colonel (gs) helmut heckhttpassets... · ied trend 2008 – january 2013. 0 200 400 600 800 1000...

10th Annual Conference of the Group of Experts on Amended Protocol IIApril 2013

“Counter-IED in AFGHANISTAN from a German perspective.Lessons learned and best practices“

Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command

Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMCurriculum Vitae

Director, C-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMColonel (GS) Helmut Heck

Date of Birth: 3 December 1956Place of Birth: Bitburg/GermanyMarital Status: Married, 2 children

From - To Assignments76 Entry into the Bundeswehr, Signal Intelligence Battalion 940 (Daun)76 - 79 Training to become signals intelligence NCO/officer79 - 83 Education studies at the Bundeswehr University (Munich)83 - 88 Platoon Cdr and Company Cdr, 3 Coy/Signal Battalion 220 (Donauwörth)88 - 91 Departmental Head of Mobile Signal Intelligence at the Army Office (Cologne)91 - 96 Company Cdr, 4 Coy/Signal Battalion 220 and Chief Evaluation, Signal Battalion 22096 - 98 G2 Ops, II (GE/US) Corps (Ulm)98 - 01 Cdr, Signal Regiment 320 (Frankenberg/Eder)01 - 04 Chief Evaluation, Signals and Electronic Intelligence Brigade 94 /Signal Group 93 (Daun)04 - 06 Electronic Warfare Staff Officer, J3 Division, Strategic Reconnaissance Command (Rheinbach)06 - 09 MoD, Army Staff III 5 (Bonn)09 - 12 Director, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Information Centre (Grafschaft-Gelsdorf)Since 2012 Director, Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices Centre (Grafschaft-Gelsdorf)

8 April 2013 2

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMAgenda

1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals

3. Counter-IED - Lessons Learned Technology Methods Equipment Training ”Own TTPs”

38 April 2013


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


48 April 2013

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM2. The IED Threat

From open internet sources

5

25.12.2011

Madalla, Nigeria

10.05.2012

Damaskus, Syrien

8 April 2013

Djerba, Tunisia Instanbul, Turkey Madrid, Spain Beslan, Russia

London, Great BritainDahab, EgyptMadalla, Nigeria Northwest province,PakistanDamascus, Syria

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM2. The IED Threat

Source: CFC - www.cimicweb.orgJIEDDO - www.jieddo.mil (without IRQ & AFG)

(UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO) 25-MONTH AVERAGES1. IED-Events (per month)-525 INCIDENTS1,

• 272 DETONATIONS • 253 FINDS

-69 CACHES

2. Casualties (per month)319 KILLED 854 WOUNDED

3. Top CountriesColombiaPakistanSyriaIndiaUSA

68 April 2013

1 Incidents includes detonations and finds

http://www.cimicweb.org/

http://www.jieddo.mil/


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


78 April 2013

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM

RC NORTHRC NORTH

RC EASTRC EAST

RC WESTRC WEST

RC CAPITALRC CAPITAL

RC SOUTHRC SOUTH

RC RC SOUTHWESTSOUTHWEST

BADAKHSHAN

LAGHMAN KONARNURESTAN

TAKHAR

NANGARHARVARDAK

PAKTIA

KHOWST

PAKTIKA

SAMANGAN

KUNDUZ

BAMIAN

GHAZNI

ZABUL

ORUZGAN

BALKH

SAR-E POL

JOWZJAN

FARYAB

BADGHIS

HERAT

FARAH

NIMRUZ

HELMAND KANDAHAR

DAYKONDIGHOWR

PANJSHIR

PARWANKAPISA

BAGHLAN

LOWGAR

KABUL

TKMTKM

IRNIRN

UZBUZB TJKTJK

PAKPAK

CHNCHN

ThreatThreat

High

Considerable

Medium

Low

2. The IED Threat - AFG

Source: C-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM 88 April 2013


IED Trend 2008 – JANUARY 2013

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN MAI SEP JAN

Vorfälle

Trend

4,275

8,05414,394 16,295 14,690 AFG

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

ISAF ANSF ZIV Gesamt0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

ISAF ANSF ZIV Gesamt

200820092010201120122013

Casualties 2008 – JANUARY 2013

Killed Injured/Wounded

2. The IED Threat - AFG

98 April 2013


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


108 April 2013

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM3. IED Fundamentals

An attacker is only limited by the components available and his own resourcefulness.

