cold war graduate conference best paper prize winner the...

Cold War Graduate Conference BestPaper Prize Winner

The Red Affair: FMLN–Cuban relationsduring the Salvadoran Civil War,

1981–92Andrea Onate

The Editors of the journal Cold War History have the pleasure to present this

paper as the winner of the Best Paper Award at the April 2010 GraduateConference on the Cold War. The Conference is an annual event which is

jointly organised by the University of California, Santa Barbara, the GeorgeWashington University, Washington DC, and the London School of

Economics and Political Science, London. Prominent Cold War scholarsfrom all three institutions gave this paper unanimous endorsement and it is

published here as an exemplar of its kind. Emerging scholars will have theopportunity to compete for this honour at the annual Graduate Conferenceon the Cold War held in April of each year. The Editors of Cold War History

will thereafter publish the best paper to underline their commitment topromote and encourage new and substantive research of the Cold War by

young scholars.

This paper examines the relationship between the leftist Salvadoran revolutionaryorganisation FMLN and the Cuban regime throughout the Salvadoran civil war

in the 1980s. In light of interviews conducted by the author in 2007 and 2008 with

ISSN 1468-2745 print/ISSN 1743-7962 online

q 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2010.545566

http://www.informaworld.com

Andrea Onate was born in 1984 in Mexico City. She has a BA in political science and history from New York

University. She is currently a second-year PhD student in Latin American history at Princeton University. Her

dissertation will explore the transnational ties that Mexico and Cuba maintained with revolutionary movements

in Central America during the 1980s.Correspondence to: Email: [email protected]

Cold War History

Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2011, 133–154

some of the highest-ranking leaders of the FMLN, it re-evaluates existing primaryand secondary sources on the topic. This study demonstrates that despite its

autonomous roots, the FMLN’s development, growth, and achievementsthroughout the Salvadoran civil war were indissolubly linked to its relationship

with Cuba. By placing Cuba as a nodal point in the Salvadoran civil war, the ideaof ‘unilateralist’ US hegemony in the region throughout the Cold War is brought

into question, as is the notion that the Soviet Union fashioned Havana’s foreignpolicy. Furthermore, this analytical paradigm begins to shed light on the

importance of transnational historical analyses.

From January 1981 until January 1992, the smallest of the Central American nations

was engaged in a bloody civil war between the Salvadoran military and the leftist

revolutionary organisation Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). On

16 January 1992, the military and the FMLN put an end to over a decade of armed

conflict with the signing of the Acuerdos de Chapultepec. Thus began the long and

arduous process of reconstruction and reconciliation. The political and military

successes of the Salvadoran insurgents throughout the 12-year civil war ensured the

FMLN’s position at the bargaining table, on an equal footing with the Salvadoran

government, and secured the organisation’s voice in the future of El Salvador as a

legitimate political party of opposition.Cuba’s role in the history of the FMLN is a topic that historians and political scientists

have largely shied away from. The scant existing sources on the topic are overridingly

biased in favour of one of the two warring factions and thus vary greatly in their

evaluation of Cuba’s contribution to the FMLN. Some – the most notable of which

are documents from the US government during the 1980s – look at the FMLN purely

through the geopolitical spectrum of the Cold War and place sole blame for its

emergence and activities on Soviet, Cuban and communist interference. This position,

which was used to justify overt and covert US support for the Salvadoran government

and military, generated a backlash. Many intellectuals, sympathetic to the plight

of the revolutionaries, or simply opposed to US intervention, focused only on the

national causes of war and denied or completely ignored Cuban involvement.

Both interpretations suffer from a politicised bias that obfuscates the genuine liaisons

between these actors.

Havana did not give birth to the Salvadoran guerrillas or push them to opt for an

armed insurgency that they would have otherwise avoided. Notwithstanding, Cuba’s

relationship with the Salvadoran opposition throughout the 1980s was extensive and

consequential. National rationales for insurgency and Cuban assistance to that

insurgency were both decisive in the civil war that unfolded throughout the 1980s: the

absence of either would have severely compromised the existence of the FMLN as an

insurgent opposition force capable of challenging the status quo.

134 A. Onate

The question of Soviet and Cuban support for revolutionary movements in LatinAmerica was central to regional geopolitics during the Cold War. A study on the

relationship between Cuba and the Salvadoran guerrilla movement presents animportant contribution to our understanding of Latin America’s Cold War history, and

it holds current political relevance in light of El Salvador’s last election in March 2009,which brought the FMLN to the presidency for the first time in the country’s history. At

a most basic level, the FMLN and the Salvadoran civil war cannot be fully understood ifCuba is not brought into the equation. Additionally, the relationship between the FMLN

and Havana is illustrative regarding the effects of the Cold War on El Salvador, and itelucidates the impact of the 1959 Cuban revolution and its aftermath on this CentralAmerican nation and on its men and women who came to believe that substantial

political change was possible only through revolution. More broadly, the historicalsignificance of this affair permeates beyond the borders of Cuba and El Salvador and

transcends the historical period in which it took place. Although Cuba’s relationshipwith the FMLN was in many respects unique, it was also reflective of Havana’s foreign

policy in Central America throughout the Cold War. Furthermore, the episode elucidatesties amongst the Latin American left that, while by no means unchanged, are not alien to

contemporary geopolitics in the region.

The power of example

Cuba’s involvement on behalf of the FMLN during the Salvadoran civil war is comparable

only to that of the United States. Evidently, Havana and Washington acted as championsof opposing camps and their involvement was, at times, mutually constitutive. Cuba’sunrivalled impact on the FMLN was twofold. First, it had a profound resonance

throughout the Salvadoran organisation on account of its demonstration effect: thesubjective impact of its revolution on the Latin American left and particularly, for the

purposes of this work, on the FMLN leadership. Second, the Castro administrationprovided direct and extensive support to the Salvadoran revolutionaries throughout the

duration of the civil war.The Cuban revolution of 1959 changed the continental axiom: it was now possible

to alter the political power structures in the area of utmost US influence against theinterests of this hegemonic power. For the first time in many years, social revolutionseemed possible and Fidel Castro’s Cuba became the obvious referent for Latin

Americans aspiring to a radically different society. With the exception of Mexico’srevolution in 1910, the option of revolution was not on the Latin American table

before 1959. Communist parties in the region had adhered to pursuing changethrough elections and refused to adopt the mantle of revolutionary vanguards. In El

Salvador, the Communist Party as such did not endorse revolution until the creationof the FMLN in 1980. In the 1970s the party would in fact split between those who

continued to oppose revolution and those who became disillusioned with the electoralavenue and joined the guerrillas.1 In this context, Cuba came to embody the possibility

of political transformations through revolutionary means.

