coment on fukuyama

8/8/2019 Coment on Fukuyama

1/9

Raymond Aron on the Endof the History ofInternational RelationsBRYAN-PAUL FROST

advent of a new millennium invites us to spec-

ulate on what might be called "the really bigquestions," and perhaps the biggest such questionfor the discipline of international relations iswhether the history of international relations will

someday come to an end-or indeed, whether or not italready has come to an end in principle. A little over adecade and a half ago, Francis Fukuyama asked and thenconfidently answered this question in the affirmative. In hisarticle "The En d of History?" Fukuyama wondered whetherthe impending demise of the Soviet Union and the end of theCold War did not herald an event of much greater global sig-nificance: the "unabashed victory of economic and politicalliberalism."1 In remarkably blunt but bold language,Fukuyama offered the following explanation for the triumphof the political and economic ideals of the West over thoseof the Eastern Bloc:

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the ColdWar, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history,but the end of history as such: that is, the end point ofmankind's ideological evolution and the universalization ofWestern liberal democracy as the final form of human gov-ernment. This is not to say that there will no longer be eventsto fill the pages of Foreign Affairs's yearly summaries ofinternational relations, for the victory of liberalism hasoccurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousnessand is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. Butthere are powerful reasons for believing that it is the idealthat will govern the material world in the long run.2

Bryan-PaulFrost is the James A. and Kaye L. .7roc&cerEndowed Professorof PoliticalScience and an adju, ;ro-fessor in the Departmentof Philosophy at the UniversityofLouisiana at Lafayette. He is the coeditor (with Daniel J.Mahoney) of the forthcoming book Political Reason in theAge of Ideology: Essays in Honor of Raymond Aron (Trans-actionPublishers).Copyright 2006HeldrefPublications

Three years later, Fukuyama fleshed out these ideas ingreater detail in his bestseller The End of Historyand he LastMan." In a nutshell, Fukuyama argued that there are twomechanisms that give an overall direction to history and thathave driven us to see capitalistic, liberal democracy as thefinal and most satisfying form of government: modern naturalscience and the desire for recognition. Modern natural scienceis critical in two important ways: (1) states that want to sur-vive as independent entities must engage in it wholeheartedlyif they hope to possess the latest military technology; and (2)modern science yields great economic wealth that satisfiesour appetitive desires.4 Bu t although modern natural scienceoften flourishes in a capitalistic system, we do not choose lib-eral democracy for economic reasons; rather, we choosedemocracy because of the way in which it satisfies our pride(or Platonic thymos)-because of the way in which thisregime and no other recognizes us as free and equal individ-uals.5 Now, if liberal democracy overcomes the most funda-mental social tensions within a state, then Fukuyama arguedthat the spread of liberal democracy should overcome ten-sions between states as well: if no individual has any rationalreason to dominate another within a state, then one liberaldemocracy should have no fear of being dominated by anotherin the international system.6The end of history, then, heraldsthe universal reign of peace between all states: there simplywill no longer be any reason for states to go to war.

What will produce peace in the post-historical world will notbe the fact that the major states share a common principle oflegitimacy. This state of affairs existed at times in the past,for example, when all the nations of Europe were monar-chies or empires. Peace will arise instead out of the specificnature of democratic legitimacy, and its ability to satisfy thehuman longing for recognition.... The post-historical worldis one in which the desire for comfortable self-preservationhas been elevated over the desire to risk one's life in a battlefor pure prestige, and in which universal and rational recog-nition has replaced the struggle for domination.7

75


2/9

76 Perspectives on Political ScienceAccording to Fukuyama, however, very few internationalrelations theorists have grasped the aforementioned facts.8

To say that Fukuyama's article and the book that fol-lowed it created anything less than an academic and publicfirestorm would be an understatement. Journals as differentas Technology Review, the AmericanJournalof Sociology,and the Journal of Communication reviewed Fukuyama'sarticle and book, and the controversy surrounding his thesisbecame known as Fukuyamismno in Argentina. 9 Given sucha voluminous response, it is not surprising to find that cer-tain reactions were shared by more than one person.' 0Although some critics more or less dismissed Fukuyamaou t of hand, others offered psychological and/or sociologi-cal reasons fo r the reappearance of the end-of-history thesisand the immense interest it generated. Still others arguedthat liberal democracies are no t only threatened internally(for example, by drugs, homelessness, and poverty) andexternally (for example, by nationalism, communism, andIslamic fundamentalism) but also by the possibility thatsome unknown "X-factor" might arise and challenge liberaldemocracies in the future. And finally, some reviewerspointed to a contradiction in Fukuyama's claim that liberaldemocracy is the final and most satisfying political orderand his fears, expressed in the last part of the book, that lib-eral democrats are nothing other than Nietzsche's "lastman." But looking beyond these critical responses toFuknyama's thesis, we must not forget one fact: that somany persons bothered to respond to him at all. It seemsthat Fukuyama "touched a sensitive nerve," that he raisednew and possibly disturbing questions about the meaning orspirit of our historical epoch., Th e fact that so many indi-viduals felt it necessary to respond to Fukuyama-that eventhose who vehemently disagreed with his thesis could notsilently dismiss it-strongly suggests that the issuesFukuyama raises are still relevant for contemporary politi-cal scientists.

