1971
841,
2,
COMMAND
HISTORY
VOLUME
I
c
A(7)A~
I
ECLU
DFR
AU
M
IC
GR
ING
SCAL
REU
E
0 D IR 5200. 0 OES OT APPL OT A 8BE TO EIG ATIO
ALS
VC/NVA
Tupport
,ctivities
SEUIYCLAWS1FICATION
compileo, the US Military Assistance Command's
role
ini
as
personnel
strengths
a
1.rovide summaries
as well
record, from the Headquarters MACV
stand-
point,
to in the footnotes
CD R
MAJ
Eugene
William N. Dempsey, USA;. to the two typists
who pre-
pared the
final camera-ready
and PFC
USMACV's
E H BRANCH
- October 1971
V-i
Development
UNCLASSIFIED
Ix
Economy
VIII-86
X-16
B.
1971 C-1
i
UNCLASSIFIED
xv
E-1
E-1
Introduction
Introduction
E-15
E-15
Organization
VI-X F-I-i
G. FREE
111-12
11-4
Tien
M-18
111-13
1, Quang Tin
ARVN Division
2
IV-29
IV-15 MR 4
IV- 36
IV-17 The
V- 30
V-9 Vietnamese
VI-18
'VI-8
USAF
VI-i Total Sorties - Laos - North
Vietnam
VI-25
Output
W: .
• VII- 13
VC I Neutralizations by Force Responsible for Anti-VCI Activities VII-22
VII-9 Number
VII- 10 Rice Production
VII-41
Corps Vill-ZO
VIII-10 LOC Construction VIII-60
VIII-84
X-o0
Battle of Krek E-10
E-7
Base Areas
RV N
TSS-2
changed. The process of Vietnamization
has largely been achieved,
forces
is
well
underway.
(U)
Culminating
their former
mission of providing security to the population centers. Now, Regignal Forces are being used
to secure unpopulated
with the National
even though
throughout
and
lines
he
has
Nearly all replacement manpower must come
from NVN,
also must be
tion
the Laotian
cross-border operations
in southern
heavy
funds
and
locally
acquired
supplies,
especially
(U) The basic Allied objective is
to build and
to continue the struggle for self-determination. 'ro achieve this,
a secure atmosphere must
by the
major emphasis has been directed toward
three
UNCLASSIFIED
I-I
*C.
while
advisory structure to provide support
to the
Its
economic
echelon. The overall size of the RVNAF has grown
by over 340,000
tlhe RVNAF was just slightly
under 1. 1 million,
consisting of 12 Army
the
Joint
the equivalent of 13 divisions.
(U) Concurrent
increase
includes recruit training,
officer and NCO
leadership courses, and
periodic refresher training
for the maneuver
partially as a result
responsibilities as
system
combat
conditions.
(U)
larger
than
the
mission
of
in increasing their effectiveness has been instrumental in permitting the
regular
operating separately
battalions,
conducting offensive operations against the enemy
local
been
restructured to meet the requirements of the expanded offensive operations
now entrusted
to them.
security for hamlets
Force soldier is recruited locally
and stationed in his home village where he participates in daylight patrols,
perimeter defense, and
regular Army recruits.
1971.
and
VNAF's percentage
the Khmer Republic increased
of
attesting to the increased
(U)
RVNAF's progress
increased responsibility for
assumed by
the Vietnamese;
by June
transporting
more cargo by air for the RVNAF than the US , and this trend continues. The
with which
logistics activities in-country
Police. The
control of the
village chief. They
and psychologically
They
the wider-ranging
Territorial Forces.
000; 1. 5 million
classified as combat and
members.
considerable significance. It
of Vietnam
is st.ifciently
trust
them
Cc¢2g infrastructure,
population and resources
196*8,
is tLe
to
stations. Prior
level. These
is
not
adequate
in conjunction
with RVNAF
The current effort to
Increase
pay and to improve motivation trainng should assist in reducing its magnitude.
Much has been done to make RVNAF
training self-sufficient, in addition to
the leader-
ship and
training at
1 year
has less than
quality middle
-- These problems
effort.
almost all fields.
World
entered the
forces have
Free World
ing combat support, combat service support, and
advice.
(U)
iorces remained in
security missions referred to as "dynamic defense" in
the
perform security missions
3, the 3d
Hoa-
area. No
the Delta, since August 1969.
(U) The US Air Force
continues the air interdiction campaign
but provides sharply decre'is-
air
support
of the RVNAF while the VNAF continues its buildup. The US Navy still
provides naval gun
in
(U) The
had advisors in
ARVN units down to battalion level, they are now for the part at level or higher.
As
the situation
improves within the provinces, advisory teams at district level are being
reduced or withdrawn.
total enemy system.
World MiUtary Assistance
interdiction campaign to prevent
Air interdic-
as
well
network over which
they move, and
interdiction campaign
were
launched-simultaneously
in
February
1971
inflicted
communication,
to organize and train their
armed
forces.
(U)
Complementary
the
but the Vietnamese
will take command
control over the
inner surface barrier.
high infiltration
to search the entire
th'c triple-edged
effort
similar.
Regular
RVNAF
base
Forces
operzte
is used extensively
to interdict enemy
movement, and to disrupt efforts to reinforce and destroy supply areas.
(U) The low level of enemy activity in Military
Region 3 has permitted the employment of
major forces in cross-border operations and has provided the opportunity for pursuit of the
objectives of community
defense and local
noteworthy
operations. Thir purpose is to detect and neutralize enemy local
guerrilla forces and the VC
Infrastructure. Territorial Forces In coordination
with local
short term operations of
3 to 5 days
MR , attacking multiple targets simultaneously.
The concept of these operations is to have all Territorial Force units seek contact with the
enemy,
leaving
major
such
as
Republic border,
and Kien
by the 'vietnamese
(U)
The
third element of the Allied effort is the neutralization of the VC infrastructure.
Besides the saturation
operations mentioned earlier, the GVN has initiated the Phung Hoang
program: operating
National
Police
work to Identify, capture, and try members of the VC infrastructure as civil
o
ffendsers.
change in
the enemy's
has
At that time
of enemy initiated activity were at their
all-time high. This period
guerrilla warfare by
launching general offensives.
to
drop.
Strengths-have
declined
and
out of
(U)
been hit hardest by
At the time of TET 68 , they
frequently served as supplementary main
forces
the shift to protracted
guerrilla and sapper style units. This process of fragmentation is
reflected
his increased dependence
small-scale terrorist, sapper, and other guerrilla actions in order to
maintain a presence with
the population. By Indiscriminate use of terrorism against civilians, the enemy
has
attempted
(U) The Viet Cong
the
with
which
enemy
documents and by ralliers and PW.
(U) The enemy's supply system has been disrupted in several ways:, disruption of
lines
of
communication and uncovering of caches have limited the enemy's in-country logistic capability;
Operation
UNCLASSIFIED
Som;
Realizing
Asia will
tion
by
(U) An infusion of
also
the
farm
to
processes, is
a program
Each village will
Bank will lend
to the village people, matching their own Investment in village self.development.
This
loan program is a transitional step towards the eventual local financing of all small
development
projects.
(U) The war in the countryside has caused an influx
of
urban areas.
the countryside, but now the GVN with MACV's advice and
assistance is paying
(U) Vietnamese industry has also improved since the TET offensive,
which caused nearly
damage.
output of the
replaced with new modern
economy,
USAID
made
has
marily
in
some cases, in heavy
industry such as steel
kilometers of
secondary interprovincial
intended but has provided land
lines
governments in the provinces and
villages. In addition, these roads
serve as the primary arteries for the
movements
of
goods,
gradually
telecommunications system
to complement
being over to
developed
for
a
South
Vietnam
is
the key building
and quality
teachers and
per
double
sessions.
A
Since
quarter of
veterans,
widows,
UNCLASSIFIED
1-10
Dl%
refugee problem is far
from being solved, it is a measure of success that over
4 million
assisted by the GVN since 1964, and that fewer than
500,000 remain to
accompanied by a steady
1969. The dismantling and redeployment of the US force has
been a complex project.
throughout each phase. Base
consists
primarily
support also
increasingly
self-sufficient.
as the
000
by
even
must be
security.
residual
to the custody of the
South Vietnamese. The US must
assure compliance with the important
provisions of the Geneva
the GV N fail to comply with the provision in
any important
effective measures to
correct the situation or to request return of the prisoners
to US
since 1961, having
suffered over 800, 000 killed and an unknown number wounded. Yet he has
been
unable
to
defeat
His
disrupted. VC infrastructure, a force which is vital to his
effort, has declined considerably. Despite this he
has not lost his willingness to fight and he still
retaifis a significant capability. He is
trying to win politically and psychologically as well as
militarily what
counter the success of the
RVN's Community Defense
of the
Free
World by exerting pressure on public opinion, especially in the United States.