Cold War History 135

The Cuban revolution also presented individual revolutionaries in the region withsomething tangible. The men and women who overthrew Cuban dictator Fulgencio

Batista appeared to have surged from the ashes. In the initial stages of the Salvadoranwar, when idealism reigned and the human fallibility of individual revolutionaries was

disregarded, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara provided the FMLN leadership with theembodiment of the ideal revolutionary man.2 While Che was immortalised as such,

Fidel Castro was the real-life example. More than any other figures, Fidel Castro andChe Guevara offered the Salvadoran youth of the 1960s and 1970s, who would form

the cadres of the FMLN in the 1980s, human examples of the possibility of demandingthe impossible: the world could in fact be theirs. The world, however, came at a price.The success of the Cuban revolution had taught a consequential lesson: radical

transformations were possible, but only through armed insurgency.Despite the hardships endured in the Sierra Maestra, the speed and relative ease

with which the Cuban revolution succeeded gave many in the region the impressionthat revolution was not only possible but also that it was simple.3 Despite apparent

commonalities across the region, many of the conditions in pre-revolutionary Cubawere an anomaly. Although unequally distributed, the island’s economic prosperity

was unique, as was its predominantly urban character and its geographic isolation.These exceptional qualities, which many would overlook or refuse to acknowledge,were evidently consequential to the success of revolution in Cuba, a success which,

with the transient exception of Nicaragua, was unobtainable anywhere else in theregion.

The ideology, leadership, and concrete accomplishments of the Cuban revolutionresulted in its unprecedented impact upon the Latin American left. According to

former FMLN leader Facundo Guardado, in El Salvador ‘the Cuba factor permeatedthe entire FMLN leadership . . . there was not a single leader that did not find in Cuba

a symbolic referent’.4 Admiration did not result in imitation. The FMLN looked toCuba more for what it destroyed with its revolution than for what it established in

place of the status quo ante. Notwithstanding, Salvadoran insurgents, like many beforethem, found in Cuba not only an inspiration but also a powerful ally. Havana’sinternationalist goals led it to throw its full support behind the FMLN’s efforts. As will

be demonstrated in the following pages, Cuban support for the FMLN was profound,extensive and enormously consequential.

The FMLN is born . . . and the affair begins

Ana Guadalupe Martınez made her way through Managua in an old Nicaraguan taxi.It was 15 October 1979 and the political representative of the Ejercito Revolucionario

del Pueblo (ERP) was headed for the Cuban embassy. She was to speak to Cubanofficials and persuade them to incorporate the ERP into the discussions taking place in

Havana. For months, the Cuban administration had been mediating talks between thegroups that it considered to be the strongest revolutionary forces in El Salvador: the

Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), the National Resistance (RN), and the Popular

136 A. Onate

Liberation Forces (FPL). The ERP accurately concluded that these meetings were

intended to cement Salvadoran revolutionary unity under Cuban auspice. A year

earlier, the Cuban government struck a similar arrangement with Nicaraguan rebel

forces. The subsequent triumph of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation

(FSLN) had a deep impact on the Cuban administration and on the Salvadoran

guerrillas. The ERP leadership knew full well that if its group were excluded from a

unified opposition force backed by Cuba, it would be on the sidelines of the

revolutionary effort. Consequently, Ana Guadalupe found herself knocking on

Havana’s door in Managua.Her task was complicated. With the murder of communist poet Roque Dalton in

1975, the ERP and Cuba had severed ties and entered into a relationship characterised

by hostility and mistrust.5 Ana Guadalupe was not deterred by the Cuban embassy’s

reluctance to see her. Some ERP members had fought with the Sandinistas and

remained in Nicaragua. Through these contacts, Ana Guadalupe secured a meeting

with the Sandinista Army Chief of Staff, Joaquın Cuadra, who persuaded two Cuban

agents in Managua to meet with the ERP representative.6

The Cuban deputies were persuaded by the young guerrillera but, being part of a

regime in which practically all decisions were made directly by Fidel Castro, Ana

Guadalupe was told to speak directly to the Directorate in Cuba. The next day, Ana

Guadalupe flew to the Caribbean bastion of revolution. Her first meeting on the island

was with the head of the America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban

Communist Party (Departamento America) and the Cuban most actively involved in

Havana’s revolutionary efforts elsewhere in the continent: Manuel Pineiro (better

known as Barbaroja – ‘red beard’). Thus began the ERP’s integration into the

organisation that would become the FMLN. This inclusion would indeed prove

decisive due to the ERP’s military strength and the close personal relationship that

developed between its leader Joaquın Villalobos and Fidel Castro.Ana Guadalupe’s crusade to re-establish relations with Havana elucidates the first

decisive chapter of Cuba’s affair with the Salvadoran revolutionary movement: the

Cuban administration’s involvement in the union of the guerrilla factions as a

collective opposition force. The alliance of the four primary guerrilla organisations

and the Communist Party into the FMLN, proclaimed on 10 October 1980, was a

momentous accomplishment. Throughout the 1970s, disagreement over insurgent

strategies, and rivalry to achieve hegemony of the revolution by winning the support of

the workers and peasants, had kept the groups at odds and unwilling to compromise

with each other. While the intellectual basis of most rested predominantly on

liberation theology, orthodox Communist Party members had a deeper Marxist basis.

The very emergence of the guerrilla groups in the early 1970s implied a rejection of the

Communist Party as a viable means for change. The party itself was split between those

in favour of armed insurgency and those still wishing to work through the electoral

avenue. Besides the Salvadoran organisations themselves, no party to the negotiations

for union was as decisive as Cuba.


The alliance of these disparate elements raises three key questions: Why did thesegroups decide to set aside their differences and coordinate their efforts? Why did they

do so in Cuba? And why did their unification occur at this particular point in history?The revolutionary leaders’ agreement to come to terms with each other after years of

enmity was driven by three decisive factors. The first entailed the repression in El

Salvador that followed the triumph of the Sandinistas and the debilitating effect thatthis had on the Salvadoran guerrillas. Fearing that El Salvador would follow in

Nicaragua’s footsteps, the army and security forces intensified their efforts to destroythe insurgency and violence became more indiscriminate. In this climate, unity seemed

to offer the Salvadoran opposition the only means by which to avoid individualannihilation. The second decisive instigator was the exemplary role of the Nicaraguan

revolution. The FSLN’s origins as a group of disparate organisations closely paralleled

the state of the Salvadoran guerrillas before they united. After years of insurgency asindividual factions, the Sandinistas overthrew the Somoza dictatorship only after

coming together in 1978 and staging a coordinated offensive. Thus, recent events inNicaragua favoured Salvadoran revolutionary cohesion.

These two factors do not account for why the ERP sought inclusion into the FMLNthrough Cuba, or explain why the terms of revolutionary unity were predominantly

convened at meetings in Havana, throughout the end of 1979 and 1980.7 These facetsof the FMLN’s creation can only be understood when Cuba’s role as promoter and

enabler of unification is factored into the Salvadoran revolutionary equation.

The fact that the ERP sought inclusion through Cuba reflects that, at this point,relations between the individual Salvadoran organisations were still dominated by

wariness. In this atmosphere, the island provided a safe heaven for the unfolding ofnegotiations and its mediation induced groups to set aside differences that they

otherwise would not have. In effect, the disparate groups envisaged Cuba as aHobbesian Leviathan that they trusted to ensure parity between them in the united

organisation by drawing on the strength of its reputation. Commensurate leadership

was indispensable for the Salvadoran groups to agree to come together and it wasinstitutionalised through the creation of the ‘Comandancia General’ – the FMLN’s

commanding body, where each group was equally represented. Notwithstanding this dejure parity, throughout the duration of the civil war certain FMLN members came to

have privileged relationships with Cuban officials – most notably with Fidel Castro –and this influenced the assistance and attention conferred by Havana.