Fukuyama may be right in saying that certain theoristshave little understanding of (or perhaps belief in) the end-of-history thesis and its implications fo r international relations-bu t this does not apply to Raymond Aron. As m any are aware,it was Alexandre Koj6ve who popularized the phrase "the endof history" during his lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit at the tcole Pratique des Hautes ttudes in the 1930s.12Along with a litany of other soon-to-be-distinguished postwarFrench intellectuals, Aron attended many of Koj6ve's lec-tures. In his Memoirs,Aron admitted that Koj6ve was one ofthe most brilliant men he had ever met, even if he remainedskeptical about Koj6ve's philosophy of history.13 Given thedeep impression that Kojeve made on Aron, we would expectthat Aron's most systematic account of the nature or historyof international relations-namely his magisterial Peace andWar-would contain some sort of argument concerning themerits and/or deficiencies of the end-of-history thesis. And, infact, I do believe that Aron addresses Koj6ve's (and Fukuya-ma's) thesis in the final two chapters of the book, fo r it is herethat Aron asks what the conditions and the likelihood are forthe end of power politics altogether. To be sure, Koj6ve isnever mentioned by name in chapters 23 and 24 (or in thebook as a whole)-but Koj6ve is rarely mentioned or dis-

cussed in any of Aron's writings, and this despite the highregard in which Aron held Koj6ve.14 It could very well be thatKoj6ve's end-of-history thesis was in the back of Aron's mindthroughout the final two chapters of Peace and War; at allevents, it certainly would no t be the first time in the history ofphilosophy that a "covert" dialogue took place between twothinkers.' 5Le t us now turn to the final two chapters of Peace andWar.1 My overall contention will be that although Aronnever categorically rules out the possibility of the universalreign of peace among all nations, he believes the chances ofit occurring are so minuscule that it is better to look forways in which wars and hostilities can be decreased inseverity rather than eliminated altogether.PEACE BY LAW AN D PEACE BY EMPIRE

According to Aron, the distinguishing characteristic ofinternational relations (as opposed to other social relations)is that they "take place within the shadow of war," or, inother words, that they involve "the alternatives of war andpeace" (6). Unlike domestic politics, where the monopolyof force is in the hands of those with legitimate authority,foreign politics deals with a plurality of armed politicalunits, each of which can legitimately resort to force to set-tle its disputes. International relations, then, are "relationsbetween political units, each of which claims the right totake justice into its ow n hands and to be the sole arbiterofthe decision to fight or not to fight" (8). As internationalrelations involve the alternatives of war and peace betweendistinct political units, should the alternative of war becomeobsolete or impossible, or should political units themselvesdisappear, then the history of international relations wouldeffectively come to an end.

At the beginning of chapter 23, Aron acknowledges thatthis question or problem is especially poignant for hisreaders:

The horrors of twentieth-century war and the thermonuclearthreat have given the rejection of power politics not only anactuality and an urgency, but also a kind of obviousness. His-toiy must no longer be a succession of bloody conflicts ifhumanity is to pursue its adventure. Never has the dispro-portion appeared so striking, so tragic, between the possiblecatastrophe and the stakes of inter-state rivalries. All classi-cal strategy... appears lamentably inadequate, measured bythe demands of peace and the dangers of war. It leads to anacknowledgement of impotence, a kind of resignation to theabsurd.I do not protest against these sentiments; I share them. Menaspire to a historical transformation of states and their relations.(703)

To see how such a transformation could occur, Aron breaksup his discussion into two parts: (1) a discussion on thepolitical, economic, and social conditions that must exist fo rinternational relations to stop being characterized as powerpolitics; and (2) an analysis of how likely these conditionsare to be realized in the foreseeable future. In answering theformer question, Aron begins by arguing that there are, ingeneral, two ways in which theorists explain the cause ofwar. Either states go to war to obtain something for them-

76 Perspectives on Political Science


3/9

Spring 2006, Volume 35 , Number 2selves (such as land or wealth) or because they are so con-stituted as to be subject to certain internal or external pres-sures (for example, capitalist countries go to war becausethey are competing for new markets or raw materials inunderdeveloped countries). In other words, certain stakesprompt nations to go to war, or there is something peculiarabout the state itself that causes it to be subject to certainbellicose pressures, whether from within or without(703-6).If what Aron says is true, then one way that peace wouldreign in the international system would be if there were asudden conversion in the character of both the stakes andthe actors. We could expect an end to international relationsonly if the traditional stakes in war ha d suddenly lost alltheir meaning or value-if gold and land and glory were nolonger the prizes we once thought they were-and if theactors themselves suddenly lost either the desire to domi-nate one another or the fear of being dominated. Aron, how-ever, severally doubts that any such conversion in the stakesand the actors will take place in the foreseeable future.Although he admits that "industrial society effectivelyattenuates the economic causes of wars" (708), even if allstates shared the same type of regime, the most that couldrealistically be expected would be the unlikelihood of a"major war between the principal actors of the internationalsystem" (708): it would not eliminate the possibility of con-flict altogether, because population pressures, limitedresources, territorial constraints, economic stagnation, andother such factors can lead to conflict and violence. Ratherthan hold out for such a radical change in the stakes and theactors, the more likely chance for universal peace would beif states relinquished their right to be the final dispenser ofjustice. In other words, Aron sees the chance of universalpeace to be much greater if the "Hobbesian situation" (orstate of nature) between states was attenuated-if statescould somehow be made or compelled to renounce the rightof using force in their own affairs (707-9).Certainly, Aron is aware that relinquishing the right touse force to settle disputes would require a change-and avery large one-in the behavior of states; but at the verybeginning of chapter 23, at least, he argues that it wouldrequire a much smaller change than would asking them tostop dominating on e another or stop desiring things such asland and wealth. In the scenario that Aron envisions, therecould still be disputes between states in the internationalsystem, but those disputes would be settled in one of tw oways: states would either have to agree to settle their differ-ences through arbitration, or they would have to allow asuperior force to impose a solution. Aron calls these twopossibilities peace by law and peace by empire: one canhope either that states will submit their grievances to inter-national tribunals and voluntarily follow the decisions ofthose tribunals, or one can establish an international powerthat is strong enough to make binding decisions on states inthe midst of a conflict (708-9).Aron begins with peace through law. Now, Aron pointsout several "essential imperfection[s]" in international law,tw o of the most significant being a logical or theoreticaltension within international law itself, and the other being