(U) The Allies too have
paid
suffered
over 45, 000 killed. The South Vietnamese have lost over 140, 000 killed. This
sacrifice
has
from defeating
SVN but
also from
Free
World
assistance
which will be
de-
This
the
artas of the
Republic, but also
cross-border
to conduct
large-scale military
a greater degree of security is
provided the people of South
Vietnam. Since 1968 the percentage of
population
living
in
secure
than
UNCLASSIFIED
I-I
of resources
administrative responsibilities,
today candidates
for leadership
recent successful
fo r continued socio-economic
Republic
South Vietnam,
progress toward its goal
Vietnam-
ese
and
RVNAF
its use as a
to include
into that
if e did
head
of
the
Cambodian
Government.
Vietnam
worked
closely
Immediate
fears
lican institutions
democracy. The US
the
held
on
assist its
and established
a military
possible
neutrality
Nixon's visit to the People's
Republic
release
Paris talks to be nothing
more
than
in
the Hanoi Government.
the
replaced him with
what appeared
tz.king and
the
sessions
had been held since the talks began. No results were achieved nor were
any
known
meaningiul
negotiations
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
IN SEA
the nations in the
area.
Most were dependent in whole or in part upon US economic aid for their continuing par-
ticipation in the war and possibly for their continuing
economic existence.
economic aid and for military
support
survival. Loans from the Asian Develop-
ment Bank and its member nations
were scarce to
concerning investments in Indochina
investor,
was that the ability of Laos and l
VN
reasonable stability
pri,:es
increased
$VN65.0 billion during
reform
The reform
the rationalization
Thia
also noted that the GVN's long-range goal was economic self-sufficiency r,.ther
than
dependence
econonic
step
forward
by
the
GVN
leadership.
a
economic maturity came during
SVX.
Hester
struck
Thien
area. Loss of life
Prompt and
aided by US forces
faced a
time considerable effort had been made to stabilize the econ-
omy. Negotiations
SVN,
to permit a greater interchange of goods. Phnom Penh, the capital of the Khmer Republic, was
particularly dependent
upon river traffic that had to pass from the coast through the SVN portion
of the Mekong
were passing virtually unmolested
was accepted and an AID agreement was
signed on 31 May
Senate to approve
foreign aid
in October
1971 created great concern among the GKR. but the subsequent reversal of that vote in November
eased the
Because
of
and eastern
US economic and military aid in its struggle against
the
Communist
incursion.
9
Laos
and military
assistance from
for survival
North Vietnamese.
antidrug
measure
to
curb
the
production
and
export
of
opium
and
other
drugs.
10
North
Vietnam
of the worst
disaster was the worst since the
famine of 1945, which reportedly killed almost a
million
most of the fall NVN rice crop, forcing that nation
to rely
from the
flood at
plus
NVN
Republic of
the
Summary
(U) As it had in years past, the US, through its diplomatic
and military agencies, aided
those nations of SEA with whom it was allied in the fight against Communist NVN.
Military aid
and outright grants of foreign aid continued to bolster war-strained economies in the Khmer
Republic,
Laos,
feeling
amounts of money and
Asia in
more and more
mission. progrested
environment
had
evolved. Each new
from
directives
the SECDEF guidance oi,
of
of RV N
subversion and
of the Central Region SEATO Field Force
(CCRSFF),
Defense
normally will
a6 directed by CIFCPAC.
Airlift support for military
to
assistance funds.
with the relationships among all personnel in the
country area
the DOD,
(PACOM). As
Single Senior Militar, Representative in the RVN, COMUSMACV serves as the military
point of
Mission,
FUNCTIONS 'OF
of all assigned US military forces and
military agencies.
to
within the corn-
or
as
authority. Following
Directi-e
10-1l,
defining
COMIJSMACV's
responsibilities
and
functions
as
command:
military agencie; assigned for
(a) Within the
and 30234
vithin the provisions of policies and directives
imposed by higher authority and
by
in
conformity
(1)(b).
2 Exercises directive authority within his command in the field of logistics to insure
effectiveness and
of unnecessary
duplication of
components.
insure
uniform
11-9
g41
4
2
4
command in
MACV Service component
the
MACV Service component
basic policy matters.
to CIVCPAC by COMUSMACV.
fully informed,, especially
concerning all high
level contacts with
major RVNAF
policies and directives.
and
management
validates communications requirements in the RVN in accordance with Pacific Command
Communications Electronics
US military intelligence and counterintel-
ligence unite/elements operating in the RVN.
(10)
developments
the RVN.
concerned, controls
ordinates operations of third country military contingents and prcvides military
and
Force Exchange privileges,
(13) Coordinates the
or
forwards recommendations on such
US Forces position in formal discussion with the American Embassy
and with
representatives of
employees in the RVN.
and
COMUSMACV had major responsibility
to assist the GYIN in achieving nation'l objectives. As stated in the following extract from MACV
Directive
10-11,
COMUSMACV
functions
(1) Makes recommendations to CINCPAC
concerning military
of the RVNAF and
Force
(3)
as directed.
(4 ) Observes
and reports on the utilization of materiel furnished by and personnel
trained
by the US.
(5) Provides appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the RVN on mil-
itary assistance.
directly with the military departments and appropriate military area commands
on the
eriel, disposal
(7) Makes recommendations
materiel or services.
(8) Provides advice
with respect to the
matters.
forces, budget, weapons, and capabilities.
(10)
Provides
to
of the DOD and performs such other functions as may
be re-
per
that portion
basis for reporting to the Chief of
Mission and
Agency
for
military
assistance
to
the
Regional Forces/Popular
developed by
organization
for matters of interest Dep-
uties and provides
Assistance
Manual,
Act, applicable DOD
Defense and Local Development
memorandum to
ment.
(2)
agen-
THIS
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Order
US/Free World and GVN to
support
pacification and development.
(4) Coordinates with the other agencies of the US Mission, Vietam,
in the planning of
population
development
activities, including provision
of security by US/FW/GVN military forces, and reports on progress, status, and pro-
blems of the pacification and development support effort.
US Mission
and
and military. As President Nixon wrote
to
Ambassador
Bunker
in
December
1969:24
Your mission as American Ambassador to Vietnam is of the utmost
significance to our
o: the
United States
direct and coordinate the activities and
operations of al l of its ele-
ments. You
leadership and guidance, but also by assuring positive program
direction to the end that
al l United States activities in
Vietnam
are
relevant to current realities, ar e efficiently and economically ad-
minister, and are effectively
a maxinium contribution to United States interests in that country,
as well as to our regional and international objectives.
(C) Although the Ambassador was in no way a
military commander, he maintained a
close
9. (C) STATES MISSION COUNCIL. The US Mission,
consisting
of the Special Assistant
in the RVN. While these US agencies respond
to the direction of US agencies at the national level, local guidance is provided by a
mission council that had been established to ensure an integrated US
effort
(Chief); the Deputy
ment Support (DEPCORDS, M.ACV); Director, USAID; Director
JUSPAO;
and
the
OSA.
The relationship
between USM.ACV and the other elements of the mission team is
one
of
Chief
of Mis-
sion and COMUSMACV, each is free to communicate such differences to national auth-
orities. COMUSM.ACV communications will be forwarded through CINCPAC.
~~~TkiS F",OE REG-q..ZED
!.O SSIFI -D
factor
to the successful functioning of the council, and it established an atmosphere conducive
to a har-
and military components of the organization at all levels. During
1971 the
US Mission
in Saigon. The
agenda expanded over
economic
assistance,
political
influences,
and
cther
appropriate
topics.
26
MACV
SERVICE
COMPONENT
COMMANDS
assigned and attache-i units.
combat,
--
directed.
at
installations
7
CINtPAC.
-- Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support to MACV.
-- Provide logistic support
--
and other
instructions from and were
Army Component Commander:
USARV through
CINCUSARPAC exercised ccmmand
leso operational control
the functions
and
was assigned
to CLNCPACFLT.
operations
(4 ) Exercise
except
those
specifically
US Coast
Guard units
with
RVNAF, and FWMAF
as directed along
the
coast of the RVN, in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), and in the Mekong Delta.
(16)
extracts
USMACV for Air Operations.
air operations, tactical airlift,
close air support, and reconnaissance
operations,
and
(5) Exercise
the
AFGP.
by COMUSMACV.
(8) Coordinate all military air operations in the USMACV area of
responsibility,
in-
not assigned
og attached
to
7AF.
(4) Function as air defense commaider and exercise overall air defense responsibility
within
the
be directed. Authority
over USARV
air defense resources will be as specified in MACV Directives 95-4
(C) and 95-8
(11) Provide weather and aerial prrt services for COMUSMACV through
attached unit3.
