coleman (1998) hobbes's iconoclasm

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University of Utah

Hobbes's IconoclasmAuthor(s): Frank ColemanSource: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Dec., 1998), pp. 987-1010Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of UtahStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/449114

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= H o b b e s ' sIconoclasm

FRANK COLEMAN, ENVIRONMENTALROTECTIONGENCYThisessayshows that Hobbes's houghtrests on biblicalfoundations,

casting him in an unfamiliarrole- that of an iconoclastic prophet, aJeremiah.Heresembles he laterprophets,particularlyeremiah,n threeways:firstby warringagainst dolatry,reconceived as the attributionofsanctity to mental images, "Phantasmes f the Brain,"as Hobbes callsthem (Leviathanh. 45, 449, E.W 3: 651)-as distinguishedfrom limit-ing such attribution o "gravenmages" Deuteronomy4: 28, Jeremiah1:16); second, by viewing iconoclasm,followedby catastrophicnterven-tion, as the path to political regeneration; nd third,by being centrallypreoccupiedwith the implicationsof the biblical dea ofa creatednatureformaterial,cultural,and politicalartifice.The essayfurthershows thatthe biblicalcosmology underlyingHobbesnaturaland civil philosophyis not, as mightbe supposed, in conflictwith the premissesof his scien-tificwritings,but is harmoniousand coincident with it.

"The freest intellects are not those beginning with unaided reason butthose firmlybound to a story of ideas through time." Eldon EisenachNOTE:The research orthis articlewas assistedby a grantfrom the NationalEndowmentfor the Humanities.All biblical referencesare taken from the RevisedStandardVersion: heNew OxfordAnnotatedBible OxfordUniversityPress, 1973). I havebeen fortunate n the comments and supportreceivedin preparing his manu-script.H. MarkRoelofs ntroducedme to the hebraic bible as an appropriateextfor inquiryand research.Thanks to the hospitableinvitation of EdwinCurley,was enabled to make furtherprogresson this essay at a seminaron Hobbes atNorthwesternUniversityEldon EisenachandJoshuaMitchellgave generouslyoftheir talents in an effortto improve the breadth, focus, and coherence of this

latestversion. DennisCrow,GayneNeurney,perhapsunawares,helpedme to testpositions offeredhere by treatingthem as worthyof attention.While the help Ihave receivedhas been substantial,I am aware that there may remainfaults forwhich I am solely responsible.PoliticalResearchQuarterly,Vol.51, No. 4 (December1998): pp. 987-1010

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Political esearch uarterlyOVERVIEW

Here I raise the possibility that Hobbes shares common ground with adistinctivestrandof biblical literature,prophetic iconoclasm, and that we mayacquire insight into the sources of his thought by exploring its connectionwith the authors who originate this literature, the later prophets. The OldTestamentprohibitsattribution of sanctity to gravenimages (Deuteronomy4:28, Isaiah 39: 18-20, Jeremiah 1:16, 10: 5-6). Hobbes goes further.Idolatry,he says, is the attribution of sanctity to "anImage, or any Creature,either theMatterthereof, or any Fancy" Leviathan h. 45, 449, 452; E.W 3: 653, 656,italics mine).' We may speculate that Hobbes makes this change to bring the"SeparatedEssences" (Leviathanch. 46, 465-66; E.W 3: 465-66), i.e., the"Nesses,Tudes,and Ties"(Leviathan h. 8, 59; E.W.3: 70), by which Aristotleand his descendants claimed the world to be ruled within the scope of icono-clastic attack. These entities are assigned causal force, Hobbes scoffs, eventhough lacking the properties of physical embodiment (Leviathanch. 46).Nevertheless, an internal difficulty arises in Hobbes'sposition to which thepresent essay calls attention.At the sametimethathe adoptsthe stance of the iconoclasttowardAristotleand his descendants, Hobbes remains anxious to defend himself against thecharge of idolatry.This anxiety emerges in a lengthy passage (Leviathanch.45, 447-55; E.W 3: 647-63) and its occasion is the attribution of sanctity tothe civil sovereign. The sovereign, Hobbes says, is the "living RepresentantofGod"(Leviathan h. 45, 454; E.W 3: 658) and the "Imageof God"(Leviathanch. 45, 448; E.W 3: 650) because s/he is alleged to be in a direct line ofdescent from Moses (Leviathan h. 36, 299 and ch. 44, 419; E.W 3: 605-606and see Leviathan h. 30, 234-36; E.W. 3: 326-29). The question arises whyHobbes should call attention to the Old Testament prophetic literature oniconoclasm when its premises may be turned againstthe very institution, thecivil sovereign, in whose behalf he has mounted an extensive philosophicdefense. Hobbes cannot have been unaware that idolatrous worship of kingsis one of the pivotal dramasof the Old Testament.It is severelyproscribed bythe later prophets (Hosea 8: 4), an outlook which is foreshadowed in theformerprophets (1 Samuel 10: 17-20).2

Chapter and page references are to Leviathan 1991, followed by citation of the standardedition: TheEnglishWorks f ThomasHobbes, dited by SirWilliamMolesworth(JohnBohn, 1839-45), cited hereafteras E.W followedby volume and pagenumber.2 One may say,of course, that Hobbes'suse of the rhetoricof iconoclasm is just that, ascreen employed to subvert biblical text and to convert an audience steeped in thetropesof biblicaldiscourse nto rationalchoice actors.Butthis interpretation f Hobbes

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Hobbes'sconoclasm

Underlying the iconoclasm of the later prophets and of Hobbes, is thebiblical idea of a created nature.3This idea is at the center of a crucialproblemto which the prophets point, one which has a bearing upon the idolatryissue.Itmaybe stated thus: if, by virtue of the reciprocaleffectswhich artifactsexertupon their makers, i.e., extending human capacities and shaping conscious-ness, artifactsmay be said to "remake"heir authors,4then might it not be thecase that humanity sharesin the otherwise exclusive role assigned God in theGenesisepic, and elsewhere in the Bible, i.e., as the maker of "worlds,"and, ifthis is the case, then might it not be that any conventional manner of humanartificecarries within it an implicit challenge to God'srole as "maker."Thischallengebecomes explicit in the case of idolatry.Idolatry s the impious sup-position that a person's powers of making extend beyond the production ofconventional forms of artifice, chairs, tables, lamps, etc., to the manufactureof likenessesof thedivine.5Jeremiah uts this issuewith characteristic luntness,"Canman make for himself gods?"and he answers, of course, "Such are nogods"(Jeremiah16: 20).Both the question raised by Jeremiah and the biblical idea of creationupon which it rests reappear in Hobbes (E.W 1: 1-92; E.W. 3:18). In theintroduction to LeviathanHobbes compares the task confronting the authors