Beyond its provision of a space for discussion and its role as guarantor that nogroup was marginalised, the Cuban administration provided the most alluring

incentive for unity: extensive Cuban support contingent on this unity. Throughout the

meetings in Havana, the Cuban administration made its position clear: it wouldprovide large-scale aid through armaments, financial backing, and military training

if, and only if, the groups agreed to unite and coordinate their efforts.8 Above allelse, the prospect of receiving weapons – at a time in which their scarcity was proving

detrimental – led the Salvadorans to agree to launch a coordinated offensive.9

Rumour had it that in one of these meeting Manuel Pineiro symbolically placed a

138 A. Onate

machine gun on the table and told the Salvadorans: ‘It’s yours if you are together’.When in early 2007 I asked Joaquın Villalobos about the veracity of this rumour

during an interview in Oxford he replied with a smirk: ‘We weren’t idiots; it was

blatantly clear that Cuba wanted us to unite and that if we did we would count on theisland’s full backing. There was no need for such insinuations; Cuba’s stance was

explicit’.10 In addition to practical considerations, Cuba’s interest in the efforts ofSalvadoran revolutionaries, and Castro’s personal offer to endorse and assist them, had

a subjective allure for the FMLN leadership.The alliance of the Salvadoran left was therefore not the result of a mutually agreed

strategy between the different groups, but rather the product of the convergence of twointerests: to overthrow the oligarchy and to do so with Castro’s support. The ERP’s

initial integration via Cuban officials is revealing. First, it discloses that the Cuban

administration played a role in determining who would form the FMLN. In fact, RNleader Eduardo Sancho recalls that in the initial stages of unification it was the Cubans

that largely pushed for the inclusion of the Communist Party in the revolutionaryalliance.11 More importantly, it elucidates an important facet of the coalition that

formed in these meetings in Havana: Cuban assistance was not independent of Cubaninfluence on the course of the Salvadoran revolutionary movement.

It would be myopic to deny Salvadoran agency in the creation of the FMLN. Theprocess was by no means a Cuban imposition. A better conceptualisation is that by

offering arms and support, Cuba made the guerrillas an offer that they could not, or did

not, refuse. Crucial to this acceptance was that Cuba never sought ideological uniformitybetween the groups. Some of Barbarroja’s first words upon meeting Ana Guadalupe

Martınez were: ‘we are not here to impose relations between the groups, but we candiscuss the importance of your union and collective coordination, independently of your

ideological differences’.12 The Cuban leadership was not dogmatic, but practical. While itsought a strategically united front, it understood that the different ideological positions

of the Salvadoran groups were impossible to reconcile. In turn, the Salvadorans’

willingness to ignore ideological opacity in their revolution can best be attributed to fearof individual annihilation. This concern, coupled with the prospect of victory with the

promised weapons and support, underlined Salvadoran motivation for cohesion.Ideological differences, and for that matter hegemonic control of the revolution, were

meaningless if the movement failed and in 1979 it looked as though it might unlessradical changes were adopted. These factors led to an implicit acceptance by the

Salvadorans that ideology and control would be resolved once victory was secured. In

turn, Cuba perhaps presumed that when the time came to settle these differences,Havana would have the political capital to influence the power struggle.

Throughout the duration of the civil war, Cuba consistently provided a forum forconflict resolution and helped mediate between disagreeing parties and individuals.

Perhaps more importantly, Cuba never wavered from its initial position on theimportance of revolutionary unity. Leaders were often willing to negotiate and

compromise for the sake of the revolution and of continued Cuban aid. At keymoments, Havana’s interventions were vital in settling conflicts and rivalries between


factions or individual leaders. The most evident illustration of this was their mediationbetween factions of the FPL after the mysterious suicide of its leader Cayetano Carpio

‘Marcial’.13 Cuba’s ability to maintain the organisations united throughout the war was

indispensable. The respect that Cuba commanded gave it the leverage to do so.Facundo Guardado retrospectively judges that this was possibly the most important

function that Cuba played in El Salvador’s revolutionary effort.14

Whereas the factors that led the Salvadorans to unite are for the most part lucid,

Cuba’s motives are more obscure on account of the unavailability of Cuban sources tothe general public, or at least to this author. Evidently, Cuba had much to gain from

another victorious revolution in Central America and its own experience, as well assuccessful revolutions elsewhere, had demonstrated that cohesion and broad-based

support were essential. The different organisations that formed the FMLN each had

distinct and powerful support bases, both at home and abroad, and the Cubansunderstood that union would drastically augment their strength. Furthermore, the

success of the Sandinistas after they united under Cuban auspices in late 1978 carriedfavour for reusing such a tactic.15

While Cuba sought other successful revolutions in the region – both for altruisticand practical geopolitical considerations – the specifics of the revolutionary efforts

and, above all, of their relationship to Havana mattered. Cuba wanted oppositionmovements, but opposition movements that were loyal. By offering and providing

decisive support, the Cuban administration bolstered these loyalties and ensured that

they transcended the purely emotive allegiances that permeated the entirety of theLatin American left. Beyond loyalties, Castro wanted to influence these movements.

The close relationship that formed between the Castro administration and FMLNleaders, and Cuba’s widespread involvement in the FMLN’s activities, forged the type

of opposition movement in El Salvador that Cuba considered most valuable.A more polemic Cuban motivation was the political situation in the United States –

unquestionably Cuba’s greatest adversary and a key influence on Havana’s foreign

policy. When the Cuban administration lobbied for Salvadoran revolutionarycohesion, it was increasingly apparent that the Carter administration was on its way

out and his successor was bound to be more prone to intervention in the region.Guided by his exceptional political cunning, Castro felt the need to act while the

situation in the north was still predictable. A strengthened revolutionary effort in ElSalvador could have one of two results. Optimally, the Salvadorans would overthrow

the government and the new US administration would be presented with a faitaccompli that it would have to acknowledge. If the general offensive failed, Carter’s

successor would face a Salvadoran leftist opposition movement that was organised,

funded, trained, and armed. Consequently, the Cubans foresaw that the incoming USadministration would prioritise preventing another revolution in Central America and

that this would give Fidel Castro and Cuba some breathing space.16

With the most important dissident organisations in El Salvador united, and

extensive Cuban assistance secured, the FMLN came into existence as the vanguard ofthe opposition fronts in the country. The FMLN’s creation resulted from a confluence

140 A. Onate

of circumstances and interests. While the revolutionaries’ decision to pursue such aunion was ultimately why it occurred, their willingness to do so, at that point in time,

was indissolubly tied to Cuban incentives. The establishment of the FMLN wassimultaneous and directly related to the inception of an extensive relationship with

Cuba. The two parties immediately began preparations for the general offensive ofJanuary 1981. Until the last day of the war in El Salvador, Castro kept his end of

the bargain, providing the FMLN with extensive assistance in practically all spheres ofits activity.