(22) On
even numbered
the Deputy CG, USARV, be re-ponsible
for
(NAV'ADVGRP) and US Air Force Advisory Group
( A F P ) con-
matters of commana, edministration,
(C) US Naval Advisory Group. NAVADVGRP was assigned to HQ .
USMACV under the
Command less
between NAVADVGRP and
Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy
(C) Functions
the VNN and VNMC coinmand,)re and staffs at all echelons
in
achieving
and maintaining a high rate of combat readiness so as to
fulfill their respon-
resistance
to
aggression.
(3) Advise
the VN N in the conduct of river patrol ooerations, and mine countermeasures
and waterway security.
(4 ) Develop, in
for VNN and
VNMC personnel :-equirements.
for V'NN and
submit to
COMUSMIANCV for
submit to COMUSMACV
programs for military assistance
with
COMUSMACV on
the utilization
other FWMAF agencies in the coordination of
pacification and de-
velopment programs.
(16) Advise
and assist the VNN and VNMC in military support of Faci'ication and de-
velopment to include
(IZ)
(13) Advise the VN N
in the
with the Coastal S;rveillance Force (TF 115) to provide
an interchange of information
and coordination of effort
(14) Provide
(C) Air
AFGP was assigned to HQ , MACV, under the ope rational
control
MACV exercises command less operational control,
however by mutual agreement, the
normal
were
between AFGP and HQ ,
items which were
provided by the
were
3
2
it to
VNAF in
withdrawals which
forces withdrew from
(USAAG)
and
Civil
Operations
headquarters in MR 2 by
the
Second
CORDS (DEPCORDS),
* ~
~
~
CC ,
in MR 3. By the same
authority a civilian wa s
appointed DEPCORDS, MR
Delta Military
remained
though
the MR . Although
to location, number
The functions
of TRAC
as stated
unilateral, combined US,
(3) Provide security for designated critical US and RV N
installations
CG , CM D
to
prevent
Corps and MR 3.
as directed by COMUSMACV.
by COMUSMACV.
of responsibility
areas in accordance with
current instructionsi.
(8) Provide advice, assistance, and suppurt to the RVNAF at CMD, corps, division/
special zone, sector, and subsector
level in
the Deputy for CORDS,
an effective military
4.
Order
1141R4
intelligence, psychological
support activities.
(10) Exercise
desig-
be through the Deputy for CORDS,
TRAC.
(11)
of all plans, policies, and programs w..ich support
pacification and development in MR
3 and submit to COMUSM4AC7t.
(13) Develop,
for ARVN
mmteriel, personnel,
MACV.
for
(14) Observe and report to COMUSMdACV on the utilization
of
(15) Provide administrative and logistic support, as required, and administer military
discipline for military personnel assigndd f! r duty wfth
CMD advisory teams.
(S) Since
to
F'WMAF
COMUSMACV
things, specified
the command and control relationsbip. The Free World Military Policy Councils
continued to
and control the assignment of mrssions to insurt mutual agreement
with
RVNAF in
1971. COMUSMACV generally- exercistd operat onal control of FWMAF while command less
operational co.trol remained with the troop contributing country
,
whose relationship was that of coordination and
cooperation.
A detailed discussion of FW'MAF in RVN is found in Annex C, Free World Military Assistance
Forces. Further information concernine logistic
support of RVNAF and FWMAF is found in
Chapter IX. US Logistical Suppor. Paragraph
13,
relationship
V7ETNAM - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES - AND OTHER FREE WORLD
MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES, VIETNAM.
is
one
of
re t .is all territor-
ial responsibilities.
underlying command relationship3 between
mutual support, coor0in-
of one
nation's military
comimander of different national
the twd nations concerned provides
for
to Indochiiia
from
narnization
redeployment
of
US
Allied gains in the
in 1971 from Hanoi,
urification of
of North
the promotion of a people's
war or a war of
national
liberation.
As
conceptualized
by
phases.
The
years of Viet
Cong (VC) organization.
of-
fensives
suffering from
68 the
DR V
All
these
factors
while
simultaneously
lengthened. Hanoi
was reflected
comflict
stressing conservation of forces,
attempts to rebuild base areas, and efforts to strengthen the guerrilla and pdlitical structures.
After the spring of 1970,
Hanoi's problems were compounded by the loss of use of the Cambodian
port of Kompong Som,
a factor which denied
the
posture.
1971 drew to a close. 'The enemy
goal
of
complete
and the concurrent
to reunite
the end
of 1971
were deliberate
dry season
southern NVN was accelerated as indicated by increased rear service
activity.
araas with the
LO C
in southern Laos the enemy deployed from 45 to 50 antiaircraft
artillery (AA) battalions n the
vicinity, and there were
major transportation units
and the RVN.
compensate
for
enemy
personnel
aTils
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
000
personnel
were
estimated
con-
cern for his LOC. Personnel in special purpose infiltration group3 destined for the RV N in-
creased from about 2,O000 in 1970 to 3, 000 in 19 71. This significant increase in
specialists
and technicians who were skilled in Viet Cong infra structure
(VCi), guerrilla, and saor-er op-
erations, revealed continued
and the attendant political
expected
to
(S) The DR V need cxternal support still critical. So-ptember
and October 1971
was
the
from the Peoplels
coatintued to improve her ports during the 7ear - - new
wharves
were
turnaround
government coaitinved to expand a
petroleum
(S) Thus it was in 1'271 that
the )RV,,contii.ue d the p:utract.'d war concept azd was
making
as w~u espoused the Farty and its leaders. In
a
May specifically pointed up Hanoi_ strale~y: economic
development cif
thr north and fighting US
aggression. Notewcrthy war clie fact that economic divelopment wa;; istbd first.
4
*similar
Van Dong on the anniversary of Ho Chi Minth'e
tpirthday
emphasized
the neces~sity for preparing for a long hard struggle and
he
'V need for international solidarity, i.e., coretinued Chinene and Soviet halp was welcomed.
The Premier stressed the -value
of such strategy
of
the
20th
anxniversary
than .'-er NVN had to advance to
comnplete vi*ctory, defeat the Vietnawxizution of the
war, and topple the puppet regisne
while
of Vietnam was
,he revision strategic goiAls
1971 phase. These -)iAses were revealed
through analysis of available COSVN resolutions,
dirzacives,
and instructions.
(C) COSVN Resolution 5, which was adopted late in 1967. and which
:mplemented Resolution
Party, commcnted on the fa;Jures of the GNIN and (! during
the 19 65-66
Z.OSv
I
12-month
period
following
general offensive.
from March to October 1968, emphasized the main
objective
of
areas
The coritr , of -ural .'reas %aa viewed as of secondary
irnp(,rtnnce. Although Directive 58, re-
l,!ased in D~ecember~ 1968.
drew
announced
s.till gauged to the straetgy
of the general
release
of
Directive
81.
tory. Accordingly, cadre were to struggle
for decisive successes, the forced withdrawal of
American
Liberation
Radio
a
governmental
aspirations of all
people,"
with the duties of mobilizing and lead fg all people and
armed forces and
formalized
of establishing legitirnste Communist control over the vil-
Aages of RV N and increasing
popular support
November 1969. Reeolution
South. Together with Resolutions
a departure from the quick and total vic-
tory of the General Offensive
and a return to limited
warfare. hi comparison with
but limited military
sparsely
populated
junglcq
and
highlands.
CONTRAST
for the VC.
* counter-pacification
and
counter-Vietnamization
missions
war, with
increased
the RVNAF
withdrawal
faith in their government's
ability to maintain security.
continued to
01/rT-71, a general guideline for 1971 issued in late
1970 or early 1971. emphasized the
strategy
coanter2acification
drive the VC iFto isolated areas
and thus away
so dependent. Directive 06/CT-7l
focused on the 1971
designed a.s a 6-month strategy
paper covering the
to the pre-GVN election
the usual evaluation of Communist victories,
the
withdrawal of US
troops, the Paris Peace Talks, the de-escalation cf the war, tn d
an assessment
of Allied
the people, creating
"new favorable con-
ditions for popular
to
the
the Allied
cross-border op-
erations, a united Indochina front was established. South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
comprised
became
program, the VC survived
against
Vietnam and Cambodia.
provements
were to be made in main force roles in countering
US and
RVV mobile
establish a
secure base
its planned
Throughout
the
(C)
Directive
06/CT-71,
cadre as an apparent
guideline for the remainder of 1971 and the first half of 1972.