a political problem of applying that law in the real world.He notes that every theory of international law that "takesas its point of departure the sovereignty of states and, inone way or another, relates law to this sovereignty, robsinternational law of certain constituent characteristics oflaw" (722). Two of the most salient characteristics are "atribunal to express the law" and "an irresistible force toimpose it" (720). According to Aron, the principle of sov-ereignty necessarily undermines the obligatory character ofinternational law as law, a law that is supposed to be supe-rior to the state and to which states are to be held account-able. Without an acknowledged arbiter or tribunal to rendera definitive interpretation of the law, and without the meansto enforce that decision, international law falls short of thevery concept of law: at most, international law would be anexhortation, warning, or moral precept that sovereign statescould accept or reject as they saw fit. Even if states occa-sionally submitted to the decisions of international tri-bunals, the theoretical problem would still remain; forweak or spotty compliance makes a mockery of law assuch, and even good international laws become con-temptible when they are haphazardly enforced. It is littlewonder, then, that few states have confidence in the integri-ty and efficacy of international law and in the tribunals thatare supposed to interpret that law.

The theoretical tension at the core of international lawcompounds the problem of its successful application topolitical reality; by positing the "absolutism of sovereign-ty," international law actually "restrain[s] the authority oflaw and encourage[s] international anarchy" (720). As longas states retain their sovereignty, it will be extremely diffi-cult to formulate a detailed and unified set of normativeprinciples or rules of conduct that all states will follow.International law is likely to be interpreted in as many waysas there are states subject to it, and it is for this reason thatstates so often reserve the right to comply or no t to complywith a particular interpretation of international law. Despitethe "lip-service" paid to the sovereignty of international lawover domestic law, states continue to guard jealously theirautonomy, a fact that only reaffirms the essentially anarchicnature of international politics (724). We might restate thelogical and political tension within international law as fol-lows. In the first place, the principle of state sovereigntynecessarily undermines the requirement that internationallaw be superior to the state. In the second place, the princi-ple of the sovereign equality of all states makes it nearlyimpossible to articulate a single set of principles and normsto which all states will agree to be held accountable. Statescontinue to act as if they were in a state of nature-a statein which they are all free and equal to do what they see is intheir ow n vital interests-and the consequences of this facthave consistently trumped the claims of international law(see 720-23). In sum, a juridical obligation that is self-enforcing can never really be considered imperative or effi-cacious: the logical inconsistency of international lawmakes its successful political application suspect.A third "imperfection" of international law stems fromits content, or lack thereof. Aron asks: what is to be the"fundamental" or "originating norm," or set of "normative

77


4/9

Perspectives on Political Sciencefacts," that is to be posited in constructing a system ofinternational law comparable to the norms and facts thatgovern a state's internal laws (718-20)? To say nothing ofthe fact that international law is by and large '7itsEuropaeutn," a fact that would most likely limit its appealif it were made compulsory for all nations, Aron can dis-cover no principle "that is not itself a rule of thumb" thatcould govern the international system (733). Certainly, theprinciple pacta sunt servanda s "indispensable to interna-tional order," bu t Aron rightly wonders how this rather for-mulaic injunction could yield a concrete set of normativedirections and obligations for all states. As for basing inter-national law on tradition and custom, Aron muses: "Whichcustom must states respect? The recourse to force consti-tutes part of the age-old behavior of states: how condemnit in a juridical system which is supposed to be the outcomeof custom?" (718). At the end of the day, the "determina-tion of facts and the interpretation of norms" are at the dis-cretion of separate states, and we once again return to aself-enforcing (and therefore ineffective) system of inter-national law. As Aron rather wryly concludes: "When the[international] jurist asserts that 'the will of the interna-tional community must be obeyed,' it is too easy to replythat the will common to the sovereign states exists only inthe imagination of the theoretician" (718-19). Rules ofthumb are no substitute for agreed-on foundational princi-ples that guide the entire system.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Aron does not yet giveup hope of finding the conditions whereby states wouldsubmit to the rule of law. If the problems associated with theprinciple of state sovereignty are greatly exacerbated in aheterogeneous international system, then perhaps theseproblems could be overcome if the system were rigorouslyhomogeneous.17 In other words, if the leaders of states weresubject to similar political controls and norms (such asmajority rule and free and fair elections); if all states hadrepublican constitutions with similar principles of legitimacy(such as consent of the governed and rule by law); and, ingeneral, if all states espoused similar goals and aspirationsfor their people (for example, economic development andthe exercise of basic rights and freedom), then it is at leastconceivable that states could create and abide by a detailedbody of international law. But although Aron sees that theseare the necessary conditions for the rule of law, they are stillnot sufficient: in addition, each and every state would haveto agree to a renunciation of violence. States would have tostop suspecting one another of the worst intentions, andthey would have to subordinate their desire to exercise theirwill to power to their desire to see the universal reign of therule of law, even when judgments go against their perceivedvital interests. In the broadest possible terms, what Aron istrying to get us to see, I believe, is that the successful oper-ation of international law is always a side-effect of a preex-isting state of international harmony and stability, and not acause of it: the successful application of international law isalways the outgrowth of some underlying, near-unanimousagreement between states, and without that prior agree-ment, the mere profusion of rules and regulations will havelittle, if any, effect on global stability (733-36; cf. 712,

