith, Gorman & Amador,

1996).

The current study investigates task-shifting abilities in patients with schizophrenia.

Task-shifting involves “moving flexibly from one behavior to another in response to

changing environmental contingencies” (Manoach et al, 2002, p. 816). Task-shifting is

usually thought to require inhibition of attention or responding from a previously reinforced

target and resolving this inhibition in order to reengage in a newly reinforced stimulus

(Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; Dreher & Berman, 2002). Task-shifting can be argued to

involve primarily intentional inhibition processes on the basis that it is deliberately

invoked, goal-directed, effortful and available to conscious reflection and strategic

interventions (Nigg, 2000; Wilson & Kipp, 1998).

Whereas some studies have found that schizophrenia patients have impaired task-

shifting abilities, mostly on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (see Crider, 1997, for

a review; Elliott, McKenna, Robbins & Sahakian, 1995), others have failed to find such a

deficit, often using the same task (e.g. Manoach et al, 2002). The reason for this

discrepancy is not clear although methodological differences have been put forward as an

explanation for differences in findings (Manoach et al, 2002). Based on our own findings

which link deficits in intentional inhibition to auditory hallucinations, variation in the

Chapter 5

- 89 -

symptom profile of patients may also have contributed to the differences in outcome of

previous studies. It is important to assess task-shifting abilities in patients with

schizophrenia because preserved task-shifting abilities appear to be inconsistent with

reports of impaired performance on other tasks of intentional inhibition (e.g. Nathaniel-

James & Frith, 1996; Ross et al, 1998; Waters et al, 2003). If task shifting involves

intentional inhibition processes then it is expected that patients with schizophrenia should

be impaired on this measure of inhibition. Consequently, the current study aims to

reexamine the task-shifting abilities of patients with schizophrenia using a novel Affective

Shifting Task originally developed by Murphy et al (1999) to assess inhibitory control in

mania and depression.

In the Affective Shifting Task, participants are asked to respond to target positive or

negative words as quickly as possible while inhibiting responses to words of the opposite

affective category. Words are presented one by one in test blocks, and every two blocks the

target valence is changed (see Table 1). On the ‘shift blocks’, participants are required to

ignore previously relevant targets, shift attention and respond to stimuli that were

distractors in the previous block. On the ‘non-shift blocks’, for the second block in a pair,

participants need to continue responding to targets and ignore distractors.

Table 1

Target description of the 10 blocks of words in the Affective Shifting Task Positive (NS1) P3

Positive (NS) P

Negative (S2) T14

Negative (NS) T2

Positive (S) T3

Positive (NS) T4

Negative (S) T5

Negative (NS) T6

Positive (S) T7

Positive (NS) T8

OR Negative (NS) P

Negative (NS) P

Positive (S) T1

Positive (NS) T2

Negative (S) T3

Negative (NS) T4

Positive (S) T5

Positive (NS) T6

Negative (S) T7

Negative (NS) T8

1 Non-shift blocks; 2 Shift blocks, 3 Practice trials, 4 Test trials

This task assesses different types of inhibitory processes which can be measured

independently: (a) selective attention and maintenance of responding in the presence of

distracting stimuli (interference control) can be assessed by examining overall performance,

(b) reversal/shifting of association (task-shifting) is examined by comparing performance

on ‘shift blocks’ and ‘non-shift blocks’, and (c) a measure of inhibitory control over

Chapter 5

- 90 -

emotional stimuli of a particular valence is obtained by contrasting performance between

negative and positive target stimuli. One of the aims of this study is, therefore, to examine

performance on the measures of interference control, task-shifting and valence-dependent

inhibitory control, to assess whether participants with schizophrenia show an impairment in

these domains.

Inhibition in patients with and without auditory hallucinations

The Affective Shifting Task is also particularly relevant to the study of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia because of the inhibitory constructs it examines. Task-

shifting abilities have not previously been investigated in patients with auditory

hallucinations, although auditory hallucinations have been found to be associated with a

deficit in intentional inhibition, as measured by the HSCT and Inhibition of Currently

Irrelevant Memories task (ICIM task, Schnider & Ptak, 1999) (Badcock, Waters &

Maybery, in press; Waters et al, 2003). If auditory hallucinations are associated with a

deficit in intentional inhibition, then patients with this symptom should show impaired

performance on the task-shifting component of the Affective Shifting Task. In addition,

previous research has shown that auditory hallucinations are not associated with a deficit in

interference control, as measured with a latency index on the Stroop Color-Word Test

(Brebion, Smith, Gorman, Malaspina & Amador, 1998). Therefore, it is anticipated that

patients with auditory hallucinations should not show significantly longer latencies overall

on the Affective Shifting Task compared to patients without hallucinations.

Affective processes

The second aim of this study is to examine the role of affective processes in patients

with schizophrenia and in a subgroup of patients with auditory hallucinations.

Affective processes in schizophrenia

Emotional dysfunction is a frequent feature of schizophrenia (Bentall, 1997,

Birchwood, 2003; McGhie & Chapman, 1961). Estimates of the frequency of depression in

patients with schizophrenia range from 13 to 70% (Baynes et al, 2000; Birchwood, Iqbal,

Chadwick & Trower, 2000; Lancon, Auquier, Reine, Bernard & Addington, 2001; Siris et

al, 2001). Some studies have suggested that depression may be associated with a greater

risk of suicide in schizophrenia (e.g. Heila et al, 1997) and may increase the probability of

relapse (Birchwood, 2003).

Chapter 5

- 91 -

There is also some evidence that individuals with schizophrenia process emotional

information differently to healthy people (e.g. Calev & Edelist, 1993; Gooding & Tallent,

2002; Suslow, Roestel, Droste & Arolt, 2003). For instance, patients with schizophrenia

have consistently been found to be less accurate than healthy controls in recognizing facial

expressions of most emotions (e.g. Gooding & Tallent, 2002). However, the cognitive

processes involved in the development and maintenance of negative emotions in

schizophrenia are not yet known.

The current study aims to investigate the possible presence of an attentional bias for

negative material in patients with schizophrenia. Cognitive models of depression and

anxiety (e.g. Beck, 1976; see MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998, and Mineka & Nugent, 1995,

for reviews) have emphasised the role of biases in attention, memory, perception and

reasoning. In support, it is now well recognized that depressed and anxious patients show a

range of cognitive biases to emotionally negative or threatening features in the environment

(Hertel, 2002; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1998; Mineka & Nugent, 1995, for reviews). For

example, depressed patients attend to and remember more negative information than

nondepressed patients (e.g. Murray, Whitehouse & Alloy, 1999). Recent studies have also

shown that depression is associated with faulty inhibitory mechanisms of selective attention

for negative information (e.g. Joormann, 2004; Murphy et al, 1999). Murphy et al (1999),

for example, demonstrated an attentional inhibition deficit for negative words on the

Affective Shifting Task in depressed patients. On this task, the performance of depressed

and manic patients was compared with that of healthy controls. Both clinical groups

exhibited biases for emotional stimuli congruent with their current mood and were found to

show a specific pattern of impairment on the measures of inhibitory control. Depressed

patients showed an attentional bias for negative material, as demonstrated by faster

latencies when negative words were the targets. They also showed a specific impairment in

their ability to shift responding from one affective category to the next. By contrast, manic

patients had a bias for processing happy stimuli, as shown by faster latencies on positive

targets, and were impaired on the interference control component of the task.

The question of attentional bias for negative material in individuals with

schizophrenia has received little attention, although Rossell, Shapleske and David (1998)

showed that patients with delusions had theme-specific deficits. Since negative affect is

such a frequent feature in schizophrenia, it is possible that both clinical depression and

Chapter 5

- 92 -

schizophrenia have similar causal mechanisms in terms of an attentional bias towards

negative stimuli. The current study examines whether patients with schizophrenia show an

attentional bias towards negative material using Murphy et al’s Affective Shifting Task.

Affective processes in auditory hallucinations

Auditory hallucinations have also often been found to co-occur with depression,

anger, fear, anxiousness and low self-esteem (Alpert & Silvers, 1970; Carter, Mackinnon &

Copolov, 1996; Close & Garety, 1998; Delespaul, deVries & van Os, 2002; Hustig &

Hafner, 1990; Johns, Hemsley & Kuipers, 2002) and with an increased risk of suicide

(Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Walsh et al, 1999). In addition, abnormal activations in the

ventral striatum and limbic circuit have been reported in auditory hallucinations (e.g.

Copolov et al, 2003; Silbersweig et al, 1995; Takebayashi, Takei & Mori, 2002; Woodruff,

2004), regions that have been implicated in the identification of stimuli of emotional

significance and the production of affective states (Phillips, Drevets, Rauch & Lane, 2003).

However, the exact role of affect in auditory hallucinations is not well understood. The

current study aims to further advance our understanding of the role of affect in auditory

hallucinations by addressing a number of specific issues.

Firstly, it is not clear whether negative mood is implicated in the presence of auditory

hallucinations. In Waters et al (2003), we showed that depression and anxiety were not

associated with the severity of auditory hallucinations. However, some authors (e.g. Johns

et al, 2002) have proposed that negative affective response is a direct consequence of the

hallucinations themselves. The current study therefore aims to examine whether depression

and anxiety scores, on the BDI-II and BAI respectively, are associated with the presence of

auditory hallucinations, regardless of their degree of severity.

Secondly, negative affective voice content is a prominent feature of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia. A relationship between derogatory voice content and

depression has been reported (e.g. Hustig & Hafner, 1990; Soppitt & Birchwood, 1997),

but many questions remain regarding the maintenance process of negative auditory

hallucinations, and the association between negative affective voice content and emotional

dysfunction. It is unclear, for example, whether a depressed/anxious mood is always

associated with negative voice content. Conversely, do patients who experience positive,

or neutral, voice content also report negative mood? The present investigation aims to

Chapter 5

- 93 -

explore the relationship between affective voice content of auditory hallucinations and

anxiety and depression.

Thirdly, an influential psychological explanation of the maintenance process of

auditory hallucinations proposes that a person's belief about his or her voices is a mediating

factor between auditory hallucinations and the distress that is experienced (Chadwick &

Birchwood, 1994). Birchwood and Chadwick (1997) further suggested that it is the belief

about voices, and not the voice activity itself, that contributes to the ensuing affect and

coping behaviour. They identified two different constructs relevant to these issues: (a) the

belief about the voices' intent to do harm or good (malevolence vs benevolence) and the

belief about the voices' omnipotence, and (b) the reaction to these beliefs in terms of

engagement or resistance. In support for their model, they found associations between

belief in malevolence, negative affective response and resistance, and also an association

between belief in benevolence and engagement (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick

& Birchwood, 1994, 1995; Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood, 2000; Soppitt & Birchwood,

1997). The current study uses Chadwick, Lees and Birchwood’s (2000) Belief About

Voices Questionnaire-Revised (BAVQ-R) to examine whether Birchwood and Chadwick’s

findings on the role of beliefs (malevolence, benevolence and omnipotence) and coping

strategies (resistance and engagement) is replicated in the current sample. The study also

investigates the relationship between beliefs, depression/anxiety and negative affective

voice content.

Lastly, the final aim of this study is to investigate the role of attentional inhibitory

biases for negative material in auditory hallucinations. Since auditory hallucinations have

been linked to depression, the examination of patients’ performance on the measure of the

Affective Shifting Task assessing attentional inhibitory control over emotional stimuli is

particularly relevant. If depression is an common component of auditory hallucinations,

patients should demonstrate a bias for negative targets. In addition, because a bias towards

negative material might partly explain the predominance of negative material in auditory

hallucinations, the association between the index of inhibitory control over negative

emotional stimuli and voice content will also be examined.

Summary of goals

The first goal of the study is to investigate inhibitory processes in patients with

schizophrenia, compared to healthy controls, on the Affective Shifting Task, in order to

Chapter 5

- 94 -

determine whether patients show an impairment on task shifting. The pattern of

performance of patients with and without auditory hallucinations on the task shifting index

of the Affective Shifting Task will also be examined. The second and third goals of this

study are to explore the role of affective processes in schizophrenia and auditory

hallucinations respectively. With regard to patients with auditory hallucinations, the

relationships between the presence and severity of hallucinations and affective voice

content, beliefs about voices, depression, anxiety and attentional inhibitory bias for

affective material are examined.

Method

Participants

The patient group consisted of 43 patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia

selected from a psychiatric hospital in Perth, Western Australia. Patients currently

experiencing hallucinations were selected on the basis of having experienced auditory

hallucinations on at least half of the days during the preceding four weeks, as assessed by

self-reports and case note reviews (“Current AH”, N = 19). Other schizophrenia patients

who did not fit this criterion were assigned to the non-hallucinating group (“Non AH”, N =

24). The control group comprised 24 healthy individuals recruited from the community

through a blood donor agency. Exclusionary criteria for all participants included a history

of head injury and neurological illness. Controls who reported a personal or first-degree

family history of psychiatric illness were also excluded. Information concerning the

patients’ and controls’ demographic and clinical data is presented in Table 2. The study

was approved by the University of Western Australia and Graylands Hospital Ethics

Committees and signed informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Clinical ratings

Patients were interviewed using the Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)

(Kay, Opler & Fiszbein, 1987). The PANSS measures both the presence and severity of

Positive (which include AH together with delusions, etc.), Negative (e.g. blunted affect)

and General symptoms (e.g. somatic concerns) on a 7-point scale. AH severity was rated

from the PANSS with higher ratings signaling an increase in AH frequency. The symptom

composition of the patient group is described in Table 2.

Chapter 5

- 95 -

Tasks and questionnaires

Assessment of general intelligence

Premorbid intelligence was estimated using the National Adult Reading Test-revised

(NART) (Nelson, 1982).

Affective Shifting Task (Murphy et al, 1999)

In this task, individual words were rapidly presented on the computer screen of a PC

running Windows 95. The task was programmed in MetaCard. Participants were required

to respond (press the space bar) to target words of either positive or negative valence, while

inhibiting responses to words of the competing affective category. There were 180 stimuli

used in the task, made up of 45 positive and 45 negative words, each used twice. Words

were presented individually in the centre of the screen for 300ms each with an inter-

stimulus interval of 900ms.

There were 2 practice blocks and 8 test blocks. Each block consisted of 18 words (9

positive and 9 negative words). The words were randomly allocated to, and within, each

block, and freshly randomized for each subject. For each block, positive (P) or negative

(N) words were specified as targets in set sequences (see Table 1). Every 2 blocks,

participants were required to shift response set from one affective category to the other (on

'shift blocks') and to inhibit responding to stimuli that were targets in the previous two

blocks and start responding to words that had been distractors. For the other four test

blocks ('non-shift blocks'), participants had to continue responding to targets of the same

valence category and inhibiting responding to distractors of the alternate category. The two

target category presentation orders (see Table 1) were alternated between participants. An

interval of 15s separated blocks of trials. There was a 500ms/450Hz tone that sounded for

false alarms (but not for omissions).

For the pilot testing of the words, a list of 60 positive and 60 negative adjectives was

given to 25 university students (age range 18-33 years) who rated each adjective on a scale

from 1 to 6 according to how positive or negative it was in connotation. The adjectives

were ranked with respect to mean ratings and the 45 positive and 45 negative words which

attracted the highest and lowest ratings were selected (see Appendix B). Positive and

negative words did not differ in word length, t(88) = 1.83, p > .05, or word frequency, t(88)

= 1.84, p > .05 (Kucera & Francis, 1967).

Chapter 5

- 96 -

Fourteen first-year psychology students (age range 18-33 years) participated in the

piloting of the task to ensure the task yielded similar results to the control participants in

Murphy et al’s (1999) study. Our pilot testing showed comparable results (within one

standard deviation) to those reported by Murphy et al for each condition of the task and

each variable, apart from the number of omissions per block of trials. Whereas Murphy et

al (1999) found that participants made an average of .26 omissions (S.E. = .06), the pilot

participants from our study made an average of .92 omissions (S.E. = .22). Although the

reasons for this difference are not clear, variations in demographics may have contributed

to differences in performance. Whereas the pilot subjects from this study were young

university students, Murphy et al’s control sample comprised individuals drawn from the

wider community with a mean age of 36.1 years and selected to match the demographic

characteristics of manic patient.

The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, 1996,

1990, respectively)

These tests both have a maximum score of 21.

Auditory Hallucinations Questionnaire (based on PSYRAT and MUPS; Haddock,

McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher, 1999; Carter, Mackinnon, Howard, Zeegers & Copolov,

1995; Appendix A)

Only one item regarding negative voice content was used for this study: “Do your

voices say unpleasant things or negative things?” Scores range from 1 (never) – 5 (always).

Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire-Revised (BAVQ-R) (Chadwick, Lees & Birchwood,

2000)

This questionnaire has 35 items, rated on a 4-point scale: disagree (0), unsure (1),

agree slightly (2) and agree strongly (3). It has three subscales related to beliefs:

Malevolence, Benevolence and Omnipotence (each with 6 items and a range of scores = 1-

18); and two subscales measuring emotional and behavioural response to auditory

hallucinations: Resistance (9 items, range of scores = 0-27) and Engagement (8 items,

range of scores = 0-24). Individuals hearing more than one voice are required to complete

the questionnaire for their dominant voice.

Chapter 5

- 97 -

Table 2

Demographic and clinical characteristics (mean, SD) of healthy controls and patients with schizophrenia, and subgroups of patients with

(Current AH) and without (Non AH) auditory hallucinations

Controls (n = 24)

Patients (n = 43)

Current AH (n = 19)

Non AH (n = 24)

Controls-Patients comparisons

Current–Non AH comparisons

Age (years) 34.67 (8.81) 36.73 (8.41) 34.10 (9.65) 38.29 (7.22) t = .95, p = .34 t =1.62, p = .11

Education (years) 11.75 (1.89) 10.97 (1.97) 10.78 (2.12) 11.20 (1.86) t =1.55, p = .12 t = .68, p = .49

Sex (M/F) 20 M, 4 F 35 M, 7 F 16 / 3 19 / 5

NART 103.62 (4.75) 100.21 (9.32) 95.89 (7.77) 104.16 (9.11) t =1.66, p = .10 t = 3.15, p < .05

BDI-II 2.04 (1.98) 12.80 (12.78) 13.84 (15.62) 11.95 (10.16) t =4.08, p < .001 t =.47, p = .64

BAI 1.54 (1.79) 9.52 (9.25) 9.15 (9.01) 9.82 (9.63) t =5.41, p < .001 t =.23, p = .81

Length of illness* (yrs) - 13.64 (8.14) 10.89 (7.11) 15.41 (8.55) - t = 1.85, p = .07

Number of admissions - 9.35 (7.79) 9.52 (10.02) 8.87 (5.68) - t = .26, p = .78

Level of positive symptoms (PANSS) - 19.06 (5.12) 23.63 (3.60) 15.45 (2.63) - t = 8.58, p < .001

Level of negative symptoms (PANSS) - 12.25 (3.22) 13.00 (2.80) 11.66 (3.45) - t = 1.36, p = .18

Level of general symptoms (PANSS) - 28.72 (5.47) 29.78 (4.79) 27.87 (5.92) - t = 1.14, p = .26

Chlorpromazine equivalent - 942.78 (445.3) 1075.52

(496.08) 814.04

(3.78.33) - t = 1.96, p = .06

* calculated as time since first admission

Chapter 5

- 98 -

Table 3

Means (and standard deviations) for latencies (RT), false alarms (FA) and omissions per block of trials as a function of shift and

valence conditions of healthy controls and patients with schizophrenia, and subgroups of patients with (Current AH) and without

(Non AH) auditory hallucinations.

Controls All Patients Current AH Non AH (n = 24) (n = 43) (n = 19) (n = 24)

RT Shift 516.77 (69.39) 594.98 (88.79) 573.41 (87.13) 612.06 (88.13)

Non-shift 514.47 (60.01) 595.21 (88.15) 577.74 (85.87) 609.04 (89.26)

Positive 512.17 (67.69) 598.28 (86.25) 578.36 (84.75) 614.05 (85.89)

Negative 519.10 (61.38) 591.68 (86.92) 572.28 (81.35) 607.05 (89.77)

FA Shift .96 (1.09) 1.66 (1.15) 2.02 (1.15) 1.38 (1.10)

Non-shift .71 (.90) 1.52 (1.28) 1.80 (1.46) 1.31 (1.11)

Positive .50 (.59) 1.65 (1.12) 1.85 (1.12) 1.48 (1.12)

Negative .35 (.41) 1.54 (1.45) 1.97 (1.62) 1.20 (1.23)

Omissions Shift .47 (.87) 1.30 (1.48) 1.71 (1.86) .97 (1.02)

Non-shift .38 (.72) 1.01 (1.29) 1.18 (1.47) .87 (1.15)

Positive .25 (.47) 1.22 (1.38) 1.56 (1.69) .94 (1.05)

Negative .18 (.31) 1.09 (1.35) 1.32 (1.54) .90 (1.17)

Chapter 5

- 99 -

Results

Preliminary analyses showed that the patients and controls did not differ in premorbid

IQ as measured with the NART, age or educational level (see Table 2). Comparisons

between the patient subgroups showed that Current AH and Non AH patients did not differ

in age, educational level, length of illness, number of admissions, and Negative and

General symptoms scores on the PANSS (Kay, Fiszbein & Opler, 1987). However,

Current AH patients had significantly higher Positive symptoms ratings, as measured by the

PANSS, compared to Non AH patients. Current AH patients also had lower premorbid IQ

scores, as measured by the NART, compared to Non AH patients and tended to have higher

chlorpromazine dosages although the difference did not reach the conventional level of

significance (Table 2). The results of the Affective Shifting Task are presented first,

followed by an analysis of the questionnaires.

Affective Shifting Task

For all conditions on the Affective Shifting Task, latencies (RT), false alarms (FA)

and omissions were computed for all participants. Anticipatory responses (with a RT less

than 100ms) were excluded from the analysis (Murphy et al, 1999). Table 3 presents

means and standard deviations for these variables as a function of the different shift and

valence conditions. The controls’ performance was within one standard deviation of the

performance of the control group of Murphy et al’s study. The data set contained a number

of outliers but the text presents results of parametric tests since results of nonparametric

tests showed no differences in outcome.

Comparisons between groups were carried out with two ANOVAs. For RT, an

ANOVA was performed with group as the between subjects factor and target valence

(positive/negative) and shift condition (shift/nonshift block) as within subject factors. For

the analysis of errors, an ANOVA was performed with group as the between subjects factor

and error type (FA, omissions), target valence and shift condition as within subjects factors.

Schizophrenia patients versus controls comparisons

Analyses showed that, overall, schizophrenia patients were significantly slower to

respond, F(1, 65) = 16.14, p < .001. Patients also made significantly more errors than

controls, F (1, 65) = 9.84, p < .01. A main effect of error type revealed that participants, on

average, made significantly more FA than omissions, F (1, 65) = 6.47, p < .01. Overall,

Chapter 5

- 100 -

more errors were made on negative than positive words, and on shift blocks than nonshift

blocks, F (1,65) = 4.56, p < .05, and F (1, 65) = 8.22, p < .01, respectively. The interaction

between subject group and shift condition was not significant for RT or errors, F (1, 65) =

.05, p =.81, and F (1, 65) = .10, p = .75, respectively. Similarly, the interaction between

subject group and target valence did not approach significance for RT or errors, F (1, 65) =

2.34, p = .13, and F (1, 65) = .39, p = .53, respectively. No other interactions were

significant (all p > .09). The results suggest that task shifting was not impaired in

schizophrenia and that patients did not show a bias towards negative words.

Analyses of patients with and without hallucinations

Despite the absence of a shifting deficit in the group of schizophrenia patients, it was

important to test whether such a deficit exists in relation to the symptom of auditory

hallucination. Group comparisons between the Current AH and Non AH patients showed

that there were no significant differences for RT, F (1, 41) = 1.89, p = .17, or errors, F (1,

41) = 3.34, p = .07. Overall, significantly more errors were made on shift compared to

nonshift blocks, F (1,41) = 7.19, p < .01. However, there were no significant effects

between subject group and (a) shift condition, (b) target valence or (c) error type, or their

interaction, for RT or errors (all p > .10).

Investigations were also carried out to examine whether the severity of auditory

hallucinations was associated with impaired task shifting performance or overall

performance, or with a bias towards negative material: (a) task shifting was examined by

computing the cost of shifting. The cost of shifting reflects the additional time, or errors,

incurred as a result of the task-shifting process and is a convenient measure to use in

correlations. It is calculated as the difference in RT/FA/omissions between shift and non-

shift blocks. Severity of auditory hallucinations was not found to be correlated with RT,

FA or omissions shifting costs (all p > .12); (b) In order to assess general accuracy of

performance, overall RT, FA and omission rates were correlated with auditory

hallucinations severity. Analyses revealed a significant correlation between overall FA

rates and auditory hallucinations severity, r = .31, p < .05, suggesting that an increase in the

severity of hallucinations was associated with an overall increase in FA on the Affective

Shifting Task. However, overall RT and omission rates were not found to be correlated

with auditory hallucinations severity, r = -.20, p = .18, and r = .14, p = .35, respectively.

Finally, (c) a bias for negative material was examined by computing a “valence cost”,

Chapter 5

- 101 -

calculated as the difference in RT/FA/omissions between negative and positive words.

There were no significant correlations between severity of auditory hallucinations and

valence cost for RT, FA or omissions (all p > .13). Overall, the results suggest that

auditory hallucinations were not associated with an impairment in task shifting or a bias

towards negative material. However, the severity of hallucinations was found to be

associated with an increase in overall FA, but not with an increase in response latency.

Questionnaire results

The following analyses report the results of nonparametric tests when the

assumptions of parametric tests were not met.

BDI-II and BAI

Healthy controls reported only minimal levels of depression and anxiety. One patient

with schizophrenia did not want to complete the BDI-II and BAI so the results include the

scores of 42 patients. Compared to controls, schizophrenia patients had significantly higher

levels of depression and anxiety (Table 2). Thirty-three percent of patients had mild,

moderate or severe levels of depression and 43% had mild, moderate or severe levels of

anxiety. Analyses were carried out to examine whether there was a specific demographic

or clinical profile associated with depression or anxiety in the schizophrenia patient group.

BDI-II and BAI scores were not found to be significantly correlated with age, years of

education, intellectual functioning, number of periods of hospitalization, length of illness,

chlorpromazine equivalents or positive, negative or general symptom scores on the PANSS

(all p> .08).

Thirty-two percent of the Current AH patients and 34% of the Non AH patients had

mild, moderate or severe levels of depression. Forty-two percent of the Current AH

patients and 43% of the Non AH patients had mild, moderate or severe levels of anxiety.

Current AH and Non AH patients did not differ significantly in levels of depression or

anxiety (Table 2).

In summary, these results show that patients with schizophrenia had significantly

higher levels of depression and anxiety compared to healthy controls, although not all

patients were rated as depressed or anxious. There were no significant differences in

depression and anxiety levels between patients with and without current hallucinations.

Chapter 5

- 102 -

Performance on the Affective Shifting Task and depression/anxiety

In order to investigate whether the depression status of schizophrenia patients was

critical to Affective Shifting Task performance, the schizophrenia patient group was

divided into those who reported low levels of depression (minimal or mild scores on the

BDI-II, between 0 and 19; n = 35) and those who reported high levels of depression

(moderate or severe scores on the BDI-II, 20 and above, n = 7). The division of the patient

group into high and low depressed groups was necessary to run similar analyses to those

reported by Murphy et al (1999).

An analysis of RT showed no significant group difference between low-depressed or

high-depressed patients, F(1, 40) = .18, p = .66. However, there was a near-significant

interaction between participant group and target valence, F (1, 40) = 3.51, p = .06. Figure 1

shows mean RT as a function of target valence for low-depressed and high-depressed

patients. A paired-samples t-test revealed that high-depressed schizophrenia patients were

slower to respond to positive targets compared to negative targets, t(6) = 2.86, p < .05,

paralleling results with patients suffering major depression (Murphy et al, 1999). For low-

depressed patients, there was no significant difference in RT between positive and negative

targets, t(34) = .10, p = .92. Analyses of errors revealed that, overall, participants made

more errors on shift than nonshift trials, F (1, 40) = 5.98, p < .01, but no other effects were

significant (all p < .08). No significant associations were found between anxiety levels as

measured by the BAI and performance on the Affective Shifting Task.

Investigations were also carried out to examine whether depression severity in the

patient group was associated with task shifting performance, overall performance and a bias

towards negative material. The valence cost for FA was found to be significantly

correlated with BDI-II scores, rho = .30, p < .05, suggesting that the number of FA on

negative words when positive words were the target increased with higher depression

scores. RT and omissions valence costs were not found to be significantly correlated with

BDI-II scores (both p > .27). Task shifting was examined using shifting costs. BDI-II

scores were not found to be significantly correlated with RT, FA or omission shifting costs

(all p > .40). Finally, overall RT, FA and omission rates were correlated with BDI-II scores

to examine general performance. None of the correlations were found to be significant (all

p > .22). Again, there were no significant correlations between BAI scores and

performance on the Affective Shifting Task (all p > .12).

Chapter 5

- 103 -

570

580

590

600

610

620

630

640

650

Low-depressed High-depressed

Patients with schizophrenia

Mea

n R

T

Positive valence Negative valence

Figure 1

Mean RT(and SD) as a function of target valence for low-depressed and high-depressed

patients with schizophrenia

In summary, patients with schizophrenia, compared to healthy controls, did not

demonstrate a bias towards negative material. However, highly depressed schizophrenia

patients showed an attentional bias for negative words, compared to low depressed patients,

as demonstrated by faster latencies when negative words were the target. In addition,

higher depression scores in the patient group were found to be associated with an increasing

number of false alarms involving negative words when positive words were the target.

The same group comparison analyses could not be carried out in the subgroup of

patients with auditory hallucinations since the number of high-depressed patients (n = 4)

was too low for meaningful analyses. However, correlations between BDI-II scores and

performance on the Affective Shifting Task were carried out in the subgroup of patients

with auditory hallucinations. The depression-related effects observed in patients with

schizophrenia were also found in hallucinating patients. BDI-II scores were found to be

positively and significantly correlated with FA valence costs, rho = .47, p < .05, suggesting

that the number of FA on negative words when positive words were the target increased

Chapter 5

- 104 -

with higher depression scores. Correlations between BDI-II scores and RT/omission

valence costs were not found to be significant, rho = -.06, p = .80, and rho = -.01, p = .97,

respectively. Correlations between BDI-II scores and RT/FA/omission shifting costs and

overall RT/FA/omissions rates were not significant either (all p > .09). There were no

significant correlations between BAI scores and measures of task-shifting, overall

performance and bias towards negative material on the Affective Shifting Task in the group

of patients with auditory hallucinations (all p > .37).

Negative voice content: Auditory Hallucinations Questionnaire

All 19 patients with current hallucinations responded to the questionnaire. The mean

score for the Negative Content item was 3.00 (SD = 1.33). Most patients (14/19, 89.4%)

responded that their voices were negative at least some of the time (score = 2-5). Three of

those reported that their voices were always negative (15.7%). Only 2 patients (10.5%)

said that their voices were never negative.

BAVQ-R

Eighteen patients agreed to fill-in the questionnaire. Subscale means on the BAVQ-R

were as follows: malevolence 5.55 (SD = 5.43), benevolence 8.94 (SD = 6.09),

omnipotence 7.66 (SD = 4.64), engagement 9.33 (SD = 7.79) and resistance 14.22 (SD =

7.64). These scores are similar to those reported by Chadwick et al (2000). Also replicated

(see Table 4), were the positive relationships between belief in malevolence and resistance

activity, and between belief in benevolence and engagement. Contrary to Chadwick et al’s

findings, no significant correlations were found between omnipotence and malevolence and

between omnipotence and resistance activity.

A cut-off point for malevolence, benevolence and omnipotence was derived to carry

out investigations on patients who believed their voices to be malevolent, omnipotent and

benevolent (as described in Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994). Since the distributions were

normally distributed, a cut-off point based on mean scores was computed. Accordingly, the

chosen cut off point for malevolence was a score of 5 or more, benevolence 9 or more and

omnipotence 6 or more. According to this criterion, it was found that 8 patients (44.4 %)

believed their voices to be malevolent, 10 (55.5 %) benevolent, and 11 (61.1 %)

omnipotent.

Chapter 5

- 105-

Table 4

Correlations between variables assessing belief about malevolence, benevolence, omnipotence and engagement and resistance behaviours

on the BAVQ, depression on the BDI-II, anxiety on the BAI and negative voice content in the Current AH group (n = 18)

BAVQ-R subscales Affect

Malevolence Benevolence Omnipotence Engagement Resistance BDI-II BAI

Negative

Content item

Malevolence - -.35 .41 -.48* .62** .56** .24 .38

Benevolence - - .03 .82*** -.40 -.43 -.18 -.70**

Omnipotence - - - .27 .50* .59** .03 .29

Engagement - - - - -.23 -.20 -.08 -.54**

Resistance - - - - - .70*** .38 .42

BDI-II - - - - - - .60*** .54*

BAI - - - - - - - .36

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Chapter 5

- 106-

Relationship between BDI-II, BAI, Negative Content and BAVQ-R

Table 4 shows that Negative Content scores were significantly correlated with BDI-II

scores, suggesting that higher negative voice content was associated with increasing levels

of depression. The two patients who did not report any negative voice content (score = 1)

rated only minimal levels of depression. Thirty-five percent of patients (6/17) who reported

some negative voice content at least some of the time (score = 2-5) had mild, moderate or

severe levels of depression, while the remainder (64%) reported only minimal levels of

depression. The 3 patients who reported hearing exclusively negative voice content

showed mild, moderate and severe levels of depression. Negative Content scores were not

significantly correlated with BAI scores.

Consistent with Chadwick et al (2000), beliefs in malevolence and omnipotence were

significantly associated with increasing depression scores (see Table 4). However, 60%

(9/15) of patients with beliefs in malevolence and/or omnipotence still scored in the

minimal range of the BDI-II, suggesting that negative beliefs are not always linked with

depression. Contrary to Chadwick et al’s finding, no significant relationship was found

between any of the BAVQ-R items and BAI scores.

Belief about benevolence was significantly and negatively correlated with Negative

Content scores. As Negative Content scores increased, levels of engagement were also

found to decrease. However, there was no significant relationship between beliefs about

malevolence and omnipotence and Negative Content scores.

Performance on the Affective Shifting Task and negative voice content

Correlations were carried out between Affective-Shifting Task performance and

negative voice content scores, but no significant correlations emerged between Negative

Voice Content and (a) RT, FA or omission shifting costs (all p > .09), (b) overall RT, FA

and omission rates (all p > .09) and (c) RT, FA or omission valence costs (all p > .09).

DISCUSSION

The results of the analyses of inhibitory processes are discussed initially and are

followed by a discussion of affective processes in patients with schizophrenia and in

relation to the experience of auditory hallucinations.

Chapter 5

- 107-

Inhibitory processes

Inhibition in schizophrenia

The first goal of the study was to investigate whether patients with schizophrenia

show an impairment in task-shifting compared to healthy controls on the Affective Shifting

Task. Firstly, analyses show that significantly more errors were made on shift compared to

nonshift trials in both the control and patient groups, suggesting that task shifting effects

were replicated in the current task (Murphy et al, 1999). Secondly, the results reveal that

patients with schizophrenia were not impaired in shifting attention and responding, as the

difference in performance in both response accuracy and latency between shift and non-

shift blocks was not significantly more pronounced relative to controls. The finding of

intact task shifting abilities in patients with schizophrenia contrasts with findings of

impaired performance on other tasks of intentional inhibition, such as the HSCT and ICIM

task (Nathaniel-James et al, 1996; Waters et al, 2004). We may speculate on the reason for

this discrepancy in findings. Similarly to the HSCT and ICIM task, task shifting on the

Affective Shifting Task is deliberately invoked, goal-directed, effortful and available to

conscious reflection and strategic interventions, thereby matching the definition of

intentional inhibition processes (Nigg, 2000; Wilson & Kipp, 1998). In addition, the

current or relevant goal is explicit for all of these tasks. What is different, however, is that,

on the Affective Shifting task, the response options are clearly defined and limited (since

only instances of negative and positive response options are presented to the participant).

In contrast, in tasks such as the HSCT and ICIM task, the response options are either open-

ended (HSCT) or unknown (ICIM task). Consequently, it may be speculated that the

Affective Shifting Task is an easier measure of intentional inhibition and may require less

inhibitory demands than tasks such as the HSCT and ICIM task, on which patients have

been found to be impaired. In support, Amieva, Phillips, Della Sala and Henri (2004) have

recently proposed that there are different degrees of inhibitory demand within tasks of

intentional inhibition and that the extent of controlled suppression is likely to vary

depending on various factors including different task requirements. It is possible, therefore,

that the material to be suppressed in the Affective Shifting task imposed weaker inhibitory

demands than other paradigms assessing intentional inhibition processes, such as the HSCT

or ICIM task.

Chapter 5

- 108-

This explanation may also accommodate the conflicting results on other task-shifting

paradigms, such as on the WCST, saccadic tasks (Manoach et al, 2002), a Rule Shift Cards

test and Discrimination Shift Learning paradigms (Cools, Brouwer, de Jong & Slooff,

2000; Crider, 1997; Elliott et al, 1995). In those paradigms where the response options

were limited or clearly defined, patients may have found it easier to inhibit the currently

irrelevant stimuli or category, compared to other paradigms where response alternatives

were open-ended or unspecified. Even within the same family of tasks, such as on the

WCST, different experimental designs varying in, for instance, the number of sorting

categories could have resulted in mixed findings. In order to test the proposal that patients

with schizophrenia have intact task shifting abilities when the response options are defined

or limited, it would be useful to carry out studies in the same sample of patients, in which

the difficulty of the same task-switching paradigm is manipulated by increasing the number

of possible options available to participants. An alternative explanation for the discrepancy

in findings in the literature has been provided by Manoach et al (2002). These authors

speculated that findings of impaired performance in some studies might have been due to

high working memory demands on the shifting component of the task used in these studies.

Healthy controls could predict and prepare for switch trials, but schizophrenia patients, as a

consequence of poor working memory, may have been at a disadvantage in the task-shifting

conditions leading to poor response accuracy on switch trials. In support, separate neural

processes have been identified in task-shifting performance according to the recency of

previously reinforced trials (Dreher & Berman, 2002). Further studies should aim to test

and contrast these two alternative explanations.

The results of this investigation also suggested that the patients responded more

slowly and made more FA and omissions relative to controls, suggesting difficulties

focusing attention and inhibiting inappropriate responding to interfering stimuli.

Difficulties in maintaining overall performance suggests impaired interference control in

patients with schizophrenia, confirming previous findings of interference control failure in

schizophrenia, as demonstrated by longer response latencies and greater number of errors

on a Stroop paradigm (Boucart et al, 1999; Brebion et al, 1996).

Inhibition in patients with and without auditory hallucinations

The second goal of this study was to examine the performance of patients with

auditory hallucinations, relative to those without, on the task-shifting and interference

Chapter 5

- 109-

control measures of the Affective Shifting Task. Firstly, the results show that auditory

hallucinations were not associated with impaired task-shifting abilities as measured by the

Affective Shifting Task. The finding of intact task-shifting abilities in patients with

auditory hallucinations contrasts with findings of impaired performance on other tasks of

intentional inhibition, such as the HSCT and ICIM task (Badcock et al, in press; Waters et

al, 2004). It may be speculated that, as discussed above, the demands of the task shifting

component of the Affective Shifting Task may have been easier than those required in these

other tasks because of a lower number of response options. This raises the possibility that,

in some situations, patients with auditory hallucinations are able to inhibit intrusive

cognitions. This finding may, at least partly, explain why hallucinations do not occur

continuously.

Secondly, analyses were carried out between the severity of hallucinations and

overall performance on the Affective Shifting Task. No significant correlations were found

between hallucination severity and overall RT. The finding that auditory hallucinations are

not associated with significantly longer response latencies replicates findings from Brebion

et al (1998) on the Stroop Color-Word Test and suggests that this aspect of interference

control is not particularly impaired in auditory hallucinations. Furthermore, the finding of

intact performance on a measure of overall performance argues against any explanation

based on impaired motivation, or general cognitive impairment, of patients with auditory

hallucinations.

Interestingly, the current results did show that the severity of hallucinations was

associated with an overall increase in false alarms. False alarms represent a failure to

inhibit inappropriate responding to previously relevant but currently inappropriate stimuli.

We previously identified similar difficulties in suppressing recently activated memory

representations in patients with auditory hallucinations, as measured by the ICIM task

(Badcock et al, in press; Waters et al, 2003). In particular, we showed that patients with

auditory hallucinations fail to suppress memories of prior events that are not relevant to

current goals. The present finding of an association between false alarms on the Affective

Shifting Task and auditory hallucinations provides further support for the proposal that the

severity of auditory hallucinations is associated with increasingly impaired control of

unwanted and irrelevant cognition.

Chapter 5

- 110-

In summary, the results of this study indicate that patients with schizophrenia did not

show task-shifting difficulties. Similarly, auditory hallucinations were not found to be

associated with a task-shifting impairment. Methodological differences, leading to

variation in the degree of intentional demand, between studies might have accounted for the

discrepancies with previous findings. This type of problem highlights the complexity of

unravelling a complex set of processes such as inhibitory control and the need of a clear

taxonomy of tasks of inhibition. Further studies should (a) aim to identify common

mechanisms that can help towards a systematic mapping of tasks assessing inhibitory

processes by undertaking a large study using a range of tasks on a variety of clinical and

healthy population groups and (b) develop better tasks where the inhibitory demands are

manipulated more systematically. The results also show that auditory hallucinations were

not associated with longer response latencies overall, suggesting that some aspect of

interference control was intact. However, it was found that severity of hallucinations was

associated with an increase in overall false alarms, indicating a failure to suppress currently

irrelevant stimuli and replicating previous results (e.g. Badcock et al, in press; Waters et al,

2003).

