Commentary on Katalin Balog, Commentary on Katalin Balog, “In defense of the phenomenal “In defense of the phenomenal

concept strategy”concept strategy”

Assistant Prof. Assistant Prof. István Aranyosi, István Aranyosi,

Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. (Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. (istvanaranyosi@gmail.comistvanaranyosi@gmail.com))

I. I. Chalmers’ argument Chalmers’ argument

(C1) If (C1) If P&~CP&~C is conceivable, then is conceivable, then CC is not is not physically explicable.physically explicable.

(C2) If (C2) If P&~C P&~C is not conceivable, then is not conceivable, then CC cannot explain our epistemic situation.cannot explain our epistemic situation.

(CC) Therefore, either (CC) Therefore, either CC is not physically is not physically explicable, or explicable, or CC cannot explain our cannot explain our epistemic situationepistemic situation..

PP == the totality of microphysical facts the totality of microphysical facts..

CC == the fact that we possess “phenomenal the fact that we possess “phenomenal concepts with the relevant key feature (e.g., being concepts with the relevant key feature (e.g., being constituted by an instance of the referent) posited constituted by an instance of the referent) posited by a physicalist account of phenomenal concepts” by a physicalist account of phenomenal concepts”

(Balog, section III).(Balog, section III).

“Our epistemic situation” “Our epistemic situation” == the fact that we the fact that we observe or intuit an explanatory gap between observe or intuit an explanatory gap between

physical and phenomenal facts –we can conceive physical and phenomenal facts –we can conceive PP without the phenomenal facts. without the phenomenal facts.

Chalmers’ Chalmers’ conclusionconclusion::

PCS cannot be PCS cannot be bothboth explanatory and explanatory and physicalistic, as the disjunction expressed physicalistic, as the disjunction expressed in in (CC)(CC) is exclusive is exclusive::

(CC) E(CC) Either ither CC is not physically explicable, or is not physically explicable, or CC cannot explain our epistemic situation, cannot explain our epistemic situation,

II. Balog’s analysis and replyII. Balog’s analysis and reply

TTwo conceptualizations of wo conceptualizations of CC::

CCPhenPhen (phenomenal) (phenomenal)

and and

CCPhysPhys (physical)(physical)

(B1) If (B1) If PP&~&~CCPhenPhen is conceivable, then is conceivable, then CCPhenPhen is is not physically explicable.not physically explicable.

(B2) If (B2) If PP&~&~CCPhysPhys is not conceivable, then is not conceivable, then CCPhysPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation. cannot explain our epistemic situation.

The conclusion we get now is:The conclusion we get now is:

(BC) (BC) CCPhenPhen is not physically explicable, or is not physically explicable, or CCPhysPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation. cannot explain our epistemic situation.

But this conclusion does not express But this conclusion does not express an exclusive disjunction, and it is an exclusive disjunction, and it is compatible with:compatible with:

(BC*) (BC*) CCPhenPhen does does explain our explain our epistemic situation & epistemic situation & CCPhysPhys is is physically explicable.physically explicable.

The conceivability of (BC*) and :The conceivability of (BC*) and :

(*) (*) CCPhenPhen and and C CPhysPhys are conceptualizations of are conceptualizations of the same factthe same fact

entails that (BC*)entails that (BC*) it is no threat to it is no threat to physicalism, and it is explanatory. physicalism, and it is explanatory.

III. Balog’s reply works against III. Balog’s reply works against Chalmers Chalmers

Chalmers’ reply (2007: 180-1) to a reasoning like Chalmers’ reply (2007: 180-1) to a reasoning like Balog’s aboveBalog’s above ( (my emphases and numberingmy emphases and numbering):):

““On this account, even if there is a sort of On this account, even if there is a sort of explanation of the explanatory gap in terms of explanation of the explanatory gap in terms of features of phenomenal concepts, features of phenomenal concepts, (1)(1) the the explanatory gap recurs just as strongly in the explanatory gap recurs just as strongly in the explanation of phenomenal concepts explanation of phenomenal concepts themselvesthemselves..””