maycommita solecism,imputingto him motivesandperspectivesmoreappropriateolatertimes, and to conclude, overhastily,hat Hobbes's conoclasmis solely rhetorical.SeeJohnston(1986: 183-84).3 The first o suggestthat the biblical deaof creationmaybe of importancen interpretingHobbes, o farasIamaware,s Oakeshott1957: iii)who, takinga cue from he introduc-tion to Leviathan,tates thatthe inspiration orHobbes'sthoughtmaybe seen to springfrom the Genesisepic, wherein civil society like nature, s the productof creativewill.Followingthis lead, Greenleaf uggests that Hobbes'splace as the head of a biblicallyderived traditionof will and artificebe madethe basis for further tudy (see Greenleaf1982). Oakeshott'sview of Hobbes is also buttressedby Foster (1934, 1935, 1936)who offersthat modernscience,asexpressed n the philosophiesof Hobbes, Descartes,Baconand Locke,restsupon an unstatedpremise,one that derives from the biblicalidea of a creatednature.It bearsemphasisthat in recommendinga returnto the Bibleforanunderstandingof Hobbes,Imean,primarily,he OldTestament.Hoffert's1984)studymakes the point that Hobbes's requentcitation of the Old Testament uggestsanaffinityof thoughtand purpose.4 The role of human agency in the productionof artifacts s easily seen. Not as easilygrasped s the roleof artifactsn reconfiguring he identityof theirmakers.The expla-nationfor this is thatthe arcof creation s apparent n the formercase but in the latterremainsunobserved.Bethis as it may,the reciprocal ffectsof artifactson their makersdid not escapethe attentionof Hobbes andthe prophetsas thisessaywill make evident.5 See particularlyElaineScarry 1985: 223-33). Feuerbach's1989) discovery, hat Godis man's nvention,wasin fact considered ongbeforeby the laterprophetsandrejectedas idolatrous.

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Political esearch uarterlyof the leviathan state to the taskconfronting God in the creationepic of Gen-esis. He begins Leviathanhus; "Nature the Artwhereby God hath made andgovemes the World) is by the Art of Man, as in many other things, so in thisalso imitated,"that man can make government through pacts and covenantsresembling,Hobbes says, "thatFiat,or the 'Letus make man,'pronounced byGod in the Creation,"and he can make "automata," r as we would say today,machines. As the product of artifice, the leviathan state invites attention tothat other artifactin history, Israel. However, unlike Israel,whose maker isGod and whose matter is man, leviathan is derived from man who is both,"the Matterthereof, and the Artificer" Leviathan10; E.W 3: ix). From theintroductionwe learn that Hobbes intended the members of a Protestantcul-ture, to draw upon the Genesis epic for an understanding of their role as"artificers," r makers, of the state and that he intended a comparison be-tween the state, a "mortalGod" (Leviathanch. 17, 120; E.W. 3: 158), andIsrael,God'sartifact n history.Thus while Hobbes' reflections turn upon thesame question as raisedbyJeremiah,"Canman make for himself, gods?"per-haps, he wishes to answer it differentlyThe argument showing that Hobbes's thought rests on biblical founda-tions concludes by casting him in an unfamiliar role-that of an iconoclasticprophet, aJeremiah.6He resembles the laterprophets, particularlyJeremiah,in threeways: first,by warring againstidolatry,reconceived as the attributionof sanctity to mental images, "Phantasme(s)of the Brain,"as Hobbes callsthem (Leviathan h. 45, 449; E.W 3: 651) as distinguished fromlimiting suchattribution to "graven mages"(Deuteronomy 4:28, Jeremiah 1:16); second,by viewing iconoclasm, followed by catastrophicintervention, as thepath topolitical regeneration;and third,by being centrallypreoccupied with the im-plications of the biblical idea of a created nature for material, cultural, andpolitical artifice.Nevertheless, as will be noted later,some qualificationscon-cerning Hobbes'srelation to prophetic traditionarenecessary.

ARTIFICER(S)NDARTIFACTThe issue of the relationshipbetween artificerand artifact,as that issue is

posed by idolatry, s the subject of a typology developed by ElaineScarry.Thistypology,drawingon the concerns of the laterprophets, illuminates the bibli-cal idea of a created nature, the nature of idolatry,and the tension between

6 Hobbeshas been castin this role before.Nevertheless, o seriousefforthas beenmade osupport hislinkage.Thepresent ssaydoesmake uchan effortbecausetis believedthatbiblical nfluenceon Hobbes s foundational.Fora view whichplaces the emphasis upon Calvinist doctrinal influence see Martinich(1992: 64).Also, see Eisenach (1931: 55-57).

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Hobbes'sconoclasmpolitical creation and other, more conventional, forms of material and cul-tural artifice. It provides an analyticalframework within which themes com-mon to the later prophets and Hobbes can be seen and sets the stage for thediscussion of propheticiconoclasm which is to come. Since the typology helpsto frame the issues to be pursued, it will be given some attention. Followingthe use of Scarryfor these purposes, the role of iconoclasm in state creation,as that is presented both in the later prophets and in Hobbes, will be de-veloped. In this later stage of the analysis attention will be shifted fromScarry'stypology to a direct examination of iconoclasm in the propheticliterature and in Hobbes's writings.

Scarry distinguishes among kinds of artifice on the basis of whether ornot observation of the human component in the creation of the artifactwillinterfere with the extension of the capacities of their author, the reciprocaltask which all artifactsare taskedto perform.Forexample, affixed to category"a"artifacts such as poems, films, paintings and sonatas is a personal signa-ture. This is so much the case that pointing to two objects in a room a personmay say "This s a Milletand that one is a VanGogh."About to lower a needleto a record a person will proclaim "Handel" Scarry 1988: 314). In this in-stance identifying the human component in the creation of the artifact notonly does not interfere,it assists in enhancing human capacities.We may saythat the human artifact bears a personal signature and that its nature as anartifact s not only recognized and recoverablebut self-announcing.A second class of artifacts,Scarry uggests,bearsageneral,as distinguishedfrom a personal signature,with the consequence that the human componentin its creation is recoverable, if not recognizable. As one maneuvers throughthe dense sea of artifactswhich sustain daily life, tablecloths, dishes, lamps,city parks, streets, language, street lights, armchairs,and so forth, one doesnot actively perceive these objects as humanly made. But if one stops for anyreasonand thinks about theirorigins, one can with varyingdegrees of successrecoverthe fact that they all have human makersand this recognitionwill notdiminish their usefulness (ibid. 312-13).The leviathanstate, it is useful to interject,is an example of this varietyofartifact.The imaginativeexercise required of us by Hobbes - the removal ofthe presence of constituted authoritywhile retainingin the mind the charac-teristics of the political culture of which one is a member-is intended, pre-cisely, to call to attention the presence of an unrecognized but recoverableartifact.Wereit not for the state, as Hobbes continually reminds,we would bereturned to "nature" nd the life of man, "solitary,poore, nasty,brutish, andshort"(Leviathanch. 13, 89, E.W 3: 113). The unrecognized function of thestate is to provide us with security in the enjoyment of the "Contentmentsoflife"which goes beyond "barePreservation" o whatever a "manby lawfull