Forming revolutionaries

Relations between the FMLN and Havana were directed by two Cuban agencies: theDepartamento America and the Departamento de Operaciones Especiales (DOE).The former managed all the key strategic and political decisions of the Cuban–FMLN

alliance, while its leader, Manuel Pineiro, was the Cuban official with whom FMLNleaders had the broadest relations. The first order of business for revolutionary

leaders upon reaching Havana was to meet with Pineiro. RN leader Eduardo Sanchorecalls that these meetings – referred to by the revolutionaries as ‘the bilaterals with

Pineiro’ – were practically obligatory.17 Although the DOE handled military trainingand operational aspects, these undertakings had to be discussed and cleared with

Pineiro beforehand. In effect, the Departamento America was ‘the bridge to the DOE’18

and Pineiro was the conduit between the FMLN and the Cuban government – which

effectively meant Castro.19 Thus, much like a country’s Foreign Ministry serves as thelink between that country’s government and its foreign counterparts, theDepartamento America was the link between the Cuban government and the

revolutionary leaders of El Salvador. The existence of the Departamento America as aparallel organisation to the Foreign Ministry enabled Havana to avoid its explicit

institutional involvement with revolutionary movements in the region. An overtassociation could have jeopardised Cuba’s relations with other Latin American

governments and with the international community – relations that Cuba had workedhard to repair since 1969.20 The Departamento America has been characterised as the

place from which revolution was exported.21 Although this classification downplaysthe indigenous causes of revolutions, and the agency of revolutionaries in shaping theirown movements, it reflects the pivotal role that this department played in Cuba’s

relations with the FMLN. The assessment that the Departamento America’s ‘links withthe Latin American left were extensive, intimate, and decisive’22 holds true in the case

of El Salvador.The scarce analysis of Cuban support for the FMLN has largely had a military focus.

While assistance was not confined to the military sphere, Cuba’s training of Salvadorancombatants and its involvement in military planning was indeed widespread.

Throughout the 1970s, Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas was limited andconsisted mainly of intelligence and counterintelligence strategies as well as urban

conspiracy tactics. After October 1980, however, Cuban military assistance increased


exponentially. Throughout the subsequent decade, Cuba trained Salvadorancombatants on the island, helped them set up a nationwide communications system,

and aided with military planning.23 In the months following the FMLN’s creation,

Cuban military assistance proved decisive. Camps were established on the island whereSalvadoran revolutionaries received training and preparation for special operations.

On the road from Havana to the beach of Varadadero lay what was known as PuntoCero – ‘Point Zero’. This was the training base for Latin American revolutionaries that

Cuban officials conceptualised as their counterweight to the United States’ ‘School ofthe Americas’.24 It must be noted, however, that Cuban training at Punto Cero excluded

the brutal methods of the School of the Americas which earned that institution the

name of ‘School of the Assassins’ amongst Latin Americans. In fact, Cuba played animportant yet scarcely recognised role throughout the conflict, by caring for the

FMLN’s sick and wounded and by promoting humane treatment of prisoners of war.25

Although the first group of FMLN military officials was formed in Cuba, the actual

number of Salvadorans trained on the island was small.26 The numbers, however, aredeceptive because Cuban-trained officials returned to El Salvador and instructed

fellow combatants based on their newly acquired skills. Thus, Cuban instruction had aripple effect which permeated the FMLN organisation and had a much greater impact

than the mere numbers would suggest. As the war in El Salvador progressed,

increasingly becoming a war of guerrillas, the Salvadoran revolutionaries’ ownexperience came to be their best instructor. By 1983, the student had outgrown the

teacher and Salvadoran revolutionaries were more adept at guerrilla warfare thanCuban officials.27 At this point, what proved most useful for the FMLN were Vietcong

guerrilla combat strategies, which were taught to the Salvadorans on the island byCuban and Nicaraguan combatants.28

At the FMLN’s request, Havana would also provide training for special operations.The most notorious of these operations was the ERP’s highly successful attack on the

Ilopango air base in 1981. In preparation for this venture, a facsimile air base was

created in Cuba, where a group of ERP members received intensive training for a45-day period. While the DOE built the Ilopango duplicate and trained the

Salvadorans, the military tactic was imported from the Vietcong. Furthermore, suchan accurate recreation of the base was made possible through photographs of Ilopango

taken from small FMLN planes.29 As this episode illustrates, Cuban military assistanceto the FMLN was largely the product of a joint collaborative effort.

Salvadoran revolutionary leaders worked closely with Havana to devise militarystrategies.30 In fact, this was the aspect of FMLN–Cuban relations that Fidel Castro

most enjoyed. Villalobos judges that the key to his chemistry with Castro – a

chemistry that was unrivalled between 1981 and 1990 – was that they shared a passionand genius for military strategies.31 Therein lay Villalobos’ comparative advantage

over other contenders for Fidel’s favour. As Villalobos claims: ‘Fidel is a commander, amilitary man, a man of war. He likes war strategy much more than the political and

ideological aspects of revolution.’32 Every time Villalobos travelled to Cuba, Castrowould invariably make a surprise appearance to meet with him.33 The former ERP

142 A. Onate

leader recalls countless meetings with Fidel Castro in which they spent hours alone,poring over maps of El Salvador and developing military strategies.34 Such instances

included preparation for the 1982 battle of Moscarron and for the 1989 ‘until the limit’offensive.35 While these summits attest to the Cuban leader’s proclivity for the military

realm in general, and for Villalobos in particular, they also reflect Castro’s constantpursuit of first-hand information and proximity to the Salvadoran leaders.

The FMLN came to have the most versatile and modern guerrilla army in LatinAmerica.36 Notwithstanding Havana’s contribution to the FMLN’s military capacity, the

Salvadoran guerrilla army cannot be reduced to a Cuban creation. At a most basic level,those doing the fighting were Salvadoran revolutionaries. At no point in the war didCubans fight with the FMLN.37 Furthermore, the myriad trainings that Cuba provided

were above all done at the FMLN’s request and while both Cuban officials and the FMLNleadership shared responsibility or credit for devising battle plans, at the end of the day,

the FMLN had to be convinced of their utility and willing to carry them out.In some cases, Cuba was more eager to assist than the revolutionary leaders wanted.

For the Ilopango operation, for example, Castro and Pineiro wanted troops to train inCuba for six months. Only after much negotiation did Villalobos reduce it to 45

days.38 The ERP leader claims that Pineiro would often press for more combatants tobe sent to the island and Villalobos would decline because Cuba tended to combinemilitary training with Marxist academic instruction and had a tendency to offer and

bestow special favours on Salvadoran combatants who kept Havana informed. In hiswords: ‘the fear was that you would send Salvadoran revolutionaries to Cuba and they

would return as Cuban ideologues that had lost sight of Salvadoran realities’.39

The promised weapons for revolution

Cuba kept its promise to supply arms to the Salvadoran revolutionaries. While it

seldom provided the weapons directly, Havana played a crucial diplomatic role inobtaining these arms from third countries and in the logistics of having them reach El

Salvador.40 In addition to Cuba, Nicaragua was also central to the FMLN’s firepower.The first step in the elaborate process of getting arms to the FMLN was persuading

countries to provide the Salvadorans with the arms in question. US governmentdocuments dating back to the 1980s attribute these efforts to Salvadoran communistleaders, most notably to Communist Party leader Shafik Handal, who is said to have

travelled to the USSR, Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia,Bulgaria, Hungary and Ethiopia in the summer of 1980 to secure arms for the

Salvadoran guerrillas.41 Although Handal’s travels and lobbying efforts did in fact takeplace,42 prominent FMLN leaders agree that Cuba’s endorsement was the deciding

factor that secured the military support of these countries.43 While Handal might haveadvocated for the Salvadoran revolutionary cause throughout his travels, and put a

face to the Salvadoran movement for national liberation, his power of influence,especially in the early stages of conflict, was no match for the Cuban leader. As