My reply to 1My reply to 1The fact that an explanatory gap occurs at a The fact that an explanatory gap occurs at a

higher level, namely, between higher level, namely, between PP and and CCPhenPhen is no is no surprise for the PCStrategist at all. surprise for the PCStrategist at all.

My reply to 1My reply to 1The fact that an explanatory gap occurs at a The fact that an explanatory gap occurs at a

higher level, namely, between higher level, namely, between PP and and CCPhenPhen is no is no surprise for the PCStrategist at all. surprise for the PCStrategist at all.

PCS contains at least two claims: that PCS contains at least two claims: that phenomenal concepts are not physical-phenomenal concepts are not physical-functional concepts, and that they have some functional concepts, and that they have some further features that are supposed to explain the further features that are supposed to explain the first-order gap, i.e. that between first-order gap, i.e. that between PP and some and some phenomenal property phenomenal property QQ. .

My reply to 1My reply to 1The fact that an explanatory gap occurs at a The fact that an explanatory gap occurs at a

higher level, namely, between higher level, namely, between PP and and CCPhenPhen is no is no surprise for the PCStrategist at all. surprise for the PCStrategist at all.

PCS contains at least two claims: that PCS contains at least two claims: that phenomenal concepts are not physical-phenomenal concepts are not physical-functional concepts, and that they have some functional concepts, and that they have some further features that are supposed to explain the further features that are supposed to explain the first-order gap, i.e. that between first-order gap, i.e. that between PP and some and some phenomenal property phenomenal property QQ. .

Since it is part of PCS that phenomenal concepts Since it is part of PCS that phenomenal concepts are not physical-functional concepts, the are not physical-functional concepts, the PCStrategist is well aware that there is no PCStrategist is well aware that there is no physical explicability of phenomenal concepts; physical explicability of phenomenal concepts; otherwise they would be physical-functional otherwise they would be physical-functional concepts.concepts.

Chalmers quote continued:Chalmers quote continued:A proponent may suggest that just as the first-A proponent may suggest that just as the first-

order explanatory gap can be explained in terms order explanatory gap can be explained in terms of second-order features of phenomenal of second-order features of phenomenal concepts, concepts, (2)(2) the second-order explanatory gap the second-order explanatory gap concerning phenomenal concepts can be concerning phenomenal concepts can be explained in terms of third-order features of our explained in terms of third-order features of our concepts of phenomenal concepts, and so onconcepts of phenomenal concepts, and so on . . Alternatively, an opponent may suggest that Alternatively, an opponent may suggest that (3)(3) the second-order explanatory gap can be the second-order explanatory gap can be explained in terms of the same second-order explained in terms of the same second-order features of phenomenal concepts that explain features of phenomenal concepts that explain the first-order explanatory gapthe first-order explanatory gap. The first move . The first move here obviously leads to a regress of explanation, here obviously leads to a regress of explanation, and the second move leads to a circular and the second move leads to a circular explanation. (…) explanation. (…)

My reply to 2 and 3My reply to 2 and 3

(2) and (3): there is no need for third-order (2) and (3): there is no need for third-order features of phenomenal concepts to features of phenomenal concepts to explain the second-order gap. It is explain the second-order gap. It is explained by the facts that: phenomenal explained by the facts that: phenomenal concepts are not physical-functional concepts are not physical-functional concepts and that physical-functional concepts and that physical-functional concepts picking out facts in the actual concepts picking out facts in the actual world are a priori entailed world are a priori entailed PP..

Chalmers quote continued:Chalmers quote continued:

A proponent may also suggest that to require that the key A proponent may also suggest that to require that the key psychological features be physically explicable is to set psychological features be physically explicable is to set the bar too high. On this view, all that is needed is a the bar too high. On this view, all that is needed is a psychological explanation of the epistemic gap that is psychological explanation of the epistemic gap that is compatible with the truth of physicalism, not one that is compatible with the truth of physicalism, not one that is itself transparently explainable in physical terms. itself transparently explainable in physical terms.