716-17, 724).18 International law, therefore, will not makea substantial contribution to peace unless states themselveshave more or less completely overcome their distrust andfear of one another.19

Not surprisingly, when Aron comes around to evaluatingwhether there has been any progress in international lawover the course of so many decades, his conclusion is largelynegative. He judges such progress according to three stan-dards: transnational society, the homogeneity or hetero-geneity of the international system, and "the consciousnessof the human community" (731). Although he admits thatglobal communications and transportation have becomemore or less instantaneous, the heterogeneity of the interna-tional system has severely hampered the full blossoming oftransnational society: too many souls were imprisoned inrepressive regimes, and this "destroys the moral unity ofhuman community" (731). Of course, Aron wrote this dur-ing the Cold War, and we might be tempted to conjecturethat he would revise his remarks today. But-to say nothingof the new global divide between the West and the Islamicworld, continuing repression in North Korea and elsewhere,and economic stagnation and civil strife plaguing Africa-Aron cautioned that even in a homogeneous system,responses to global events vary widely depending on thestate in question and that all states are, in the final analysis,responsible for their own security and prosperity. But per-haps Aron's most telling point transcends homogeneous andheterogeneous systems altogether. "Men react to a naturalcatastrophe as to a misfortune which touches all humanityand the humanity within each man.... But how rare andweak are these shared emotions compared to the nationaland ideological emotions which unite people or blocs anddivide humanity!" (732). We may sympathize with friendsand foes alike when it comes to a natural disaster; it is notso clear that we rejoice and grieve alike when it comes toeconomic and political events. Aron's conclusion seems asaccurate now as it was during the Cold War: "Today it iseven less true than yesterday that an event receives, aroundthe globe, the same judgment, whether just or unjust, favor-able or contrary to liberty" (732).

At all events, by the very end of chapter 23, Aron won-ders whether the conditions for peace by law would notinevitably lead to a global federation or empire: after all, ifthe international system were rigorously homogeneous, andif states did in fact renounce their right to take up arms, thenwhat would prevent them from granting the authority toenforce the rule of law to some supranational regime? Aronseems to suggest that the conditions for the existence ofpeace by law ultimately boil down to the conditions forpeace by empire: to require states to comply with the deci-sions of an international tribunal is, in essence, to ask themto transfer some of their sovereignty to a supranationalregime, thereby giving international law its obligatory char-acter as law (cf. 713, 716-17, 724, 736).Now, Aron believes that one of the first examples hisreaders will conjure up to illustrate the general idea of peacethrough empire is the Common Market (o r EuropeanUnion): the Common Market has the right to make certaindecisions that the member states are obliged to follow,

78


5/9

Spring 2006, Volume 35, Number 2although this does not erase the sovereignty of the states assuch. But although Aron admits that there is some truth tothis example (745-46), it would be wrong to imagine thatthe simple establishment of a transitional regime will on itsown lead to the type of regime that could effectively elimi-nate the possibility of war altogether. "[T]he formation of aCommon Market does not lead, either by juridical necessityor by historical necessity, to an authentic federation" (746).Aron sees as one of the "great illusion[s] of our times"(748) the belief(s) that technological and economic integra-tion will inevitably lead to political unification, that stateswill renounce having separate foreign policies and standingarmies, and that a common political will will arise betweenthem. Aron does not categorically rule out this possibility,but it would have to be desired by the peoples and leadersthemselves and would not emerge as a kind of natural out-growth of integration, pure and simple. Politics, or the polit-ical, has a primacy in international relations that cannot bereduced to economic considerations: economic integrationmay help shape political decisions, but it certainly does notdetermine them. Aron, then, takes issue with one of the pre-dominant themes of our time-namely, that situations ofcomplex economic interdependence necessarily createexpected patterns of behavior between states that ultimatelyinfluence and constrain their political actions. Similar to thesuccessful application of international law, situations ofintegration and interdependence are the result and not thecause of prior political actions on the part of the statesinvolved (746-48).

But there is a deeper reason wh y it is highly unlikely thatstates would be willing to sacrifice their political sovereignty(as opposed to some of their economic sovereignty) at thealtar of a universal empire of states: nations respond to andare an outgrowth of a people's desire to express their uniqueand autonomous culture or character. "[T]he modem nationin Europe consists precisely of the conjunction of a com-munity of culture and a desire for autonomy" (750). Aronreadily acknowledged that not every political unit in theworld today could claim to be a nation in this sense, and hewas equally aware that the community of culture was"never entirely one and homogeneous" (750-51) and that itcontained disparate elements within it. Nevertheless,through centuries of "force" and "bloodshed," certainnations ha d coalesced to achieve an (admittedly "never per-fect") "singular grouping of beliefs and behavior"-"aunion of culture and politics, history and reason" (750-51)."The nation has its language and its law, which it ha sreceived from the past and which express a unique calling.Citizens seek to live together, to establish their ow n laws inorder to make a contribution to the human enterprise which,without them, would not exist" (750-51). Fo r Aron, a uni-versal empire would necessarily efface this wondrous mul-tiplicity, in which each nation, as in a fine tapestry,"express[es] the wealth of human possibilities. The diversi-ty of cultures is not a curse to be exorcized but a heritage tobe safeguarded" (750-51). This is not to deny that humanbeings also think of themselves in universal terms and thatthey can feel connected to and obligated toward others inways that transcend national borders: indeed, Aron suggests