In
munist
pronouncements,
COSVN
in
effect
emphasis on the im-
political and proselyting effort at the grass roots level. The
directive indicated
reappraise the
with the
counter-pacification and political effort.
was reflected
in a
possibly
statement
however, was
the fact
directly
COSVN
Z, 3,
force (MF) or
urits
the VC
as
battalions
level organizatioad.
normally
to
military
Tin
the same
unit
which strategic ,naiysis was
The
VC/NV.A
of enemy initiated incidents
downward.
16
(S)
For
the period beginning December 1971 and continuing through 197Z, MR I was
expezted
threat;
were expected to be deployed in the area
to
counter
continue scattered
area in
shortages and
the requirement to protect LO C against RVNAF ope'ations: In the remainder
of
MR
attacks, would be the
threat
area, a situation
sapper and
te orisr
1971, however
established
similar
1971
by RVN
Figure 111-7
Figure 111-8 Total NVA Battalions by
RV N
1966 THROUGH
during
40[kB93
K44[.j
TWANG
UC
ToE
U
A7E
R
NIN0
THUA
m
N'w
CNHA15tR
THUAN
r-3
V:MCJ
LAM
DONS
4THIS
AE
EPEOUCASrE
K7~86CAMBODIA
30 JUN
IS IPHONG
(U)
The
statistical data con-
cerning the enemy in the RVN. Figure 111-18 provides an
overview of enemy initiated incidents
fo r the period 1966 to the present,
while
Figure
111-19
provides
detailed information regarding
incdents for 1971 by RVN military region. Figures .2I-0 and 21 cover captured enemy crew-
served and
individual weapons.
2 0
the statistical
10 15 4 250{ 78) 49 1 0 36 365
Mar 12 16
Ap r
8 13
1 3
25 510
Au g 12 8 7 231 (81)
34
(118)
29
1 8 102 765
0
566
1,332
58 1 0 22 9 752
May 23
40 2
No v
Source: MACJ231-6
the year.
237 32 6
oat of lowland
DMZ ?,nd the unpopulated
al l
areas of
(Quang
Nam,
of considerable military
a
etronghold
noted near population centers
consolidation and
in the Central Highlands.
ncas), where larg~e NV A forces wt-re located along
the Cambodian Border. Enemy activity
anc terrorist
and contested
to be concentrating
contacts;
economy
and.sapper activity, represented
COSVN modns operandi
in the regoion.
security of western RVN MR 3 was
the 101st NVA Regt, which operated out of BA 355 on the Tay
Ninh-Binh
enemy
units
VC LF
threat from the
bases in outlying areas.
the
with
local
population
perception
of
enemy
strength.
2
1
(C)
activity was at a low ebb; significant
w s the
confi~ed
month.
and conducted his
level, charactarized
LAM
level at
the end
activity
ol 28 March, the enemy launched
a
widespread
a'tions in the Da
term
documents
indicated
except
in
On I
attacks in the
000 damage.
Enemy activity
Allied
winter/spring campaign continued.
end of
(ARVN)
characterized by ABFs, limitt..
quarter
consisted
of
light,
operation of the
(lZ2mm rockets) on 22 January
(two rounds) and on
Post
rounds on 5 March.
were
capitals, and district
while inFebruary and March the
average was 14 and 13 respectively. The enemy overran
40
friendly
reached its peak during the end of Feb-
ruary. A130 in
Region 4.
the
Activity typically consisted of ambushes
and ABFs
was spent in resupply and refitting of
B-5 Front
Vietnamese Marines
moderate ABF evel.
in what was known
moderate except for
FSB Fuller re s ilted in its evacuation
by ARVN forces; concurrent attacks occurred
elsewhere
higher
camoaign
area; thereafter activity was sporadic.
During
this
phase the enemy suffered heavy losses, with 3. 452 soldiers killed in action.
Phase
MR
ground probes against RF/PF
and Allied positions. For the rest of the quarter enemy aggres-
siveness
commencement of a
highland
the triborder region
was restricted
to logist'cal
localized ard uncoordinated.
sapper
attack
against
a
FSB 5
in the
--
by scattered ABFS
by
MR
attack occurred in
against RF/PF,
nine
continued to be overrun, there being
28 such incidents during the period.
One
conjunction
The extremely
low level of enemy activity in June was due to the
southwest
monsoon
activities. As the rainy season continued, enemy activity in MR
I was at
the quarter with
brought
elections. In the
securing
in VC MR 5 began Phase 1
of
began with a significant
On 20 September
fall/winter campaign with light ABFs against PSDF in
Quang Nam
a
the entire quarter with an
increase in conjunction with disruption of GV N elections. B-3 Front elements were engaged in
resupply and refitting
their
to
influence
August enemy
August enemy sappers penetrated the perimeter of the Allied Cam
Ranh Bay triservice
the
on 21 September, re-
ceiving a total of
low with a slight
isolated territorial force outposts and Alliad
base
finds in July. In August
an expected GVN election-related
on the Z5th when FSB Pace
and other
the
against RF/PF outposts
August, and one in September. By the end of July
1971, 77 outposts
enemy, contrasted
to a total of 67 for the same period in 1970: a total of 18 outposts were
overrun during the quarter,
previous quarters. Allied intel-
there were also indications of intensive administrative reorganizations. Combat activity
in the
the first
12
ABFs in Quang Tri Province and 14 in Qusng Nam Province. Elsewhere, and following the 3
October GVN
area on 23
October, further reduced
of ABFs in the
B-5 Front area,
while the Da Nang errirons were VC MR 5 targets. Northwestern Quang Tri
Province
was
LOC.
Supplies
aggressiveness during the holiday period of 19-22 December, bu t
mar-power and supply problems limited the effort.
--
Activity
in MR Z remained low for the entire quarter, with slight increases brought about
by reaction to the
the 19-22 December holiday period. Information obtained from a rallier
revealed that there
72 in
the Ben
other reports referred to future plar-ied activity in Pleiku Province.
-- Enemy initiated activ - remained low in
MR 3, limited to scattered ABFs, limited
ground
attacks, and sapper operations. In Tay Ninh Province ABFs occurred against various
FSBs and Tay Ninh City itself. On 3 October Bien Hoa
Air Force
ABF
and a rocket attack, respectively. There was a high incidence of fire bombing
of vehicles in Saigon
Thien Ngon Base Camp (ARVN)
was attacked on Z3 December with resultant loss
of a
products. Bien Hoa was attacked by indirect fire
on both 17
2
by the enemy, contrasted with 67
fo7 1970.
acknowledged in 1962,
was the controlling
element for Communist activities in South Viatnam. The PRP (in reality the
southern branch of the
Party)
through the political and
leadership
COSVN itself was con'rolled by
the
COSVN's
staff
was
estimated
members.
(C)
To carry out the insurgency, the Communists had four distinct org.anizations: the PRP,
the
National Front for the Liberation of S:)uth Vietnam (NFLSVN), :he SVNLA,
and
of these organizations -- their
activities were coordinated at
(C) Since vhe PRP was formed as a replacemeut
for
Party,
totally
dedicated
the
four
other three organizations: the NFLSVN, SVNLA,
and PRG. In short, the PEP controlled and directed the insurgency in SVN.
S PAGE
not
realize
that
(C) The formation of the SVNLA, also
known as the People's Liberation
Armed Forces, was
announced in 1961;
Communists as the military
by COSVN
body
continually
administrative
Communist claims to legit-
positions in front organizations and made al l policy decisions.
All VC military tunits contained
Party organizations within them
local forci units
in vh ich
key positions in
Minister
members
occupied a total
of 20 positions
in the PRP,
occupied
15 members of the Presidium of the
NFLSVN occupied 27 positions. The system
of interlocking directorates was most evident at
the
national
to village level. The chief of
the village
this system, COSVN was able to insure
Communist control of
Although studies were made in
an attempt to portray
always por-
-however, indicated
that the
PE P worked closely with the Lao Dong Party and received consider-
able
strategical
advice
from
NVN.
a means fo r
an indigenous patriotic
(C /NF) One of the keys to understanding Hanoi's influence
on the southern insurgency was
examination
organieations at the national level.
Most
of
Party
members
Committee of
two
THIS PAG. . 3., ,-
Dong Central
were
.e cf
members of the Lan Dong Party.
(C) A simi)r situation existed
on the Milita:y Affairs Committee of
the
SVNLA.
Altbough
level organiration, at leapt
memoers
positior.s in the Lao Dong Politburo, the Lao
Dong Central Committee, and the Cerzral Committee of the PRP.
(C) The
NFLSV'N were composed
%lmost ntirely of
entwined in the system of interlocking directorates.
(C/NF) As might be expected, since
the war in the
not feel the need
appeared to have broad powers in conducting the day-to-day activities
of the insurgency in
Apparently,
to
the
scene
of action and thus in a better to workable tactics.