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Political esearch uarterly

Industry...shall acquireto himself (Leviathan h. 30, 231; E.W.3: 322 and seech. 14, 93; E.W 3: 120). But this office, though unrecognized by a sensibilitywhich peace has dulled, can be recoveredthrough a suitable reminder of thehorrorsof the state of nature (Leviathan h. 18, 128; E.W 3: 170).A third classification touches upon the idolatry issue. This class ofartifacts is distinguished by the circumstance that observation of theirhuman origin will interfere with the reciprocal task implied by the cre-ation of the artifact. In order for the artifact to discharge the function forwhich it was created the toil and imagination expended by its human au-thor in the process of its creation must remain undisclosed. Marx allegesthat capital occupies this role in Western society since, though created bylabor, once created it transforms labor into a "commodity,"a thing madeby capital (Marx 1988). Concealment of the relationships between artifi-cer and artifact is indispensable to discharging the function for which thelatter was called into being. More recently, McLuhan (1964: 23) has sug-gested that the "medium"has become "themessage". McLuhanassigns themessage to the medium as a way of pointing out that the media usurpspublic speech; speech acts originating in human agency are detached fromtheir source and reassigned to the media, an impalpable, omnipresent de-ity often thought to control every aspect of contemporary life .The issue of the relationbetween artificerand artifact,between (M)aker(s)and the made, is centralto the issue of idolatry.Implicit in idolatryis the viewthat not only such strawmen as the golden calf (Exodus 32), and the "scare-crows"in the cucumber field (Jeremiah10: 5) but, scandalously,God, him-self, may be a category"c"artifact.In the eyes of the prophets, idolatry is themajoroffense of the Old Testament. Hobbes appears to commit this very of-fense not occasionally and inadvertentlybut repeatedly and deliberately.Asnoted before, the state is a "MortallGod"(Leviathan h.17, 120; E.W.3: 158);state creation is equivalent to the Genesis epic (Leviathan10; E.W 3: ix); themonarch occupies the same place as is affordedGod in the decalogue (Levia-thanch. 30, 234-36; E.W 3: 326-28); the sovereign is "the iving representantof God" Leviathanh. 45,445-57; E.W 3: 645-63). Unlike Israel,whose makeris God and whose matter is man, the state, the "MortallGod," s derived fromman who, as Hobbes emphasizes, is both "theMatterthereof, and the Artifi-cer"(Leviathan10; E.W 3: ix). Thus man upstages God as the artificerof cen-tral importance in the events leading to the generation of the state. Hobbesappearsdetermined to bring to the fore the very role feared and deplored bythe prophets, man as a creatorwhose powers rival those of God.To remove human artifice from the stain of rivaling the powers of God,indeed to preempt the issue of whether human powers of artificeextend be-yond categories "a"and "b" o category "c,"the Old Testamentproceeds by

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Hobbes'sconoclasm

showingthat in everycase artificewhich bears divinesanctiontriumphs,whereas rtificewhich acksapprovalomesto dust.Anexamples thebuild-ing of the towerof Babeland the creationof a nativelanguage.Neitheroftheseformsof humanmaking s authorized y God. Thus n the biblicalac-countthisactivitysviewedas theproductof wicked nsolenceand the towerof Babelandits languagemust be (andis) dealtwith in an horrificmanner(Genesis11:1-9).A greateroffence s the makingof graven mages.Theseimagesoffera tangible ubstitute orthe unrepresentablendunimaginableGod of Israeland thus offera meansof relief or the strained eligiousmagi-nation.But heyalsodirectlyposetheissueofwhetheror nothumanmakingincludes hemakingof God.Suchactivitys also,therefore,egardeds auda-ciousandwicked nsolenceandalso meetswitha devastatingeply(Exodus32: 20; Leviticus26:1-2). Finally,he ten commandmentsmakeclear thatGod'smakingalone s to be honoredasin thekeepingof thesabbath,hedayon whichhe restedfromhis projectof world creation.ManparticipatesnGod'sprojectof worldtransformationy abstainingrom abor on this hal-lowedday (Deuteronomy:12).From hese andlikeinstancesone gathers hat there s strongpresump-tiveevidencen the Bibleagainsthepropriety fanyformof humanmaking,fallingwithincategories a" nd"b,"whichdoesnot havetheexpress anctionofGod.Thisprecautionarytance swarrantedythedanger hatIsrael,hav-ing reappropriatedts rolein the creationprocess,mightcome to displaceGod'shegemonicpositionas "maker."evertheless,he thoughtcannotes-capeattention,as in the quotation romJeremiah bove(eremiah 16: 20),thatman'spowersmayextendbeyondcategories a" nd"b"ormsof artificeto category"c."When the issue doesoccur, t is raised n rhetoricalorm, .e.,raisedonlyto dismiss t. Isaiah's uestionanswerstself,"Shallhepotterberegarded s theclay; hatthethingmadeshouldsayof itsmaker,Hedid notmakeme';or the thingformed ayof him who formed t, 'Hehas no under-standing'?"Isaiah29: 16).Asnoted,Jeremiahmmediately esponds o hisownquestion,"Such re no gods" Jeremiah 6:20). Thedominantmotif sunmistakable.sraeldid not makeGod. GodmadeIsrael."It s He thathathmadeus and we arehis" Psalms100).To review: he characteristictanceof the Old TestamenttressesGod'srole as "maker"nd assignshim an exclusiverolein the creationprocess.Categories f artificearerigidlyseparated,defined,and sanctionedbecausethetaskwhichGodmustdischarge,omakeandremake srael,s threatenedoncehis exclusive oleas anartificers (perceived s)compromised yactsofhumanmaking.Hobbes,by comparison, alorizeshumananddivineartificedifferentlys we shall see.

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Political esearch uarterlyGENERATION

Consider he idolatry ssue andScarry'sypologyalongsideHobbes'sequallypronounced concerns with making and its reciprocaleffects.Scarry'sypologyis implicit in Hobbes'sdivision of PartsI and IIof Leviathannto the "Rationall"kingdom, a product and sponsor of "a"recognized and recoverableforms ofartificeand "b"unrecognizedbut recoverableforms of artificeas distinguishedfrom the "Prophetique" ingdom, the subject matter of PartsIIIand IV,and aproduct of category "c"unrecognized and unrecoverable artifice (Leviathanch. 12, 79, ch. 31, 246, ch. 35; E.W 3: 98-99, 345; see Eisenach 1981: 57-66). This division, the "Rationall"kingdom which is a product of human arti-fice, and the "Prophetique"which is a product of divine artifice, rests uponHobbes's definition of philosophy. Investigation of this definition repays at-tention because it shows that while Hobbes differs from the laterprophets invalorizinghuman above divine artificethat, nevertheless, the biblical idea of acreatednature is foundational to both.

Philosophy,Hobbes says, is "theKnowledge acquired by Reasoning,fromthe Manner of Generationof any thing to the Properties;or from the Proper-ties, to some possible Wayof Generation of the same; to the end to be able toproduce, as faras matter,and humane force permit, such Effects,as humanelife requireth" Leviathan h. 46, 458; E.W. 3: 664). He applies this definitionto the "arts"n the following passage:

Of the arts,some aredemonstrable,othersindemonstrable; nd demon-strableare those the construction whereof is in the power of the artisthimself,who in his demonstration,does no more but deduce the conse-quencesof his own operation ... (C)onsequentlywherethe causesareknown, there is place fordemonstration,but not where the causes are toseek for. Geometrytherefore s demonstrable,for the lines and figuresfromwhich we reason are drawnand describedby ourselves;and civilphilosophy is demonstrable,becausewe make the commonwealth our-selves. Butbecauseof naturalbodies we know not the construction,butseek it from the effects,there ies no demonstrationof whatthe causes bewe seek for,but only of whatmaybe. (E.W. 1:183)

Several distinguishing features of Hobbes's philosophy are present inthis passage. First, the possible objects of "demonstrable"knowledge arerestricted to those wherein we may conceive of ourselves as artificers, ac-tively engaged in the creation of the object of our understanding, and wherewe may thereby (in an act of "pre-cognition") deduce the manner of itscreation from our own activity. "Demonstrable"knowledge, therefore, isonly of such effects as we are competent to produce and this means that

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Hobbes'sconoclasm

knowledge claims absent determinate artificers and their products shouldbe viewed with suspicion for "wherethere is no generation or property,thereis no philosophy"(E.W.1: 10). Tolaystress,knowledge is only of artifactsandthe manner of their generation. Leviathanas an example, is written from theperspectiveof a precognition of the causes of the state because we are both its"Matter"nd its "Maker." ut,more extensively,Hobbes cites language (Levia-thanch. 4, 24-25, 32; E.W.3: 18-19), commonwealth (Leviathan h. 17, 120;E.W 3: 158), and geometry (Leviathan h. 20, 145; E.W.3: 195-96) as satisfy-ing this definition of the proper objects of philosophic concern.