that in certain areas (such as resource conservation and allo-cation, or population control) it might be better if the humanrace approached these problems as if they were a "singlecollectivity." But this desire fo r universalism is much weak-er than attachment to the nation, precisely because con-sciousness of the community of all human beings is muchweaker than the consciousness of our national society (748,751-53). In fact, the possibility of the former is based onthe latter, and it is thereby more diluted in its intensitybecause it is more general.With these thoughts in mind, Aron argues that a betterchance to achieve peace by empire while still preserving thecommunities of culture would be through a global federa-tion along the lines of the Swiss Confederation: it is theconfederation, and not the separate cantons, that has astanding army and an independent foreign policy, and it isto the confederation that the cantons look when they havedisputes among themselves. Aron ends his discussion inchapter 24 by asking two questions: (1) What conditionswould have to be met for such a global federation to comeinto existence? and (2) Would such a federation be contraryto nature? (752-53). To establish a universal federationwould more or less require the same conditions required bypeace through law. First and foremost, states would have torenounce the recourse to arms. This, in turn, would requirethe rigorous homogeneity of the international system, simi-lar governments and goals between all the states involved,and the creation of a supranational political and militaryregime that would settle disputes and enforce compliance.In essence, this form of peace by empire would requiredepriving states of their "external sovereignty"-"thestate's right of determining justice without appeal"-whileat the same time not depriving them of the management oftheir internal affairs as separate states (753). And this is pre-cisely the crux of the problem according to Aron. On theone hand, if states were deprived of military and a signifi-cant amount of political sovereignty-of their ability to bethe final arbiter in cases of justice-then to what would thestate be reduced, and would it retain enough dignity to becalled a (sovereign) state at all? On the other hand, if onedoes no t strip political and military sovereignty from states,then how is peace by empire ever to be achieved (753-54,758-59)?Notwithstanding such practical difficulties, Aron's moreinteresting ruminations revolve around whether this is con-trary to human nature. Turning first to Carl Schmitt, Aronargues that the friend-enemy distinction does not prove thathuman collectivities are necessarily hostile; instead, themost that one can claim is that as long as states are in a stateof nature, this distinction will obtain, and no t that the stateof nature is an inherent and permanent part of humannature. The more essential issue is whether this distinctionis a manifestation that hostility is a constitutive part ofhuman beings. If so, then no social order would be able toeliminate conflict altogether but at most could only trans-pose it to a higher or different level. In the case of a globalfederation (lacking an external enemy), that hostility wouldmanifest itself as internal civil strife, and such tensionscould, over time, destroy the federation itself. Aron rightly

79


6/9

Perspectives on Political Scienceargues that this transposition of conflict has been witnessedthroughout history as entities arise and define themselves inrespect to specific threats, only to dissolve once thosethreats are eliminated. Would the same occur in a globalfederation that had effectively dissolved the external sover-eignties of political units, or would it instead lead to lessvolatile disagreements between peoples, which could besolved peacefully? Aron underlines that this is no longer anidle question: in the post-World War H era, history will be"universal" and include the "whole of the human race" andthus the question of the transposition (or not) of hostilitycannot be avoided. And perhaps surprisingly, Aron does notgive a categorical answer to this question. On the one hand,he says that hostilities will remain: if, as Hegel claimed, agroup of nations came together to form an alliance orleague, that league, "in its individuality" would more thanlikely "generate opposition and create an enemy."2' On theother hand, he wonders whether human beings would notbecome more pacific and tolerant if they knew that theirsecurity and welfare were taken care of. Rather than specu-late on an answer to this question, Aron feels that the inter-ests of peace are better served by , instead, seeking ways toencourage states to moderate their rivalry, ac t prudentlywith weapons of mass destruction, and be more cautious indemands and claims (755-58).21

At the end of the day, if the chance for realizing peace byempire boils down to the chance of realizing peace by law,then neither event is ever likely to occur, nor the end of the his-tory of international relations. What Aron's analysis helps topu t in perspective is the following idea: even ifyou begin withthe most optimistic assumptions about bringing about univer-sal peace-namely, asking states to forgo the use of force bysubmitting to international law or empire-the conditions bywhich this could be realized would require a radical change inthe very nature of states and the meaning of the stakes forwhich they fight. You simply cannot hope to attenuate the stateof nature without inevitably asking for the conversions of theactors and the stakes; and, as Aron had remarked in the begin-ning of chapter 23, this is almost too fanciful to imagine,requiring as it would a fundamental change in human nature(708-9, 756). Of course, this means that Aron believes thatinternational relations, or the alternatives of war and peace,will remain a permanent fixture of human history as long asstates remain what they are.AN ARONIAN CRITIQUE OF FUKUYAMA(AND A KOJAVEAN REPLY)

We can bring into sharper relief Aron's thoughts on theend of the history of international relations by briefly sug-gesting, in this concluding section, the main criticisms hemight have offered had he been able to review Fukuyama'sbook. Th e reason I wish to offer an Aronian-inspired cri-tique of Fukuyama rather than one based on his principalphilosophical inspirateur s that most persons are probablymore familiar with the outlines (if not the details) ofFukuyama's thesis than with Koj6ve's rich and voluminousoeuvre. To offer an informed critique of Koj6ve himselfwould ultimately require immersing oneself in that oeuvre,

seeing that Koj6ve's arguments for the end of history andthe advent of the universal and homogeneous state are basedon both his philosophy of history (which itself is groundedin his interpretation of Hegel's master-slave dialectic in thePhenonenologyof Spirit)as well as his detailed discussionof the historical evolution of right and law.2 2 This is obvi-ously beyond the scope of this essay.

