coin and afghanistan
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COIN and Afghanistan. Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 6, 2011. JCS options (13-15 Sept). (a) cruise missile attacks; (b) longer bombing campaign; (c) large-scale invasion CIA Plan: money, SOF + airpower. US demands. Hand over leaders of al-Qaeda Close all terrorist camps - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
COIN and Afghanistan
Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 6, 2011
JCS options (13-15 Sept)
(a) cruise missile attacks;
(b) longer bombing campaign;
(c) large-scale invasion
CIA Plan: money, SOF + airpower
US demands
1. Hand over leaders of al-Qaeda
2. Close all terrorist camps
3. Give US full access to verify closure
4. Release all foreign nationals held captive
5. Protect foreigners (including aid workers)
President Bush statement to Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2011
Balance of forces
Coalition Enemy
SOF 300-500 Al Qaeda 2-3,000
Western troops 3-5,000
Taliban 60,000
Northern Alliance 15,000
Operation Enduring Freedom
1.Coalition air offensive (7-19 Oct 2001).
2.US/UK special forces supported Northern Alliance offensive in northern Afghanistan (late Oct – Nov 2001).
3.US/UK-led land offensive in southern Afghanistan (Dec 2001 – July 2002).
Campaign milestones
Mazar-e-Sharif (10 Nov)
Kabul (13 Nov)
Konduz (26 Nov)
Kandahar (6 Dec)
Tora Bora (17 Dec)
Paktia (March, May)
Political development
UN Bonn Conference, Dec 2001
Transitional Authority up to mid 2002
Loya Jirga elects Hamid Karzai as President, June 2002
Presidential elections, 2004 and 2009
Parliamentary elections, 2005 and 2010
Campaign incoherence
Operational Progress
1. Protect the population
2. ANSF development
3. Growth of sub-national governance
4. Military momentum
CIVCAS (2009-Oct 2010)
Total ISAF/ANSF
Non-adjusted Stable Down 20%
Adjusted Reduced Down 50%
ANSF numbers
Target: Oct 2010
Actual: 24 Sept 2010
ANA 134,000 139,000
ANP 109,000 122,000
Not perfect but popular
The best counterinsurgents?
Goverment-in-a-box?
Sub-national governance
80+ KTD
District Delivery Prog: 14 of 80 by Sept 2010
NSP + ASOP producing results
Evidence of progress
Obama’s War
Main effort: the South
March 2009 Feb 2010
RC-N 5,080 7,500
RC-W 2,940 5,500
RC-C 5,740 5,000
RC-E 25,570 26,500
RC-S 22,330 54,500
Op MOSHTARAK
Strategic obstacles
1. Government corruption
2. NATO war-weariness
3. Insurgent safe havens in Pakistan
Fall in public support (%)
Country 2009 2010
United States
55 40
United Kingdom
42 37
Germany 37 30
France 32 30
The Transition Strategy
Most likely scenario
“Continued operational progress is most unlikely to produce desired strategic outcomes.”
Relearning the principles of COIN
1. Political-led campaign
2. Population = COG
3. Isolate the insurgent
4. Operate within the law
5. Minimum use of force