Bycontrast, hesubjectmatterof philosophydoes not extendto phenomenawhich areingenerable, uchas God(Leviathanh. 31,252; E.W.3: 354), a limita-tion also applyingto His works, i.e., to Nature,althoughto a lesserextent, for"theres no effectin naturewhich the Author of naturecannotbringto passbymoreways than one"(E.W.7: 88). Hobbes'sview of knowing as "making"seeHanson 1991: 637; Funkenstein 1986: 327) has the consequenceof privilegingthe"synthetic"unctionsof philosophy,where as artificerswe know thecauseandseek the effects,as distinguishedfromthe "analytic"unctions,where we knowthe effectsand seek a probablecause, a preferenceclearlyremarkedby Hobbes(E.W.1: 66-74) and noted by a numberof commentators(Shapinand Schaffer1985: 148). A proper nference o draw from this definitionof philosophyis thatinsofaras the stateis consideredan effectof God or Nature,civilphilosophyhasnothing to say about it. But since Hobbes obviouslydoes think civilphilosophycan illuminate the generationof the state, it must be so because its manner ofgeneration s dependenton humanmaking.Second,since "demonstrable"nowledgeis only of such effects(artifacts) swe arecompetentto produce, t is not onlypossiblebut desirable o separatecivilfromnaturalphilosophy(fora contrastingview see Watkins 1969: 93-94; Sorell1986: 25-26). It is desirablebecauseknowledgeof such effectsas we arecompe-tent to produce,thesubjectmatterof civilphilosophy,occupiesan epistemologi-callyprivilegedplacein comparison o effectswhere the causesareto be sought,thesubjectmatterofnaturalphilosophyThe subordinate laceoccupiedbynaturalphilosophy in Hobbes'shierarchyof knowablethings is statedwith clarityandforce n the assertion,"(the)Principlesof naturalScience..are o farre rom teach-ing us anythingof God'snature,as theycannot teachus our own nature,nor thenatureof the smallestcreatureliving" Leviathanh. 31, 252; E.W.3, 354).7

7 Accordingo Sorell 1986:26), Hobbes s not saying hatnaturalphilosophy ailsto con-tribute o ourunderstanding f the statebut rather ntendsa lesser,auxiliary ole. Butitremainsunclear romSorell's ccountwhat naturalphilosophyhas to contribute o ourunderstandingf thegeneration f the leviathan tate.He acknowledgeshat the mannerofgeneration f thestatemaybe grasped ntirely ndependently f thenatural ciences.995


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Third, nowledgemustbelogicallyndempiricallydemonstrable."tsem-piricaldemonstrabilitysbasedontheworldofsecondary,ause-effectelationswherenature,because reated,s real, .e.,non a priori Leviathanh.46, 463;E.W.3:672),and,therefore,ountsasevidence,notmerelyasillustration, fsuchpropositionaltatements s we makeabouttheeffectsof knowncauses(seeFoster19:35:454). Itis truethatHobbesdiminishes heimportance fknowledgeclaimsbasedon experimentation.Experienceoncludethnoth-ing universally," obbessaysas a way of replying o Boyle(andthe RoyalSociety)whoconsideredhatan nternallyoherent ccountoftheworldcouldbe builtupfrom heresultsoflaboratoryxperiment seeHobbes1994:ch.4,p.33;Shapinand Shaffer 985: 110-54;Martinich 997: 100-103).But thisdoesnot mean thathe denied thevalue of experimental roof,only thatheregardeduch accountsas fallingshort of the requirements f philosophyLogicaldemonstrabilitys establishedhrough"reckoning," knowledgeofdefinitions and theirconsequences (Leviathan h. 5, 32-33, 36; E.W.3: 30-31,36). Neither ogicalnor empiricaldemonstrabilitymaystand on their ownbutexist n aninterdependentelationshipn validdemonstrativeccountsofthe mannern which effects artifacts)regenerated.

If we ask whatis the derivationof Hobbes's pistemology,Foster's e-ply is the biblicalidea of a creatednature.8Such an hypothesiscasts anilluminating ight upon the origins of Hobbes'sphilosophybecause theBible,like Hobbes,projectsa view of natureas artifactual, eal,andradi-cally contingent.Hobbes,as is true for theBible,withdraws ntelligibilityfrom "nature" nd ascribes ntelligibilitysolely to those thingswhich arethe productof artifice,God or man, but alwaysand only a determinateartificer. urther, s created,nature s realand,as such,propositionaltate-mentsaboutnaturemustrelyon sensoryexperienceorevidence,notmerelyfor llustration,fpropositionaltatements bout he world(Leviathanh.46,463; E.W.3: 672; Macpherson 963: 454-55). Additionally,uch proposi-tions as are broughtforwardby science about nature must be stated inhypothetico-deductiveanguageLeviathanh.9)because ature, stheproductofcreativewill,bothin theBibleandin Hobbes,harbors radical lementofcontingencyE.W.7: 3, 88;Macpherson1963: 463).8 See Foster(1934: 448, 453). ContrastMacpherson 1962: 9-46). Macpherson'search

for a naturalphilosophy which will enable him to account for the physiologicalandbehavioralpremisesunderlyingHobbes's"possessivemarket"model of society leadshimto concludethatthesepremisesoriginaten modemscience,particularlyhethoughtof Galileo.Despite the acknowledged nfluence of the Bibleon 17th centuryculture,Macphersonneverconsidersthe possibilitythatmodernscience, itself,maybe rootedin a biblicalcosmology.996


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Hobbes'sconoclasmA significantproblem for Hobbes is that while he affirms that the proper

objectof philosophic concern is category"a" nd category"b"artifacts,amongwhich common-wealth, language, and geometry are to be included (becausethese effects all have determinate artificers and manner of generation) andthat while his preference for category "a"and "b"artifacts is unmistakable(Leviathanch. 13, 89 E.W 3:113), nevertheless, as Hobbes well knows, inhistory, particularly contemporary English history, the state is considered acategory "c"artifact.This circumstance does not bring him satisfaction butrather occasions the well-known lament, "It is impossible that a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power ca-pableof giving greaterrewards hanLife;and of inflicting greaterpunishments,than Death"(Leviathan h. 38, 306-37; E.W.3: 437). Religion, he maintains,whether "natural"religion or "civil"religion (Leviathan hs. 12 and 31), sup-plies fertile grounds for that "glorying"of mind which foments "Warre" ndthe foregoingof the benefits of category"a" nd "b" orms of artifice(Leviathanch. 13, 88-90; E.W.3:1 12-14).On what basis does Hobbes valorize category "a"and "b"artifice overcategory"c?"Why does he consider the state an instance of the formerbut notthe latter? Hobbes's scale of value is a consequence of his definition of phi-losophy.Human artifice,fallingwithin classifications"a" nd "b,"by Hobbes'sdefinition, is the properand exclusive object of philosophic concern becauseonly these effects are the issue of recoverable uman agency The definition ofphilosophy contains the corollarythat the state is and ought to be the productof human agency exclusive of category"c"artifice.Additionally, t contains animplicit valorizationof categories "a"and "b"artificein comparison with cat-egory "c." n one of the most rememberedpassagesof LeviathanHobbes makesclear thatforegoingthe benefits of category"a" nd "b"artifice s the chief costof failing to observe the agreementswhich constitute the state.