Villalobos conveys: ‘the most important communist we had was Fidel, not Handal’.44


Providing further validation to this point, Villalobos recounts that in one of his firstmeetings with Castro, he explained that FMLN members wanted him to travel to

Moscow and secure the provision of weapons. Castro’s response was: ‘Chico! What areyou going to do in Moscow? Your place is in El Salvador, with the combatants. I’ll take

care of Moscow’s support.’45

The weapons granted by third countries were brought to the island on Cuban

commercial boats or on airplanes.46 From the island, the weapons were sent toNicaragua both by sea and by air and then, from there, they were transported

clandestinely by sea into El Salvador through the Gulf of Fonseca or overland throughHonduras.47 The main problem for the FMLN was not obtaining weapons but gettingthem in to El Salvador; a process for which Cuba and Nicaragua were indispensable. In

effect, these two countries served as bridges to get arms to the FMLN and aswarehouses for such arms. Nicaragua’s ‘warehouse status’ led to the scandalous event

in 1993, colloquially known as ‘El Buzonazo’, in which the explosion of a bomb in aresidential area of Managua resulted in the uncovering of a very large arms cache that

belonged to the FPL.

Show me the money

With very specific exceptions, Cuba could not play a significant role in the FMLN’s

finances, for the simple reason that it lacked a monetary surplus to bestow on any cause,regardless of how worthy it felt the cause to be. There were very specific moments when

Cuba gave money directly to the FMLN. Fidel Castro made a small contribution to helpfinance the 1981 ‘final offensive’,48 he gave Joaquın Villalobos $500,000 for the battle ofMoscarron, and also gave almost $1,000,000 for the last large-scale ‘until the limit’

offensive in 1989.49 Attesting to Castro’s very limited possibility of providing financialsupport, Villalobos recalls that every time he was given Cuban money Castro would

remind him: ‘remember that people in Cuba don’t have toothpaste’, or ‘remember thatwe suffer economic limitations on the island’. ‘It was as though with every payment, he

was giving me a part of his soul’, Villalobos recalls.50

While Cuba did not determine what the money it gave ought to be used for, the

Cuban administration did monitor how the Salvadorans spent their resources throughinformants they had within the FMLN ranks.51 The Cuban administration was on arelentless quest for information obtained through intelligence, not unlike most

governments throughout the Cold War.The Salvadoran revolutionaries did not depend on Castro financially. They had

their own reserves – obtained through kidnappings, bank robberies, and taxationfrom territories under their control. Furthermore, they received money from Western

Europe, socialist countries, and support groups in the United States.52 The FMLN’smonetary funds were perhaps the sphere in which the organisation enjoyed the most

independence from Cuban support. This financial independence from Havana wasconsequential because it gave the FMLN the space to pursue strategies that Cuba did

not necessarily agree with, especially in the ambit of foreign policy.

144 A. Onate

FMLN diplomacy

The FMLN’s quest to transform El Salvador was not confined to the military realm.

Spearheaded by the Political Diplomatic Commission (Comision Polıtico Diplomatica,

CPD), the FMLN created a diplomatic nexus that was unprecedented, in both scope

and significance, by any other opposition movement in Latin America. The CPD

enabled the international community to hear not just the point of view of the

Salvadoran powers that be, but also that of the opposition, which was quickly

becoming a de facto power alongside the state. In this non-military realm of FMLN

activity, Cuba also proved its resolve to support its Salvadoran allies. In contrast to the

covert nature of Cuban–FMLN relations in the military sphere, diplomatic relations

were institutional and between the CPD and Cuba’s Foreign Ministry and embassies.

At gatherings of the Socialist International and meetings of the Non-Aligned

Movement, Havana advocated the cause of the Salvadoran opposition and gave the

FMLN a space to present its platform.53 Cuban endorsement at these international

forums – arenas where Cuba was well respected – undoubtedly bolstered the

recognition of the FMLN by the member countries. This reality becomes especially

palpable when one takes into account that the FMLN’s diplomats were predominantly

in their mid or late twenties; a factor that surprised governments and raised initial

scepticism. The effectiveness of such efforts, and the capabilities of the CPD corps,

resulted in the Salvadoran guerrillas receiving ‘more international aid from the

Socialist world than any other Latin America insurgent group ever received during the

Cold War’.54

The FMLN’s foreign policy did not come cheap. Travels to countries such as Cuba,

Mexico, Russia, Czechoslovakia and Angola had to be paid for and the FMLN lacked

the financial resources to do so. When the FMLN attended conferences of the Non-

Aligned Movement and the Socialist International, the Cuban administration and

embassies took care of the logistics of the FMLN’s diplomatic missions abroad. Cuba

handled the CPD’s transportation to and from these foreign countries and the

representatives’ accommodation while on these missions.55 Most frequently, the CPD

members would travel to these conferences on Cuban planes.56 In addition to Cuba,

the FMLN was assisted in its travels by a number of countries that gave the

organisation airplane ticket vouchers. Providing this type of assistance presented a

convenient way for some governments to help the Salvadoran revolutionaries while

avoiding the potential complications that could come from giving them money

directly. French President Mitterrand, for example, unable to give the FMLN money

directly because in his words: ‘France is not Cuba, and in France leaders have to

account for money spent’, resorted to giving the Salvadoran revolutionaries $50,000 in

airplane vouchers.57 The Soviet Union also provided thousands of Aeroflot tickets.58

These vouchers would prove to be an invaluable resource to the FMLN during the

peace negotiations.

The diplomatic endeavours of the FMLN reveal a crucial facet of the nature of its

relationship with Cuba. Cuban influence, and Fidel Castro’s clout within the FMLN


leadership, did at times shape the FMLN’s politics and, by extension, the course of thewar. In 1981, the FMLN proclaimed that it was open to negotiations with the Salvadoran

government through international mediation. This platform was initially adopted not

because the FMLN seriously considered negotiation, but as a political strategy tostrengthen international support by giving the organisation moral high ground.59 Cuba

was always in favour of the FMLN’s adoption of this strategy and this was vital in makingit a reality. The leader of the ERP recalls that he was initially exposed to the idea in his

first meeting with M-19 leader Jaime Bateman, who discussed the M-19’s negotiationswith the Colombian government. After this meeting, which had been arranged by

Manuel Pineiro in his Protocol House in Cuba, Villalobos began to support the FMLN’s

stance as a willing negotiator. The ERP and M-19 leader subsequently met on a couple ofoccasions, always in the company of Pineiro.60

Including a willingness to negotiate on the political platform was a contentiousprocess for the incipient Salvadoran organisation. While the majority of the FMLN

leadership favoured the strategy, FPL leader Cayetano Carpio – the de facto leader ofthe organisation when the war began – believed it represented a betrayal of

revolutionary principles. The Comandancia General of the FMLN devised a seven-point proposal, known as ‘the green book’, that justified using such a strategy. Carpio

refused to endorse it. Aware that Cuba supported using negotiations as a political

strategy, the drafters of the proposal turned to the Cubans for support.61 A decisivemeeting followed in Havana where the FMLN leadership sat across the table from their

Cuban and Nicaraguan counterparts to discuss the platform. According to an accountby an FMLN leader who has asked to remain anonymous, Fidel Castro picked up the

proposal and one by one read over the seven points, asking Carpio to voice objectionsto each point as he finished reading them. Sensing his isolation, and the evident

endorsement of the Cuba leader for the proposal, Carpio was, in essence, coerced intosigning the document. For a man such as Carpio, who prided himself on being the

revolution’s supreme leader and insisted on being treated accordingly, this event was

humiliating.62 Not only had it become evident that the rest of the FMLN leadershipdisagreed with him, but he had been pressured by Cuba into endorsing something he

opposed. The FMLN leader who recounted the story to the author recalls that, whenCarpio left the room abruptly after signing the document, ‘I thought he was going to

commit suicide’. Carpio did in fact kill himself under very mysterious circumstances –not unrelated to this meeting – just a couple years later.