Affective processes

Affective processes in schizophrenia

The results reveal that patients with schizophrenia reported significantly higher

depression levels compared to controls. It was also found that a third of patients with

schizophrenia showed mild, moderate or severe levels of depression, replicating findings by

Siris et al (2001) in an international survey of depression in schizophrenia. The results also

show that 43% of patients report mild, moderate or severe levels of anxiety. These results

indicate that although negative mood is significantly associated with schizophrenia, it is not

a necessary feature of the illness.

Scores on the BDI-II and BAI were not found to be significantly correlated with

positive, negative or general symptoms severity as measured by the PANSS. This suggests

that although emotional disturbances were identified in the patient group, they are not

directly related to the severity of major symptom groups. Although some correlational

studies have found that depression is associated with positive symptoms (e.g. Zisook et al,

1999), other studies have found depression to be independent of the symptoms of

schizophrenia (Marengo, Harrow, Herbener & Sands, 2000). Lancon et al (2001) provided

Chapter 5

- 111-

an explanation for the discrepancy in findings, suggesting that the relationship between

depression and symptoms of schizophrenia depends largely on factors such as whether the

patients are in an acute or stable period. Depression and anxiety scores were not

significantly associated with any specific demographic or clinical characteristics either, a

finding which replicates previous studies (Baynes et al, 2000; Zisook et al, 1999)

The presence of attentional bias for negative material in patients with schizophrenia

was also investigated in this study. It was found that the patients, as a group, did not show

an attentional bias for negative material when compared to healthy controls. However, the

results did indicate an association between depression and a bias towards negative targets in

patients with schizophrenia. The subgroup of patients who scored high levels of depression

demonstrated faster latencies when negative words were the targets, and higher depression

scores in the patient group were found to be associated with an increasing number of false

alarms on negative words when positive words were the targets. The demonstration of

faster RTs for negative words, compared to positive words, in depressed schizophrenia

patients resembles the results reported for depressed individuals in Murphy et al’s (1999)

study. The finding of the same bias on negative words in the two patient groups, who are

both depressed, indicates an overlap in affective cognitive mechanisms. Beck’s (1976)

model of depression suggests that depression is characterized by distortions in information

processing, or negative schemas, and is subject to biases that overvalue negative or

threatening features in the environment (Hertel, 2002). The current results suggest that an

attentional bias for negative information may also be part of the development and

maintenance process of depression in schizophrenia patients and merit further investigation.

Overall, the results of this investigation reveal that about one third of patients with

schizophrenia were depressed and approximately one half showed elevated anxiety scores.

This suggests that emotional dysfunction is often present in schizophrenia although it is not

a core component of the disorder. Clinical and demographic factors were not found to

contribute to BDI-II and BAI scores. Consequently, what contributes to depression and

anxiety in patients with schizophrenia? Auditory hallucinations have often been linked to

emotional dysfunction. The following discussion examines the role of depression and

anxiety in patients with auditory hallucinations.

Chapter 5

- 112-

Affective processes in auditory hallucinations

Approximately one third of patients with auditory hallucinations had elevated

depression and anxiety scores, although the results also show that depression and anxiety

were not specifically related to the presence, or severity, of auditory hallucinations. This

indicates that negative affect is associated with auditory hallucinations, but not specifically

so. These findings do not support the proposal that negative affect is a direct consequence

of the hallucinations themselves (Johns et al, 2002) or that an increase in negative mood

should correlate with an increase in frequency of auditory hallucinations (Morrison &

Baker, 2000).

The results also show that only 10% of patients reported that their voices were never

negative, suggesting that negative affective hallucinations are very common in patients with

schizophrenia. The relationship between affective voice content and negative mood was

also examined. There were three significant findings: (a) those patients with no negative

voice content reported only minimal levels of depression; (b) depression levels were

significantly correlated with the amount of negative voice content; but (c) most patients

with negative voice contents still rated themselves as being minimally depressed.

Altogether, the results indicate that depression is linked to, but is not a necessary outcome

or a precondition of negative voice content of auditory hallucinations.

Exploratory analyses of the BAVQ-R reveal that, consistent with Chadwick and

Birchwood’s (1994, 1995) findings, beliefs in malevolence and omnipotence were

associated with increasing depression and resistance activity, supporting their proposal that

beliefs about voices contribute to ensuing affect. However, it was also found that beliefs in

malevolence and/or omnipotence did not necessarily result in elevated depression scores.

This supports findings by Close and Garety (1998) that show that the patients’ affective

response is not always dependent on beliefs about voices. The results also show that belief

in malevolence or omnipotence was not related to negative voice content, although belief in

benevolence was found to decrease with increasing reports of negative voice content. In

sum, the results of this investigation suggest that beliefs about voices are important

components to understanding affect and content of auditory hallucinations, although they

are not always effective predictors of negative affective states or negative voice content.

The role of attentional bias for negative material in patients with auditory

hallucinations was also investigated in this study. The results reveal that the presence of

Chapter 5

- 113-

auditory hallucinations was not associated with an attentional bias for negative material.

Similar findings have recently been reported in healthy individuals identified as being

disposed to developing hallucinations using an affective priming task (van ‘t Wout,

Aleman, Kessels, Laroi and Kahn, 2004).

However, the depression-related effect on the Affective Shifting task observed in the

schizophrenia sample group was also found to apply to patients with auditory

hallucinations who are also depressed. Although the results are preliminary given the size

of the sample group, depression in patients with auditory hallucinations was associated with

a bias towards negative material. In particular, higher depression scores were found to be

associated with an increasing number of false alarms on negative words when positive

words were the targets. This suggests that, when present, depression in patients with

hallucinations is linked to the intrusion of unwanted negative material from memory. It

may be speculated that depression, therefore, may be linked to the occurrence of negative

voice contents frequently reported by hallucinating patients. Difficulties with this proposal

include (a) as discussed above, negative voice contents still occur in patients who rate

themselves as being minimally depressed and (b) negative voice content was not found to

be associated with a bias for negative targets on the Affective Shifting Task. These

findings perhaps suggest that a more socio-psychological explanation should be put

forward to explain the frequent negative voice content reported by patients. In support,

some argue against a purely cognitive explanation for auditory hallucinations. Proponents

of this approach propose that “cognitivism” is insufficient to explain the uniqueness of

human experience, and that a better approach is to try to understand the “reflexive”

relationship between the person and the person’s experience of voices (e.g. Davies, Thomas

& Leudar, 1999; Leudar, Thomas, McNally & Glinski, 1997; Thomas, Bracken & Leudar,

2004). They suggest that voice contents can only be explained in the context of each

individual’s social, cultural, history and political framework (Thomas, Bracken & Leudar,

2004), and that only investigations at this level can explain the voices’ content. Further

research is needed to investigate this proposal.

In summary, the results show that negative mood is commonly found in patients with

auditory hallucinations although it is not necessarily linked to the presence or severity of

auditory hallucinations. In patients with auditory hallucinations, depression was found to

be related to negative voice content and beliefs in malevolence and omnipotence.

Chapter 5

- 114-

However, negative voice content and negative beliefs could not fully explain the emotional

state of hallucinating patients, since their presence did not always predict whether patients

were depressed or not. Anxiety levels were not found to be associated with any of the

current factors examined in relation to auditory hallucinations. Overall, the results suggest

that voice contents and beliefs about voices are not significant determinants of, and do not

directly result from, elevated depression/anxiety reported by hallucinating patients with

schizophrenia. Finally, an attentional bias for negative material was found to be associated

with depression in hallucinating patients, although a critical analysis of the results

suggested that this bias for negative material could not fully account for negative voice

content.

Theoretical developments

A particularly interesting new development is raised by the finding of a relationship

between belief in malevolence and omnipotence and resistance activity. Resistance activity

on the BAVQ-R is measured by the following statements: “When I hear my voice, usually:

I tell it to leave me alone, I try and take my mind off it, I try and stop it, and I do things to

prevent it talking”. The same attempts at thought control have been implicated as an

etiological and maintaining factor in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). OCD is

characterised by recurring and persistent unwanted thoughts that are actively resisted

(Purdon & Clark, 2001; Salkovskis, Richard & Forrester, 1995). It is believed that thought

control and deliberate thought suppression efforts lead to the paradoxical effect of

persistent recurrence of those unwanted thoughts. It has been found that participants

instructed to suppress thoughts about ‘white bears’ report increasing occurrence of thoughts

about white bears in a thought suppression session compared to participants who expressed

white bear thoughts prior to suppressing them (Purdon, 1999). These findings have been

incorporated into models of OCD that suggest that efforts to control intrusive obsessional

thoughts backfire by making those thoughts more accessible and by priming negative

appraisal of the thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2001; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989).

It may be speculated that these findings are relevant to the current investigations,

since hallucinating patients claim to resist voices that are believed to be malevolent and

omnipotent. It is possible that, in this way, the actual occurrence of these beliefs comes to

play a key role in the maintenance process of auditory hallucinations. Attempts at

suppressing negative and other unwanted mental events, which may originally occur as a

Chapter 5

- 115-

result of the deficit in inhibition (see Waters et al, 2003), produce a recurrence of these

events. As a result, the motivation to suppress increases and serves as a further cue for the

intrusion, and so on. Therefore, the notion of thought suppression might lead to a clearer

understanding of the maintenance process of negative affective auditory hallucinations.

One challenge to this proposal, however, is how to explain the maintenance process of

positive/neutral hallucinations. One possibility is that positive voice contents occur

randomly as a result of the inhibitory deficit outlined in Waters et al and are not actively

suppressed, so do not tend to reoccur. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the

engagement activities associated with belief in benevolence, at least in some cases,

promotes the reoccurrence of future hallucinatory episodes containing positively valenced

material.

This proposal has implications for the treatment of patients with auditory

hallucinations. The finding that depression and anxiety, at least as measured by the BDI-II

and BAI respectively, were not directly associated with auditory hallucinations suggests

that treatment directed at negative affect may not always contribute towards remission of

auditory hallucinations. However, if beliefs in malevolence and omnipotence are central to

resistance activities then effective treatments should target these beliefs. This is an

approach which has had some success in the past (e.g. Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994;

Chadwick, Sambrooke, Rasch & Davies, 2000). Those authors have developed a cognitive

behaviour therapy treatment that targets the beliefs held by patients about their voices.

They propose that a weakening or loss of these beliefs reduces negative mood states and

facilitates more adaptive coping strategies. The above proposal, however, suggests that this

therapeutic approach is beneficial because a weakening of these beliefs results in

decreasing resistance activity. These suggestions, however, are purely speculative, but they

may be worthy of further investigation in future studies.

Finally, the current study showed that less than half of the schizophrenia patients had

signs of affective disorder and no single factor investigated was found to accurately predict

whether a patient would show signs of depression or anxiety. So what determines negative

affect in patients with schizophrenia with/without auditory hallucinations? One suggestion

is that the scales used in this study were not accurate or sensitive enough to capture

emotional dysfunction in these patients. In support, the use of the BDI-II to assess

depression in schizophrenia has been questioned on the grounds that it was developed to

Chapter 5

- 116-

assess depressed mood in clinical depression, and that the symptom complaints may be

different in both disorders (Lancon et al, 2001). Instead, specific scales have been

developed to evaluate symptoms of depression independently of other negative or extra-

pyramidal symptoms of schizophrenia (Addington et al, 1993). Another possibility is that

depression and anxiety are not key affective components in schizophrenia. Other negative

moods such as fear, distress or low self-esteem, may be better contributors to negative

affect in schizophrenia. Another suggestion was raised by Marengo et al (2000). In order to

explain why only some patients develop schizophrenia, Marengo and colleagues have

simply proposed various levels of vulnerability to depression, with some patients showing

low levels of vulnerability and others showing high vulnerability to depression. In support,

they showed that some patients experience recurring depressive symptoms during the

course of their illness but a subgroup of patients are resistant to depression. The data

shown in the current study could fit a vulnerability view of depression. Only further

research in the domain of negative affect and schizophrenia can shed some light into this

complex problem.

Chapter 5

- 117-

References

Addington, D., Addington, J., Maticka-Tyndale, E. (1993). Rating depression in

schizophrenia. A comparison of a self report and an observer report scale. Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease. 181(9): 561-565.

Alpert, M., & Silvers, K. N. (1970). Perceptual characteristics distinguishing auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia and acute alcoholic psychoses. American Journal of

Psychiatry, 127(3), 298-393.

Amieva, H., Phillips, L. H., Della Sala, S., & Henry, J. D. (2004). Inhibitory functioning in

Alzheimer's disease. Brain, 127, 949-964.

Arbuthnott, K., & Frank, J. (2000). Executive control in set-switching: residual switch cost

and task-set inhibition. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54(1), 33-41.

Badcock, J. C., Waters, F. A. V. & Maybery, M. T (in press). Auditory hallucinations:

failure to inhibit irrelevant memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.

Badcock, J. C., Michie, P. T., Johnson, L., & Combrinck, J. (2002). Acts of control in

schizophrenia: dissociating the components of inhibition. Psychological Medicine, 32,

287-297.

Baynes, D., Mulholland, C., Cooper, S. J., Montgomery, R. C., MacFlynn, G., Lynch, G.,

Kelly, C., & King, D. J. (2000). Depressive symptoms in stable chronic

schizophrenia: prevalence and relationship to psychopathology and treatment.

Schizophrenia Research, 45, 47-56.

Beck, A. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. Penguin Psychology.

Beck, A. (1990). BAI . San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Beck, A. (1996). BDI-II . San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Beech, A., Powell, T., McWilliam, J., & Claridge, G. (1989). Evidence of reduced

'cognitive inhibition' in schizophrenia. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28,

109-116.

Bentall, R. (1997). The syndromes and symptoms of psychosis. Or why you can't play

'twenty questions' with the concept of schizophrenia and hope to win. In R. Bentall

(Ed.), Reconstructing schizophrenia (pp. 23-59). London: Routledge.

Birchwood, M. (2003). Pathways to emotional dysfunction in first-episode psychosis. The

British Journal of Psychiatry, 182, 373-375.

Chapter 5

- 118-

Birchwood, M., & Chadwick, P. (1997). The omnipotence of voices: testing the validity of

a cognitive model. Psychological Medicine, 27, 1345-1353.

Birchwood, M., Iqbal, Z., Chadwick, P., & Trower, P. (2000). Cognitive approach to

depression and suicidal thinking in psychosis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 177,

516-528.

Boucart, M., Mobarek, N., Cuervo, C., & Danion, J.-M. (1999). What is the nature of

increased Stroop interference in schizophrenia. Acta Psychologica, 101, 3-25.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., & Amador, X. (1996). Reality monitoring failure in

schizophrenia: The role of selective attention. Schizophrenia Research, 22, 173-180.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., Malaspina, D., & Amador, X. (1998). Resistance to

interference and positive symptomatology in schizophrenia. Cognitive

Neuropsychiatry, 3, 179-190.

Calev, A., & Edelist, S. (1993). Affect and memory in schizophrenia: Negative emotion

words are forgotten less rapidly than other words by long-hospitalised schizophrenics.

Psychopathology, 26, 229-235.

Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., & Copolov, D. L. (1996). Patients' strategies for coping with

auditory hallucinations. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 184(3), 161-166.

Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., Howard, S., Zeegers, T., & Copolov, D. L. (1995). The

development and reliability of the Mental Health Research Institute Unusual

Perceptions Schedule (MUPS): an instrument to record auditory hallucinatory

experience. Schizophrenia Research, 16, 157-165.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1994). The omnipotence of voices - the cognitive

approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 190-201.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1995). The Omnipotence of Voices II: The Beliefs About

Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ). British Journal of Psychiatry, 166, 773-776.

Chadwick, P., Lees, S., & Birchwood, M. (2000). The revised Beliefs About Voices

Questionnaire. British Journal of Psychiatry, Sept, 229-232.

Chadwick, P., Sambrooke, S., Rasch, S., & Davies, E. (2000). Challenging the

omnipotence of voices: group cognitive behaviour therapy for voices. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 38, 993-1003.

Chapter 5

- 119-

Close, H., & Garety, P. (1998). Cognitive assessment of voices: further develoments in

understanding the emotional impact of voices. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,

37, 173-188.

Cools, R., Brouwer, W. H., de Jong, R., & Slooff, C. (2000). Flexibility, inhibition and

planning: frontal dysfunctioning in schizophrenia. Brain and Cognition, 43, 108-112.

Copolov, D. L., Seal, M. L., Maruff, P., Ulusoy, R., Wong, M. T. H., Tochon-Danguy, H.

J., & Egan, G. F. (2003). Cortical activation associated with the experience of

auditory hallucinations and perception of human speech in schizophrenia: a PET

correlation study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 122, 139-152.

Crider, A. (1997). Perseveration in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 23(1), 63-74.

Davies, P., Thomas, P., & Leudar, I. (1999). Dialogical engagement with voices: a single

case study. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 72, 179-187.

Delespaul, P., deVries, M., & van Os, J. (2002). Determinants of occurrence and recovery

from hallucinations in daily life. Society of Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology,

37, 97-104.

Dreher, J.-C., & Berman, K. F. (2002). Fractionating the neural substrate of cognitive

control processes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA,

99(22), 14595-14600.

Elliott, R., McKenna, P. J., Robbins, T. E., & Sahakian, B. J. (1995). Neuropsychological

evidence for frontostriatal dysfunction in schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 25,

619-630.

Falloon, I. R. H., & Talbot, R. E. (1981). Persistent auditory hallucinations: coping

mechanisms and implication for management. Psychological Medicine, 11, 329-339.

Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and

interference control functions: a latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental

Psychology: General, 133(1), 101-135.

Gooding, D.C., & Tallent, K.A. (2002) Schizophrenia patients’ perceptual biases in

response to positively and negatively valenced emotion chimeras. Psychological Medicine,

32(6), 1101-1107.

Haddock, G., McCarron, J., Tarrier, N., & Faragher, E. B. (1999). Scales to measure

dimensions of hallucinations and delusions: the psychotic symptom rating scales

(PSYRATS). Psychological Medicine, 29, 879-889.

Chapter 5

- 120-

Haila, H., Isometsa, E.T., Henriksson, M.M., Heikkinen, M.E., Marttunen, M.J., &

Lonnqvist, J.K. (1997). Suicide and schizophrenia: a nationwide psychological

autopsy study on age- and sex-specific clinical characteristics of 92 suicide victims

with schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry. 154, 1235-1242.

Hertel, P. T. (2002). Cognitive biases in anxiety and depression: introduction to the special

issue. Cognition and Emotion, 16(3), 321-330.

Hustig, H. H., & Hafner, R. J. (1990). Persistent auditory hallucinations and their

relationship to delusions and mood. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,

178(4), 264-267.

Johns, L. C., Hemsley, D., & Kuipers, E. (2002). A comparison of auditory hallucinations

in a psychiatric and nonpsychiatric group. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,

41(1), 81-86.

Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria: the role of inhibitory processes.

Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 125-147.

Kay, S. R., Fiszbein, A., & Opler, L. A. (1987). The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale

(PANSS) for Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, 261-276.

Kopp, B., & Rist, F. (1994). Error-correcting behaviour in schizophrenia patients.

Schizophrenia Research, 13, 11-22.

Lancon, C., Auquier, P., Reine, G., Bernard, D., & Addington, D. (2001). Relationships

between depression and psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia during an acute

episode and stable episode. Schizophrenia Research, 47, 135-140.

Laplante, L., Everett, J., & Thomas, J. (1992). Inhibition through negative priming with

Stroop stimuli in schizophrenia. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 31, 307-327.

Leudar, I., Thomas, P., McNally, D., & Glinski, A. (1997). What voices can do with words:

pragmatics of verbal hallucinations. Psychological Medicine, 27, 885-898.

MacLeod, C., & Rutherford, E. (1998). Automatic and strategic cognitive biases in anxiety

and depression. In K. Kirsner & C. Speelman (Eds.), Implicit and explicit mental

processes (pp. 468pp). Mahwah, NJ< USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Manoach, D. S., Lindgren, K. A., Cherkasova, M. V., Goff, D. C., Halpern, E. F.,

Intriligator, J., & Barton, J. J. (2002). Schizophrenic subjects show deficient

inhibition but intact task switching on saccadic tasks. Biological Psychiatry, 51, 816-

826.

Chapter 5

- 121-

Marengo, J., Harrow, M., Herbener, E. S., & Sands, J. (2000). A prospective longitudinal

10-year study of schizophrenia's three major factors and depression. Psychiatry

Research, 97(1).

Maruff, P., Danckert, J., Pantellis, C., & Currie, J. (1998). Saccadic and attentional

abnormalities in patients with schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 28, 1091-1100.

McGhie, A., & Chapman, J. (1961). Disorders of attention and perception in early

schizophrenia. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 34, 103-116.

Mineka, S., & Nugent, K. (1995). Mood-congruent memory biases in anxiety and

depression. In D. L. Schacter (Ed.), Memory distortion: How minds, brains and

societies reconstruct the past (pp. 173-193). London, England: Harvard University.

Morrison, A. P., & Baker, C. A. (2000). Intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations: a

comparative study of intrusions in psychosis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38,

1097-1106.

Murphy, F. C., Sahakian, B. J., Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Rogers, R. D., Robins, T.

W., & Paykel, E. S. (1999). Emotional bias and inhibitory control processes in mania

and depression. Psychological Medicine, 29, 1307-1321.

Murray, L. A., Whitehouse, W., & Alloy, L. (1999). Mood congruence and depressive

deficits in memory: a forced-recall analysis. Memory, 7(2), 175-196.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Brown, R., & Ron, M. (1996). Memory impairment in

schizophrenia: its relationship to executive function. Schizophrenia Research, 21, 85-

96.

Nathaniel-James, D., & Frith, C. (1996). Confabulation in schizophrenia: evidence of a new

form? Psychological Medicine, 26, 391-199.

Nelson, H. E. (1982). The National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test Manual. Windsor,

Berks: NFER-Nelson.

Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology: Views

from cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition taxonomy.

Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 220-246.

Phillips, M. L., Drevets, W. C., Rauch, S. L., & Lane, R. (2003). Neurobiology of emotion

perception I: the neural basis of normal emotion perception. Biological Psychiatry,

54, 504-514.

Chapter 5

- 122-

Purdon, C. (1999). Though suppression and psychopathology. Behaviour Research and

Therapy, 37, 1029-1054.

Purdon, C., & Clark, D. (2001). Suppression of obsession-like thoughts in nonclinical

individuals: impact on thought frequency, appraisal and mood state. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 39, 1163-1181.

Ross, R., Harris, J., Olincy, A., Radant, A., Adler, L., & Freedman, R. (1998). Familial

transmission of two independent saccadic abnormalities in schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia Research, 30, 59-70.

Rossell, S. L., Shapleske, J., & David, A. S. (1998). Sentence verification and delusions: a

content-specific deficit. Psychological medicine, 28, 1189-1198.

Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: a cognitive behavioural

analysis. Behaviour, Research & Therapy, 23(5), 571.

Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive

thoughts in obsessional problems. Behavioural Research and Therapy, 27(6), 677-

682.

Salkovskis, P. M., Richards, H. C., & Forrester, E. (1995). The relationship between

obsessional problems and intrusive thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy,

23, 281-299.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

Schwartz, B. D., & Evans, W. J. (1999). Neurophysiologic mechanisms of attention deficits

in schizophrenia. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology & Behavioural Neurology.

Silbersweig, D. A., Stern, E., C, F., & al, e. (1995). A functional neuroanatomy of

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Nature, 378, 176-179.

Siris, S. G., Addington, D., Azorin, J.-M., Fallon, I. R., Gerlach, J., & Hirsch, S. R. (2001).

Depression in schizophrenia: recognition and management in the USA. Schizophrenia

Research, 47, 185-197.

Soppitt, C. W., & Birchwood, M. (1997). Depression, beliefs, voice content and

topography: a cross sectional study of schizophrenia patients with auditory verbal

hallucinations. Journal of Mental Health, 6(5), 525-532.

Suslow, T., Roestel, C., Droste, T. Arolt, V. (2003). Automatic processing of verbal

emotional stimuli in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 120(2), 131-144.

Chapter 5

- 123-

Takebayashi, H., Takei, N., & Mori, N. (2002). Unilateral auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia after damage to the right hippocampus. Schizophrenia Research.

Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Leudar, I. (2004). Hearing voices: a phenomenological-

hermeneutic approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 13-23.

van 't Woot, M., Aleman, A., Kessels, R., Laroi, F., & Kahn, R. S. (2004). Emotional

processing in a non-clinical psychosis-prone sample. Schizophrenia Research, 68,

271-281.

Walsh, E., Harvey, K., White, I., Manley, C., Fraser, J., Stanbridge, S., & Murray, R. M.

(1999). Prevalence and predictors of parasuicide in chronic psychosis. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 100(5), 375-382.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (2003). Inhibition in

schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 62,

275-280.

Wilson, S. P., & Kipp, K. (1998). The development of efficient inhibition: Evidence from

directed-forgetting tasks. Developmental Review, 18, 86-123.

Woodruff, P. W. R. (2004). Auditory hallucinations: insights and questions from

neuroimaging. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 73-91.

Zisook, S., McAdams, L. A., Kuck, J., Harris, J., Bailey, A., Patterson, T. L., Judd, L. L., &

Jeste, D. V. (1999). Depressive symptoms in schizophrenia. American Journal of

Psychiatry, 156, 1736-1743.

- 125 -

CONTEXT MEMORY

AND

AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS

- 127 -

Foreword to Chapter 6 and 7

The results presented in previous chapters suggest that an impairment in intentional

inhibition is associated with the presence and severity of auditory hallucinations. Since a

failure of inhibition results in mental events intruding into consciousness, the inhibitory

deficit might account for the commonly reported complaint that auditory hallucinations are

intrusive and uncontrollable. However this impairment is clearly not enough for auditory

hallucinations to occur since inhibitory deficits are also present in conditions who do not

commonly report auditory hallucinations (i.e. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Vasterling,

Braily, Constans & Sutker, 1998). Another deficit must also be present, which, when

combined with the inhibitory deficit, would result in auditory hallucinations.

The preliminary study presented in Chapter 2 has shown that, in addition to the

notion of intrusiveness, individuals vulnerable to hallucinations identify experiences which

are referred to an external agency. Since schizophrenia patients with auditory

hallucinations also attribute mental events to an external agent, it is possible that the failure

to assign mental events to the self might be a generic feature of the hallucinatory

experience. The following two chapters aim to investigate the mechanisms that are

responsible for this particular feature of the hallucinatory experience in schizophrenia.

A recent cognitive model of auditory hallucinations has proposed that the patients’

failure to identify correctly the origins of auditory hallucinations results from a fundamental

deficit in context memory (Nayani & David, 1996). In support, Johnson, Hashtroudi and

Linsay (1993) have suggested that a loss of qualitative information in memory, such as

contextual details, would make it difficulty to identify correctly the origins of mental

events. The aim of Chapters 6 and 7 is to investigate the proposal that a context memory

deficit is associated with auditory hallucinations in patients with schizophrenia.

Chapter 6 starts by investigating whether a deficit in context memory is present in

patients with schizophrenia, compared to a group of healthy controls. A new task was

developed, in which memory for events is assessed in conjunction with memory for both

the source and temporal characteristics of those events.

Chapter 7 subsequently presents the results of subgroup analyses, comparing the

performance of patients with and without auditory hallucinations on the Context Memory

task.

- 128 -

References

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring. Psychological

Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

Vasterling, J., Brailey, K., Constans, J., & Sutker, P. (1998). Attention and memory

dysfunction in post-traumatic stress disorder. Neuropsychology, 1998(12), 1, 125-

133.

- 129 -

Chapter 6

Context Memory and Binding in Schizophrenia

Abstract

The current study aimed to provide evidence for the context-memory hypothesis

which proposes that schizophrenia is linked to a deficit in retrieving contextual information

and in binding the different components of a memory together. A new task was developed

in which memory for the content of events could be assessed in conjunction with memory

for both source and temporal information. Forty-three patients with schizophrenia and 24

normal controls took part in the study. Patients were found to be less accurate in

identifying the source and temporal context of events. Furthermore, whereas controls

tended to identify correctly both source and temporal context of events, patients tended to

have a more fractionated recollection of those events. The study provides support for the

context-memory hypothesis by demonstrating that patients with schizophrenia show a

fundamental deficit in binding contextual cues together to form a coherent representation of

an event in memory.

Waters, FAV, Maybery, MT, Badcock, JC, Michie, PT. (2004) Context Memory and

Binding in Schizophrenia, Schizophrenia Research, 68(2-3), 119-125.

Chapter 6

- 130 -

Schizophrenia has increasingly been linked to a deficit in integrating contextual

information in memory and several authors have proposed that many of the cognitive

deficits observed in schizophrenia result from an impairment in the ability to process

contextual information (e.g. Bazin, Perruchet, Hardy-Bayle, & Feline, 2000, Cohen &

Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Rizzo, Danion, Van der Linden, & Grange, 1996a; Servan-

Schreiber, Cohen, & Steingard, 1996). In the sphere of long-term memory research, a

context-memory hypothesis (e.g. Danion, Rizzo & Bruant, 1999; Rizzo et al, 1996a,b;

Schwartz et al, 1991) suggests that patients with schizophrenia have a deficit in binding

together different contextual information to form an intact memory representation.

In episodic memory research, a distinction between the 'content' and 'context' of

memory events is often made, the content referring to the event itself while information

about context usually refers to extrinsic features that are not part of the stimulus itself, such

as the source of an action or its temporal context. There is evidence that memory for the

content and context of an event may be functionally dissociable and may rely on different

anatomical regions of the brain (Cabeza et al, 1997; Nyberg et al, 1996). However,

memories require not only the retention of particular features but also the cognitive

processes for binding the features together. Binding processes combine different elements

into a complete memory representation and provide the knowledge that certain features

belong together (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996).

Evidence supporting the context memory hypothesis in schizophrenia rests primarily

on findings of impairment in source recognition (Danion et al, 1999; Keefe, Arnold, Bayen,

& Harvey, 1999; Vinogradov et al, 1997), in judgements of temporal order as assessed by

recency discrimination tasks (Rizzo et al, 1996a; Schwartz et al, 1991) and in memory for

spatial location (Rizzo et al, 1996b). While this hypothesis is supported by demonstrations

that patients perform poorly on tasks assessing individual contextual cues, more convincing

evidence for a general binding impairment would lie in demonstrating that patients are not

able to reconstruct a complex memory occurrence based on a combination of contextual

cues.

The current study aimed to test directly the hypothesis that schizophrenia is linked to

a deficit in binding different elements in memory together. A new task was developed

where memory for events could be assessed in conjunction with memory for both source

and temporal information: each participant watched or performed pairings of common

Chapter 6

- 131 -

household objects in two different sessions. The task therefore tested recognition for

specific events, the source of these events, when the events occurred and the ability to bind

the two contextual features together.

Method

Participants

Forty-three patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia were selected from a

psychiatric hospital in Perth, Western Australia. Their demographic and clinical data are

presented in Table 1. All patients were receiving typical, atypical or a combination of

neuroleptics. A control group comprised 24 individuals with no personal or first-degree

family history of psychiatric illness was then selected from the community. Exclusionary

criteria for all participants included a history of head injury and neurological illness.

Patients and controls did not differ in premorbid IQ as measured with the National Adult

Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), age or educational level. The study was approved by the

University of Western Australia and Graylands Hospital Ethics Committees and signed

informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Table 1

Demographic and clinical data for patients with schizophrenia and healthy control

participants (means and standard deviations)

Controls (n = 24) Patients (n = 43) Group

Comparisons p

Age 34.67 (8.81) 36.73 (8.41) t = .95 .34

Gender 20 M, 4 F 35 M, 7 F

Handedness 19 R, 4 L 35 R, 6 L

Years Education 11.75 (1.89) 10.97 (1.97) t = 1.55 .12

NART 103.62 (4.75) 100.21 (9.32) t = 1.66 .10

Age of first hospitalisation - 23.09 (5.80)

Number of admissions - 9.35 (7.79)

Duration of illness (years) - 13.64 (8.14)

Chlorpromazine equivalent - 942.78 (445.35)

Chapter 6

- 132 -

Memory for context task (adapted from Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Danion et al, 1999;

Huppert & Piercy, 1978).

Participants watched or performed pairings of two sets of 24 household objects over

two sessions 30 minutes apart.

Materials: There were 48 common household objects. Half were allocated to the

'watch' action (participants watched the experimenter pair the objects) and half to the

'perform' action (participants performed the pairing themselves). A series of cards provided

instructions to position objects next to one another or to watch the experimenter perform

the action. In the recognition test, 24 pairs of objects were presented: 16 pairs were kept in

their original combination (“intact pairs”), and 8 pairs were objects that were re-paired in

new combinations (“rearranged pairs”). No new objects were added. Objects in new

combinations were kept within the same action sequence (watch/perform) and presentation

session (1 or 2).

Procedure: In the first session, participants were shown 24 common objects set out

randomly on a table. They were told that they would pair objects together or watch the

experimenter pair objects together in two different sessions and were instructed that they

should try to remember which objects went together, who paired them and in which

session, for a test later on. Thirty minutes after the first session the second session took

place. A different set of 24 objects was presented but the procedure remained the same.

Five minutes after the end of the second session, the recognition test was administered

verbally. Pairs of objects were read out individually. Participants indicated whether each

pair was an intact or rearranged combination, and for pairs judged as being intact they had

to specify who performed the pairing (self/experimenter), and when (session 1/2).

Data analysis

Multinomial modelling (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990) and signal-detection methods

(Hilford, Glanzer, Kim & DeCarlo, 2002) are alternative analytic techniques advocated for

source memory paradigms, with each providing estimates of sensitivity to item information,

sensitivity to source information and guessing biases. We adopted signal-detection

methods for two reasons. First, substantial reviews of evidence concerning both item

recognition (Kinchla, 1994) and source recognition (Hilford et al, 2002) favour the

predictions of signal detection models over the predictions of threshold models, of which

Chapter 6

- 133 -

multinomial models are instances. Second, multinomial modelling is not suited to our task

design. In contrast to traditional source monitoring designs, our rearranged test pairs were

not novel: each consisted of two objects that had been encountered previously in the same

study session and in relation to the same source. This meant that the rearranged pairs could

not be used in the way new items are used in traditional designs when estimating

parameters of multinomial models. Therefore we applied signal-detection analyses (with

corrections recommended by Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) to the recognition of intact versus

rearranged pairs, to judgments of source, and to temporal judgments. These analyses

provided independent estimates of discrimination accuracy and bias for each type of

judgement.

Results

Analyses of memory for content are presented initially followed by analyses of

context judgements. We then report comparisons of the patient group to a low-scoring

subgroup of controls. In the last analysis, binding is investigated by examining whether

participants had intact memory for the conjunction of the contextual cues. Table 2 shows a

detailed breakdown of responses and Table 3 shows proportions correct data for object pair

recognition and for source and temporal judgments for correctly recognized intact pairs,

and results of binding investigations.

Intact versus rearranged object pair recognition

The proportions of object pairs correctly recognized as intact or rearranged were subjected

to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with participant group as a between-subjects factor

and intact versus rearranged object pairs as a within-subjects factor. Recognition accuracy

was lower for the patient group compared to the control group, F(1, 65) = 17.82, p < .001.

Recognition accuracy did not differ significantly for intact versus rearranged stimuli, F(1,

65) = .49, p = .48, nor was the interaction significant, F(1, 65) = 2.37, p = .12.

Discrimination accuracy was higher for controls (M = 1.03, SD = .91) than for patients (M

= .37, SD = .55), t(65) = 3.66, p < .001, although both groups were significantly better than

chance, smaller t(42) = 4.28, p < .01. The group difference in response bias (controls: M =

1.05, SD = .76; patients: M = 1.24, SD = .58) was not significant, t(65) = 1.11, p = .26.

Chapter 6

- 134 -

Table 2

Number of responses (means and standard deviations) for source and temporal judgements

for controls and patients

Responses1

SOURCE JUDGEMENTS Intact-Performed Intact-Watch Rearranged

CONTROLS

Test stimuli:

Intact – Performed

Intact – Watched

Rearranged

5.45 (1.55)

.37 (.71)

1.33 (1.27)

1.0 (1.10)

5.33 (2.01)

1.54 (1.41)

1.54 (1.47)

2.29 (1.65)

5.12 (2.07)

PATIENTS

Test stimuli:

Intact – Performed

Intact – Watched

Rearranged

3.51 (2.24)

.51 (.79)

1.11 (1.05)

1.39 (1.17)

3.39 (2.00)

2.09 (1.68)

3.09 (2.05)

4.09 (2.00)

4.79 (2.23)

TEMPORAL JUDGEMENTS Intact-Session 1 Intact-Session 2 Rearranged

CONTROLS

Test stimuli:

Intact – Session 1

Intact – Session 2

Rearranged

5.00 (1.71)

1.29 (1.42)

1.45 (1.31)

.95 (.95)

4.91 (2.08)

1.41 (1.28)

2.04 (1.51)

1.79 (1.81)

5.12 (2.07)

PATIENTS

Test stimuli:

Intact – Session 1

Intact – Session 2

Rearranged

2.32 (1.82)

2.23 (2.12)

1.83 (1.67)

1.46 (1.36)

2.76 (2.07)

1.37 (1.30)

4.20 (2.05)

3.00 (2.01)

4.79 (2.23)

1 Out of a possible 8 per condition/row. The underlined scores represent the number of

correct responses per condition.

Chapter 6

- 135 -

Table 3

Means and standard deviations of (1) proportions correct for object pair recognition and

for source and temporal judgements for correctly recognized intact pairs, and (2)

proportions of correctly recognized intact pairs for which 'who & when' , 'who only', 'when

only' and 'neither' were recognised

Controls Low Controls Patients

M SD M SD M SD

1. Content and context memory judgements

Object pair recognition .69 .22 .63 .22 .57 .25

Source judgements .88 .12 .88 .13 .75 .17

Temporal judgements .81 .14 .81 .12 .57 .24

2. Binding of source and temporal information

Who & When 0.73 .19 0.70 .18 0.41 .23

Who only 0.15 .11 0.17 .12 0.31 .22

When only 0.08 .10 0.10 .14 0.14 .12

Neither 0.03 .05 0.01 .03 0.12 .17

Source and temporal judgments

Participants provided source and temporal judgments only for stimulus pairs they

judged to be intact so analyses of context recognition were restricted to correctly

recognized intact stimulus pairs. For these pairs, the proportions of source and temporal

judgements that were correct were calculated for each participant. These proportions were

then subjected to an ANOVA with participant group as a between-subjects factor and

context (source versus temporal) as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant main

effect of group, F(1, 64) = 23.84, p < .01, indicating that controls were more accurate in

recalling the source or temporal context of an event compared to patients. The effect of

context was also significant, F(1, 64) = 14.64, p < .01, with source being identified

correctly more often than temporal context. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 64) =

2.59, p = .11.

Chapter 6

- 136 -

Discrimination accuracy values calculated in separate signal detection analyses for

source and temporal information1 were subjected to ANOVA. Discrimination accuracy was

higher overall for controls (M = 1.86, SD = .87) than for patients (M = .82, SD = 1.03), F(1,

65) = 27.36, p < .001. The effect of context was also significant, F(1, 65) = 19.32, p < .001,

but the interaction was not, F(1, 65) = 2.18, p = .14.

An analysis of bias for source (i.e. the preference to identify stimuli as self-paired

rather than experimenter-paired) revealed a nonsignificant difference between controls (M

= 1.52, SD = .74) and patients (M = 1.32, SD = .67), t(65) = 1.10, p = .27. An analysis of

bias for temporal context (i.e. the preference to identify stimuli as having been presented in

session 1 rather than session 2) also showed a nonsignificant difference between controls

(M = 1.08, SD = .63) and patients (M = 1.24, SD = .69), t(65) = .90, p = .37.

Low-functioning controls

Direct comparisons of contextual memory between patients and controls are not

entirely satisfactory since overall patients recalled significantly fewer intact object pairs

than controls. Consequently, it is not clear whether the deficit in context memory is due to

a specific deficit in schizophrenia or is present in all individuals with poor memory. In

order to examine this possibility, controls with high levels of recognition accuracy for intact

object pairs were removed and ten participants remained with a mean level of recognition

accuracy on intact pairs (M = .58, SD = .08) that was similar to that of patients (M = .54, SD

= .22).

The proportions of object pairs correctly recognized as intact or rearranged were

subjected to ANOVA with participant group as a between-subjects factor. There were no

significant effects in this analysis (the main effect of group yielded F(1, 51) = 2.97, p =

.09). In addition, discrimination accuracy did not differ significantly for the low-

functioning controls (M = .78, SD = .88) and patients (M = .37, SD = .55), t(51) = 1.82, p =

.07, nor did bias (controls: M = 1.64, SD = .82; patients: M =1.24, SD = .58), t(51) = 1.83, p

= .07.

1 For the analysis of source judgments, correct source identification for self-paired stimuli constituted hits, and incorrect source identification of experimenter-paired stimuli constituted false alarms. For the analysis of temporal judgments, correct temporal judgments for session-1 stimuli constituted hits, and incorrect temporal judgments for session-2 stimuli constituted false alarms. Outcomes were unchanged when alternative analyses (i.e. in which correct identification of experimenter-paired stimuli constituted hits in the analysis of source, and correct identification of session-2 stimuli constituted hits in the analysis of temporal judgments) were conducted.