Insuchcondition ofWarre),here s no placeforIndustry; ecausethe fruit thereof s uncertain: nd consequentlyno Culture,of theEarth;no Navigation,nor use of the commodities hatmaybe im-portedby Sea;no commodiousBuilding; o Instruments f movingandremovinguchthingsasrequiremuch orce;no Knowledge fthefaceof theEarth; o accountof Time:noArts;no Letters; o Society;andwhich s worstofall,continualleare,anddanger f violentdeath;And the life of man,solitary, oore,nasty,brutish,and short.(Levia-thanch. 13, 89; E.W3: 113)Thus Hobbes wishes to assimilate he task of creating he state(anunrecog-nized but recoverableartifact) o the languageof classification"c,"but only inorderthat furtheractsof humanmakingfallingwithin category"a" nd "b"can

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Political esearch uarterlyoccur. By contrast, the later prophets are alarmed over the prospect that cat-egories "a"and "b"artifice will encourage the conceit that human makingextends to category "c."They wish to keep artifactsfalling within classifica-tion "c" the issue of God as unrecognized and unrecoverableartifact)sepa-rate fromthose fallingwithin classifications"a" nd "b' n order that the formermay avoid being absorbedby the latter.This difference over the distribution of valorization among the catego-ries of making, which extends to a difference in ascription of the site ofartifice (i.e.,whether the primary artificer is man or God) conceals an im-portant area of agreement. To the question of what significance is involvedin the attribution of making, both Hobbes and the later prophets bothanswer "everything."Hobbes's ascription of the site of artifice to man is ofcrucial importance as is the Old Testament attribution of the site of artificeto God. Hobbes and the later prophets are united by a preoccupation withthe reciprocal effects of made things, i.e., the manner in which artifactsreconfigure the identity of their makers. This effect is not neutral, as theprophets observed, because the consequence of such remaking is to in-duce the belief that man's powers as a maker rival those of God. Idolatrymakes explicit the presumption hidden within all acts of human makingthat man's powers as an artificer compare with those of the Maker of Is-rael. Despite the presence of such a threat, Hobbes values the products ofhuman artifice at a higher rate. For example, the making of the "MortalGod,"a patently idolatrous act by Old Testamentstandards, does not causeHobbes to shrink from the implicit comparison between human and di-vine making. The reason that he does not shrink is that Hobbes shareswith the prophets the idea of knowledge as making-for both the world ismade intelligible through artifice.

Although Hobbes and the latter prophets resolve the problem of thesite of artifice (Scarry 1985: 221-33) in a completely different way, onestipulating God and the other man as the proper site, and although thecategories of artifice are valorized differently, this difference is overshad-owed by the significance of their agreement on the premise of a creatednature. Since Hobbes's conception of making has common ground withthe prophetic literature of the Old Testament, it becomes reasonable toinvestigate this literature, its idea of a created nature, as well as biblicalviews of the manner of generation of the state.

BIBLICAL OURCESHobbes restrictsthe possible objects of knowledge to those which arethe

product of our own creation. A typology illuminating this idea of possibleobjectsof knowledgeshows thatonly category"a" nd "b""recoverable"rtifacts

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Hobbes'sconoclasmfall within Hobbes's account of possible objects of knowledge and only thosecategoriesas well promote the useful artswhich bring peace. The question towhich we come is whether Hobbes's account of the causal forces drivingthegenerationof the stateis relatedto the biblicalnarrativeconcerning the genera-tion of Israel. Posed differently,s therea connection between iconoclasm, art,and political regeneration, n Hobbes and the latterprophets?Or,to put a finepoint on the matter, does Hobbes rely upon a distinctively biblical under-standing of the knowledge requiredto make the state in his many referencesto knowledge as making?The Bible conceives of the world as God'sartifact.It begins with a projectof world creation,recordingthe mannerin which a solitary,powerful, procre-ative will, God, creates the world in the beginning through fiat (Genesis 1,2).The world, as the creation epic makes clear, has no independent, physicalexistence save as the product of God'screativewill. The Bible further recordsthat God'sactivityas a powerful, procreativeforceis duplicated on many sub-sequent occasions. He makes Adam, a word properlytranslated from the He-brew as mankind (von Rad 1961: 55). He makes wombs, formerlybarren,tobecome fertile (Genesis 17, 25: 21). He covenants with Abraham,promisinghim that his descendants will be a mighty nation, as numerous as the sands ofthe seashore or the stars of heaven (Genesis 15: 5, 22: 17). This promise isinherited by and fulfilled in the people of Israel.The scope of God'spower as an artificer n the Bible cannot be exagger-ated. Although the world produced in the beginning is pronounced "good," tis only so because it is God'sartifact, and its role thereafteris confined toserving as a backdropagainstwhich numerous additional acts of artificemaybe displayed. One scholar notes that for the Old Testamentmind theretrulyisno such thing as nature (natura), there is only creation (creatura),(von Rad1961: 53). Another notes that there is no word in the Hebrew for "nature"nits currentmeaning as the "totalityof the processes and powers that make upthe universe" (Kaufman 1972: 349). This omission is significant. Thedesacralization of the natural realm enjoined in many Biblical passages(Exodus 23; 23-24; Deuteronomy4: 15-32;Jeremiah3: 6-11), combined withthe reduction of nature to God'sartifact,removes every obstacle that mightstand in the way of God'sproject of world transformation.God'soriginal act,the creation of the world, conceives of the entirecosmos as the properdomainfor actsof artifice.All formsof material,cultural,and politicalcreationoriginatewith God, are substantiatedby Israel and the world, and are unhindered inthe manner of their expression by a naturalrealm.What is the connection between the biblical idea of creationand the gen-eration of the Israelite state? To answer this question we must shift attentionfrom the narrativeof God'sredemptive activity in history (see, e.g., Walzer

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Political esearch uarterly1985 and Roelofs 1988) to the essential relationbetween Israel and its Maker.The most essential attributeof Israelin the biblical record,as contrasted withGod, is that it is body. It is one body as in the account where Israel,battlingwith the Midianites, smites them "as one man" (Judges 6: 16-18). WhenIsrael swears to the Mosaic covenant it is "with one voice" (Exodus 24: 3).Pedersen says that Israel in the biblical account must be regarded as one,moral, collective, physicalperson (Pederson 1926: 267-79).