Lao
had analyzed and
appeared,
and played a decisive
role in the Communist
South.
Its
one of a simple
developed
key
control
of
of the south
Ninh,
and the subregions
surrounding and including the city of Saigon). (See Figure 111-24.) All the
political
areas passed from COSVN to subordinate echelons
through channels
controlled by
the PRP.
in
the
country (M R 5, B-3 Front, and MR Tri-Thien-Hue) was not as clearly delineated.
Apparently,
both COSVN and Hanoi communicated with MR 5 and B-3 Front; Hanoi controlled the military
activities while COSVN provided the political
guidance. While this separation of military and
political command was
frequently substantiated by
in a given geographical
military activities were separated. In late 196b, Quang
Tri and Thus, Thien Provinces were separated from MR 5 and renamed Military Region Tri-
Thien - Hue
(MRTTH). Since that time, it was believed that MRTTH was under
complete
North
Party
and
the
the Ministry of
available explanation
For
example,
both
Lao
in
in urban centers.
both in
of
the
activities. The
levels, receipts, execution
signed
and
sealed
of life.
and
whose
announced,
the
Committee and
opportunity has not
occurred. The Revolutionary
administration,
(U) Lower level activities
from
village, district,
meeting
monthly -- current affairs committees
at each level met more often in order to carry on day-to-day activities. Monthly reports of
activities were
four villages.
cadre varied according to the
amount of security in the area of operation. In strong
VC areas the village cadre lived in
their own houses
night. A
hamlet in the
"liberated" village
in his district, continually alternating his time schedule. In weak or con-
tested VC
night
(U) Thus
and political effort in
aspect of the
papers and identification cards were frequently destroyed; government administrators
were
and replaced by elements of the VCI; heavy taxes were
levied; fortifi-
tee organized local guerrilla
forces; the youths were
through propaganda and
trained to ac t
NFLSVN; men were recruited or drafted
fo r the
con-
reported
to house and feed VC troops as they moved
through the area; women were urged to
participate
in
face-to-face
struggles (demonbtrations
against GVN authorities); families of RVN soldiers were plagued to order
their men back honme;
ammunition;
no r
free
action
was
possible.
29
VCI
REORGANIZATION
(C) Since 1971 saw a shift in VC emphasis on political and logiftical activity from urban to
rural areas and
areas to support protracted
There
area was organized,
VC MR 5 and the
northern portion of the
of
the
of the Mekong Delta region
took place
reorganization
its reorganization five major goals would
be
achieved:
self-sufficiency
consolidation of Party control of political
and military activities; streamlining of control
of infiltration of both
years -- dramatically
the RVN. This
into and through the Laotian/RVN
border
areas,
and
into
from
complex process.
the DMZ, but took advantage of weaker nations,
Laos and Cambodia,
the borders the NVA
DMZ
followed
the two. Person-
trails; however, very seldom were they moved
together. Supplies were shipped
units arranged
from Binh Tram tc Binh Tram, i. e. by elements
of
Group which were
station
described
below.
3
7
(C) The NVN High Command, whose functions were similar to those of
the US Joint Chiefs
the General Political Directorate, the General Staff
Directorate, and
the
General Directorate of Bear Services (GDRS). Of concern here was the
latter,
through-
GDRS
had three Rear. Service Transportation Groups (TG) as subordinates; the 500th TG , the 559th TO
and the 470th
TG .
The 500th TG was responsible for the movement of personnel and material
t
6
rough
Laos; and the 470th
was responsible for movement
of the Allied cross-
the
the
responsible
Thua Thien
Province, RVN, and the 71st Trans Regt responsible for infiltration between Thua
Thien and the RVN/Laos/Cambodia
and other lesser units. It was estimated
that the unit had a strength of approximately 1, 300
personnel in
1959 and
and
accommodate
of men and material into the Republic of Vietnam.
(C) Four major responsibilities were assigned to
the 559th and 470th TGs:
Transportation,
troop
movements,
construction
of
LOC,
LO C and installations.
The prime rear service
movement
and personnel from
NV N through Laos to the battlefields of South Vietnam and Cambodia.
Once in Cambodia it was
THIS
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
Order
Sec
Army
By
DAivi
per
MI
45
0-
:1b4
J,
94
Tram (BT).
of transportation,
470th TG took over
Laos,
and commo-liaison
32, 33, 34,
also
seven identified base areas
Facilities
of
men
and
supplies
into
the
for infiltration
groups; to
these stations
area.
liaison
While
commo-liaison station
usually had
two bivouac
could be utilized
particularly when a group moving south met a group moving
north. Commo-liaison
stations were located near a water supply. The soil of
the area
for sani-
tation reasons. They were placed so as to avoid casualties
and damage in the
event of a flash
located under thick jungle foliage to preclude de-
tection from the air; they had
to be defendable
in the event
of an enemy attack. They were located at least 30 minutes
walking distance from
to avoid simultaneous destruction of both a motor convoy and
an infiltration
come
into
contact
with
and a foot infiltration route, Interstations
were believed to be responsible
for
two
near the
Interstations
as a commo-liaison
station in that they provided lodging for infiltration groups and guides to move the infiltration
groups
in that it had
ilities for food which infiltrators
picked up to replenish their supplies, and in that it was located
close
to
medical facilities which could be used by members of the infiltration group. Inter-
stations were usually connected
BTs
geographic
to be
about
30 to 60 tinutes
walking distance from the route. They had to be large enough for storage sites
:or food, bivouac
billeting for permenant
extra day of rest. Because of
the increased
tLey
liaison stations, possibly up to
battalion size. Again, the exact str.ngth of each interstation
depended upon the terrain and
the area's vulnerability to attack.
(C) The movement of personnel and supplies through the Ho Chi Minh trail
from NVN to
the ultimate destination in the south was accomplished over roads of varying
cohditions, trails
many and varied types of carriers, from sampans
to boats. There were three
major
into
the
central Lao Panhandle from NVN. They were the Mu Gi a Pass, Ban Karai Pass,
and
the road/trail structure through Ban Karai
and Ban
This development
which had been considered the major entry
point.
38
points
Pass
while the other entered just to the northwest of the DMZ.
The 592d NVA Engineer Pipe-laying
Regiment,
with
three subordinate battalions and a total strength of 1,050 men, was responsible
for the
was used
per day, under optimum conditions. The actual
capacity
requirements in the
were
inter-
dicted
was
temporarily
multiple
key to the enemy resupply effort. Men
and material coming
into
Laos from the Ban Karai Pass via Route 912 were for the
most part
was considered the most important sector
along the intiltration corridor
supply routes. Supplies
to the
triborder area. From and triborder
area supplies were moved
the
Route
1,
activities
opened
and
in-
creased
the
mileage of the system by approximately 30 percent. Prior to the
1970-71 con-
single-lane unpaved
roadway, most of which had been constructed since 1965 at the rate
of
about
added more
than 600
miles of well-constructed new roads, bringing the total mileage built
to 2. 200. Most of this
new construction consisted of bypasses along established entrance corridors,
extensive work on
forces
719 early in 1971 there
was an enemy
with more use
Routes 16 and 23 in Laos; this to offset
Allied interdiction of Route 914. Expansion continued even after termination of
the
Allied
operation.
North
Viet-
supplies faster
the
1971-72
dry
season
than
previously.
RV N
followed generally
past several years. Personnel
Hanoi's
discretion.
Training consisted of basic military training, special individual training, and pol-
itical indoctrination. Upon completion of training,
infiltration groups,
into the RVN. Training quotas and scheduling
clearly
followed
a
route: These groups departed
infiltration routes described
previously (see Figure
group
usually
sequence.
The
of the infiltration group
number. The greatest number of infiltrators were assigned to RVN MR I
and MR 3
NVA
activity
was
the
highest.
43
(C) Personnel infiltration into the RV N followed two policies. First, the NVA seemed to
have a planned
groups which infiltrated
under the numerical
Secondly, the enemy had in the past
proved that he could infiltratecomplete units or large groups of
replacements prior to or during
large operations.
This was
the
case during the TET, Kh e Sanh, Hue City, and Saigon. campaigns
in
when the
the I.VN.
Ilb~HIs
 
(C) While it was long surmised that an exiiltration system from the
RVN did
(C) Stati.tical
details concerning infiltration of personnel into the RVN are shown in
Figure
sharply over the peak of
more than
considered that
material;
infiltration activity had
and
crease in infiltration
the Khmer
it
down
visual
reconnaissance,
more
than
the
estimated
minimum
to stock-
BAa, a normal happening for the time
period.
supplies were believed
areas via the
were probably met
and stored in the
1971, for the period
total
of
season period
of August,
been infiltrated into Cambodia by
way of the Mekong River system.