Chapter 6

- 137 -

Table 3 shows that the performance of the low-functioning controls in identifying

source and temporal context was almost identical to the broader control group; although

they recalled fewer than 60% of all intact pairs correctly, those object pairs were nearly

always accompanied by correct source and temporal recollection. An ANOVA conducted

on the accuracy of source and temporal context recognition yielded a significant main

effect of group, F(1, 50) = 12.02, p < .01, showing that the low-functioning controls were

more accurate in recalling the context of an event compared to patients. The effect of

context was significant, F (1, 50) = 6.12, p < .01, but the interaction was not, F (1, 50) =

1.16, p = .28.

Discrimination accuracy of context judgements was also subjected to ANOVA. The

analysis confirmed that discrimination accuracy for context judgments was higher for low-

functioning controls than for patients, F(1, 51) = 10.50, p < .01. Analyses of bias values

again failed to reveal any group differences for source or temporal judgements (all p > .37).

These results show that although the low functioning controls had intact object pair

recognition comparable to that of the patients they still recalled source and temporal

context significantly more often than patients.

Binding of source and temporal information

In this section, binding ability was examined by investigating whether patients had an

intact memory for all contextual cues. This was assessed by investigating how many

contextual features were recalled in conjunction with each correctly recognized intact

event. Four variables extracted were the proportions of object pairs: (1) where both source

and temporal information were correctly retrieved ('who & when'), (2) where source only

was correctly retrieved (‘who only’), (3) where temporal information only was correctly

retrieved (‘when only’), and (4) where neither source nor temporal information was

correctly retrieved (‘neither’). A 2 (patients vs. controls) x 3 (context: 'who only' vs. ‘when

only' vs. 'who & when') ANOVA was performed. Proportions for 'neither' were not

included to prevent collinearity problems arising from using all four proportions, which

would sum to one. There were significant main effects of context, F(1, 65) = 158.21, p <

.001, and group, F(1, 65) = 8.40, p < .01, and a significant interaction, F(1, 65) = 25.62, p

< .001. Table 3 shows that, in controls, correct item recognition was accompanied by

retrieval of both contextual cues approximately three quarters of the time. Patients, by

contrast, retrieved correctly both source and temporal features much less than half the time

Chapter 6

- 138 -

with the majority retrieving only one or the other contextual feature, or none at all. T-tests

confirmed that patients differed from controls for each of the four recognition variables,

smallest t(65) = 2.11, p < .05. These results support the hypothesis that patients have a

deficit in binding individual features together. Table 3 also shows that the performance on

source and temporal judgements of low-functioning controls was almost identical to the

control group before the high-scoring individuals were removed and thus that poor item

recognition is not necessarily linked to a decrease in binding efficiency.

Demographic and clinical factors

No significant correlations were found between object pairs, source or temporal

recognition conditions and age, NART scores, duration of illness, chlorpromazine dosage

equivalents or number of admissions.

Discussion

The current study investigated whether schizophrenia was associated with a deficit in

binding contextual cues together. Firstly, at the level of content and individual contextual

features, patients recognized significantly fewer object pairs than controls and were less

accurate in recalling the source and temporal context of events. These results are consistent

with some findings that episodic memory is impaired in schizophrenia (e.g. Gur, Moelter,

& Ragland, 2000) and that schizophrenia is also associated with source and temporal

context deficits (Danion et al, 1999; Keefe et al., 1999; Rizzo et al., 1996a; Vinogradov et

al., 1997). Furthermore, although discrimination accuracy was lower for patients than

controls, the results showed that this was not linked with an unusual bias in responding in

the patient group. Secondly, the results suggested that schizophrenia is associated with an

impairment in combining contextual cues together to form an integrated representation of

an event in memory. While controls tended to retrieve all the features of events, patients

tended to have a more fractionated recollection of these events, retrieving only individual

features in isolation or none at all. This points to an abnormality in the ability to bind

together all the original components of an experience. Furthermore the current findings

were strengthened by the comparison of the patients' performance with that of controls who

also performed poorly on content memory. Although the lower-functioning controls had

low recognition accuracy for intact object pairs, source and temporal context judgments and

Chapter 6

- 139 -

binding abilities were still intact, suggesting that the deficit in binding is specific to patients

with schizophrenia and is not a general feature of participants with poor content memory.

In summary, the study showed that patients had a disproportionately severe deficit in

combining contextual cues in memory. This is the first demonstration of such a deficit in

schizophrenia and provides direct evidence for theories of schizophrenia that posit a deficit

in context memory and relational binding (Rizzo et al., 1996a,b; Schwartz et al., 1991).

The results are also consistent with similar theories of schizophrenia that propose a deficit

in integrating contextual information, as defined by background information temporarily

held in mind to mediate an appropriate response (Bazin et al, 2000; Cohen & Servan-

Schreiber, 1992; Servan-Schreiber et al, 1996).

What underlies this poor performance in contextual memory and binding? Johnson

and colleagues' (1993, 1994) source-monitoring framework posits that memory records are

inferred on the basis of available cues and other decision processes and therefore that a lack

of qualitative information and poor decision-making processes would contribute to poor

judgements about the origins of memories. Similarly, binding ability depends on encoding

processes and the ability to 'reactivate' information based on inferences and other cognitive

processes (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). This view would be consistent with findings from

the current patient group since schizophrenia has often been linked to deficient encoding

(Gur et al., 2000) and some common symptoms have been linked to a lax criterion in

responding ( Baker & Morrison, 1998).

Although contextual memory and binding are discussed separately in this paper, they

are not separate constructs. Contextual memory depends on the binding of each contextual

cue to the content of the event and thus impaired binding ability would result in impaired

contextual memory (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). However, separation of these processes

in the current study was necessary to determine whether schizophrenia is linked to a

specific impairment in retrieving a particular type of context or in binding the different

contextual features together.

In conclusion, the current study showed that schizophrenia is linked to a deficit in

binding contextual cues together to form a whole representation of an episode in memory.

Complex event memories are central for a sense of who we are and our place in relation to

others. Such a deficit is consistent with the view that schizophrenia is linked to

Chapter 6

- 140 -

dysfunctional integration as proposed by the disconnection hypothesis of schizophrenia

(e.g. Friston, 1999).

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank particularly all the participants of this study, Andrew Heathcote

for his very helpful statistical advice, David Castle for his training on psychiatric scales and

Danny Rock for his invaluable help in recruiting patients.

Chapter 6

- 141 -

References

Baker, C. A., & Morrison, A. P. (1998). Cognitive processes in auditory hallucinations:

attributional biases and metacognition. Psychological Medicine, 28, 1199-1208.

Batchelder, W.H. & Riefer, R.M. (1990) Multinomial processing models of source

monitoring. Psychological Review, 97(4), 548-564.

Bazin, N., Perruchet, P., Hardy-Bayle, M., & Feline, A. (2000). Context-dependent

information processing in patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 45(1-

2), 93-101.

Cabeza, R., Mangels, J., Nyberg, L., Habib, R., Houle, S., McIntosh, A. R., & Tulving, E.

(1997). Brain regions differentially involved in remembering what and when: A PET

study. Neuron, 19, 863-870.

Chalfonte, B. L., & Johnson, M. K. (1996). Feature memory and binding in young and

older adults. Memory and Cognition, 24(4), 403-416.

Cohen, J. D., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). A neural network model of disturbances in

the processing of context in schizophrenia. Psychiatric Annals, 22(3), 131-136.

Conway, M. A., & Dewhurst, S. A. (1995). Remembering, Familiarity, and Source

Monitoring. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A(1), 125-140.

Danion, J.M., Rizzo, L., & Bruant, A. (1999). Functional mechanisms underlying impaired

recognition memory and conscious awareness in patients with schizophrenia.

Archives of General Psychiatry, 56(7), 639-644.

Friston, K. J. (1999). Schizophrenia and the disconnection hypothesis. Acta Psychiatrica

Scandinavica, 99(Suppl. 395), 68-79.

Gur, R. C., Moelter, S. T., & Ragland, J. D. (2000). Learning and memory in

schizophrenia. In T. Sharma & P. Harvey (Eds.), Cognition in Schizophrenia:

Impairments, importance and treatment strategies (pp. 73-92). Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Hilford, A., Glanzer, M., Kim, K., & DeCarlo, L.T. (2002). Regularities of source

recognition: ROC analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131(4),

494-510.

Huppert, F., & Piercy, M. (1978). The role of trace strength in recency and frequency

judgements by amnesic and control subjects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental

Psychology, 30, 347-354.

Chapter 6

- 142 -

Keefe, R. S. E., Arnold, M. C., Bayen, U. J., & Harvey, P. D. (1999). Source monitoring

deficits in patients with schizophrenia: a multinomial modeling analysis.

Psychological Medicine, 29, 903-914.

Kinchla, R.A. (1994). Comments on Batchelder and Riefer's multinomial model for source

monitoring. Psychological Review, 101, 166-171.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring. Psychological

Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Johnson, M. K., Kounios, J., & Reeder, J. A. (1994). Time-course studies of reality

monitoring and recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory

and Cognition, 20(6), 1409-1419.

Nelson, H. E. (1982). The National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test Manual. Windsor,

Berks: NFER-Nelson.

Nyberg, L., McIntosh, A. R., Cabeza, R., Habib, R., Houle, S., & Tulving, E. (1996).

General and specific brain regions involved in encoding and retrieval of events:

What, where and when. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 93, 11280-

11285.

Rizzo, L., Danion, J.-M., Van der Linden, M., & Grange, D. (1996a). Patients with

schizophrenia remember that an event has occured, but not when. British Journal of

Psychiatry, 168, 427-431.

Rizzo, L., Danion, J.-M., Van Der Linden, M., Grange, D., & Rohmer, J.-G. (1996b).

Impairment of memory for spatial context in schizophrenia. Neuropsychology, 10(3),

376-384.

Schwartz, B. L., Deutsch, L. H., Cohen, C., Warden, D., & Deutsch, S. I. (1991). Memory

for temporal order in schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry, 29, 329-339.

Servan-Schreiber, D., Cohen, J., & Steingard, S. (1996). Schizophrenic Deficits in the

processing of context: A test of a theoretical model. Archives of General Psychiatry,

53(12), 1105-1112.

Snodgrass, J.G. & Corwin, J. (1988) Pragmatics of measuring recognition memory:

Applications to dementia and amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology:

General, 117(1), 34-50.

Chapter 6

- 143 -

Vinogradov, S., Willis-Shore, J., Poole, J. H., Marten, E., Ober, B. A., & Shenaut, G. K.

(1997). Clinical and Neurocognitive aspects of source monitoring errors in

schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154(11), 1530-1537.

- 145 -

Chapter 7

Context memory and auditory hallucinations

Abstract

Waters, Maybery, Badcock and Michie (2004) have shown that a deficit in context

memory and binding is present in schizophrenia. According to Johnson, Hashtroudi and

Linsay (1993), this loss of information would make it difficulty to identify correctly the

origins of mental events. Since patients with auditory hallucinations incorrectly attribute

hallucinated events to an external agent, the aim of the current study is to investigate

whether patients with auditory hallucinations have particularly impaired context memory

compared to patients without hallucinations. The performance of patients with and without

auditory hallucinations on the Context Memory task (Waters et al, 2004) was compared.

The results show that significantly more patients with auditory hallucinations have a deficit

in some form of memory for context (source and/or temporal context) compared to patients

without auditory hallucinations, although the deficit was not found to be specific to patients

with auditory hallucinations.

Chapter 7

- 146 -

Auditory hallucinations are often described as comprising a mixture of different

phenomenological features. One critical feature is that the experience is perceived to

originate from another agency. In individuals vulnerable to auditory hallucinations,

experiences are also referenced to an external agency (Waters, Badcock, Maybery &

Michie, 2003), suggesting that it may be a generic feature of the hallucinatory experience.

Why are auditory hallucinations attributed to an external agent? Nayani and David

(1996a) have proposed that auditory hallucinations are memories of speech fragments that

are not recognized because they have lost the contextual details that would allow them to be

correctly situated in time, in place and in person. In particular, they proposed that there is a

disorder of the relationship between “mental events, time and self” (p. 363), resulting in a

failure to identify the origins of memories. The contents of these memories would be

retained in the absence of identifying features, so that an individual may correctly report

that the voice of another is being heard, but often cannot identify its source nor situate it in

its correct timeframe.

There is empirical evidence to support the suggestion that source memory is impaired

in patients with auditory hallucinations compared to non hallucinating schizophrenia

patients (e.g. Baker & Morrison, 1998; Brebion, Smith, Gorman & Amador, 1996; Brebion,

Amador, David, Malaspina, Sharif & Gorman, 2000; Franck et al, 2000), and in normal

individuals who score high on a predisposition to hallucinations scale relative to low

scorers (Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995). Apart from investigations regarding the source of

memories, there has been no direct investigation of whether patients with hallucinations

also suffer from a deficit in other contextual details, such as temporal information.

However, Brebion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina and Sharif (2002) provided indirect

evidence for this proposal by interpreting their finding of list intrusions in a free-recall

memory task as an impairment in the ability to remember the temporal context of the

production of words. No studies, to date, have examined processing of multiple contextual

information in patients with auditory hallucinations and the ability to bind this together

with an event in memory.

The current study entails a reanalysis of the results presented in Waters, Maybery,

Badcock and Michie (2004), in which we showed that patients with schizophrenia have a

fundamental deficit in binding contextual cues together to form a coherent representation of

an event in memory. In particular, the aims of the current study are to 1) examine whether

Chapter 7

- 147 -

patients with hallucinations would show a deficit in remembering individual contextual

cues, and particularly the source of events in memory and the temporal context of those

events, and 2) examine whether context binding generally, as defined by a deficit in source

and/or temporal context, is particularly impaired in patients with current auditory

hallucinations compared to those without.

Method

Participants

Forty-three patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia were selected from a

psychiatric hospital in Perth, Western Australia. Patients currently experiencing

hallucinations were selected on the basis of having experienced auditory hallucinations on

at least half of the days during the preceding four weeks, as assessed by self-reports and

case note reviews (“Current AH”, N = 19). Other schizophrenia patients who did not fit

this criterion were assigned to the non-hallucinating group (“Non AH”, N = 24, including 4

individuals with no history of auditory hallucinations). Exclusionary criteria included a

history of head injury and neurological illness. See Table 1 for demographic and clinical

descriptions of these patient groups and statistical tests comparing the two. The study was

approved by the University of Western Australia and Graylands Hospital Ethics

Committees and signed informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Tasks

Memory for context task (adapted from Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Danion et al, 1999;

Huppert & Piercy, 1978; as used by Waters et al, 2004).

Participants watched or performed pairings of two sets of 24 household objects over

two sessions 30 minutes apart.

Materials: There were 48 common household objects. Half were allocated to the

'watch' action (participants watched the experimenter pair the objects) and half to the

'perform' action (participants performed the pairing themselves). A series of cards provided

instructions to position objects next to one another or to watch the experimenter perform

the action. In the recognition test, 24 pairs of objects were presented: 16 pairs were kept in

their original combination (“intact pairs”), and 8 pairs were objects that were re-paired in

new combinations (“rearranged pairs”). No new objects were added. Objects in new

Chapter 7

- 148 -

combinations were kept within the same action sequence (watch/perform) and presentation

session (1 or 2).

Procedure: In the first session, participants were shown 24 common objects set out

randomly on a table. They were told that they would pair objects together or watch the

experimenter pair objects together in two different sessions and were instructed that they

should try to remember which objects went together, who paired them and in which

session, for a test later on. Thirty minutes after the first session the second session took

place. A different set of 24 objects was presented but the procedure remained the same.

Five minutes after the end of the second session, the recognition test was administered

verbally. Pairs of objects were read out individually. Participants indicated whether each

pair was an intact or rearranged combination, and for pairs judged as being intact they had

to specify who performed the pairing (self/experimenter), and when (session 1/2).

Assessment of General Intelligence

Premorbid intelligence was estimated using the National Adult Reading Test-revised

(Nelson, 1982).

Digits Forward (Digit Span subtest, WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997)

This simple measure of memory span (maximum score of 14) was used as a general

measure of cognitive function.

The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, 1996,

1990, respectively)

These tests both have a maximum score of 21.

Results

Preliminary analyses showed that the Current AH and Non AH patients did not differ

in age, educational level, Digits Forward span scores, length of illness, number of

admissions, and Negative and General symptoms scores on the PANSS (see Table 1).

However, Current AH patients had significantly higher Positive symptoms ratings, as

measured by the PANSS, compared to Non AH patients. Current AH patients had lower

premorbid IQ scores, as measured by the NART, compared to Non AH patients and also

tended to have higher chlorpromazine dosages, although the difference did not reach the

conventional level of significance (Table 1).

Chapter 7

- 149 -

Analyses of memory for content are presented initially followed by analyses of

individual context judgments. Finally, context binding abilities are investigated in the last

analysis. Table 2 presents a detailed breakdown of responses for source and temporal

judgments and Table 3 shows proportions correct data for object pair recognition and for

source and temporal judgments for correctly recognized intact pairs, including the results of

binding investigations.

Table 1.

Demographic and clinical characteristics (mean, SD) of patients with (Current AH) and

without (Non AH) auditory hallucinations

Current AH

(n = 19)

Non AH

(n = 24)

Current – Non AH

Comparisons

Age (years) 34.10 (9.65) 38.29 (7.22) t = 1.62, p = .11

Education (years) 10.78 (2.12) 11.20 (1.86) t = .68, p = .49

Sex (M/F) 16 / 3 19 / 5 X2 = .17, p = .67

NART 95.89 (7.77) 104.16 (9.11) t = 3.15, p < .05

Digit Span forward 6.52 (1.42) 7.33 (1.88) t = 1.54, p = .12

Depression (BDI-II) 13.84 (15.62) 11.95 (10.16) t = .47, p = .64

Length of illness* (yrs) 10.89 (7.11) 15.41 (8.55) t = 1.85, p = .07

Number of admissions 9.52 (10.02) 8.87 (5.68) t = .26, p = .78

Level of positive

symptoms (PANSS) 23.63 (3.60) 15.45 (2.63) t = 8.58, p < .001

Level of negative

symptoms (PANSS) 13.00 (2.80) 11.66 (3.45) t = 1.36, p = .18

Level of general

symptoms (PANSS) 29.78 (4.79) 27.87 (5.92) t = 1.14, p = .26

Chlorpromazine

equivalent

1075.52

(496.08)

814.04

(3.78.33) t = 1.96, p = .06

* calculated as time since first admission

Chapter 7

- 150 -

Intact versus rearranged object pair recognition

The proportions of object pairs correctly recognized as intact or rearranged were

subjected to a 2 (Current AH vs Non AH) x 2 (intact vs rearranged object pairs) ANOVA.

Overall recognition accuracy did not differ significantly for intact versus rearranged

stimuli, F(1, 41) = .84, p = .34, and the difference between groups was not significant, F (1,

41) = .20, p = .65. However, the interaction was found to be significant, F(1, 41) = 5.06, p

< .05. On proportions of object pairs correctly recognized as intact, the difference between

the groups was found to be significant, t(41) = 2.14, p < .05, with Non AH patients

recognizing significantly more intact object pairs than Current AH patients (see Table 3).

By contrast, Current AH patients tended to correctly recognize significantly more

rearranged object pairs compared to Non AH patients, t(41) = 2.01, p = .05. Signal

detection parameters (representing estimates of discrimination accuracy and bias) were

calculated but were not found to be significantly different between the two groups, t(41) =

.44, p = .66, and t(41) = .37, p = .70, respectively.

Source and temporal judgments

Participants provided source and temporal judgments only for stimulus pairs that they

judged to be intact so analyses of context recognition were restricted to correctly

recognized intact stimulus pairs. The proportions of correct source and temporal judgments

were subjected to a 2 (subgroup) x 2 (source vs temporal context) ANOVA. There was a

nonsignificant main effect of group, F (1, 40) = .21, p = .64, but there was a significant

main effect of context, with source being recalled correctly more often than temporal

context, F (1, 40) = 13.44, p < .001. The interaction was also significant, F (1, 40) = 5.75, p

< .05. Follow-up analyses showed that there was a significant difference between the

patient subgroups in source judgments, t (40) = 2.41, p < .05, with Current AH patients

making a significantly smaller number of correct source judgments compared to Non AH

patients (see Table 3). In contrast, the groups did not differ in temporal judgments, t (40) =

1.08, p = .28.

Discrimination accuracy values were calculated in separate signal-detection analyses

for source and temporal information. For source discrimination, there was a significant

difference between the two groups, t(40) = 2.36, p < .05, with Non AH patients having

significantly better discrimination accuracy than Current AH patients (see Table 3). For

temporal discrimination, there was no significant difference between Current AH and Non

Chapter 7

- 151 -

AH patients, t(40) = .68, p = .50. The analysis of bias for source (the preference to identify

stimuli as experimenter-paired rather than self-paired) showed a nonsignificant difference

between the patient subgroups, t(40) = .08, p = .93. Analysis of bias for temporal context

(the preference to identify stimuli as having been presented in session 1 rather than session

2) showed a nonsignificant difference between Current AH and Non AH patients, t(40) =

1.24, p = .21 (see Table 3).

We previously showed that schizophrenia is linked to a context memory deficit

compared to healthy controls (Waters et al, 2004). In order to examine the specificity of

this deficit to auditory hallucinations, the percentage of patients currently experiencing

hallucinations impaired on source and temporal context memory relative to healthy controls

(for details of selection procedures and demographics see Waters et al, 2004) was

calculated and then compared to the percentage of patients without hallucinations who also

exhibited the context memory failures. The percentage of patients impaired on source and

temporal memory was calculated with reference to whether scores were in excess of one

standard deviation from control group means. For comparison, the probability that an

individual would score more than one standard deviation from the mean on a normal

distribution is 15% (.158). Twelve of the 19 patients with Current AH patients (63%) were

found to have a deficit in source memory, compared to 8 of the 24 patients with Non AH

patients (33%), a difference which is significant, X2(1) = 3.79, p = .05. Eleven of the

Current AH patients (57%) and 13 of the Non AH patients (54%) had a deficit in temporal

memory, a difference which was not significant, X2(1) = .20, p = .65.

Binding of source and temporal information

Firstly, the proportions of contextual features recalled in conjunction with each

correctly recognized intact event was calculated. The measures were calculated for each

individual, including the proportions of object pairs (1) where both source and temporal

information were correctly retrieved ('who & when'), (2) where source only was correctly

retrieved (‘who only’), (3) where temporal information only was correctly retrieved (‘when

only’), and (4) where neither source nor temporal information was correctly retrieved

(‘neither’). A 2 (subgroup) x 3 (context: 'who only' vs. ‘when only' vs. 'who & when')

ANOVA was performed. Proportions for 'neither' were not included to prevent collinearity

problems arising from using all four proportions, which would sum to one.

Table 2

Chapter 7

- 152 -

Number of responses (means and standard deviations) for source and temporal judgments

for patients with (Current AH) and without (Non AH) auditory hallucinations.

Responses1

SOURCE JUDGMENTS Intact-Performed Intact-Watch Rearranged

Current AH

Test stimuli:

Intact – Performed

Intact – Watched

Rearranged

2.61 (2.09)

.50 (.70)

.83 (.70)

1.77 (1.06)

3.05 (1.69)

1.77 (1.59)

3.61 (1.94)

4.44 (1.75)

5.38 (1.85)

Non AH

Test stimuli:

Intact – Performed

Intact – Watched

Rearranged

4.33 (2.01)

.54 (.88)

1.37 (1.20)

1.16 (1.20)

3.79 (2.10)

2.41 (1.71)

2.50 (1.81)

3.66 (2.03)

4.20 (2.34)

TEMPORAL JUDGMENTS Intact-Session 1 Intact-Session 2 Rearranged

Current AH

Test stimuli:

Intact – Session 1

Intact – Session 2

Rearranged

2.33 (1.71)

1.88 (1.84)

1.50 (1.54)

1.27 (1.17)

2.44 (1.58)

1.11 (.96)

4.38 (1.91)

3.66 (1.71)

5.38 (1.85)

Non AH

Test stimuli:

Intact – Session 1

Intact – Session 2

Rearranged

2.41 (1.90)

2.58 (2.30)

2.16 (1.73)

1.66 (1.49)

3.12 (2.34)

1.62 (1.49)

3.91 (2.06)

2.29 (1.80)

4.20 (2.34)

1 Out of a possible 8 per condition/row. The underlined scores represent the number of

correct responses per condition.

Chapter 7

- 153 -

Table 3

Means and standard deviations of (1) proportions correct for intact and new object pair

recognition and for source and temporal judgments for correctly recognized intact pairs,

(2) discrimination accuracy and bias in response parameters for object pair recognition

and for source and temporal judgments and (3) proportions of correctly recognized intact

pairs for which 'who & when , 'who only', 'when only' and 'neither' were recognised.

Current AH Non AH

M SD M SD

1. Content and context memory judgments

Intact object pair recognition .46 .22 .61 .21

New object pair recognition .68 .23 .51 .30

Source judgments .68 .18 .81 .16

Temporal judgments .62 .21 .54 .26

2. Discrimination accuracy and bias for content and context memory judgments

Object discrimination accuracy .42 .56 .34 .56

Object response bias 1.27 .65 1.21 .53

Source discrimination accuracy .92 .83 1.58 .95

Bias for experimenter pairs 1.32 .50 1.34 .79

Temporal discrimination accuracy .51 1.03 .27 1.20

Bias for session 1 1.09 .54 1.36 .79

2. Binding of source and temporal information

Who & When .42 .20 .44 .27

Who only .25 .20 .36 .22

When only .20 .13 .10 .10

Neither .11 .09 .08 .11

Chapter 7

- 154 -

There was a significant main effect of context, F(1, 40) = 37.01, p < .001; both

contextual features were retrieved correctly more often than source judgments alone, which

were retrieved correctly more often than temporal judgments alone. However, there was a

nonsignificant main effect of group, F(1, 40) = .59, p = .44, and a nonsignificant

interaction, F(1, 40) = 1.87, p = .17. In addition, there was no significant group difference

for the proportions of ‘neither’ cases, t(40) = .74, p = .46.

Secondly, the proportions of patients impaired in source and/or temporal memory,

using the criterion of a score more extreme than one standard deviation from the mean of

Waters et al’s (2004) control group, was computed. As comparison, the probability that an

individual would score more than one standard deviation away from the means of controls

on one task or the other is 29% [Pr A or B = Pr A + Pr B – Pr (A*B) = .29]. It was found

that 17 out of the 19 patients (89.5%) with current hallucinations had a deficit in source

and/or temporal memory, compared to 15 out of 24 of patients without hallucinations

(62.5%), a difference which is significant, X2(1) = 4.05, p < .05, suggesting that

significantly more patients with auditory hallucinations had some form of memory for

context impairment compared to patients without hallucinations. Of the four patients with

no previous history of hallucinations, none showed a context memory deficit.

Specificity of deficits to auditory hallucinations and alternative explanations of

performance

Since source judgments and accuracy of intact object pair recognition were found to

be particularly impaired in patients with auditory hallucinations, the specificity of these

deficits to auditory hallucinations was tested. Correlations between accuracy of source

judgments and positive, negative and general symptom group scores from the PANSS

revealed that accuracy of source judgments was negatively correlated with severity of

positive symptoms scores, r = -.35, p < .02, but not with severity scores for any other

symptom group (all p > .33). The correlation with positive symptoms remained significant

even after hallucination ratings were subtracted from the broader set of positive symptom

ratings, r = -.35, p = .05. Accuracy of intact object pair recognition was not found to be

significantly correlated with severity scores for any of the symptom groups (p > .06). The

results also showed that proportions of correct intact pair recognition was significantly

correlated with correct source judgments, r = .40, p < .01.

Chapter 7

- 155 -

Since Seal, Crowe and Cheung (1997) argued that source memory impairments may

be due to poor verbal intelligence, correlations were carried out to examine the relationship

between NART scores and accuracy of source judgments. The correlation was not

significant, r = .13, p = .39. NART scores were not significantly correlated with

proportions of correct intact pair recognition either, r = .06, p = .66, suggesting that poor

verbal intelligence was not the direct cause of impaired content, and source, memory recall.

Given that Current AH patients tended to have higher chlorpromazine dosage than Non AH

patients, the relationship between chlorpromazine dosage and proportions of correct object

pair recognition and accuracy of source judgments was investigated. None of the

correlations were found to be significant (smallest p = .23).

Discussion

In Waters et al (2004), we showed that patients with schizophrenia have a deficit in

context memory and binding compared to healthy controls. The current study investigated

the specificity of this deficit to auditory hallucinations. In particular, the aim of this study

was to examine whether patients with hallucinations would show a deficit in remembering

individual contextual cues in memory, and particularly the source of events in memory and

the temporal context of those events, and whether they would be particularly impaired in

context binding generally, compared to patients without hallucinations.

Firstly, patients with current hallucinations were found to be particularly impaired in

recalling the source of memories, compared to patients without hallucinations. The finding

of an association between auditory hallucinations and a source memory deficit replicates

and extends previous findings that have shown that patients with hallucinations are less

able than nonhallucinating patients to identify the source of an action or a thought (e.g.

Blackmore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone & Frith, 2000). Such a deficit actually forms the basis

of reality- and self-monitoring theories of auditory hallucinations (e.g. Frith, 1995).

However, these theories also propose that this impairment is associated with poor decision-

making in identifying the origins of memories, and in particular with a bias towards the

erroneous attribution of internal events as being real (e.g. Bentall & Slade, 1985; Rankin &

O’Carroll, 1995), and with a bias towards misattributing self-produced material to another

source (e.g. Johns & McGuire, 1999). The results from the current Context Memory task

are not compatible with this proposal; subgroup membership was not found to be associated

Chapter 7

- 156 -

with a particular response bias in object and source recognition, showing that patients with

hallucinations did not show an unusual decision criterion in content or source recognition.

Secondly, the results revealed that patients with hallucinations, compared to patients

without, were not found to be disproportionally impaired in the recall of the temporal

context of memories, suggesting that impairments in temporal memory are not related to

the presence of auditory hallucinations specifically. The results, therefore, indicate that the

temporal context deficit is present in patients with schizophrenia, irrespective of their

hallucinating status. It is important to note, however, that this does not imply that an

impairment in temporal memory does not play an important role in auditory hallucinations,

since hallucinating patients still present with this deficit compared to healthy controls. The

current results are inconsistent with Brebion et al’s proposal (2002) that temporal memory

is especially impaired in hallucinating patients. In their study, Brebion et al used the

increase in list intrusions in a memory task as an indirect index of the ability to remember

the temporal context of the production of words. By contrast, the current Context Memory

task directly assessed temporal memory and failed to find that patients with hallucinations

were relatively more impaired on this condition compared to patients without

hallucinations.

Thirdly, at the level of content memory, the results revealed that patients with

auditory hallucinations correctly recognized fewer intact object pairs, but more rearranged

pairs, compared to patients without hallucinations. The finding of an event memory deficit

in patients with auditory hallucinations replicates the results of Brebion et al (2002), who

showed that the severity of hallucinations was associated with an increasing number of

errors in a verbal memory task. The content memory deficit may be the result of deficits in

contextual memory. According to Johnson, Hashtroudi and Lindsay (1993) and Johnson

and Chalfonte (1994), the processes involved in retrieving memories include a decision

process that is reached on the basis of the availability of memories details such as

contextual information. This proposal is consistent with the current finding that a decrease

in source recognition was associated with a reduced proportion of intact object pairs

correctly recognized. It is more difficult to explain the dissociation in performance

between intact and rearranged pairs in patients with auditory hallucinations, although the

Context Memory task is a forced-choice decision paradigm so a decrease in correct intact

Chapter 7

- 157 -

object pairs may be inversely related to an increase in correct rearranged object pair

recognition.

Fourthly, the current study aimed to evaluate the proposal that auditory hallucinations

are linked to a deficit in context binding in memory. The findings revealed that almost

90%, i.e. nearly all, patients with auditory hallucinations showed a deficit in identifying the

origins of memories, as shown by deficits in either source and/or temporal memory, and

that significantly more patients with hallucinations showed this deficit compared to patients

without. These results provide strong support for Nayani and David’s (1996a) proposal

that contextual memory is impaired in patients with auditory hallucinations. However, the

current findings also demonstrated that a deficit in both source and temporal context is not

necessary for hallucinations to occur, since there was no significant difference between

patients with and without hallucinations in the proportion of objects where both source and

temporal information were correctly retrieved. Rather, it appears that missing contextual

cues in some form of memory for context, such as source or/and temporal memory, are

associated with the hallucinatory experience; for instance, sometimes the temporal context

but not the source might be lost and other times the reverse might happen, or both forms of

context might be lost. This finding is consistent with the results of a phenomenological

survey that shows that a significant proportion of patients with auditory hallucinations are

very clear about the identity of some of their voices and that 46% of verbal hallucinatory

experiences are believed to belong to people familiar in real life (e.g. relative) (Nayani &

David, 1996b).

We may speculate on the processes that contribute towards making source judgments

in patients with auditory hallucinations. Recent findings suggest that episodic memory

retains traces of both voice characteristics and words (Goldinger, 1996). Furthermore, it

has been noted that the human voice carries important information such as the affect,

gender, age and other physical characteristics of a talker (Belin, Fecteau & Bedard, 2004;

Stevens, 2004). It may, therefore, be speculated that some of the auditory sensory features

of the remembered events are retained and that patients make attributions based on

information that is recalled. However, recognition may ultimately depend on the amount

and type of information available for making source judgments. The proposal of preserved

auditory sensory features in auditory hallucinations is consistent with findings from Hunter

and Woodruff (2004) who recently described three case studies of functional auditory

Chapter 7

- 158 -

hallucinations. In all three cases, these authors noted that the patients’ auditory

hallucinations retained certain acoustic features that were present in the original signal,

providing support for the current suggestion that some elements of memory may be

preserved during the hallucinatory experience. In sum, our results suggest that context

information, as assessed by the Context Memory task which is largely based on

visuo/motor context cues, may be impaired in patients with auditory hallucinations, while

other evidence indicates that auditory sensory features in memory may be retained. An

explanation for the dissociation between impaired visuo/motor information and intact

auditory sensory information is provided by the proposal of a distinction between intrinsic

and extrinsic context information, the former referring to cues which are part to the

stimulus itself (e.g. colour of an object, pitch/prosody of a voice) and the latter referring to

information which is not part of the stimulus itself but which needs to be encoded

separately (e.g. temporal context) (Troyer & Craik, 2000). Support for a dissociation

between intrinsic and extrinsic cues has been provided by Troyer and Craik (2000), who

have found that these processes are dissociable in a study using young adults. Accordingly,

we propose that patients with auditory hallucinations have a deficit in extrinsic context, but

intact intrinsic context information. Other factors may also be relevant and this proposal

requires further investigation. However it has previously been noted that the experience of

auditory hallucinations is highly personalized (Nayani & David, 1996b). The current

suggestion leaves open the possibility that variation in the details of events from memory

contributes to variability of the hallucinatory experience from person to person.

Overall, the results showed that significantly more patients with auditory

hallucinations have a deficit in some form of memory for context than patients without.

However, the results also demonstrated that (a) 62% of patients without hallucinations

showed context binding difficulties, (b) impaired source memory was associated with

positive symptoms in general and (c) temporal memory judgments did not differ

significantly between current- and non-hallucinators. These findings lead to the conclusion

that a context memory deficit is not specific to patients with auditory hallucinations.

However, if a context memory deficit is not specific to auditory hallucinations, why are

patients without hallucinations not reporting hearing voices? The only explanation is that a

deficit in context memory, on its own, is not sufficient for auditory hallucinations to occur.

Only when combined with (at least one) other deficits (i.e. the unbidden and uncontrollable

Chapter 7

- 159 -

retrieval of auditory representations) would the symptom of auditory hallucinations become

manifest (see Badcock, Waters & Maybery, in press; Waters, Badcock, Maybery & Michie,

2003). In support, there is growing awareness that a single cognitive deficit is unlikely to

result in such a complex event (Nayani & David, 1996a) and that a combination of deficits

might be needed to explain auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia (e.g. Aleman, Bocker,

Hijman, de Haan & Kahn, 2003; Beck & Rector, 2003). In Waters, Badcock, Michie and

Maybery (2004), we explore the proposal that a combination of deficits in context memory

and intentional inhibition is critical for hallucinations to occur.

The finding that a context memory deficit is not specific to patients with auditory

hallucinations does not necessarily imply that an impairment in context memory is not a

prerequisite to auditory hallucinations. In support for the role of context memory in the

aetiology of auditory hallucinations, most of the Non AH patients have had hallucinations

in the past and none of the four patients who have never hallucinated showed context

memory deficits. Although this latter group is too small for definitive conclusions, the

results appear to indicate that context memory difficulties may be a trait-dependent marker

for auditory hallucinations. Further studies should target individuals who have no history

of hallucinations to test this proposal. The role of context memory deficits in other positive

symptoms such as delusions also deserves investigating.

The current findings of impaired context memory are also consistent with the pattern

of activated neural systems in auditory hallucinations. The frontal lobes, medial temporal

lobes and the amygdala have been linked with source and temporal context memory, and

with context memory generally (e.g. Davachi, Mitchell & Wagner, 2002; Glisky, Rubin &

Davidson, 2001; Mayes et al, 2001; Sullivan, Shear, Zipursky, Sagar & Pfefferbaum,

1997). Neural imaging of auditory hallucinations also points to the activation of the frontal

cortex, temporal cortex and hippocampal/parahippocampal cortex (McGuire et al, 1995;

Woodruff et al, 1997), and to abnormal frontal-temporal connections (Shergill, Brammer,

Williams, Murray & McGuire, 2000), supporting the role of disturbed contextual memory

deficits in auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia.

Several alternative explanations of why patients experiencing auditory hallucinations

showed these deficits may be ruled out. Group comparisons (see Table 1) for a range of

demographic factors such as age and years of education, and clinical indicators including

duration of illness, depression and number of admissions, suggested that patients with

Chapter 7

- 160 -

current hallucinations were not generally more unwell. Patients with hallucinations showed

more positive symptoms than non-hallucinators, but there were no significant differences in

negative and general (somatic) symptoms. Compared to non-hallucinators, patients with

hallucinations tended to have higher chlorpromazine equivalents and lower verbal

intelligence, although these variables did not correlate with performance on source memory

performance. In addition, Digits Forward, commonly used as a general measure of

cognitive function, was not found to be disproportionally impaired in hallucinating patients,

suggesting that they were not more cognitively impaired than patients not currently

hallucinating.

In conclusion, the results from the present study are clearly preliminary and ought to

be replicated before any definite conclusions can be drawn. An interesting and revealing

study would investigate whether the context deficits lie at the encoding, storage or retrieval

phase. This is a relevant issue because Rizzo, Danion, Van der Linden and Grange (1996)

proposed that the context memory deficit in schizophrenia stems from difficulties in the

early stages of encoding that comprise the processes responsible for establishing

associations between different features in working memory. This hypothesis was recently

supported by Burglen et al (2004) who showed that schizophrenia patients exhibited

deficits in binding object and location features in a working memory task. Future studies

should examine feature binding in working memory in patients with auditory

hallucinations.

Chapter 7

- 161 -

References

Aleman, A., Bocker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., de Haan, E. H. F., & Kahn, R. S. (2003).

Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia: role of top-down information

processing. Schizophrenia Research, 1926, 1-11.

Badcock, J. C., Waters, F. A. V. & Maybery, M. T (in press). Auditory hallucinations:

failure to inhibit irrelevant memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.

Baker, C. A., & Morrison, A. P. (1998). Cognitive processes in auditory hallucinations:

attributional biases and metacognition. Psychological Medicine, 28, 1199-1208.

Beck, A. (1990). BAI . San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Beck, A. (1996). BDI-II . San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Beck, A. T., & Rector, N. A. (2003). A cognitive model of hallucinations. Cognitive

Therapy and Research, 27(1), 19-52.

Belin, P., Fecteau, S., & Bedard, C. (2004). Thinking the voice: neural correlates of voice

perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 129-1355.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985). Reality testing and auditory hallucinations: A signal

detection analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 24, 159-169.

Blakemore, S., Smith, J., Steel, R., Johnstone, E., & Frith, C. (2000). The perception of

self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity

experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psychological Medicine,

30, 1131-1139.

Brebion, G., Amador, X., David, A., Malaspina, D., Sharif, Z., & Gorman, J. M. (2000).

Positive symptomatology and source-monitoring failure in schizophrenia - an analysis

of symptom specific effects. Psychiatry Research, 95, 119-131.

Brebion, G., Gorman, J. M., Amador, X., Malaspina, D., & Sharif, Z. (2002). Source

monitoring impairments in schizophrenia: characterisation and association with

positive and negative symptomatology. Psychiatry Research, 112, 27-39.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., & Amador, X. (1996). Reality monitoring failure in

schizophrenia: The role of selective attention. Schizophrenia Research, 22, 173-180.

Burglen, F., Marczewski, P., Mitchell, K. J., van der Linden, M., Johnson, M. K., Danion,

J.-M., & Salame, P. (2004). Impaired performance in a working memory binding task

in patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 125, 247-255.

Chapter 7

- 162 -

Conway, M. A., & Dewhurst, S. A. (1995). Remembering, Familiarity, and Source

Monitoring. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A(1), 125-140.

Danion, J. M., Rizzo, L., & Bruant, A. (1999). Functional mechanisms underlying impaired

recognition memory and conscious awareness in patients with schizophrenia.