Manybiblicalpassages bring into reliefthe sentient and perishablenatureof Israel'sbody by contrastingit with the indomitable, imperishablenature ofits Maker.9"Allflesh is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field"we are reminded (Isaiah40: 63). Despite this reminderof the fragile,evanes-cent characterof its existence, Israel is proud in the peculiar biblical sensethat it is recalcitrantmaterialfromwhich God can produce a work of artifice."Ihave seen this people andbehold, it is a stubbor people"(Deuteronomy 9:13). "Iknow thatyou areobstinate, and your neck is an iron sinew and yourforeheadbrass" Isaiah48: 4). Israel'spride extends to a gloryingin its accom-plishments and the conceit that its powers rival those of God. All instances ofcategories "a"and "b"artifice, the prophets warn, harbor the implicit threatthat they may extend to category "c."Idolatryis the most complete expression of Israel'spride. The reason thisis so is that the implicit threat that category "a"and "b"artificemay spill overinto "c" ecomes overt n idolatry.Herethe artificeof Israelrivalsanddestabilizes9 "Sentience"s a term of art in Scarry's1985: ch. 3) interpretive ramework.She pro-poses thatthe biblicalemphasisupon extremesentience,Israelas a body in pain, takesplacewithin a narrative tructurewhich enacts an important ntuitionconcerningthenatureof creation.Pain of sufficientobduracyand intensity deprivesus of all artifice,

language included, by which the world is known and expressed; it is, therefore,deworlding.But this condition seeks relief in its opposite- the imaginationextendedinto its objects. The imagination,which cannot be conceived apartfrom its objectsaccordingto Scarry, emoves us from the condition of pain by seeking extension out-ward into the object world. While it may offend common sense to view pain as anintentionalstate, it maybe so considered in the context of work, labor,and creation;opposite pain, in this samecontext, is rangedthe imagination, ts complementary,n-tentionalstate.These intentionalstates,thebody in painand the imaginationextendedinto its objects,while opposed, arenevertheless,complementary;or while the formeris a stateof embodimentwithout the reliefof the objectsof imagination, he latter s astateof objectification derivingfrom the natureof the imagination)without the reliefof embodiment. Creation,labor,artificemediates the tension which exists betweenthese intentional statesbecause throughthe aversivenessof work we are lifted out ofthe silent, cellularcontractionof the body in pain and into the createdworld. This isthedynamicwhich the OldTestamentcriptures eek to conveyin their narrativereat-mentof the relationshipsbetweenIsrael, he body in pain, and its Creator,particularlyas they relate to wounding and creation.1000


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God'sposition as the site of artifice.By the same token, iconoclasm, the de-struction of the artifactswhich purport to represent God in a catastrophicevent, is the antidote to man'sprideful claims and the path to political regen-eration. Let us note that iconoclasm is not limited to the smashing of idols; itincludes the breakingof bodies as well. The prophets continually warn of theconsequences following upon Israel's ntractablebehavior.

Blesseds he who fears he Lord lways;Buthewhohardens is heartwillfall ntocalamity Proverbs8: 14)He whois oftenreproved, etstiffens isneckwillsuddenly ebroken eyondhealing.Proverbs9:1)Ihavepersistentlyentmyservantsheprophetsothemdayafter ay,yet heydidnot istenome,or nclineheear, ut tiffenedheir eck...Therefore .. the dead bodies of thispeople will be food for the birds oftheair,andforthebeastsof the earth."Jeremiah:5, 32)

A whiff of calamity is salutarybecause it reminds Israelof the basic facts ofhuman sentience, it is mere body, and that God'sdispleasure may reduce Is-rael to its essential attribute a body in pain. God, whose authority over hiscreation is complete, may reverse the course of his making and destroy hiscreation. In the passage from Isaiah quoted above he concludes, "Thegrasswithers, the flower fades, when the breath of the Lord blows upon it; surelythe people is grass" Isaiah4: 7).Letus review this. Idolatry s the premierexemplarof pridebecauseit is bydefinitionan elevationof humancapacitiesbeyond category"a" nd "b" orms ofartifice o includecategory"c."Hence Isaiah 39: 18-20, 41: 29, 42: 8, 44: 9-20,46: 5-7),Jeremiah 1:16, 2:17, 7: 18, 10, 17:20), Micah (1: 7-8), and Habakkuk(2: 18-19) repeatedlyexpress deep shock at the presumptioninherentin idola-try that man'spowers of artifice are considered to rival those of God. "Theyhave burned incense to other gods, and worshipped the works of their ownhands"(Jeremiah1: 16). Faith,by contrast,consists in submission to the willof God to include his repossession of the sentient body of Israelfrom whichHe has been expelled by rebellious pride.Iconoclasm prepares the way for the reoccupation of Israelby God be-cause it is attended by cataclysmand consequent to cataclysmis the wound-ing of Israel.Woundingis an essential element within the trajectoryof politicalregeneration because only thus is Israel reduced to a body in pain (Scarry1985: 198-210), hence deworlded, hence in need of having its world restoredthrough the extensions of artifice made possible by the Artificer.A centraldramaof the Old Testament-the crushing of Israel'spride by an event whichdemonstrates God's prowess - conflates wounding with divine creation.

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Wounding is necessary to the drama of political regeneration,as it is visual-ized in the HebraicBible, because only thus can Israel be reminded that it isperishable,mortal,sentient-a body in pain-and only thus can Israelachieveawareness of the role of its Maker n liberatingit-through artifice- from itscell of silent and painful contraction. The conflation of wounding and politi-cal creationis so pronounced in the Bible that the most extreme form of pun-ishment is not the prophesied catastrophe, itself, but the deprivation ofsentience necessary to comprehend its object lesson.

Hear and hearbut do not understand;see and see but do not perceive.Makethe heartof this people fat,and their earsheavy,and shut theireyes;lest they see with theireyes,and hearwith theirears,and understandwith theirhearts,and turnand be healed. (Isaiah6: 9-11)

When God wishes to punish pharaoh he not only sends plague but hardenshis heart(Exodus 10). Thus the worst punishment for pride is not necessarilyadversitybut deprivationof the characteristicsof sentient life and, hence, thevery possibility of regeneration.

Conversely,belief, an intentional state which is the opposite of pride, isstronglyreinforcedby Old Testamentpassages.As pride is a resistanceto theoccupation of Israel'sbody by the Artificer,so belief is characterizedby themalleability of Israel to God'sintentions. The objective of the covenant re-newal ceremonies of the Old Testament(Exodus 20-24, Deuteronomy 20-24)is to evoke the circumstanceswhich occasion belief: the contraction of Israelto embodied pain duringits period of bondage and enslavement, its opportu-nities for self-extension through the activities of the primary Artificer,themanner in which belief in the Artificerhas, in fact, produced this self-exten-sion, the opportunities for furtherremakingwhich arise from this.The intentional statesand preoccupationswhich informprophetic icono-clasm in Jeremiahare also present in Hobbes. Hobbes's admonitions to the"childrenof Pride,"by whom I understandhim chiefly to mean religious andpolitical elites (see Baumgold 1990; Hobbes 1990), is tied to the circumstancethat he relies upon them for an intuitive appreciationof his biblically derivedargument for civil authority.This is an argument which trades upon all thesignificantthemes of biblical discourse. As Hobbes invokes the powers of the"MortallGod"as the appropriateresponse to the children of pride so must thepredicament to which he is responding be seen as biblical as well. This pre-dicamentmaybe statedin termsof the intractable, roward,cranky, tiff-neckeddisposition of Israel (and their modem descendants!) toward their Artificer,