Le t us recall that, in Fukuyama's version of the end ofhistory, there are two mechanisms that have driven us to seecapitalistic, liberal democracy as the final and most satisfy-ing form of government-namely, modem natural scienceand the desire fo r recognition. Now the first criticism thatAron would likely levy against Fukuyama is his thorough-going reductionism: for Fukuyama, the ultimate ground orcause of all wars and imperialism is an excess of pride orthymos. By reducing all wars to excessive manifestations ofpride-however diverse their form-Fukuyama clearlydoes no t begin his analysis from the perspective of theactors themselves: certainly diplomats down through theages would no t characterize all of their own or even theiropponents' actions as simply motivated by pride-thymos-or the desire fo r recognition.' Fukuyama tends toignore the factor that plays such a central role in Aron'sunderstanding of international politics: that states believethemselves to be the final arbiters ofjustice-that they oftenare willing to wage war to right perceived wrongs. Th echarge of reductionism is especially problematic forFukuyama. When Fukuyama himself turns to criticize real-ists such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau fo r failingto grasp the changing reality of the international system, heclaims that they mistakenly reduce all the actions of statesto a search fo r power; bu t is Fukuyama not guilty of thesame crime when he reduces the cause of all wars to pridealone? As Fukuyama himself rightly states, a concept that isused to explain everything ends up explaining nothing. Bu tif this applies to realists when they say that all states seekpower, surely it applies to some extent to Fukuyama's argu-ments as well."4

Now, Fukuyama makes a great deal about the fact thatliberal democracies do no t go to war against one another.Relying largely on the ideas ofKant in PerpetualPeaceandempirical confirmation by political scientists such asMichael Doyle and others, Fukuyama assumes that onceliberal democracies are established in every single state inthe world, wars simply will disappear as a legitimate policyoption.2: Clearly, Aron was aware of such ideas, because heargued that republican forms of government in all stateswere a necessary condition for both peace by law and peaceby empire. But, certainly, Aron would ask Fukuyama howhe is so certain that this is a sufficient condition for the endof international relations. In fact, there are good reasons todoubt this certainty, given how Fukuyama himself describesthe end of history.

Fo r example, although Fukuyama believes that much ofou r pride can be satisfied once we recognize and are recog-nized by everyone else as dignified, autonomous humanbeings, he also admits that irrational forms of pride such asnationalism or religion must exist for individuals to beattached to their state. 26 But if irrational forms of pride will

800


7/9

Spring 2006, Volume 35, Number 2exist at the end of history, what will prevent them frombeing manifested in the phenomenon of war, especiallygiven the fact that war itself is an irrational or immoderateexpression of pride? Fukuyama might respond by sayingthat irrational forms of pride will be channeled into activi-ties such as economic competition, political campaigns, orathletics; however, Fukuyama never shows that the tensionsresulting from economic competition between states mightnot reach such a feverish pitch that they would lead tobloodshed. Although this might seem like an unlikely pos-sibility, Aron at least never ruled it out. Even if a state wasbenefiting through trading with its neighbors, it could resortto violence if another state was benefiting to a much greaterextent relative to it. Or again, if the world's population con-tinues to grow at its current enormous rate, Aron perceivesthat two liberal democracies could go to war to secureaccess for their own people to absolutely vital bu t scarceresources. At all events, in Fukuyama's scheme, conflict isnot eliminated but simply transformed; however, he saysvery little regarding how or wh y this transformation willeliminate political violence between states altogether.Furthermore, if Fukuyama suggests that irrational formsof pride are sometimes needed as structural reinforcementbinding individuals to their ow n state, then how will indi-viduals feel that humanity, at large, is as dear to them as amember of their own state? That individuals must be con-cemed with the fate of humanity is recognized by bothFukuyama and Aron: the only way that separate states aregoing to be able to tolerate one another and live in peace isif they see that their common humanity outweighs any dif-ferences that exist between them as particular peoples ornations. At the very least, this means that developed nationsmust be willing to sacrifice a portion of their wealth toassist the underdeveloped, because such disparities inwealth remain potential sources of hostility between states.Overall, we might state the deficiencies of Fukuyama'sargument as follows. Although Fukuyama speaks only inpassing about international law, and not at all about peaceby empire, he does seem to agree with Aron's starting point:the best hope for the universal reign of peace lies in attenu-ating the state of nature, and not in wishing away the exis-tence of separate states. But Fukuyama goes astray or isambiguous in that, unlike Aron, he sees the possibility of achange in the state of nature without being quite clearwhether this change will be followed by a wholesale changein human nature. If Fukuyama does indeed think humannature will change, then it is unclear why separate stateswould exist at all: why would not borders simply disappearas individuals became aware of their unity as humanbeings? But if Fukuyama does not think human nature willchange, or if he thinks that human beings will alwaysremain in part somewhat irrational, then why is he so con-fident that the establishment of liberal democracy through-out the international system will on its ow n lead to univer-sal peace?In closing, let me briefly look at what Koj6ve might haveto say about Aron's analysis. Of course, the most obvious

disagreement between them is that although Aron examinedthe prospect of peace while still admitting the existence of