Archives of General Psychiatry, 56(7), 639-644.

Davachi, L., Mitchell, J. P., & Wagner, A. D. (2003). Multiple routes to memory: distinct

medial temporal lobe processes build item and source memories. Proceedings of the

National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100(4), 2157-2162.

Franck, N., Rouby, P., Daprati, E., Dalery, J., Mari-Cardine, M., & Georgieff, N. (2000).

Confusion between silent and overt reading in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia

Research, 41, 357-364.

Frith, C. (1995). Functional imaging and cognitive abnormalities. The Lancet, 346(8975),

615-620.

Glisky, R. L., Rubin, S. R., & Davidson, P. S. R. (2001). Source memory in older adults: an

encoding or retrieval problem? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,

Memory and Cognition, 27(5), 1131-1146.

Goldinger, S.D. (1996). Words and voices: episodic traces in spoken word identification

and recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory

and Cognition. 22(5):1166-83.

Hunter, M. D., & Woodruff, W. R. (2004). Characteristics of functional auditory

hallucinations. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(5), 923.

Huppert, F., & Piercy, M. (1978). The role of trace strength in recency and frequency

judgments by amnesic and control subjects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental

Psychology, 30, 347-354.

Johns, L. C., & McGuire, P. K. (1999). Verbal self-monitoring and auditory hallucinations

in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 353(9151), 469-470.

Johnson, M. K., & Chalfonte, B. L. (1994). Binding Complex Memories: the role of

reactivation and the hippocampus. In D. L. Schacter & E. Tulving (Eds.), Memory

Systems (pp. 311-350). Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring. Psychological

Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Chapter 7

- 163 -

Mayes, A., Isaac, C., Holdstock, J., Hunkin, N., Montaldi, D., Downes, J., MacDonald, C.,

Cezayirli, E., & Roberts, J. (2001). Memory for single items, word pairs and temporal

order of different kinds in a patient with selective hippocampal lesion. Cognitive

Neuropsychology, 18(2), 97-123.

McGuire, P. K., Silbersweig, D. A., Wright, I., Murray, R. M., David, A. S., Frackowiak,

R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (1995). Abnormal monitoring of inner speech: a physiological

basis for auditory hallucinations. The Lancet, 346(8975), 596-600.

Nayani, T.H., & David, A. (1996a). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996b). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Nelson, H. E. (1982). The National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test Manual. Windsor,

Berks: NFER-Nelson.

Rankin, P. M., & O'Carroll, P. J. (1995). Reality discrimination, reality monitoring and

disposition towards hallucination. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 517-

528.

Rizzo, L., Danion, J.-M., Van der Linden, M., & Grange, D. (1996). Patients with

schizophrenia remember that an event has occured, but not when. British Journal of

Psychiatry, 168, 427-431.

Seal, M. L., Crowe, S. F., & Cheung, P. (1997). Deficits in source monitoring in subjects

with auditory hallucinations may be due to differences in verbal intelligence and

verbal memory. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2(4), 273-290.

Shergill, S., Brammer, M., Williams, S., Murray, R., & McGuire, P. (2000). Mapping

auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia using functional magnetic resonance

imaging. Archives of General Psychiatry, 57(11), 1033-1038.

Stevens, A. A. (2004). Dissociating the cortical basis of memory for voices, words and

tones. Cognitive Brain Research, 18, 162-171.

Sullivan, E. V., Shear, P. K., Zipursky, R. B., Sagar, H. J., & Pfefferbaum, A. (1997).

Patterns of content, contextual and working memory impairments in schizophrenia

and nonamnesic alcoholism. Neuropsychology, 11(2), 195-206.

Chapter 7

- 164 -

Troyer, A., & Craik, F. (2000). The effect of divided attention on memory for items and

their context. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54(3), 161-170.

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T (2003) Revision of the factor structure of the

Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R). Personality and Individual Differences,

35, 1351-1357.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (2003). Inhibition in

schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 62,

275-280.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Michie, P. T. & Maybery, M. T. (2004). Auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia: Intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories.

Submitted for publication.

Waters, F.A.V., Maybery, M.T., Badcock, J.C.& Michie, P.T. (2004) Context memory and

binding in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 68(2-3), 119-125.

Wechsler, D. (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) . New York: The

Psychological Corporation.

Woodruff, P., Wright, I., Bullmore, E., Brammer, M., Howard, R. J., Williams, S.,

Shapleske, J., Rossell, S., David, A. S., McGuire, P. K., & Murray, R. (1997).

Auditory hallucinations and the temporal cortical response to speech in schizophrenia:

A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. American Journal of Psychiatry.

- 165 -

AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS: A COMBINATION OF DEFICITS IN

INTENTIONAL INHIBITION AND CONTEXT MEMORY

- 167 -

Foreword to Chapter 8

So far, the results of our investigations have identified that intentional inhibition and

context memory processes are impaired in patients with auditory hallucinations. We

proposed that the inhibitory deficit might lead to mental events intruding into

consciousness in a manner that is beyond the control of the sufferer, and that the deficit in

context memory might contribute in the attribution of mental events to an external agent.

However, a single deficit in either intentional inhibition or context memory is not

sufficient for auditory hallucinations to occur, since inhibitory impairments are also present

in clinical conditions that do not report hallucinatory experiences (e.g. Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder), and context memory deficits also occur in schizophrenia patients,

irrespective of their hallucinatory status. These findings reflect an increasing concern in

auditory hallucination research that a single deficit is unlikely to result in such a complex

event. By contrast, the complexity of this mental phenomenon points to the suggestion that

a combination of deficits might be needed to explain it. In support, dual-deficit models

have started to emerge as an explanation of other complex symptomatology such as

delusions (e.g. Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). There has been a recent trend in suggesting a

combination of deficits in auditory hallucinations (e.g. Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de Haan

& Kahn, 2003; Beck & Rector, 2003) but no empirical evidence has yet been put forward.

In the next chapter (Chapter 8), a new model of auditory hallucinations is presented

which differs from contemporary single-deficit cognitive accounts of auditory

hallucinations by the proposal that auditory hallucinations arise as a result of a combination

of a minimum of two deficits. We propose that there must be a failure in, at least,

intentional inhibition and context memory for auditory hallucinations to occur. The failure

in intentional inhibition produces unwanted and uncontrollable mental events which are not

recognized because they have lost the contextual cues that would facilitate recognition.

This proposal allows for nonhallucinating individuals to show a deficit on either, but not

both, of these cognitive processes. Chapter 8 presents a novel reanalysis of the data

presented in preceding studies and a review of published behavioural and neuroanatomical

evidence to support this position.

- 168 -

References

Aleman, A., Böcker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., de Haan, E. H. F., & Kahn, R. S. (2003).

Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia: role of top-down information

processing. Schizophrenia Research, 1926, 1-11.

Beck, A. T., & Rector, N. A. (2003). A cognitive model of hallucinations. Cognitive

Therapy and Research, 27(1), 19-52.

Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind &

Language, 15(1), 184-218.

- 169 -

Chapter 8 Auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia: intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories

Abstract

Introduction. This paper presents a new cognitive model of auditory hallucinations

in schizophrenia. We suggest that auditory hallucinations are auditory representations

derived from the unintentional activation of memories and other irrelevant current mental

associations. Our model proposes that a combination of deficits in intentional inhibition

and contextual memory is critical to the experience of auditory hallucinations. The failure

in intentional inhibition produces unwanted and uncontrollable mental events which are not

recognized because they have lost the contextual cues that would normally facilitate

recognition. Method. This article amalgamates recently published data and presents a re-

analysis of the findings on 43 patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia using a case-by-

case approach (Badcock, Waters, Maybery, Michie, in press; Waters, Badcock, Maybery &

Michie, 2003, Waters, Maybery, Badcock and Michie, 2004). Results. Almost 90% of

patients currently experiencing auditory hallucinations showed the predicted combination

of deficits on both inhibition and context memory, compared to only a third of patients

without hallucinations. Conclusions. The results of our investigations strongly support the

role of intentional inhibition and context memory in auditory hallucinations. Critical

consideration of the findings also suggests that additional cognitive processes might be

important for the expression of this symptom.

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Michie, P.T. & Maybery, M.T. (2004). Auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia: intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories. Submitted for

publication.

Chapter 8

- 170 -

It has been estimated that approximately 74% of those with a diagnosis of

schizophrenia will experience auditory hallucinations during the course of their illness

(Sartorius, Shapiro & Jablensky, 1974). Traditional definitions of auditory hallucinations

suggest that they are an auditory sensory experience in the absence of external stimuli and

with the compelling sense of reality of a true perception (Gelder, Gath & Mayou, 1993).

Auditory hallucinations are not restricted to schizophrenia (Assad & Shapiro, 1986; Honig

et al, 1998; Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2003). However, our focus is on auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia, primarily because the mechanisms responsible for them

may vary between different populations (Frith & Dolan, 1997).

The aim of the present paper is to identify some of the cognitive processes that are

responsible for auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. We propose a novel approach that

differs from contemporary cognitive accounts of auditory hallucinations, which are

essentially single-deficit accounts. There is a growing concern that a single deficit is

unlikely to result in such a complex event (e.g. Nayani & David, 1996a). In contrast, the

diverse phenomenology of auditory hallucinations (Nayani & David, 1996b) suggests that a

combination of deficits might be needed to explain this mental phenomenon.

Our model proposes that auditory hallucinations consist of the activation of auditory

mental events that include memories and other currently active mental associations. We

also suggest that at least two cognitive deficits must be present to explain auditory

hallucinations: a) a fundamental deficit in intentional inhibition which leads to auditory

mental representations intruding into consciousness in a manner that is beyond the control

of the sufferer; and b) a deficit in binding contextual cues, resulting in an inability to form a

complete representation of the origins of mental events. Our model posits that, as a result

of these combined deficits, mental events are experienced as involuntary and intrusive and

are not recognized because the contextual cues that would allow them to be identified

correctly are missing or incomplete. We propose that this combination of deficits can

readily account for a broad range of phenomenological characteristics of auditory

hallucinations. Our model further posits that nonhallucinating individuals (with

schizophrenia or with another clinical condition) may show a deficit on either cognitive

process, but only schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations will show the

combination of deficits in intentional inhibition and context memory. In this paper, we

review evidence supporting our position and present a novel reanalysis of recently

Chapter 8

- 171 -

published empirical findings using a case-by-case approach. The deficits in inhibition and

context memory will be considered in turn.

A deficit in intentional inhibition

Patients often describe their hallucinations as disturbing, unwanted and

uncontrollable (Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier, 1995; Nayani & David, 1996a). Auditory

hallucinations are reported to be intrusive because they are unintended and because patients

are often unable to escape from the experience (Carter, Mackinnon & Copolov, 1996; Close

& Garety, 1998). Intrusiveness is such a common component of auditory hallucinations

that some authors have added to current definitions of auditory hallucinations that they are

not amenable to voluntary control (e.g. David, 2004; Seal, Aleman & McGuire, 2004).

Several researchers have noted the importance of the intrusiveness and unintendedness of

the experience (e.g. Morrison, 2001; Nayani & David, 1996a). For example, Morrison and

Baker (2000) showed that schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations had more

intrusive thoughts compared to non-hallucinating psychotic patients and a nonpatient

control group, and that the former group of patients described their intrusive thoughts as

more uncontrollable and unacceptable than the other groups. In order to explain the

unintended and intrusive characteristic of auditory hallucinations, our model proposes that

individuals with auditory hallucinations suffer from a failure in inhibition, and in particular

in intentional inhibition.

Inhibition: definition and taxonomy

Inhibition is a basic cognitive mechanism which has been defined as a collection of

processes which allow the suppression of previously activated cognitive contents, the

clearing of irrelevant actions or attention from consciousness and the control of overt

behavior and motor movements (Harnishfeger, 1995). The process of inhibition is essential

for suppressing irrelevant thoughts, and a failure to maintain control through inhibitory

efficiency is thought to result in information that intrudes into ongoing thinking. There is a

general agreement that inhibition is not a unitary construct, but that it is better described as

a family of processes, each with its own distinct operating characteristic (e.g. Kramer,

Humphrey, Larish, Logan & Strager, 1994; Spinella, 2002, Stuss et al, 1999). Harnishfeger

and colleagues (1995; Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1995; Wilson & Kipp, 1995) make a

distinction between inhibitory processes that are automatic (or unintentional) and those that

Chapter 8

- 172 -

are intentional. Automatic inhibition occurs when an individual automatically suppresses

an item and is unaware that the suppression is taking place (e.g. inhibition of return). By

contrast, intentional inhibition occurs when an individual deliberately suppresses the

activation of an item after deciding it is irrelevant (e.g. Directed Forgetting tasks).

Intentional inhibition is thought to be effortful, available to conscious reflection and

available for strategic interventions (Nigg, 2000). There is recent empirical support for the

distinction between automatic and intentional processes, with studies showing dissociations

in performance between clinical populations (e.g. Amieva, Phillips, Della Sala & Henry,

2004; Nigg, Butler, Huang-Pollock & Henderson, 2002).

Inhibition deficits in auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia

Theoretical support for the suggestion that an inhibitory failure is involved in

auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia arises from studies that have shown that a failure

in inhibition results in intrusive thoughts (e.g. Enright & Beech, 1993; Kramer et al, 1994;

Vasterling, Brailey, Constans & Sutker, 1998). There is also considerable experimental

evidence that schizophrenia is linked to a deficit in inhibition (e.g. Beech, Powell,

McWilliam & Claridge, 1989; Brebion, Smith, Gorman & Amador, 1996; Crider, 1997;

Nathaniel-James, Brown & Ron, 1996). An association between the positive symptoms of

schizophrenia and a failure in inhibition has also often been proposed (e.g. Bullen &

Hemsley, 1987; Cornblatt, Lenzenweger, Dworking & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1985; Frith,

1979; Gray, 1998; Peters et al, 2000; Williams, 1996). In addition, there is recent indirect

evidence that there may be a breakdown of inhibitory processes in those with auditory

hallucinations. For example, Hoffman, Rapaport, Mazure and Quinlan (1999), using a

speech tracking task, showed that patients with hallucinations had misheard portions of text

as verbalizations related to their voices and made more intrusive errors when shadowing

noise-contaminated speech compared to nonhallucinating patients. These intrusions in

performance were interpreted as a breakdown in the regulation of auditory mental events.

DiGirolamo and Posner (1996) also proposed that auditory hallucinations arise because of a

hyperactive executive attentional network, leading to poor regulatory control of internal

activations and competing ideas that are then interpreted as voices. However, it should be

noted at the outset that the few studies that have directly investigated the role of inhibitory

processes in auditory hallucinations using negative priming (Peters et al, 2000) and

interference tasks (Brebion, Smith, Amador, Malaspina & Gorman, 1998) have failed to

Chapter 8

- 173 -

demonstrate any such role. However, since auditory hallucinations are consciously

experienced mental events, it is possible that they may reflect impairments in intentional

inhibitory processes rather than other forms of inhibition. Neither negative priming nor

interference control are categorized as intentional forms of inhibition (Harnishfeger, 1995).

Therefore the failure of previous studies to establish a relationship between auditory

hallucinations and inhibition may be because of the form of inhibition investigated.

New empirical support for a failure in intentional inhibition in auditory hallucinations

Recent investigations have been carried out by our research group to test the

prediction that those schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations suffer from a

deficit in intentional inhibition (Badcock, Waters, Maybery, Michie, in press; Waters,

Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003). There were two tasks assessing the intentional

suppression of cognitive events – the Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT; Burgess

& Shallice, 1996) and the Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories task (ICIM; Schnider

& Ptak, 1999), which require the volitional inhibition of currently active mental

associations and irrelevant memories respectively. The patient group consisted of 43

patients with schizophrenia (19 with auditory hallucinations, and 24 without, 4 of whom

had never experienced auditory hallucinations in the past) (see Table 1 for a description of

the participants). It was found that auditory hallucinations severity (as measured by the

PANSS) was significantly correlated with performance on the inhibitory conditions of the

HSCT (type A errors) and ICIM (false alarms on the last three runs) tasks, and thus linked

to a deficit in intentional inhibition. In Badcock et al (in press), we further demonstrated

that those patients who were not current hallucinating and those who had never hallucinated

showed a pattern of performance on the ICIM task that was not significantly different from

that of healthy controls, suggesting that this impairment might not be a general feature of

schizophrenia but is specifically associated with the presence of hallucinations.

Chapter 8

- 174 -

Table 1

Demographic and clinical characteristics (mean, SD) of patients with Schizophrenia

Current AH1

(n = 19)

Non AH2

(n = 24)

Never AH3

(n = 4)

Current vs. Non

AH comparisons

Age (years) 34.10 (9.65) 38.29 (7.22) 36.25 (10.84) t = 1.62, p = .11

Education (years) 10.78 (2.12) 11.20 (1.86) 12.50 (2.08) t = .68, p = .49

Sex (M/F) 16 / 3 19 / 5 2 / 2 X2 = .17, p = .67

Quick Test 93.68 (5.52) 95.54 (5.49) 98.00 (5.88) t = 1.09, p = .27

Digit Span forward 6.52 (1.42) 7.33 (1.88) 7.50 (2.08) t = 1.54, p = .12

Length of illness* 10.89 (7.11) 15.41 (8.55) 9.50 (4.20) t = 1.85, p = .07

Beck Depression

Inventory (BDI-II) 13.84 (15.62) 11.95 (10.16) 4.02 (5.30) t = .47, p = .64

Number of admissions 9.52 (10.02) 8.87 (5.68) 5.75 (4.27) t = .26, p = .78

Level of positive

symptoms (PANSS) 23.63 (3.60) 15.45 (2.63) 16.25 (3.30)

t = 8.58, p <

.001

Level of negative

symptoms (PANSS) 13.00 (2.80) 11.66 (3.45) 10.00 (2.70) t = 1.36, p = .18

Level of general

symptoms (PANSS) 29.78 (4.79) 27.87 (5.92) 27.75 (3.30) t = 1.14, p = .26

Chlorpromazine

equivalent

1075.52

(496.08)

814.04

(3.78.33)

740.50

(446.10) t = 1.96, p = .06

1 Current-AH = patients currently experiencing auditory hallucinations; 2 Non-AH = patients who have not had auditory hallucinations in the last four weeks or on less than half of the days in the last 4 weeks (includes 4 Never AH patients); 3 Never-AH = patients who have never experienced auditory hallucinations; * calculated as years since first admission.

Chapter 8

- 175 -

However, the most stringent test of whether a deficit is an essential component of

auditory hallucinations is to determine whether each and every individual currently

experiencing hallucinations exhibits the specified cognitive failure relative to other patients

with schizophrenia who do not report hallucinations. Consequently, the percentages of

patients impaired on the inhibitory tasks (HSCT type A errors or ICIM false alarms on the

last three runs, or both) were calculated with reference to whether scores were in excess of

one standard deviation from control group means. The probability that an individual would

score more than one standard deviation from the mean on a normal distribution is .158 so

the probability that an individual would score one standard deviation away from the mean

of controls on one inhibition task or another is .291 [where Pr A or B = Pr A + Pr B – (Pr A

* Pr B)]. Table 2 shows that all of the 19 patients with current auditory hallucinations

were found to have a deficit in inhibition, convincingly demonstrating the role of

intentional inhibition in the hallucinatory process. In comparison, less than half of patients

without hallucinations (45.8%) could be classified as impaired on intentional inhibition

using the above definition of impairment. This difference in frequency between the patient

groups was significant, X2(1) = 14.75, p < .001. Amongst the four patients who had never

hallucinated, only one showed such a deficit, a result that is not much different from

chance. When a more stringent criterion of two standard deviations from the mean of

controls was applied, the results showed that 84.2% of patients with hallucinations still

showed an inhibition deficit, compared to 37.5% of patients without hallucinations, a

difference that remained significant, X2(1) = 9.50, p < .01. Altogether these results

strikingly show that all patients with hallucinations showed a deficit in inhibition, with

varying degree of severity; this was not the case for the patients without auditory

hallucinations, the majority of whom did not exhibit a deficit. These observations support

the first part of our model - that a failure to inhibit current mental events and memory

representations is significantly associated with the hallucinatory experience.

Chapter 8

-176 -

Table 2

Percentage of patients impaired on the experimental tasks (as defined by scores more than

one standard deviation from that of the mean of controls)

Current AH1

(n = 19)

Non AH2

(n = 24)

Inhibition deficit

(on HSCT or ICIM or both)

100 % 45.8 %

Context memory deficit

(on source or temporal accuracy or both)

89.5 % 62.5 %

Inhibition and context deficit 89.5 % 33.3 %

1 Current-AH = patients currently experiencing auditory hallucinations; 2 Non-AH = patients who have not had auditory hallucinations in the last four weeks or on less than half of the days in the last 4 weeks (includes 4 Never AH patients).

In sum, these results demonstrate that those with auditory hallucinations showed

increasing intrusion of current mental events and other representations previously acquired

in memory, as measured by the HSCT and the ICIM respectively. We may speculate on the

involvement of the brain regions that have led to impairments on these tasks. Effective

performance on the HSCT has been linked with activation of prefrontal areas and the

anterior cingulate gyrus (Burgess & Shallice, 1996, Collette et al, 2001, Nathaniel-James,

Fletcher & Frith, 1997). The anatomical regions involved in the ICIM have been

investigated by Schnider, Treyer & Buck (2000). They found that performance on runs 2-4

provoked posterior orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) activation and other subcortical regions

contiguous with the left OFC structures: left caudate nucleus, left substantial nigra, ventral

tegmental area and right medial thalamus. In addition, the inhibitory mechanisms needed

to control distracting memories are thought to activate the prefrontal cortex and the anterior

cingulate gyrus (Levy & Anderson, 2002). Auditory hallucinations have also been linked

to abnormal activation of the prefrontal cortex including the OFC and anterior cingulate

(Lennox et al, 1999; McGuire, Shah & Murray, 1993; Silbersweig et al, 1995), and to

abnormalities in basal ganglia structures and the thalamus (Copolov et al, 2003;

Silbersweig et al, 1995; Takebayashi, Takei & Mori, 2002; Woodruff & Murray, 1994;

Chapter 8

-177 -

Woodruff, 2004), consistent with the role of disturbed intentional inhibition deficits in

auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia.

In addition to the role of inhibitory processes, the results obtained on the ICIM task

suggest that episodic memory also plays a role in the genesis of auditory hallucinations.

The relation between inhibition and memory has recently been explored in the normal

population (e.g. Anderson & Green, 2001; Conway, Harries, Noyes, Racsma’ny &

Frankish, 2000; Levy & Anderson, 2002). It is now believed that the ability to control

distracting memories is accomplished by inhibitory mechanisms, and consequently that a

failure in inhibition might help promote the formation of intrusive memories (Conway et al,

2000; Levy & Anderson, 2002). These findings suggest that more than one cognitive

process may be involved in the hallucinatory experience. Further consideration of the

current data supports this possibility since approximately 46% of those patients without

hallucinations still exhibited a deficit of intentional inhibition, indicating that such a deficit

is not sufficient for hallucinations to occur. Non-specificity of cognitive deficits is a

criticism often directed at contemporary theories of auditory hallucinations (e.g. Frith,

1996) as the proposed deficits are often found in nonhallucinating schizophrenia patients

(e.g. Keefe, Arnold, Bayen & Harvey, 1999). As a consequence, there has been an

increasing awareness that a combination of deficits might be needed to explain such a

complex event (e.g. Nayani & David, 1996a). Our model proposes that patients with

auditory hallucinations, in addition to the intentional inhibition deficit, also suffer from a

context deficit in memory.

A deficit in memory for context

Approximately 60% of all patients with auditory hallucinations report hearing sounds

other than voices, which include environmental noises (e.g. clicks, bangs, city traffic) and

animals sounds (Nayani & David, 1996b; Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2004). This

finding alone is not easily explainable by exclusively language-based accounts of auditory

hallucinations (e.g. Frith & Dolan, 1997) but rather points to the role of auditory

representations in memory. Our own investigations (Waters, Badcock & Maybery, 2004)

also show that a majority of patients report knowing the identity of their voices and close to

half agree with the idea that the contents of their voices could be reproductions of speech

they had heard in the past. These results support the proposal that auditory hallucinations

are, at least partly, composed of memories of speech and sounds. Several authors have

Chapter 8

-178 -

also noted the importance of memory in auditory hallucinations (e.g. David & Lucas, 1993;

Nayani & David, 1996a). For instance, David and Lucas (1993) first proposed that

auditory hallucinations may be associated with a failure in regulating memories and other

unwanted mental events from being activated involuntarily. Also, Hemsley (1993),

Hoffman et al (1994), Nayani and David (1996a) and David (2004) have suggested that

hallucinations may be associated with the intrusion of material from long-term memory.

But why wouldn’t patients recognize these events as memories? Nayani and David

(1996a) observed that all memories carry contextual details that allow them to be correctly

situated in time, in place and in person. To explain why these memory activations are not

recognized by the patient, they proposed a disturbance of the processes that serve to bind

the contextual components of memories, resulting in an incomplete representation of

memories and consequently a failure to identify their origins. In particular, they proposed a

disorder of the relationship between “mental events, time and self” (p. 363), suggesting

confusion about the temporal locus and source of speech fragments in memory. We extend

this proposal by suggesting that the loss of contextual information is not always absolute

and that the amount of information being recalled varies between individuals and between

hallucinatory episodes. As such, some contextual elements of the original experience are

sometimes preserved, such as the familiar voice of a TV or radio personality, or that of a

person well known to the sufferer.

Context memory: definition

In episodic memory research, a distinction is made between content and context

information. Content information refers to the event itself, whereas contextual information

refers to details which are encoded with the event, but which are not part of the event itself.

Context refers to information such as the source (“who”) or temporal (“when”)

characteristics of the memory event (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996). The context of

memories provides cues that allow us to differentiate one memory from other memories.

Johnson and colleagues have proposed the most influential theory of how contextual

memory is recalled, with their Source-Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi &

Lindsay, 1993; Johnson, Kounios & Reeder, 1994). Their central claim is that memory

records are evaluated through a decision process performed during remembering. During

this process, the origins of memories are inferred on the basis of available cues (perceptual

details, contextual information, affect, semantic content and cognitive operations during

Chapter 8

-179 -

encoding). Retrieval success depends partly on the quality of information that was encoded

and disruption may occur because cues are missing, incomplete or ambiguous.

Furthermore, Johnson, Hashtroudi and Linsay (1993) have proposed that a loss of

qualitative information such as contextual details would make it difficulty to identify

correctly the origins of mental events and results in confusion with other stimuli. We

suggest that schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations fail to access the contextual

cues that would allow them to form an intact representation of events in memories.

Context memory deficits in auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia

It is now a consistent view that schizophrenia is linked to a deficit in integrating

contextual information in memory, and several authors have proposed that many of the

cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia result from an impairment in the ability to

process contextual information (e.g. Bazin, Perruchet, Hardy-Bayle, & Feline, 2000; Cohen

& Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Rizzo, Danion, Van der Linden, & Grange, 1996; Servan-

Schreiber, Cohen, & Steingard, 1996). There are also increasing suggestions that a deficit

in context memory may be linked to positive symptoms, and in particular to auditory

hallucinations (Brebion et al, 1999; Brebion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina & Sharif, 2002;

Guillem et al, 2003; Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, & Steingard, 1996). Support for the

proposal of a context memory deficit in auditory hallucinations comes primarily from

studies that have shown a failure to identify the source of actions among schizophrenia

patients currently experiencing auditory hallucinations (Baker & Morrison, 1998; Bentall,

Baker & Havers, 1991; Brebion, Smith, Gorman, Amador, 1996; Brebion et al, 2000, 2002;

Franck et al, 2000; John & McGuire, 1999). A deficit in identifying the source of events

has also been demonstrated in normal individuals who score high on a measure of

predisposition to hallucinations (Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995). The only study that

considered a loss of context information other than source in patients with auditory

hallucinations is Brebion et al (2002). They gave patients with schizophrenia a task of free

recall in which four lists of words were presented. They found that auditory hallucinations

severity was correlated with the erroneous recall of words presented in different lists, and

interpreted this deficit as an impairment in the ability to remember temporal context during

production of the words. In sum, the only empirical evidence supporting Nayani and

David's theory is the finding of a deficit in source monitoring in auditory hallucinations

and, indirectly, a deficit in retaining the temporal context of memories, suggesting that the

Chapter 8

-180 -

exact nature of the contextual memory deficit in auditory hallucinations has not yet been

clearly established.

New empirical support for a failure in context memory in auditory hallucinations

We are now able to test the prediction that patients with auditory hallucinations suffer

from a deficit in context memory. In Waters, Maybery, Badcock and Michie (2004), the

contextual memory of patients with schizophrenia was tested with a new task in which

memory for events was assessed in conjunction with memory for both the source and the

temporal characteristics of those events. Each participant watched or performed pairings of

common household objects in two different sessions. Subsequently, the participant’s

memory for pairs of objects, for who paired the objects and for when the objects were

paired, was tested. Therefore, the task tested recognition for individual contextual cues

(source and temporal memory) as well as the ability to bind those contextual cues together.

The results showed that compared to healthy controls, patients with schizophrenia had an

impairment in combining contextual cues together to form an integrated representation of

an event in memory.

As explained earlier, the most stringent test of whether a deficit is an essential

component to auditory hallucinations is to examine individual cases and determine the

percentages of patients impaired in the particular cognitive domain. The percentage of

patients who had a context memory deficit (impaired on source memory or temporal

memory or both), as defined by scores one standard deviation away from the means of the

control group, was computed (see Table 2). The results showed that nearly all patients

with auditory hallucinations showed a context memory deficit (89.5%). These results

confirm the second part of our model that contextual memory is impaired in those with

auditory hallucinations. The finding that a few patients with hallucinations did not show a

deficit in contextual memory may reflect the insensitivity of the particular task we used and

suggests that future studies should consider different ways to measure context memory.

The results also showed that 62.5% of the schizophrenic patients without

hallucinations were impaired. The difference in frequencies for the two patient groups was

significant, X2 (1) = 4.05, p < .05, suggesting that significantly more patients with auditory

hallucinations showed a deficit in contextual memory compared to patients without

hallucinations.

Chapter 8

-181 -

The finding that a failure in context memory is also present in nonhallucinating

individuals is not a problem for our model, primarily because we are proposing that context

memory is only one of at least two cognitive processes which are thought to be impaired.

Thus any single deficit may be associated with many of the symptoms of schizophrenia;

only in combination with the inhibitory impairment would the symptom of auditory

hallucinations become manifest. Interestingly, of the four patients with no previous history

of hallucinations, none showed a context memory deficit. Using a more stringent two

standard deviations criterion, two thirds of all hallucinating patients (63.2%) and less than

half of nonhallucinating patients (41.7%) still showed a significant impairment. This

difference was however nonsignificant, X2(1) = 1.96, p = .16. Overall, these results

indicate that, in concordance with our model, patients currently hallucinating showed a

deficit in contextual memory with varying degrees of severity.

Further empirical evidence also supports the involvement of episodic and context

memory processes in auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. There is ample evidence

that the prefrontal regions are associated with source and temporal context memory

retrieval (e.g. Cabeza et al, 1997; Glisky, Rubin & Davidson, 2001; Henson, Shallice &

Dolan, 1999; Johnson, Kounios & Nolde, 1996; Rugg, Fletcher, Chua & Dolan, 1999;

Simons et al, 2002; Sullivan, 1997; Stuss, Eskes & Foster, 1994). The frontal lobes may

also be involved in the integration of multiple independent features of an experience into a

composite memory trace, with reduced frontal lobe functions resulting in memory traces

that lack rich contextual detail (Fuster, 1999; Stuss & Benson, 1989). Other studies have

linked contextual binding to the frontal lobes and to its connections with the hippocampus

and medial temporal system (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Mitchell et al, 2000). The

temporal lobes have also been associated with source and temporal memory (Mayes et al,

2001; Spencer & Raz, 1995; Thaiss & Petrides, 2003). The finding that schizophrenia

patients show activation of the hippocampus (e.g. Copolov et al, 2003; Silbersweig et al,

1995; Woodruff & Murray, 1994), temporal lobes (e.g. Silbersweig et al, 1995) and

prefrontal cortex (Bushara et al, 1999; Copolov et al, 2003) during auditory hallucinations

is consistent with the notion that selection/retrieval from memory, and context memory

deficits, are important in the hallucinatory process. Most recently, Stevens (2004)

investigated the neural systems associated with voice memory, independently of word

memory, with functional magnetic resonance imaging. Voice memory processes engaged a

Chapter 8

-182 -

network of left temporal, right frontal and right medial parietal areas. The involvement of

the frontal and temporal regions is certainly consistent with regions activated during

auditory hallucinations.

A combined deficit in inhibition and context memory

We have demonstrated that inhibition and context memory processes are commonly

impaired in individuals with auditory hallucinations. However, patients not experiencing

hallucinations also demonstrated such deficits, showing that these deficits, singly, are not

sufficient for hallucinations to occur. Our model proposes that the two deficits should co-

occur in those patients currently experiencing auditory hallucinations. To test this theory,

the percentage of patients impaired on tasks of both intentional inhibition and contextual

memory was computed. The probability that an individual would score one standard

deviation away from the mean of controls in both cognitive domains by chance is .085.

Table 2 shows that, using a one standard deviation criterion, nearly all patients

currently experiencing hallucinations (89.5%) exhibited the proposed combination of

deficits, compared to only 33.3% of patients without active hallucinations. The difference

was significant, X2(1) = 13.73, p < .001, confirming that significantly more patients with

hallucinations showed the predicted combination of deficits than patients without

hallucinations. Furthermore, when using the most stringent criterion of two standard

deviations, more than half of the hallucinating patients still showed the combination of

deficits (52.6%) compared to only 16.7% of nonhallucinating patients, the difference again

being significant, X2 = 6.24, p < .01. Of the patients who had never hallucinated, none

showed the combination of deficits.

A critical reflection on the pattern of data for current hallucinators indicates strong

support for the notion that the two deficits, in varying degrees of severity, are significantly

associated with the hallucinatory process. However, the results also revealed that some

past hallucinators also showed the combination of deficits, suggesting that two deficits

alone may not be sufficient to explain the presence of auditory hallucinations, but that an

additional cognitive process is important for the expression of this symptom. One proposal

is that the role of this third process may be to 'activate' the internal representations that

would lead to auditory hallucinations. Our model, and all other contemporary models of

hallucinations, still need to identify the processes responsible for the selection and

activation of the hallucinatory material.

Chapter 8

-183 -

Several alternative explanations of why the patients currently experiencing auditory

hallucinations showed these deficits may be ruled out. We investigated whether the

patients had a more severe illness or were more cognitively impaired on intellectual

measures than patients not currently experiencing hallucinations. The results of our studies

(Badcock et al, in press; Waters, Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003; Waters et al, 2004)

indicate that this was not likely to be the explanation for the pattern of results. Group

comparisons (see Table 1) for a range of demographic factors such as age and years of

education, and clinical indicators including duration of illness, depression and number of

admissions, suggested that patients with current hallucinations were not generally more

unwell. Patients with current hallucinations showed more positive symptoms than non

hallucinators, but there were no significant differences in negative and general (somatic)

symptoms. Compared to non hallucinators, patients with hallucinations tended to have

higher doses of chlorpromazine equivalents, although this variable did not correlate with

performance on inhibition and context memory tasks (Waters, Badcock, Maybery &

Michie, 2003; Waters et al, 2004). Finally, hallucinating patients were not found to be

significantly more impaired on other measures of current cognitive functioning such as

general intelligence quotient or short-term memory tasks, suggesting that the above deficits

were not associated with a widespread cognitive impairment.

Assessment of the model

The current investigations consolidated empirical evidence in support of the proposal

that deficits in both intentional inhibition and context memory are important components to

the hallucinatory experience in schizophrenia. However, can this proposal also explain the

clinical phenomenology of auditory hallucinations? One criterion for judging the adequacy

of a theory of auditory hallucinations is the extent to which it can explain the

phenomenology of the experience.

Our model proposes that auditory hallucinations consist of the activation of auditory

mental events that include memories and other currently active mental associations. The

proposal of auditory hallucinations as consisting of auditory reproductions from memories

is able to explain the different forms and contents of auditory hallucinations. For example,

it can explain why hallucinations can take the form of nonverbal sounds, in addition to

voices (e.g. bangs, animal sounds; Nayani & David, 1996b). The finding that patients

experience nonverbal auditory hallucinations has been a problem for language-based

Chapter 8

-184 -

theories of auditory hallucinations, such as Inner Speech theories (e.g. Bentall, Kaney &

Dewey, 1991; Frith, 1996; Frith & Dolan, 1997). Our explanation also accounts for why

voices are often recognized as belonging to people that the hearer knows, and why sufferers

report hearing different types of grammatical speech, such as second or third person

hallucinations. The proposal of auditory hallucinations as memories can also explain why

entire dialogues from a conversation may be recalled, and why voices often refer to the

patient’s personal details and are perceived to be intimate. This aspect may contribute to

the compelling sense of reality and omnipotence of auditory hallucinations (Chadwick &

Birchwood, 1995; Gelder et al, 1993) since they comprise the intrusion of highly familiar

information (i.e. memories).

Another distinguishing feature of schizophrenic hallucinations is that the experience

is perceived to originate from another agency, a finding that has traditionally been

explained with reference to difficulties in distinguishing sensations caused by one’s own

actions or a failure in self-monitoring (Frith & Dolan, 1997; McGuire et al, 1995). The

current suggestion of a disordered context memory system can also explain why the origins

of these mental events are often not recognized. The contextual features are missing or

incomplete, resulting in confusion about the origins of the experience. Misattribution can

therefore be understood as the transference of the origins of memories as a result of

impaired context memory abilities. It may also be speculated that the failure to identify the

origins of recalled memories would lead to misinterpretations about the message and the

intent of the experience, accounting for variations in beliefs about the voices and also for

negative affect such as distress and fear commonly experienced by patients with auditory

hallucinations (e.g. Close & Garety, 1998).

In addition, the proposal of hallucinations as memories provides, in our view, a

satisfactory explanation of why voices are perceived to have an external origin and believed

to be real. Recent findings suggest that episodic memory retains traces of both voice

characteristics and words (Goldinger, 1999). Furthermore, it has been noted that the human

voice carries important information such as the affect, gender, age and other physical

characteristics of a talker (Belin, Fecteau & Bedard, 2004; Stevens, 2004). The attributes

carried are such that voices have been described as an ‘auditory face’, carrying a

combination of individual features and emotional states (Belin et al, 2004), confirming the

patients’ firm assertions that that they are not just hearing words, but a real voice with,

Chapter 8

-185 -

sometimes, its own social and physical identity. The individual is therefore correct in

reporting that the voice of another is being heard. A similar line of argument regarding the

preserved perceptual aspects of memories of speech (Hunter and Woodruff, 2004) further

contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of the location in space of hallucinated

speech. Auditory hallucinations are sometimes perceived to originate from inside the head,

and sometimes from outside (Copolov, Trauer & MacKinnon, in press; Hunter, 2004). In

our view, those sensory records, which includes the elements of the original perceptual

trace of an auditory event in external space, indicates that the experience originated from a

non-self source and from a location outside the head. In the case where the original

experience was actually generated by the patient’s own mental production, an absence of

these perceptual elements may lead to the correct conclusion that the voice originated from

inside the head.

As noted above, auditory hallucinations are often reported to be intrusive, unintended

and beyond the control of the voice-hearer (Slade & Bentall, 1988; Oulis, Mavreas,

Mamounas & Stephanis, 1995). This feature of the hallucinatory experience has often been

ignored in contemporary cognitive theories of auditory hallucinations (e.g. Aleman,

Böcker, Hijman, Kahn & de Haan 2002, Frith, 1996). Our model’s proposal of a failure in

the control of intentional inhibition explains that patients would find it difficult to suppress

irrelevant mental events, which would then be experienced as conscious events. It makes

intuitive sense that these unsolicited mental events would contribute to the perceived

intrusiveness of hallucinations.

It is important to note that our model should not be seen as an independent approach

to understanding auditory hallucinations. It is our view that the proposed deficits should be

seen as complementary to other explanations of hallucinations. For instance, the current

proposal of a context memory deficit in patients with auditory hallucinations is actually not

dissimilar to reality- and self-monitoring theories of auditory hallucinations (e.g. Frith,

1996). In support, Brebion et al (1996) suggested that difficulties in identifying the

contextual details of mental events would result in a failure to discriminate between real

and imaginary events, or between external events themselves, resulting in a failure in

reality monitoring. However, our proposal differs in the suggestion that the context

memory deficit is more extensive than simply a source-monitoring deficit. The lack of

specificity criticism often directed at these theories is not of primary importance to the

Chapter 8

-186 -

current theory as it allows for other conditions to show similar deficits, as long as they do

not show the exact same permutation of deficits.

In addition, it is unlikely that cognitive impairments are the sole factors responsible

for auditory hallucinations. It is now generally acknowledged that psychological factors

such as metacognitive biases, beliefs and attributions concerning the origins and intent of

voices have considerable explanatory power (e.g. Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995). This

level of explanation, for which the content of voices is so meaningful, may account for the

material comprising hallucinated speech and issues of affect, which our model cannot fully

account for. For instance, Thomas, Bracken and Leudar (2004) have argued that the voices

may only be explained in the context of each individual’s social, cultural, historical and

political framework, providing a useful approach to understanding the content of voices and

the special relationships that develop between patients and their voices. It is our view that,

although psychological explanations do not explain so well how hallucinations occur in the

first place, they are very convincing models of the maintenance process of auditory

hallucinations and their insight can be integrated with the current level of explanation to

understand the very personalized experience of sufferers.