Undoubtedly, ‘Cuba carried a tremendous weight with negotiations being used as apolitical tool’ and their endorsement of this strategy was crucial to its

implementation.63 The FMLN leadership turned to Cuba in pressuring Carpio to

do something the Salvadoran leaders could not accomplish alone because theyperceived that Castro’s position could make or break certain facets of the revolution.

Castro’s success in securing Carpio’s official endorsement of the green book provedthat the FMLN leaders were right about Fidel’s potential coercive power. Castro’s clout

cannot be reduced to his provision of arms and military training. This was, of course,important, but the Cuban leader’s capacity to influence the course of events had much

146 A. Onate

more profound historical roots. As described by Joaquın Villalobos, Fidel was in manyways looked to by the Salvadoran revolutionaries as ‘el papa’ or the father figure of

revolution.64

What did Cuba get?

While the core benefits obtained by the FMLN from its relationship with Cuba shouldbe, at this point, clear, a crucial question warrants further discussion: what was in it forCuba? In other words, what did Cuba have to gain that merited putting so much of

itself into this relationship?First, it must be stressed that Cuba’s relationship with the FMLN was the product of

Cuban policy and not, as some have charged, the product of instructions fromMoscow.65 Cuban diplomacy is what secured the support of the Soviet camp towards

the Salvadoran revolutionaries and not the other way around. With the exception ofsome members of the Salvadoran Communist Party, who did have close ties with

Moscow, the FMLN leadership dealt with Havana and not with the Soviet Union. Inthe words of an FMLN leader and member of its Directorate:

The USSR never understood revolutionary movements in Central America, theynever understood Che Guevara and they never understood us. The initiative inCuba’s relations with the FMLN was Cuban and the Soviets . . . stayed out of it andlet the Cubans do their thing.66

In an extensive study on Cuban foreign policy, Jorge I. Dominguez establishes that this

independence from Moscow actually pertained to the entirety of Central America.67

Cuba’s policy towards the FMLN was therefore its own and was driven, above all, bythree factors: Cuban altruism, an attempt to compensate for the island’s geographical

and geopolitical isolation, and the aim to keep revolutionary movements in the regionclose.

The Cuban government accurately perceived – and empathised with – the sufferingof the Salvadoran masses under the exclusionary political order that ruled the country

until the 1980s. Whatever might be said about Fidel Castro’s pragmatism, he is also aman of conviction who genuinely believes that the socioeconomic system in post-

revolutionary Cuba offers people a more dignified existence than the alternativepresented by free-market economies. The bold voluntarism that constituted a keyelement of Cuban foreign policy – under the principle that ‘it is the duty of

revolutionaries to make the revolution’ – cannot be understood if this factor is nottaken into account.

Supporting the FMLN was also a Cuban foreign policy strategy to ensure its ownsurvival. In Havana’s eyes, while the United States was vexed with possible

revolutionary triumphs elsewhere in Latin America, its resources and attentionfocused on preventing such an occurrence, and Cuba took a back seat to these more

immediate objectives. For the United States to prioritise other revolutionary efforts, itwas essential for these movements to appear as though they might succeed. By

promoting the union of the opposition in El Salvador; arming, training, and indirectly


funding the guerrillas, and supporting their strength in the international arena, Cubacontributed towards creating the type of movement that it believed would scare and

preoccupy Washington. Cuba’s foreign policy strategy produced the desired results.

With the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the birth of the FMLN in ElSalvador, the United States made preventing revolution in Central America one of its

priorities abroad. It trained and funded counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua anddiverted a vast amount of resources to defeat the FMLN. Over the course of the

decade, the United States provided more than a million dollars a day to fund a lethal

counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador.68

US Ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick argued that the Reagan administration’s

resolve to prevent revolution in El Salvador resulted from Central America being ‘themost important place in the world for the United States’.69 Others have countered that

it was the region’s insignificance that made it a place where the US could recover fromthe calamitous loss and humiliation it had suffered in Vietnam.70 Irrespective of the

motivator, the outcome for Cuba was the same: insurgency in El Salvador absorbed avast amount of attention and resources from the region’s hegemonic power.

Finally, while Castro’s administration certainly favoured the emergence of othersocialist movements in the region, it wanted these movements to be close to Havana

and under its clout. Providing widespread assistance and being actively involved in

every sphere of FMLN activity enabled Cuba to obtain the coveted loyalty andinfluence from the Salvadoran insurgents.

The survival of the Cuban revolutionary government for almost half a century, inthe face of myriad challenges, largely attests to its bold and successful foreign policy.

Some FMLN leaders emphasise the Cuban administration’s selfless motivations whenassessing why their movement received so much support from Havana.71 Others focus

instead on the pragmatic considerations that led Cuba to endorse and assist theirmovement.72 In truth, altruistic and pragmatic motivators are not mutually exclusive

and both drove the Cuban–FMLN affair.

Cuba’s support for revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Latin Americathroughout the Cold War merits a historical and geopolitical contextualisation.

Throughout this time period of stark polarisation, and when so much was consideredto be at stake, not only was it unfeasible for Cuba – the bastion of communism in the

hemisphere – to remain uninvolved, but also, very few countries actually remainedneutral.73 The beacons of capitalism and communism in the hemisphere – the United

States and Cuba respectively – were both actively and extensively involved in the

Salvadoran conflict: each throwing its support behind the faction closest to itsgeopolitical position and interests.

The Salvadoran civil war should not be reduced to geopolitics, but it also cannotbe fully understood without considering this dimension. The involvement of the

United States and Cuba was profoundly consequential in shaping and defining thisepisode of Salvadoran history. The primary guarantors of the FMLN’s endurance and

success were the FMLN guerrillas. Notwithstanding, without Cuba’s support, theSalvadoran security forces – which enjoyed the institutional advantages that came

148 A. Onate

with the regime’s support and extensive backing of the United States – would havemilitarily defeated the FMLN. In turn, had Washington not supported the Salvadoran

military and security forces, the Salvadoran opposition would have been victorious.The parallel accusations made by the Cuban and US governments against each other,

that their respective involvement was crucial in the survival of the warring factioneach supported, were valid and provided both administrations with a justification for

participating in the war. One can only speculate how the war in El Salvador wouldhave developed if Cuba and the United States had not become active participants. It

is certain, however, that it would have been remarkably different.

The end of the affair?