separate states, Koj6ve sees that universal peace can onlyarise through the overcoming of state sovereignty. The rea-son Koj6ve takes this approach rather than Aron's is quitesimple: whereas Aron looks at the problem of peace with-out counting on a radical change in human nature, Koj6vecounts on that change, and in precisely the ways Aron hadoutlined. On the one hand, Koj6ve argued that modem sci-ence and technology would continue to exploit, with evergreater efficiency and ingenuity, the power of nature, andthat this, in turn, would secure the material prosperity of allcitizens. At the end of history, natural scarcity and incomedisparities in and across states could be overcome, and thiswould mean that the traditional stakes of international poli-tics would have lost their meaning or attractiveness. On theother hand, Koj6ve also argued that the actors themselveswould undergo a fundamental change. Once the desire forrecognition is fully satisfied-and it is this desire that is themotivation of all political struggle-no one would have anyreason to dominate or to fear being dominated by someoneelse. Human beings could live in harmony with one anotherprecisely because the desire that had caused wars would havebeen satiated, and because irrational forms of this desirewould have been extirpated from human self-consciousness.Contrary to both Aron and Fukuyama, Koj6ve counts on aradical transformation of both the actors and the stakesbecause he believes that human beings have the ability totransform themselves historically according to their highestaspirations and desires. For him, there are no inherent limi-tations based in human nature, as there are for Aron, andthus there is no reason, according to Koj6ve, why humanbeings cannot put an end to the history of international rela-tions and the awful violence entailed therein if they sochoose. Notwithstanding this massive disagreement, how-ever, it is important to stress that Aron and Koj6ve bothagree that unless one counts on a conversion in humannature, there is absolutely no reason to expect the end of thehistory of international relations. Therefore, at least part ofthe value of studying the final two chapters of Peace andWar is that Aron forces us to see exactly how far someonemust go to make the case for the end of history. In thisrespect, Aron lets us see how ultimately unsatisfactory anduntenable Fukuyama's half-way house is both philosophi-cally and politically, precisely because he does not appearto see the truly radical character of the issues at stake.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTThe author would like to thank Blaine Arnold, Daniel J. Mahoney, andNathan McCune for reading and commenting on earlier versions of thisessay.

NOTES1. Francis Fukuyama, "The En d of History?" National Interest 16(1989): 3. See also his "A Reply to My Critics," National Interest 18(1989-90): 21-28.2. Ibid., 4, emphasis in original.3. Francis Fukuyama, The EndofHistoryand the LastMan (New York:Free Press, 1992).4. Ibid., xiv-xv, 71-81.5. Ibid., 122-25, 131-39, 143-208.6. Ibid., 245-65.7. Ibid., 279, 283.

81


8/9

82 Perspectives on Political Science8. It should be noted that Fukuyama seems to have backtracked a bitfrom his original thesis in the new "Afterword" he wrote for the secondpaperback edition of his book (2006). In the concluding paragraph. he

writes: "[M]y historicist view of human development has always been onlyweakly deterministic, unlike the strong determinism of Marxism-Leninism.I believe that there is a broad historical trend toward liberal democracy, andI think that there are a number of foreseeable challenges.... Weak deter-minism means that in the face of broad historical trends, statesmanship, pol-itics, leadership, and individual choice remain absolutely crucial to the actu-al course of historical development .... Thus the future is really much moreopen than its economic, technological, or social preconditions ma y suggest.Th e political choices that are made by populations that vote and by the lead-ers of our different democracies will have large effects on the strength andquality of liberal democracy in the future." Fukuyama now seems to grant amuch larger autonomy to politics or the political, even if he still believesthat the ultimate or inevitable direction of history is toward liberal democ-racy (the quality ofwhich will depend decisively on the political decisionsmade today). Interestingly, Fukuyama does no t speak about the desire forrecognition (or Platonic thynmos) in his "Afterword;' for it was this desirethat was largely responsible for giving history its directionality and purpo-siveness. He now seems to suggest that there are a range of other influencesand motivations that might affect the direction history takes.

9. See Samuel C. Florman, "The En d of History?" Technology Review93 (April 1990): 70; John A. Hall, "Review of The End of Histolyand theLast Man," American Jounial of Sociology 98 (May 1993): 1523-24;Michael Cornfield, "What Is Historic about Television?" Journalof Com-munication44 (Winter 1994): 106-16; and Michael Novak, "Beyond theEn d of History?" Fortune125 (February 24, 1992): 112.10. I do no t engage here in a review of the hundreds-if not thousands-of responses to Fukuyama's thesis. For those interested in wading throughthe critical literature, the best discussions (in general) are to be found in theNational Interest see nos. 16-18 [1989-901, 26 [1991-92], and 56 [1999])and the French journal Commentaire (see nos. 47-50 [1989-90] and 58[1992]). See also the very fine collection of essays edited by Timothy Bumsin After History?FrancisFukuyamnaand His Critics Lanham, MD: Row-ma n and Littlefield, 1994) as well as many of the essays in Histoly and theIdea of Progress, d. Arthur M. M elzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. RichardZinman (Ithaca, NY . Cornell University Press, 1995). For a list of respons-es in many American newspapers and magazines, see Guyora Binder, "Post-Totalitarian Politics," Michigan Law Review 91, no . 6 (1993): 1494 n. 9.

11 . Peter Foster, "A Whole Lotta History Goin' On,' CanadianBusiness65 (May 1992): 78 .