(S/NF) During
for political,
ordnance, food,
Jan
to include additional areas
Song Goung. It was believed that
the area
NV A Regiment. A
attrib-
719 and at -
enemy activity noted during the last
quarter
on both friendly and enemy operations caused by the rainy
season. Such activity was made neces-
sary because of
the DRV and Typhoon
Hester which ravaged the
many enemy installations
and cache sites.
(C) Base Area 1Z8 for the last half of 1971 was characterized by the historic
tapering off of
rainy
same reasons
in the vicinity were extremely hard pressed for
supplies
refitting and resupply actions at the expense of operations.
(C )
Enemy activity in base area.129 declined considerably over previous periods, again
due
building
activities.
(C) Base Area 201,
bivouac areak it was
astride
an
important infiltration and resupply route extending from BA 614 used for resupplying
areas
and transshipment points in GVN Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. A reported decrease
in enemy activity in the area was probably due
to the fact that
thought
to be located in the area, was believed to be somewhere in MR I.
(C)
Base Area 202 was the terminus of a logistical route which originated in BA 701 and
which supported enemy
and western Binh Dinh Province. Per-
sonnel infiltrating
historically known
for elements of
the 95B NVA Regt. BA 20Z was used as a staging
area
enemy
between Pleiku City and Binh Dinh Province.
(C ) Base Area 226 was consistently the most active in-co untry BA
in RVN ME Z. Major
combat an support elements of the 3d NVA Div, as
well as other main force and local force
units, used this BA as their primary training and resupply area. The mission of units located
in
the
coastal low-
(C) Base Area 236 continued
to be
and
disrupt
means of small unit operations and terrorist activities.
Enemy initiated
end,
number
of Allied operations being conducted.
(C ) Base Area 238 continued as one of low activity levels, serving as a
rear service area
for a force
conduct harassment opera-
tions and highway interdiction in the vicinity o Ban Me Thuot.
(C ) Base Area 252
resupply, and training area fo r enemy
units operating in Khanh Hoa Province; low levels of enemy activity were
due to the absence of
THIS
PAGE
REGR,1AND
UICLASSIFIED
Order
that
enemy
served
(C) Base
terminus of enemy
of BA
operations
in
the
Tuy
Province,
(C) Base
area
Khanh
area for attacks against
Phuoc Tuy Provinces,
and in portions
Area 305, located only 6 km from BA 300, served
as a site through
end
as
Allied
forces conducted operations in and around the BAs. Once friendly activity decreased,
it was expected that the BA would
become more
on the
Pro-
activity towards the end of the year, possibly
due to a relocation of
all
but
enemy activity would be governed by the local tactical situation.
(C) Base Area 351 was situated
astride
Jolley and Adams Roads, originated in BA 351 as
they extended from Cambodia
infiltration
351 would
northern
to show a moderate level of
activity for 1971 as RV N cross-border operations severely limited its effectiveness. In the
past
directed against RV N forces along
QL 22 and
cross-border operations, the BA
(C) Base Area
of
1971,
the last half
of 1971 the BA was used as a staging area for
large
Tay Ninh City.
which extended eastward into BA 355, and
Robert's Route
Nghia Province. The importance of the
BA
if RV N forces consolidated in
MR 3 and the area
continued
to
woods,
the
along the
and the movement
Regiment,
Battalion.
near War Zone D
to the west. Enemy
elements of sev-
logistical
~(C)
during the year due
and the construction of Allied fire support bases and outposts
nearby.
infiltration from Cambodia,
the
northern
and BA 400's use as
a rest area virtually
as the center of enemy activity in VC MR Z.
Supplies and
personnel infiltrated
through
Kien
little
in rear
VC MR 3.
zorest area, it
along
the
coastline
between
RVN operations in
of personnel indicated that
he intended to retain
enemy
threat
still
existed
at
the
end
of
the
year.
(C )
local force units operating
used as
through two "secret zones"
Tre Province.
The VCI
was particularly
active in
the Ban Karai,
consisting
of
roads,
and Quang Nam Provinces.
was
(C) Base Area 609
continued to operate in
Front. The
trails, while extensive multicanopy
the last
3 months
of 1971
infiltrated into the BA ;
(C) Base Area
611, especially its
main
of
storage facilities
Base Area 612
transient storage
further south
of the
559th TO.
was
re-
in Quang Nam, Quang Tin,
and Konturn Pro-
units were
found to
and
Darlac
Provinces.
support to the units of B-3 Front
operating in Kontum
in the area
in area
(C) Base Area
Fer
P4142
were
reported
to be located
in the area.
(C) Base Area 70 8 continued as a staging area and
transshipment point for men and materiel
entering
(C) Base Area 711
shifted his activities
the Prek Chlong, the
and
supplies
support
area afforded
Subregion
BA complex
to Allied
com-
plex)
35 4 in support of enemy
operations
cross.-border
strongest enemy resistance
was ,xperienced m
complex mentioned
forces
targeted
against
via several
Thien Province,
Figure 111-30).
The entire
and experience,
was extremely flexible
routes for supplies entering
built
warehouses
Thien Province, supplies which entered the A
Shau
supply activity (from Laos by way of Route 614) declined
during the
area. In contrast, however, materiel
did
enter
indicated
that
the
In western Quang
Tin Province goods
were received from
regiment supplemented supplies
were used in the transshipment of materiel,
and infiltration
(C) MR
III-Z)
which
coordinated
the
movement
of BA
351, Adams
Road and
Joiley Road.
and War Zone
D. Other RSGs
and Hau Ngia
infil-
tration
routes
"rHISPAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
supplies,
especially
large caliber ammunition, small arms, and medical equipment. Most supplies
transshipped by
method
of
throughout the Republic of Vietnam with
funds and supplies. The VCI in 1971 had to cope with increasing
problems concerning the finance
ar.d support of military
people and
the land
of SVN for other assistance. To acquire this vital support, Hanoi
was forced to rely more
heavily on covert apparatur to
obtain
supply procure-
(S/NF) Specific agencies
structure
formed
High Command exercised
headquarters in the Republic. Senior
politi-
Committees (CAC) provided
overall policy guidance
acquiring and
within their
also found at province, district, and some village
levels throughout the RVN. The core of
the
SSS
included
Economy Sections
and Forward
Sections at region and subregion levels planned and managed manufacturing
of
.ollection and allocation agencies
district levels, these sections determined when and where to
tax
the
populace
between Finance and Economy
support
mainly by exploiting
the population. Forward Su, ply Councils also managed the entry and exit
points where supplies were purchased
on the open market and cached nearby for
future distri-
bution. Councils were staffed jointly by VCI civilians from finance and economy sections and
military
and
The bank
in Hong Hong, Singapore,
acquired in $1, 000, $500,
$100 and
economy sections to VC region and subregion (SP) levels fcr
exchange
Saigon,
VCI
activities,
probably
Nam Province during June 1970 and
another
more
involved the
Cay Div in
subordinate to rear service
individuals
over 1 million GVN
m-59 4 4 2
this
situation
7;
and
ordinate to SR 4.
for conversion to SVN
sort
Although taxation took several forms, agricultural
taxation, taxation in the form of
protection
success of
it more
with the
their
deteriorating tax
detailed
discussion
out in the RVN.
and supplies. The enemy
obtain
the
necessary
licenses
and
permits
and supplies
Province, as well as subsequent discoveries of
locally
manufactured
system,
particularly
an additional
the
II
markets by
reportedly paid 10 to 35 percent
over market prices
stated
batteries,
cadre or organizations
was the fourth
farmers'
of
taxation,
but payment
the harvest
period and
demanded. The movement
in Binh Tuy Province
the
enemy
no
purchasing
it
placed
a
greater
forces
leted the
in-
cluded
the
management
supplies to political and military elements.
Captured
0l RSG 84 in southern
Binh Tu/ Province.
and Binh Thuan
per .ruck to procure
of
a
commo-liaison
station
on
Saigon. Young
personnel
that the
(S/NFj The magnitude
of the system was revealed by the ability of the enemy
to
procure
imported
th'ese items into the retail
market without any GVN restrictions
or checks being made as to
the final destination of
without question. As an
VC
Saigon to Phan
When GVN
judicial police
of
Economy,
fire. It
appeared that
and ubiquitous small-scale
or confiscate
developed over at
increased tax collection
manufacture, a 29 .
5 kg device
(ARVN) captured a.Rumanian 7.62mm
719 --
appeared to be
identical to the
in Warsaw Pact armies. 54 The
DRV
did
not
introduce
a new type
shaped charge was captured on 27 Mar 71. Of factory manufacture in
the DRV,
It weighed about
a mechanical device such as the Soviet MUV, a chemical
pencil such as the MY-8,
ar
electrical-
ly.