The FMLN’s attempt to bring about a new order through armed insurrection was thenorm rather than the exception in Latin American during the Cold War. Although

undoubtedly the methods, objectives, and success of the region’s various revolutionaryefforts varied, they were all symptomatic not only of legitimate national grievances but

also of a sentiment that social revolution was the only viable option and, moreimportantly, that it could succeed. These movements were inherent to an epoch in

which the triumph of capitalism was not yet secure. Many still believed that a moreegalitarian socioeconomic system was possible, and some were prepared to fight

and die for it. When peace negotiations between the FMLN and the Salvadorangovernment began in earnest, the Cuban administration neither supported nor

opposed the process.74 While its phlegmatic attitude towards the peace process starklycontrasted its involvement during the war, the Cubans respected the FMLN’s decisionto negotiate and transform into a democratic force. While the FMLN leadership

celebrated what they perceived, in effect, to be the end of a terrible war, Cuba wasperhaps mourning a lost revolution which, coupled with the fall of the Berlin wall a few

years earlier, was perceived as an omen of the end of revolutions; the end of their LatinAmerican left.

As exemplified by the Salvadoran case, Latin America’s Cold War was marked by aseries of ‘hot wars’ that transformed the political and economic landscape of the

region. In this process of conflict and transformation, the region’s leftist movementswere pivotal agents and it is therefore necessary to understand how they were shapedand how they operated. While the Latin American Cold War left has received ample

scholarly attention, the different revolutionary and guerrilla movements have beenstudied largely through national paradigms and thus contemplated as independent

entities that acted predominantly within the confines of the nation-state. Furthermore,Cold War historiography of the region has largely focused on Washington as the

central international actor shaping geopolitical developments and national processes.Contemporary scholars of the Latin American Cold War need to move beyond

frameworks of analysis confined by national boundaries and to look past US influencein the region by considering the impact of other regional powers. Doing so will

broaden our understanding of how the Cold War unfolded in different parts of the


region and it may reveal how the mutually constitutive interaction between national

and international processes shaped the region’s post-Cold War order.

Notes

[1] Information on Latin America’s Communist Parties and their views towards armed insurgency

can be found in: Castaneda, ‘In the Beginning’, Utopia Unarmed. Joaquın Villalobos and

Eduardo Sancho, both former leaders of the FMLN, conveyed the specifics of the Salvadoran

Communist Party to the author. Interviews with Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford) and Eduardo

Sancho.

[2] FMLN leaders agreed that Cuba embodied the possibility of change and that Fidel Castro and

Che Guevara were tangible examples of the ideal ‘revolutionary man.’ Interviews with Ana

Guadalupe Martınez, Salvador Sanchez Ceren, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and

Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).

[3] Facundo Guardado and Joaquin Villalobos both claim that Cuba not only made revolution

look possible but also gave the impression that it was easy. Interviews with Facundo

Guardado and Joaquin Villalobos (Oxford).

[4] Interview with Facundo Guardado.

[5] Roque Dalton was a communist Salvadoran poet and guerrilla who joined the ERP in 1974.

Before joining the ERP, Roque Dalton lived in Cuba, received guerrilla training and

developed close relationships with prominent members of the Cuban administration. In

May of 1975 he was accused of treason by leaders of the ERP, was tried by an ad hoc military

commission and was found guilty. Dalton was executed on 10 May 1975. His death was

condemned by Havana which consequently broke relations with the ERP. Eduardo Sancho

‘Ferman Cienfuegos’, provides a first-hand account of Dalton’s death. Cienfuegos and

Sancho, Cronica Entre los Espejos, 100–14.

[6] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martınez.

[7] This was first documented by the United States’ Department of State in its ‘White Paper,’

subsequently used by the Reagan administration to justify its support for the Salvadoran

armed forces. This document reports that from 5 May to 8 June 1980, Salvadoran guerrillas

attended meetings in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua and then went to

Cuba and met with Castro and with the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations (DOE) ‘to

discuss guerrilla military plans’. In late May 1980 the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP)

was ‘admitted into the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in Havana’. US Department of

State, ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’. In interviews carried out by the author with

three Commanders of the FMLN: Ana Guadalupe Martınez (prominent member of the

ERP), Eduardo Sancho (leader of the RN and member of the ‘Comandancia General’), and

Joaquın Villalobos (supreme leader of the ERP and member of the ‘Comandancia General’),

these meetings in Havana to establish unity between the guerrillas were confirmed. All three,

as well as FPL Commander Facundo Guardado, agree that Cuba played a pivotal role in

bringing about the creation of the FMLN as such. The interviewees also disclosed that

meetings between the FPL, CP and RN began in mid-1979, in Cuba. These three groups were

the first to unite, forming the ‘revolutionary tripartite’. After Ana Guadalupe Martınez’s

successful lobbying efforts, the ERP was included and the PRTC was the last to join.

Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martınez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and


[8] Interview with Eduardo Sancho.

[9] Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos, who were present at these negotiations, concur that

Havana’s offer to provide weapons was Cuba’s biggest selling point in exchange for unity.

150 A. Onate

Villalobos recalls that in the meetings the Cubans effectively said: ‘unite and we give you

arms’. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).

[10] Interview with Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).


[12] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.

[13] Cuba’s decisive role in keeping the FPL united after the death of its leader, Cayetano Carpio, was

revealed to the author by Facundo Guardado of the FPL and Eduardo Sancho of the RN.

Interviews with Facundo Guardado and Eduardo Sancho.

[14] Interview with Facundo Guardado.

[15] Cuba’s role in the unification of the Nicaraguan guerrillas was documented by the Central

Intelligence Agency as follows: ‘Castro assumed a similar role in Havana’s dealings with the

Sandinistas in late 1978 and was instrumental in unifying the three Sandinista factions. In

return for the Sandinistas unity agreement, the Cubans sharply increased their assistance in

money, arms, and ammunition. The same may also occur in the case of El Salvador’. CIA

Memorandum, ‘Cuba: Looking to El Salvador’.

[16] Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer argue that Cuba foresaw that the general

offensive would succeed and that the new administration in the United States would have no

choice but to accept it. Bracamonte and Spencer, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran

FMLN Guerrillas, 16.


[18] Interview with Claudio Armijo.

[19] Joaquın Villalobos, Eduardo Sancho, and Claudio Armijo expressed that the Departamento

America was the effective mechanism for revolutionary leaders to get to Fidel Castro. Both

Joaquın Villalobos and Claudio Armijo explicitly stated that Pineiro was the bridge to

Castro. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Claudio Armijo and Joaquin Villalobos (Oxford).

[20] Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 120–21

[21] Jorge Castaneda describes the Cuban creation of the America Department as follows: ‘Thus was

born the (in)famous America Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban

Communist Party, or, some might have called it, the Ministry of Revolution. This was,

thereafter, where Revolution was exported from . . . ’ Castaneda, Utopia Unarmed, 57.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Eduardo Sancho and Facundo Guardado told the author that the DOE was extensively involved

in setting up a nationwide communication system for the guerrillas; that it taught the FMLN

secret codes to communicate clandestinely; and that it kept the organisation up to date with

the most modern technology available. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Facundo

Guardado.


[25] A number of health facilities on the island, most notably the ‘26 of July Camp’, were devoted to

assisting injured FMLN combatants and FMLN leaders recognise that Cuba promoted the

humane treatment of prisoners of war. Interviews with Ana Guadalpe Martınez, Leonel

Gonzalez and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford). Jorge Castaneda, one of the few writers on the

subject to acknowledge this role, suggests that Cuba’s humanitarian functions in El Salvador

were symptomatic of its foreign policy throughout Latin America. Castaneda, Utopia

Unarmed, 55.