However, an opponent will now question the compatibility However, an opponent will now question the compatibility of the account with the truth of physicalism. of the account with the truth of physicalism. (4)(4) Just as Just as the original explanatory gap gave reason to think that the original explanatory gap gave reason to think that consciousness is not wholly physical, the new consciousness is not wholly physical, the new explanatory gap gives reason to think that phenomenal explanatory gap gives reason to think that phenomenal concepts are not wholly physical.concepts are not wholly physical.” ”

My reply to 4My reply to 4

The PCStrategists reply is quite obvious, The PCStrategists reply is quite obvious, and is the reverse of Chalmers’ statement: and is the reverse of Chalmers’ statement:

Just as the original explanatory gap gave no Just as the original explanatory gap gave no reason to think that consciousness is not reason to think that consciousness is not wholly physical, the new explanatory gap wholly physical, the new explanatory gap gives no reason to think that phenomenal gives no reason to think that phenomenal concepts are not wholly physical. concepts are not wholly physical.

TThere is an epistemic gap between here is an epistemic gap between PP and and CCPhenPhen because of the latter being a phenomenal because of the latter being a phenomenal concept and not a physical one. concept and not a physical one.

If earlier it was accepted that the epistemic gap If earlier it was accepted that the epistemic gap between P and Q does not entail an ontic gap between P and Q does not entail an ontic gap between them because Q is grasped via a between them because Q is grasped via a phenomenalphenomenal concept rather than a physical- concept rather than a physical-functional one, then it should be (or could be) functional one, then it should be (or could be) admitted now, at a higher level, that the admitted now, at a higher level, that the epistemic gap between P and epistemic gap between P and CPhenCPhen does not does not entail an ontic gap between them, because entail an ontic gap between them, because CPhenCPhen is what it is – again, a is what it is – again, a phenomenalphenomenal conceptualization rather than a physical-conceptualization rather than a physical-functional one. functional one.

As Balog correctly points out, if there is As Balog correctly points out, if there is circularity here, it is not vicious but circularity here, it is not vicious but explanatory. explanatory.

Finally, via Balog’s premises (*) and (BCFinally, via Balog’s premises (*) and (BC**), ), we get that PCS is not only explanatory we get that PCS is not only explanatory but physicalistic too.but physicalistic too.

IV. My challenge to BalogIV. My challenge to Balog

My proposed gap is between P and the fact My proposed gap is between P and the fact FF that there is a phenomenal conceptualization - that there is a phenomenal conceptualization - CCPhenPhen -- of the fact – C - that there are of the fact – C - that there are phenomenal concepts with the relevant features phenomenal concepts with the relevant features Balog ascribes to them. Balog ascribes to them.

I would like to stress that this fact is different I would like to stress that this fact is different from from CCPhenPhen itself, so the gap is not captured by:itself, so the gap is not captured by:

(B1) It is conceivable that (B1) It is conceivable that PP &~C&~CPhenPhen

CCPhen Phen expresses in phenomenal vocabulary expresses in phenomenal vocabulary the fact that there are phenomenal the fact that there are phenomenal concepts that have some features. concepts that have some features.

Let Let stand for the fact that there are stand for the fact that there are phenomenal concepts that have some phenomenal concepts that have some features. features.

Let Let stand for the fact that stand for the fact that CCPhenPhen expresses expresses ..

Suppose that P & Suppose that P & ~~ is not conceivable. is not conceivable.

Then the fact that Then the fact that is phenomenally is phenomenally expressed by expressed by CCPhenPhen could have been could have been deduced from P, which means that deduced from P, which means that does does not distinguish us from conceivable not distinguish us from conceivable zombies, and, therefore, does not explain zombies, and, therefore, does not explain our epistemic situation. our epistemic situation.

Suppose that P & Suppose that P & ~~ is conceivable. is conceivable. Then, following Balog’s recipe above, this is only Then, following Balog’s recipe above, this is only

consistent with both physicalism and explanatoriness consistent with both physicalism and explanatoriness regarding our epistemic situation if there is a physical regarding our epistemic situation if there is a physical conceptualization of conceptualization of ..