Potential empirical and theoretical developments

We should elaborate on the specificity of the model to patients with auditory

hallucinations. It was explained earlier that nonhallucinating individuals may show a

deficit in either cognitive domain, but only hallucinating patients should show a deficit in

both. This explanation allows for the finding that these deficits, singly, may be present in

patients with schizophrenia, irrespective of their hallucinatory status, and in other disorders.

In particular, we may speculate that either of these deficits may be found in other psychotic

symptoms which frequently co-occur with auditory hallucinations, perhaps acting like a

predisposing factor for hallucinations. However, it is anticipated that only hallucinating

patients will show the combination of deficits.

The model described so far has focused largely on processes believed to be relevant

to the onset of hallucinations but further work is required to elaborate on the processes

responsible for the relapse and recovery phases. It may be speculated that fluctuations in

one of the cognitive mechanisms suggested above modulate the cognitive states the patients

pass through. In support, our studies have shown that the inhibitory deficit is present

particularly in periods in which hallucinations are actually experienced (e.g. Badcock et al,

Chapter 8

-187 -

in press). In addition, fluctuations in the level of control for auditory hallucinations have

been found in schizophrenia patients during different phases of their illness. Larkin (1979)

found that patients were able to stop auditory hallucinations during remission but not

during the acute phase of their illness. If the process of inhibition is instrumental in the

patient’s control over auditory hallucinations, then Larkin’s study also suggests that levels

of inhibitory control may vary according to the phase of the patient’s illness. A revealing

study would be to monitor the processes of inhibition and context memory longitudinally to

investigate how these vary according the state of the patient.

It is perhaps conceivable that fluctuations in these processes, and perhaps even the

onset of hallucinations, occur as a result of significant life changes associated with stress

and other emotive states. It has often been suggested that stress plays an important role in,

and often precedes, auditory hallucinations (Bentall, 1990, 1997; Hustig & Hafner, 1990;

Soppitt & Birchwood, 1997). Nayani and David (1996b) also found that some affective

states such as sadness, fear and anger sometimes trigger hallucinations. The mechanisms

by which these events trigger hallucinations can only be speculated but it is well recognized

that mood states such as arousal, depression or anxiety have been found to affect cognitive

performance such as inhibitory processes (Brewin et al, 1996; Reynolds & Brewin, 1998)

and encoding or retrieval of memories (Deffenbacher, 1994; Derix & Jolles, 1997) to a

significant degree. It may, therefore, be possible that, in a predisposed individual, an

intensely emotional event may activate auditory hallucinations by precipitating a change in

the balance of normal cognitive processes.

Our findings showed that a small number of patients who no longer experienced

auditory hallucinations showed the combination of deficits, suggesting that additional

cognitive process(es) may be necessary to explain auditory hallucinations in patients with

schizophrenia. We speculated that the role of this additional process may be to 'activate'

the representations that would lead to auditory hallucinations. Another process that may be

relevant to our investigations is mental imagery. One recently developed theory of auditory

hallucinations proposes that, in individuals susceptible to auditory hallucinations, top-down

processes are given higher priority than bottom-up processes resulting in an imbalance

between sensory and mental elements and an increasing influence of imagery on perception

(Aleman, Böcker, Hijman, de Haan & Kahn, 2003). The proposal of impaired imagery

may be of considerable value in identifying additional cognitive deficits in addition to the

Chapter 8

-188 -

ones already proposed. Although empirical evidence is still needed to convincingly support

the role of imagery in hallucinating schizophrenia patients, it is a factor that has been

consistently identified in research on normal people with a predisposition to hallucinations

(Aleman, Böcker & de Haan, 1999; Barrett & Etheridge, 1992).

Finally, the small sample size is a limitation of our research and replication is needed

using larger samples. Investigations should also particularly target individuals with

schizophrenia who have no history of auditory hallucinations to validate our model, as they

represent the strongest test of which combination of cognitive deficits is specific to auditory

hallucinations.

In conclusion, we propose a new model of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia,

whereby a failure in both intentional inhibition and in contextual memory must be present

simultaneously for hallucinatory experiences to occur. Empirical evidence was assembled

to show that these deficits were significantly associated with this symptom. Given the

heterogeneous nature of schizophrenia, continued research using the research strategies

summarized here should further elucidate the relationship between psychotic symptoms and

cognitive impairment.

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a University Postgraduate Award and a Departmental

Scholarship from the School of Psychology of the University of Western Australia to F.

Waters as well as research funds from the University of Western Australia Schools of

Psychology and of Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences. The authors wish to thank all of

the patients who took part in this study, Danny Rock whose help was invaluable in

recruiting the patients, and G. Haddock, D. Copolov and their colleagues for their

permission to use the PSYRAT and the MUPS respectively as part of our research.

Chapter 8

-189 -

References

Aleman, A., Böcker, K., & deHaan, E. (1999). Disposition towards hallucination and

subjective versus objective vividness of imagery in normal subjects. Personality and

Individidual Differences, 27, 707-714.

Aleman, A., Böcker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., Kahn, R. S., & de Haan, E. H. F. (2002).

Hallucinations in schizophrenia: imbalance between imagery and perception?

Schizophrenia Research, 57(2-3), 315-316.

Aleman, A., Böcker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., de Haan, E. H. F., & Kahn, R. S. (2003).

Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia: role of top-down information

processing. Schizophrenia Research, 1926, 1-11.

Amieva, H., Phillips, L. H., Della Sala, S., & Henry, J. D. (2004). Inhibitory functioning in

Alzheimer's disease. Brain, 127, 949-964.

Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive

control. Nature, 410(6826), 366-369.

Asaad, G., & Shapiro, B. (1986). Hallucinations: theoretical and clinical overview.

American Journal of Psychiatry, 143(9), 1088-1097.

Badcock, J. C., Waters, F. A. V., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (in press). Auditory

hallucinations: failure to inhibit irrelevant memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.

Baker, C. A., & Morrison, A. P. (1998). Cognitive processes in auditory hallucinations:

attributional biases and metacognition. Psychological Medicine, 28, 1199-1208.

Barrett, T., & Etheridge, J. (1992). Verbal hallucinations in normals, I: People who hear

'voices'. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6(5), 379-387.

Bazin, N., Perruchet, P., Hardy-Bayle, M., & Feline, A. (2000). Context-dependent

information processing in patients with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 45(1-

2), 93-101.

Beech, A., Powell, T., McWilliam, J., & Claridge, G. (1989). Evidence of reduced

'cognitive inhibition' in schizophrenia. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28,

109-116.

Belin, P., Fecteau, S., & Bedard, C. (2004). Thinking the voice: neural correlates of voice

perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 129-1355.

Bentall, R. P., Baker, G. A., & Havers, S. (1991). Reality monitoring and psychotic

hallucinations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 213-222.

Chapter 8

-190 -

Bentall, R. P., Kaney, S., & Dewey, M. E. (1991). Paranoia and social reasoning: an

attribution theory analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 13-23.

Bentall, R. P. (1990). The illusion of reality: A review and integration of psychological

research on hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin, 107(1), 82-95.

Bentall, R. (1997). The syndromes and symptoms of psychosis. Or why you can't play

'twenty questions' with the concept of schizophrenia and hope to win. In R. Bentall

(Ed.), Reconstructing schizophrenia (pp. 23-59). London: Routledge.

Bjorklund, D., & Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The evolution of inhibition mechanisms and

their role in human cognition. In F. Dempster & C. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference and

Inhibition in Cognition (pp. 141-173). San Diego, London: Academic Press, Inc.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., & Amador, X. (1996). Reality monitoring failure in

schizophrenia: The role of selective attention. Schizophrenia Research, 22, 173-180.

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Amador, X., Malaspina, D., & Gorman, J. (1998). Word

recognition, discrimination accuracy and decision bias in schizophrenia: association

with positive symptomatology and depressive symptomatology. The Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(10), 604-609.

Brebion, G., Amador, X., David, A., Malaspina, D., Sharif, Z., & Gorman, J. M. (2000).

Positive symptomatology and source-monitoring failure in schizophrenia - an

analysis of symptom specific effects. Psychiatry Research, 95, 119-131.

Brebion, G., Amador, X., Smith, M., Malaspina, D., Sharif, Z., & Gorman, J. (1999).

Opposite links of positive and negative symptomatology with memory errors in

schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 88, 15-24.

Brebion, G., Gorman, J. M., Amador, X., Malaspina, D., & Sharif, Z. (2002). Source

monitoring impairments in schizophrenia: characterisation and association with

positive and negative symptomatology. Psychiatry Research, 112, 27-39.

Brewin, C. R., Hunter, E., Carroll, F., & Tata, P. (1996). Intrusive memories in depression:

an index of schema. Psychological Medicine, 26(6), 1271-1276.

Bullen, J. G., & Hemsley, D. R. (1987). Schizophrenia: a failure to control the contents of

consciousness. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 26, 25-33.

Burgess, P., & Shallice, T. (1996). Response suppression, initiation and strategy use

following frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 34(4), 263-273.

Chapter 8

-191 -

Bushara, K. O., Weeks, R. A., Ishii, K., Catalan, M.-J., Tian, B., Rauschecker, J. P., &

Hallett, M. (1999). Modality-specific frontal and parietal areas for auditory and visual

spatial localization in humans. Nature Neuroscience, 2(8), 759-766.

Cabeza, R., Mangels, J., Nyberg, L., Habib, R., Houle, S., McIntosh, A. R., & Tulving, E.

(1997). Brain regions differentially involved in remembering what and when: A PET

study. Neuron, 19, 863-870.

Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., & Copolov, D. L. (1996). Patients' strategies for coping with

auditory hallucinations. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 184(3), 161-

166.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1995). The Omnipotence of Voices II: The Beliefs About

Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ). British Journal of Psychiatry, 166, 773-776.

Chalfonte, B. L., & Johnson, M. K. (1996). Feature memory and binding in young and

older adults. Memory and Cognition, 24(4), 403-416.

Close, H., & Garety, P. (1998). Cognitive assessment of voices: further develoments in

understanding the emotional impact of voices. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,

37, 173-188.

Cohen, J. D., & Servan-Schreiber, D. (1992). A neural network model of disturbances in

the processing of context in schizophrenia. Psychiatric Annals, 22(3), 131-136.

Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Delfiore, G., Degueldre, C., Luxen, A., & Salmon, E.

(2001). The functional anatomy of inhibition processes investigated with the Hayling

Task. NeuroImage, 14, 258-267.

Conway, M., Harries, K., Noyes, J., Racsma'ny, M., & Frankish, C. (2000). The disruption

and dissolution of directed forgetting: inhibitory control of memory. Journal of

Memory and Language, 43, 409-430.

Copolov, D., Trauer, T., & MacKinnon, A. (in press). On the non-significance of internal

versus external auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research.

Copolov, D. L., Seal, M. L., Maruff, P., Ulusoy, R., Wong, M. T. H., Tochon-Danguy, H.

J., & Egan, G. F. (2003). Cortical activation associated with the experience of

auditory hallucinations and perception of human speech in schizophrenia: a PET

correlation study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 122, 139-152.

Chapter 8

-192 -

Cornblatt, B., Lenzenweger, M., Dworking, R., & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, L. (1985). Positive

and negative schizophrenia symptoms, attention and information processing.

Schizophrenic Bulletin, 11(3), 397-407.

Crider, A. (1997). Perseveration in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 23(1), 63-74.

David, A. S. (2004). The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations: an

overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 107-123.

David, A. S., & Lucas, P. A. (1993). Auditory-verbal hallucinations and the phonological

loop: A cognitive neuropsychological study. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,

32, 431-441.

David, A. S. (2004). The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations: an

overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 107-123.

Deffenbacher, K. A. (1994). Effects of arousal on everyday memory. Human Performance,

7(2), 141-161.

Derix, M. M. A., & Jolles, J. (1997). Neuropsychological abnormalities in depression:

relation between brain and behavior. In A. Honig & H. M. van Praag (Eds.),

Depression: neurobiological, psychopathological and therapeutic advances (Vol. 3,

pp. 109-126). New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

DiGirolamo, G. J., & Posner, M. I. (1996). Attention and schizophrenia: a view from

cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 1(2), 95-102.

Enright, S. J., & Beech, A. R. (1993). Reduced cognitive inhibition in obsessive-

compulsive disorder. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32, 67-74.

Franck, N., Rouby, P., Daprati, E., Dalery, J., Mari-Cardine, M., & Georgieff, N. (2000).

Confusion between silent and overt reading in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia

Research, 41, 357-364.

Frith, C. D. (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophrenia. British

Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 225-235.

Frith, C. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: the case of auditory

hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: B, 351,

1505-1512.

Frith, C., & Dolan, R. J. (1997). Brain mechanisms associated with top-down processes in

perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B, 352, 1221-

1230.

Chapter 8

-193 -

Fuster, J. M. (1999). Synopsis of function and dysfunction of the frontal lobe. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 99 (Suppl. 395), 51-57.

Gelder, M., Gath, D., & Mayou, R. (1993). Oxford textbook of psychiatry (2nd ed.).

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Glisky, R. L., Rubin, S. R., & Davidson, P. S. R. (2001). Source memory in older adults: an

encoding or retrieval problem? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,

Memory and Cognition, 27(5), 1131-1146.

Goldinger, S.D., Kleider, H.M., Shelley, E. (1999). The marriage of perception and

memory: creating two-way illusions with words and voices. Memory and Cognition,

27(2): 328-338.

Gray, J. A. (1998). Integrating Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 24(2), 249-266.

Guillem, F., Bicu, M., Pampoulova, T., Hooper, R., Bloom , D., & Wolf, M.-A. e. a.

(2003). The cognitive and anatomo-functional basis of reality distortion in

schizophrenia: a view from memory event-related potentials. Psychiatry Research,

117, 137-158.

Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: theories, definitions

and research evidence. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference and

inhibition in cognition. Chap 6 (pp. 175-205). San Diego: Academic Press.

Hemsley, D. R. (1993). A simple (or simplistic?) cognitive model for schizophrenia.

Behavior Research and Therapy, 31(7), 633-645.

Henson, R. N. A., Shallice, T., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). Right prefrontal cortex and episodic

memory retrieval: a functional MRI test of the monitoring hypothesis. Brain, 122,

1367-1381.

Hoffman, R. E., Oates, E., Hafner, J., Hustig, H. H., & McGlashan, T. H. (1994). Semantic

organization of hallucinated "voices" in schizophrenia. American Journal of

Psychiatry, 151, 1229-1230.

Hoffman, R. E., Rapaport, J., Mazure, C., & Quinlan, D. (1999). Selective speech

perception alternations in schizophrenic patients reporting hallucinated voices. The

American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(3), 393-399.

Honig, A., Romme, M. A. J., Ensink, B. J., Escher, S. D., Pennings, M. H. A., & Devries,

M. W. (1998). Auditory Hallucinations: A comparison between patients and

nonpatients. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(10), 646-651.

Chapter 8

-194 -

Hunter, M. D. (2004). Locating voices in space: a perceptual model for auditory

hallucinations. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 93-105.

Hunter, M. D., & Woodruff, W. R. (2004). Characteristics of functional auditory

hallucinations. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(5), 923.

Hustig, H. H., & Hafner, R. J. (1990). Persistent auditory hallucinations and their

relationship to delusions and mood. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,

178(4), 264-267.

Johns, L. C., & McGuire, P. K. (1999). Verbal self-monitoring and auditory hallucinations

in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 353(9151), 469-470.

Johnson, M., Kounios, J., & Nolde, S. (1996). Electrophysiological brain activity and

memory source monitoring. NeuroReport, 7, 2929-2932.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring. Psychological

Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Johnson, M. K., Kounios, J., & Reeder, J. A. (1994). Time-course studies of reality

monitoring and recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory

and Cognition, 20(6), 1409-1419.

Keefe, R. S. E., Arnold, M. C., Bayen, U. J., & Harvey, P. D. (1999). Source monitoring

deficits in patients with schizophrenia: a multinomial modelling analysis.

Psychological Medicine, 29, 903-914.

Kramer, A., Humphrey, D., Larish, J., Logan, G., & Strager, D. (1994). Aging and

inhibition: Beyond a unitary view of inhibitory processing in attention. Psychology

and Aging, 9(4), 491-512.

Larkin, A. R. (1979). The form and content of schizophrenic hallucinations. American

Journal of Psychiatry, 136(7), 940-943.

Lennox, B. R., Bert, S., Park, G., Jones, P. B., & Morris, P. G. (1999). Spatial and

Temporal mapping of neural activity associated with auditory hallucinations. The

Lancet, 353(9153), 644.

Levy, B. J., & Anderson, M. C. (2002). Inhibitory processes and the control of memory

retrieval. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(7), 299-305.

Mayes, A., Isaac, C., Holdstock, J., Hunkin, N., Montaldi, D., Downes, J., MacDonald, C.,

Cezayirli, E., & Roberts, J. (2001). Memory for single items, word pairs and temporal

Chapter 8

-195 -

order of different kinds in a patient with selective hippocampal lesion. Cognitive

Neuropsychology, 18(2), 97-123.

McGuire, P., Shah, G., & Murray, R. M. (1993). Increased blood flow in Broca's area

during auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 342, 703-706.

McGuire, P. K., Silbersweig, D. A., Wright, I., Murray, R. M., David, A. S., Frackowiak,

R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (1995). Abnormal monitoring of inner speech: a physiological

basis for auditory hallucinations. The Lancet, 346(8975), 596-600.

Mitchell, K., Johnson, M., Raye, C., & D'Esposito, M. (2000). fMRI evidence of age-

related hippocampal dysfunction in feature binding in working memory. Cognitive

Brain Research, 10, 197-206.

Morrison, A. P., Haddock, G., & Tarrier, N. (1995). Intrusive thoughts and auditory

hallucinations: a cognitive approach. Behavioral and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23,

265-280.

Morrison, A. P., & Baker, C. A. (2000). Intrusive thoughts and auditory hallucinations: a

comparative study of intrusions in psychosis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38,

1097-1106.

Morrison, A. P. (2001). The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative

cognitive approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioral and Cognitive

Psychotherapy, 29, 257-276.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Brown, R., & Ron, M. (1996). Memory impairment in

schizophrenia: its relationship to executive function. Schizophrenia Research, 21, 85-

96.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Fletcher, P., & Frith, C. (1997). The functional anatomy of verbal

initiation and suppression using the Hayling Test. Neuropsychologia, 35(4), 559-566.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996a). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996b). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Chapter 8

-196 -

Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology: Views

from cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition taxonomy.

Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 220-246.

Nigg, J. T., Butler, K. M., Huang-Pollock, C. L., & Henderson, J. M. (2002). Inhibitory

processes in adults with persistent childhood onset ADHD. Journal of Consulting and

Clinical Psychology, 70(1), 153-157.

Oulis, P. G., Mavreas, V. G., Mamounas, J. M., & Stefanis, C. N. (1995). Clinical

characteristics of auditory hallucinations. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 92, 97-102.

Peters, E. R., Pickering, A., Kent, A., Glasper, A., Irani, M., David, A., Day, S., &

Hemsley, D. (2000). The relationship between cognitive inhibition and psychotic

symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109(3), 386-395.

Rankin, P. M., & O'Carroll, P. J. (1995). Reality discrimination, reality monitoring and

disposition towards hallucination. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 517-

528.

Reynolds, M., & Brewin, C. R. (1998). Intrusive cognition, coping strategies and emotional

responses in depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and a non-clinical population.

Behavior Research and Therapy, 36(2), 135-147.

Rizzo, L., Danion, J.-M., Van der Linden, M., & Grange, D. (1996). Patients with

schizophrenia remember that an event has occured, but not when. British Journal of

Psychiatry, 168, 427-431.

Rugg, M., Fletcher, P., Chua, P., & Dolan, R. J. (1999). The role of the prefrontal cortex in

reocgnition memory and memory for source: an fMRI study. NeuroImage, 10, 520-

529.

Sartorius, N., Shapiro, R., & Jablensky, A. (1974). The international pilot study of

schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11, 21-34.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

Schnider, A., Treyer, V., & Buck, A. (2000). Selection of currently relevant memories by

the human posterior medial orbital cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 20(15),

5880-5884.

Chapter 8

-197 -

Seal, M. L., Aleman, A., & McGuire, P. K. (2004). Compelling imagery, unanticipated

speech and deceptive memory: neurocognitive models of auditory verbal

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 43-72.

Servan-Schreiber, D., Cohen, J., & Steingard, S. (1996). Schizophrenic Deficits in the

processing of context: A test of a theoretical model. Archives of General Psychiatry,

53(12), 1105-1112.

Silbersweig, D. A., Stern, E., Frith, C, Cahill, C, Holmes, A, Grootoonk, S, Seaward, J,

McKenna, P, Chua, S., Schnorr, L, Johnes, T, Frackowiak, R (1995). A functional

neuroanatomy of hallucinations in schizophrenia. Nature, 378, 176-179.

Simons, J. S., Verfaellie, M., Galton, C. J., Miller, B. L., Hodges, J. R., & Graham, K. S.

(2002). Recollection-based memory in frontotemporal dementia: implications for

theories of long-term memory. Brain, 125(11), 2523-2536.

Slade, P. D., & Bentall, R. P. (1988). Sensory deception: A scientific analysis of

hallucinations. London: Croom Helm.

Soppitt, C. W., & Birchwood, M. (1997). Depression, beliefs, voice content and

topography: a cross sectional study of schizophrenia patients with auditory verbal

hallucinations. Journal of Mental Health, 6(5), 525-532.

Spencer, W., & Raz, N. (1995). Differential effects of aging on memory for content and

context: A meta-analysis. Psychology and Aging, 10(4), 527-539.

Spinella, M. (2002). Correlations among behavioral measures of orbitofrontal function.

International Journal of Neuroscience, 112(11), 1359-1369.

Stevens, A. A. (2004). Dissociating the cortical basis of memory for voices, words and

tones. Cognitive Brain Research, 18, 162-171.

Stuss, D. T., & Benson, D. F. (1989). The Frontal Lobes.

Stuss, D. T., Eskes, G. A., & Foster, J. K. (1994). Experimental neuropsychological studies

of frontal lobe functions. In F. G. Boller, J (Eds) (Ed.), Handbook of

Neuropsychology (vol 9) .

Stuss, D., Toth, J., Franchi, D., Alexander, M., Tipper, s., & Craig, F. (1999). Dissociation

of attentional processes in patients with focal frontal and posterior lesions.

Neuropsychologia, 37, 1005-1027.

Chapter 8

-198 -

Sullivan, E. V., Shear, P. K., Zipursky, R. B., Sagar, H. J., & Pfefferbaum, A. (1997).

Patterns of content, contextual and working memory impairments in schizophrenia

and nonamnesic alcoholism. Neuropsychology, 11(2), 195-206.

Takebayashi, H., Takei, N., & Mori, N. (2002). Unilateral auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia after damage to the right hippocampus. Schizophrenia Research.

Thaiss, L., & Petrides, M. (2003). Source and content memory in patients with a unilateral

frontal cortex or a temporal lobe excision. Brain, 126(5), 1112-1126.

Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Leudar, I. (2004). Hearing voices: a phenomenological-

hermeneutic approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 13-23.

Vasterling, J. V., Brailey, K., Constans, J. I., & Sutker, P. B. (1998). Attention and memory

dysfunction in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Neuropsychology, 12(1), 125-133.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., & Maybery, M. T. (2003). Revision of the factor structure

of the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS-R). Personality and Individual

Differences, 35, 1351-1357.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., & Maybery, M. T. (2004). An analysis of the main

clinical features of auditory hallucinations. Unpublished manuscript.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (2003). Inhibition in

schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 62,

275-280.

Waters, F. A. V., Maybery, M. T., Badcock, J. C., & Michie, P. T. (2004). Context memory

and binding in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 68 (2-3), 119-125.

Williams, L. M. (1996). Cognitive Inhibition and schizophrenic symptom subgroups.

Schizophrenia Bulletin, 22(1), 139-151.

Wilson, S. P., & Kipp, K. (1998). The development of efficient inhibition: Evidence from

directed-forgetting tasks. Developmental Review, 18, 86-123.

Wong, A. H. C., & Van Tol, H. H. M. (2003). Schizophrenia: from phenomenology

to neurobiology. Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews, 27, 269-306.

Woodruff, P. W. R., & Murray, R. M. (1994). The aetiology of brain abnormalities in

schizophrenia. In R. Ancill (Ed.), Schizophrenia: Exploring the Spectrum of

Psychosis. New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Woodruff, P. W. R. (2004). Auditory hallucinations: insights and questions from

neuroimaging. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 73-91.

Chapter 8

-199 -

Young, H. F., Bentall, R. P., Slade, P. D., & Dewey, M. E. (1987). The role of brief

instructions and suggestibility in the elicitation of auditory and visual hallucinations

in normal and psychiatric subjects. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,

175(1), 41-47.

- 201 -

INTENTIONAL INHIBITION, CONTEXT MEMORY

AND OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER

- 203 -

Foreword to Chapters 9 and 10

The results of our investigations of schizophrenia patients with auditory

hallucinations have suggested that a combination of deficits in both intentional inhibition

and context memory is critical, although not sufficient, for auditory hallucinations to occur.

We proposed that the deficit in inhibition leads to auditory mental representations intruding

into consciousness in a manner that is beyond the control of the sufferer, and that the deficit

in context memory results in an inability to form a complete representation of the origins of

mental events and therefore a failure to recognize these unintended mental representations.

Our model of auditory hallucinations anticipates that (a) non-hallucinating

individuals (with or without schizophrenia) may present with a deficit in either intentional

inhibition or context memory, but (b) none of these individuals should show a deficit in

both cognitive domains. The aim of this last investigation is to test this prediction by

investigating the proposed deficits in another clinical group, namely patients with

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). This patient group was selected because of the

similarities between OCD and auditory hallucinations. In particular, OCD patients

experience intrusive and unwanted thoughts but, unlike patients with auditory

hallucinations, they do not mistake the origins of these thoughts.

Chapter 8 presents a review of the phenomenological, clinical, cognitive and

neuropathological research findings concerning OCD, together with a critical analysis of

the similitudes between OCD and auditory hallucinations.

Chapter 9 investigates the prediction that none of the patients with OCD would

show deficits in both intentional inhibition functioning and memory for context.

- 205 -

Chapter 9 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: an overview

Abstract

Similarities between obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and auditory

hallucinations have recently been the focus of much interest. The aim of this chapter is to

present a brief overview of the phenomenology of OCD, together with a summary of the

cognitive processes presumed to be important in OCD and pertinent neuropathological and

clinical research findings. A critical analysis of the similitudes at the symptom, cognitive

and neuropathological level between OCD and auditory hallucinations is also provided.

This review of the similarities between the two disorders suggests that there may be an

overlap of some cognitive mechanisms that have been the focus of this thesis.

Chapter 9

- 206 -

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a chronic and often disabling anxiety

disorder (Skoog & Skoog, 1999). Similarities between OCD and schizophrenia have been

the focus of much research (e.g. Enright, 1996; Hwang, Morgan & Losconzcy, 2000; Insel

& Akiskal, 1986; Lysaker et al, 2000; Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski & Foa, 2001).

Enright and Beech (1990) have even suggested that OCD may be a mild form of

schizophrenia. Recent research has shown that approximately 25-50% of individuals with

schizophrenia experience significant obsessive or compulsive symptomatology (Berman,

Kalinowski, Berman, Lengua & Green, 1995; Nechmad et al, 2003; Tibbo & Warneke,

1999) and that 15-26% meet the diagnostic criteria for OCD (Nechmad et al, 2003; Ohta,

Kokai & Morita, 2003). The similarities between obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms

and auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia have also been noted. For example, patients

with OCD have been found to have elevated scores on measures of schizotypy, especially

those related to positive symptomatology and predisposition to hallucinations (Enright &

Beech, 1990). The following is a review of the epidemiological, clinical, cognitive and

neuropathological features of OCD, together with a critical examination of the similarities

between OCD and auditory hallucinations.

Epidemiological and clinical features of OCD

Epidemiologic studies suggest that the lifetime prevalence of OCD is between 2%

and 3% in the general population (Andrews, Crino, Hurt, Lampe & Page, 2004), although

the true rates are difficult to estimate because of the secretive nature of the disorder and

because many do not seek treatment. The incidence of OCD is slightly higher in women

than men. Similar to schizophrenia, onset of OCD often occurs before 25 years of age,

there is poor prognosis and poor response to treatment (Enright, 1996).

Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, APA

1996), the diagnostic criterion for OCD is the presence of either obsessions or compulsions

that are time consuming, taking more than 1 hour each day and which significantly interfere

with the person’s normal functioning.

Obsessions are defined as ideas, thoughts and impulses that enter the subject's mind

repeatedly. They are recognized as the product of the sufferer's own mind, are recurrent

and persistent, and are perceived to be intrusive, inappropriate and senseless (Andrews et

al, 1994). Some of the more common obsessions include recurrent aggressive or horrific

images, pathologic doubt, fear of contamination and need for order or symmetry.

Chapter 9

- 207 -

Compulsions are repetitive or stereotyped behaviours that are performed in response to an

obsession, to prevent the occurrence of an unlikely event, or to prevent discomfort. The

most common compulsive behaviours include washing, checking, counting, ordering and

repeating words or actions (Andrews et al, 1994). Typically, patients experience both

obsessions and compulsions and only rarely are compulsions experienced without

obsessions. Although OCD is a unitary diagnosis, patients often experience multiple forms

of obsessions or compulsions and the phenomenology may change over time (Akhtar, Wig,

Varma, Pershad & Verma, 1975; Andrews et al, 1994; Calamari, Wiegartz & Janeck, 1999;

Lochner & Stein, 2003). Obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviours are frequently, but

often unsuccessfully, resisted leading to distress and significant disruption in day-to-day

functioning.

The most striking similarity between OCD and auditory hallucinations is that they are

both characterised by persistent intrusive thoughts. Nayani and David (1996) noted that

"the perseverative and intrusive character of hallucinations bears a striking resemblance to

the phenomena of the obsessional patient” (p. 264). Chadwick and Birchwood (1994) also

reported that the contents of some patients' auditory hallucinations, which include being

told to kill or hit people, to steal and to commit suicide, are very similar to the contents of

obsessions, with the most typical themes involving aggression, sex and blasphemy. Aubrey

Lewis in 1935 (Insel & Akiskal, 1986) pointed out that: "it must be a very short step from

feeling that one must struggle against thoughts that are not one's own, to believing that they

are forced upon one by an external agency", highlighting the fact that although intrusive

thoughts in OCD are experienced as being unintended, they are not attributed to another

agency, as is the case with auditory hallucinations.

Other similarities between OCD and auditory hallucinations include the observation

that they are both highly distressing to the sufferer and that they both interfere significantly

with normal daily routine and occupational functioning (Clark, 1995; Morrison, 2001).

Patients are often impaired socially and suffer from lowered quality of life and significant

functional disability (Goodman, 1999). Both OCD and auditory hallucinations also often

co-occur with depression and with other anxiety disorders (Andrews et al, 1994; Rachman

& Hodgson, 1980).

Chapter 9

- 208 -

Neuropathology of OCD

There are a number of similarities in brain regions thought to be involved in both

OCD and auditory hallucinations. OCD has been associated with a deficit of the fronto-

striatal circuitry, involving the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), cingulate gyrus and striatum

abnormalities (Breiter & Rauch, 1996; Kim, Park, Shin & Kwon, 2002; Mataix-Cols et al,

1999; Rauch, 1996; Rosenberg & Keshavan, 1998). Evidence arises partly from

neurosurgical data that shows that operations such as capsulotomy or cingulectomy are

often effective for patients with intractable symptoms (Dougherty et al, 2002). Structural

and functioning imaging studies have also identified abnormalities in the inferior prefrontal

cortex, the basal ganglia (especially the caudate nucleus), thalamus and the cingulate gyrus

(Breiter et al 1996; Hajcak & Simons, 2002; Kim et al, 2002; Pujol et al, 1999; Rauch et al,

1996; Saxena, Brody, Schwartz & Bazter, 1998; Szeszko et al, 1999). Abnormalities have

also been identified in the structures of the mesiotemporal lobes, the amygdala and the

hippocampus (Breiter et al, 1996; Szeszko et al, 1999).

The brain regions activated by the experience of auditory hallucinations are very

similar to the proposed neuroanatomical substrates of OCD. For instance, the inferior

prefrontal cortex (including the OFC), cingulate gyrus, basal ganglia, thalamus and

hippocampus have all been found to be activated in the hallucinatory experience (Copolov

et al, 2003; Silbersweig et al, 1995; Takebayashi, Takei & Mori, 2002; Woodruff &

Murray, 1994).

Neuropsychological findings

Patients with OCD and auditory hallucinations also share some similarities in

cognitive profile. The most consistent reports of cognitive impairment in OCD have been

on tests of executive functions (particularly inhibition) and memory functioning. The

following provides an overview of the cognitive findings in OCD, together with a review of

the similarities between deficits shown in OCD and auditory hallucinations.

The repetitive and uncontrollable thoughts in OCD suggest difficulties in cognitive

control and in inhibiting inappropriate response sets (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Such an

impairment forms the basis of some cognitive behavioural models, which suggest that

faulty inhibitory processes underlie the intrusive and repetitive clinical obsessions

(Rachman, 1998; Salkovskis, 1998; Tolin, Abramowitz et al, 2002; Tolin, Hamlin & Foa,

Chapter 9

- 209 -

2002). In support, OCD patients have consistently been found to show impaired inhibition

on various paradigms. There is some evidence of an impairment in intentional inhibition as

demonstrated by impairments on the task shifting conditions of the Wisconsin Card Sorting

Test (e.g. Okasha et al, 2000; Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios & Pantelis, 1998; Tallis, 1997), on

affective words in a Directed Forgetting procedure (Tolin, Hamlin & Foa, 2002; Wilhelm,

McNally, Baer & Florin, 1996), antisaccade tasks (Maruff, Purcell, Tyler, Pantelis &

Currie, 1999; Rosenberg, Averbach, O’Hearn, Seymour, Birmaher & Sweeny, 1997;

Rosenberg, Dick, O’Hearn & Sweeney, 1997), and on the Go/Nogo paradigm (Bannon et

al, 2002). Impaired automatic inhibition has also been identified on Negative Priming

tasks (Enright & Beech, 1990, 1993a, b), visuospatial priming tests (Hartston & Swerdlow,

1999) and a Lexical Decision paradigm (Tolin, Abramowitz et al, 2002). Finally, reduced

interference control has been demonstrated on the Stroop interference task (Bannon,

Gonsalvez, Croft & Boyce, 2002; Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999; Martinot et al, 19990;

Schmidtke, Schorb, Winkelmann & Hohagen, 1998) and other tests of selective attention

(Clayton, Richards & Edwards, 1999).

In sum, similarly to patients with auditory hallucinations, patients with OCD have

demonstrated impairments on tasks of intentional inhibition. However, OCD patients have

shown additional deficits on automatic forms of inhibition and in interference control, on

which patients with auditory hallucinations have not been found to be impaired.

Difficulties on other tasks of executive functions have also often been demonstrated

in OCD (e.g. Mataix-Cols et al, 1999; Okasha et al, 2000; Purcell et al, 1998; Tallis, 1997).

In particular, difficulties in abstract thinking (Tallis et al, 1997), mental control and

cognitive flexibility (Okasha et al, 2000) have been identified, although many studies have

failed to find impairments on executive tasks (e.g. Kim et al, 2002; Martinot et al, 1990;

Purcell et al, 1998; Schmidtke et al, 1998). Difficulties on tasks of executive functioning

have often been attributed to patients with schizophrenia (e.g. Elvevag & Goldberg, 2000),

although not specifically to auditory hallucinations.

Memory functioning has also been investigated in OCD. A number of studies have

identified compromised nonverbal memory abilities (Kim et al, 2002; Martinot et al, 1990;

Purcell, 1998; Tallis, Pratt & Jamani, 1999). There is also some evidence that OCD is

associated with a verbal memory deficit (Martinot et al 1990; Savage et al, 1999), although

Chapter 9

- 210 -

this has not been consistently supported (Rubenstein, Peynircioglu, Chambles & Pigott,

1993; Tallis, 1997).

Context memory abilities have also been examined in OCD. Similarly to the

proposal of a reality-monitoring deficit in auditory hallucinations, a poor memory for

actions has been identified in OCD, and particularly in OCD checkers (Rubenstein et al,

1993; Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews & Alexander, 1989; Tolin, Abramowitz et al, 2002).

According to this proposal, OCD checkers have difficulties differentiating between

memories of performed acts and memories of imagined acts (Johnson, Hashtroudi &

Lindsay, 1993). Studies examining action memory have come up with mixed results. For

instance, Ruberstein et al (1993) and Ecker and Engelkamp (1995) found evidence to

support the proposal that individuals with OCD have difficulties remembering whether they

have performed or imagined certain actions. By contrast, other studies have shown no

difference from healthy controls in reality-monitoring skills (Constans, Foa, Franklin &

Mathews, 1995; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Merckelback & Wesse, 2000; Tallis, 1997;

Tallis et al, 1999). An alternative proposal suggests that the deficit characterising OCD is

not one of memory per se but due to lack of confidence in memory, as doubts regarding a

memory may also result in repeated checking. In support, many studies have investigated

confidence judgements in OCD and have found impaired knowledge about one's memory

capabilities (Constans et al, 1995; Foa, Amir, Gershuny, Molnar & Kozak, 1997; Jurado,

Junque, Vallejo, Salgado & Grafman, 2002; MacDonald, Antony, Macleod & Richter,

1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Merckelbach & Wessel, 2000; Rachman & Hodgson,

1980; Tolin, Abramowitz, Kozak & Foa, 2001; Tolin, Abramowitz, et al, 2002).

Temporal context memory was investigated by Jurado et al (2002). These authors

tested temporal ordering of a list of words in patients with OCD compared to healthy

controls. They found that OCD patients showed impairments in sequentially ordering

words despite normal recognition memory, and argued that the patients had a deficit in

temporal memory.

As a summary, executive functions, and particularly inhibitory processes, have been

found to be impaired in patients with OCD. OCD patients have also been shown to have

compromised memory functioning in nonverbal memory and, possibly, in context memory.

Although patients with auditory hallucinations also show deficits in intentional inhibition

Chapter 9

- 211 -

and context memory, it is unclear whether both disorders share the exact same deficits.

This is the subject of our next investigation.

Maintenance theories of OCD

Two main cognitive-behavioural formulations have been put forward to explain the

maintenance process of OC symptoms.

Central to Salkovskis’ (1985; 1989; 1998; Salkovskis, Richards & Forrester, 1995;

Salkovskis et al, 2000) theory is the notion of responsibility. He proposes that intrusive

thoughts escalate in frequency and intensity with the dysfunctional belief that one has

become or may become responsible for harm to oneself or others. This results in negative

appraisal of the thought and ultimately the conclusion that something must be done to put

matters right (neutralize, suppress, perform compulsive acts etc). A cycle is created

because this behaviour perpetuates the dysfunctional belief that one has the responsibility to

protect others or onself from harm. Thought suppression activities are also thought to be a

particularly important component of this theory, based on Wegner’s (1994) findings that

deliberate thought suppression is associated with an increase in frequency and persistent

recurrence of unwanted thoughts. Efforts to control obsessional thoughts are thought to

result in increasing accessibility of these thoughts and prime the negative appraisal of the

thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2001; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989). Furthermore, this deliberate

effort at suppressing unwanted thoughts is thought to have a negative impact on mood by

prolonging the emotional intensity of the experience. (Purdon & Clark, 2001). Supporting

evidence for the role of responsibility and thought suppression in OCD comes from

findings that both these factors have been found to serve as mediators between intrusive

thoughts and OC symptoms in healthy people (Smari & Holmsteinsson, 2001).

In an alternative explanation of obsessions, Rachman (1993, 1997, 1998) proposes

that problems occur when there is exaggerated significance about the thoughts, for

example, that they reveal something meaningful about the individual (that one is bad, for

example), or that something negative is going to happen as a result. This catastrophic

misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts is thought to give rise to active resistance

(suppression) and avoidance. These behaviours provide short-term relief that serves to

preserve the misinterpretation. Rachman further proposes four vulnerability factors for

OCD: (a) elevated moral standards, (b) particular cognitive biases such as thought-action

fusion (such that unacceptable thoughts may actually influence the probability of the

Chapter 9

- 212 -

aversive event, or the belief that having a repugnant unacceptable thought is morally

equivalent to carrying out the relevant action), (c) depression and (d) anxiety.

These theories of OCD are not dissimilar to recent socio-psychological theories of

auditory hallucinations, as both propose that a key factor is the way in which the intrusive

thoughts are interpreted. The issue of belief, for example, is central to Birchwood and

Chadwick’s (1997) theory. They have proposed that beliefs about the voices’ intent to do

harm or good develops as a result of an attempt to explain unusual experiences and results

in distress and other negative affect. Morrison (2001) also proposes that the

misinterpretation of intrusive thoughts can result in psychotic symptoms such as auditory

hallucinations. For instance, he has proposed that hallucinating patients exaggerate the

significance of their hallucinations and misinterpret the voices content as being threatening

to their physical and psychological integrity. This produces an increase in negative mood

and physiological arousal, and leads to the development of metacognitive beliefs which, in

turn, contribute to the external attribution of voices and to the maintenance process of

hallucinations. In sum, the role of misinterpretation, dysfunctional beliefs and negative

affect is emphasised in maintenance theories of both OCD and auditory hallucinations.