118 April 2013


An IED is a device manufactured and emplaced in an improvised manner, incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary or pyrotechnic substances. It is designed to kill, injure or destroy, harass or distract.C-IED Concept, FMOD, Armed Forces Staff IV 3/V 1 dated 4 December 2007

What is an IED?

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are one of the weapons of choice for an asymmetrically operating enemy. They are still the biggest threat to military forces in an asymmetric scenario.

3. IED Fundamentals

128 April 2013


Production of HME Storage of HME

3. IED Fundamentals

13

The enemy is innovative, adaptive and unscrupulous!The enemy is innovative, adaptive and unscrupulous!

• INEXPENSIVE, EASY to build using commercial technology and easy to emplace• IED components readily available throughout the area, no lengthy procurement

processes• Small RISK – Big SUCCESS, precise and lethal• Demoralise the population, create an instable security situation• Turn the population against governmental organisations / ISAF• Unlimited opportunities for production and proliferation

WHY IEDs? Employment and Effects

8 April 2013


Power Source

Firing Switch Main Charge

Initiator+

-

Container

An IED usually contains five components. Building an IED

3. IED Fundamentals

148 April 2013


Main Charge Commercial Explosives

Military Explosives

Homemade Explosives (HME)

Common Explosives in IEDs

3. IED Fundamentals

158 April 2013


59

2 2 2

18

17

Ammonium nitrate(AN)Ammonium nitrate/Aluminium(ANAL)Potassium Chlorate (PC)

Potassium Nitrate

Urea nitrate

other

In per cent of analysed IEDs

HME Mixtures in Afghanistan

More than 80 per cent of the main charges in Afghanistan are made from homemade explosives (HME). Commercial explosives were found only in a small number of IED incidents.

Main ingredients in HME in Afghanistan:

3. IED Fundamentals

168 April 2013


Production Facilities and Smuggling Routes

Match Facility

AN Facility

AN Flow

PC Flow

Urea Facility

3. IED Fundamentals

178 April 2013


Vehicle Track

Main Charge

Battery

Receiver

Transmitter

A radio-controlled IED is a command-operated IED (COIED). RCIEDs use a remote controlled firing system consisting of a transmitter and a receiver. The transmitter sends a signal to the receiver. Upon reception of the signal, the firing circuit is completed, the electrical initiator is activated by the power source and the IED is caused to detonate.

Example: Radio Controlled IED (RCIED)Electronic firing switches

The most common RC switch in Afghanistan is based on a modified commercial garage door opener.

Commercial receiver board with self-made decoder board Commercial transmitter

3. IED Fundamentals

188 April 2013


Most of the commercial electronic components used in IEDs in Afghanistan are made in China.

They are sold worldwide by several (internet) shops.

Electronic firing switches

3. IED Fundamentals

198 April 2013


2004 2005 2008 2009 2010

RCIED

SIED

VOIED

CWIED

NMCPPLMCPP

ECM equipment

Protection and jamming equipment

Increased use of

RCP and metal detectors

200720062003 2011

INS

2012

RCIEDRC-N

3. IED Fundamentals

2013

208 April 2013


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


218 April 2013


ENEMY TTPLESSONS

IDENTIFIED

LESSONS

IDENTIFIED

LESSONS

IDENTIFIED ?

?

ENY RCIED Switch Techniques

RCIED Main Switch Type Threat

RCIED Switch Type

RCIED Different Switch

Type Threats

RCIED Switch Type

RCIED Programmable

SwitchType Threats

RCIED SwitchType

ECMresponsive FP against various RCIED threats

responsive• switch type

signal detection

• flexible reaction

• Threat assesment

LESSONS

IDENTIFIED

ECMFP against

RCIED main threat

non programmable“one fits all“

solution

OWN TTPsLESSONS

IDENTIFIED

ECMprogrammable

FP against various RCIED

threats

programmable• signal power• frequency• waveform

LESSONS

IDENTIFIEDConclusion• ENY forces developed their TTPs and proved themselves as flexible and

challenging opponents using various & cunning RCIEDs (uneducated does not mean “dumb“)

• OWN forces strengthen their efforts to further develop flexible ECM techniques and systems to respond to the threat, conduct an effective threat assessment and take the initiative in the “invisible electronic war“

Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Technology

228 April 2013


ENEMY TTP

OWN TTP

LESSONS

IDENTIFIEDLESSONS

IDENTIFIED ?