[26] Eduardo Sancho conveyed that the first cadre of officials was formed in Cuba. FMLN leaders

concur that the actual number of combatants trained on the island was small. Based on his

visits to these training camps, ERP Commander Claudio Armijo estimates that the number

of trainees on the island at any given time was around 100. Interviews with Eduardo Sancho,

Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Leonel Gonzales, Claudio Armijo, Facundo Guardado, and



[27] Joaquın Villalobos, Facundo Guardado and Eduardo Sancho agree that Cuban military

training, although crucial in the initial stages of war, quickly came to play a secondary role in

the organisation’s military capacity. Facundo Guardado gave the specific date of 1983 to the

author. Interviews with Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquın Villalobos

(Oxford).

[28] Interviews with Eduardo Sancho, Claudio Armijo, and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).

[29] A 1989 secret report by the Department of State claims: ‘to train FMLN guerrillas for the highly

successful 1981 attack on Ilopango air base, the Cubans built a facsimile of Ilopango airfield

in Cuba’. US Department of State, ‘Cuban Support for Subversion in Latin America’. ERP

leader Joaquın Villalobos and ERP Commander Claudio Armijo confirmed this information

to the author and added that the tactic used came from the Vietcong. Villalobos, conveyed

the additional details of the ERP’s contribution to this operation. Interviews with Claudio

Armijo and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).

[30] Interview with Eduardo Sancho, Facundo Guardado, Ana Guadalupe Martınez, and Joaquın

Villalobos (Oxford).


[32] Ibid.

[33] Interview with Joaquın Villalobos (Mexico City).



[36] FMLN members interviewed by the author expressed that the FMLN was the most modern

guerrilla army in the region. While their assessment could be attributed to hubris, David

E. Spencer and Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte, who are both staunchly critical of the FMLN

and whose sympathies clearly lie with the Salvadoran army, make the same judgment.

Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 7.

[37] Jorge I. Dominguez asserts that Cuba publicly denied that Cuban advisers ever worked in El

Salvador with the guerrillas. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 136. The FMLN

leaders interviewed by the author also affirmed that Cuban troops never fought with the

FMLN. Even the United States Department of State, in a 1985 secret memorandum based on

the testimony of a captured FMLN combatant, recognised that ‘to the best of [the combatants’]

knowledge, there are no Cuban or Nicaraguan advisors in El Salvador because of ‘political

considerations’. US Department of State, ‘Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels’.


[39] Ibid.

[40] In 1982, ERP leader Joaquın Villalobos personally received 12 weapons from Fidel Castro. This

was utterly atypical, however. Ibid.

[41] US Department of State, ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’, 4.


[43] Joaquın Villalobos, Ana Guadalupe Martinez and Eduardo Sancho all judge that Cuba’s

diplomatic efforts on the FMLN’s behalf were the deciding factor that secured the support of

socialist countries in providing weapons to the FMLN. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe

Martınez, Eduardo Sancho, and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).


[45] Interviews with Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).

[46] Because Havana had legitimate trade relations with these countries, the boats used to transport

the weapons were predominantly Cuban commercial carriers. ‘Although there was

regulation of these carriers, it was impossible to know which ones were carrying arms, and

the arms were generally hidden within the vessels.’ Interview with Eduardo Sancho.

[47] Interview with Eduardo Sancho; Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN

Guerrillas, 177; and US Department of State, ‘Cuba and Sandinista Aid to the Salvadoran Rebels’.

152 A. Onate


[49] Interviews with Joaquın Villalobos.


[51] Joaquın Villalobos, who personally managed a large amount of Cuba’s financial assistance,

related that Cuba gave the money freely but that they closely monitored how it was spent.

For example, Joaquın Villalobos affirms that his logistics coordinator, whom he trusted

entirely, was constantly informing the Cuban administration of the ERP’s spending.

Interview with Joaquın Villalobos (Mexico City).


[53] Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martınez, Eduardo Sancho, and Leonel Gonzalez.

[54] Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerrillas, 3.

[55] Interview with Ana Guadalupe Martinez.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Joaquın Villalobos recounts that this is what President Mitterrand told Guillermo Ungo when they

first met and Ungo asked for financial backing. Interview with Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford).


[59] Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martınez, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford

and Mexico City).


[61] Interview with Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos (Mexico City).

[62] Many FMLN leaders retrospectively judge Cayetano Carpio as somewhat of a tyrant. A leader

who believed the FMLN should be a hierarchical organisation that he would preside.

Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martınez, Eduardo Sancho, Facundo Guardado, and

Joaquın Villalobos (Oxford and Mexico City).


[64] Ibid.

[65] This was the official position of the United States during the Salvadoran civil war. Speeches by ex-

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, US Ambassador to the UN Jean Kirkpatrick, and President

Ronald Reagan, presented events in Central America as reflecting Soviet expansionism

channelled through Cuba. Whitehead, ‘Explaining Washington’s Central American Policies’. In

the ‘White Paper’ the US Department of State affirms: ‘it is clear that over the past year the

insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into another case of indirect

armed aggression against a small Third World country by Communist powers acting through

Cuba.’ US Department of State, ‘Communist Interference in El Salvador’. After over a decade

of stressing Soviet and communist involvement in El Salvador, the United States’ Defense

Intelligence Agency eventually recognised the absence of direct Soviet support for the FMLN.

In a secret position paper written in 1990, the Agency states: ‘The Soviet Union does not

appear to have provided direct military training or equipment to the FMLN since the early

1980s. However, the Soviet Union has not indicated that it disproves of such aid by the

Cubans, who depend economically and militarily on the Soviets.’ U.S. Defense Intelligence

Agency, ‘Soviet and Cuban support for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front’.


[67] Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution, 4.

[68] Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 71. In a secret memorandum from Salvadoran President Cristiani

to the US Department of State, Cristiani affirms: ‘The US has supported the Salvadoran

Government throughout the ten year insurgency with economic and military assistance

totaling more than $3billion.’ US Department of State, ‘Proposed Call on the President by

Salvadoran President Cristiani’.

[69] Grandin, Empire’s Workshop, 71.


[70] This position is argued by Greg Grandin in Empire’s Workshop, chapter 2: ‘The Most Important

Place in the World: Toward a New Imperialism’. It is also presented by LeoGrande in ‘A

Splendid Little War’.

[71] Interviews with Salvador Sanchez Ceren and Ana Guadalupe Martınez.

[72] Interviews with Facundo Guardado and Joaquın Villalobos.

[73] Even those countries proclaiming to have a foreign policy of non-intervention supported

groups that adhered to either Cuba or the United States. Perhaps the best example of this is

Mexico which proclaimed neutrality in the region and had close relations with both Cuba

and the United States but provided widespread support to the FMLN through its diplomatic

efforts. See Salvador Samayoa’s, El Salvador: la reforma pactada.

[74] Ana Guadalupe Martinez, Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos agree

that Cuba stayed out of this final stage of the conflict. Villalobos recalls failed attempts to get

the Cubans more involved with the process. Interviews with Ana Guadalupe Martinez,

Facundo Guardado, Eduardo Sancho and Joaquın Villalobos (Mexico City).

References

Bracamonte, Jose Angel Moroni, and David E. Spencer. Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN

Guerillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprints for Future Conflicts. Westport, CT: Praeger

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154 A. Onate

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