Conclusions and direction

In sum, the current review highlighted the striking similarities in clinical features

between OCD and auditory hallucinations, particularly regarding the presence of intrusive

and uncontrollable thoughts in both disorders. A summary of the neuropathological and

cognitive processes associated with OCD also pointed out parallels with research findings

on auditory hallucinations. Finally, socio-psychological theories of OC symptomatology

and auditory hallucinations are converging in their proposal that interpretation of intrusive

thoughts is an important component to understanding the maintenance process of both

disorders.

On the basis of the similitudes between OCD and auditory hallucinations, it is

reasonable to investigate further the pattern of cognitive performance that underlies those

two disorders. The next chapter aims to examine the performance of patients with OCD on

tests which have been found to be particularly relevant to investigations of auditory

hallucinations, in particular the HSCT and ICIM test, assessing intentional inhibition

processes, and the Context Memory task, assessing context memory processes.

Chapter 9

- 213 -

References

Akhtar, S., Wig, N., Varma, V., Pershad, D., & Verma, S. (1975). A phenomenological

analysis of symptoms of obsessive-compulsive neurosis. British Journal of

Psychiatry, 127, 342-248.

Andrews, G., Crino, R., Hurt, C., Lampe, L., & Page, A. (1994). Obsessive-Compulsive

Disorder syndrome, The treatment of anxiety disorders. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

Bannon, S., Gonsalvez, C. J., Croft, R. J., & Boyce, P. M. (2002). Response inhibition

deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 110, 165-174.

Berman, I., Kalinowski, A., Berman, S. M., Lengua, J., & Green, A. (1995). Obsessive-

compulsive symptoms in chronic schizophrenia. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 36(1), 6-

10.

Birchwood, M., & Chadwick, P. (1997). The omnipotence of voices: testing the validity of

a cognitive model. Psychological Medicine, 27, 1345-1353.

Breiter, H. C., & Rauch, S. L. (1996). Functional MRI and the study of OCD: from

symptom provocation to cognitive-behavioural probes of cortico-striatal systems and

the amygdala. NeuroImage, 4, S127-S138.

Calamari, J. E., Wiegartz, P. S., & Janeck, A. S. (1999). Obsessive-compulsive disorder

subgroups: a symptom-based clustering approach. Behaviour Research and Therapy,

37, 113-125.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1994). The omnipotence of voices - the cognitive

approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 190-201.

Clark, D. A. (1995). The assessment of unwanted intrusive thoughts: a review and critique

of the literature. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(8), 967-976.

Clayton, I. C., Richards, J. C., & Edwards, C. J. (1999). Selective attention in obsessive-

compulsive disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108(1), 171-175.

Constans, J. I., Foa, E. B., Franklin, M. E., & Mathews, A. (1995). Memory for actual and

imagined events for OC checkers. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 33(6), 665-671.

Copolov, D. L., Seal, M. L., Maruff, P., Ulusoy, R., Wong, M. T. H., Tochon-Danguy, H.

J., & Egan, G. F. (2003). Cortical activation associated with the experience of

auditory hallucinations and perception of human speech in schizophrenia: a PET

correlation study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 122, 139-152.

Chapter 9

- 214 -

Dougherty, D.D.(2002). Surgery can aid patients with severe obsessive-compulsive

disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 159: 269-275.

Ecker, J. & Engelkamp, J. (1995). Memory for actions in obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Behaviour Cognitive Psychotherapy. 23: 349-371.

Elvevag, B., & Goldberg, T. E. (2000). Cognitive impairment in schizophrenia is the core

of the disorder. Critical Reviews in Neurobiology, 14(1), 1-21.

Enright, S., & Beech, A. (1990). Obsessional states: anxiety disorders or schizotypes? An

information processing and personality assessment. Psychological Medicine, 20, 621-

627.

Enright, S. J. (1996). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: Anxiety disorder or schizotype? In R.

M. Rapee (Ed.), Current controversies in the anxieties disorders (pp. 161-190). New-

York, London: Guilford Press.

Enright, S. J., & Beech, A. R. (1993a). Further evidence of reduced cognitive inhibition in

obsessive-compulsive disorder. Personality and Individual Differences., 14(3), 387-

395.

Enright, S. J., & Beech, A. R. (1993b). Reduced cognitive inhibition in obsessive-

compulsive disorder. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32, 67-74.

Foa, E. B., Amir, N., Gershuny, B., Molnar, C., & Kozak, M. J. (1997). Implicit and

Explicit Memory in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders,

11(2), 119-129.

Frith, C. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: the case of auditory

hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: B, 351,

1505-1512.

Frith, C., & Dolan, R. J. (1997). Brain mechanisms associated with top-down processes in

perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, B, 352, 1221-

1230.

Goodman, W. K. (1999). Obsessive-compulsive disorder: diagnosis and treatment. Journal

of Clinical Psychiatry, 60(18), 27-32.

Hajcak, G., & Simons, R. F. (2002). Error-related brain activity in obsessive-compulsive

disorder. Psychiatry Research, 110, 63-72.

Hartston, H. J., & Swerdlow, N. R. (1999). Visuospatial priming and Stroop performance in

patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Neuropsychology, 13(3), 447-457.

Chapter 9

- 215 -

Hwang, M., Morgan, J., & Losconzcy, M. (2000). Clinical and neuropsychological profiles

of obsessive-compulsive schizophrenia; A pilot study. The Journal of

Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 12, 91-94.

Insel, T. R., & Akiskal, H. S. (1986). Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder with psychotic

features: A phenomenologic analysis. American Journal of Psychiatry, 143(12), 1527-

1533.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring. Psychological

Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Jurado, M. A., Junque, C., Vallejo, J., Salgado, P., & Grafman, J. (2002). Obsessive-

Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients are impaired in remembering temporal order

and in judging their own performance. Journal of Clinical and Experimental

Neuropsychology, 24(3), 261-269.

Kim, M.-S., Park, S.-J., Shin, M.-S., & Kwon, J. S. (2002). Neuropsychological profile in

patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder over a period of 4-month treatment.

Journal of Psychiatric Research, 36, 257-265.

Lochner, C., & Stein, D. J. (2003). Heterogeneity of obsessive-compulsive disorder: a

literature review. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 11, 113-132.

Lysaker, P. H., Marks, K. A., Picone, J. B., Rollins, A. L., Fastenau, P. S., & Bond, G. R.

(2000). Obsessive-compulsive symptoms in schizophrenia. The Journal of Nervous

and Mental Disease, 188(2), 78-83.

Macdonald, P. A., Antony, M. A., Macleod, C. M., & Richter, M. A. (1997). Memory and

confidence in memory judgements among individuals with obsessive-compulsive

disorder and non-clinical controls. Behaviour, Research & Therapy, 35(6), 497-505.

Martinot, J. L., Allilare, J. F., Mazoyer, B. M., Hantouche, E., Huret, J. D., Legaut-Demare,

F., Deslauriers, A. H., Hardy, P., Pappata, S., Baron, J. C., & Syrota, A. (1990).

Obsessive-compulsive disorder: a clinical, neuropsychological and positron emission

tomography study. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 82, 233-242.

Maruff, P., Purcell, R., Tyler, P., Pantelis, C., & Currie, J. (1999). Abnormalities of

internally generated saccades in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychological

Medicine, 29, 1377-1385.

Chapter 9

- 216 -

Mataix-Cols, D., Junque, C., Sanchez-Turet, M., Vallejo, J., Verger, K., & Barrios, M.

(1999). Neuropsychological functioning in a subclinical obsessive-compulsive

sample. Biological Psychiatry, 45, 898-904.

McNally, R. J., & Kohlbeck, P. A. (1993). Reality monitoring in obsessive-compulsive

disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31(3), 249-253.

Merckelback, H., & Wessel, I. (2000). Memory for actions and dissociation in obsessive-

compulsive disorder. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 188(12), 846-848.

Morrison, A. P. (2001). The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative

cognitive approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioural and Cognitive

Psychotherapy, 29, 257-276.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

Nechmad, A., Ratzoni, G., Poyurovsky, M., Meged, S., Avidan, G., Fuchs, C., Bloch, Y., &

Weizman, R. (2003). Obsessive-compulsive disorder in adolescent schizophrenia

patients. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 1002-1004.

Ohta, M., Kokai, M., & Morita, Y. (2003). Features of obsessive-compulsive disorder in

patients primarily diagnosed with schizophrenia. Psychiatry and Clinical

Neurosciences, 57, 67-74.

Okasha, A., Rafaat, M., Mahallawy, N., El Nahas, G., Seif El Dawla, A., Sayed, M., & El

Kholi, S. (2000). Cognitive dysfunction in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 101, 281-285.

Pujol, J., Torres, L., Deus, J., Cardoner, N., Pifarre, J., Capdevila, A., & Vallejo, J. (1999).

Functional magnetic resonance imaging study of frontal lobe activation during word

generation in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 45(7), 891-897.

Purcell, R., Maruff, P., Kyrios, M., & Pantelis, C. (1998). Neuropsychological Deficits in

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: A comparison with unipolar depression, panic

disorder, and normal controls. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 415-423.

Purdon, C., & Clark, D. (2001). Suppression of obsession-like thoughts in nonclinical

individuals: impact on thought frequency, appraisal and mood state. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 39, 1163-1181.

Chapter 9

- 217 -

Rachman, S. (1993). Obsessions, responsibility and guilt. Behaviour Research and

Therapy, 31(2), 149-154.

Rachman, S. (1997). A cognitive theory of obsessions. Behaviour Research and Therapy,

35(9), 793-802.

Rachman, S. (1998). A cognitive theory of obsessions: elaborations. Behaviour Research

and Therapy, 36, 385-401.

Rachman, S. J., & Hodgson, R. J. (1980). Obsessions and Compulsions. New Jersey:

Prentice Hall Inc.

Rachman, S., & Hodgson, R. (1980). Obsessions and Compulsions.

Rauch, S. L. (1996). Neuroimaging in obsessive-compulsive disorder and related disorders.

In Jenike MA, chairperson. Recent developments in neurobiology of obsessive-

compulsive disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 57(10), 492-495.

Rosenberg, D. R., & Keshavan, M. S. (1998). Toward a neurodevelopmental model of

obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 43, 623-640.

Rosenberg, D. R., Averbach, D. H., O'Hearn, K. M., Seymour, A. B., Birmaher, B., &

Sweeney, J. A. (1997). Oculomotor response inhibition abnormalities in paediatric

obsessive-compulsive disorder. Arch Gen Psychiatry, 54, 831-838.

Rosenberg, D. R., Dick, E. L., O'Hearn, K. M., & Sweeney, J. A. (1997). Response-

inhibition deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder: an indicator of dysfunction in

frontostriatal circuits. Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, 22(1), 29-38.

Rubenstein, C. S., Peynircioglu, Z. F., Chambles, D. L., & Pigott, T. A. (1993). Memory in

sub-clinical obsessive-compulsive checkers. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 31(8),

759-765.

Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: a cognitive behavioural

analysis. Behaviour, Research & Therapy, 23(5), 571.

Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive

thoughts in obsessional problems. Behavioural Research and Therapy, 27(6), 677-

682.

Salkovskis, P. M. (1998). Psychological approaches to the understanding of obsessional

problems. In S. e. al (Ed.), OCD.

Chapter 9

- 218 -

Salkovskis, P. M., Richards, H. C., & Forrester, E. (1995). The relationship between

obsessional problems and intrusive thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive

Psychotherapy, 23, 281-299.

Salkovskis, P. M., Wroe, A. L., Gledhill, A., Morrison, N., Forrester, E., Richards, C.,

Reynolds, M., & Thorpe, S. (2000). Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are

characteristic of obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38,

347-372.

Savage, C. R., Baer, L., Keuthen, N. J., Brown, H. D., Rauch, S. L., & Jenike, M. A.

(1999). Organizational strategies mediate nonverbal memory impairment in

obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 45, 905-916.

Saxena, S., Brody, A. L., Schwartz, J. M., & Baxter, L. R. (1998). Neuroimaging and

frontal-subcortical circuitry in obsessive-compulsive disorder. British Journal of

Psychiatry, 173(Suppl. 35), 26-37.

Schmidtke, K., Schorb, A., Winkelmann, G., & Hohagen, F. (1998). Cognitive frontal lobe

dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Biological Psychiatry, 43(9), 666-673.

Sher, K.J., Frost, R.O., Kushner, M., Crews, T.M. & Alexander, J.E. (1989). Memory

deficits in compulsive checkers: replication and extension in a nonclinical sample.

Behaviour Research and Therapy, 27, 65-69.

Silbersweig, D. A., Stern, E., C, F., & al, e. (1995). A functional neuroanatomy of

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Nature, 378, 176-179.

Skoog, G., & Skoog, I. (1999). A 40-year follow up of patients with obsessive-compulsive

disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 56, 121-127.

Smari, J., & Holmsteinsson, H. E. (2001). Intrusive thoughts, responsibility attitudes,

thought-action fusion, and chronic thought suppression in relation to obsessive-

compulsive symptoms. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 29, 13-20.

Szeszko, P., Robinson, D., Alvir, J., Bilder, R., Lencz, T., Ashtari, M., Wu, H., & Bogerts,

B. (1999). Orbital frontal and amygdala volume reductions in obsessive-compulsive

disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 56(10), 913-919.

Takebayashi, H., Takei, N., & Mori, N. (2002). Unilateral auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia after damage to the right hippocampus. Schizophrenia Research.

Chapter 9

- 219 -

Tallis, F. (1997). The neuropsychology of obsessive-compulsive disorder: A review and

consideration of clinical implications. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 36, 3-

20.

Tallis, F., Pratt, P., & Jamani, N. (1999). Obsessive-compulsive disorder, checking, and

non-verbal memory: a neuropsychological investigation. Behaviour Research and

Therapy, 37, 161-166.

Tibbo, P., & Warneke, L. (1999). Obsessive-compulsive disorder in schizophrenia:

epidemiologic and biologic overlap. Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 24(1), 15-

24.

Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Drigidi, B. D., Amir, N., Street, G. P., & Foa, E. B. (2001).

Memory and memory confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 39, 913-927.

Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Kozak, M. J., & Foa, E. B. (2001). Fixity of belief,

perceptual aberration, and magical ideation in obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Anxiety Disorders, 15, 510-510.

Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Przeworski, A., & Foa, E. B. (2002). Thought suppression

in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 125501274.

Tolin, D. F., Hamlin, C., & Foa, E. B. (2002). Directed forgetting in obsessive-compulsive

disorder: replication and extension. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 793-803.

Wilhelm, S., McNally, R., Baer, L., & Florin, I. (1996). Directed forgetting in obsessive-

compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34(8), 633-641.

Woodruff, P. W. R., & Murray, R. M. (1994). The aetiology of brain abnormalities in

schizophrenia. In R. Ancill (Ed.), Schizophrenia: Exploring the Spectrum of

Psychosis . New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

- 221 -

Chapter 10

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Intentional inhibition and context memory processes

Abstract

The model of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia presented in Waters,

Badcock, Michie and Maybery (2004) suggests that a combination of deficits in both

intentional inhibition and context memory is necessary for auditory hallucinations to occur.

Consequently, patients who do not experience auditory hallucinations may show an

impairment in either intentional inhibition or context memory and none should present with

deficits in both. The current study tested this proposal in a group of patients with

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Like patients with hallucinations, OCD patients

experience intrusive and unwanted thoughts but, unlike hallucinating patients, they do not

mistake the origins of these thoughts. Accordingly, the aims of this study were to assess

whether patients with OCD would show (a) poor inhibitory functioning but (b) intact

memory for context, and that, in a test of the model, (c) none of the patients with OCD

would present with deficits in both domains simultaneously. Fourteen participants with

OCD participated in the study and were tested on the Hayling Sentence Completion Test

(Burgess & Shallice, 1996) and the Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories task

(Schnider & Ptak, 1999), assessing intentional inhibition processes, and a Context Memory

task. Consistent with the hypotheses, the results revealed that (a) patients with OCD

showed a deficit on tasks of intentional inhibition compared to healthy controls, (b) patients

were not significantly different from controls in any of the conditions of the Context

Memory task, and (c) only one of the 14 patients showed the specified combination of

deficits. The results provide strong support for our model of auditory hallucinations.

Results are discussed with reference to similar studies of schizophrenia patients with

auditory hallucinations.

Chapter 10

- 222 -

According to the model of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia outlined in

Waters, Badcock, Michie and Maybery (2004), a combination of deficits in both intentional

inhibition and contextual memory is critical to the experience of auditory hallucinations. It

was proposed that the deficit in intentional inhibition leads to mental representations

intruding into consciousness in a manner that is beyond the control of the sufferer, and the

deficit in binding contextual cues results in an inability to form a complete representation of

the origins of mental events. Consequently, it was anticipated that patients (with or without

schizophrenia) who do not experience auditory hallucinations may demonstrate a deficit in

either intentional inhibition or context memory, but none should present with this particular

combination of deficits. As a test of this model, the current study examines the intentional

inhibition and context memory abilities of patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

(OCD).

Both auditory hallucinations and OCD are characterized by recurrent and persistent

thoughts which sufferers are not able to control. The co-expression of this characteristic

may reflect an overlap of cognitive deficits associated with OCD and auditory

hallucinations. Since a deficit in intentional inhibition has been linked to the intrusive and

unwanted character of hallucinations (see Badcock, Waters & Maybery, in press; Waters,

Badcock, Maybery & Michie, 2003), it is reasonable to suggest that OCD patients might

also show the same deficit. In Badcock et al (in press) and Waters et al (2003), we

demonstrated that auditory hallucinations were associated with deficits on the Hayling

Sentence Completion Test (HSCT, Burgess & Shallice, 1996) and/or the Inhibition of

Currently Irrelevant Memories task (ICIM, Schnider & Ptak, 1999), which require the

volitional inhibition of currently active mental associations and irrelevant memories

respectively. Accordingly, it was anticipated that patients with OCD would show a deficit

on these tasks.

One crucial difference between the two disorders, however, is that there is no loss of

personal agency in OCD, with sufferers claiming ownership of the intrusive thoughts. It

has been suggested that correctly identifying the origins of mental events is contingent on

intact context memory (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). In episodic memory

research, a distinction between the 'content' and 'context' of memory events is often made,

content referring to the event itself while context usually refers to extrinsic features that are

not part of the stimulus itself, such as the source of an action or its temporal context. There

Chapter 10

- 223 -

is evidence that memory for the content and context of an event may be functionally

dissociable (Cabeza et al, 1997; Nyberg et al, 1996). In Waters, Badcock et al (2004), we

showed that significantly more patients with auditory hallucinations had a deficit in some

form of memory for context (source or temporal memory, or both) compared to patients

without hallucinations. We speculated that this deficit in context memory results in an

inability to form a complete representation of the origins of mental events, leading to a

failure to recognize hallucinated events as being self generated.

The ability of OCD patients to identify the origin of their thoughts suggests that

contextual memory should be intact in patients with OCD. However, this proposal

contrasts with studies that have shown poor memory for actions in OCD (e.g. Tolin,

Abramowitz, Przeworski & Foa, 2002). These studies show that OCD patients, and in

particular OCD checkers, have difficulties differentiating between memories of performed

acts and memories of imagined acts, which can be interpreted as a source memory deficit.

Jurado, Junque, Vallejo, Salgado and Grafman (2002) have also shown poor temporal order

judgment in patients with OCD, suggesting that temporal memory may be impaired in

OCD. In order to investigate whether context memory is impaired in OCD, the

performance of patients on the Context Memory task was examined. In this task (as used in

Waters, Maybery et al, 2004), memory for events is assessed in conjunction with memory

for both source and temporal information. The task therefore tests recognition for specific

events, the source of these events, when the events occurred and the ability to bind the two

contextual features together.

In sum, in view of the observations that patients with OCD experience intrusive

thoughts, but that they do not mistake the origins of these thoughts, the aims of the current

study were to identify whether patients with OCD would show 1) poor inhibitory

functioning on tasks of intentional inhibition, namely on the HSCT and ICIM task; but 2)

intact context memory abilities on the Context Memory task. In a crucial test of our

combined-deficit model of auditory hallucinations, the study will also test the proposal that

OCD patients may show a deficit in either intentional inhibition or context memory, but

none should show combined deficits in both cognitive domains.

Chapter 10

- 224 -

Method

Participants

Fourteen OCD outpatients were recruited via their treating psychiatrist or through

community advertising. The MINI (Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview;

Sheehan et al, 1998) was administered to confirm the diagnosis of OCD and identify the

presence of other psychiatric disorders. Duration of illness ranged from 2 to 37 years. Ten

of the 14 patients were on antidepressant medication and one of these was also on a mood

stabilizer. The control group comprised 24 healthy individuals recruited from the

community through a blood donor organization. Exclusion criteria for all participants

included a history of head injury, neurological illness, substance abuse or dependence

within the last 6 months, English as a second language, a personal or family history of

psychosis or schizophrenia disorder and reports of any past or present auditory

hallucinations that were not as a result of a fever or drugs. The demographic and clinical

characteristics of participants are presented in Table 1. The study protocol was approved

by the human research ethics committee of the University of Western Australia and the

institutional ethics committee at Graylands Hospital. All participants provided signed

informed consent prior to their participation in the study.

Clinical ratings

The 10-item Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS, Goodman et al,

1989a, b) is a self-report measure whereby patients are asked to answer 5 questions

regarding the severity of obsessions and 5 questions pertaining to the severity of

compulsions. The Y-BOCS has been reported to have good reliability and validity

(Goodman, 1999; Goodman et al, 1989a, b) and excellent internal consistency and test-

retest reliability (Steketee, Frost & Bogart, 1996). Total scores can range from 0 to 40.

The range of total scores in the present OCD sample was 9 – 31, confirming the presence of

significant symptomatology. The mean Y-BOCS subscale and total scores of the current

OCD sample (see Table 1) were within the range of previously reported data (e.g. Denys,

De Geux, Van Megen & Westenberg, 2000).

Chapter 10

- 225 -

Table 1.

Demographic data for controls and patients with OCD (means and SD) Controls OCD

(n = 24) (n = 14)

Age 34.67 (8.71) 36.00 (11.10)

Gender 20 M, 4 F 5 M, 9 F

Handedness 19 R, 4 L 13 R, 1 L

Years Education 11.75 (1.89) 14.79 (1.72)

NART 103.62 (4.75) 109.07 (6.26)

Y-BOCS total - 20.57 (6.19)

OBSESSION score1 - 10.21 (4.19)

COMPULSION score1 - 10.35 (2.64)

Duration of illness (yrs) - 13.28 (9.55)

Age onset - 22.71 (7.26)

BDI-II 2.04 (1.98) 18.71 (12.01)

BAI 1.54 (1.79) 14.36 (9.92) 1 On Y-BOCS

Tasks and questionnaires

Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, 1996,

1990).

These tests both have a maximum score of 21.

Assessment of General Intelligence

Premorbid intelligence was estimated using the National Adult Reading Test-revised

(Nelson, 1982).

Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT; Burgess & Shallice, 1996)

In this test the participant was required to provide single-word completions to

sentences. In the first condition (Response Initiation), subjects were required to finish the

sentence with a word that would complete it in a sensible fashion, and in the second

condition (Response Suppression) subjects were required to complete the sentence with a

word that was unrelated to the context of the sentence. Latencies for the two conditions

Chapter 10

- 226 -

were recorded. A Response Inhibition measure was obtained by calculating the difference

in latency for the Response Initiation and Response Suppression conditions. Consistent

with the test manual, two errors types were recorded in the Response Suppression

condition: A category A error was where the supplied word completed the sentence in a

plausible fashion (e.g. 'most cats see very well at...night'), and a category B error was where

the response was semantically connected to the sentence, but was not the most plausible

completion (e.g. 'the dough was put in the hot…kitchen'.

Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories task (ICIM; adapted from Schnider & Ptak,

1999, as used in Waters et al, 2003)

This task involved the presentation of a series of animal pictures (selected from the

Berkeley Digital Library Project collection) for repeated identification. Four runs were

shown of the same basic set of 52 pictures. Four pictures were repeated 8 times within each

run as described by Schnider and Ptak. These target items were different for the 4 runs.

The pictures were presented for 2000 ms each with an inter-stimulus interval of 1000 ms.

Immediately after the 1st run, the 2nd run was presented. A 3rd run was made 5 minutes after

the 2nd run, and the 4th run was made after a 30-minute delay. For the first run, participants

were told that pictures of animals would be presented and that some would be shown more

than once. The task was to identify which pictures were repeated. For each subsequent run,

participants were instructed to forget that they had already seen the pictures and to indicate

picture reoccurrences only within that run. Performance on the first run depended on new

learning, whereas subsequent runs required active inhibition of memory of pictures seen in

the previous runs (Schnider, Treyer & Buck, 2000). Consequently the number of false

alarms (FA) in the last three runs, but not the first, was used to index inability to inhibit

irrelevant memories.

Context Memory task (adapted from Conway & Dewhurst, 1995; Danion, Rizzo & Bruant,

1999; Huppert & Piercy, 1978, as used in Waters, Maybery, Badcock & Michie, 2004)

Participants watched or performed pairings of two sets of 24 household objects over

two sessions 30 minutes apart.

Materials: There were 48 common household objects. Half were allocated to the

'watch' action (participants watched the experimenter pair the objects) and half to the

'perform' action (participants performed the pairing themselves). A series of cards provided

instructions to position objects next to one another or to watch the experimenter perform

Chapter 10

- 227 -

the action. In the recognition test, 24 pairs of objects were presented: 16 pairs were kept in

their original combination (‘intact pairs’), and 8 pairs were objects that were re-paired in

new combinations (‘rearranged pairs’). No new objects were added. Objects in new

combinations were kept within the same action sequence (watch/perform) and presentation

session (1 or 2).

Procedure: In the first session, participants were shown 24 common objects set out

randomly on a table. They were told that they would pair objects together or watch the

experimenter pair objects together in two different sessions and were instructed that they

should try to remember which objects went together, who paired them and in which

session, for a test later on. Thirty minutes after the first session the second session took

place. A different set of 24 objects was presented but the procedure remained the same.

Five minutes after the end of the second session, the recognition test was administered

verbally. Pairs of objects were read out individually. Participants indicated whether each

pair was an intact or rearranged combination, and for pairs judged as being intact they had

to specify who performed the pairing (self/experimenter), and when (session 1/2).

Results

Patients with OCD and healthy controls did not differ significantly in age, t(36) = .41,

p = .68. However, patients with OCD had significantly higher premorbid IQ as measured

by the NART, t(36) = 3.02, p < .005, and significantly more years of education compared to

controls, t(36) = 4.92, p < .001 (see Table 1). Patients with OCD also had greater levels of

depression and anxiety, as measured by the BDI-II and BAI respectively, t(36) = 6.70, p <

.001 and t(36) = 6.21, p < .001.

Intentional inhibition

HSCT

Table 2 shows mean scores and standard deviations on the HSCT for each group.

Distributions were approximately normal except for Type A errors which were positively

skewed. Consequently, parametric tests were carried out on all measures except for Type A

errors for which nonparametric tests were used. Patients with OCD were significantly

slower than controls in the Response Suppression condition and on the Response Inhibition

measure, t(36) = 2.59, p < .01, and t(36) = 2.54, p < .01, respectively. This is unlikely to

have been due to generally slower response speed since the two groups did not differ

Chapter 10

- 228 -

significantly on latencies from the Response Initiation condition, t(36) = 1.43, p = .16.

Patients with OCD also made significantly more type B errors than controls, t(36) = 2.22, p

< .05, but there was a nonsignificant difference between the groups on the number of type

A errors, Mann-Whitney U = 166.50, p = .92.

Table 2

Scores on the HSCT (means and SD) Response Initiation, Response Suppression and

Response Inhibition latencies (secs) and Category A and B errors for controls and patients

with OCD

Controls OCD

(n = 24) (n = 14)

Response Initiation 2.66 (1.73) 3.71 (2.78)

Response Suppression 29.33 (24.02) 53.14 (32.16)

Response Inhibition 26.66 (23.87) 49.42 (30.88)

Category A errors .12 (.44) .14 (.53)

Category B errors 2.75 (3.22) 5.42 (4.12)

ICIM task

On the ICIM task, the ability to correctly detect targets was assessed by analyzing the

number of hits for repeated targets across the four runs of the task. There was no

significant difference in total number of hits made by the OCD patients (M = 110.07, SD =

2.33) and healthy controls (M = 110.16, SD = 2.59), t(36) = .11, p = .91.

The number of false alarms made on the first run of the ICIM task reflects new

learning rather than suppression. This measure showed a nonsignificant difference between

patients with OCD and controls, t(36) = .27, p = .78. However, on subsequent runs (i.e.

runs 2-4), which required active inhibition, patients with OCD made significantly more

false alarms compared to controls, t(36) = 2.19, p < .05. This pattern of results is shown in

Figure 1. Finally, the proportion of false alarms to distracters that were targets in previous

runs was also computed. The difference between controls (M = .05, SD = .09) and patients

with OCD (M = .07, SD = .08) was not significant, Mann-Whitney U = 57.50, p = .12.

Chapter 10

- 229 -

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1 2 3 4

Run

Mea

n nu

mbe

r of f

alse

ala

rms

Healthy controls OCD patients

Figure 1

Mean number of false alarms (with SE) on each run of the ICIM task in the OCD

patients and healthy controls

In summary, patients with OCD made significantly more type B errors compared to

controls on the Response Suppression condition of the HSCT and made significantly more

false alarms on the last three runs of the ICIM test (although not specifically to previous

targets). The percentage of patients with OCD impaired on either of these measures was

calculated with reference to whether scores were in excess of one standard deviation from

control group baseline means. By comparison, the probability that an individual would

score more than one standard deviation from the mean on a normal distribution is .158 so

the probability that an individual would score one standard deviation away from the mean

of controls on one task or another is .291 [using Pr A or B = Pr A + Pr B – (Pr A * Pr B)].

The analyses showed that 10/14 (71.4%) of patients had a deficit on either of these

measures. The patients who were impaired using this criterion were not necessarily those

who took medication, X2(1) = 1.26, p = .26. When a more stringent two standard deviations

Chapter 10

- 230 -

criterion was applied, the results showed that 6/14 (42.85%) of the OCD patients still had

the deficit. The same results were obtained when the calculations were repeated using the

Response Inhibition measure, since those OCD patients who made a high number of type B

errors were the same patients who had significantly longer response latencies compared to

controls on the HSCT.

Inhibitory performance on the HSCT and ICIM tasks was correlated with Y-BOCS

scores on the Obsession and Compulsions subscales, and with the total score, but there

were no significant associations (all p > .08) suggesting that these deficits were not

associated with symptom severity. We also examined whether the current findings could

be accounted for by differences in depression and anxiety, premorbid IQ and education.

BDI-II scores were found to be significantly correlated with latency of inhibition as shown

by the Response Inhibition measure of the HSCT, r = .62, p < .01, but no other correlations

were significant (all p > .08).

Context memory

Table 3 shows the proportions correct data for object pair recognition and for source

and temporal judgments for correctly recognized intact pairs, and the results of analyses

investigating binding. Analyses of memory for content are presented initially followed by

analyses of individual context judgments. Finally, context binding abilities are investigated

in the last analysis.

Intact versus rearranged object pair recognition

The proportions of object pairs correctly recognized as intact or rearranged were

subjected to a 2 (OCD vs. controls) x 2 (intact vs. rearranged object pairs) ANOVA.

Overall recognition accuracy did not differ significantly for intact versus rearranged

stimuli, F(1, 36) = 3.60, p = .07. More significantly, the difference between groups was not

significant, F(1, 36) = .25, p = .61, and there was no significant interaction, F(1, 36) = .25,

p = .61. Signal detection parameters (representing estimates of discrimination accuracy and

bias) were calculated but were not found to be significantly different between the two

groups, t(36) = .51, p = .61, and t(36) = .29, p = .77, respectively.

Source and temporal judgements

Participants provided source and temporal judgments only for stimulus pairs that they

judged to be intact so analyses of context recognition were restricted to correctly

recognized intact stimulus pairs. The proportions of correct source and temporal judgments

Chapter 10

- 231 -

were subjected to a 2 (group) x 2 (source vs temporal context) ANOVA. There was a

significant main effect of context, with source being recalled correctly more often than

temporal context, F(1, 36) = 12.24, p < .001. However, the main effect of group and the

interaction were not significant, F(1, 36) = 1.26, p = .26, and F(1, 36) = .50, p = .48,

respectively. Discrimination accuracy values drawn from separate signal detection

analyses for source and temporal information were subjected to a common 2 (group) x 2

(source vs. temporal context) ANOVA. There was a nonsignificant difference between

controls (M = 1.85, SD = .13) and patients (M = 1.68, SD = .17) in discrimination accuracy,

F(1, 36) = .71, p = .40. The effect of context was significant, F(1, 36) = 16.71, p < .001,

but the interaction was not, F(1, 36) = 1.16, p = .28.

Table 3

Means (and standard deviations) of (1) proportions correct for object pair recognition (for intact and new pairs) and for source and temporal judgements for correctly recognized intact pairs, and (2) proportions of correctly recognized intact pairs for which 'who & when' , 'who only', 'when only' and 'neither' were recognised for controls and OCD patients Controls OCD

(n = 24) (n = 14)

1. Content and context memory judgements

Intact object pairs .76 (.17) .75 (.16)

Rearranged object pairs .63 (.25) .68 (.22)

Source judgements .88 (.12) .86 (.13)

Temporal judgements .81 (.14) .75 (.09)

2. Binding of source and temporal information

Who & When .73 (.19) .64 (.14)

Who only .15 (.11) .22 (.11)

When only .08 (.10) .11 (.11)

Neither .03 (.05) .05 (.01)

An analysis of bias for source (i.e. the preference to identify stimuli as self-paired

rather than experimenter-paired) revealed a nonsignificant difference between controls (M

= .89, SD = .61) and patients (M = 1.19, SD = .51), t(36) = 1.53, p = .13. An analysis of

bias for temporal context (i.e. the preference to identify stimuli as being presented in

Chapter 10

- 232 -

session 1 rather than session 2) also showed a nonsignificant difference between controls

(M = 1.08, SD = .63) and patients (M = .90, SD = .33), t(36) = 1.02, p = .31.

Binding of source and temporal information to event memory

The proportions of contextual features recalled in conjunction with each correctly

recognized intact event were calculated. The measures were calculated for each individual

and included the proportions of object pairs (1) where both source and temporal

information were correctly retrieved (‘who & when‘), (2) where source only was correctly

retrieved (‘who only‘), (3) where temporal information only was correctly retrieved (‘when

only‘), and (4) where neither source nor temporal information was correctly retrieved

(‘neither‘). A 2 (subgroup) x 3 (context: ‘who only‘ vs. ‘when only‘ vs. ‘who & when‘)

ANOVA was performed. Proportions for ‘neither‘ were not included to prevent

collinearity problems arising from using all four proportions, which would sum to one.

There was a significant main effect of context, F(1, 36) = 170.23, p < .001, whereby both

contextual features were retrieved correctly more often than source judgments alone, which

were retrieved correctly more often than temporal judgments alone. However, there was a

nonsignificant main effect of group, F(1, 36) = 2.52, p = .12, and a nonsignificant

interaction, F(1, 36) = 1.75, p = .19. In addition, in a separate one-way ANOVA, there was

no significant group difference on the proportions of ‘neither‘, F(1, 36) = 3.19, p = .08.

In order to assess whether patients with OCD had a context binding deficit, the

proportion of patients showing an impairment in some form of memory for context was

calculated, as assessed by the percentage of patients with OCD who were impaired on

either source or temporal judgments or both. Using a one standard deviation criterion, the

results showed that only one of the 14 patients had a deficit on either of these variables

(.07%). Using the two standard deviations criterion, none of the patients with OCD had a

deficit.

In sum, patients with OCD did not show a context memory impairment, as their

performance on all aspects of the task showed no significant difference from the

performance of healthy controls.

Combined deficits in inhibition and context memory

The percentage of patients with OCD whose performance was impaired on both tasks

of intentional inhibition (as measured by deficits on the HSCT type B error variable or false

alarms on ICIM runs 2-4 or both) and contextual memory (as measured by deficits on

Chapter 10

- 233 -

source or temporal memory or both) was computed. The probability that an individual

would score one standard deviation away from the mean of controls in both cognitive

domains by chance alone is .085. With a one standard deviation criterion, the results

showed that only 1 patient (.07%) showed the combination of deficits. Using a two

standard deviation criterion, none of the patients showed a combined deficit in both

inhibition and context memory.

Discussion

Intentional inhibitory processes

The first goal of the study was to investigate whether OCD was associated with an

impairment in intentional inhibition, as measured by the HSCT and ICIM task. The results

showed that patients with OCD had a deficit on both tasks.

On the HSCT, the results revealed that patients with OCD showed an impairment in

both latency and accuracy compared to controls. Specifically, patients with OCD made

more type B errors and responded more slowly than controls on the Response Inhibition

measure of the HSCT. The increased latency was not related to a general decrease in

response speed since the patients did not show slower latency compared to controls in the

Response Initiation condition. The additional time was, therefore, due to “thinking time”

taken up to inhibit the dominant response and produce a novel word that was not a

straightforward sentence completion (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Nathaniel-James, Fletcher

& Frith, 1997).

Patients with OCD also showed impaired performance on the inhibitory condition of

the ICIM task. Specifically, patients made significantly more false alarms in runs 2-4

compared to controls, indicating a deficit in suppressing activated memory traces that were

not immediately relevant. This performance cannot be attributed to learning and

recognition difficulties since patients showed normal performance in the first run of the

task. Difficulties with encoding can also be ruled out since the total number of hits across

the four runs was not significantly different between the two groups. In addition, the

results cannot be attributed to an overall bias to say ‘yes’ since there was no significant

difference between the two groups in the number of false alarms in the first run.

Poorer performance on the HSCT and ICIM task was not found to be associated with

a widespread cognitive impairment since patients with OCD did not differ from controls in

Chapter 10

- 234 -

terms of response speed on the Response Initiation condition of the HSCT and actually had

significantly more years of education than controls and higher intellectual functioning as

measured by the NART. BDI-II scores were found to be correlated with the Response

Inhibition measure of the HSCT, but depression scores were not significantly correlated

with any other inhibitory measures so cannot be the reason for poor inhibitory performance.

Performance on the HSCT or ICIM task was not associated either with symptom severity or

other clinical characteristics. An association between inhibitory impairment and symptom

severity is not a consistent finding in the literature. For example, Bannon, Gonsalvez, Croft

and Boyce (2002) showed that OCD severity scores on the Y-BOCS correlated with Stroop

reaction time but not with the number of commission errors on the Go/Nogo task.

In summary, it was found that patients with OCD showed a deficit in intentional

inhibition, as measured by the HSCT and ICIM task. The results support the proposal that

both OCD patients and schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations have a deficit in

intentional inhibition as assessed by these tasks. However, the nature of the deficits on the

two tasks was somewhat different for the two disorders, suggesting that the mechanisms of

intentional inhibition may be somewhat different in both patient groups. On the HSCT,

auditory hallucinations were associated with an increased number of type A, but not type B,

errors (Waters et al, 2003). Patients with OCD, by contrast, had a greater number of type B

errors and longer response latencies on the Response Inhibition condition. On the ICIM

task, patients with auditory hallucinations, compared to patients without hallucinations,

made significantly more false alarms on runs requiring active suppression (runs 2-4),

particularly on distracters that had been targets in previous runs (Badcock et al, in press).

By comparison, patients with OCD had a significantly greater number of false alarms on

runs 2-4 compared to healthy controls although the groups did not differ in the number of

errors on distracters that were previous targets. In addition, the pattern of performance of

hallucinating patients across the four runs of the ICIM task indicated that the overall rate of

false alarm errors increased up to the third run and decreased only on the fourth and final

run, after a 30 minute delay had occured. In contrast, the overall rate of false alarm errors

by OCD patients increased only up to the second run, which occurs immediately after the

first run.

The different performance profiles for the two patient groups is difficult to interpret

as there is no clear explanation of what the different errors on the HSCT and ICIM task

Chapter 10

- 235 -

represent. One possibility is that patients with auditory hallucinations are more prone to

making highly prepotent responses relative to OCD patients, as shown by deficits on Type

A errors on the HSCT and on distracters that were previous targets on the ICIM task. A

difficulty with this proposal, however, is that the patients with OCD have substantially

longer response latencies on the Response Suppression condition of the HSCT, which may

also indicate difficulties resisting prepotent responses. Similar problems with conceptual

coherence apply to other potential explanations we have been able to generate for the

different inhibitory profiles for the OCD and AH patient groups.

In sum, these explanations do not satisfactorily explain the difference in patterns of

performance on the HSCT and ICIM task in patients with OCD and patients with auditory

hallucinations, and no clearer picture has emerged as a result of our speculations. In the

future, studies should aim to explore further the processes underlying the different error

types on the HSCT and ICIM task.

In any case, the results support the proposal that both OCD and auditory

hallucinations are characterized by a deficit in intentional inhibition, as measured by the

HSCT and ICIM task. The number of OCD patients with a deficit in intentional inhibition

was calculated. It was found that 72% of all patients with OCD showed an intentional

inhibition deficit on either or both of the two tasks relative to healthy controls. Although

these results convincingly demonstrate the role of intentional inhibition in OCD, not all

patients exhibited the anticipated deficit. The current results perhaps suggest that the

HSCT and ICIM task were not sensitive enough to identify intentional inhibition processes

in OCD patients. Alternatively, levels of intrusive thoughts may vary between patients with

OCD, and a better experimental design would be to examine the association between a

measure of intrusive thoughts and intentional inhibition.