LESSONS

IDENTIFIED

LESSONS

IDENTIFIED

no ECMno FP against

RCIED

No awareness of the RCIED threat

RCIED Against

vehicles / mounted CF

Target Acquisition• unprotected• predictable

ECMvehicle mounted

ECM FP• mounted

movements• convoys

ECM vehicle

mounted & manpack

ECM FP• mounted/

dismounted movements

• static operations

• EOD/EOR procedures

Countering EOR/EOD • EOR procedures• dismounted patrols

RCIED Against

mounted / dismounted CF

Conclusion• ENY forces reacted immediately to the lack of deployed or ineffective ECM

systems during all operations. They used RCIEDs as the weapon of choice in the RC North.

• OWN forces first misunderstood ECM as a limiting factor (communications etc.) and not as a part of force protection. Then they started deploying ECM systems and implemented ECM into pre-deployment training, leadership training and operations planning.

ENY RCIED Tactics

Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Technology

238 April 2013


Fitting selected existing vehicles with demining systems for convoy protection.Advantage

• Improved protection for patrols/convoys• Independence of engineer support (scarce resources:

RC Sys, EOD) time, reduced exposition to hostile reconnaissance

Disadvantage• Additional attachment (cost, driver training)

MRAP Bushmaster (AUS) with mine roller

IFV Bradley (USA) with mine roller

ESV Stryker (USA) with mine roller

ATF Dingo with SPARK OEF+ mine roller

SOUVIM 2 with KALIF mine roller

LEMIR mine roller fitted to armoured multipurpose vehicle

Technology

248 April 2013

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMTechnology

• Transport case with evaluation equipment

• Can be carried in backpacks during dismounted operations

• Employed to evaluate IED incidents

• Geared to field evaluation needs

258 April 2013


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


268 April 2013


QualifiedCapability

A

ExtendedCapability

B

Basic Capability

• 5/25 Check• 4 “C“• VP Check

C

EOR Procedures:

4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Methods

278 April 2013


CONFIRM

CLEAR

CORDON

CONTROL

Confirm suspected IED(from a distance, then SWEEP, if required )

Clear the area- no passing the location again, no pushing through or

splitting up,- 200 to 400 m, depending on terrain and vehicles,- continued line of sight to the suspected location/scene of

attack,- 5-25 checkCordon off- self-protection,- no-one must approach the site,- bypass site on foot, if required

Control the situation- report- secure - establish reporting point to receive support forces


Improvised Explosive Device – “4 C’s“ Policy

288 April 2013


Short halt (about 2 minutes)- 5-25 check- Communication- All-round security

25 m

5 m

Search for IEDs- Holes- Colours- Cables- Markings- Antennas- Changes

Longer halt- Security areas- Vehicle checkpoints- Situation adapted- Communication

BildSVBIED SITE

Attack- 5-25 check

25 m

5 m

25 m

5 m


Improvised Explosive Device – “5-25 Check”

298 April 2013


Note: The GSA capability has manifold applications. The graph only shows C-IED relevant GSA methods used to contribute to the protection against the general IED threat in AFGHANISTAN.

Ground Sign Awareness

ProtectionProtection

DefensiveDefensive

EOR proceduresEOR procedures

Ground Sign AwarenessGround Sign Awareness

OffensiveOffensive

C-IED TrackingC-IED Tracking Combat Tracking

Aerial and Imagery Reconnaissance

Aerial and Imagery Reconnaissance

Personal TracesPersonal Traces Tracking Hostile Forces


308 April 2013


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


318 April 2013

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOM4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Equipment

Ballistic Underwear

“Future Infantryman” Equipment

• Adapt and enhance personal equipment of every soldier

• Test ballistic underwear

328 April 2013

Version III (only soldiers with direct interface to IdZ*-system)

Version II(vehicle crew, support

troops)

basic equipmentVersion I(HQ staff)

*IdZ (DEU: Infanterist der Zukunft = Future Infantryman


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


338 April 2013


Counter-IED Training IAW Joint Training Concept C-IED, Army Office, dated 31 October 2012

4. Counter-IED Lessons Learned - Training

348 April 2013

4

3

2

1

C-IED personnel in Brig/Div-HQ and special assignment

(C-IED distinctive competencies)

C-IED personnel in Btl-HQ (C-IED advisor)

C-IED personnel in Coy (C-IED/EOC/EOD/IEDD Officer/NCO)

every soldier

QualifiedCapability

ExtendedCapability

BasicCapability

Level Personnel


Pre-Deployment Counter-IED Training to Date

NationalCounter–IED Courses

- For C-IED Personnel in Staff Assignments - For Instructors at Central Training

Facilities- Operator Course for Counter-IED Devices

Orientation Courses- Orientation for Command Personnel

at BwJFOCOM- Counter-IED Module for Command

Personnel (C-IED Seminar)