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the vaingloriouspridewhich makesthem thinkthemselveshis equal,theforgetting f originsandcovenantobligations,he competitionamongreli-giousandpolitical liteswhoaimto usurpsovereignty,ndthus the need forawounding, avagepen,Hobbes!!!,o shatter he idols,and to bringmen toan awareness ftheirdependence ntheArtificer. husstated, heperceptionof theproblem owhichLeviathans addresseds biblically nspiredand so istheproposed resolution.Thepenultimateine of Leviathanherethesover-eignispictured verawing the hildrenofpride"Leviathanh. 28, 221:E.W3: 307) could have been writtenbyJeremiah ecause he objectof attack sidolatrouspride,a "vain i.e., delusional)conceit" hat the powersof manrivalthose of the mortalGod"towhichwe owe, under the ImmortalGod,ourpeaceand defence"Leviathanh. 17, 120. E.W.3: 158).Asnoted, conoclastic ttacks,ifanything,moregenerallytatednHobbesthan in the prophets. It extends beyond the making of graven images(Deuteronomy4: 28, Isaiah 39: 18-20, Jeremiah1: 16, 10: 5-6) to theattribution fsanctityo,"an mage, ranyCreature,ither he matterhereof,oranyFancy"Leviathanh.45,449,452, E.W.3:653, 656).ButwhileHobbesbroadenshescopeof theattack,he better o embrace he attributionfsanc-tityto mental magesand thusto deal with the vainphilosophyof AristotleandscholasticismLeviathanh.8, 59: E.W3:70),theobjectof attack emainsthe sameas in Jeremiah,.e., to remindthe pridefulof the factsof humansentienceandof theirdependenceon thegreatArtificer,heMortallGod,towhom,under he immortalGodpeaceanddefense s owed(Leviathanh. 17,120, E.W.3: 158).Ultimately,he objectof iconoclasticattack s to stabilizethe site of artificenow transferredrom the Artificer f Israel o man, themakerand thematterof the leviathan tate.

Those who are the object of Hobbes'sattack-it is a long list-are theCatholicChurchLeviathanh.46, 47);theChurchwhichhaspresumedmostof ReformationLeviathanh. 12, 86; E.W.3:109);the hyperconscientious(Leviathanh. 7, 48; E.W. 3: 53); vain gloriousmen (Leviathan h. 11, 72; E.W.3: 88);"higher"atures Leviathanh. 15, 107;E.W.3:140);rich andpotentsubjects Leviathanh. 30, 233;E.W.3:324);thosetakenwith a vainconceitof their own wisdom(Leviathan h. 13; 87. E.W3:110 ); the privatelyn-spired Leviathanh 8: 55;E.W.3: 64).This istingshouldnot divertattention rom hepremier bjectof attackwhichis Aristotleandhis descendants.And the reason or thismaybe evi-dent. First,the attribution f efficacy o mental mages,the tudes, ies,andseparatedssencesywhichAristotlendhis descendants onsideredheworldto be governed, its Hobbes's echnicaldefinitionof idolatryabove.Second,Aristotelianismuppliesaglossuponnaturewhich s theantithesis f Hobbes'sbeginningpoint.Nature, orHobbes, s not simplythosephantasmswhich

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Political esearch uarterlyremain to mind following the conceptual exercise of imagining away theworld (E.W. 1: 91-2) but it is the experienceof the world's absence. Hencethe obliterating, deworlding force of pain, "thelife of man, solitary, poore,nasty, brutish, and short," is the beginning point for Hobbes and opposedto this, solely, are the achievements of artifice (Leviathanch. 13, 89; E.W.3: 113) through which the world is restored. Aristotle's a priori investiga-tion of nature cannot engage the Hobbesian perspective because to do sowould require surrender of an exclusively conceptual manner of encoun-tering the world. Much stress is laid by Hobbes on the sword of the sover-eign as a means of defeating pride and securing covenants made (Leviathanch. 28, 221; E.W.3: 307). Butprior to the sword of the sovereign is Hobbes'siconoclasm which, like Jeremiah's, is intended to deworld us, and thus toput us in a frame of mind to be receptive to the interventions of artifice.

Having proposed Hobbes's filiation with the later prophets, let us ac-knowledge some qualifications. First, one cannot imagine Hobbes becom-ing offended, as is true ofJeremiah, about "committing adultery with stoneand tree" (Jeremiah 3: 9). He just assumes that insofar as these impulsesremain they are of such a marginal character as not to constitute an ob-stacle to the forms of self-extension which the state makes possible. Thedesacralization of nature is assumed to be complete. Second, the object ofJeremiah's iconoclasm is to restore a covenant with the Artificer, whereasthe evident intent of Hobbes's iconoclasm is to enhance opportunities forcategories "a"and "b" orms of artifice. Another way of putting this is thatHobbes valorizes only category "a" nd "b" orms of artificewhile the proph-ets treat these with deep suspicion because of their implied relation withcategory "c" issues. Third, Hobbes's elevation of the monarchical sover-eign to Mortal God itself invites iconoclastic attack. Hobbes's defense ofmonarchy restores a dilemma familiar to the students of the Old Testa-ment. For the installation of the kings as God's representatives on earthdeposes the kingship of God over Israel (1 Samuel 10: 17-20). Hosea makesa direct link between Israelite kingship and the successive development ofidolatrous worship. He says

Theymadekingsbutnot throughme.Theysetup princes,but withoutmy knowledge.Withtheirsilverandgold theymade dolsfor theirowndestruction.(Hosea:4)

Hobbes pretends to do no more than to restorethe biblical solution, the kingsare sanctioned by God. Thereforeit cannot be idolatrous (Leviathanch. 12,88, E.W 3: 108) to be their obedient subjects. This saves his position. Butit is1004


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reasonably evident that Hobbes is exposed to iconoclastic attack from thevery sources on which he is dependent and that he knows it (Leviathan h. 45,447-55, E.W. 3: 650-58).Let us return to the question raised at the outset of this essay, "What isHobbes'srelation to Old Testamentprophetic tradition?"This relation is trun-cated. While he looks back to the iconoclasm of Jeremiahas the inspirationfor his attackon contemporaneous idolatries and while the biblical idea of acreatednature occupies a foundational place in mounting this attack, never-theless, the object of the attack is not to restore obedience to the ImmortalGod, or,at least it would seem, not primarilyThe attackis in the service of thestate, an artifactof man, and the forms of self-extension heralded by this arti-fact.10 nsofaras prophetic tradition may be invoked to mount an attack onthe state, it is clear that Hobbes regards it as an irrelevant and dangerous,historical anachronism (Leviathan h. 32, 258-59, ch. 36, 290, 298, E.W 3:364-65, 412, 425). A possible explanation for Hobbes'ssweeping dismissal ofthe prophets is that having revitalizeda tradition that may be arrayedagainstthe monarchy,he wished to put some distance between himself and it. Evenso, insofaras the prophets invoke ajudgment in behalf of biblically inspired,collective values, Hobbes is most certainly a prophet. Eisenach suggests theterm "prophet"of "humanepolitics"or "prophetichumanism"as apt for theambiguous position takenby Hobbes in relation to the scripturesand modemliberalism.11More to the point for the view offered here is that Hobbes is aprophet in the service of category "a"and "b" orms of artifice.