Context memory processes

The second goal of the current study was to examine the performance of patients with

OCD on the Context Memory task. It was found that patients with OCD were not

significantly different from healthy controls in any of the task conditions. Specifically,

OCD patients showed intact recognition accuracy for object pairs, intact source and

temporal context judgments and normal binding abilities, suggesting that contextual

memory was clearly not impaired in patients with OCD. Only one of the patients with

Chapter 10

- 236 -

OCD showed a deficit on either source or temporal context, a result that is not much

different from chance.

The finding of intact source memory contrasts with studies that have shown that OCD

patients have a poor memory for the origin of actions (e.g. Tolin et al, 2002). However,

studies have been inconsistent in outcomes, with many now proposing that the deficit is

primarily due to lack of confidence in memory (e.g. Constans, Foa, Franklin & Mathews,

1995). In support, many recent studies have found impaired knowledge about one's

memory capabilities in OCD patients (Constans, Foa, Franklin & Mathews, 1995; Foa,

Amir, Gershuny, Molnar & Kozak, 1997). The finding of intact temporal memory in the

Context Memory task, however, contrasts with Jurado et al’s (2002) findings. They

investigated temporal ordering of a list of words and found that, compared to a group of

healthy controls, patients with OCD showed normal recognition memory but compromised

ability to sequentially order words. The exact reason for this discrepancy is not clear,

although methodological differences may have accounted for the mixed results. The

processes for ordering a list of words in memory may differ quite substantially from

remembering which of two sessions an event had occurred in, and different levels of

working memory involvement and strategic encoding may have contributed to differences

in task performance.

In any case, the aim of the study was to test for the presence of a precise deficit in

patients with OCD, characterised by a deficit in contextual memory and defined by an

impairment in identifying the source and/or temporal features of events in memory. The

results supported our proposal that patients with OCD do not show compromised context

memory ability, as measured by the Context Memory task. As suggested by Johnson et al

(1993), this pattern of intact processes contributes to an efficient memory system, allowing

the patient to remember the origins of their intrusive thoughts and to distinguish between

different events in episodic memory.

A combination of deficits in inhibition and context memory

Finally, the main aim of this study was to examine whether any of the OCD patients

would show the combination of deficits in both intentional inhibition and context memory,

as presented by schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations. It was found that,

using the stringent criterion of scores two standard deviations away from the means of the

control group, none of the OCD patients showed the combination of deficits. When the

Chapter 10

- 237 -

more flexible criterion of one standard deviation away from the means of controls was

applied, only one patient out of 14 was found to have a combined impairment on tasks of

intentional inhibition and context memory. These results provide strong support for the

proposal that OCD is not associated with a combined deficit in intentional inhibition and

context memory.

However, the finding that one OCD patient showed the combination of deficits is

inconsistent with our model of auditory hallucinations, since it predicts that the

combination of deficits is associated with the experience of auditory hallucinations. A

close investigation of this patient’s details revealed that she was the only OCD patient who

reported hypnopompic hallucinations (auditory hallucination-like occurrences experienced

during the transition from sleep to wakefulness). These were reported as occurring

approximately every 6 weeks and consisted of the patient hearing faint voices and

conversations. Since hallucinations occurring as a result of falling asleep or waking up

were not a criterion for exclusion, this patient was included in the study.

These results would appear to imply that the processes underlying hallucination-like

experiences in the realm of non-psychotic states might also rely on similar cognitive

processes to those shown by schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations. In

support, similar deficits in reality monitoring (Bentall & Slade, 1985b; Rankin & O’Carroll,

1985) and metacognitive beliefs (e.g. Morrison et al, 2000; in press) have been identified in

patients with a predisposition to hallucinations and schizophrenia patients with auditory

hallucinations. This proposal is also consistent with David’s (2004) recent suggestion that

auditory hallucinations are still the result of a pathological process, even if they are

reported by the ‘normal’ population. Interestingly, some commonalities between processes

involved in hypnopompic and hypnagogic experiences (HHEs) and hallucinations in

psychotic individuals have recently been highlighted. For example, Cheyne, Rueffer and

Newby-Clark (1999) have pointed out that HHEs “begin with an affectively charged sense

of presence leading to interpretive efforts to corroborate that conviction” (p. 332). This

view is consistent with suggestions of biases and beliefs in patients with auditory

hallucinations (e.g. Chadwich & Birchwood, 1994; Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier, 1995).

In addition, HHEs have been linked to REM states, which have been found to involve

interactions between limbic structures such as the amygdala and the anterior cingulate.

Interestingly, the limbic system has also been linked to auditory hallucinations in

Chapter 10

- 238 -

schizophrenia (e.g. Copolov et al, 2003; Lennox, Bert, Park, Jones & Morris, 1999),

consistent with suggestions of commonalities between HHEs and auditory hallucinations of

schizophrenia.

Alternatively, this single OCD case presenting with the combination of deficits may

indicate vulnerability to schizophrenia (increased schizotypy). In support of this

possibility, there is evidence that HHEs are associated with a high rate of schizophrenia.

In addition, it is increasingly believed that OCD can be divided into clinical subtypes, and

in particular a subtype of OCD with schizotypal features has been identified (Harris &

Dinn, 2003; Hwang, Morgan & Losconzcy, 2000), explaining perhaps why the chance of

developing schizophrenia in OCD is significantly higher than in the general population

(Spitznagel & Suhr, 2002). Harris and Dinn (2003) have proposed that this OCD-

schizotypal subtype shows neuropsychological and neural characteristics of both OCD and

schizophrenia disorders. If a context memory deficit is common to patients with

schizophrenia in general (Waters, Maybery, Badcock & Michie, 2004), the combination of

the intentional inhibitory deficit found in OCD, together with the context memory

impairment in schizophrenia, may create the precise dual deficit combination necessary to

promote the emergence of hallucinations. In support, Hermesh et al (2004) have recently

reported that musical hallucinations are a particularly common experience among OCD

patients. However, they further identified that although OCD is a contributor to the

develoment of musical hallucinations, it is not enough on its own. An additional (i.e.

comorbid) mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, that interacts with OCD markedly

increases the likelihood of the occurrence of these hallucinations. This further supports our

proposal that only a combination of deficits may result in a hallucinatory experience.

Further research in other clinical samples is needed to support our proposal that the

combination of deficits in both intentional inhibition and context memory is specifically

associated with auditory hallucinations.

A shortcoming of this study is that the sample of OCD patients was not very large.

However, due to the reluctance of OCD patients to participate in research, it was not

possible to increase the sample size. One consequence of the small sample size is that it

was not possible to carry out analyses within subgroups. For example, differences in

patterns of performance on a Negative Priming task have been found in checkers and

noncheckers subgroups of the OCD population (e.g. Hoenig et al, 2002). Future research

Chapter 10

- 239 -

should assess cognitive inhibition efficiencies in those major groups to examine the range

of inhibitory deficit types present and their role in symptom presentation. Also, the current

OCD sample did not include nonmedicated patients so it was not possible to investigate the

roles of medications on cognitive performance. Although previous studies have not found

that common medications used for OCD have a significant effect on cognitive performance

(Bannon et al, 2002; Purcell et al, 1998), investigations of the effect of medication dosage

and type should be encouraged.

Finally, it should be made clear that the intention of this study was not to demonstrate

that OCD and auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia are one and the same disorder with

the exception of an intact context memory deficit. Although OCD and hallucinations may

share an intentional inhibition deficit, OCD is also associated with a range of other

cognitive deficits, in automatic forms of inhibition and in interference control, as well as

impairments in executive functions and visuospatial memory. This combination of deficits

results in the expression of a clinical disorder that is distinct from that of auditory

hallucinations. In support, OCD presents with very specific themes of obsessions, such as

fear of contamination or need for order or symmetry, and compulsions, confirming that the

two disorders are distinct disorders that merely share a common deficit in intentional

inhibition.

Chapter 10

- 240 -

References

Amieva, H., Phillips, L. H., Della Sala, S., & Henry, J. D. (2004). Inhibitory

functioning in Alzheimer's disease. Brain, 127, 949-964.

Badcock, J. C., Waters, F. A. V., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (in press).

Auditory hallucinations: failure to inhibit irrelevant memories. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.

Bannon, S., Gonsalvez, C. J., Croft, R. J., & Boyce, P. M. (2002). Response

inhibition deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 110, 165-174.

Beck, A. (1990). BAI . San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Beck, A. (1996). BDI-II . San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.

Breiter, H. C., & Rauch, S. L. (1996). Functional MRI and the study of OCD: from

symptom provocation to cognitive-behavioural probes of cortico-striatal systems and the

amygdala. Neuroimage, 4, S127-S138.

Burgess, P., & Shallice, T. (1996). Response suppression, initiation and strategy use

following frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 34(4), 263-273.

Cabeza, R., Mangels, J., Nyberg, L., Habib, R., Houle, S., McIntosh, A. R., &

Tulving, E. (1997). Brain regions differentially involved in remembering what and when: A

PET study. Neuron, 19, 863-870.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1994). The omnipotence of voices - the cognitive

approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 190-201.

Cheyne, J. A., Rueffer, S. D., & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1999). Hypnagogic and

hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis: neurological and cultural construction

of the night-mare. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 319-337.

Cleghorn, J. M., Franco, S., Szechtman, B., Kaplan, R., Szechtman, H., Brown, G.

M., Nahmias, C., & Garnett, E. S. (1992). Toward a brain map of auditory hallucinations.

American Journal of Psychiatry, 149(8), 1062-1069.

Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Delfiore, G., Degueldre, C., Luxen, A., & Salmon,

E. (2001). The functional anatomy of inhibition processes investigated with the Hayling

Task. NeuroImage, 14, 258-267.

Constans, J. I., Foa, E. B., Franklin, M. E., & Mathews, A. (1995). Memory for actual

and imagined events for OC checkers. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 33(6), 665-671.

Conway, M. A., & Dewhurst, S. A. (1995). Remembering, Familiarity, and Source

Monitoring. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A(1), 125-140.

Chapter 10

- 241 -

Copolov, D. L., Seal, M. L., Maruff, P., Ulusoy, R., Wong, M. T. H., Tochon-

Danguy, H. J., & Egan, G. F. (2003). Cortical activation associated with the experience of

auditory hallucinations and perception of human speech in schizophrenia: a PET correlation

study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 122, 139-152.

Danion, J. M., Rizzo, L., & Bruant, A. (1999). Functional mechanisms underlying

impaired recognition memory and conscious awareness in patients with schizophrenia.

Archives of General Psychiatry, 56(7), 639-644.

David, A. S. (2004). The cognitive neuropsychiatry of auditory verbal hallucinations:

an overview. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 107-123.

Denys, D., De Geux, F., Van Megen, H. G. M., & Westenberg, H. G. M. (2000).

Clinical characteristics of obsessive-compulsive disorder: A sample of 300 OCD-

outpatients.

Enright, S., & Beech, A. (1990). Obessional states: anxiety disorders or schizotypes?

An information processing and personality assessment. Psychological Medicine, 20, 621-

627.

Foa, E. B., Amir, N., Gershuny, B., Molnar, C., & Kozak, M. J. (1997). Implict and

Explicit Memory in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 11(2),

119-129.

Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and

interference control functions: a latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental

Psychology: General, 133(1), 101-135.

Goodman, W. K., Price, L. H., Rasmussen, S. A., Mazure, C., Delgado, P., Heninger,

G. R., & Charney, D. S. (1989a). The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale - Validity.

Archives of General Psychiatry, 46, 1012-1016.

Goodman, W. K., Price, L. H., Rasmussen, S. A., Mazure, C., Fleischmann, R. L.,

Hill, C. L., Heninger, G. R., & Charney, D. S. (1989b). The Yale-Brown Obsessive

Compulsive Scale: I. Development, use, and reliability. Archives of General Psychiatry,

46, 1006-1011.

Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: theories,

definitions and research evidence. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference

and inhibition in cognition. Chap 6 (pp. 175-205). San Diego: Academic Press.

Chapter 10

- 242 -

Harris, C. L., & Dinn, W. M. (2003). Subtyping Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder:

Neuropsychological correlates. Behavioural Neurology, 14, 75-87.

Hermesh, H., Konas, S., Shiloh, R., Dar, R., Marom, S., Weizman, A., & Gross-

Isseroff, R. (2004). Musical hallucinations: prevalence in psychotic and nonpsychotic

outpatients. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 65, 191-197.

Hoenig, K., Hochrein, A., Muller, D. J., & Wagner, M. (2002). Different negative

priming impairments in schizophrenia and subgroups of obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Psychological Medicine, 32, 459-468.

Huppert, F., & Piercy, M. (1978). The role of trace strength in recency and frequency

judgments by amnesic and control subjects. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,

30, 347-354.

Hwang, M., Morgan, J., & Losconzcy, M. (2000). Clinical and neuropsychological

profiles of obsessive-compulsive schizophrenia; A pilot study. The Journal of

Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 12, 91-94.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring.

Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Jurado, M. A., Junque, C., Vallejo, J., Salgado, P., & Grafman, J. (2002). Obsessive-

Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients are impaired in remembering temporal order and in

judging their own performance. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology,

24(3), 261-269.

Lennox, B. R., Bert, S., Park, G., Jones, P. B., & Morris, P. G. (1999). Spatial and

Temporal mapping of neural activity associated with auditory hallucinations. The Lancet,

353(9153), 644.

Maruff, P., Purcell, R., Tyler, P., Pantelis, C., & Currie, J. (1999). Abnormalities of

internally generated saccades in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychological Medicine,

29, 1377-1385.

Morrison, A. P., Haddock, G., & Tarrier, N. (1995). Intrusive thoughts and auditory

hallucinations: a cognitive approach. Behavioral and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 265-

280.

Morrison, A.P., Wells, A., & Nothard, S. (2000). Cognitive factors in predisposition

to auditory and visual hallucinations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 67-78.

Chapter 10

- 243 -

Morrison, A.P., Wells, A., & Nothard, S. (in press). Cognitive and emotional

predictors of predisposition to hallucinations in non-patients. British Journal of Clinical

Psychology.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Fletcher, P., & Frith, C. (1997). The functional anatomy of

verbal initation and suppression using the Hayling Test. Neuropsychologia, 35(4), 559-566.

Nelson, H. E. (1982). The National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test Manual.

Windsor, Berks: NFER-Nelson.

Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology:

Views from cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition taxonomy.

Psychological Bulletin, 126(2), 220-246.

Nyberg, L., McIntosh, A. R., Cabeza, R., Habib, R., Houle, S., & Tulving, E. (1996).

General and specific brain regions involved in encoding and retrieval of events: What,

where and when. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 93, 11280-11285.

Okasha, A., Rafaat, M., Mahallawy, N., El Nahas, G., Seif El Dawla, A., Sayed, M.,

& El Kholi, S. (2000). Cognitive dysfunction in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Acta

Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 101, 281-285.

Purcell, R., Maruff, P., Kyrios, M., & Pantelis, C. (1998). Cognitive deficits in

obsessive-compulsive disorder on tests of frontal-striatal function. Biological Psychiatry,

43, 348-357.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

Schnider, A., Treyer, V., & Buck, A. (2000). Selection of currently relevant

memories by the human posterior medial orbital cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience,

20(15), 5880-5884.

Sheehan, D. V., Lecrubier, Y., Harnett Sheehan, K., Janavs, J., Weiller, E., Keskiner,

A., Schinka, J., Knapp, E., Sheehan, M. F., & Dunbar, G. C. (1997). The validity of the

Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI) according to the SCID-P and its

reliability. European Psychiatry, 12, 232-241.

Silbersweig, D. A., Stern, E., C, F., & et al (1995). A functional neuroanatomy of

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Nature, 378, 176-179.

Chapter 10

- 244 -

Spitznagel, M. B., & Suhr, J. A. (2002). Executive function deficits associated with

symptoms of schizotypy and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 110,

151-163.

Steketee, G., Frost, R., & Bogart, K. (1996). The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive

Scale: interview versus self report. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34(8), 675-684.

Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Przeworski, A., & Foa, E. B. (2002). Thought

suppression in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40,

125501274.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Maybery, M. T., & Michie, P. T. (2003). Inhibition

in schizophrenia: association with auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research, 62,

275-280.

Waters, F. A. V., Badcock, J. C., Michie, P. T., & Maybery, M. T. (2004). Auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia: intrusive thoughts and forgotten memories. Submitted for

publication.

Waters, F.A.V., Badcock, J.C., Maybery, M.T., & Michie, P.T. (2004) Context

Memory and auditory hallucinations. Unpublished manuscript, University of Western

Australia.

Waters, F. A. V., Maybery, M. T., Badcock, J. C., & Michie, P. T. (2004). Context

memory and binding in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 68(2-3), 119-125.

- 245 -

GENERAL DISCUSSION

- 247 -

Chapter 11 General discussion

The aim of this thesis was to provide a new perspective on the nature of the cognitive

deficits underlying auditory hallucinations. Firstly, we investigated the similitudes in

characteristics between hallucinatory-like experiences in healthy individuals and auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia in order to identify factors that may be important to the

hallucinatory experience in general. Secondly, the processes of intentional inhibition and

context memory were examined individually in schizophrenia patients with auditory

hallucinations. Thirdly, the proposal that these two cognitive deficits, combined, must be

present for auditory hallucinations to occur was tested. Finally, the specificity of this

combination of deficits to patients with auditory hallucinations was investigated by

examining the integrity of these processes in another clinical group who also experiences

intrusive thoughts, namely patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). In this

chapter, the main findings relevant to auditory hallucinations are reviewed in turn, together

with a discussion of the implications of these results at the end of each section. Answering

one question often raises previously unconsidered questions, consequently some possible

directions for future research are also outlined in each section.

Hallucinatory predisposition in healthy individuals

Summary of results of Chapter 2

As a preliminary study to our investigations of auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia, a factor analysis of a measure of hallucinatory predisposition, the Launay-

Slade Hallucination Scale-Revised (Bentall & Slade, 1985a), was carried out on a large

sample of undergraduate students (N = 562). One of the findings from this study was that

one of the factors underpinning predisposition to auditory hallucinations in the normal

population is characterised as the experience of intrusive mental events. In addition,

healthy individuals vulnerable to hallucinations identified experiences that are referred to

an external agency. These two characteristics are defining features of auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Since mental processes are thought to occur on a

Chapter 11

- 248 -

continuum, an overlap in characteristics between hallucinatory-like experiences in normal

individuals and auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia suggests that these factors may be

important components to the hallucinatory experience in general.

Since little is known about the cognitive processes that give rise to these

characteristics in schizophrenic auditory hallucinations, the subsequent studies investigated

the mechanisms responsible for (a) the intrusiveness and (b) the attribution of mental events

to an external agent, in auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia.

Intentional inhibition and auditory hallucinations The cognitive process of inhibition is essential for suppressing irrelevant thoughts,

and a failure to maintain control through inhibitory efficiency is thought to result in

information that intrudes into ongoing thinking. In order to explain the intrusive and

unintended characteristic of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, we proposed that

individuals with auditory hallucinations suffer from a failure in inhibition, and in particular

in intentional inhibition (Harnishfeger, 1995) since auditory hallucinations are consciously

experienced mental events.

Summary of results of Chapter 3

The aim of Chapter 3 was to investigate the proposal that auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenia are linked to a deficit in intentional inhibition. Patients with schizophrenia

(N = 42) and healthy controls (N = 24) completed two tasks selected to assess the

intentional suppression of cognitive events, the Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT)

(Burgess & Shallice, 1996) and the Inhibition of Currently Irrelevant Memories (ICIM)

task (Schnider & Ptak, 1999), which require the inhibition of currently active mental

associations and irrelevant memories respectively. Firstly, the patients performed

significantly worse on the measures of inhibition relative to controls. Secondly, it was

found that an increase in auditory hallucinations severity (as measured by the PANSS)

among the schizophrenia patients was associated with an increasing deficit on the two tasks

of inhibition, suggesting that difficulties suppressing unwanted mental associations and

irrelevant memory representations are associated with the experience of auditory

hallucination in schizophrenia.

Chapter 11

- 249 -

Summary of results of Chapter 4

In order to address the question of whether this deficit is a general feature of

schizophrenia or whether it is specifically associated with the presence of auditory

hallucinations, Chapter 4 contrasted the performance of patients who reported auditory

hallucinations in the last four weeks (N = 23) with patients who reported no auditory

hallucinations during the same period (N = 20) on the ICIM task. Whereas patients with

hallucinations showed a deficit inhibiting recently activated memory traces, the

performance of patients with no hallucinations was not significantly different from that of

healthy controls, indicating that the inhibitory impairment was specific to patients with

auditory hallucinations and not to all patients with schizophrenia.

Summary of results of Chapter 5

One of the aims of Chapter 5 was to revisit the integrity of intentional inhibition

processes in auditory hallucinations with a task-switching paradigm. The Affective

Shifting Task (Murphy et al, 1999) was specifically chosen because it assesses different

types of inhibitory processes, namely task-shifting abilities (assessing intentional inhibition

processes), interference control and valence-dependent inhibitory control. Patients

currently experiencing hallucinations were selected on the basis of having experienced

auditory hallucinations on at least half of the days during the preceding four weeks, as

assessed by self-reports and case note reviews (N = 19). Other schizophrenia patients who

did not fit this criterion were assigned to the non-hallucinating group (N = 24). Severity of

auditory hallucinations, measured with the PANSS, was also used to assess whether task

performance was associated with severity, rather than the presence, of auditory

hallucinations.

Firstly, the analyses revealed that neither the presence nor the severity of auditory

hallucinations was associated with an impairment in task-shifting on the Affective Shifting

Task. These results contrast with earlier findings of impaired performance on other tasks of

intentional inhibition such as the HSCT and ICIM task (see Chapters 3 and 4). We

speculated on the reason for this discrepancy in findings. On the Affective Shifting Task,

the response options are clearly defined and limited. In contrast, on the HSCT and ICIM

task, the response options are either open-ended (HSCT) or unknown (ICIM task).

Consequently, it is possible that the Affective Shifting Task is an easier task of intentional

inhibition and may require less inhibitory demands than tasks such as the HSCT and ICIM

Chapter 11

- 250 -

task. In support for this proposal, Amieva, Phillips, Della Sala and Henri (2004) have

recently proposed that tasks of intentional inhibition differ in terms of inhibitory demand,

depending on various factors such as different task requirements. In order to test the

suggestion that the Affective Shifting Task may have been easier than other tasks because

of a lower number of response options, an interesting study would manipulate the difficulty

of the same task-switching paradigm by increasing the number of possible options available

to participants. Future studies should develop better tasks where the inhibitory demands are

manipulated more systematically. In any case, the current suggestion leaves open the

possibility that, in some situations, patients with auditory hallucinations are able to exert

some control over mental events. This proposal may perhaps explain why patients do not

experience auditory hallucinations continuously.

Secondly, no significant association was found between severity of hallucinations and

overall latency on the Affective Shifting Task, suggesting that this aspect of interference

control is not particularly impaired in auditory hallucinations. This replicates previous

findings from Brebion, Smith, Gorman, Malaspina and Amador (1998) on the Stroop

Color-Word Test. However, the results showed that the severity of auditory hallucinations

was associated with an overall increase in false alarms. False alarms represent a failure to

inhibit inappropriate responding to previously relevant but currently inappropriate stimuli.

Similar difficulties in suppressing recently activated but irrelevant memory representations

were identified in Chapters 3 and 4. The present finding of an association between false

alarms on the Affective Shifting Task and severity of auditory hallucinations supports the

proposal that auditory hallucinations are associated with impaired control of unwanted and

irrelevant cognition, and is consistent with the suggestion that auditory hallucinations are

associated with a deficit in intentional inhibition.

Summary of results of Chapter 8

The analyses from Chapters 3 and 4 revealed that patients with auditory

hallucinations have an impairment in the intentional inhibition of active mental events and

irrelevant memory traces, as assessed using the HSCT and ICIM task. In order to

investigate whether this deficit is an essential component of auditory hallucinations, the

percentage of patients impaired on either, or both, of the two inhibitory tasks was calculated

with reference to whether scores were in excess of one standard deviation from control

group means. The results presented in Chapter 8 showed that all of the patients with

Chapter 11

- 251 -

auditory hallucinations (N = 19) were found to have a deficit in intentional inhibition,

supporting the role of intentional inhibition in the hallucinatory process. In comparison,

less than half of the patients without auditory hallucinations (N = 24) could be classified as

impaired. This latter group included 4 patients who had never experienced auditory

hallucinations in the past. Amongst those patients, only one showed such a deficit, a result

that is not much different from chance. These results strongly support the proposal that

auditory hallucinations are associated with a deficit in intentional inhibition.

General comments regarding the role of intentional inhibition processes in auditory

hallucinations

A number of studies have suggested that factors such as depression, poor processing

speed and low verbal intelligence (e.g. Brebion, Smith, Amador, Malaspina & Gorman,

1997; Brebion, Gorman, Malaspina, Sharif & Amador, 2001; Seal, Crowe & Cheung,

1997) may account for some cognitive deficits associated with auditory hallucinations.

Chapters 3, 4 and 8 investigated whether poor performance on tasks of inhibition may

actually reflect other types of deficits. It was found that auditory hallucinations were not

associated with widespread impairment in current intelligence quotient, speed of

responding, memory span or general discrimination ability. In addition, group comparisons

for a range of demographic factors such as age and years of education, and clinical

indicators including duration of illness, depression, anxiety and number of hospital

admissions, also suggested that patients with hallucinations were not generally more unwell

compared to patients without current hallucinations. Patients with hallucinations had more

positive symptoms than patients without, but there were no significant differences in

negative and general (somatic) symptoms. Patients with hallucinations also tended to have

higher chlorpromazine equivalents, although this variable did not correlate with

performance on the inhibition tasks. These findings argue against a significant role of these

variables in the inhibitory deficits associated with auditory hallucinations.

The issue of the specificity of the intentional inhibition deficit was also investigated.

Performance on the HSCT and ICIM task was not found to be associated with positive

(once hallucinations severity ratings were subtracted from the set of positive symptoms

ratings), general or negative symptoms as measured by the PANSS, confirming the finding

that the failure in intentional inhibition is associated with the presence of auditory

Chapter 11

- 252 -

hallucinations specifically and is not a general feature of patients with schizophrenia (see

Chapter 4).

As reviewed in Chapter 8, the proposal that auditory hallucinations are associated

with a deficit in intentional inhibition is consistent with imaging investigations of the brain

regions thought to be involved in intentional suppression, as measured by the HSCT and

ICIM task. In particular, the prefrontal areas, the anterior cingulate gyrus, the basal ganglia

structures and the thalamus, which have been found to be activated during HSCT and/or

ICIM task performance (Collette et al, 2001, Schnider, Treyer & Buck, 2000), are regions

which have also been found to be associated with the hallucinatory experience (Copolov et

al, 2003; Lennox, Bert, Park, Jones & Morris, 1999; McGuire, Shah & Murray, 1993;

McGuire et al, 1995; Silbersweig et al, 1995; Woodruff & Murray, 1994).

In summary, the current set of studies has identified the presence of an inhibitory

impairment in auditory hallucinations. In particular, the domain of intentional inhibition

was found to be particular affected. The results of our investigations also indicated that

performance on tasks of intentional inhibition may depend on the task requirement of

different paradigms and identified the need for a more systematic manipulation of task

difficulties in studies using tasks of inhibition.

Context memory and auditory hallucinations Another defining characteristic of auditory hallucinations is that the experience is

attributed to an external agent. In order to explain this feature of the hallucinatory

experience, Nayani and David (1996a) proposed that schizophrenia patients with auditory

hallucinations have a deficit in context memory. They suggested that the contextual

features of mental events are missing or incomplete, resulting in confusion about the origins

of these events. The aim of Chapters 6 and 7 was to investigate the proposal that a context

memory deficit is present in patients with schizophrenia, and those with auditory

hallucinations more specifically.

Summary of results of Chapter 6

Chapter 6 examined whether patients with schizophrenia, as a group, showed a

context memory deficit. The performance of a group of patients with schizophrenia (N =

43) was contrasted with the performance of a group of healthy controls (N = 24) on a

Memory for Context task, in which memory for events and memory for the source and

temporal information about those events was assessed. The results showed that patients

Chapter 11

- 253 -

with schizophrenia have a deficit in context memory, as shown by difficulties recalling both

the source and the temporal context of events in memory. Furthermore, while controls

tended to retrieve all the different contextual features of events (source and temporal

characteristics), patients tended to have a more fractionated recollection of the events,

retrieving only individual features in isolation or none at all, pointing to an inability to bind

together all the original components of an experience. The findings were strengthened by

the comparison of the patients' performance with that of a subgroup of controls who also

performed poorly on content memory. Although this group of controls had low recognition

accuracy for intact object pairs, source and temporal context judgments and binding

abilities were still intact, suggesting that the deficit in binding was specific to patients with

schizophrenia and did not extend to all participants with poor content memory.

Summary of results of Chapter 7

Chapter 7 investigated the specificity of context memory and binding deficits to

auditory hallucinations. The study involved a reanalysis of the results presented in Chapter

6. Patients were divided into those who reported auditory hallucinations on at least half of

the days during the preceding four weeks (N = 19) and those who did not (N = 23). The

aims of this study were to examine whether patients with hallucinations would show a

deficit in remembering individual contextual cues, and particularly the source of events in

memory and the temporal context of those events, and examine whether context binding

generally, as defined by a deficit in source and/or temporal context, is particularly impaired

in patients with current auditory hallucinations compared to patients without.

Firstly, patients with current hallucinations were found to be particularly impaired in

recalling the source of memories, compared to patients without hallucinations. However,

patients with auditory hallucinations were not found to be disproportionally impaired in the

recall of the temporal context of memories, suggesting that the deficit is present in

schizophrenia patients, irrespective of their hallucinating status. Secondly, the results

showed that nearly all patients with auditory hallucinations (89.5%) showed a deficit in

identifying the origins of memories, as shown by deficits in either source and/or temporal

memory relative to healthy controls, and that significantly more patients with hallucinations

showed this deficit compared to patients without. These results provide strong support for

Nayani and David’s (1996a) proposal that contextual memory is impaired in patients with

auditory hallucinations.

Chapter 11

- 254 -

The current findings also suggested that a deficit in both source and temporal context

is not necessary for hallucinations to occur. Rather, it appears that missing contextual cues

in source or/and temporal memory are associated with the hallucinatory experience; in

other words, sometimes the temporal context but not the source might be lost and other

times the reverse might happen, or both forms of context might be lost. Johnson,

Hashtroudi and Linsay (1993) have proposed that a loss of qualitative information in

memory would make it difficult to correctly identify mental events and may result in

confusion regarding the origins of these events. It is possible, therefore, that, in patients

with auditory hallucinations, this deficit accessing correctly any number of contextual cues

results in an incomplete representation of events in memories, leading to a failure to

recognize the hallucinated material.

The finding that auditory hallucinations are associated with correct context judgment

at least some of the time is consistent with Nayani and David’s (1996b) survey that showed

that a significant proportion of patients with auditory hallucinations are very clear about the

identity of some of their voices. In Chapter 7, we speculated about the processes that

contribute towards making source judgments in patients with auditory hallucinations.

Recent findings suggest that episodic memory retains traces of both voice characteristics

and words (Goldinger, 1996), and that the human voice carries important information such

as the affect, gender and other physical characteristics of a talker (e.g. Belin, Fecteau &

Bedard, 2004). Consequently, we argued that some of the auditory sensory features of the

remembered events may be retained, which are then used by the patients to make

attributions regarding the source of this remembered information, although recognition

depends on the amount and type of information available. The proposal of preserved

auditory sensory features in auditory hallucinations is consistent with the observation that

the acoustic qualities of an original event are retained in functional auditory hallucinations

(e.g. Hunter & Woodruff, 2004). In sum, our results indicate that context information, as

assessed by the Context Memory task which is largely based on visuo/motor context cues,

may be impaired in patients with auditory hallucinations, while other evidence suggests that

auditory sensory features in memory may be retained. An explanation for the dissociation

between impaired visuo/motor information and intact auditory sensory cues was provided

by the proposal of a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic context information, which

has recently been found to be dissociable (Troyer & Craik, 2000). Accordingly, as

Chapter 11

- 255 -

suggested in Chapter 7, patients with auditory hallucinations may have a deficit in extrinsic

context, but intact intrinsic context information. This proposal requires further

investigation but the current suggestion proposes that variation in the details of events from

memory contributes to variability of the hallucinatory experience.

Overall, the results showed that significantly more patients with auditory

hallucinations have a deficit in some form of memory for context compared to patients

without hallucinations. However, it was also found that nearly two-thirds of patients

without current auditory hallucinations had context binding difficulties, suggesting that the

context memory impairment is not specific to patients with auditory hallucinations. Some

may argue that if a context memory deficit is not specific to patients with auditory

hallucinations, why are nonhallucinating patients not reporting auditory hallucinations? As

argued in Chapter 7, our proposal is that a deficit in context memory, singly, is essential,

but not sufficient, for auditory hallucinations to occur. Only when combined with (at least

one) other deficits would the symptom of auditory hallucinations become manifest. In sum,

it is our proposal that the finding of nonspecificity of the context memory impairment to

auditory hallucinations is not a setback in the search for cognitive deficits associated with

auditory hallucinations. There is a growing awareness that a single deficit is unlikely to

result in such a complex event and that a combination of deficits might be needed to

explain auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia (Nayani & David, 1996a). In a

forthcoming section, we explore the proposal that a combination of deficits in context

memory and intentional inhibition is critical for hallucinations to occur.

General comments regarding context memory processes in auditory hallucinations

The proposal that auditory hallucinations are associated with a deficit in context

memory is consistent with imaging investigations of the brain regions thought to be

involved in context memory. Retrieval of context memory and binding has been associated

with activation of the frontal lobes, medial temporal lobes and the amygdala (e.g. Davachi,

Mitchell & Wagner, 2003; Mayes et al, 2001), and neural imaging of auditory

hallucinations also points to the activation of the frontal cortex, temporal cortex and

hippocampal/parahippocampal cortex (e.g. McGuire et al, 1995; Woodruff et al, 1997).

The results from Chapter 7 revealed that patients with current auditory hallucinations

were particularly impaired in recalling the source of events in memory, compared to

patients without. This replicates and extends a commonly reported finding that patients

Chapter 11

- 256 -

with hallucinations have difficulties identifying the source of an action or a thought

compared to patients without hallucinations (e.g. Blackmore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone &

Frith, 2000). Such a deficit actually forms the basis of reality- and self-monitoring theories

of auditory hallucinations (e.g. Bentall & Slade, 1985b; Frith, 1996). However, our

proposal differs from these theories in three important ways. Firstly, they propose that this

impairment is also associated with poor decision-making in identifying the origins of

memories (e.g. Rankin & O’Carroll, 1995), or with a bias towards misattributing self-

produced material to another source (e.g. Johns & McGuire, 1999). The results from our

investigations are not compatible with this proposal, as patients with hallucinations did not

show an unusual decision criterion in event or source recognition. Secondly, our proposal

suggests that the extent of the deficit is more wide-ranging than simply a deficit in

identifying the source of mental events. Instead, we suggest that patients with auditory

hallucinations have a general deficit in identifying the context of mental events, involving

at least source memory, as well as other contextual cues such as temporal memory.

Finally, instead of suggesting a single-deficit account of auditory hallucinations, our model

proposes that context memory is only one of many (at least two) cognitive processes that

must be impaired in patients with auditory hallucinations, and therefore a context memory

deficit may not be necessarily specific to patients with auditory hallucinations. This

proposal allows for the finding that some nonhallucinating patients have been shown to

have this deficit without experiencing hallucinations.

The results from Chapter 7 also indicated that, although significantly more patients

with auditory hallucinations showed a deficit in some form of memory for context

compared to patients without, a context memory deficit was not specific to patients with

auditory hallucinations. This suggests that some of the current findings and analyses may

also be relevant to other (particularly positive) symptoms of schizophrenia. Context

binding difficulties, for instance, could provide a complimentary explanation of some

aspects of delusion formation. A failure to identify the origins of mental events may

contribute to some of the characteristic features of delusions, such as an inability to

generate and evaluate alternative explanations of a false conviction (Blackwood, Howard,

Bentall & Murray, 2001; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon & Breen, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart,

2000). In addition, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic cues in context memory

may be relevant to contemporary research on the sense of agency in symptoms such as

Chapter 11

- 257 -

delusions of control and thought insertion (i.e. Frith, 2004; Gallagher, 2004). In sum, the

role of context memory deficits in other positive symptoms deserves investigating.

Issues of affect

Summary of results of Chapter 5

Auditory hallucinations have often been found to co-occur with negative affect such

as depression. One of the aims of Chapter 5 was to examine further the role of affect in

auditory hallucinations. Forty-three patients with schizophrenia took part in this study, 19

of whom reported auditory hallucinations on at least half of the days during the preceding

four weeks and 23 who did not.

Firstly, the results revealed that approximately one third of patients with auditory

hallucinations had elevated depression and anxiety scores and that these were not

specifically related to the presence, or severity, of auditory hallucinations. This indicates

that negative affect is associated with auditory hallucinations, but not specifically so.

Secondly, the results showed that, consistent with previous findings (e.g. Hustig &

Hafner, 1990), negative voice content was commonly reported by hallucinating patients.

Depression levels (but not anxiety levels) were significantly correlated with the frequency

of negative voice content, although most patients who reported hearing negative voices still

rated themselves as being minimally depressed. These results were interpreted as

suggesting that depression is linked to, but is not a necessary outcome or a precondition of

negative voice content of auditory hallucinations.

Thirdly, exploratory investigations regarding beliefs about voices (i.e. malevolence,

benevolence and omnipotence) and reaction to these beliefs (i.e. resistance or engagement)

were carried out using Chadwick, Lees and Birchwood’s (2000) Belief About Voices

Questionnaire-Revised (BAVQ-R). The results were mostly consistent with Chadwick et

al’s findings. The results showed that (a) beliefs in malevolence and/or omnipotence were

associated with resistance activity and elevated levels of depression, but were not

necessarily linked to depression, and (b) belief in malevolence or omnipotence was not

related to negative voice content, although belief in benevolence was found to decrease

with increasing reports of negative voice content. The results therefore indicated that

beliefs about voices are important components to understanding affect and content of

auditory hallucinations, although they are not always effective predictors of negative

affective states or negative voice content

Chapter 11

- 258 -

Finally, the role of attentional bias for negative material in patients with auditory

hallucinations was investigated with the Affective Shifting Task. In addition to measures

of interference control and task-shifting ability (see Chapter 5), this task provides a

measure of valence-dependent inhibitory control. This allowed the investigation of the

presence of faulty inhibitory mechanisms of selective attention for negative information in

auditory hallucinations. Cognitive models of depression and anxiety have emphasized the

role of biases in attention for negative information in the environment (see MacLeod &

Rutherford, 1998, for a review). Auditory hallucinations have often been found to co-occur

with negative affect (e.g. Close & Garety, 1998) and negative affective voice content is a

prominent feature of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Consequently, this measure

examined whether patients with auditory hallucinations, and those with negative voice

contents especially, showed a particular bias for negative targets. The results revealed that

an attentional bias for negative material was not associated with the presence of auditory

hallucinations, an outcome which is consistent with recent findings by van ‘t Wout,

Aleman, Kessels, Laroi and Kahn (2004) in individuals with a predisposition to

hallucinations. However, higher depression scores in patients with auditory hallucinations

were found to be associated with an increasing number of errors on negative words when

positive words were the targets, suggesting that depression in patients with auditory

hallucinations is associated with a bias towards negative material. Although these results

are preliminary, the results suggest that, when present, depression in patients with

hallucinations is linked to the intrusion of unwanted negative material from memory.

Could depression, therefore, be linked to negative voice contents in hallucinations? A

critical analysis of the data did not support this proposal, as negative voice contents were

still reported in patients who rate themselves as being minimally depressed and negative

voice content was not found to be associated with a bias for negative targets on the

Affective Shifting Task. As a result, we considered that a more psycho-psychological

explanation may be needed to explain negative voice content. For instance, Thomas,

Bracken and Leudar (2004) have proposed that, in order to explain the ephemeral properties

of the hallucinatory experience, the content of voices may only be explained in the context

of the individual’s social, historical and cultural background. These authors suggested that

researchers should attempt to understand the “reflexive” relationship between the person

and the person’s experience of voices, and that only investigations at this level can explain

Chapter 11

- 259 -

the voices’ content. Given the complexity of the multifactorial issues linking affect and

hallucinations, this proposal certain deserves further investigation.

In summary, it was found that a negative mood is commonly found in patients with

auditory hallucinations, although it is not directly related to the presence or severity of

auditory hallucinations. Depression was found to be related to voice content and beliefs in

malevolence and/or omnipotence. However, the results also showed that negative voice

contents and beliefs about voices were not direct determinants of, or did not directly result

from, elevated depression/anxiety reported by hallucinating patients. Finally, an attentional

bias for negative material was found to be associated with depression, although a critical

analysis of the results suggested that this bias for negative material could not fully account

for negative voice content.