But But contains phenomenal vocabulary, and on the contains phenomenal vocabulary, and on the assumption of PCS that phenomenal and physical assumption of PCS that phenomenal and physical concepts are distinct and not a priori related, there can’t concepts are distinct and not a priori related, there can’t be a physical conceptualization of be a physical conceptualization of . .

That is, there can’t be a physical conceptualization of a That is, there can’t be a physical conceptualization of a phenomenal conceptualization – that would destroy the phenomenal conceptualization – that would destroy the phenomenality of that conceptualization. But given phenomenality of that conceptualization. But given Balog’s implicit assumption that according to Balog’s implicit assumption that according to physicalism there is a physical conceptualization of any physicalism there is a physical conceptualization of any actual fact, the impossibility of a physical actual fact, the impossibility of a physical conceptualization of conceptualization of entails the falsity of physicalism. entails the falsity of physicalism.

So the conclusion of my argument is:So the conclusion of my argument is:

(AC) Either (AC) Either is explanatory regarding our is explanatory regarding our epistemic situation, or physicalism is false.epistemic situation, or physicalism is false.

V. ObjectionV. Objection

I make a use/mention fallacy in the above I make a use/mention fallacy in the above argument. argument.

More precisely, there can be a physical More precisely, there can be a physical conceptualization conceptualization PhysPhys of of , because , because either in either in PhysPhys or in both or in both PhysPhys and and , , CCPhenPhen is is mentioned rather than used. mentioned rather than used.

Reply AReply A

(() Suppose that ) Suppose that CCPhenPhen is mentioned in is mentioned in . .

In order for In order for to be explanatory of our epistemic to be explanatory of our epistemic situation, it has to be the case that situation, it has to be the case that PP & & ~~ is is conceivable, even under the assumption that conceivable, even under the assumption that has the phenomenal vocabulary only mentioned. has the phenomenal vocabulary only mentioned. But this means that from the point of view of But this means that from the point of view of whether whether is explanatory, the use/mention issue is explanatory, the use/mention issue does not make a difference. So in does not make a difference. So in , , CCPhenPhen behaves as if used, even if it is mentioned. behaves as if used, even if it is mentioned.

(() Now suppose that ) Now suppose that CCPhenPhen is mentioned in is mentioned in PhysPhys..

In order for In order for PhysPhys to be a priori entailed by to be a priori entailed by P, and so to render P, and so to render PhysPhys physically physically explicable because explicable because CCPhenPhen is only mentioned is only mentioned in in PhysPhys , the behavior of , the behavior of CCPhenPhen has to be has to be different when mentioned from when used, different when mentioned from when used, otherwise the use/mention issue wouldn’t otherwise the use/mention issue wouldn’t make a difference.make a difference.

But since But since PhysPhys is merely a is merely a conceptualization of conceptualization of , they have to , they have to express the same fact. If physicalism is express the same fact. If physicalism is true, they express the same true, they express the same physicalphysical fact. fact.

What we get, finally, is that whether it What we get, finally, is that whether it makes a difference or not whether the very makes a difference or not whether the very same phenomenal vocabulary is used or same phenomenal vocabulary is used or mentioned in stating the very same mentioned in stating the very same physical facts does not supervene on the physical facts does not supervene on the totality of physical facts. totality of physical facts.

The PCStrategist cannot now appeal to The PCStrategist cannot now appeal to the fact that phenomenal concepts are not the fact that phenomenal concepts are not physical-functional concepts; the argument physical-functional concepts; the argument concerns the concerns the very samevery same phenomenal phenomenal concepts, and indicates that their behavior concepts, and indicates that their behavior does not supervene on physical facts. does not supervene on physical facts.

Since their behavior is no less a fact than Since their behavior is no less a fact than any other fact, we get some fact that does any other fact, we get some fact that does not supervene on physical facts. So again not supervene on physical facts. So again the victim is physicalism itself. the victim is physicalism itself.