12. Kojhve's lectures were collected and published in 1947 as Iztroductionei la lecture de Hegel, ed. Raymond Queneau, 2nd ed. (Paris: Gallimard,1968). The abridged, English translation is hItroduction to the Reading ofHegel, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca. NY . Cornell University Press,1980). In all fairness to Fukuyama, it must be stressed that he never set him-self the task of interpreting and critically assessing Koj6ve's political philos-ophy on its own terms (even if he relied on it throughout). See Fukuyama,The End of History, 144, 192 n. 3; "Reflections on The End of History,FiveYears Later,' in After History?251-52: and "On the Possibility ofWriting aUniversal History" in History and the Idea of Progress,18 n. 11.13. Raymond Aron, Minmoires:50 ans de riflexionpolitique (Paris: Jul-hard, 1983), 94-100, 731-32. In addition to Aron, Georges Bataille, Andr6Breton, Father Gaston Fessard, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,Eric Weil, and many others attended Koj6ve's seminars at various times,and although no t all agreed with his conclusions, many of them testified tohis acumen, rigor, and great erudition.

14. As for the high regard in which Koj6ve held Aron, it should be notedthatAron and Gaston Fessard were the only two students in Koj6ve's sem-inar who were allowed, on the final day of the course, to offer a rebuttal toKoj6ve's position. See Gaston Fessard, La Philosophiehistoriquede Ray-mondAron (Paris: Julliard, 1980), 51-52.15. See, for example, what appears to be a hidden dialogue between Aronand Carl Schmitt in Philippe Raynaud, "Raymond Aron et ]a droit intema-

tional," Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique, no. 15 (1989):115-28.16. Raymond Aron, Peaceand War:A Theomy of InternationalRelations,intro. Daniel J. Mahoney and Brian C. Anderson, trans. Richard Howardand Annette Baker Fox (New Brunswick. NJ : Transaction Publishers,2003). Al l page references in this next section will be to this edition.Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasized words in quotations are con-tained in the original.17. Aron defines an international or diplomatic system as "the ensemble

constitutedby political units that maintain regular relationswith eachotherand that are all capable of being inplicated n a generalizedwar."The difference between a homogeneous and heterogeneous internationalsystem is that in the former, the great powers have the same type of regimeand seek similar objectives, whereas in the latter they have differentregimes and pursue conflicting goals (see 94-104).

18. To offer an example of what Aron is talking about, I do not think thathe would explain the successful prosecution of the first Gulf wa r and therepeated failures in the former Yugoslavia as a success or failure of inter-national law pe r se. Rather, the application of international law was suc-cessful in the former case because the international community wasalready in general agreement as to the threat Iraq posed to regional andglobal stability, whereas in the latter case, no such agreement was everreached on important issues by a sufficient number of states in the UnitedNations or on the Security Council.19. See Aron's discussion of the reasons for the essential failure of theLeague ofNations and United Nations (709-17, especially 716-17).20. G. W. F Hegel, Elementsof the PhilosophyofRight, trans. H. B. Nis-

bet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 322-24.21. Aron's unwillingness to offer an answer to this question reflects, oris the outgrowth of, a larger dynamism in his thought-namely betweenunderstanding human history as an ongoing drama, the outcome of whichis forever unknown to us, and understanding history as a process, whichwill eventually culminate in some sort of predetermined end. An d just ashe is unwilling to answer the aforementioned question, Aron does notcome down categorically on the side of history as either drama or process:although he refuses to believe (i la Marx) that history is a rational, purpo-sive process, he also sees that the nature of industrial society constrains, tosome extent, the direction that history might take. For Aron, history asdrama and history as process are dialectically interconnected, with neitherprocess no r drama eclipsing the other. On these issues, see Aron, "On theDawn of Universal History,' in In Defense of PoliticalReason: Essays byRayniondAron, ed. Daniel J. Mahoney, 131-52 (Lanham. MD : Rowmanand Littlefield, 1994).22 . On the former themes, see Koj6ve's hItroduction;on the latter ones,see his Outli,e of a Phenonmenologyof Right, rans. Bryan-Paul Frost andRobert Howse, ed. Bryan-Paul Frost (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Little-field, 2000).23. Aron is in agreement with Fukuyama that pride or glory is one of thegoals that states seek-but it is no t the only one. At the most general levelof abstraction or conceptualization, he argues that states have sought threehistorical objectives: security (either by increasing their ow n force orweakening a rival's), power (the ability of imposing one's will on another),and glory (to be recognized by others in a certain way or for a certain qual-ity). Aron goes on to recategorize these objectives as he deepens his analy-sis of them. Th e ternary series security, power, and glory could also bereformulated as space (to conquer more territory), men (to conquer moresubjects), and souls (to convert others to a political, social, or religiousidea), or again as body (to accumulate material objectives, such as space orresources or force), heart (to satisfy a state's amour-propre by prevailingover its rivals), and mind (to spread an idea ofwhich the state represents aunique incarnation). See Peace and War,71-93.24. See, in general, Fukuyama, The End of History, chs. 23-24, espe-cially pp. 255-56.25. Ibid., 262--64, 281-83.26 . Cf. ibid., 200-6 with 207, 215, 222, 229, 233, 311,334.

Perspectives on Political Science2


9/9

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

TITLE: Raymond Aron on the End of the History of

International Relations

SOURCE: Perspectives on Political Science 35 no2 Spr 2006

PAGE(S): 75-82

WN: 0610501234006

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it

is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in

violation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher:

http://www.heldref.org/

Copyright 1982-2006 The H.W. Wilson Company. All rights reserved.

coment on fukuyama

Documents