55
several items,
Communist A130B transceiver.
USSR-manufactured RI05D
radio in
most respects,
netting
with
the
a Sony all-wave radio
manufactured
the
standard
to be a significant
detector kits. One cannister
the other was suspected to have been manufactured in Poland,
while
the
which were directly related to POL transmis-
sion
and
a
tactical
POL
$ate
item was
a viscometer
which in turn
World Military
Assistance Forces
units
used
was recognized early.
Vietnamese
included
and 20,000 people in South Vietnam
in
early
areas
under
black and
couaterintelligence efforts.
collection
the
section
was
further
reduced
Any Security Section could be
tasked by the CAC at its own level and by the Security Section
at the level above it. Security
Sections down to province level could be tasked directly by the Mlinistryh Most of the An Ninh
personnel selected to serve in the South were South Vietnamese who had regrouped to North
Vietnam after 1954. It
who
class" (either
peasant or
school education,
Dong Party
was not
School, C-500, commonly known
of
could accommodate about
New recruits
with
emphasis
jects.
wide variety of basic
taught in advanced
munication procedures. The
motivation, and
for advanced training
tion
al l levels down to district
condudted
varied from I year at COSVN level to I week
at
(S/NF) Although conventional military operations and the GVN Community Defense and Local
Development program took their toll of the An Ninh,
the service remained effective.
to conduct
Cuu). Strategic intelligence
was the province of the Cuc Nghien Cuun CNC) an agency of the North
Vietnamese Ministry of
Free
considered sig-
nificant to the national security of North Vietnam and the furtherance of her national
objectives.
the merger of a
civilian intelligence agency subordinate
under the
the
CNC
was
controlled
by the Defense Ministry, but was also tasked directly by the Prime
Minister's Office
the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, The CNC
provided finished intelligence, not
but to the highest
Government. Its school in North Vietnam also gave advanced training
to military intelligence
levels
of
regfme with strategic intelligence and to advaoce nat-onal objectives by manipulating the affairs
of countries
destine
operations
incident
functions of management, collection, evaluation,
ant. dissemination of strategic intelligence, the
CNC
It
provided
NVA personnel as well ar its own.
*THS P GE FE E uc~sFa
4424-64
It
controlled
provided an opportunity
Combat Intelligence
NVA-controlled area,
Co
the lowest
least frequent contact
available
operations.
its assets
the Strategic Intelligence
ten strategic
espionage
dissemination
of
intelligence
were
discovered.
accomplish
these
missions,
SIO agents included a
member of the Chamber
sophisticated
structure.
Counterespionage
operations
and
the
preservation of
party discipline
the Chieu Hoi
persons
THIS
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
SVNLA.
This
informa-
tion was used
in the planning of VC military operations. The Military Intelligence Staff of
COSVN
the other
taught basic
espionage methods
headquarters, it contained a signal element, five collection teams, and sometimes a reconnais-
sance company
and
company size special action group. The MIO possessed a capability to
reconnoiter RVNAF and Allied military in
allations throughout
using Vietnamese nationals who had contact
with military personnel. It could penetrate the RVNAF directly by recruiting
military personnel
RVNAF. MIO had the capability to recruit US and other
Allied personnel
through intimidation,
bribery, or
less probably, on
an ideological basis.
(S ) It was estimated that about 4, 000 pzrsonnel were involved in COSVN's communications
intelligence
effort,
The units
battalion
and recording capabilities. TRUs
deployed so as to be able to react immediately to intelligence
derived from
airstrikes, and artillery missions. Captured training documents and notebooks stressed atten-
tion to Allied
particularly mis-
direction of airstrikes and artillery fire against friendly troops, were also attempted.
The enemy
used captured
US tactical radios augmented by large numbers of commercial and Chinese Coin-
munist military radios.
twofold
and the second
scope of their own
US forces fell
was an
indication of their true purpose. The mission of the Military
Proselyting Section was simply
to
undermine the will and cause desertion of Allied forces. Parallel proselyting efforts o.cisted
on the civilian side of
the
military goals, but the civilain
elements operated covertly
military elements proselyted in "liberated" zones. The principal US
targets of propaganda
recruitment in
and RVNAF. It is
probable that these activities were coordinated with and supervised by the Militar'y Security
Office
at
the
same
echelon.
61
was the ACof S J2, which
was
charged with a two-fold mission. One aspect of the mission
involved the continuing US effort
to aid the RVNAF in becoming self-sufficient in their struggle to counter the threat to their
country. Accordingly,
the 3Z
of the J2 mission
concerning areas of
(U), Gp-Not stated.
71,
Cambodia, and Laos (U),
Gp-Not stated; Rpt (SINF), CIA, May 1971, Subj: Intelligence Memo, Shipping
to North
May 1971,
Not
stated.
Directives and Instructions
at Commander's Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update, 18 Dec 71, pp
1-2, Gp-
Not stated.
Strategy for 1971 --
9. Same as # 7. pp 1-Z.
10. Embtel (S/NF). Amemb
Cuu Long
Briefing (U), Gp-Not stated; MACV
Command History 1970, Vol
I, (S/NF), p 111-60,
14. Same as # IZ, p 5.
15. Rpt (TS/S),
War
(U),
pp vi, vii, Gp-I.
16. Same as # 15,
p vii; Charts (C), MACJ231, 1966-71, Subj: Yearly Composite Statistics (U),
Op-Not stated,
in SE A
During
197Z (U), extracted from Portfolio for SECDEF Briefing, 4 Nov 71, Gp-4.
18. Rpt (C), MACJ231-6,
San 72, Subj: Order of Battle Summary. Vol II(U). Gp-
4
71, Subj: MACV Perintrep
MACJ231,
Not
stated.
* 21.
Community Defense and
stated.
in
Viet Cong Infrastructure (U), p 2;
Rpt (C/NF) MACJ233, Z8 Sep 71, Subj: SRAP 0671, COSVN and the Communist Control
Apparatus in South Vietnam (U), p 1, Gp-3.
24 . Rpt (C/NF), MACJ233, 28 Sep
71, Sub3: SRAP
25 .
2.
26.
Same
Description (U), pp 9-13,
29 .
Political and Administrative Reorganization
Subj: Summary of VCI Activities, 1-71 to 12-71 (U),
Gp-Not stated.
Amemb
Recruitment in
Op-Not stated; M sg (TS), DIA., 6 May 71, Subj:
Watch Report
Report (U), Gp-i.
33. Rpt (C/NF),
North
Vietnam
Personnel
4
(U), p 5, Gp-3.
35 . Manuscript (S), MACJ3, 10 Nov 71, Subj: Command Briefing (U), p
5, Gp-Not stated.
Digest (U),
p 18,
39.
Rpt
1-10, Gp-
(TS), MACJ3-
44. Msg
Subj: RVNAF
4
DMCZ3Ag7,Sb:
ircie0CT
SO. Rpt
(C), MAC3233, 12 Mar 70, Subj: VC Methods of "Taxation" (U), pp
i.
Strategy
oe eogDelta, FVS-28,241, Op-Not stated;
Same
okt()
p
3
Rifle HEAT
Subj: Rumanian 7. 62mm
Light Machinegun (U), Op..3..
17 Jun
May 71, Subj:
(C), US
Element, CMEC, USMACV, 7 May 71, Subj: Radio - ceiver Son/ All Wave
(U),
Unidentified CHICOM
Subj: CHICOM Chemical
10 Au g 71,
Gp-Not
Canister,
Protective
Protective
Mask
CMEC, USMAZV, 29 Jun
71, Subj: Gate Valve,
USMACV,
19
Aug
Estimate, Republic of Vietnam,
62. Manuscript
Orientation
Guide (U), pp l-l,,Gp-
Combined
the CSOP was
a posthostilities
derived information about the vehicle's speed
and
33 dicts
Z at 29
and 30 minutes
division,
and
various
courses
of
action
in
the
event
attack
outlined
in
the
Combined
Campaign
Plan
Interdiction Program.
The basic
of RV N during
As such the CCP involved
intensified integration of all Allied
air, land,
No formal written document
Combined
newly formed
review interdiction efforts.
1971, as in the
Div
unattended
1967.
of
the
program,
called
acquisition
sensors (US and RVNAF) were employed throughout RVN,
primarily along
(S) Using seismic, acoutgic,
were employed
more
sensors,
of approach. Signals transmitted from the sensor to a monitor,
either by
were emplaced by hand, either by Ranger
Border Defense
border counterinfiltravion
Terminals (DART's) were being implanted by
USAF
recognized
nelicop.er implant efforts
ti.is as a training
role
and northwestern Military Region (MR)
I area encom-
the
2, 226 target , of which 256 were
engaged. 0 DUFFEL BA G activations countrywide during the same month recorded
4,
171
enemy
as a resuh. A variety of
responses
had completed
a comprehensive
itself, demonstrated the continued
capability and desire to assume the major
role. Since
the enemy
a new north-
into RVN by
was
the Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) 1971, AB 146. Since the first CCP had been published by
HQ MACV and RVNAF JGS in November 1967
(for CY68), the
'one
war
effort with American cooperation. Approved
on
out
of
which
the
Combined
Interdiction
Program
and
seasonal
plans
were
developed.