Reply BReply B

Given Balog’s own theory of Given Balog’s own theory of phenomenal concepts, phenomenal concepts, mmentioning phenomenal entioning phenomenal vocabulary vocabulary by usby us (as opposed to (as opposed to conceivable zombies) implies conceivable zombies) implies using them. using them.

In canonical uses, when we apply a In canonical uses, when we apply a concept like, e.g., PAIN, we apply it, concept like, e.g., PAIN, we apply it, according to Balog, directly to the according to Balog, directly to the reference of the concept, because the reference of the concept, because the reference constitutes the very application reference constitutes the very application of that concept. of that concept.

WWhat happens in non-canonical hat happens in non-canonical application of PAINapplication of PAIN,, when some pain when some pain is not currently experienced but is not currently experienced but rememberedremembered??

If it is derivative of the canonical If it is derivative of the canonical application, then it implicitly mentions that application, then it implicitly mentions that canonical applicationcanonical application::

`I remember being in pain yesterday``I remember being in pain yesterday` would go something likewould go something like

`I bear relation `I bear relation RR to a time in the past at to a time in the past at which I applied PAIN to my which I applied PAIN to my then currentthen current experience`.experience`.

We can formalize this statement using a We can formalize this statement using a quantified tense logic containing operators quantified tense logic containing operators N (`it is now the case that`) and T (for `it is N (`it is now the case that`) and T (for `it is then the case that`), besides the usual, P then the case that`), besides the usual, P and F, for past and future respectively, as and F, for past and future respectively, as follows:follows:

(a)(a) N(N(ii bear bear RR to (PT ( to (PT (ii apply PAIN to apply PAIN to experience)))experience)))

But since the application of PAIN to the But since the application of PAIN to the current pain one is undergoing current pain one is undergoing constitutively involves that pain, we can constitutively involves that pain, we can replace T(replace T(ii apply PAIN to experience) with apply PAIN to experience) with T(T(ii am in pain). So the formula becomes: am in pain). So the formula becomes:

(b) N((b) N(ii bear R to (PT ( bear R to (PT (ii am in am in painpain))))))

(b) uses PAIN rather than mentioning it. (b) uses PAIN rather than mentioning it.

TThe situation with he situation with mentioning mentioning phenomenal concepts is the very same, phenomenal concepts is the very same, the only difference being that the only difference being that is not is not about the past application of phenomenal about the past application of phenomenal concepts, but about their application in concepts, but about their application in general and at all times. general and at all times.

In our language we formalize `at all times In our language we formalize `at all times it is the case that it is the case that qq` as:` as:

(c) ((c) (PPqq) & () & (FFqq) & N) & Nqq

So whatever proposition So whatever proposition pp exactly exactly asserts about PAIN by mentioning asserts about PAIN by mentioning it, we can formalize this fact as:it, we can formalize this fact as:

(d) (d) PP((PAIN is applied) ((PAIN is applied) pp)) & )) & FF((PAIN is applied) ((PAIN is applied) pp)) & N((PAIN is applied) )) & N((PAIN is applied) pp))))

If it is true that PAIN is applied at some time, If it is true that PAIN is applied at some time, then:then:

(e) PT(PAIN is applied) or FT(PAIN (e) PT(PAIN is applied) or FT(PAIN is applied) or N(PAIN is appliedis applied) or N(PAIN is applied))

which then implies:which then implies:

(f) PT(someone is in pain) or (f) PT(someone is in pain) or FT(someone is in pain) or N(someone FT(someone is in pain) or N(someone is in pain).is in pain).

CConclusiononclusion::

given the features Balog attributes to given the features Balog attributes to phenomenal concepts via the phenomenal concepts via the constitutional view, it doesn’t matter constitutional view, it doesn’t matter whether whether uses or mentions phenomenal uses or mentions phenomenal vocabulary. vocabulary.

Mentioning it is no different from a non-Mentioning it is no different from a non-canonical application of its component canonical application of its component concepts, which, in turn, will use them, concepts, which, in turn, will use them, albeit derivatively. albeit derivatively.

THE ENDTHE END