10Freudcatchesthe spiritof this distinctivelymodernenterpriseof Hobbesin a passagewhich bears comparisonwith the triumphant isting of the extensions of artificeinLeviathan.He writes:"With verytool man is perfectinghis own organs,whether mo-tor or sensory,or is removingthe limits to their functioning.Motorpower places gi-ganticforcesat his disposal,which, like his muscles,he can employ in any direction;thanksto ships andaircraftneither waternor air can hinder his movements;by meansof spectacleshe correctsdefectsin the lenses ofhis own eye;by means of the telescopehe sees into the fardistance;andby meansof the microscopehe overcomesthe limitsofvisibilitysetby the structureof his retina.Inthephotographiccamerahe has createdan instrumentwhich retains he fleetingvisualimpressions, ust as a gramophonediscretainsthe fleetingauditoryones;both areatbottom materializations f the powerhepossessesof recollection,his memory.Manhas, as it were,becomea kind of prostheticGod (Freud1961: 42-43; cf. Leviathanh. 13, 89; E.W3: 113).11Eisenach(1981: 56). CompareMitchell(1993a: ch. 2 and 1993b: 79-100). The ac-count offered here contrastswith Mitchell'swhile remainingcompatiblein other re-spects. Forexample,the dilemma of man'spridefulnature is said by Mitchell to waituntil St. Paul to receive attention.Bycontrast,I locate this issue in the laterprophets.

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CLOSESome accountsof Hobbes, in contrastto the view above, rejectthe idea ofbiblical nfluence,12 otherinterpretations f Hobbesacknowledge heimportanceof biblical nfluence,while limitingits extent.13This is unfortunatebecauseit is

Similarly,whereas Mitchellsays that the dilemmaof man'ssinful pride remainsunre-solved priorto Christ'satonement,I believe the ascriptionof sentience to God in thelaterprophetsanticipates he resolutionof theNew Testament. n IsaiahGodis referredto as cryingout "likea womanin travail"Isaiah42: 14), inJeremiahHis eyes become"a ountainof tears" eremiah 9: 1) and He speaksof himself as grievously"wounded"(Jeremiah10: 19). When God takes on the characteristicsof human sentience, thenarratives f wounding and creation,so characteristic f the Old Testament,aretrans-formed.Christ,whosebody s brokenor us, reenacts the familiarbody breakingnarra-tives centered on pride; at the same time He acknowledgesand legitimizes humansufferingand redirectsartifice, herapeutically,oward ts alleviation.Interestingly,heprophetsderidethe worshipof idols preciselybecause, lackingthe propertiesof sen-tience, they lackthe healingpowerof God (Jeremiah10: 5; Isaiah44: 9-20). A furtherpoint of contrast s that Hobbes's tresson man as artificer, irelessly aboringto over-come the adversitiesof humansentience,and indeed creatinghis own identityin his-tory,mayaddressman'sspiritualneedinwaysthatgo beyondtheaccountwhichMitchellprovides.Lastly,he limitson politicalsovereigntyarising romtheHobbesiancovenantput in doubt the savingrole attributedby Mitchellto the state.For a discussionwhichstressesthe limits on sovereignty mposedby the covenantrelationsee Coleman(1977and 1974: 57-89). Also see Scarry 1985: 210-21, 230-32).

12 Forexample,Johnstonstates that Hobbesemploysbiblical discourseas a cloak withinwhich is concealeda very different,modem, and scientificmessage.He contends thatthe objectof Hobbes's eview of importantdoctrinesof Christian eaching n Leviathan(Pts. IIIand IV)relating o miracles,prophecy, he authorityof scripture, he natureofGod,the status of thesoul, is to subjectthemto rationalistic riteriawhich subvert heirmeaning.The result of this corrosiveanalysisis that we are transformed nto "morerationaland predictablebeing consistent with the thrustof PartsI and II, ratherthanconformed o Christian rthodoxy.Thisaccountturnson a distinctionbetweenHobbes'sreal and apparent ntentions,his esotericcontrastwith his exotericdoctrine;it is as-sumedthroughout hat Hobbes'shiddenagenda s to convertus all into scientific,ratio-nal choice actors,a view which commendsitself to those who see Hobbesin a similarlight (Johnston1986: 134). And see Curley(1989-90: 162-249); Hampton(1988). Foran accountwhich, likeJohnston's,presentsHobbesas the progenitorof a distinctivelymodem ideaof "scientificnlightenment"utwhich,unlikeJohnston,viewsthis achieve-ment with forebodingsee Kraynak1990).

13Followingthe eschatologicalversionof historypresentedby Hobbes in Leviathanch.35), Eisenachallowsthe existenceof a biblical nfluenceon Hobbesonly in a weakandepiphenomenalsense. The shortcomingin Eisenach's and Pocock's) nterpretation,accordingto the view offeredhere, is that it limits the scope of biblical influence toChristian schatology, erhapsaconsequenceof focusingupon Hobbes'splace n Protes-tant,post-Reformation,ectarianontroversy.eeEisenach1981)andPocock 1973: 174).1006


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Hobbes'sconoclasm

possiblethat the Bible,correctlyused, would assistthese same scholars n illumi-natingtheirown arguments. ohnston,as an example,refusesto acceptHobbes'sown affirmations hat his "materialism"s coincident with and possiblyderivedfrom biblical sources (Leviathan h. 34, 35). He representsHobbes as havingwrested biblicaltext to camouflagea materialisticphilosophyarrivedatby inde-pendentmeans.Nevertheless, f by "materialism"e meanthe transformationfthe worldinto artifact,here s possiblyno major extmore materialistic han theBible, a view confirmedby a number of authors (Scarry1985; White 1987;Kaufman1972; Foster 1934). It is true that the prophets, as we have noted,are deeply suspicious of artifice directed to extending human powers andcapacities;but, even so, the principle of transformingthe world into artifactremainsand thus becomes available forappropriationand redirectionby oth-ers (e.g., Hobbes). Hobbes is quite right, therefore,to discover the origins ofhis philosophy of artificein the Bibleand his statements to that effect shouldbe taken as what he meant to say.It is also unfortunate to restrict the influence of the Bible to Christianeschatology. The central figure in Eisenach's and Pocock's interpretationof Hobbes is the Christianprotagonist caught between the conflicting claimsof "Rationall"vs. "Prophetique"forms of political rule (Leviathanch. 246,E.W. 3: 345) during a period of God'swithdrawal from history. Pivotal tothis account are Hobbes's remarks on the "kingdom"of God as variouslyconceived in history and his reflections on the manner in these concep-tions shape the prospective loyalties of the members of common-wealth(Leviathanch. 12, 31, 35). One may concede that God'sredemptive inter-vention in history is central to the scriptures and that Hobbes is wrestlingwith the political implications of this in the passages to which these au-thors point. But God'sredemptive activity in history is not the only narra-tive of significance in the Bible - there is the creation epic - and, it ispossible that the Bible is conceptually more diverse than the Second-Com-ing- there is the idea of nature as God's artifact and of iconoclasm as thepath to a regenerative politics. The present interpretation has attemptedto retrieve these biblical themes for an understanding of Hobbes.

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Received:February6, 1977Accepted:June 4, [email protected]

coleman (1998) hobbes's iconoclasm

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