35

1.1. MissionMission--oriented conflict oriented conflict prevention and crisis prevention and crisis management trainingmanagement training

2.2. CounterCounter--IED training as part of IED training as part of missionmission--oriented conflict oriented conflict prevention and crisis prevention and crisis management training management training

3.3. PrePre--deployment Counterdeployment Counter--IED IED training to datetraining to date

4.4. PrePre--deployment Counterdeployment Counter--IED IED training since 2012 training since 2012

8 April 2013


Mission-Oriented CPCM Training Concept In Theatre Training (Outdoor)


36

Deployment

8 April 2013


5m

10m

15m

20m

0

25m

30m

35m

40m

45m

50m

55m

60m

65m

70m

75m

80m

5m 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m 35m0

5m

10m

15m

20m

0

25m

30m

35m

40m

45m

50m

55m

60m

65m

70m

75m

80m

6m

7m

8m

7m

2 m (Depth)

,5 m

,5 m

1m

3 m

10 m

10 m

15 m

16 m

,5m

,5m

,5m

,5m

Elevation of the Road and Track (2 feet)

Front

Back

Side

Top View

35 meters

20 feet

20 feet

35 meters

20 feet

20 feet

Entrance for Vehicles (Large enough for MRAP

Entrance for Vehicles (Large enough for MRAP

80 meters

35 meters

80 meters

Car

Mud WallComplex


37

Mission-Oriented CPCM Training Concept In Theatre Training (Indoor)

8 April 2013


1. The IED Threat

WORLDWIDE

AFGHANISTAN

2. IED Fundamentals


388 April 2013


ADDITIONAL BEAM EQUIPMENTSensor:- Camera (Stereo RGB)- Detector (GPR/MD)TOOLS:- Culvert-Camera- Grabber- Fork- Water- /Air Spade

4. Organisation

DEU Route Clearance System (RCSys)

398 April 2013


48h

72h – 28d

20h – 100d

VorlAuswK SOP 10371

24h/ 72h/ 7d

National ISAF

72h/ 10d/ 28d

5d/ 30d/ 100d

4. Organisation

408 April 2013

Counter-IED Centre, BwJFOCOMIED Exploitation in Afghanistan

Level 1 – Field Exploitation• Explosive Ordnance Disposal • Military Police • Intelligence

German capability

Level 2 – In Theatre Laboratory• Chemical identification • Electronics identification • Biometrics preservation (DNA, latent prints)

lead nation USA, German participation

Level 3 – Out of Theatre • Technical and scientific investigation• Forensic examination• Tactical assessment

German Capability

418 April 2013


AFG CAPTURED MATERIAL EXPLOITATION (ACME) LABORATORIES

ACME at CAMP MAZAR-E-SHARIF

- Operational Readiness since October 2010.

- Timely Examination of Evidence from RC-N Possible. Optimisation of Attack Analysis.

- DEU Contribution: Two Posts.- Electronics Specialist- Specialist Personnel for Weapons Effects

Technical Technical EvaluationEvaluation

Biometric Biometric Analyses Analyses

VorVor--OrtOrt--UntersUnters.. von Zwischenfvon Zwischenf..

4. Organisation

428 April 2013


Technical Technical EvaluationEvaluation

Biometric Biometric AnalysisAnalysis

Field Field ExploitationExploitation

ASIC

CCIRM

C-IED Advisor

ICC & ICCT

Exploitation

Pre- Deployment

Trg

SOFLE

Targeting

OPLAN

Combat Develop-

ment

4. Organisation

438 April 2013


IncidentIncident

Test ProceduresTest ProceduresDevelopment of

Vehicles Development of

VehiclesConstruction

of New VehiclesConstruction

of New Vehicles

TTPTTP

Threat AnalysisThreat Analysis

Aims of ETAV*German Level 3 “Out of theatre exploitation”

448 April 2013*Expert Group for the Technical Analysis of Incidents


“Counter-IED in AFGHANISTAN From a German Perspective.Lessons Learned and Best Practices”

Colonel (GS) Helmut Heck

Thanks For Your Attention!

458 April 2013

colonel (gs) helmut heckhttpassets... · ied trend 2008 – january 2013. 0 200 400 600 800 1000...

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