(S )
1970
on two assumptions
Communist Bloc na'ions would
continue materiel aid but would not intervene overtly in the conflict; NVN would
continue its
southward flow
of materiel,
reinforcements, and
agreement reached at the Paris
peace negotiations would not
the VC
NVN would continue
pressure on the
the 1971
Vietnamese
people
Develop-
ment
Defense and
maneuver forces were to conduct sustained,
coordinated, .and combined mobile operations
against
VC/NVA
forces, base areas (BAs), and logistical systems in RVN and authorized
contiguous areas. Ground, sea, and ai r operations
would be conducted to interdict enemy
land
(LOC),
activities, as required.
RVNAF and FWMAF units would be required to undertake various efforts
for the support of nation
building.
ulation centers
military bases and
installations. Additionally, RVNAF
comprehensive
telecommunications
system.
12
and FWMAF units in cri-
tical priority areas,
zones. With
forces were to be employed in two interdependent
roles.
*IV-5424
•Z
(1)
neutralize enemy main
forces, base areas, and logistics systems; (2) deter enemy incursion into
RV N along the
and in coastal
waters; (3) prevent
Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF), supported by the
National
Police
by mobile field forces
pacification and development
centers, military bases,
use of sea infiltration routes. The Vietnameae Navy (VNN) specif-
ically was to continue coastal surveillance and inland
waterway interdiction
waterway systems, to deny
for
friendly
The VNN would also continue riverine
operations in MRs 1, 3, and 4, and
would provide harbor
required.
through Vietnamization, the Vietnamese
supremacy
areas
where
as close air support.
in
furthering
purposes of the CCP, results
were to
Chief, JGS, and COMUSMACV at
the semi-annual review.
and Local
be implemented
(These are discussed
-- Inflict more losses
systems in RVN
_gMMW THIS PAGE
per
'~8
- .414
24
IV-7
As 1970 and 1971
plainly dictated, there would continue to be a need to
achieve the proper balance between the
military and
Furthermore, an even more important role
was
document
continued
to emphasize the
clos* relationship between the 1971 CD and LD Plan and the CCP as complementary efforts that
would lead to the accomplishment
of GV N national goals. Their
JGS
counterparts
share of the
short-range
WINTER CAMPAIGN
MACV
assumed greater responsibility for the
war. For if the
fulfilled, these efforts
were of paramount
guerrilla warfare.
Vietnam (COSVN]
these enemy
resources denial, and
with continuing
and possibly
between relieving and relieved
and nation building
specifically tasked subordinate
coordination with the province and
district intelligence
THIS
PAGE
REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
provide
suf-
(GVN) elements so as to enable upgrading of all V-rated
(VC controlled)
hamlets. Accordingly,
FWMAF and US units would
serve
whenever these
use of
road, railroad,
especially during hours darkness, commanders would support like RVNAF efforts. The
concept also stressed maximum
neutralization of VCI
with the appropriate GV N
officials, land clearing operations would
be conducted in heavily vegetated
areas.
-- Training
support. To further aid the RVNAF in reaching the highest
possible combat
assist in training
items,
LOC
similar
ventures.
operations as a normal adjunct
to combat operations.
to communications
dealing with
and back-up
GVN
agencies.
5
fall
points were stressed. Commanders
-- assist
in
-- further
Vietnamese-American
relations,
in
elimination
operations
and component
well as furnish
June,
an
of vital
US installations
defending
belts south
sur-
and combat
to
hold
troops and
assault helicopter
the transition from
combat support.
Rules
this period would
these moves
cross-border
headquarters undevstood MACV policy
guidance
large
definitions applied:
reconnaissance
operations,
other operations
involving
units
of
the latter half
of 1971, with
enemy
personnel
17 by December.
11 14-7 i12 18
oj N N N
E4
0
.'~
0 n- C- C-
'3 N
especially in
recruitment inputs
RVNAF forces
on the battlefield in 1971, the great distance they had
traveled along the road
ally as they had done
in the
continued working
together on carefully programmed steps of filling the void with Vietnamese
combat
power.
FWMAF,
locate
and
logistics
systems,
Prevent enemy incursion
operations
district
capitals,
villages
and
hamlets.
25
4OA
AftT
5I
I
W
2.14
iiST
!zf.
Tr
TW
N
W.K
a
MR
months of
and west
of the
I and
northern MR 2, the northeast air flow caused poor weather for an average 20
days of
exception.
May through
rains
to
in
struck
May
coast
winds,
northern
The transition period,
the Republic, bringing
dominance over RV N and
typhoon Hester brought very heavy raia and damaging winds to MR I around 2" ".tober; on
the
nches of rain to ' northern MR 1.
Rainfall
gradually
declined
November
but
cloud ceiling* with light rain and drizzle
a common
a
Lai during Typhoon Hester.
a constraint
point of placing friendly forces at a major
tactical disadvantage. The essential small unit
nature of the ground
as the continued upward trend in LO C improvements throughout
the RVN,
offset the
conditions upon ground mobility.
(U) For a detailed
1969 MACV Command History.
BY
MILITARY
REGION
(S)
region
Following
during the year by military region,
preceded
northern
is
Laos,
with the South China Sea to the east as a natural boundary
(see Figure IV-8).
the
state of Maryland, the region encompasses part of the northern highlands of RV N
and is characterized by three types of terrain:, the wide
belt
narrow
transitional piedmont in the middle, and coastal plains in the
east.
(U)
i
on slopes
usually no larger than 2, 100 meters, the highlands meet
the
South
China
plains dense grass
dllWlHIS PAGE REGP.-DiD
per
V841424
'concentrations in support
west of
following a lonig-range patrol in
the
Central
of the Z st ARVN mIf Div on , an air-
mobile opercation approach a landing zone
west of Can Tho, MR 4.
SWIM&
UNLSSFE
%1
cap-
tured.
101st Abn Div (Ambl),
and DEWEY CANYON
II, while two
Quang Tri Province
on Z1 May, killing 29 US an d wounding 33. He relied on this
tactic
with
fire,
to destroy
enemy. Three separate
of June accentuated
the 1s t Mar
three
regiments of the 2d ARVN Div and the 77th Border Ranger
Def Bn in search
and clear
operations in the vicinity of the junctions of Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Kontum provincial
borders.
a
1W
and
30
enemy picture;
however, the declining force level of US/FWMAF maneuver elements stimulated MACV and 3S
planners to study
either through
regions.
(S)
In
a countrywide move to reflect the diminishing
role of US combat forces, US operations
were redesignated at the en d of July, JEFFERSON GLEN was renamed OPORD 13-70. The six-
battalion
US
contribution to LA M SON 720 (which had increased to 20 RVNAF battalions) was
redesignated FRAGO-041. Throughout
Div continued its "dynamic
defense" operations with four infantry battalions in Quang Ngai Province. The units of the I1th
assisted the 2d ARVN Div and Territorial Forces n a rice denial campaign
(a
were
unsuccessful.
consider.
belt
west of Chu Lal. Allied combat power in MR further
diminished in August
effort in
ARVN
gallons of fuel, 10 tons of
rice, and killed 125 of the
enemy
at
a
cost of 13 KIA. The entire division then returned to their regimental locations to provide security
for
ARVN Div terminated
its Operation QUYET THANG in the three southernmost provinces "n MR 1
with more than
in
with two of its organic
infantry
battalions.
action filled an imminent void; in mid-October, both the 198th
and 11th Bdes of the
23d i Div
and had begun final standdown operations, along with
one US armored cavalry
'
8 October after 13 months of operations in Thus Thien and
Quang
Tri
the DM Z in northern
A
Quang
Tri
by March 1972. (See
Division
in
a
i
standdown
posture.
31
the
a
long the
South China Sea, vM 2 contains an extensive area of high rolling
plains along
the border
Laos and
Cambodia, and in the west central area. (See Figure IV-11.) The MR comprises
nearly half the geographical area of
RVN. With
00 meters,
the high-
eat peaks are found in Kontum' Province. Rolling or hilly high plains cover much of the central
and
southern
plain has less
of relatively short streams drain the
eastern portion of MR 2 into
the
River.
plain, with a
region.
I, faced a significant
lower
activity at the beginning of tle year, except for
a