General comments regarding issues of affect and auditory hallucinations

The current investigations were not able to fully determine the factors that contribute

significantly to negative affect in patients with auditory hallucinations. Marengo, Harrow,

Herbener and Sands (2000) proposed that patients with schizophrenia have different levels

of vulnerability to depression, explaining why only some patients are depressed. The data

shown in the current investigations could certainly fit a vulnerability view of depression. It

may be speculated that depression in those vulnerable individuals promotes the occurrence

of negative voice contents and beliefs in malevolence or omnipotence. One difficulty with

this proposal is how to explain the presence of positive voice contents in depressed

individuals. It appears more likely that, in the patients with a predisposition to depression,

the presence of negative hallucinatory content and/or beliefs in malevolence or

omnipotence may lead to the depressive symptoms. Further research is needed to

investigate this proposal.

An interesting development in this study was the finding of a strong association

between belief in malevolence and/or omnipotence and resistance activities, such as trying

to stop the voice or prevent it talking. As noted in Chapter 5, attempts at thought control

have been implicated as an etiological and maintaining factor in OCD. In support, BAVQ-

R statements assessing resistance activities (e.g. I try and take my mind off it; I try and stop

it) are activities commonly reported by patients with OCD to try to escape intrusive

thoughts. It is believed that deliberate thought control efforts lead to the contradictory

effect of making those thoughts more accessible and more persistent (e.g. Purdon & Clark,

Chapter 11

- 260 -

2001). We therefore speculated that resistance activities towards unwanted thoughts may

play a key role in the maintenance process of auditory hallucinations. In order to explain

the presence of positive/neutral voice contents, we further speculated that the content of the

hallucinatory material (negative, positive or neutral) is activated initially by random

generation of mental events occurring as a result of the deficit in inhibition described

earlier. Subsequently, negative voice hallucinations re-occur as a result of attempts at

thought control and positive voice contents do not re-occur because they are not actively

suppressed. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the engagement activities associated

with belief in benevolence, at least in some cases, promotes the reoccurrence of future

hallucinatory episodes containing positively valenced material. Clearly, these speculations

require further investigations, although the proposal of the role of resistance activities in the

maintenance process of auditory hallucinations is particularly intriguing.

A combination of deficits in intentional inhibition and context memory

A new cognitive model of auditory hallucinations was outlined in Chapter 8. To

begin with, our model proposes that auditory hallucinations consist of the activation of

auditory mental events that include memories and other currently active mental

associations. In addition, our model proposes that the following two cognitive deficits, at

least, must be present to explain auditory hallucinations: (a) a fundamental deficit in

intentional inhibition, which leads to auditory mental representations intruding into

consciousness in a manner that is beyond the control of the sufferer; and (b) a deficit in

binding contextual cues, resulting in an inability to form a complete representation of the

origins of mental events. As a result of these combined deficits, our model proposes that

mental events are experienced as involuntary and intrusive and are not recognized because

the contextual cues that would allow them to be identified correctly are missing or

incomplete.

In order to test this proposal, the percentage of patients impaired on tasks of both

intentional inhibition (HSCT and/or ICIM task) and context memory (source and/or

temporal memory), as defined by scores one standard deviation away from the means of the

control group, was computed. It was found that nearly 90% of patients currently

experiencing hallucinations (N = 19; auditory hallucinations on at least half of the days

during the preceding four weeks) showed the combination of deficits, compared to only a

Chapter 11

- 261 -

third of patients without hallucinations (N = 23; patients who did not fit the above

criterion). These results were interpreted as supporting our proposition that the two

deficits are significantly associated with the hallucinatory process.

It is our claim that this model is able to explain many of the clinical features of

auditory hallucinations. For instance, as noted by Nayani and David (1996a), the proposal

of auditory hallucinations as consisting of auditory reproductions from memories is able to

explain why patients report hearing speech as well as nonverbal sounds, why voices are

often recognized as belonging to people that the hearer knows and why sufferers report

hearing different types of grammatical speech, such as second or third person

hallucinations. The proposal of auditory hallucinations as memories can also explain why

voices often refer to the patient’s personal details. Auditory hallucinations as consisting of

current mental associations accounts for first person hallucinations and running

commentaries. The suggestion of a disordered context memory system can explain why the

origins of these mental events are often not recognized. It may also be speculated that the

failure to identify the origins of recalled memories may lead to misinterpretations about the

message and the intent of the experience, accounting for variations in beliefs about the

voices, negative affect and delusional personification of the experience. Finally, the

perceived intrusiveness so commonly reported by hallucinating patients can also be

explained by a failure in the control of intentional inhibition. Therefore, a range of

phenomenological features are now explained by our new model.

This model should not be taken as an independent approach to understanding auditory

hallucinations but should be seen as complementary to other explanations of hallucinations.

As discussed above, the current proposal of a context memory deficit in patients with

auditory hallucinations is actually not dissimilar to reality- and self-monitoring theories of

auditory hallucinations (e.g. Frith, 1996). In addition, it is unlikely that cognitive

impairments are the sole factors responsible for auditory hallucinations. Rather, socio-

psychological factors have been shown to have considerable explanatory power (e.g.

Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995; Morrison, 2001; Thomas et al, 2004) and may well

contribute to an explanation of issues of affect and of the material comprising hallucinated

speech, which are not fully explained by our model. We fully believe that insights from a

socio-psychological approach can be integrated with the current level of explanation to

Chapter 11

- 262 -

understand the very personalized experience of sufferers and to provide a more complete

understanding of the maintenance process of auditory hallucinations.

Although it was found that nearly all patients currently experiencing hallucinations

showed the combination of deficits, the results of our investigations also revealed that a

minority of past hallucinators showed the combination of deficits. This suggests that the

two deficits may not be sufficient to explain the presence of auditory hallucinations, and

that additional cognitive process(es) might be important for the expression of this symptom.

We can only speculate, at this stage, what these additional processes are. The role of a third

process, for instance, may be to 'activate' the representations that would lead to auditory

hallucinations.

Finally, it is now increasingly believed that the ability to control distracting memories

is accomplished by inhibitory mechanisms (Anderson & Green, 2001; Conway & Fthenaki,

2003; Levy & Anderson, 2002). According to Conway and Fthenaki (2003), the role of

inhibition is to promote forgetting of redundant information. Whereas a healthy inhibitory

system ‘shapes’ detailed memories by inhibiting redundant details which are not relevant

within the context of the situation, a deficient inhibitory system is not successful at sieving

out irrelevant material and makes too many items equally available for recall, hence

producing a flooding of irrelevant memories. Future studies should investigate the

relationship between inhibition and context memory processes in order to examine whether

the failure in inhibition is partly responsible for the formation of intrusive memories in

patients with auditory hallucinations.

Intentional inhibition and context memory in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD)

According to this new model of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, a

combination of deficits in intentional inhibition and contextual memory is essential to the

experience of auditory hallucinations. Consequently, patients who do not experience

auditory hallucinations may demonstrate a deficit in either process but none should present

with this particular combination of deficits. As a test of this proposal, Chapter 10

examined the intentional inhibition and context memory abilities of patients with OCD.

Both auditory hallucinations and OCD are characterised by recurrent and persistent

thoughts which sufferers are not able to control, although, unlike patients with auditory

hallucinations, OCD patients do not mistake the origins of these thoughts. It was therefore

Chapter 11

- 263 -

hypothesized that patients with OCD would show poor inhibitory functioning on the HSCT

and ICIM task, but intact memory for context on the Context Memory task. In addition, it

was predicted that none of the patients with OCD would show deficits in both cognitive

domains simultaneously. Fourteen participants with OCD took part in this study, and their

performance was compared with that of a group of healthy controls (N = 24).

Summary of results and general comments regarding intentional inhibition processes in

OCD

Firstly, the results showed that OCD was associated with an impairment in intentional

inhibition, as measured by the HSCT and ICIM task. The results, therefore, supported the

proposal that both OCD patients and schizophrenia patients with auditory hallucinations

have a deficit in intentional inhibition. However, the nature of the deficit was slightly

different for the two disorders. On the HSCT, patients with hallucinations showed an

increased number of Type A errors whereas patients with OCD had a greater number of

Type B errors and longer response latencies. On the ICIM task, patients with auditory

hallucinations made significantly more false alarms on runs requiring active suppression

(runs 2-4), and particularly on distracters that had been targets in previous runs, compared

to patients without hallucinations. Patients with OCD also had a significantly greater

number of false alarms on runs 2-4 relative to healthy controls but the groups did not differ

in the number of errors on distracters that were previous targets.

The difference between the performance profiles of each patient group is difficult to

interpret as there is no clear explanation of what the different errors on the HSCT and ICIM

task represent. We can only conclude that it indicates that the mechanisms of intentional

inhibition are somewhat different in both patient groups. Future studies should aim to

explore further the processes underlying the different error types on the HSCT and ICIM

task.

In any case, impaired performance on these tasks indicates that patients with OCD

have a deficit in intentional inhibition processes. We may speculate on the commonalities

in functional anatomy in both disorders which has contributed to impaired performance in

intentional inhibition, as measured by the HSCT and ICIM task. Effective performance on

the HSCT has been linked with the activation of frontal areas and of the anterior cingulate

gyrus (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Collette et al, 2001; Nathaniel-James, Fletcher & Frith,

1997), regions also associated with both OCD and auditory hallucinations (e.g. Breiter &

Chapter 11

- 264 -

Rauch, 1996; Cleghorn et al, 1992; Silbersweig et al, 1995). Performance on runs 2-4 of the

ICIM has been found to activate the posterior orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and left caudate

nucleus, left substantial nigra, ventral tegmental area and right medial thalamus (Schnider,

Treyer & Buck, 2000). OCD and auditory hallucinations have also been linked to deficits

to the OFC, and abnormalities in basal ganglia structures and the thalamus (e.g. Breiter &

Rauch, 1996; Copolov et al, 2003; Silbersweig et al, 1995), supporting the finding that both

disorders show an overlap in intentional inhibition processes.

The study findings may be able to complement our understanding of the role of

intentional inhibitory processes generally. OCD has been associated with deficits in

inhibition across a range of inhibitory domains, although, until now, it has not been clear

which of these domains contribute to the intrusive and repetitive nature of OCD. The

finding of a commonality in intentional inhibition processes in patients with OCD and

auditory hallucinations, who both report intrusive and unwanted thoughts, suggests that

intentional inhibition may be responsible for the intrusive and persistent thoughts. One

difficulty with this proposal is that only approximately 70% of patients with OCD showed a

deficit on the HSCT and/or ICIM task. This suggests that an intentional inhibition deficit,

as measured by these tasks, is not essential for OCD to occur. However, levels of intrusive

thoughts may vary between patients with OCD and a better experimental design would be

to examine the association between a measure of intrusive thoughts and task performance.

Finally, the finding of impaired intentional inhibition in OCD also has implications

for our understanding of the processes underlying the inhibitory deficit generally. Patients

with OCD had significantly higher premorbid intelligence scores compared to both patients

with hallucinations and healthy controls, yet they still showed a deficit in inhibition. This

suggests that superior intelligence quotient does not necessarily result in better inhibitory

control (Krikorian, Zimmerman & Fleck, 2004) and, therefore, that it is not a protective

factor against an inhibitory impairment.

Summary of results and general comments regarding context memory and OCD

Secondly, the results showed that patients with OCD were not significantly different

from controls on any of the conditions of the Context Memory task, showing intact

recognition accuracy for object pairs, intact source and temporal context judgments and

normal binding abilities. This supports the proposal that contextual memory is not

impaired in patients with OCD.

Chapter 11

- 265 -

The combined results of the investigations of context memory in auditory

hallucinations and OCD confirm our understanding of the role of context memory

processes in everyday cognitive activities. Nayani and David (1996a) proposed that a

deficit in context memory would result in an incomplete representation of mental events

and consequently a failure to identify their origins. In support of this proposal, patients with

auditory hallucinations, who incorrectly attribute self-generated mental events to another

agent, showed a deficit in context memory, whereas OCD patients, who do not confuse the

origins of their intrusive thoughts, showed intact context memory abilities. These findings

are consistent with the proposal that intact qualitative information contributes to an efficient

memory system, allowing the patient to remember the origins of their intrusive thoughts

and to distinguish between different events in episodic memory (Johnson et al, 1993).

Summary of results and general comments regarding combined deficits in intentional

inhibition and context memory and OCD

If a combined impairment in intentional inhibition and context memory is crucial for

auditory hallucinations to occur, then it follows that nonhallucinating individuals should

not present with this particular combination of deficits. In support of this prediction, the

results of the study on OCD showed that only one patient out of 14 was found to have a

combined impairment on tasks of intentional inhibition and context memory, confirming

the proposal that OCD is not associated with a deficit in both cognitive domains.

However, the finding that one OCD patient showed the combination of deficits is

inconsistent with our model of auditory hallucinations which specifies that the combination

of deficits is associated with the experience of auditory hallucinations specifically. A close

investigation of this patient’s details revealed that she was the only OCD patient who

reported frequent hypnopompic hallucinations. This suggests that the processes underlying

hallucinations in the realm of “non-psychotic” experiences might be similar to those

underlying auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia, a proposal which is consistent with

findings by Bentall and Slade (1985b), Morrison et al (2000, in press) and Rankin and

O’Carroll, 1985). Future studies should examine the integrity of intentional inhibition and

context memory processes in individuals vulnerable to hallucinations.

Alternatively, this single OCD case presenting with this specific combination of

deficits may indicate vulnerability to schizophrenia. As noted in Chapter 10, a subtype of

OCD with schizotypal features has recently been identified which shows

Chapter 11

- 266 -

neuropsychological and neural characteristics of both OCD and schizophrenia (Harris &

Dinn, 2003; Hwang, Morgan & Losconzcy, 2000). We hypothesised that, since a context

memory deficit has been found to be common to patients with schizophrenia (Chapters 6 &

7), the added inhibitory deficit presented by OCD may create the precise dual deficit

combination necessary to promote the emergence of hallucinations. In support, we

reviewed that Hermesh et al (2004) recently identified that musical hallucinations are

particularly common in OCD. However, these authors also identified that an additional

comorbid mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, is necessary to increase the likelihood of

the occurrence of these hallucinations. The implication of this finding is that any individual

who presents with (a) a deficit in intentional inhibition similar to the one experienced in

hallucinations and (b) schizotypal features may be at risk of developing hallucinations,

since the combination of deficits in inhibition and context memory should, according to our

model, provide the right mixture of factors conducive to generating hallucinations.

Final comments The aim of this thesis was to contribute towards a better understanding of the

cognitive processes underlying auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia. Instead of the

conventional approach of examining a single deficit, the possibility that a combination of

deficits might be responsible for auditory hallucinations was investigated. The results of

our investigations showed that a combination of deficits in intentional inhibition and

context memory is critical, although perhaps not sufficient, for auditory hallucinations to

occur. The power in our model comes from its ability to explain a broad range of

phenomena that previous models could not account for. Our model accounts for the

perceived intrusiveness and unintendedness of the hallucinatory experience, it explains the

form and content of auditory hallucinations, it clarifies why the origins of the mental

contents are not recognized and it contributes to our understanding about external

attribution. Finally, it describes why voices are familiar with the patients’ intimate details

and it provides an explanation for the patients’ conviction about the veridicality of the

experience. However, a critical analysis of the results suggested that additional processes,

such as “activational” processes, might be necessary to fully account for auditory

hallucinations in schizophrenia. It would be very revealing for future research to

investigate the processes responsible for the selection and activation of the hallucinated

material. An additional strength of the research was the comparison of the pattern of

Chapter 11

- 267 -

performance of patients with auditory hallucinations with that of patients with OCD, who

also experience uncontrollable and intrusive thoughts. The results suggested that

impairments in both intentional inhibition and context memory are not found in any clinical

group who also experiences unwanted and intrusive thoughts.

In general, future studies should focus on extending the knowledge developed in this

thesis about the role of intentional inhibition and context memory processes in auditory

hallucinations. Currently, there is a paucity of studies that have examined the presence of

an inhibitory deficit in auditory hallucinations and the exact nature of the context memory

deficit is still unclear. Future studies should strive to test our proposal that only intentional

inhibitory processes are impaired in auditory hallucinations, and to examine whether the

context memory deficits extend to, for instance, binding in working memory.

The results of this thesis have practical implications beyond the immediate impact of

a theoretical account. Similarities in clinical features between auditory hallucinations and

OCD suggest that research into the treatment of OCD might become useful for

understanding the best approach to treating auditory hallucinations. For example, research

into OCD treatment has shown that strategies employing distraction techniques are often

the most effective way to reduce the frequency of unwanted thought activities.

Psychological therapy for hallucinating patients may therefore be most effective if it were

to employ techniques designed to encourage patients to participate in distracting activities,

rather than encourage attempts to exert some control over the experience, which may, in

fact, lead to an increase in the salience of the intrusion (Gibbs, 1996). It may be useful for

clinicians to provide specific distraction tasks for patients to implement when they find

themselves engaging in active thought suppression of hallucinations.

However, research into OCD has also informed us that distracting activities and other

coping strategies in general are much less effective in the presence of depressed mood

(Gibbs, 1996). We may, therefore, speculate that differences in levels of depressed mood

may be responsible for variations in the effectiveness of hallucinating patient’s coping

strategies and treatments (Shergill et al, 1998). Consequently, before recommending or

assigning distracting tasks to hallucinating patients, clinicians should assess for, and treat

first, the presence of a depressed mood. In addition, psychological theories of OCD (e.g.

Salkovskis, 1989) have informed us that a change in the meaning assigned to the intrusive

thought is required for a reduction in symptoms. When the thought no longer bears a

Chapter 11

- 268 -

special meaning, the individual does not feel compelled to engage in thought control

strategies. One specific application to hallucinations is that if resistance activity is the

product of belief about malevolence and omnipotence (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995,

2000a) a useful strategy may consist in changing the idiosyncratic beliefs that the patient

has about their voices. This approach has been instigated with some success in patients

with auditory hallucinations (e.g. Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997; Chadwick & Birchwood,

1994, 2000b). There is also evidence that cognitive behavioural therapies targeting the

interpretations of hallucinations have become a useful treatment strategy (Dickerson, 2000;

Shergill et al, 1998; Rector & Beck, 2001).

Finally, theories of OCD have highlighted the role of factors that make it more likely

for individuals to develop OCD, such as misinterpretation of the intrusive thoughts,

dysfunctional beliefs and negative affect. There is an increasing interest in the role of such

factors in auditory hallucinations (i.e. Morrison, 2001; Morrison, Haddock & Tarrier,

1995). Cognitive and neuropathological similarities between OCD and auditory

hallucinations certainly suggest that such investigations should be actively pursued. Other

advances in theoretical understanding of OC symptomatology should also contribute to our

understanding of auditory hallucinations.

It was made explicit early in the thesis that the investigations would concentrate on

elucidating the processes responsible for auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. To

determine the specificity of the findings to this group, future studies should explore the

integrity of inhibition and context memory mechanisms underlying visual, olfactory and

gustatory hallucinations, in patients with schizophrenia and in individuals in other clinical

groups.

Finally, there is an urgent need for prospective, longitudinal research into the

developmental process of auditory hallucinations. In addition to furthering our

understanding of the fluctuating processes responsible for auditory hallucinations, such

investigations may also provide information about protective factors which prevent

individuals from relapsing and promote well being.

In conclusion, auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia are one of the most difficult

symptoms to study in a manner acceptable to clinicians and researchers alike. However,

research into the causes and nature of hallucinations remain an exciting area of scientific

inquiry. Understanding the processes underlying auditory hallucinations remain an

Chapter 11

- 269 -

important priority, not only because of the health care and other economic costs attributable

to schizophrenia, but also because of the suffering of those affected with the illness and

their families.

Chapter 11

- 270 -

References Aleman, A., Bocker, K. B. E., Hijman, R., de Haan, E. H. F., & Kahn, R. S. (2003).

Cognitive basis of hallucinations in schizophrenia: role of top-down information

processing. Schizophrenia Research, 1926, 1-11.

Amieva, H., Phillips, L. H., Della Sala, S., & Henry, J. D. (2004). Inhibitory functioning in

Alzheimer's disease. Brain, 127, 949-964.

Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive

control. Nature, 410(6826), 366-369.

Birchwood, M., & Chadwick, P. (1997). The omnipotence of voices: testing the validity of

a cognitive model. Psychological Medicine, 27, 1345-1353.

Beck, A. T., & Rector, N. A. (2003). A cognitive model of hallucinations. Cognitive

Therapy and Research, 27(1), 19-52.

Belin, P., Fecteau, S., & Bedard, C. (2004). Thinking the voice: neural correlates of voice

perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(3), 129-1355.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985a). Reliability of a scale measuring disposition towards

hallucination: a brief report. Personality and Individual Differences, 6(4), 527-529.

Bentall, R. P., & Slade, P. D. (1985b). Reality testing and auditory hallucinations: A signal

detection analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 24, 159-169.

Blakemore, S., Smith, J., Steel, R., Johnstone, E., & Frith, C. (2000). The perception of

self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity

experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoring. Psychological Medicine,

30, 1131-1139.

Blackwood, N. J., Howard, R. J., Bentall, R. P., & Murray, R. M. (2001). Cognitive

neuropsychiatric models of persecutory delusions. American Journal of Psychiatry,

158(4), 527-539.

Brebion, G., Gorman, J. M., Malaspina, D., Sharif, Z., & Amador, X. (2001). Clinical and

cognitive factors associated with verbal memory task performance in patients with

schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 758-764.

Brebion, G., Smith, M. J., Amador, X., Malaspina, D., & Gorman, J. M. (1997). Clinical

correlates of memory in schizophrenia: differential links between depression, positive

and negative symptoms and two types of memory impairment. American Journal of

Psychiatry, 154(11).

Chapter 11

- 271 -

Brebion, G., Smith, M., Gorman, J., Malaspina, D., & Amador, X. (1998). Resistance to

interference and positive symptomatology in schizophrenia. Cognitive

Neuropsychiatry, 3, 179-190.

Breiter, H. C., & Rauch, S. L. (1996). Functional MRI and the study of OCD: from

symptom provocation to cognitive-behavioural probes of cortico-striatal systems and

the amygdala. Neuroimage, 4, S127-S138.

Burgess, P., & Shallice, T. (1996). Response suppression, initiation and strategy use

following frontal lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 34(4), 263-273.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1994). The omnipotence of voices - the cognitive

approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, 190-201.

Chadwick, P., & Birchwood, M. (1995). The Omnipotence of Voices II: The Beliefs About

Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ). British Journal of Psychiatry, 166, 773-776.

Chadwick, P., Lees, S., & Birchwood, M. (2000a). The revised Beliefs About Voices

Questionnaire. British Journal of Psychiatry, Sept, 229-232.

Chadwick, P., Sambrooke, S., Rasch, S., & Davies, E. (2000b). Challenging the

omnipotence of voices: group cognitive behaviour therapy for voices. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 38, 993-1003.

Cleghorn, J. M., Franco, S., Szechtman, B., Kaplan, R., Szechtman, H., Brown, G. M.,

Nahmias, C., & Garnett, E. S. (1992). Toward a brain map of auditory hallucinations.

American Journal of Psychiatry, 149(8), 1062-1069.

Close, H., & Garety, P. (1998). Cognitive assessment of voices: further develoments in

understanding the emotional impact of voices. British Journal of Clinical Psychology,

37, 173-188.

Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Delfiore, G., Degueldre, C., Luxen, A., & Salmon, E.

(2001). The functional anatomy of inhibition processes investigated with the Hayling

Task. NeuroImage, 14, 258-267.

Conway, M. A., & Fthenaki, A. (2003). Disruption of inhibitory control of memory

following lesions to the frontal and temporal lobes. Cortex, 39(4-5), 667-686.

Copolov, D. L., Seal, M. L., Maruff, P., Ulusoy, R., Wong, M. T. H., Tochon-Danguy, H.

J., & Egan, G. F. (2003). Cortical activation associated with the experience of

auditory hallucinations and perception of human speech in schizophrenia: a PET

correlation study. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 122, 139-152.

Chapter 11

- 272 -

Davachi, L., Mitchell, J. P., & Wagner, A. D. (2003). Multiple routes to memory: distinct

medial temporal lobe processes build item and source memories. Proceedings of the

National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 100(4), 2157-2162.

Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & Breen, N. (2001). Monothematic delusions:

Towards a two-factor account. In C. Hoerl (Ed.), On understanding and explaining

schizophrenia: Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology .

Dickerson, F. B. (2000). Cognitive behavioural psychotherapy for schizophrenia: a review

of recent empirical studies. Schizophrenia Research, 43, 71-90.

Frith, C. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: the case of auditory

hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London: B, 351,

1505-1512.

Frith, C. (2004). Comments on Shaun Gallagher: "Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia:

a neurophenomenological critique". Psychopathology, 37, 20-22.

Gallagher, S. (2004). Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological

critique. Psychopathology, 37, 8-19.

Gibbs, N. A. (1996). Non-clinical populations in research on obsessive-compulsive

disorders: a critical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 16, 729-773.

Goldinger, S.D., 1996. Words and voices: episodic traces in spoken word identification and

recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and

Cognition. 22(5):1166-83.

Harnishfeger, K. K. (1995). The development of cognitive inhibition: theories, definitions

and research evidence. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference and

inhibition in cognition. Chap 6 (pp. 175-205). San Diego: Academic Press.

Harris, C. L., & Dinn, W. M. (2003). Subtyping Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder:

Neuropsychological correlates. Behavioural Neurology, 14, 75-87.

Hermesh, H., Konas, S., Shiloh, R., Dar, R., Marom, S., Weizman, A., & Gross-Isseroff, R.

(2004). Musical hallucinations: prevalence in psychotic and nonpsychotic outpatients.

Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 65, 191-197.

Hunter, M. D., & Woodruff, W. R. (2004). Characteristics of functional auditory

hallucinations. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(5), 923.

Chapter 11

- 273 -

Hustig, H. H., & Hafner, R. J. (1990). Persistent auditory hallucinations and their

relationship to delusions and mood. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,

178(4), 264-267.

Hwang, M., Morgan, J., & Losconzcy, M. (2000). Clinical and neuropsychological profiles

of obsessive-compulsive schizophrenia; A pilot study. The Journal of

Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 12, 91-94.

Johns, L. C., & McGuire, P. K. (1999). Verbal self-monitoring and auditory hallucinations

in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 353(9151), 469-470.

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source Monitoring. Psychological

Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.

Krikorian, R., Zimmerman, M. E., & Fleck, D. E. (2004). Inhibitory control in Obsessive-

Compulsive Disorder. Brain and Cognition, 54, 257-259.

Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2000). The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind &

Language, 15(1), 184-218.

Lennox, B. R., Bert, S., Park, G., Jones, P. B., & Morris, P. G. (1999). Spatial and

Temporal mapping of neural activity associated with auditory hallucinations. The

Lancet, 353(9153), 644.

Levy, B. J., & Anderson, M. C. (2002). Inhibitory processes and the control of memory

retrieval. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(7), 299-305.

MacLeod, C., & Rutherford, E. (1998). Automatic and strategic cognitive biases in anxiety

and depression. In K. Kirsner & C. Speelman (Eds.), Implicit and explicit mental

processes (pp. 468pp). Mahwah, NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Marengo, J., Harrow, M., Herbener, E. S., & Sands, J. (2000). A prospective longitudinal

10-year study of schizophrenia's three major factors and depression. Psychiatry

Research, 97(1).

Mayes, A., Isaac, C., Holdstock, J., Hunkin, N., Montaldi, D., Downes, J., MacDonald, C.,

Cezayirli, E., & Roberts, J. (2001). Memory for single items, word pairs and temporal

order of different kinds in a patient with selective hippocampal lesion. Cognitive

Neuropsychology, 18(2), 97-123.

McGuire, P. K., Silbersweig, D. A., Wright, I., Murray, R. M., David, A. S., Frackowiak,

R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. (1995). Abnormal monitoring of inner speech: a physiological

basis for auditory hallucinations. The Lancet, 346(8975), 596-600.

Chapter 11

- 274 -

McGuire, P., Shah, G., & Murray, R. M. (1993). Increased blood flow in Broca's area

during auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. The Lancet, 342, 703-706.

Morrison, A. P., Haddock, G., & Tarrier, N. (1995). Intrusive thoughts and auditory

hallucinations: a cognitive approach. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23,

265-280.

Morrison, A. P. (2001). The interpretation of intrusions in psychosis: an integrative

cognitive approach to hallucinations and delusions. Behavioural and Cognitive

Psychotherapy, 29, 257-276.

Morrison, A., Wells, A., & Nothard, S. (2000). Cognitive factors in predisposition to

auditory and visual hallucinations. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 39, 67-78.

Morrison, A., Wells, A., & Nothard, S. (in press). Cognitive and emotional predictors of

predisposition to hallucinations in non-patients. British Journal of Clinical

Psychology.

Murphy, F. C., Sahakian, B. J., Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Rogers, R. D., Robins, T.

W., & Paykel, E. S. (1999). Emotional bias and inhibitory control processes in mania

and depression. Psychological Medicine, 29, 1307-1321.

Nathaniel-James, D. A., Fletcher, P., & Frith, C. (1997). The functional anatomy of verbal

initation and suppression using the Hayling Test. Neuropsychologia, 35(4), 559-566.

Nayani, T., & David, A. (1996a). The neuropsychology and neurophenomenology of

auditory hallucinations. In C. Pantelis, H. E. Nelson, & T. R. E. Barnes (Eds.),

Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Chap. 17 . New York: John Wiley

& Sons Ltd.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996b). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Purdon, C., & Clark, D. (2001). Suppression of obsession-like thoughts in nonclinical

individuals: impact on thought frequency, appraisal and mood state. Behaviour

Research and Therapy, 39, 1163-1181.

Rankin, P. M., & O'Carroll, P. J. (1995). Reality discrimination, reality monitoring and

disposition towards hallucination. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 517-

528.

Rector, N. A., & Beck, A. T. (2001). Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for schizophrenia: An

empirical review. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 189(5), 278-287.

Chapter 11

- 275 -

Salkovskis, P. M. (1989). Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive

thoughts in obsessional problems. Behavioural Research and Therapy, 27(6), 677-

682.

Schnider, A., & Ptak, R. (1999). Spontaneous confabulators fail to suppress currently

irrelevant memory traces. Nature Neuroscience, 2(7), 677-681.

Schnider, A., Treyer, V., & Buck, A. (2000). Selection of currently relevant memories by

the human posterior medial orbital cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 20(15),

5880-5884.

Seal, M. L., Crowe, S. F., & Cheung, P. (1997). Deficits in source monitoring in subjects

with auditory hallucinations may be due to differences in verbal intelligence and

verbal memory. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 2(4), 273-290.

Shergill, S. S., Murray, R. M., & McGuire, P. K. (1998). Auditory hallucinations: a review

of psychological treatments. Schizophrenia Research, 32, 137-150.

Silbersweig, D. A., Stern, E., C, F., & al, e. (1995). A functional neuroanatomy of

hallucinations in schizophrenia. Nature, 378, 176-179.

Stevens, A. A. (2004). Dissociating the cortical basis of memory for voices, words and

tones. Cognitive Brain Research, 18, 162-171.

Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Leudar, I. (2004). Hearing voices: a phenomenological-

hermeneutic approach. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 9(1/2), 13-23.

Troyer, A., & Craik, F. (2000). The effect of divided attention on memory for items and

their context. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54(3), 161-170.

van 't Woot, M., Aleman, A., Kessels, R., Laroi, F., & Kahn, R. S. (2004). Emotional

processing in a non-clinical psychosis-prone sample. Schizophrenia Research, 68,

271-281.

Woodruff, P. W. R., & Murray, R. M. (1994). The aetiology of brain abnormalities in

schizophrenia. In R. Ancill (Ed.), Schizophrenia: Exploring the Spectrum of

Psychosis . New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Woodruff, P., Wright, I., Bullmore, E., Brammer, M., Howard, R. J., Williams, S.,

Shapleske, J., Rossell, S., David, A. S., McGuire, P. K., & Murray, R. (1997).

Auditory hallucinations and t he temporal cortical response to speech in

schizophrenia: A functional magnetic resonance imaging study. American Journal of

Psychiatry.

Appendix A

- 277 -

Appendix A

An analysis of the main clinical features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia

Introduction It has been estimated that approximately 74% of those with a diagnosis of

schizophrenia will experience auditory hallucinations during the course of their illness

(Sartorius, Shapiro & Jablensky, 1974). Auditory hallucinations are complex mental

events often described as comprising a mixture of different phenomenological features,

which combine to produce a highly individualized experience. The phenomenological

features of auditory hallucinations have been comprehensively investigated by a number of

authors (e.g. Nayani & David, 1996; Oulis, Mavreas, Mamounas & Stephanis, 1995),

although these studies surveyed a range of psychotic patients, some of which did not have a

diagnosis of schizophrenia. Given the singular importance of auditory hallucinations in the

diagnosis of schizophrenia, there are surprisingly few detailed surveys of the main

phenomenological features of auditory hallucinations in this patient group alone. We

conducted a phenomenological investigation of auditory hallucinations selecting only

individuals with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia.

Method Forty-three patients with a DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia were recruited from a

psychiatric hospital. Four patients, on the basis of clinical interviews, questionnaire

responses and case histories, indicated that they had never experienced auditory

hallucinations and another four refused to fill in the questionnaire. Information concerning

the 35 remaining patients’ demographic and clinical data is presented in Table 1. All

patients were receiving typical, atypical or a combination of neuroleptics. Exclusionary

criteria included a history of head injury and neurological illness. Participants were asked

to complete a questionnaire comprising selected items from the Psychotic Symptom Rating

Scales (PSYRAT; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher, 1999) and the Mental Health

Appendix A

- 278 -

Research Institute Unusual Perceptions Schedule (MUPS; Carter, Mackinnon, Howard,

Zeegers & Copolov, 1995) addressing issues of interest.

Approval for this study was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committees of

the University of Western Australia and of Graylands Hospital, Perth, Australia, and signed

informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Table 1

Demographic and clinical characteristics (mean, SD) of patients with Schizophrenia

Questionnaire patients

(n = 35)

Age (years) 35.80 (8.28)

Education (years) 11.05 (1.89)

Sex (M/F) 29 / 6

Quick Test 94.60 (5.41)

Digit Span forward 7.00 (1.69)

Length of illness* (yrs) 13.14 (8.39)

Number of admissions 9.22 (8.29)

Level of positive symptoms (PANSS) 19.80 (5.32)

Level of negative symptoms (PANSS) 12.40 (3.27)

Level of general symptoms (PANSS) 28.82 (5.99)

Chlorpromazine equivalent 970.28 (457.95)

* calculated as time since first admission,

Results

The results of the 35 completed questionnaires on items addressing the characteristics

of auditory hallucinations are presented in Table 2.

Appendix A

- 279 -

Table 2

Frequencies of response on questionnaire items (n = 35)

Frequency %

Do you ever hear sounds other than voices that you suspect others can't hear? (hums, clicks, animal sounds, etc) No 42.9 % Yes 57.1 % In what 'person' does the main voice speak to you? 'I' only 0 % 'you' only 2.9 % 'he/she' only 5.7 % 'your name' only 0 % Other things only 11.4 % Mixture of above 77.1 % Not sure 2.9 % Do the voices say unpleasant things or negative things? Never unpleasant 14.3 % Occasionally unpleasant 37.1 % Minority unpleasant 11.4 % Majority unpleasant 17.1 % Always unpleasant 20.0 % Do you know the identity of the voices? No 37.1 % Yes 37.1 % Sometimes 25.7 % Are the voices similar to voices of people who have spoken to you in the past? No 37.1 % Yes 42.9 % Unsure 20.0 % Do you believe the voices could be replays of memories of previous conversations you have had or heard?

No 37.1 % Yes 45.7 % Unsure 17.1 % Are the memory replays identical or similar to conversations you have had or heard? Identical 5.7 % Similar 37.1 % Unsure 42.9 % Different 14.3 %

Appendix A

- 280 -

When you hear voices, how long do they last?

Few seconds 37.1 % Several minutes 28.6 % At least an hour 8.6 % Hours at a time 22.9 % Other 2.9 % How loud are they? Quieter than own 31.4 % Same as own 62.9 % Louder than own 5.7 % Extremely loud 0 % When you hear voices, where do they sound like they are coming from? Inside head 22.9 % Outside head 28.6 % Inside + outside 48.6 % Are your voices distressing? Not at all 17.1 % Occasionally 37.1 % Minority of voices distressing 11.4 % Majority of voices distressing 8.6 % Voices always distressing 22.9 % Not sure 2.9 % How distressing are the voices?

Not at all 17.1 % Slightly 31.4 % Moderate degree 17.1 % Very, but could be worse 17.1 % Extremely 11.4 % Not sure 5 % How much disruption do the voices cause you? Not at all 17.1 % Minimal 31.4 % Moderate 40.0 % Severe 11.4 % When you hear voices, is the mood of the voice like your mood at the time? No 42.9 % Yes 40.0 % Unsure 17.1 %

Appendix A

- 281 -

Do the voices tell you what to do?

Never 11.4 % Rarely 25.7 % Sometimes 48.6 % Often 14.3 % Are you able to resist doing what they tell you to?

Never 0 % Rarely 8.6 % Sometimes 20.0 % Often 62.9 %

Table 2 shows that nearly 60% of the sample admitted to hearing non-verbal

hallucinations, consistent with the findings from Nayani and David’s (1996) survey.

Verbal hallucinations were found not to be restricted to any one type of grammatical speech

but rather included a mixture of grammatical types. Similar to Linn’s (1977) finding that

voices are rarely expressed in the first person, none of the patients in the current sample

reported first person hallucinations. Most patients reported that their voices said negative

things and only a minority reported that their voices were never unpleasant.

Approximately 60% of patients reported knowing the identity of some of their voices, a

percentage similar to that obtained by Nayani and David. Close to half of all patients

believed that the voices that they experienced were familiar and similar to voices of people

who had spoken to them in the past. Forty-six percent thought it possible that the voices

could be memory reproductions of conversation they have had or heard in the past and, of

those, half felt that these memory reproductions were identical or at least similar to past

conversations.

With respect to the form of auditory hallucinations, the results suggested that the

majority of patients heard voices for up to several minutes at a time, although

approximately a third experienced auditory hallucinations for more than one hour at a time.

The voices were predominantly experienced as being of the same loudness as the patient’s

own voice or quieter, confirming the results obtained by Nayani and David. A quarter of

the sample perceived their voices to be coming from inside the head and another quarter

outside the head, the results being approximately similar to those found by Copolov et al

(in press).

Appendix A

- 282 -

Concerning the intrusive and affective nature of hallucinations, most patients (82.9%)

admitted that at least some of their voices were distressing. When asked to rate how

distressing their voices were, 48.5% stated them to be slightly to moderately distressing and

28.5% reported them to be very to extremely distressing. This percentage of patients

experiencing distress is higher than that reported by Nayani and David but is consistent

with Honig et al’s (1998) findings. Half of the patient sample reported that their

hallucinated voices caused them moderate to severe disruption. Forty percent of patients

explained that the mood of their hallucinated voices was similar to their own mood at the

time they were experiencing the hallucinations. A large majority of patients reported that

their voices had at one point or another told them what to do, although these patients stated

that they were generally able to resist following those commands.

Discussion

Overall, the results of this survey were similar to previous findings (e.g. Nayani &

David, 1996) confirming that the experiences of psychotic patients provides an accurate

indication of the main features of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia specifically. The

results also indicate that our sample of patients is not atypical. This review of the main

phenomenological features of auditory hallucinations reveals the striking complexity of the

hallucinatory experience and indicates the broad range of features that potentially

contribute to a highly individualized experience.

Appendix A

- 283 -

References Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., Howard, S., Zeegers, T., & Copolov, D. L. (1995). The

development and reliability of the Mental Health Research Institute Unusual

Perceptions Schedule (MUPS): an instrument to record auditory hallucinatory

experience. Schizophrenia Research, 16, 157-165.

Copolov, D., Trauer, T., & MacKinnon, A. (in press). On the non-significance of internal

versus external auditory hallucinations. Schizophrenia Research.

Haddock, G., McCarron, J., Tarrier, N., & Faragher, E. B. (1999). Scales to measure

dimensions of hallucinations and delusions: the psychotic symptom rating scales

(PSYRATS). Psychological Medicine, 29, 879-889.

Honig, A., Romme, M. A. J., Ensink, B. J., Escher, S. D., Pennings, M. H. A., & Devries,

M. W. (1998). Auditory Hallucinations: A comparison between patients and

nonpatients. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(10), 646-651.

Nayani, T. H., & David, A. S. (1996). The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological

survey. Psychological Medicine, 26, 177-189.

Linn, E. L. (1977). Verbal auditory hallucinations: mind, self and society. The Journal of

Nervous and Mental Disease, 164(1), 8-17.

Oulis, P. G., Mavreas, V. G., Mamounas, J. M., & Stefanis, C. N. (1995). Clinical

characteristics of auditory hallucinations. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 92, 97-102.

Sartorius, N., Shapiro, R., & Jablensky, A. (1974). The international pilot study of

schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11, 21-34.

Appendix B

- 285 -

Appendix B Words used in the Affective Shifting task

Negative words

Positive words

evil miserable fantastic witty

abusive ugly wonderful pleasant

revolting incapable brilliant handsome

cruel coward genuine confident

worthless inadequate joyful perceptive

deceitful depressed loyal truthful

cheat desperate honest tender

vulgar guilty wise competent

horrible crude generous thoughtful

vicious dull intelligent likable

useless powerless courageous beloved

imbecile weak admirable tolerant

selfish lonely warm respectable

shameful hurt friendly gentle

retard angry talented funny

pathetic unhappy perfect reliable

failure foolish clever humorous

idiot lazy cheerful earnest

greedy helpless charming smart

hopeless fearful blessed efficient

dishonest incompetent sincere considerate

stupid loser creative brave

offensive adorable